BNUMBER:  B-275934.2 
DATE:  May 29, 1997
TITLE: Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., B-275934.2, May 29, 1997
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.*
Matter of:Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc.

File:     B-275934.2

Date:May 29, 1997

Paul Shnitzer, Esq., and Mark D. Taylor, Esq., Crowell & Moring, for 
the protester.
Paul F. Khoury, Esq., and David A. Vogel, Esq., Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, for EG&G Washington Analytical Services Center, Inc., an 
intervenor.
E.J. Hong, Esq., and James I. Menapace, Esq., Department of the Navy, 
for the agency.
Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protester's arguments that the cost realism adjustments made to the 
proposed costs of two of its subcontractors were unreasonable is 
denied where the record shows that the agency had sound reasons for 
each of its conclusions and performed its evaluation consistent with 
the requirements set forth in the solicitation.

DECISION

Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. protests the award of a contract to EG&G 
Washington Analytical Services Center, Inc. pursuant to request for 
proposals (RFP) No. N00024-96-R-6430, issued by the Department of the 
Navy to procure technical and engineering support services for three 
Navy program offices--the New Attack Submarine Program, the Submarine 
Electronics Systems Program, and the AN/BSY-2 Program.  Booz-Allen 
argues that the Navy made unreasonable cost realism adjustments to the 
proposed costs of two of its subcontractors.  

We deny the protest.
 
BACKGROUND

This is the second protest of this procurement.  A more comprehensive 
explanation of the RFP and the Navy's award decision is set forth in 
our decision on the first protest, General Physics Fed. Sys., Inc., 
B-275934, Apr. 21, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  171 at 2-4.  As Booz-Allen's 
protest challenges only the cost realism adjustments made to two 
subcontractors, we need not repeat the full background of this 
procurement here.

Upon completion of the evaluation of offers for this 
cost-plus-award-fee level-of-effort contract--reserved for the offeror 
whose proposal offered the best value to the government--the Navy 
concluded that only the proposals of Booz-Allen and EG&G were in the 
competitive range.  The assigned scores and proposed and evaluated 
costs for the two competitive range offerors are set forth below:

     OFFEROR          SCORE         PROPOSED
                                      COSTS        EVALUATED
                                                     COSTS

      EG&G            90.10       $106,567,354   $107,524,326

   Booz-Allen         86.20         [deleted]      [deleted]
Using the offerors' total scores and evaluated costs, the Navy applied 
a series of calculations set forth in the RFP to determine which 
proposal offered the best value to the government.  In essence, the 
Navy was willing to pay a premium of up to 30 percent above a 
minimally acceptable proposal with the lowest evaluated cost.  The 
application of these formulae resulted in the determination that the 
EG&G proposal presented the best value,[1] and it was selected for 
award on December 20, 1996.

Booz-Allen learned of the award on December 30, and requested a 
debriefing, which was held on January 7, 1997.  During the debriefing, 
the Navy provided the company with its own evaluation information, but 
withheld from Booz-Allen information deemed proprietary to its 
subcontractors.  Since one of Booz-Allen's subcontractors, [Company 
A], attended Booz-Allen's debriefing, the Navy gave a separate 
debriefing to [Company A] immediately following Booz-Allen's 
debriefing.  A second major subcontractor, [Company B], also requested 
a debriefing, and received a written explanation of the Navy's cost 
realism adjustments by letter dated January 12.  

By letter dated January 10, Booz-Allen complained to the agency 
regarding the cost realism analysis of [Company A]'s proposal, and by 
letter dated January 14, [Company B] complained regarding its own cost 
realism analysis.  The Navy denied both agency-level protests on 
February 6, and this protest followed.[2]

