BNUMBER:  B-275587.9; B-275587.10; B-275587.11; B-275587.12 
DATE:  June 29, 1998
TITLE: Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., Aero Corporation, B-275587.9; B-
275587.10; B-275587.11; B-275587.12, June 29, 1998
**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
The decision issued on the date below was subject to a GAO Protective 
Order.  This redacted version has been approved for public release.
Matter of:Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., Aero Corporation

File:     B-275587.9; B-275587.10; B-275587.11; B-275587.12

Date:June 29, 1998

Kevin P. Connelly, Esq., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, for 
Pemco Aeroplex, Inc.; and Thomas G. Jeter, Esq., Suzanne L. Karbarz, 
Esq., and Michael T. Janik, Esq., McKenna & Cuneo, for Aero 
Corporation, the protesters.
John E. Lariccia, Esq., Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., and Brad Adams, 
Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the agency.
John Van Schaik, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) provides that 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) has protest jurisdiction to review 
objections to cancellations of solicitations and that GAO shall decide 
protests "concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or 
regulation."  Since 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 (1994) mandates that the 
Department of Defense (DOD) procure goods or services under specified 
circumstances, rather than supply them from an in-house source, it is 
a procurement statute.  Under the circumstances, where a DOD agency 
issues a solicitation, receives and evaluates bids or proposals, and 
awards a contract, and then cancels the solicitation to take the work 
in-house, CICA grants GAO the authority to consider a protest that the 
agency did not comply with 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462.  

2.  In a negotiated procurement, the contracting officer is required 
to have a reasonable basis to cancel a solicitation.  There could be 
no reasonable basis for cancelling a solicitation in order to bring 
work in-house if doing so violates 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462, which is a 
congressional mandate to allow private companies to provide goods and 
services to DOD unless the government can provide those goods and 
services at a lower cost.  Thus, although DOD agencies historically 
have had broad discretion to manage resources and make decisions as to 
whether to contract out or perform work in-house, when 10 U.S.C.  sec.  
2462 applies, those decisions are required to be based on a 
determination of which source can provide a supply or service at the 
lower cost.  

3.  Although 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 generally requires that decisions of DOD 
agencies as to whether to perform work in-house or to contract out are 
to be based upon a determination of which source can perform the work 
at the lower cost, section 2462 is subject to the proviso:  "Except as 
otherwise provided by law."  Where a DOD agency reasonably relies on 
the need to meet the requirements of 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a) (West Supp. 
1998)--which limits the funds which DOD agencies can use to contract 
out for depot-level maintenance and repair work--as a basis for 
cancelling a solicitation, this statutory direction means that the 
requirements of section 2462 do not apply. 

DECISION

Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. and Aero Corporation protest the cancellation of 
request for proposals (RFP) No. F09603-95-R-13032 issued by the Air 
Force for programmed depot-level maintenance (PDM) of the C-130 
aircraft.  Pemco and Aero also challenge the decision of the Air Force 
to perform the work covered by the RFP in-house at Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center and Ogden Air Logistics Center.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The RFP was issued in July 1996 and included C-130 PDM work in Europe, 
the continental United States, and the Pacific.  After a contract for 
the continental United States work was awarded to Aero on April 15, 
1997, Pemco protested the evaluation of proposals and the award to 
Aero.  In response to that protest, the Air Force determined that the 
evaluation of the offerors' past performance appeared to be 
inadequate.  As a result, the Air Force announced that it would revise 
the solicitation, conduct discussions, solicit best and final offers, 
reevaluate proposals, and make a new selection decision.  On May 19, 
1997, we dismissed Pemco's protest, since the Air Force's corrective 
action rendered the protest academic.

