BNUMBER:  B-276033 
DATE:  May 5, 1997
TITLE: Geo-Centers, Inc., B-276033, May 5, 1997
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Geo-Centers, Inc.

File:     B-276033

Date:May 5, 1997

Daniel J. Kelly, Esq., Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, for the protester.
Matthew S. Perlman, Esq., Richard J. Webber, Esq., and Alison J. 
Micheli, Esq., Arent Fox Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, for Dynamac 
Corporation, an intervenor.
Joshua A. Kranzberg, Esq., and David H. Scott, Esq., Department of the 
Army, for the agency.
Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency contention that protest should be dismissed as untimely 
when filed nearly 3 months after contract award, and nearly 2 months 
after debriefing, is denied where the record shows that:  (1) the 
protester sought a debriefing within 10 days of contract award; (2) 
the debriefing was delayed because of the unavailability of agency 
technical personnel; (3) the information which forms the basis for 
protest was withheld from the protester at the debriefing, even though 
the protester requested the information; and (4) the information was 
later provided to the protester in response to a Freedom of 
Information Act request filed immediately after the debriefing.

2.  Contention that agency unreasonably evaluated technical proposals 
by awarding both proposals the maximum number of available points is 
denied because the record shows that the evaluation was reasonable and 
in accordance with the stated evaluation criteria, and because there 
is nothing per se improper about an evaluation which results in the 
award of the maximum score to more than one offeror.

3.  Protester's contention that the cost evaluation improperly relied 
on a flawed government cost estimate is denied where the agency 
recognized that its estimate of costs was low and other steps were 
available to the agency to permit an assessment of proposed costs.

4.  Challenge to agency's evaluation of sample task costs is sustained 
where the record shows that the agency failed to evaluate sample task 
cost proposals in accordance with the solicitation evaluation 
criteria, and did not reasonably consider the impact that widely 
divergent sample task costs might have on the determination of which 
proposal is most advantageous to the government.

DECISION

Geo-Centers, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Dynamac 
Corporation, pursuant to request for proposals (RFP) No. 
DAAD05-95-R-0794, issued by the Department of the Army for scientific 
and technical support services related to the Health Effects Research 
Program of the Army's Center for Health Promotion and Preventative 
Medicine at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.  Geo-Centers argues 
that the agency improperly awarded maximum technical scores to each 
offeror's proposal and performed an unreasonable cost realism 
evaluation.

We sustain the protest.

The RFP anticipated award of a cost-plus-fixed-fee task order-type 
contract for a base year and 2 option years to the offeror whose 
proposal offered the best value to the government.  Section M of the 
RFP set forth five evaluation factors:  technical merit, management 
merit, performance risk, cost, and subcontracting plan.  The RFP 
advised that the technical and management factors would be combined 
and numerically scored (on a 1,000-point scale); the performance risk 
and cost factors would be evaluated on a narrative basis; and the 
subcontracting plan would be evaluated on a go/no-go basis.  Potential 
offerors were also advised that the technical/management area would be 
significantly more important than cost, which would be slightly more 
important than performance risk.  In addition, the RFP explained that 
if the proposals were relatively equal in the technical/management 
area, cost would assume greater importance.  Finally, the RFP 
identified the required labor categories--i.e., chemist, biologist, 
statistician, etc.--and the estimated hours for each category.

The RFP contained three sample tasks to which offerors were to submit 
a technical response and sample task cost proposals.  (The sample task 
cost proposals were in addition to the main cost proposal required by 
the RFP.)  The RFP stated that the sample task cost proposals would be 
evaluated for price reasonableness (section L at 7), and for cost 
realism (section M at 2).  The RFP set forth different definitions for 
price reasonableness and cost realism.[1]

The Army received two proposals--one from Dynamac, one from 
Geo-Centers, the incumbent contractor providing many of the services 
here.  The Army found both proposals acceptable,[2] and conducted 
discussions with both offerors.  After the conclusion of negotiations, 
both offerors submitted revised proposals that were evaluated prior to 
the request for best and final offers (BAFO).  Upon receipt of BAFOs, 
proposals were evaluated for a third time.  The results of the 
technical evaluations are set forth below:

