BNUMBER:  B-274654; B-274654.2; B-274654.3; B-274654.4; B-274654.5
DATE:  December 26, 1996
TITLE:  International Data Products, Corp.; I-NET, Inc.;
and Dunn Computer Corp.

**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:International Data Products, Corp.; I-NET, Inc.;
             and Dunn Computer Corp.

File:     B-274654; B-274654.2; B-274654.3; B-274654.4; B-274654.5

Date:December 26, 1996

Carl J. Peckinpaugh, Esq., and Eric J. Marcotte, Esq., Winston & 
Strawn, for International Data Products, Corp.; Richard J. Conway, 
Esq., and Robert J. Moss, Esq., Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshinsky, 
L.L.P., for I-Net, Inc.; and Edward J. Tolchin, Esq., Fettman, Tolchin 
& Majors, P.C., for Dunn Computer Corp., the protesters.
Marcia G. Madsen, Esq., Scott E. Pickens, Esq., David F. Dowd, Esq., 
and Jessica C. Abrahams, Esq., Miller & Chevalier, for Hughes Data 
Systems, the intervenor.
Lisa J. Obayashi, Esq., and Alden F. Abbott, Esq., Department of 
Commerce, for the agency., for the agency.
Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protesters rated eighth and ninth in overall technical merit are 
interested parties for the purpose of pursuing a protest where both 
claim their proposals were improperly evaluated, both offered lower 
prices than the awardee, and the solicitation called for award to the 
offeror whose proposal was found most advantageous to the government.  
Under these circumstances, if their protests were sustained, either 
protester could be in line for award.  

2.  Contention that agency improperly evaluated proposals is denied 
where the record shows that the evaluation was reasonable and in 
accordance with the stated evaluation criteria.

3.  Where solicitation requires offerors to provide technical 
literature to demonstrate commerciality and compliance with 
specifications, a proposal's affirmative response to a solicitation 
requirement that is contradicted by the required technical data 
generally cannot be reasonably accepted by agency evaluators.  

4.  Contention that agency improperly made award on the basis of 
initial proposals is denied where the record shows that the 
solicitation clearly indicated the agency's intent to make award 
without discussions if possible, and that the evaluation reasonably 
determined that discussions were not needed to determine the proposal 
offering the best value to the government.

5.  Claim that Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  15.610(c) required the 
agency to give the protester an opportunity to comment on adverse 
reports of past performance is denied because the cited regulation has 
no application where the agency does not otherwise hold discussions.

6.  Argument that the agency selection official failed to make an 
independent and properly documented selection decision is denied where 
the record shows that the selection official reasonably relied upon 
and adopted the findings set forth in a detailed best value analysis 
prepared by the evaluation panel.

DECISION

International Data Products, Corp.; I-NET, Inc.; and Dunn Computer 
Corp. protest the award of a contract to Hughes Data Systems pursuant 
to request for proposals (RFP) No. 52-PAPT-5-00005, issued by the 
Patent and Trademark Office, Department of Commerce, for computer 
workstations.  All three protesters challenge the agency's evaluation 
of their proposed workstations, and all argue that the agency's 
selection of Hughes' proposal over theirs was unreasonable.

The protests are denied.

BACKGROUND

The RFP here anticipated award of a fixed-price, indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity contract for two levels of workstations (level 1 
and level 2) comprised of commercially-available, off-the-shelf (and 
in current production), desktop microcomputers and peripherals for the 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).  RFP  sec.  C.2.  In addition, the 
solicitation sought technical support services and a warranty.  The 
contract period was for a base year and two 1-year option periods, and 
the agency reserved the right to make award based on initial 
proposals.  

Potential offerors were advised that the agency would evaluate 
proposals using four evaluation factors--technical, past performance, 
management and price--the first three of which would be scored using 
adjectival and numerical ratings.  The price factor was not to be 
scored, but was to be evaluated by totaling the price for the base 
year and both options.  Section M of the RFP explained that the 
technical factor was slightly more important than the past performance 
factor, which in turn was slightly more important than the management 
factor.  In addition, section M explained that the technical, past 
performance and management factors combined were slightly more 
important than price.  Section M further advised that award would be 
made to the offeror whose proposal presented the best value to the 
government.  