The Air Force, however, did not complete this corrective action.  The 
Air Force's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and 
Management) directed the agency to take the announced corrective 
action but also stated:  "[I]n view of emerging changes in depot 
workloads[,] re-evaluate the C-130 PDM requirement."  May 19, 1997 
Letter at 1.  After determining that the corrective action could not 
be completed until October 1997, the Air Force terminated Aero's 
contract and decided that, as a temporary measure, Warner Robins would 
"organically" perform the C-130 PDM workload.  On June 24, the Air 
Force notified offerors that it was "reevaluating the [continental 
United States] and [European] C-130 PDM effort to determine the best 
approach to ensure readiness and sustainability of the C-130 weapon 
system."  June 24, 1997 Memorandum.[1] 

Finally, on March 3, 1998, the Air Force announced its plans for the 
C-130 work.  In a memorandum of that date, the contracting officer 
informed the offerors that she was cancelling the RFP.  That 
memorandum stated:

     As a result of a comprehensive business case analysis, using the 
     same terms, conditions and work statement in the C-130 PDM [RFP], 
     the Air Force has concluded that splitting the [continental 
     United States] and [European] C-130 PDM workload between the 
     Warner Robins Air Logistics Center and the Ogden Air Logistics 
     Center is the most cost effective means of satisfying this 
     requirement.

March 3, 1998 Memorandum.

PROTEST CONTENTIONS

In addition to arguing that the Air Force improperly failed to take 
the corrective action that it had promised, and that the Air Force's 
actions were calculated to punish Pemco for filing its earlier 
protest, Pemco and Aero argue that there is no reasonable basis for 
cancelling the RFP.  According to the protesters, the initial reason 
offered by the Air Force for cancelling the RFP--that it is more cost 
effective to perform the work in-house--was based on a flawed business 
case analysis.  In addition, the protesters argue that, in conducting 
its business case analysis and cancelling the RFP on the basis of that 
analysis, the Air Force violated 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 (1994) and its 
implementing regulations, 32 C.F.R.  sec.  169a (1997).  Section 2462 of 
title 10, which is titled "Contracting for certain supplies and 
services required when cost is lower," states:

     (a) In general.--Except as otherwise provided by law, the 
     Secretary of Defense shall procure each supply or service 
     necessary for or beneficial to the accomplishment of the 
     authorized functions of the Department of Defense (other than 
     functions which the Secretary of Defense determines must be 
     performed by military or Government personnel) from a source in 
     the private sector if such a source can provide such supply or 
     service to the Department at a cost that is lower (after 
     including any cost differential required by law, Executive order, 
     or regulation) than the cost at which the Department can provide 
     the same supply or service.

     (b) Realistic and fair cost comparisons.--For the purpose of 
     determining whether to contract with a source in the private 
     sector for the performance of a Department of Defense function on 
     the basis of a comparison of the costs of procuring supplies or 
     services from such a source with the costs of providing the same 
     supplies or services by the Department of Defense, the Secretary 
     of Defense shall ensure that all costs considered (including the 
     costs of quality assurance, technical monitoring of the 
     performance of such function, liability insurance, employee 
     retirement and disability benefits, and all other overhead costs) 
     are realistic and fair. 

The protesters argue that the cost of contracting for the C-130 PDM 
work is lower than the cost of in-house performance and that the Air 
Force has not performed the "realistic and fair" cost comparison 
required by section 2462(b) in order for an agency to bring work 
in-house and to justify a decision to cancel the solicitation.  The 
protesters argue that the business case analysis was a competition 
between public entities--Warner Robins and Ogden--and private 
contractors, including Aero and Pemco, and used the proposals 
submitted by those firms to determine whether C-130 PDM work could be 
performed more cost effectively in-house.  The protesters argue that 
this competition violated the basic structures and protections of the 
procurement system and cannot form the basis for the agency's 
cancellation of the C-130 procurement.  

Among other flaws, the protesters argue that they were not permitted 
to compete equally with the government since Warner Robins and Ogden 
were not required to meet the same minimum requirements, submit the 
same information, bid on the same level of work, and make the same 
certifications.  The protesters also argue that the contractors 
proposed under a best value solicitation that emphasized technical 
merit over price, while the decision to perform the work in-house was 
based on low price.  The protesters also argue that there was no 
meaningful analysis of the agency's conclusion that the government's 
estimate of the cost of in-house performance poses low technical and 
cost risk.

The protesters also argue that, although no discussions were conducted 
with Aero and Pemco while the agency was performing the business case 
analysis, the agency discussed the in-house cost estimate with Warner 
Robins and Ogden throughout the analysis.  In addition, the protesters 
argue that the Air Force violated proscriptions on disclosure and use 
of a competitor's proprietary information and violated prohibitions 
against assisting a competitor--in this case Warner Robins and 
Ogden--in preparing its proposal.  The protesters also argue that the 
Air Force failed to comply with the Department of Defense (DOD) cost 
comparison handbook, which requires, among other things, that audits 
of public awards be conducted by the Defense Contract Audit 
Administration or a public accounting firm and that the government's 
proposals be based on generally accepted accounting principles.  

