BNUMBER: B-277326; B-277326.2; B-277326.3; B-277326.4; B-277326.5
DATE: September 30, 1997
TITLE: Microcosm, Inc., B-277326; B-277326.2; B-277326.3; B-
277326.4; B-277326.5, September 30, 1997
**********************************************************************
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective
Order. This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Microcosm, Inc.
File: B-277326; B-277326.2; B-277326.3; B-277326.4; B-277326.5
Date:September 30, 1997
Alfred J. Verdi, Esq., for the protester.
Timothy A. Harness, for Summa Technology, Inc., and John R. Grady, for
Universal Space Lines, the intervenors.
Vincent A. Salgado, Esq., and Louis R. Durnya, Esq., National
Aeronautics & Space Administration, for the agency.
Christina Sklarew, Esq., and Paul Lieberman, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Where protester's proposal under broad agency announcement failed to
include sufficient technical information to establish viability of
proposed research, agency reasonably determined that technical success
was improbable and properly determined not to fund proposal.
DECISION
Microcosm, Inc. protests the National Aeronautics & Space
Administration's (NASA) evaluation and rejection of its proposal under
NASA research announcement (NRA) 8-19, issued for low-cost
earth-to-orbit transportation systems research proposals. Microcosm
alleges that NASA failed to evaluate the protester's proposal fairly,
failed to communicate with the protester regarding certain aspects of
its proposal, relaxed certain of the NRA requirements for the
awardees, and used competitive procurement evaluation procedures which
were not appropriate for NRAs.
We deny the protest.
This procurement was conducted under NASA's Broad Agency Announcement
(BAA) authority contained in NASA Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (NFARS) sec. 1835.016-70. A BAA is a contracting method by
which government agencies can acquire basic and applied research.
BAAs may be used by agencies to fulfill requirements for scientific
study and experimentation directed toward advancing the state of the
art or increasing knowledge or understanding rather than focusing on a
specific system or hardware solution. A BAA is considered a
competitive procedure and meets the requirements for full and open
competition if it is general in nature, identifying areas of research
interest including criteria for selecting proposals; solicits the
participation of offerors capable of satisfying the government's
needs; and provides for peer or scientific review. Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) sec. 6.102(d)(2). Unlike sealed bidding and
other negotiated procurement methods, a BAA does not contain a
specific statement of work and no formal solicitation is issued. In
addition, the issuing agency is under no obligation to award any
contracts and there is no common due date for proposals. Instead, the
agency identifies a broad area of interest within which research may
benefit the government and publishes its desire to contract for such
research. Private organizations are then invited to submit their
ideas within a certain period of time. The offerors who submit
proposals are not competing against each other but rather are
attempting to demonstrate that their proposed research meets the
agency's requirements. The agency may decide to fund those efforts
and award contracts to those offerors who submit ideas which the
agency finds suitable. See FAR sec. 35.016.
The BAA at issue is under NASA's Bantam System Technology Project, the
first phase of which was conducted under NRA 8-15, which focused on
other aspects of the project such as developing and demonstrating, in
ground tests, low cost components for propulsion systems, adapting
commercial manufacturing practices, utilizing commercial off-the-shelf
hardware, and other similar requirements. This NRA, for Phase II, is
intended to continue the technology maturation process by
demonstrating low recurring-cost technologies with a focus on flight
demonstrations.[1] NRA 8-19, in relevant part, solicited proposals
for innovative technology development and flight demonstration to
enable significant cost reduction in transporting small payloads to
low earth orbit. The NRA expressed NASA's goal for a new Bantam
transportation system of delivering small payloads (150 kilograms) to
low earth orbit (200 nautical miles sun synchronous) for a recurring
price of $1.5 million beginning in 2001. The Bantam System Technology
Project was divided into two proposal cycles. Cycle One proposals
were for a 6-month effort for initial design and business plan
development, with Cycle Two proposals to be for flight
demonstrations.[2] This protest concerns the first of the two cycles.