The RFP identified several subfactors under each of the three scored 
evaluation factors.  These were:

Technical
  -- Product quality and technical sufficiency
  -- Lifecycle service quality
  -- Commerciality

Past Performance
  -- Degree and relevance of current and past experience and 
performance
  -- Customer satisfaction with performance

Management
  -- Production and delivery capability
  -- Order processing capability
  -- Management approach

As with the evaluation factors, the RFP assigned relative weights to 
the evaluation subfactors.[1]  

By the January 18, 1996, closing date, the agency received 20 
proposals. After eliminating three substantially noncompliant 
proposals, the agency evaluated the remaining 17 proposals using four 
separate teams, one for each of the four evaluation factors.  The 
teams evaluating the technical, past performance, and management 
factors assigned ratings of outstanding (scores from 90-100), 
excellent (scores from 80-89), good (scores from 70-79), marginally 
acceptable (scores from 60-69), or unacceptable (scores from 0-59), 
for each appropriate factor and subfactors.

After completion of the initial review, each team reported the results 
of its evaluation to the source selection evaluation board (SSEB).  
The following table shows the total score for all three scored factors 
and the total price for each acceptable offeror.

                                  Total      Price
     Offeror                      Score (in millions)  

     Hughes                       89.48    $152.0
     I-Net                        84.57  [deleted]
     Company A -- Alternate       78.85    $151.4
     Company A -- Primary         77.99    $150.5
     Company B                    76.80    $161.2
     Company C -- Primary         76.25    $146.7
     Company C -- Alternate       75.89    $143.5
     IDP                          73.82  [deleted]
     Dunn                         71.41  [deleted]
     Company D                    71.28    $132.9
     Company E                    68.18    $155.3
     Company F                    67.37    $171.5
     Company G                    64.37    $159.9
     Company H                    60.90    $158.2
     Company I                    54.54    $154.4
     Company J                    52.72    $162.7
     Company K                    47.40    $142.3

To streamline its comparison of the relative merits of the 17 
evaluated proposals, the SSEB elected to create six clusters of three 
proposals each beginning with the lowest price offer to the highest 
priced offer.  The price range between proposals within each cluster 
ranged from 0.8 percent to 5.6 percent.  For each cluster, the agency 
compared the favorable, unfavorable and neutral impacts of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposals in that cluster.  The agency 
then selected the offer within each cluster that represented the best 
value to the government.  Upon completion of this analysis, the agency 
compared the following six offers:

                                   Price          Score
     Offeror                  (in millions)         Ranking 
     
     IDP                       [deleted]         5
     Company C -- Primary        $146.7          4
     Hughes                      $152.0          1
     Company E                   $155.3          6
     Company B                   $161.2          3
     I-Net                     [deleted]         2

After again comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the 
offers emerging from each cluster, the SSEB decided that the agency 
could award without discussions, and advised the source selection 
official (SSO) that the proposal submitted by Hughes Data 
Systems--which received the highest merit rating with a price in the 
middle of the price range--represented the best value to the 
government.  On August 23, the SSO awarded the contract to Hughes and 
these protests followed.

INTERESTED PARTY STATUS OF IDP AND DUNN

During the course of these proceedings, Hughes and the agency 
repeatedly sought dismissal of the protests filed by IDP and Dunn on 
the grounds that neither is an interested party for purposes of filing 
a bid protest under our regulations.  See Bid Protest Regulations, 
section 21.0(a), 61 Fed. Reg. 39,039, 39,042 (1996) (to be codified at 
4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.0(a)).  According to the requests for dismissal, since 
IDP and Dunn are ranked eighth and ninth, respectively, in total 
merit, they are presumably not in line for award if their protests are 
sustained and therefore lack the direct economic interest necessary to 
contest the procurement.  