Pemco and Aero also argue that the business case analysis performed by 
the agency was not realistic and fair, as required by section 2462(b), 
since it did not state the reasonable costs the agency could expect to 
incur to perform the PDM work.  For example, according to the 
protesters, the Air Force double counted overhead cost "savings" 
associated with the increased volume of work and decreased excess 
capacity at the depots.  They also argue that the agency unfairly 
added $9,556,958 to the contractor's proposal used in the cost 
comparison.  In addition, the protesters argue that the Air Force 
cannot substantiate or support its cost estimate and that the analysis 
did not consider depreciation costs, income tax deductions, or cost of 
money, and also did not adequately consider the cost of a C-130 flight 
test hangar which the Air Force is constructing at Ogden.  

ANALYSIS

As we explain in detail below, this Office has jurisdiction to 
consider whether the Air Force has a reasonable basis to cancel the 
RFP.  We also have authority to consider whether the Air Force acted 
contrary to 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 by deciding to cancel the procurement and 
perform the C-130 PDM work in-house, instead of contracting for it.  
Finally, on the merits of the protests, we conclude that the Air Force 
has a reasonable basis for cancelling the solicitation and that the 
agency's actions did not violate section 2462 or other applicable 
laws.

Jurisdiction

The Air Force's primary response to the protests is to argue that our 
Office has only limited jurisdiction over the issues raised.  
Specifically, the Air Force argues that our Office does not have 
jurisdiction to consider objections to the Air Force's management 
decision to perform the C-130 workload in-house, including the 
contention that the Air Force's action have violated 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462.  
We conclude that our Office has jurisdiction to consider these 
protests.

The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA), 31 U.S.C.A.  sec.  
3551-56 (West Supp. 1998), which establishes the procurement protest 
system under which we review the contracting actions of federal 
agencies, limits our review to consideration of objections to 
solicitations, cancellations of solicitations, proposed awards, and 
awards of contracts for the procurement of property or services, and 
to terminations of such awards under limited circumstances.  31 U.S.C.  sec.  
3551(1) (1994).  Thus, as the Air Force acknowledges, this Office has 
jurisdiction under CICA to review and decide objections to the 
cancellation of a solicitation.

CICA provides further that the Comptroller General shall decide 
protests "concerning an alleged violation of a procurement statute or 
regulation."  31 U.S.C.A.  sec.  3552.  Section 2462 of title 10 mandates 
that DOD agencies procure goods or services from a source in the 
private sector under specified circumstances, rather than from an 
agency source; therefore it is a procurement statute.  Thus, where, as 
here, a DOD agency issues a solicitation, receives and evaluates bids 
or proposals, and awards a contract, and then cancels the solicitation 
to take the work in-house, CICA grants us the authority to consider a 
protest that the agency did not comply with the requirements of 10 
U.S.C.  sec.  2462.[2]  In this case, therefore, we have jurisdiction to 
consider the propriety of the Air Force's decision to cancel the 
solicitation, including whether the effect of that decision--taking 
the C-130 PDM work in-house--is consistent with 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462.

Cancellation of the RFP

In a negotiated procurement, the contracting officer has broad 
authority to decide whether to cancel the solicitation; there need be 
only a reasonable basis for the cancellation.  Cantu Servs., Inc., 
B-219998.9, B-233697, Mar. 27, 1989, 89-1 CPD  para.  306 at 2.  So long as 
there is a reasonable basis for doing so, an agency may cancel a 
solicitation no matter when the information precipitating the 
cancellation first surfaces or should have been known, even if the 
solicitation is not canceled until after proposals have been submitted 
and evaluated, Peterson-Nunez Joint Venture, B-258788, Feb. 13, 1995, 
95-1 CPD  para.  73 at 4; Nomura Enter. Inc., B-251889.2, May 6, 1993, 93-1 
CPD  para.  490 at 3-4; after contract award, see Atlantic Scientific & 
Tech. Corp., B-276334.2, Oct. 27, 1997, 97-2 CPD  para.  116 at 2; or after 
the announcement of a different course of action in response to a GAO 
protest.  Id. at 1-2.  In addition, although we will consider a 
protester's contention that an agency's actual motivation in 
cancelling a solicitation is to avoid awarding a contract or is in 
response to the filing of a protest, see Griffin Servs. Inc., 
B-237268.2 et al., June 14, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  558 at 3, recon. denied, 
B-237268.3 et al., Nov. 7, 1990, 90-2 CPD  para.  369, if there is a 
reasonable basis for the cancellation, notwithstanding some element of 
personal animus, we will not object to the cancellation.  Dr. Robert 
J. Telepak, B-247681, June 29, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  4 at 4.