Offerors were invited to propose any transportation system
architecture or concept (e.g., reusable, partially reusable,
expendable, liquid, hybrid, or solid propellants) that would best
approach or accomplish NASA's goal. Different architectures and
innovative concepts were encouraged, and both existing and new
technologies were acceptable. The NRA stated that "[m]ultiple awards
are planned for each cycle and it is undesirable for NASA to have more
than one contractor working on identical architectures or concepts."
Offerors were required to submit a technical description of their
planned system and a business plan for the operation of the system on
a commercial basis. The NRA listed representative parameters to be
defined in the technical and business plan areas of the proposals.
Offerors were also instructed to include an overview of how they
intended to accomplish the second phase, and the NRA stated that
offerors selected for the first cycle must have the capability to
accomplish the second cycle. The NRA included standard instructions
for responding to NRAs and supplemental guidelines specific to this
NRA. Offerors were warned that NASA might accept proposals without
discussions and that proposals should therefore initially be as
complete as possible and be submitted on the proposers' most favorable
terms. The instructions stated that to be considered responsive, a
submission must, at a minimum, present a specific project within the
areas delineated by the NRA; contain sufficient technical and cost
information to permit a meaningful evaluation; be signed by an
official authorized to legally bind the submitting organization; not
merely offer to perform standard services or to just provide computer
facilities or services; and not significantly duplicate a more
specific current or pending NASA solicitation. Proposals were to be
evaluated under three principal factors, of approximately equal
importance, described in the instructions as follows:
Relevance to NASA's objectives: includes the consideration of
the potential contribution of the effort to NASA's mission.
Intrinsic merit: includes the following factors:
1. Overall scientific or technical merit of the proposal or
unique and innovative methods, approaches, or concepts
demonstrated by the proposal;
2. Offeror's capabilities, related experience, facilities,
techniques, or unique combinations of these which are integral
factors for achieving the proposal objectives;
3. The qualifications, capabilities and experience of the
proposed principal investigator, team leader, or key personnel
critical in achieving the proposal objectives;
4. Overall standing among similar proposals and/or evaluation
against state-of-the-art.
Evaluation of the cost of a proposed effort: includes the realism
and reasonableness of the proposed cost and available funds.
A synopsis of the NRA was published in the Commerce Business Daily in
January 1997, and the NRA was released in March. Twelve offerors,
including Microcosm, submitted proposals for Bantam technology, Cycle
One on April 30. NASA established a source evaluation team (SET)
consisting of a technical panel, a business panel, and a cost panel to
evaluate these proposals with panel members from three different NASA
installations. Individual members of the panels conducted the initial
evaluations; each panel then met, discussed the attributes of each
proposal, and reached a consensus on their findings. The voting
members reviewed the panel findings and reached a consensus on the
strengths and weaknesses of each proposal and reported their findings
to the source selection official (SSO). The SSO selected 4 of the 12
proposals for negotiations leading to award. Microcosm, whose
proposal was not among those chosen, requested and received a
debriefing, and this protest followed.
Microcosm protests that its proposal was misevaluated, in essence
alleging that the proposal's strengths were not given sufficient
credit in the evaluation and that the proposal should not have been
downgraded for improperly identified weaknesses. In addition,
Microcosm asserts that the agency was required to communicate with the
protester to clarify any technical points and alleges that NASA
introduced evaluation factors that were not disclosed in the NRA.
Proposals were not numerically scored. They were evaluated according
to the factors listed in the NRA, and strengths and weaknesses were
assessed. The evaluation record shows that NASA evaluators considered
Microcosm's approach to be among the most complex of all the concepts
that were submitted, and found that Microcosm's proposal failed to
justify the added complexity and cost that this approach presented.
The evaluation of technical proposals is primarily the responsibility
of the contracting agency; the agency is responsible for defining its
needs and the best method of accommodating them and must bear the
burden of any difficulties arising out of a defective evaluation.