The requests here overlook the substance of the issues raised by both 
of these protesters.  Both claim that their proposals were improperly 
evaluated, and that if they were evaluated correctly, their proposals 
would have been found to be the most advantageous to the government.  
Since neither the agency nor Hughes can state with certainty that, 
upon reevaluation, the relative standing of these proposals would not 
change, and since both proposals included prices significantly lower 
than the price offered by Hughes, IDP and Dunn clearly are interested 
parties under our Bid Protest Regulations.  Id.; Bendix Field Eng'g 
Corp., B-246236, Feb. 25, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  227 at 5; Textron Marine 
Sys., B-243693, Aug. 19, 1991, 91-2 CPD  para.  162 at 4. 

IDP'S PROTEST

The agency's review of IDP's proposal led it to conclude that IDP's 
equipment was noncompliant with several material requirements in the 
specification.  As a result, IDP received a relatively low technical 
score of 71.20, which contributed significantly to its overall ranking 
as 8th of 17 in the area of total merit.  Nonetheless, when IDP was 
compared with other similarly-priced offerors in its cluster, its 
offer emerged as the best value of those three offers.  In comparison 
with the other cluster finalists, IDP offered the lowest price, but 
ranked 5th of 6 in total merit.  Ultimately, the agency concluded that 
the relative strengths of the Hughes proposal--indicated by its 
significantly higher total merit rating of 89.48 versus IDP's 
73.82--justified its higher price--i.e., $152.0 million versus IDP's 
[deleted] million. 

IDP argues that the agency's evaluation of its technical proposal was 
unreasonable, and that the resulting score used to compare IDP's 
proposal with those of Hughes and other offerors did not accurately 
reflect the merits of its approach.  Specifically, IDP challenges the 
agency's finding that its proposal was inconsistent in at least 10 
separate areas, leading the agency to conclude that it could not be 
sure that the equipment offered complied with the solicitation's 
requirements.[2]  In addition, IDP challenges the agency's assessment 
of its benchmark test data, and argues that PTO should have held 
discussions rather than making award on initial proposals because many 
of the agency's concerns could have been easily answered.  
In considering a protest against an agency's evaluation of proposals, 
we will examine the record to determine whether the agency's judgment 
was reasonable and consistent with stated evaluation criteria and 
applicable states and regulations.  ESCO, Inc., 66 Comp. Gen. 404 
(1987), 87-1 CPD  para.  450.  Here, we have compared the narrative portion 
of IDP's proposal with the technical literature and the completed 
contract line item (CLIN) matrices provided therein, the evaluation 
materials, IDP's pleadings, and PTO's responses.  As a result of our 
review, we find no basis for concluding that the evaluation was 
unreasonable or not in accordance with the stated evaluation criteria.  
To illustrate our conclusion, we will discuss in detail three of the 
areas where IDP's proposal was downgraded by the PTO.

As a first example, IDP argues that the agency unreasonably concluded 
that one of its proposed bar code scanners did not meet a required 
specification.  The RFP here contained two separate CLINs for bar code 
scanners--a laser scanner (CLIN 018), and a network scanner (CLIN 
019).  The RFP required both scanners to include an audible indicator 
to permit a user to differentiate between an acceptable read, an 
unacceptable read, and a transmission.  RFP  sec.  C.2.6.5, C.2.6.6. 

The dispute here--and in many of IDP's contentions--involves an 
inconsistency between portions of IDP's proposal.  Section L.25 of the 
RFP set forth discrete requirements for the technical proposals to be 
submitted in response to this solicitation.  Specifically, section 
L.25.2.2 required offerors to "concisely describe the physical and 
environmental characteristics of offered products . . . ."  Within the 
same section, offerors were also required to provide additional 
documentation for certain of the products here.  This documentation 
was especially important given the RFP's requirement that the offered 
equipment be off-the-shelf commercially available products.  The 
provision explained this requirement as follows:

     "For the Level 1 and Level 2 workstations (CLINS 001AA and 
     001AB), the 17" monitor (CLIN 002AA), and the network laser 
     printer (CLIN 016AA), Offeror shall provide one of the following:  
     an annotated photograph, appropriate available marketing 
     material, or an annotated engineering drawing.  
     Photos/drawings/other material shall show the interior and 
     exterior of the workstations and printer, and the exterior of the 
     monitor.  Annotation shall include, at a minimum, showing 
     dimensions and labeling of major components and controls."