In a declaration prepared after the protests were filed, the Air 
Force's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and 
Management) explained that cancellation of the solicitation was in the 
best interests of the government for three reasons.  First, as Pemco 
and Aero were informed on March 3, the Air Force maintains that 
performance of the work in-house will reduce the cost of depot-level 
maintenance.  According to the Air Force, its business case analysis 
showed that the cost of performing the C-130 PDM work in-house would 
result in savings in excess of $14 million over 3 years.

Second, the Air Force's Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary asserts 
that cancelling the RFP is justified because the Air Force no longer 
requires an overflow contractor to perform C-130 PDM work in the 
United States and Europe.  According to her declaration, as a result 
of increased efficiency and dwindling workload, the Air Force's air 
logistics centers now have excess capacity that can be used to perform 
C-130 PDM work in-house.

Third, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary states that cancelling 
the solicitation and performing the C-130 PDM work in-house will 
facilitate the Air Force's compliance with limitations on contracting 
for depot-level maintenance and the best use of Air Force capacities 
and resources.  The Air Force notes that Congress has enacted a 
complex statutory regime to govern DOD's utilization of its depot 
facilities.  In particular, the Air Force notes that 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  
2466(a) (West Supp. 1998) prohibits the Air Force from contracting out 
more than 50 percent of its depot-level maintenance and repair work.  
According to the Air Force, in-house performance of the C-130 PDM work 
will facilitate the Air Force's ability to operate within that 
statutory limit.

The Air Force argues that any one of these reasons is sufficient to 
justify cancellation of the solicitation.  According to the Air Force, 
absent a demonstration that each of the three reasons lacks a 
reasonable basis, the cancellation must stand.

Pemco and Aero, on the other hand, argue that the Air Force could not 
have acted reasonably in cancelling the solicitation and bringing the 
work in-house if doing so violated 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462.  Thus, according 
to the protesters, since 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 requires that the decision 
as to whether to contract or to obtain a particular supply or service 
in-house is to be based on low cost, regardless of the merits of any 
other grounds for cancellation, if in-house performance of the C-130 
PDM work is not the lower cost alternative, then section 2462 requires 
that the PDM work be contracted out.

Although the Air Force correctly points out that section 2462 does not 
address the cancellation of a solicitation, we agree with Pemco and 
Aero that there could be no reasonable basis for cancelling the 
solicitation in order to bring work in-house if doing so violates 10 
U.S.C.  sec.  2462, which on its face governs decisions concerning whether 
to contract or perform work in-house.  As the protesters argue, 
section 2462(a) is a congressional mandate to allow private companies 
to provide goods and services to DOD unless the government can do so 
at a lower cost.  Thus, although DOD agencies historically have had 
broad discretion to manage resources and make decisions as to whether 
to contract out or perform work in-house, when 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 
applies, those decisions are required to be based on a determination 
of which source can provide a supply or service at the lower cost.  In 
other words, when it applies, section 2462(a) does not permit an 
agency to base such a decision on noncost factors.  See CC 
Distributors v. United States, 883 F.2d 146, 149, 154-156 (D.C. Cir. 
1989) (holding that under 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 and its implementing 
regulations, the decision about whether particular work should be 
performed in-house is not totally discretionary to agency officials); 
see also Diebold v. United States, 947 F.2d 787, 797 (6th Cir. 
1991).[3]

Nonetheless, although we conclude that 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 generally 
applies to DOD agency decisions as to whether to perform work in-house 
or to contract out, section 2462 is subject to the proviso:  "Except 
as otherwise provided by law."  We conclude that the proviso applies 
here--thereby negating the requirements of section 2462--since the Air 
Force determined--and the record supports that determination--that 
cancellation and performance of the work in-house were justified by 
the Air Force's need to comply with the limitation contained in 10 
U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a).  That provision states:

     Percentage limitation.--Not more than 50 percent of the funds 
     made available in a fiscal year to a military department or a 
     Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and repair workload 
     may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal 
     Government personnel of such workload for the military department 
     or the Defense Agency.  Any such funds that are not used for such 
     a contract shall be used for the performance of depot-level 
     maintenance and repair workload by employees of the Department of 
     Defense.