Avogadro Energy Sys., B-244106, Sept. 9, 1991, 91-2 CPD para. 229 at 5.
In reviewing an agency's technical evaluation, we will not reevaluate
the proposals; we will only consider whether the agency's evaluation
was reasonable and in accord with the evaluation criteria listed in
the solicitation. Herndon Science and Software, Inc., B-245505, Jan.
9, 1992, 92-1 CPD para. 46 at 3. A protester's disagreement with the
agency's judgment is not sufficient to establish that the agency acted
unreasonably. Id.
Microcosm proposed to design, test, qualify, and operate a [deleted]
system that it calls the "Sprite." Microcosm has developed a family
of expendable launch vehicles under a sounding rocket program called
"Scorpius," based on research that was performed, in part, under
government contracts. The proposed Sprite launch vehicle, while not a
part of the Scorpius group, is designed to build on the technology
developed under the Scorpius program in order to reduce cost and risk
factors. [Deleted].
Based on our review of the record, we find the agency's evaluation and
consequent rejection of Microcosm's proposal reasonable. The
evaluation record indicates that the evaluators generally had concerns
both because there was insufficient information included in
Microcosm's proposal to permit a clear understanding of the firm's
approach, and because that approach was exceptionally complex.
Under the "Relevance to NASA's Objectives" evaluation factor, the fact
that Microcosm's [deleted] was already in testing was deemed a
significant strength. The status of the engine was considered
particularly important, given the fact that [deleted]. The evaluators
also identified the proposed leveraging of existing avionics as a
strength; the proposal identified three key elements of the proposed
[deleted] as being available from Microcosm's sounding rocket program.
However, the evaluators had concerns regarding the remaining
[deleted], as well as the placement of the [deleted], for which they
did not find adequate description in the proposal.
The SET found three significant weaknesses (the [deleted] in the
system; the use of [deleted]; and research repetitive of NASA/Air
Force contract programs) and six other weaknesses ([deleted] that were
considered unrealistic, the retention of data rights, and four arising
from technical areas with insufficient proposal detail) under this
evaluation factor.
The first of the significant weaknesses concerned the [deleted], which
NASA considered to be insufficiently explained. [deleted]. In
addition to the fact that Microcosm's overall vehicle design was
considered one of the most complex of the 12 vehicle designs proposed,
the SET found that the first-stage pod design was much more complex
than the level of engineering detail in the Microcosm proposal would
explain. During NASA's review of the proposal, specialists in system
design, main propulsion system design, structural design, structural
analysis, avionics design, performance modeling, and operations from
three NASA installations reviewed the proposal. The proposal did not
convince these specialists that the proposed design adequately
supported the proposed manufacturing approach or had lower
recurring-cost potential. Although the [deleted] was one of the most
unique features of Microcosm's proposed vehicle, it was one of the
least completely described features in the proposal. In view of the
complexity and importance of the [deleted], NASA concluded that
Microcosm's failure to adequately address it in its proposal was a
significant weakness.
Microcosm takes the position that [deleted] "is used in various
configurations on nearly all launch vehicles worldwide including
Shuttle, Titan [and others]" takes exception to the agency's
characterization of this aspect of Microcosm's design as a "unique
feature." In response, NASA points out that it is not the use of
[deleted] per se that is considered to add complexity. Rather, NASA
explains that under the protester's concept, [deleted] are dependent
on other [deleted] for oxidizer; half of the [deleted] have engines
(causing them to lift or push) while the remaining [deleted] drag or
pull; in addition, the [deleted] are individually jettisoned,
requiring piping to be disconnected and shut off in a very precise and
complicated manner. The agency has provided a chart comparing key
characteristics in Microcosm's design to two other [deleted], to
illustrate its basis for concluding that Microcosm's design was
unusually complex. The chart compares attributes such as number of
stages, propulsion system type, complexity of engines (by number of
parts), ignition systems, and thrust vector control. In nearly every
category, the Sprite vehicle is more complex. While these comparisons
are not dispositive of whether the Sprite design would achieve the
agency's goal, they support the agency's position that in the absence
of sufficient additional information explaining the complexity (or
demonstrating that the design is not as complex as it appears), the
SET reasonably concluded that these unexplained complexities
represented a significant weakness.
