BNUMBER:  B-275859.2 
DATE:  April 11, 1997
TITLE: Matter of:Alcan Environmental, Inc. 

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Matter of:Alcan Environmental, Inc.

File:     B-275859.2

Date:April 11, 1997

Erling T. Johansen, Esq., Davison & Davison, for the protester.
Sherry Kinland Kaswell, Esq., and Justin P. Patterson, Esq., 
Department of the Interior, for the agency.
Paul E. Jordan, Esq., and Paul Lieberman, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest of technical evaluation based upon alleged consideration of 
improper information by evaluators is denied where there is no 
evidence of impropriety and record fully supports the evaluation of 
protester's proposal.  In view of reasonableness of evaluation, 
protester's bias allegations are denied as there is no basis to 
conclude that agency acted with intent to injure the protester.

DECISION

Alcan Environmental, Inc. protests the award of a contract to 
Harding-Lawson Associates/Wilder Construction Company, Joint Venture 
(HLA/Wilder) under request for proposals (RFP) No. 1422-N660-R96-3005, 
issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Department of the 
Interior.  Alcan challenges the agency's evaluation based on its 
allegation that evaluators were biased against the protester. 

We deny the protest.

The RFP sought proposals for hazardous materials disposal in Alaska 
(the Hazmat Program) under a requirements contract for a base year 
with two 1-year options.  Award was to be made to the offeror whose 
proposal was most advantageous to the government based upon 
consideration of the stated evaluation criteria.

Proposals were evaluated on the basis of three factors, listed in 
descending order of importance:  technical, cost/price, and business 
management.  Offerors' technical proposals were evaluated on the basis 
of two factors with related subfactors:  technical approach (eight 
subfactors) and key personnel and past performance (five subfactors).  
Each subfactor was evaluated on a scale of zero (unsatisfactory) to 10 
(excellent) and multiplied by the subfactor's weight.  Thus, a perfect 
score of 
10 on each subfactor would result in a weighted total score of 3,800 
points.  The cost/price proposals were not point scored, but were 
evaluated for reasonableness and an assessment of the offerors' 
understanding of requirements and validity of approach.  The business 
management proposals also were not point scored, but were evaluated to 
determine whether offerors had adequate project management systems, 
subcontracting management and plans, and financial resources.  
Evaluations were conducted by a technical proposal evaluation 
committee (TPEC).  The contracting officer served as source selection 
official (SSO).  

Five offerors, including Alcan and HLA/Wilder, submitted proposals by 
the July 10, 1996, closing date.  The TPEC performed an initial 
evaluation in which HLA/Wilder's proposal received the highest score 
(3,170 points) and Alcan's the lowest (1,400 points).  All offers were 
placed in the competitive range and written discussions were 
conducted.  After review of the offerors' responses to the discussion 
questions, the agency rescored the proposals.  Alcan, which proposed 
the lowest estimated price, had its proposal score increased to 2,090 
points with a business management ranking of "good."  HLA/Wilder's 
score increased to more than 3,400 points with a business management 
ranking of "very good."  Since HLA/Wilder's proposal had the strongest 
technical score and the second lowest estimated price, the contracting 
officer determined that it represented the best value to the 
government. 

On December 2, prior to making his award determination, the 
contracting officer received a letter from Alcan which enclosed a 
memorandum written by a Hazmat Program specialist.  The memorandum, 
dated September 6, discussed pending task order 008, under the 
incumbent contract being performed by AQE, Inc., which included Alcan 
as a team member.  The memorandum was critical of AQE's written 
response plan to perform the task order.  Alcan believed the document 
contained false statements and misrepresentations and had been widely 
circulated at BLM.  Alcan requested an investigation of the matter and 
postponement of the award determination until Alcan and AQE could 
respond to the memorandum.  The contracting officer, who was listed as 
an addressee on the memorandum, had never seen the document before and 
could not find it in the agency's records.  He investigated the matter 
and determined that the memorandum had no impact on the evaluation of 
Alcan's past performance.  Accordingly, he awarded the contract to 
HLA/Wilder on December 6.  After receiving notice of the award and a 
debriefing, Alcan filed this protest.  Performance of the contract has 
been stayed pending this decision.

Alcan proposed the lowest estimated price and, thus, argues that its 
proposal represented the best value.  In Alcan's view, the agency's 
"subjective" evaluation of its proposal was flawed through the bias of 
evaluators who based their evaluation on untrue negative information 
about the firm.[1]

In reviewing an evaluation, it is not the function of our Office to 
evaluate the proposals de novo.  Rather, we will examine an agency's 
evaluation to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the 
stated evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations, 
since the relative merit of competing proposals is primarily a matter 
of administrative discretion.  Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 
69 Comp. Gen. 284 (1990), 90-1 CPD  para.  203; Advanced Technology and 
Research Corp., B-257451.2, Dec. 9, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  230.  From our 
review of the record, we find neither evidence of any specific intent 
to injure the protester nor any other basis to object to the agency's 
evaluation.