10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a). 

Pemco argues that the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" proviso 
does not apply here.  Pemco notes that 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 was originally 
set forth in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,  sec.  1223(a), 100 Stat. 3816, 3977 (1986).[4]  
Pemco also notes that a Senate report concerning 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 
states as follows:

     This provision will enable private industry to compete with the 
     government sector wherever possible with the following 
     exceptions: Firefighters (see applicable bill language) . . . and 
     Core Logistics functions as determined by last year's 
     authorization bill.

S. Rep. No. 99-331, at 277-278 (1986).

According to Pemco, this legislative history indicates that the 
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" proviso of 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 
exempts only firefighters and core logistics functions.  As Pemco 
notes, the solicited C-130 PDM work does not involve firefighters and 
is not a core logistics function.  Thus, Pemco argues, since there is 
nothing in the legislative history that suggests the drafters of 10 
U.S.C.  sec.  2462 or 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466 believed that 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466 
would fall within the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" 
exception, this Office should not interpret section 2466 as an 
exception to section 2462.

We do not agree with Pemco's interpretation.  When determining 
legislative intent, "the beginning point must be the language of the 
statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial 
inquiry into the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary 
circumstances, is finished."  Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992).  While the Senate report contains 
language suggesting that the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law" 
proviso should be limited to two specific circumstances--firefighters 
and core logistics functions--those specific circumstances were not 
included in the enacted version of section 2462.  Therefore, based on 
a plain reading of the statute, the exception is not limited to those 
circumstances.  Chicago City-Wide College, B-228593, Feb. 29, 1988, 
88-1 CPD  para.  208 at 5.  Under the circumstances, we conclude that the 
requirements of section 2466 can form the basis for an exception to 
the requirements of section 2462.

We now turn to the merits of the Air Force's determination that 
cancelling the solicitation is necessary to ensure compliance with 10 
U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a).  The Air Force argues that the agency's Principal 
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acquisition and Management) is cognizant 
of the overall depot environment and the statutory constraints imposed 
on the Air Force's management of its depots and that in managing the 
contracting activity ongoing at any one depot, she must consider 
current as well as future contract activity.  According to the Air 
Force, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary determined that 
performance of the C-130 PDM workload in-house reflected an 
appropriate allocation of in-house and contractor resources and would 
facilitate the Air Force's ability to operate within the 50-percent 
limit set by Congress in section 2466(a).  

In response to this contention, the protesters argue that the decision 
of the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary--that performance of the 
C-130 workload in-house would facilitate the Air Force's ability to 
operate within the limit of 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a)--has not been 
documented and there is no evidence in the record that the agency did 
any analysis to support that conclusion.  In addition, the protesters 
argue that the Air Force's own documents show that the conversion of 
this work to in-house performance will not seriously affect the 
ability to meet the workload ratio requirement.  The protesters argue 
that the C-130 PDM workload is worth approximately $27 million in 
fiscal year 1998 and note that the Air Force's documents show that 
bringing the C-130 PDM work in-house will effect a change of less than 
1 percent in the proportion of the Air Force's depot-level work that 
is performed in-house.

In response to our request, the Air Force provided the following 
further explanation of its need to cancel in order to ensure 
compliance with 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a).  According to the Air Force, 
due to section 2466(a), the agency's management of its depot system is 
tightly proscribed by law and, as a result, the agency must vigilantly 
manage its depot-level maintenance and repair workloads, carefully 
balancing the funds used for contracting and in-house performance.  
The Air Force notes that it must manage numerous contracting and 
organic actions that have or may have an effect on its ability to 
comply with the law.  The Air Force notes that information provided to 
GAO in connection with a statutorily required GAO audit of DOD 
compliance with section 2466 shows that, for fiscal year 1998, the 
difference between the funds provided to public depots (approximately 
$3.112 billion) and private contractors (approximately $2.503 billion) 
is approximately $600 million.  Thus, the Air Force points out that a 
shift of $300 million from the public depots to the private sector 
will result in the Air Force violating 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a).