     OFFEROR         INITIAL
                    PROPOSAL
                      SCORE           POST-
                                   DISCUSSIONS
                                      SCORE     
                                                     BAFO
                                                     SCORE

   Geo-Centers         930             998           1,000

     Dynamac           680             775           1,000
After concluding that the BAFOs were technically equal, the Army made 
its selection decision on the basis of cost--there being no 
significant discriminator under the performance risk or subcontracting 
plan evaluation factors.  Since the RFP specified the applicable labor 
categories and labor hours under each category, and since the contract 
was to involve task orders, the review of the overall cost proposals 
focused on the direct and indirect rates applied.  The proposed costs 
offered initially, and at BAFO, are set forth below:

                                Initial   BAFO
                                Costs     Costs 

               Geo-Centers     [deleted] [deleted]
               Dynamac         [deleted] $3.3 mil.

Using proposed costs, together with an assessment from the pricing 
review team that the proposed costs were reasonable, the Army awarded 
the contract to Dynamac on October 30, 1996.  Geo-Centers filed its 
protest with our Office on January 24, 1997.

The decision below sustains Geo-Centers's complaint that the agency 
unreasonably evaluated its sample task cost proposals--one of three 
challenges to the Army's cost evaluation.  Before reaching this issue, 
however, the decision considers and denies the other cost realism 
challenges, as well as Geo-Centers's arguments that the evaluation of 
technical proposals was unreasonable.  In addition, the decision 
considers the threshold issue of whether this protest was filed on a 
timely basis.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES

The Army argues that Geo-Centers's protest is untimely because 
Geo-Centers did not file here until 3 months after contract award, and 
almost 2 months after its debriefing.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we conclude that the protest is timely. 

The record in this case shows that Geo-Centers became aware of the 
October 30 contract award to Dynamac on November 1.  Although the 
record reflects disputes about when the debriefing was requested, it 
shows that on November 7 the contracting officer scheduled a November 
12 debriefing for Geo-Centers.[3]  Because the Army was unable to make 
available any of the technical personnel involved in the evaluation on 
November 12, the debriefing was rescheduled to--and held on-- November 
26.  

During the course of the debriefing, Army officials disclosed to 
Geo-Centers that there were no weaknesses or deficiencies in either 
proposal and that the proposals were relatively equal to one another 
in the area of technical and management merit.  Geo-Centers was also 
advised that the agency conducted a cost realism review of the 
proposals that was generally limited to verifying the offerors' labor, 
overhead, and general and administrative (G&A) rates with the Defense 
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).  In response to questions seeking the 
point scores assigned to the proposals, and the independent government 
cost estimate (IGCE) used for evaluation, the agency officials 
explained that they were not sure such information could be released.

By letter dated December 5, Geo-Centers requested the point scores and 
the IGCE from the Army under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
By letter dated January 10, 1997--and received by Geo-Centers on 
January 16--the Army released both items.  Thus, on January 16, 
Geo-Centers learned for the first time that both offerors received the 
maximum possible point score--1,000 points--and that the agency IGCE 
was erroneously calculated.  Specifically, the materials provided by 
the Army showed that the agency failed to include in its IGCE 22,500 
hours of engineering technician time added by amendment No. 0003 to 
the RFP, and failed to include the costs associated with the second of 
the three sample tasks identified in the solicitation.  Thus, in its 
protest filed on January 24--8 days after receipt of the Army's 
January 10 letter--the protester argues that the evaluation was 
unreasonable since both offerors received the highest possible scores, 
and that the conclusion that the awardee's costs were reasonable was 
based on a comparison with a flawed IGCE.