Alcan relies on various documents, including the September 6 
memorandum discussed above, which it believes reflect negatively on 
Alcan.  These include the September 6 memorandum; notes of an August 
30 telephone call from the same specialist; an August 30 follow-up 
memorandum to the call; and two memoranda which discussed three BLM 
personnel and their potential bias against AQE.  Alcan argues that the 
TPEC and contracting officer saw these documents and took them into 
consideration in evaluating Alcan's proposal.  Nothing in the record 
before us indicates that these documents were considered in the 
evaluation or had any adverse impact on the evaluation of Alcan's 
proposal.

A co-chairman of the TPEC explains that, in accordance with the RFP, 
no outside information was considered by the TPEC in evaluating 
Alcan's or the other offerors' proposals.  All judgments were made on 
the basis of the proposals submitted and discussion responses, without 
consideration of personal knowledge of the offerors.  Further, the 
evaluation score sheets contain no references to the supposed negative 
information in these documents, nor do they appear to be based on 
them.  In this regard, the majority of the panel members had never 
seen the documents relied upon by the protester.  While some TPEC 
members had seen the documents, there is no basis for finding that the 
documents were considered and counted against Alcan.  

For example, the September 6 memorandum was seen only by two TPEC 
members and one of the co-chairmen and then only after the initial 
evaluations had been conducted and discussion questions sent to the 
offerors.  Since Alcan's proposal scores increased after the TPEC 
reviewed its discussion responses, the memorandum and its related 
documents appear to have had no adverse effect on Alcan.  In any 
event, the September 6 memorandum and the related August 30 documents 
reflect a single BLM employee's concerns with AQE's plans to perform 
task order 008.  There is nothing improper about an agency employee 
responsible for drawing-up task orders expressing concerns with the 
way a contractor performs its work.  In this case, the concerned 
employee did not serve on the TPEC and her personal viewpoints were 
not considered.[2]  Moreover, the agency explains, without 
contradiction from Alcan, that task order 008 was awarded to AQE and 
was completed to the government's satisfaction.

The remaining documents also had no discernable effect on the 
evaluation.  One of the documents, dated in 1994, identifies two BLM 
inspection personnel who apparently held negative views of Alcan and 
its team member AQE.  The memorandum sought to ensure that these 
employees were not involved in reviewing Alcan's performance.  The 
other document, dated in May 1996, explains one BLM employee's 
difficulties with another BLM employee in negotiating a task order 
with Alcan.  It also expresses concern about future work, since Alcan 
had bid on part of the job as a prime contractor.  None of these BLM 
employees identified as having negative views of Alcan were in any way 
involved with the evaluation of its proposal.  Further, Alcan's 
failure to obtain the job as prime was due to its submission of one of 
the highest bids, not because of agency bias.[3] 

Alcan also contends that its low consensus score is evidence of the 
evaluators' consideration of negative information.[4]  However, the 
record establishes otherwise.  The individual evaluators reviewed the 
proposals against the stated evaluation criteria without input from 
other TPEC members.  Only after all individual evaluations were 
completed did any member learn how another had scored a proposal.  
They then met as a group to arrive at a consensus score.  In their 
discussions, the evaluators pointed out information in the proposals 
on which they based their individual scores and all scores were based 
on the proposals submitted.[5]

Alcan's proposal received the lowest consensus score of all proposals 
on the initial evaluation.  However, through discussions, Alcan was 
provided the opportunity to improve its score by submitting additional 
information.  Alcan availed itself of this opportunity and increased 
its score significantly from 1,400 to 2,090 points.  In this regard, 
Alcan's score was increased in 10 of the 13 subfactors, while the 
other scores remained the same.  One of these was already scored as 
"very good" (160 points out of a possible 200 points).  The other two 
were scored as "fair" and "poor."  While Alcan asserts that some of 
its scores and evaluator comments were unfair, it fails to explain why 
its proposal score was undeserved in those areas. 

For example, Alcan's proposal was rated "poor" on subfactor II C under 
the key personnel and past performance factor.  As stated in the RFP, 
this subfactor concerned the offeror's record of jobs of different 
sizes and variety performed over the past 2 years, including 
information to show adherence to regulatory permits and contractual 
time schedules and budgets.  In its proposal, Alcan listed a number of 
projects it had completed, along with the budgets and start/stop 
dates.  The proposal did not identify how Alcan had met the schedule 
and annual cost of work figures it had identified in the proposal.  In 
discussions, the agency specifically asked Alcan to clarify the size, 
contractual time schedules, and budgets of its past performances.  In 
its response, Alcan stated that it had regularly met its past 
contractual time schedules and listed some of the same past contracts 
as in its initial proposal.  However, as noted by the TPEC in the 
final evaluation, Alcan had not furnished information on its 
compliance with contractual schedules; its estimated charges were not 
shown to be within budgetary constraints; and some information was 
missing from new and old projects.  An offeror must demonstrate 
affirmatively the merits of its proposal and runs the risk of a lower 
evaluation score if it fails to do so.  See InterAmerica Research 
Assocs., Inc., B-253698.2, Nov. 19, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  288.  While Alcan 
believes the evaluators' comments evidence consideration of outside, 
negative information about its past performance, the record indicates 
that the assessment simply reflects a reasonable evaluation of its 
proposal.[6] 