ANALYSIS

As stated above, Booz-Allen's protest here is limited to the upward 
cost realism adjustments made to the proposed costs of two of its 
subcontractors, [Company A] and [Company B].  With respect to [Company 
A], Booz-Allen challenges the Navy's:  (1) use of unaudited 5-month 
year-to-date overhead rates instead of the audited full-year rates 
identified in [Company A]'s proposal (adding $392,897); (2) use of 
certain of the RFP's average labor category rates instead of the 
category average rates proposed by [Company A] (adding $805,392); and 
(3) use of the RFP's suggested wage escalation rate of 3.6 percent 
instead of [Company A]'s proposed [deleted] percent rate (adding 
$440,647).  With respect to [Company B], Booz-Allen challenges the 
Navy's: (1) upward adjustments to the proposed rates for two 
individuals who Booz-Allen now asserts are not properly subject to 
overhead burdens and general and administrative (G&A) expense (adding 
$444,080); and (2) use of on-site labor overhead rates for [Company B] 
employees Booz-Allen claims will be working at its facility instead of 
the off-site (and lower) overhead rates applied to the costs for these 
employees in [Company B]'s proposal (adding $870,000).

When an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed costs are not 
dispositive, because regardless of the costs proposed, the government 
is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs.  
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  15.605(c).  Consequently, a 
cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the 
extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represent what the 
contract should cost, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.  
CACI, Inc.-Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71, 75 (1984), 84-2 CPD  para.  542 at 5.  
Contracting officers are required by the FAR to document this 
evaluation, FAR  sec.  15.608(a)(1), and when properly documented, our 
review of an agency's exercise of judgment in this area is limited to 
determining whether the agency's cost evaluation was reasonably based 
and not arbitrary.  General Research Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 279, 282 
(1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  183 at 5, recon. denied, American Management Sys., 
Inc.; Department of the Army--Recon., 70 Comp. Gen. 510, 515 (1991), 
91-1 CPD  para.  492 at 7-8; Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111, 
1126 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325 at 27-28.

Use of Year-to-Date Overhead Rates

[Company A]'s proposal allocated its direct labor costs to two 
discrete overhead pools, called departments, based on whether the 
individuals were specifically identified in the proposal.  Identified 
personnel were assigned to department 80 (described as "services" in 
[Company A]'s proposal), with an overhead rate of [deleted] percent.  
Unidentified personnel were assigned to department 30 (described as 
"specialties" in the proposal), with an overhead rate of [deleted] 
percent. 

The Navy submitted [Company A]'s cost proposal to the Defense Contract 
Audit Agency (DCAA) for review.  DCAA noted that although the proposal 
used only two labor overhead rates--departments 80 and 30, described 
above--[Company A] was, in fact, offering personnel whose direct labor 
costs were traditionally allocated to six different overhead pools.  
Since the use of only two overhead pools was a deviation from the 
company's established accounting practice, DCAA calculated a weighted 
average overhead rate of [deleted] percent using the actual 
departmental assignments of the employees.

The Navy's Cost Analysis Panel (CAP) elected not to use the weighted 
average overhead rate prepared by DCAA, and decided to accept [Company 
A]'s approach of allocating its costs only to departments 80 and 30.  
Nonetheless, the CAP concluded that [Company A]'s historical rates for 
these departments from 1991 to 1995 might not accurately reflect 
overhead costs given [Company A]'s decision to deviate from its past 
allocation practices.  Since the only rates available using the 
proposed deviation from [Company A]'s standard practice were unaudited 
year-to-date rates, the CAP instead applied the actual rates for the 
first 5 months of 1996--[deleted] percent and [deleted] percent, for 
departments 80 and 30, respectively.  While these rates were higher 
than the [deleted] and [deleted] percent rates proposed, they were 
lower than the [deleted]-percent rate recommended by DCAA. 

Booz-Allen argues that the Navy's use of part-year rates was 
unreasonable because the Navy accepted [Company A]'s proposed 
allocation to two departments, but did not accept the historical rates 
for those departments.  Booz-Allen also complains that the Navy's use 
of part-year rates was unreasonable because DCAA took no issue with 
the rates, despite the agency's assertion to the contrary, and because 
part-year rates are often anomalous and generally should not be 
substituted for full-year rates.