The Army is correct in its claim that Geo-Centers was generally 
required to challenge any of the particulars regarding its evaluation, 
and the selection decision here, within 10 days of the November 26 
debriefing.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2) (1997); GBF Medical Group/Safety 
Prod. Mktg., Inc.--Recon., B-250923.2, Nov. 24, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  378 
at 2-3.  Nonetheless, receipt of a debriefing does not preclude an 
offeror from filing a later protest on an issue about which it was not 
advised by the agency during the debriefing.  See Hughes Space and 
Communications Co.; Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc., B-266225.6 et 
al., Apr. 15, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  199 at 23.  

Here, where the record shows that the protester clearly sought a 
debriefing within 10 days of learning of the award, and diligently 
sought more information at each step in the process--at no point 
allowing more than 10 days to pass before making its next request--we 
will not conclude that Geo-Centers has failed to diligently pursue its 
interests with respect to this procurement.  Thus, we conclude that 
Geo-Centers can raise a timely challenge based on the information 
received in the Army's FOIA response--i.e., the awarding of maximum 
scores to both offerors, and the agency's reliance on a flawed 
IGCE--but cannot raise issues based on information provided at the 
November 26 debriefing.[4]

TECHNICAL EVALUATION

With respect to the contention that the evaluation was unreasonable 
because both offers received the highest possible technical score, 
Geo-Centers argues that the scoring system was flawed as it did not 
discriminate between exemplary and acceptable proposals, and because 
proposals were scored by way of deductions from the maximum possible 
score, rather than beginning with a score of zero and awarding points.  
In addition, Geo-Centers argues that the evaluation was arbitrary in 
that the evaluators did not understand, and as a result, misused 
several important terms of art.  Finally, it argues that the high 
score awarded to Dynamac's proposal was improperly achieved after the 
agency spoon-fed the awardee during discussions by revealing every 
weakness in the proposal perceived by agency evaluators.

In considering a protest against an agency's evaluation of proposals, 
we will examine the record to determine whether the agency's judgment 
was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation criteria and 
applicable statutes and regulations.  ESCO, Inc., 66 Comp. Gen. 404, 
410 (1987), 87-1 CPD  para.  450 at 7.  In this regard, we note at the 
outset that there is nothing per se improper about an evaluation which 
results in the award of the maximum possible score to more than one 
offer, and nothing about this result automatically requires a finding 
that an agency was seeking only minimally acceptable proposals.[5]  
Alcoa Marine Corp., B-196721, May 9, 1980, 80-1 CPD  para.  335 at 4.  

With respect to Geo-Centers's first contention, our review of the 
record finds no support for its claim that the agency's evaluation 
approach did not discriminate between meritorious proposals and those 
that are minimally acceptable.[6]  The three assessments performed 
here resulted in scores consistent with the evaluators' narrative 
views of the relative merits of the two proposals.  For example, at 
the conclusion of the first two assessments of these proposals, the 
record clearly reflects the evaluators' views that the Geo-Centers 
proposal is strong and the Dynamac proposal is significantly weaker.  
These narrative assessments are consistent with the differences in the 
point scores.  In the final evaluation, when the scores of both offers 
are at the highest possible level, the record shows that both 
proposals are considered superior for the reasons explained in the 
narrative evaluation materials--reasons not challenged by Geo-Centers.  
Thus, there is no basis to conclude that the agency used a scoring 
device that equates minimally acceptable proposals with superior ones.  
Id. 

With respect to the protester's second claim--that the evaluation was 
arbitrary because the record shows the agency evaluators misunderstood 
or misused several terms of art--we again see nothing in the record 
that would invalidate this evaluation.  In this regard, while the 
protester is correct that the agency evaluators referred to 
deficiencies when they meant weaknesses, mislabeled an acceptable 
proposal unacceptable in certain documents, and generally created a 
sloppy record, our review of these errors does not lead us to conclude 
that the evaluation was arbitrary.  Two examples of the protester's 
arguments are set forth below.