Alcan also challenges the composition of the TPEC, arguing that it was 
improper to use BLM personnel from the Alaska office who were familiar 
with Alcan's performance under the incumbent contract.  The 
composition of a technical evaluation panel is within the discretion 
of the contracting agency.  In the absence of evidence of bad faith, 
conflict of interest, or actual bias, we have no reason to question 
the composition of the panel.  Delta Ventures, B-238655, June 25, 
1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  588; Johns Hopkins Univ., B-233384, Mar. 6, 1989, 
89-1 CPD  para.  240.  

Alcan has identified nothing which establishes any reason to question 
the composition of the TPEC.  The mere fact that evaluators have 
worked with or are otherwise familiar with one or more of the offerors 
in a procurement is no basis for disqualifying them from service.  
Here the agency sought balance in its panel by selecting five 
evaluators, only three of whom were regular Hazmat Program personnel.  
The fourth member had only recently transferred to the Alaska office 
from the Bureau of Mines and the fifth worked in a division outside 
the Hazmat Program.  While Alcan argues that its low evaluation scores 
resulted from the Alaska employees' familiarity with it, we note that 
on the initial evaluation, a regular Hazmat Program employee gave 
Alcan its highest proposal score, while the new Hazmat employee gave 
Alcan one of its lowest scores, even though the regular employee 
presumably knew more about Alcan than did the new one.[7]  

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States 

1. The protester submitted a number of arguments in support of these 
and other protest grounds; the agency responded to each argument, 
justifying its actions.  We have reviewed the entire record, 
considered all of the arguments, and find no basis for sustaining the 
protest.  However, we will discuss only the more significant arguments 
in this decision.

2. Notwithstanding Alcan's views, we find no evidence of bias in the 
August 30 documents.  The telephone notes simply discuss other methods 
of obtaining the services covered by task order 008 if Alcan declined 
to accept the task order.  While the notes also state that the 
incumbent contract "expires end of Sept.," this simple statement of 
fact does not, as argued by Alcan, indicate that the agency has no 
intention of dealing with Alcan again.  The August 30 memorandum 
reflects the BLM specialist's plans to postpone task order 008 
negotiations with AQE.  To the extent this memorandum is viewed as 
negative to Alcan, we note that a marginal note from one of the 
memorandum recipients disputes the specialist's viewpoints.

3. In any event, even if the evaluators had considered the documents 
at issue, Alcan has not shown how the documents adversely affected its 
evaluation.  Moreover, in evaluating proposals, contracting agencies 
properly may consider any evidence, even if that evidence is entirely 
outside the proposal, so long as the use of the extrinsic evidence is 
consistent with established procurement practice.  Intermagnetics Gen. 
Corp.--Recon., B-255741.4, Sept. 27, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  119. 

4. Alcan asserts that one of the evaluators exerted an undue influence 
over the other members of the TPEC causing them to match his score 
which was lower than all the others.  The co-chairmen of the TPEC 
explain that the evaluators arrived at their consensus ratings on 
their own, without strong influence by any one member on the others.  
We also note that the score on which Alcan relies was the initial 
consensus score and not the final where its score significantly 
increased.

5. To the extent Alcan is arguing that the consensus ratings were 
unfair, there is nothing inherently objectionable in an agency's 
decision to develop a consensus rating.  Appalachian Council, Inc., 
B-256179, May 20, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  319.  The fact that some of the 
evaluators individually rated Alcan's proposal more favorably on some 
subfactors than they did on a consensus basis for those subfactors 
does not, by itself, warrant questioning the final evaluation results.  
See Syscon Servs., Inc., 68 Comp. Gen. 698 (1989), 89-2 CPD  para.  258; 
Dragon Servs., Inc. B-255354, Feb. 25, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  151.  A 
consensus score need not be the score of the majority the evaluators 
initially awarded--the score may properly be determined after 
discussions among the evaluators.  GZA Remediation, Inc., B-272386, 
Oct. 3, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  155 (note 3). 

6. Since we find no error in the evaluation of Alcan's proposal, we 
have no basis to conclude that the agency acted with a specific intent 
to injure Alcan or that the evaluation unfairly affected the 
protester's competitive position.  Hill's Capitol Sec., Inc., 
B-250983, Mar. 2, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  190. 

7. Alcan contends that one of the TPEC members had a conflict of 
interest which should have disqualified her from service.  According 
to a deposition excerpt from Alcan's state lawsuit against a former 
BLM employee, the former employee had dinner with the evaluator in 
February 1996, 5 months prior to the receipt of proposals and the 
commencement of evaluations.  The excerpt reflects that they did not 
talk about ongoing BLM projects and only briefly discussed the 
lawsuit.  We see nothing remotely indicative of a proposed conflict of 
interest from such a casual meeting between a future evaluator and a 
person unrelated to the procurement.