Microcosm argues that comparing systems by their parts count is not
the only way to determine whether a design is complex or simple;
rather, low-cost elements, such as the engine, and design features,
such as a low number of moving parts, should also be considered.
Microcosm argues, for example, that although its design includes
[deleted], rather than the [deleted] that NASA has cited in its
comparisons, it is more relevant to the issue of simplicity that
[deleted]. However, the information that Microcosm now provides was
not provided in its proposal.[3] In addition, NASA points out that at
least one of the systems used in its comparison has engines with only
six parts; moreover, both engines in this design have been tested,
whereas only one of Microcosm's engine designs has been tested.
Throughout the evaluation and agency report, it is clear that NASA
considered a number of features of the Sprite design to be engineering
challenges that could not be understood without substantially more
data disclosure; in short, the proposal did not adequately explain the
approach. Although Microcosm has attempted in its protest submissions
to provide additional information to explain certain aspects of its
proposal, this information does not change the validity of the
proposal's evaluation, since the agency could only evaluate proposals
on the basis of the information they contained when they were
submitted. It is an offeror's responsibility to submit an adequately
written proposal in order to establish that what it proposes will meet
the government's needs; an offeror runs the risk of having its
proposal rejected if the proposal submitted is inadequately written.
See Herndon Science and Software, Inc., supra, at 4.
Identified as Microcosm's second significant weakness was the
[deleted], which NASA believed would lower reliability and increase
the cost of the system. Although the NRA clearly welcomed innovative
design approaches and permitted any type of vehicle configuration, the
solicitation also made it clear that whatever configuration was
proposed would be evaluated in terms of its ability to advance the
NRA's stated mission--to enable significant cost reduction in
transporting small payloads to low earth orbit. NASA believed this
design, which was the only one it received that proposed the use of
[deleted], would generally increase vehicle processing time, reduce
reliability, and increase recurring cost due to duplication of
systems, increase in overall vehicle complexity, and high parts count.
As an example of one of its concerns with the multi-stage Sprite
design, NASA notes in its report that in order to [deleted]. Thus,
the agency concluded that the [deleted], the higher the cost and
reliability risk. The Sprite's [deleted] design requires [deleted]
systems, in addition to individual separation systems for each of the
[deleted].
In response to the agency's analysis, Microcosm asserts that NASA has
raised a "broad philosophical argument with no basis in engineering
fact or support in traditional launch vehicle design." The thrust of
Microcosm's response is that NASA has ruled out any multi-stage
design, and that this is an arbitrary restriction, inconsistent with
the terms of the NRA. On the contrary, these concerns are reasonably
related to the NRA requirements. NASA's concerns, discussed above,
are similar to the concerns expressed regarding the [deleted]: that
the design is particularly complex; that the complexities are not
justified by any explanations in the proposal; and that the
complexities are inconsistent with achieving the stated goal of
lowering costs. We conclude that NASA's evaluation in this area was
reasonable and consistent with the NRA.
The third significant weakness identified under this factor was NASA's
concern that funding the proposed effort would be repetitive of
contracts that Microcosm had with the Air Force and with NASA.
Microcosm's proposal states that the Scorpius program is currently
funded under multiple contracts, including ones with NASA, which call
for initial launch of two suborbital vehicles within the next year;
these launches would provide the system level test-bed for the Sprite.
While NASA appreciated that the use of existing and already funded
technologies proposed by Microcosm would reduce the element of risk to
a certain extent, and assigned the proposal a significant strength on
this basis, the evaluators did not want to fund a second demonstration
of these technologies on what they considered to be only a slightly
different scale. NASA viewed this duplication of effort as analogous
to the duplication that would occur if two contractors were working
separately on identical technologies or concepts, which the NRA
expressly discouraged.