Geo-Centers points out that despite its proposal's initial technical 
score of 930, the letter it received from the agency inviting 
Geo-Centers to participate in discussions stated that the proposal was 
"unacceptable."  Geo-Centers argues it was unreasonable to consider 
its highly rated initial proposal unacceptable, and then conclude that 
the Dynamac proposal was acceptable after discussions, when that 
proposal had a revised score of 775, significantly lower than the 
score first awarded to Geo-Centers.  However, Geo-Centers fails to 
acknowledge that the agency report here explained that the labeling of 
Geo-Centers's initial proposal as "unacceptable" was an error.  Thus, 
there is no evidence of unequal treatment vis-a-vis the two offerors 
in this regard.

Geo-Centers also points out that in at least two instances the cost 
evaluation materials include incorrect technical scores for the 
Dynamac proposal.  Specifically, the initial review of costs and the 
final review of costs both state that Dynamac's technical/management 
score is 937, when the scores should have been reflected as 680 and 
775, respectively.  Likewise, our review shows that Geo-Centers's 
score is incorrectly displayed in these documents as 959, when the 
scores should have been reflected as 930 and 998, respectively.  
Nonetheless, there was no reason to set out the results of the 
technical evaluation in the cost evaluation materials.  While the 
protester is correct in its claim that the numbers are wrong, there is 
nothing about this error that invalidates either of the cost reviews.

Finally, Geo-Centers complains that the agency engaged in technical 
leveling during discussions by "spoon-feeding" to Dynamac every 
perceived weakness in its proposal.  

Technical leveling occurs where an agency, through successive rounds 
of discussions, helps to bring a proposal up to the level of another 
proposal by pointing out weaknesses that remain in a proposal due to 
an offeror's lack of diligence, competence, or inventiveness after 
having been given an opportunity to correct them.  Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR)  sec.  15.610(d); Battelle Memorial Inst., B-259571.3, 
Dec. 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  284 at 5.  In this regard, our Office has 
recognized the tension between the requirement for meaningful 
discussions with all responsible sources whose proposals are within 
the competitive range, and the admonitions in the FAR against 
technical leveling, technical transfusion, and auctions.  Matrix Int'l 
Logistics, Inc., B-249285.2, Dec. 30, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  452 at 5.  We 
have held that this is an area where contracting officers necessarily 
have considerable discretion.  Id.  

Our review of the pleadings and the record as a whole leads us to 
conclude that the Army has not acted improperly in this regard, and 
instead, has held detailed and thorough negotiations consistent with 
its obligation to conduct meaningful discussions.  FAR  sec.  15.610(c).  
As an initial matter, we note that despite the protester's claim that 
it "strongly believe[s] that a second and perhaps third round of oral 
discussion[s] occurred between the Army and Dynamac," there is no 
evidence of a second round of discussions in this record.  Without a 
second round of discussions, the protester cannot show the successive 
efforts necessary to demonstrate that the Army engaged in technical 
leveling to help Dynamac improve its proposal.  FAR  sec.  15.610(d); 
Battelle Memorial Institute, supra.  Alternatively, the protester 
argues that the Army engaged in spoon-feeding during discussions, and 
points to the fairly straightforward correlation between the 
weaknesses identified in the initial technical evaluation and the 
weaknesses pointed out to Dynamac during discussions.  In our view, 
while we agree that the discussions here were thorough, the record 
shows that both offerors were treated equally in that Geo-Centers, 
too, was given thorough discussions.  In short, the record shows that 
the Army diligently pointed out Dynamac's weaknesses in order to give 
the company an opportunity to improve its proposal, and we have no 
basis to conclude that the Army's contracting officials abused their 
wide discretion in this area.  FAR  sec.  15.610(c).

Finally, in possible explanation for the increase in Dynamac's BAFO 
score, we note that the record shows that even the contracting officer 
expressed curiosity about the sudden significant improvement in 
Dynamac's BAFO.  She reflected in her best value analysis that she 
asked the evaluators about the improvement and was advised "that 
Dynamac engaged a professional consultant to prepare its BAFO.  The 
consultant was well-versed in this particular type [of] research 
project and was able to produce the proposal that the evaluators 
wanted to see."  Best Value Analysis at 3.