Id.  Finally, the RFP also required proposals to include completed 
matrices showing detailed specification compliance information and 
reliability statistics.  Id.; RFP  sec.  L.24.3.  PTO's evaluators paid 
close attention to the symmetry between an offeror's narrative claims 
of compliance; the details of the required photographs, drawings, or 
other material which helped establish the commerciality of the offered 
products; and the detailed CLIN matrix, which provided a complete 
checklist of specification compliance.

In the narrative portion of its proposal, IDP includes the following 
statement about its laser scanner (CLIN 018):  "[s]upports visible and 
audible indicators for system status and error conditions."  IDP 
Technical Proposal at I-2-22.  The technical literature following this 
section is silent on the subject of audible indicators.  Id. at first 
unnumbered page after I-2-22.  In its completed CLIN matrix, IDP 
inserted the term "visible" in response to the matrix request to 
indicate the type (visible, audible, visible/audible, other) of 
indicator proposed for the laser scanner (CLIN 018).  Id. at 
I-CLIN1-13.  In contrast, IDP inserted the terms "visible (LED) & 
audible" in response for the network scanner (CLIN 019).  Id.  The 
agency downgraded IDP in this area, because it could not conclude for 
certain that IDP was proposing a compliant laser scanner for CLIN 018.

In its comments, IDP responds to this criticism as follows:

     "In this instance, the [g]overnment is correct that IDP's 
     description of the CLIN-018 scanner in the CLIN Matrix does not 
     indicate it had audible indicator capability.  However, IDP does 
     state that the scanner '[s]upports visible and audible indicators 
     for system status and error correction.'  [Citation omitted.]  
     IDP's affirmative response to this requirement should be 
     accepted."

IDP Comments, Nov. 1, 1996, at 8-9.

In our view, the protester's argument on this issue is unpersuasive.  
A proposal's affirmative response to a requirement that is 
contradicted by required technical data generally cannot be reasonably 
accepted by agency evaluators.  Koehring Cranes & Excavators; Komatsu 
Dresser Co., B-245731.2; B-245731.3, Nov. 23, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  362 at 
7.  Accord University Systems, Inc., General Services Board of 
Contract Appeals Nos. 10818-P; 10924-P, Dec. 20, 1990, 91-1 BCA  para.  
23,617, 1990 BPD  para.  434 at 6-7.  The record here shows that when 
answering the CLIN matrix for the network scanner, IDP indicated that 
its scanner included indicators both "visible (LED) & audible."  This 
specificity on the network scanner reasonably caused the agency 
evaluators to be concerned when the response on the laser scanner 
portion of the matrix--located in close proximity to the complete 
response quoted above--stated only "visible."  In addition, IDP's bald 
statement that the agency was wrong not to accept its affirmative but 
general response in the narrative--i.e., that the scanner "supports" 
both audible and visible indicators--without rationale or 
justification, offers no basis to conclude otherwise.

A second example is IDP's offered mouse.  The brief narrative 
description of IDP's proposed workstation makes no mention of the 
mouse, but states that the offered equipment meets the government's 
requirements.  Id. at I-2-1.  The narrative's reference to the 
technical literature immediately following this portion of the 
narrative states, "[t]he attached brochure further illustrates the 
characteristics of the Level 1/Level 2 Workstation being proposed to 
the [g]overnment by IDP. . . ."  Id.  The attached brochure states, 
"[t]he Ergonomic Microsoft compatible two button mouse is provided 
standard."  Id. at first unnumbered page immediately following I-2-1.  
The reference to a two-button mouse in the technical brochure 
conflicts with the solicitation's requirement for a three-button 
mouse, RFP  sec.  C.2.1.7, and is contradicted by the completed CLIN 
matrix, which indicates that IDP is offering a three-button mouse.  
Id. at I-CLIN1-2.  Faced with a conflict between the required 
technical literature and the required CLIN matrix, the agency 
evaluators concluded that it was unclear if IDP was offering to comply 
with the solicitation.  Again, IDP was downgraded in this area, and 
again, for the reasons stated above we conclude that the agency's 
evaluation was reasonable given the conflicting information in the 
proposal.  Koehring Cranes & Excavators; Komatsu Dresser Co., supra.

