BNUMBER:  B-277415 
DATE:  September 22, 1997
TITLE: Lifeline Ambulance Services, Inc., B-277415, September 22,
1997
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Matter of:Lifeline Ambulance Services, Inc.

File:     B-277415

Date:September 22, 1997

Richard L. Grier, Esq., and Cathryn L. Ammermann, Esq., Mays & 
Valentine, for the protester.
Merilee D. Rosenberg, Esq., Philip Kauffman, Esq., and Phillipa L. 
Anderson, Esq., Department of Veterans Affairs, for the agency.
Sylvia Schatz, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Solicitation requiring vendors to hold city franchise or permit to 
provide emergency ambulance services is not impermissably 
restrictive--even though, as a result, only one firm may be able to 
compete--where requirement is necessary to meet legitimate agency need 
of ensuring that contractor will be able to perform services without 
disruption caused by city's efforts to enforce its permit requirement.

DECISION

Lifeline Ambulance Services, Inc. protests a provision in Department 
of Veterans Affairs (VA) request for quotations (RFQ) No. 652-82-97, 
issued under simplified acquisition procedures for ambulance services 
in Richmond, Virginia.  The protester maintains that the requirement 
for a franchise or permit from the city of Richmond granting authority 
to provide emergency ambulance services (1) unduly restricts 
competition because only one firm possesses a franchise or permit, and               
(2) improperly permits a locality to prevent the federal government 
from selecting whichever firm it deems responsible to perform.

We deny the protest.

The RFQ includes Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  52.212-4, 
which, among other provisions, requires the contractor to "comply with 
all applicable Federal, State, and local laws, executive orders, rules 
and regulations applicable to its performance under this contract."  
FAR  sec.  52.212-4(q).  This provision had the effect of incorporating 
into the RFQ a Richmond city ordinance which provides, in part, that 
"[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to transport a patient in an 
emergency medical services vehicle without holding a City franchise or 
permit."  Richmond, VA, Code of the City of Richmond  sec.  10-58(a).  The 
ordinance further states that "[a]ny police officer of the City may 
issue a warrant, citation or summons charging a person driving an 
emergency medical services vehicle in the City in violation of this 
section."  Id. at  sec.  10-58(c).  The RFQ explicitly states that 
quotations submitted must include verifiable documentation attesting 
that the vendor holds a City franchise or permit.

We note initially that, while the protester argues that full and open 
competition is required, the RFQ was issued subject to the simplified 
acquisition procedures and therefore required only competition to the 
"maximum extent practicable."  41 U.S.C.  sec.  253(g) (1994); FAR  sec.  
13.106-2(a)(1).    

Even under a full and open competition standard, however, the RFQ's 
permit requirement is unobjectionable.  The VA reports that the 
requirement is necessary to ensure timely performance of the emergency 
ambulance services by precluding the possibility that the services 
will be interrupted by the city's enforcement attempts against an 
unlicensed contractor.  Avoidance of such a potential disruption in 
critical services provides a legitimate basis for imposing a local 
licensing requirement as part of the agency's minimum needs.  See 
William B. Jolley, B-208443, Nov. 17, 1982, 82-2 CPD  para.  455 at 2-3. 

Further, while the protester argues that the permit requirement is not 
enforceable against a government contractor, citing Leslie Miller, 
Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 190 (1956), this is not dispositive of 
the issue here.  In structuring a solicitation, a contracting officer 
reasonably may be more concerned with whether a contract will be 
performed properly and without interference than with whether the 
contractor ultimately would prevail in litigation.  See What-Mac 
Contractors, Inc., 58 Comp. Gen. 767, 776 (1979), 79-2 CPD  para.  179 at 
12.  

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States