In our view, there was nothing unreasonable about the Navy's decision 
to accept [Company A]'s proposed allocation of costs to two 
departments, but not to accept the historical rates for those two 
departments.  While we agree with Booz-Allen that the use of a full 
year of cost experience is generally preferable for calculating 
indirect rates, and that the use of part-year rates can result in 
anomalies, see generally FAR  sec.  31.203(e), we will not overturn agency 
evaluation decisions based on less than full-year rates when the 
agency has sound reasons for doing so.  See generally AmerInd, Inc., 
B-248324, Aug. 6, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  85 at 10-11.  

Here, as indicated above, the Navy's evaluators expressed a concern 
that the historical rates for these departments might not be 
indicative of the rates that will be experienced given the changes in 
[Company A]'s allocation practices.  In order to gain a more realistic 
snapshot of what [Company A]'s billings to the government might be, 
the Navy reviewed the year-to-date figures derived using the proposed 
allocation practices, and found them higher than past annual rates.  
Due to concerns about relying on figures derived from different 
allocation practices, the Navy substituted the only actual figures 
available under [Company A]'s proposed approach.  We see nothing 
unreasonable about this adjustment under the circumstances present in 
this procurement.  Compare AmerInd, Inc., supra (agency properly 
substituted year-to-date figures for the full-year historical figures 
included in an offeror's proposal to adjust proposed G&A expense where 
record showed that the G&A currently experienced was significantly 
higher than the historical rates) with Geo-Centers, Inc., B-276033, 
May 5, 1997, 97-1 CPD 182 at 10 (agency's decision to accept an 
offeror's shifting of costs to an on-site cost center found reasonable 
where the agency followed DCAA's advice regarding acceptance of the 
rates, and no evidence was presented showing that assignment of more 
personnel to this cost center than in the past would change DCAA's 
conclusion).

In addition, while Booz-Allen is correct in its claim that DCAA did 
not take issue with [Company A]'s proposed rates for departments 80 
and 30, its complaint misses the point.  DCAA accepted the rates, but 
not the allocation of costs.  Thus, DCAA used [Company A]'s rates to 
calculate a recommended weighted-average rate, which, incidentally, 
would have been much less favorable to [Company A] than the rates the 
Navy used.  Finally, we note that Booz-Allen has made no specific 
showing that the 5-month year-to-date rates used here might contain 
costs that make the rates unrepresentative of the total annual 
indirect cost experience.[3]    

Category Average Labor Rates

As explained above, [Company A]'s proposal either named specific 
individuals for the required labor categories (permitting verification 
of the actual rates paid to those individuals), or proposed category 
average labor rates for those areas where specific individuals were 
not identified in the proposal.  In several instances, the Navy 
rejected [Company A]'s category average rates and substituted the 
rates identified in the RFP.  Booz-Allen argues that the Navy's 
adjustment in this area, adding $805,392 to [Company A]'s proposal, 
was unreasonable.

The RFP advised potential offerors that their cost proposals should 
include "under each cost element a narrative description, in 
sufficient detail, to demonstrate price reasonableness, credibility 
and reliability."  RFP, section L-2, paragraph 8.2 at 119.  In 
addition, the RFP set forth unburdened base year labor rates for each 
of ten labor categories.  RFP, section L-2, paragraph 8.2.2 at 120.  
Accompanying these rates were the following instructions:

     "The base year labor rate column, while not a firm requirement, 
     represents the unburdened hourly rate (direct labor) the Navy 
     estimates is required to hire and retain personnel at the skill 
     levels defined under Labor Mix Definitions.  

                    .     .     .     .     .

     ". . . unsubstantiated unrealistic rates may result in an 
     adjustment to the cost data."  Id.

[Company A]'s proposal offered several category average rates 
significantly below the rates suggested by the RFP.  For example, 
while the RFP-suggested rate for a Senior Staff Level-2 position is 
$31.66 per hour or above, [Company A] proposed a rate of [deleted] per 
hour.  In apparent explanation, [Company A]'s cost proposal states 
that "[t]he hourly rates of the employees within each skill type at a 
specific level are averaged to arrive at a labor category bid rate."  
[Company A] Cost Proposal, July 30, 1996, section 3, first unnumbered 
page.  [Company A] argues that since these rates are based on average 
actual rates it was unreasonable for the Navy to adjust the rates 
upward.