In addition, the Air Force notes that each one of these decisions to 
contract out performance of depot-level maintenance and repair has an 
impact on and possibly precludes future decisions, because 
"headroom"--the amount of appropriated funds that the Air Force can 
use for contracting with the private sector for depot-level 
maintenance and repair without violating 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466--is a 
scarce resource.  The Air Force explains that, when it makes a 
decision to contract out, the agency loses its ability to use that 
"spent" headroom to contract for future depot-level maintenance and 
repair, which may, in retrospect, be more suitable for contractor 
performance because the depots do not have required capabilities.

As an additional factor complicating these decisions, the Air Force 
notes that, while in 1997 Congress amended section 2466 to 
increase--from 40 percent to 50 percent--the percentage of depot-level 
maintenance and repair workload that could be contracted out, at the 
same time, Congress also statutorily defined "depot-level maintenance 
and repair."  In this respect, "depot-level maintenance and repair" is 
now statutorily defined to include, among other things, "interim 
contractor support or contractor logistics support."  10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  
2460 (West Supp. 1998).  According to the Air Force, "interim 
contractor support or contractor logistics support" efforts have 
historically been performed by the private sector and the Air Force 
previously did not consider these efforts to be depot level 
maintenance and repair workload.  As a result, the Air Force argues 
that these revisions significantly altered the agency's balance of 
workload for purposes of section 2466 and greatly increased the need 
for close scrutiny of all depot-level source of repair assignments and 
the difficulty of complying with the limitation on contracting 
depot-level workload.  

Information provided to this Office in connection with the required 
audit of DOD compliance with section 2466(a) supports the Air Force's 
contention that it is close to the 50-percent limit for fiscal year 
1998 and later years.  In fact, that information shows that 45 percent 
of the funds available for depot-level maintenance and repair for 
fiscal year 1998 are to be spent on private sector contracts--placing 
the Air Force within 5 percent of the 50-percent limit of section 
2466.  While this situation could change, the agency is constrained 
by, among other factors, the fact that funds committed to contracts 
with the private sector are lost for the duration of those 
contracts.[5]  In any event, since the Air Force is projected to be 
close to the statutory limit, we think the agency must be allowed a 
reasonable exercise of discretion in determining what steps to take to 
remain within that limit.  Thus, in this case, since the Air Force is 
projected to be close to the 50-percent limit for fiscal year 1998, we 
conclude that it was a reasonable exercise of the agency's discretion 
to cancel the RFP in order to bring the C-130 PDM workload in-house.

Other Issues

The protesters, nonetheless, argue that cancelling the RFP cannot be 
justified by the need to comply with section 2466(a) since the Air 
Force is left violating the requirement of 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 that the 
Air Force perform a realistic and fair cost comparison in making its 
decision whether to contract out.  We do not agree.  Although the 
protesters argue that nothing in section 2466(a) specifically negates 
section 2462's mandatory cost comparison requirement, as explained 
above, the cost comparison provision of section 2462 is negated in 
this case by the "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law," language of 
section 2462 itself and by section 2466(a), which, in fact, otherwise 
provides.

In this respect, an agency needs only one reasonable basis to cancel a 
solicitation and there is no reason to consider the other grounds 
offered by the Air Force to justify the cancellation--that 
cancellation and performance of the work in-house will reduce the cost 
of depot-level maintenance and that the Air Force no longer requires 
an overflow contractor to perform C-130 PDM work.  Thus, since the Air 
Force's reliance on section 2466 means that the section 2462(a) 
provision requiring  the decision to be based on low cost does not 
apply here, even if in-house performance, in fact, will cost more, the 
cancellation is still reasonable.  Accordingly, there is no reason to 
consider allegations by Pemco and Aero that the Air Force's cost 
comparison, or business case analysis, amounted to an unfair 
competition between the private firms and the Air Force depots or that 
the business case analysis was flawed.  Since, as we explained above, 
cancelling the solicitation was reasonable--based on the need to 
ensure compliance with 10 U.S.C.A.  sec.  2466(a)--there is no reason to 
consider the other grounds offered by the Air Force to justify the 
cancellation or the protesters' allegations concerning those other 
grounds.