Microcosm points out that the NRA advised offerors that both existing
and new technologies would be acceptable, and reasons that the
proposed technology from existing programs should be acceptable.
Microcosm concedes that its current contracts use the [deleted] now
being developed in single stage suborbital flights, but distinguishes
the efforts by noting that these flights do not test the [deleted] or
the [deleted], nor any other aspects crucial to the Sprite system.
We find no basis to question NASA's assessment of a significant
weakness due to other similar contracts Microcosm holds. Since NASA's
purpose in trying to avoid the award of two contracts to two different
contractors for the same approach is to expend research funds only on
truly innovative concepts, it is reasonable to conclude that the same
purpose is served by preventing one contractor from performing the
same (or substantially similar) work under more than one contract.
The agency also identified various other weaknesses, including the
absence of any [deleted]; [deleted] detail that was minimal; the
failure to address [deleted]; [deleted]; and structural mass fractions
proposed for the first and second stages, the achievability of which
the evaluators doubted.[4] The evaluators also expressed doubt
regarding the achievability of the proposed [deleted], which was the
final weakness identified in this area. In sum, these weaknesses were
all based on NASA's conclusion that additional basic engineering data
was necessary to demonstrate the viability of the system and to
validate Microcosm's claims of system simplicity.
Based on our review of the record in each of these areas, we consider
reasonable NASA's conclusions regarding the paucity of detail in the
protester's proposal. For example, the report explains the weakness
rating for the failure to provide any [deleted] in the proposal as
follows:
A propulsion system consists of engines, tanks to hold
propellants, a pressurization system to move fluids around the
vehicle, and a plumbing and control system connecting the tanks
and the engines. Typically this information is portrayed on a
fluid, or gas, system schematic. The main propulsion system must
provide for loading and unloading of rocket propellant from each
stage, loading and unloading liquid oxygen from each stage,
loading and unloading pressurization gases from each stage,
pre-start chill functions, engine start and operation, engine
shutdown, and system preparations for staging. The evaluation
team identified the lack of a [deleted] as a weakness in the
offeror's proposal.
Microcosm acknowledges that it included no [deleted] in its proposal,
asserting that the NRA did not expressly require this information and
that [deleted] is common to all launch vehicles, rather than being
unique to the Microcosm design.
Although this information was not specifically required, the NRA did
require that proposals contain sufficient technical information to
permit a meaningful evaluation. We find reasonable the agency's
explanation regarding the importance of this information for the
purpose of validating the firm's claims of system viability and
simplicity.
Responding to the weakness ratings generally, Microcosm asserts that
while "the central theme of the NASA evaluation is the complexity of
the Microcosm design," Microcosm in fact "identified design simplicity
as one of the major strengths." However, the primary support in the
proposal for simplicity of design consists of the protester's
conclusory statements to that effect. For example, Microcosm states
in its proposal, "We anticipate more than a factor of [deleted] than a
traditional vehicle with almost no [deleted]. If funding proceeds for
the Scorpius program, we anticipate being able to reduce total launch
costs by a factor of [deleted] with commercial operation beginning in
[deleted]. . . ." Microcosm lists the requirements established in the
NRA for payload capacity, orbit, and price per mission and then lists
"Microcosm Design Capability" next to that list, matching its
projected capability to each of the stated requirements. The proposal
concludes that "Microcosm meets the above economic and performance
goals with a [deleted] that will be made from major assemblies
developed over the past 4 years for low cost rockets." These
unsupported assertions, however, do not demonstrate that the system it
is proposing will perform as represented. It is the offeror's
responsibility to submit an adequately written proposal in order to
establish that what it proposes will meet the government's needs; this
principle is particularly important where research is to be undertaken
into new concepts. See Herndon Science and Software, Inc., supra, at
4.