The Navy explained that it was concerned about the wide discrepancy 
between some of [Company A]'s category averages and the rates the Navy 
believed would be necessary to hire and retain qualified people.  In 
addition, the Navy explained that its concern was increased when it 
noticed that the category average rates were lower than the actual 
rates paid to identified personnel within those categories.  Finally, 
since the Navy viewed [Company A]'s explanation of its rates as 
insufficient to justify the discrepancy, the Navy elected to use the 
RFP-recommended rates.

We have no basis to consider the Navy's actions in this regard 
unreasonable.  While [Company A] correctly claims that its proposal 
states that the rates are actual averages, the proposal is silent on 
the subject of why [Company A] believes it can meet the Navy's 
needs--now and in the option years--with rates significantly below the 
RFP-recommended rates.  In this regard, [Company A] cannot claim to 
have met the RFP's section L-2 requirement to provide a narrative with 
sufficient detail to demonstrate the reasonableness of proposed 
prices.  In addition, in the absence of a compelling justification for 
its lower wage rates, we think the Navy reasonably questioned the 
difference between the proposed rates and the actual rates paid to 
identified personnel.  AmerInd, Inc., supra at 7.

[Company A]'s Wage Escalation Rates and [Company B]'s Proposed Rates 
for Two Individuals

Booz-Allen's final challenge to the Navy's adjustments to [Company 
A]'s proposed costs--i.e., that the agency unreasonably rejected its 
wage escalation rate--and its contention that the Navy unreasonably 
adjusted the actual wage rates paid to two [Company B] employees, 
raise the same issue.  In essence, for both of these adjustments 
Booz-Allen acknowledges that its subcontractors failed to provide 
explanatory information to justify their approaches, but argues that 
the Navy had other access to the information necessary to permit the 
agency to accept the approaches specified in the proposals.

With respect to the wage escalation rate, the RFP specified that:

     "offerors and subcontractors, if any, are to propose 3.6 
     [percent] escalation for each option year (one through four).  
     Any deviation (upward or downward) from the proposed 3.6 
     [percent] shall be fully documented and include an established 
     corporate policy on the proposed escalation rate."  

RFP, section L-2, paragraph 8.2.2, pp. 119-120 (underlining and bold 
in original).  Booz-Allen explains that while [Company A] proposed a 
wage escalation rate of [deleted] percent for each of the option 
years, the company "inadvertently omitted" the documents justifying 
its lower rate.  Booz-Allen's Comments, Mar. 31, 1997, at 8.  
Nonetheless, Booz-Allen argues that the Navy should have accepted 
[Company A]'s lower proposed escalation rate because four recent 
[Company A] proposals submitted to the Naval Sea Systems Command--the 
Command conducting the instant procurement--contained the supporting 
documentation omitted here.  According to Booz-Allen, the Navy should 
have used the information submitted in those proposals to evaluate 
[Company A]'s proposal here.  Booz-Allen argues that this situation is 
analogous to the one addressed in our recent decision in International 
Business Sys., Inc., B-275554, Mar. 3, 1997, 97-1 CPD  para.  114.  We 
disagree.

In the International Business Systems case we sustained a protest 
against an agency's failure to consider favorable past performance 
information that would have been generated from information provided 
in the offeror's proposal.  Specifically, even though the protester 
there identified an earlier contract providing the same services to 
the same agency and handled by the same contracting officer--and even 
though the record included concrete evidence of the contracting 
officer's first-hand knowledge of the protester's favorable 
performance of that contract--the agency did not consider the 
protester's favorable past performance there because other agency 
personnel failed to complete and return the past performance 
questionnaire to the contracting officer.  Id. at 4-6.