While Geo-Centers suggests there was something untoward about this 
turn of events, we do not agree.  The record here shows that 
Geo-Centers was the incumbent on parts of this effort, and may have 
enjoyed a competitive advantage in its familiarity with the effort, 
and its familiarity with "a majority of the technical review team 
prior to the solicitation issuance."  Id.  If Dynamac was able to 
improve its proposal with outside, and presumably more sophisticated, 
assistance, we see nothing improper about its use of that assistance 
to offset the competitive advantage enjoyed by Geo-Centers.

COST EVALUATION

In its initial protest filing, Geo-Centers argues that the Army 
conducted an unreasonable cost evaluation of the proposals because the 
IGCE used for comparison with the offerors' proposed costs failed to 
include certain categories of costs.  In its comments on the agency 
report, Geo-Centers supplemented its challenge to the cost evaluation 
with arguments that the Army improperly permitted Dynamac to introduce 
significant changes to its overhead rates without independent 
verification of the rates by the agency, and that the Army did not 
evaluate the sample task cost proposals reasonably, or in a manner 
consistent with the RFP.

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not 
dispositive, because regardless of the costs proposed, the government 
is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs.  FAR  sec.  
15.605(c).  Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be performed by 
the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror's proposed 
costs represent what the contract should cost, assuming reasonable 
economy and efficiency.  CACI, Inc.-Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71, 75 (1984), 
84-2 CPD  para.  542 at 5.  Contracting officers are required to document 
this evaluation, FAR  sec.  15.608(a)(1), and, when properly documented, 
our review of an agency's exercise of judgment in this area is limited 
to determining whether the agency's cost evaluation was reasonably 
based and not arbitrary.  General Research Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 279, 
282 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para. 183 at 5, aff'd, American Management. Sys., 
Inc.; Department. of the Army--Recon., 70 Comp. Gen. 510, 515 (1991), 
91-1 CPD  para.  492 at 7-8; Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111, 
1133 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325 at 27-28.

Inaccuracies in the Government's Cost Estimate

With respect to Geo-Centers's first challenge--that the Army's IGCE 
omitted costs associated with 22,500 hours of engineering time added 
by amendment No. 0003, and contained mathematical errors as 
well--there is no dispute in the record.  The Army acknowledges that 
these errors were made and that its overall IGCE should have been 
$5,389,578, rather than the $4,236,727 estimate the Army used.  Thus, 
Geo-Centers argues that the agency's flawed IGCE was responsible for 
its failure to conclude that Dynamac's $3.3 million BAFO cost was 
unreasonably low.

As with Geo-Center's challenge to the award of maximum technical 
scores, we note initially that an offeror's proposed costs are not 
unreasonable per se because they are lower than the government's cost 
estimate.  Sterling Servs., Inc.; Trim-Flite, Inc., B-229926.5; 
B-229926.6, Oct. 3, 1988, 88-2 CPD  para.  306 at 4.  Here, the evaluation 
record shows that upon receipt of the initial proposals--wherein 
Geo-Centers's proposed costs were $4.7 million and Dynamac's were $4.2 
million--the evaluators recognized that the government estimate was 
low and recommended that the estimate be recalculated.  Pricing Review 
of Proposals, June 10, 1996, at 3.  In addition, while the Army 
concedes that it failed to add the cost of the additional 22,500 
engineering hours to its estimate, the relevant hours were properly 
included on the table of labor categories and estimated hours used to 
evaluate proposals.  The Army explains it verified the rates proposed 
for this position--as well as for the other positions--as part of its 
cost review, thus resulting in less emphasis on the actual estimate 
itself.  

The Army also explains that Dynamac's BAFO, lowering its proposed 
costs to $3.3 million, explained each change from its earlier 
proposal, allowing review by the evaluators.  One of the these 
changes, a significant reduction in Dynamac's overhead rate, is 
challenged by Geo-Centers and discussed below.  It is these specific 
changes and whether they are reasonable that we consider important in 
this case, and not the variance between the offerors' proposed costs 
and the government's estimate--especially given the recognition by the 
evaluators that the estimate was flawed.  See Porter/Novelli, 
B-258831, Feb. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  101 at 7.