Microcosm also protests that NASA improperly assigned a significant
weakness to its business plan, which the agency considered to be
incomplete. The record shows that, although the NRA required offerors
to identify certain parameters for the system in its first 10 years of
operation, such as expected annual revenues and expenses, Microcosm
only showed 4 years of the life cycle in its plan, from which the
values for the missing years could not be determined. NASA also was
concerned that the lack of information about initial nonrecurring
expenses would preclude determining the rate of return. Revenue and
expenses, shown as total amounts, provided no way to determine what
was included, and "other revenue" entries included no explanation of
their source or content. As a related weakness, the evaluation noted
that little basis was provided for the projection of [deleted] flights
per year; this rate, which is higher than the current rate, was not
supported by trend data or market research information.
NASA also identified Microcosm's failure to grant NASA [deleted] as a
significant weakness. The NRA warned offerors that "restrictions on
resulting technology are highly discouraged and will be considered in
the evaluation." Microcosm stated in its proposal that NASA would
acquire unlimited rights to all inventions developed under the
contract; however, Microcosm also retained certain rights for itself
in its proposal, stating, for example, that
[Deleted].
The protester opines in its proposal, further, that "in order for
commercial funding to occur, it is critical that [deleted] be retained
by SSLC."[5]
Based on our review of the record, we find no basis to question the
reasonableness of the agency's evaluation with regard to Microcosm's
incomplete business plan and its failure to grant unlimited data
rights.
Microcosm also protests that NASA violated NFARS sec. 1835.016-70(e)(4)
by failing to communicate with Microcosm to clarify areas of its
proposal that were unclear. This regulation provides, in relevant
part:
After receipt of a proposal and before selection, scientific or
engineering personnel shall communicate with an offeror,
regarding the proposal, only for the purpose of clarification, as
defined in FAR 15.601, or in order to understand the meaning of
some aspect of the proposal that is not clear, or in order to
obtain confirmation or substantiation of a proposed approach,
solution, or cost estimate.
Microcosm argues that this provision required NASA to communicate with
the protester, particularly in connection with those areas of the
proposal that were considered lacking in technical information or
detail. We disagree.
The operative language, quoted above, describes the only purposes for
which communication with an offeror is permitted; it does not, as the
protester urges, require that communications occur. Here, the NRA
explicitly warned offerors that the agency might accept proposals
without discussion and that proposals should initially be as complete
as possible and be submitted on the proposer's most favorable terms.
NASA did not communicate with any offerors before it made its
selections.
Microcosm also protests that NASA introduced "other competitive
procurement evaluation procedures," alleging that the agency
improperly created three categories of proposals (high potential,
potentially viable, and not viable) and followed procedures similar to
ones used by the Air Force. We find this allegation without merit.
First, there is no prohibition in the NFARS, the NRA, or applicable
portions of the FAR, against sorting proposals into categories during
the process of evaluation and source selection. We do not agree with
Microcosm's premise that this act constituted a competitive range
determination. Second, there is no evidence of any impropriety in the
selection process.
Taken together, the strengths and weaknesses identified in Microcosm's
proposal reasonably support the SET's decision to reject Microcosm's
proposal. Accordingly, the issues raised in Microcosm's initial
protest are denied.
Microcosm raised a number of additional issues in comments and
supplemental protests, which we dismiss for the reasons explained
below.
Several of Microcosm's supplemental protest grounds concern the
evaluation of other offerors' proposals. However, unlike the
situation that exists under a negotiated procurement, offerors who
submit proposals under a BAA are not competing against each other, and
thus the various issues Microcosm has raised regarding the evaluation
of other offerors' proposals are not for consideration.[6] See FAR sec.
35.016.