We do not consider the situation here to be sufficiently similar to 
the International Business Systems case to justify shifting the 
responsibility for this omission from the protester to the agency.  
The protester here is the party that failed to provide the requested 
justification, despite an explicit requirement in the RFP to do so.  
Simply put, an offeror has the burden to submit a proposal adequate 
for evaluation, especially, where, as here, the offeror is on notice 
that the agency intends to make award based on initial proposals 
without discussions.  Titan Corp., B-260557.2, July 18, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  
89 at 9.  Given that the proposal failed to include the information 
needed and that the Navy did not--and was not required to--hold 
discussions, we conclude that the CAP reasonably rejected [Company 
A]'s significant deviation from the RFP's recommended escalation rate.  
Crimson Enter., Inc., B-243193.4, June 12, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  512 at 
10-11.  See also NSI Tech. Servs. Corp., B-253797.4, Dec. 29, 1993, 
93-2 CPD  para.  344 at 12-13.

Similarly, Booz-Allen argues that the Navy should have looked beyond 
[Company B]'s proposal to other information before making an upward 
adjustment to the rates of two of the personnel proposed there.  
Specifically, [Company B]'s proposal identified hourly rates for two 
individuals significantly lower than the actual rates paid to these 
individuals, and offered no explanation for the difference.  During 
the course of this protest, Booz-Allen acknowledged that the rates for 
these individuals were not actual rates, but were adjusted downwards 
to reflect reductions in indirect costs associated with their status 
as retirees.  Thus, in Booz-Allen's view, the rates were an attempt to 
show the true cost to the government for these individuals. 

While Booz-Allen now points to an unrelated DCAA report accepting this 
method of calculating the labor rates for these two individuals, we 
again view this as a matter [Company B] was required to explain in its 
proposal.  As above, absent such an explanation, we do not agree that 
the agency should have accepted the rates proposed. 

Finally, we need not consider Booz-Allen's last contention--i.e., that 
the Navy used an incorrect overhead rate for [Company B]'s 
personnel--because the amount of the adjustment ($870,000) is less 
than the advantage assigned to EG&G's proposal ($890,423) by the 
Navy's best value calculation.  Thus, even if Booz-Allen prevailed in 
its challenge to this adjustment, EG&G's selection would stand.  

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. While a detailed description of the Navy's tradeoff formula is not 
relevant to the considerations here, the result of the Navy's 
calculations is an advantage worth $890,423 in EG&G's favor.  To the 
extent Booz-Allen could reduce its evaluated costs by more than this 
amount, the Navy would conclude that Booz-Allen's proposal is more 
advantageous to the government.

2. For the record, we disagree with EG&G's contention that Booz-Allen 
may not now raise the issues challenged by [Company B] in its January 
14 letter.  Since the cost realism adjustments made to [Company A]'s 
and [Company B]'s subcontract proposals included proprietary 
information not releasable to Booz-Allen, the two subcontractors 
received separate debriefings.  While Booz-Allen raised an 
agency-level challenge to the adjustments made to [Company A]'s 
proposal by letter dated January 10, it could not raise with 
specificity any issues regarding the adjustments made to [Company B]'s 
proposal, as the Navy did not provide a debriefing to [Company B] 
until January 12.  Immediately thereafter, [Company B] filed its own 
timely agency-level challenge to the adjustments made to its proposal.  
Although our Office would not have considered [Company B] an 
interested party to challenge the selection of EG&G, see 4 C.F.R.  sec.  
21.0(a) (1997), the Navy accepted and addressed [Company B]'s 
agency-level challenge--providing a response to [Company B] on the 
same day, February 6, it responded to Booz-Allen.  Since only 
Booz-Allen can challenge the Navy's agency-level response to [Company 
B] before our Office, and since both Booz-Allen's and [Company B]'s 
agency-level protests were timely (as was the subsequent protest filed 
with our Office), see 4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2), (3), Booz-Allen properly 
may raise the challenges related to both subcontractors.  

3. For example, in AmerInd the protester offered evidence that the 
year-to-date rate used was unusually high because of certain 
events--such as the loss of funding on one contract and delays in 
awarding others.  AmerInd, Inc., supra at 11 n.4.  The record here 
contains no such claim.