Changes in Dynamac's BAFO Overhead Rates

Dynamac's initial cost proposal included several labor overhead rates 
spread over different [deleted].  In its BAFO, Dynamac shifted the 
majority of its labor expenses to [deleted] cost center with an 
overhead rate significantly lower than the rates used in its earlier 
proposals.  These lower rates for Dynamac's [deleted] cost center had 
been approved by DCAA in a letter dated June 29, 1996.  According to 
Geo-Centers, the Army's acceptance of these rates was unreasonable 
given that in other instances the Army questioned the findings in the 
June 29 DCAA letter, and given that the approval of the rates for the 
[deleted] cost center was made prior to the time Dynamac shifted its 
billing approach and may not have considered the use of this cost 
center for the majority of Dynamac's billings.

We see nothing unreasonable about the Army's acceptance of Dynamac's 
[deleted] labor overhead rates.  As stated above, and as Geo-Centers 
notes, Dynamac presented these rates for approval by the DCAA and 
received authorization to use them in DCAA's letter.  In fact, the 
second page of DCAA's letter directs the use of these rates in all 
contracts with Dynamac.  Although Geo-Centers complains that on 
another issue--the appropriate G&A rate for use with a different cost 
center--the Army's price analyst expressed concern in an earlier 
pricing review that the rate might be overly optimistic, that concern 
does not preclude the Army from accepting other DCAA findings in this 
letter about Dynamac's costs.  In addition, we are aware of no reason 
why the Army should have rejected Dynamac's use of the [deleted] cost 
center rate approved by DCAA for personnel appropriately assigned to 
that cost center, as there is no requirement that an agency 
independently verify each and every item in conducting a cost realism 
analysis.  Intermetrics, Inc., B-259254.2, Apr. 3, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  
215 at 7.  In short, without evidence that DCAA erred in its review, 
see American Management Sys., Inc.; Dept. of the Army--Recon., 70 
Comp. Gen. 510, 514-515 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  492 at 7-8, and without 
evidence that the assignment of more personnel to this cost center 
might change DCAA's conclusion, we conclude that the Army reasonably 
accepted Dynamac's change in its overhead rates.  Intermetrics, Inc., 
supra.

Evaluation of Sample Task Costs

Geo-Centers also alleges that the Army failed to evaluate the sample 
task cost proposals associated with Dynamac's BAFO and failed to 
follow the evaluation criteria set forth in the RFP for these 
materials.  In the protester's view, if the sample task costs had been 
evaluated for both cost realism and price reasonableness, the high 
costs associated with Dynamac's sample tasks--approximately [deleted] 
hours and [deleted] costs proposed by Geo-Centers for the same 
tasks--would have led to a conclusion that Geo-Center's proposal 
offered the best value to the government.

As stated above, the RFP required separate cost proposals for each of 
three sample tasks.  RFP,  sec.  L at 7.  The RFP stated that these sample 
task cost proposals would be "used for a price reasonableness 
determination," id., and would be "evaluated for cost realism."  RFP,  sec.  
M at 2.  Price reasonableness was defined as "a matter of the 
competitiveness of the offeror's proposal, considering the price and 
the merit factors area."  RFP,  sec.  M at 3.  Cost realism was defined as 
"a matter of whether or not the offeror has proposed sufficient 
resources to successfully perform the contract and sample task work."  
RFP,  sec.  M at 2.  