The protesters argue that the Air Force has unreasonably failed to 
take the corrective action which it promised and that the real reason 
for cancelling the solicitation was not section 2466(a).  For example, 
Pemco argues, as it did in its reconsideration request, that the 
agency's actions were calculated to deny Pemco a contract in order to 
punish Pemco for filing its earlier protest.  According to Pemco, this 
contention is supported by an article in an Air Force publication, 
"The Inspector General Brief," which, according to Pemco, 
misrepresents the facts of pending litigation between Pemco and the 
Air Force.  

As explained above, so long as there is a reasonable basis for doing 
so, an agency may cancel a solicitation after the announcement of a 
different course of action in response to a GAO protest.  See Atlantic 
Scientific & Technology Corp., supra, at 1-2.  In addition, if there 
is a reasonable basis for cancelling a solicitation, notwithstanding 
some element of personal animus, we will not object to the 
cancellation.  Dr. Robert J. Telepak, supra, at 4.  Here, the 
protesters have offered no credible evidence showing that the 
cancellation was based upon animus toward either firm.  In any event, 
since the Air Force has provided a reasonable basis for cancelling the 
solicitation, neither the timing of the announcement of that basis nor 
the possibility of personal animus provides grounds for sustaining 
this protest.

Finally, Pemco argues that it is entitled to be reimbursed for the 
costs of preparing its proposal.  The sole basis for this assertion is 
Pemco's argument that the solicitation was improperly canceled.  CICA, 
31 U.S.C.  sec.  3554(c)(1) (1994), and our implementing regulations, 4 
C.F.R.  sec.  21.8(d) (1998), provide for the recommended reimbursement of 
proposal preparation costs only where our Office determines that "a 
solicitation for a contract or a proposed award or the award of a 
contract does not comply with a statute or regulation."  In this case, 
since the challenged cancellation was proper, and since there has been 
no showing that the agency has acted contrary to statute or 
regulation, there is no basis to recommend the recovery of these 
costs.  See Bahan Dennis Inc., B-249496.3, Mar. 3, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  
184 at 6.

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. Pemco requested reconsideration of our dismissal of its earlier 
protest.  Among other allegations, Pemco argued that we should 
reconsider its protest as a result of the Air Force's failure to 
promptly take the promised corrective action.  Pemco also protested 
that the Air Force had improperly canceled the solicitation.  In Pemco 
Aeroplex, Inc.--Recon. and Costs, B-275587.5, B-275587.6, Oct. 14, 
1997, 97-2 CPD  para.  102, we denied Pemco's reconsideration request and 
protest. 

2. We do not decide here whether we would have jurisdiction if the Air 
Force had simply issued the solicitation and canceled it without 
receiving and evaluating proposals and making award.

3. In the past we have declined to review DOD agency decisions 
concerning whether to perform work in-house or to contract out because 
we considered such decisions to be a matter of executive branch 
policy, Nomura Enter. Inc., supra, at 4; Daniels Mfg. Corp., B-253637, 
June 7, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  439, except where the challenged agency had 
used the procurement system by issuing a solicitation for the purpose 
of conducting a cost comparison under Office of Management and Budget 
Circular A-76.  Daniels Mfg. Corp., supra.,  W. B. & A., Inc., 
B-229926.3, May 19, 1988, 88-1 CPD  para.  475 at 2.  We are unaware of any 
previous instance in which a protester has raised 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2462 as 
the basis for challenging an agency's decision to cancel a 
solicitation to bring work in-house.

4. This section was originally set forth at 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304.

5. The Air Force is preparing to conduct public-private competitions 
for extensive workloads at the Sacramento Air Logistics Center and the 
San Antonio Air Logistics Center.  See Public-Private Competitions:  
Review of Sacramento Air Force Depot Solicitation, GAO/OGC-98-48, and 
Public-Private Competitions:  Review of San Antonio Air Force Depot 
Solicitation, GAO/OGC-98-49.  These competitions each have a potential 
value of more than $2 billion over a number of years.  These workloads 
could have a substantial impact upon the Air Force's ability to comply 
with the 50-percent limit.