In comments filed under its initial protest, Microcosm raised two new
issues, alleging a "prejudicial assignment of adjectival ratings" and
"random gradings not related to the NRA requirements or the evaluation
factors." Because these were not raised within 10 days of when the
protester first became aware of their basis (in the agency report),
they are supplemental protest grounds which fail to independently
satisfy our timeliness requirements. Although Microcosm received an
extension of time for filing its comments on the agency report, such
an extension did not have the effect of waiving the timeliness
requirements for filing bid protests; notwithstanding the extended
comment due date, any protest allegations based on information in the
agency report had to be filed no later than 10 days after Microcosm
received the agency report. Accordingly, these new issues are
untimely. Management Tech., Inc., B-257269.2, Nov. 8, 1994, 95-1 CPD para.
248 at 10.
After receiving a supplemental agency report in response to
Microcosm's second supplemental protest on August 12, Microcosm filed
a third supplemental protest on August 22. In this protest, Microcosm
alleges that proposals were evaluated in an unequal manner (including
objections to individual ratings); and that the evaluation was
inadequately documented and the source selection decision inadequately
justified; and that NASA conducted discussions with only the awardees,
allegedly violating a duty to open discussions with all offerors. On
September 18, Microcosm filed its fourth supplemental protest, based
on statements contained in a request filed by the agency seeking
dismissal of certain supplemental issues. This latest protest alleges
a reversal in the agency's position regarding issues raised in the
penultimate supplemental protest.
We dismiss these issues. Several of the allegations involve the
evaluation of the selectees' proposals and therefore, as explained
above, do not form a valid basis of protest in a procurement under a
BAA. To the extent the newly-raised issues are based on information
contained in the initial agency report, which Microcosm received on
July 30, they are untimely filed. Moreover, allegations that NASA
failed to follow its source selection plan fail to state a valid basis
for protest, since the source selection plan provides internal agency
guidance and does not establish legal rights and responsibilities such
as to make actions taken contrary to those statements subject to
objection. See Indian Resources Int'l, Inc., B-256671, July 18, 1994,
94-2 CPD para. 29 at 3; Motorola, Inc., B-247937.2, Sept. 9, 1992, 92-2
CPD para. 334 at 5. New issues concerning the production of individual
evaluators' worksheets to document the evaluation fail to state a
valid basis of protest since, as explained above, the consensus
reports and source selection decision were consistent with the NRA;
since the evaluators' notes and scoring sheets are not necessary to
judge the rationality of the evaluation that is otherwise adequately
documented, an examination of individual scoresheets would be
irrelevant here. See Hydraudyne Sys. and Eng'g, B.V., B-241236,
B-241236.2, Jan. 30, 1991, 91-1 CPD para. 88 at 4-5.
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. The NRA solicited proposals in three separate areas; only the first
area, for Bantam Technologies, is relevant here.
2. Cycle Two, for flight demonstration, will be acquired competitively
and Microcosm will be eligible to compete for that phase as well.
3. Microcosm repeatedly and inaccurately asserts that certain
information was in fact included in the proposal. For example, the
protester alleges that "specific facts" concerning its engines--parts
count, man-hour estimates, and comparison pricing with other
engines--were included in its proposal; however, the support cited for
this assertion is to a journal article listed only as a reference in
one of the proposed employee's resumes included in the proposal. We
do not consider this information to have been included in the proposal
in any useful way.
4. The evaluators were unable to arrive at a more certain conclusion
because of the low level of detail in the proposal for the structure
and main propulsion system.
5. In addition to restricting rights, this statement also draws into
question the exact relationship between the Scorpius and Sprite
projects and would appear to support NASA's concern that research
under the two programs could be duplicative. To the extent the line
between the two is imprecise--as demonstrated by the discrepancy in
opinion between NASA and Microcosm expressed in the course of this
protest--the line between data rights arising under one project or the
other would also be imprecise.
6. We also find without merit the protester's allegations of unequal
treatment among offerors; since we have concluded that NASA's
treatment of Microcosm's proposal was reasonable, the evaluation of
other offerors' proposals is irrelevant, and no credible claim of bias
has been raised.