Geo-Centers's argument hinges on the fact that Dynamac [deleted] the 
labor hours and costs for its sample tasks in its revised proposal and 
BAFO, and, at the same time, lowered its overall proposed costs by 
nearly 25 percent.  (In addition, as stated above, the labor hours and 
costs for these sample tasks are more [deleted] amount proposed by 
Geo-Centers.)  Given this BAFO increase in Dynamac's labor hours and 
costs for its sample tasks, Geo-Centers argues that it was 
unreasonable for the evaluators not to reevaluate the sample task 
costs for price reasonableness and cost realism.  In response to this 
protest issue, the Army states that "[t]he pricing in the sample task 
was not intended as a tool for establishing a basis for price 
reasonableness."  Contracting Officer's statement at 5.[7]  Rather, 
the contracting officer explains, the sample task responses "were 
carefully analyzed to ensure both contractors had a clear 
understanding of the effort involved."  Id.

In using a task order requirements contract, an agency is 
acknowledging that it cannot determine the precise quantity of 
services and materials needed during the contract period.  See FAR  sec.  
16.501-1, 15.503(b).  In this environment, the cost of performance to 
the government will vary depending on the actual task orders issued 
and, in large measure, with a given contractor's efficiency in 
performing the resulting tasks.  Group Technologies Corp., B-240736, 
Dec. 19, 1990, 90-2 CPD  para.  502 at 9.  As we explained in Group 
Technologies, the use of sample tasks permits agencies to review the 
approaches and efficiencies of different contractors under simulated 
contract conditions which require the submission of detailed cost 
proposals.  Id.  Thus, in a situation like the one here--where the RFP 
expressly advised that sample task costs would be evaluated for both 
cost realism and price reasonableness--agencies must use the 
evaluation tools identified in the evaluation scheme to ensure that 
the government obtains the lowest overall cost of performance.  Id.; 
Research Management Corp., 69 Comp. Gen. 368, 371-372 (1990), 90-1 CPD  para.  
352 at 5-6.

The record here contains no evidence of any review of the cost realism 
or price reasonableness of Dynamac's BAFO sample task costs.  With 
respect to cost realism, a failure to analyze the realism of the 
proposed costs leaves the agency open to the possibility that the 
proposal did not accurately account for all of the costs that will be 
incurred during performance.  Failure to complete this review violates 
the FAR's requirement that agencies ensure that the contractor "can 
perform the contract in a manner most advantageous to the 
[g]overnment."  FAR  sec.  15.605(c).

With respect to a review of price reasonableness, the record shows 
that the Army at no point in this procurement made an assessment of 
reasonableness, despite the requirement in the RFP.  Instead, the 
contracting officer's statement and other evaluation materials clearly 
indicate that the sample task costs were not used to assess the 
reasonableness of offeror's proposed costs here, but were used only to 
ensure a clear understanding of the sample task effort, and verify 
that the offeror understood how to write a sample task cost proposal.  
In our view, these factors offer no insight into the relative 
efficiency of competing sample proposals.  As we stated in Group 
Technologies, "a proposal with an excellent but time-consuming (and 
therefore, expensive) approach which was accurately reflected in its 
cost proposal would presumably, under the method of cost analysis 
employed by the Army, be seen in the exact same light as a technically 
excellent competing proposal which was less time-consuming and 
therefore reflective of a lesser cost of contracting to the 
government."  Group Technologies Corp., supra.

As in Group Technologies, we think the RFP here did not permit the 
Army to ignore a significant difference in an offeror's proposed 
sample task costs simply because the costs were consistent with that 
offeror's approach.  Instead, we think the Army was required to 
consider the disparity in the proposed sample task costs in the 
selection decision.  Nonetheless, our Office will not sustain a 
protest unless the protester demonstrates a reasonable possibility 
that it was prejudiced by the agency's actions, that is, unless the 
protester demonstrates that, but for the agency's actions, it would 
have had a substantial chance of receiving the award.  
McDonald-Bradley, B-270126, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  54 at 3; see 
Statistica, Inc. v. Christopher, No. 96-1148, slip op. ___ (Fed. Cir. 
Dec. 19, 1996).  Since the Army did not consider the reasonableness of 
the sample task costs in its selection decision, and since 
Geo-Centers's proposal had the highest possible technical score with 
sample task hours and costs [deleted] those of the awardee, we cannot 
conclude that the protester would not have had a substantial chance of 
award had the agency properly reviewed this issue.  Therefore, since 
we cannot conclude that the Army had a reasonable basis for selecting 
between these offerors, and did not follow the stated RFP evaluation 
criteria, we sustain the protest.  Group Technologies Corp., supra.

RECOMMENDATION

For the reasons stated above, we recommend that the Army reevaluate 
the BAFOs submitted by these offerors to determine the cost realism 
and price reasonableness of each offeror's proposed sample task costs, 
consistent with this decision and with the terms of the solicitation.  
Upon completion of this determination, we recommend that the Army 
reconsider its award decision.  While we do not suggest how much 
weight should be given to sample task costs in evaluating overall 
costs, the method chosen by the Army should consider the relative 
impact that varying contractor efficiencies may have in the overall 
cost to the government for these services.  If, at the conclusion of 
the agency's reevaluation, the revised best value determination shows 
that Geo-Centers's proposal, and not Dynamac's, represents the best 
value to the government, the agency should terminate the contract 
awarded to Dynamac for the convenience of the government.  We also 
recommend that the protester be reimbursed the reasonable costs of 
filing and pursuing its protest including attorneys' fees.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  
21.8(d)(1) (1997).  In accordance with 4 C.F.R. sec.  21.8(f)(1), 
Geo-Centers's certified claim for such costs, detailing the time 
expended and the costs incurred, must be submitted directly to the 
agency within 60 days after receipt of this decision.  

The protest is sustained.

Comptroller General
of the United States 

1. Cost realism was defined as "whether or not the offeror has 
proposed sufficient resources to successfully perform the contract and 
sample task work.  Resources include materials, labor, facilities, 
equipment, travel and other elements of cost (direct and indirect) 
necessary" to perform the effort.  RFP,  sec.  M at 2.  Price 
reasonableness is defined as "a matter of the competitiveness of the 
offeror's proposal, considering the price and the merit factors area."  
RFP,  sec.  M at 3.

2. In its letter to Geo-Centers opening discussions, the Army 
described the proposal as "unacceptable but capable of being made 
acceptable."  However, the contracting officer explains that the 
statement in the letter was incorrect and that Geo-Center's initial 
proposal was acceptable.  Contracting Officer's Statement at 2.

3. We need not resolve the dispute about when the debriefing was 
requested since Geo-Centers did not file a protest within 5 days of 
the debriefing seeking a stay of this procurement until resolution of 
its protest.  Accordingly, Geo-Centers does not claim that the 
debriefing was a "required debriefing," as that term is used in 31 
U.S.C.  sec.  3553(d)(4) (1994).

4. For example, the protester cannot now argue that the agency 
unreasonably determined the Dynamac proposal to have the same level of 
merit as Geo-Centers's proposal, as it was on notice of this from the 
debriefing.  Id.

5. Likewise, there is nothing per se improper about an evaluation 
approach based on the deduction of points from a stated maximum, as 
opposed to the awarding of points from a starting point of zero.  See 
NITCO, B-246185.3, Sept. 17, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  183 at 3, 5-6 
(evaluation process of assigning maximum number of available points 
for prior production of solicited item and deducting from the maximum 
for less experience in producing the item held reasonable method of 
assessing relative merits of different offerors).

6. For the record, our review is based on evaluations themselves, and 
on compliance by the evaluators with the requirements set forth in the 
RFP--not on agency rating plans.  Agency rating plans are internal 
agency instructions and, as such, do not give outside parties any 
rights.  Ralph G. Moore & Assocs., B-270686; B-270686.2, Feb. 28, 
1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  118 at 4.  

7. This approach is also reflected in the Prenegotiation Objective 
Memorandum (at the eighth unnumbered page) which states under a 
heading entitled "Cost Realism":  "[t]he sample tasks are not used to 
determine the total contract price but were included merely as a way 
to gauge how well the contractor understands the contract requirements 
as well as a way to evaluate the offeror's ability to price a task."