A third example is the operating speed for IDP's proposed hard drive.  
For this item, the RFP required an internal hard drive with a 10 MB or 
faster data transfer rate.  RFP  sec.  C.2.3.1.  IDP's narrative expressly 
addressed this requirement stating, "[d]ata transfer rate of 5.26 
MB/s."  IDP Technical Proposal at I-2-7.  The technical data following 
this section stated: 

        Data Transfer Rate:
           -- Buffer to Host  5.26 MB/s (sustained)
                              11.1 MB/s (burst PIO, Mode 3)
                              13.3 MB/s (burst DMA, Mode 1) 

Id. at first unnumbered page immediately following I-2-7.  Finally, 
IDP's completed CLIN stated that the offered rate was 5.26 MB/s.  Id. 
at I-CLIN1-9.  Based on the statements in the narrative and the CLIN 
matrix, the PTO evaluators concluded that IDP was offering a hard 
drive with an operating speed of 5.26 MB/s and that the speed was not 
in compliance with the RFP's requirements.  

IDP argues that the agency evaluation was unreasonable because the 
technical literature provided with the proposal, quoted above, showed 
that under certain burst scenarios, IDP's offered hard drive could 
transfer data at speeds higher than 10 MB.  The agency responds that 
it was seeking a sustained speed and that IDP's answers in the CLIN 
matrix and in its narrative providing the sustained speed of the hard 
drive show that IDP understood the agency's requirement but did not 
meet it.  Based on our review of these materials, we agree.  IDP's 
responses in its narrative and CLIN matrix are straightforward and 
unambiguous, and we see nothing unreasonable in the agency's 
conclusion that IDP was offering a data transfer rate of 5.26 MB/s.

In addition to the specifics of the discussion above, our review shows 
that there is no consistency in IDP's argument about which source of 
compliance information in its proposal--i.e., the narrative, the 
required technical literature, or the completed CLIN matrix--controls 
in any given situation.  To illustrate this issue more clearly, the 
matrix below shows where, according to IDP, the agency should have 
focused its review in order to determine IDP's compliance with the 
solicitation in each instance.  As the table shows, IDP seeks to 
designate as controlling whichever portion of the proposal comes 
closest to demonstrating its compliance.

      ITEM          NARRATIVE      TECH. LIT.     CLIN MATRIX

Bar Code Scanner    compliant        silent      not compliant

3 Button Mouse       silent       not compliant    compliant

Hard Drive Speed  not compliant     compliant    not compliant
Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that IDP has shown that 
the agency's concern about the compliance of the proposed equipment 
was unreasonable.

IDP also argues that the agency unreasonably rejected its benchmark 
test data and erred in not asking IDP to clarify its proposal or 
alternatively, in not holding discussions.  

The RFP, at section L.25.3, required offerors to perform and provide 
the results of benchmark tests on their proposed hardware.  The 
provision required that the tests be performed using the same make and 
model of equipment as offered, configured as required by PTO.  Upon 
reviewing the results of IDP's benchmark tests, the agency concluded 
that the benchmark tests were invalid because IDP failed in several 
instances to perform the testing as required.  Specifically, PTO noted 
that IDP ran its benchmark tests without installing the required 
CD-ROM, and using a video card that was not in compliance with the 
required settings for resolution, color and refresh rates.   IDP does 
not contradict the agency's specific findings, but argues that any 
discrepancies were minor, should not invalidate the testing, and 
should not be used as a pass-fail requirement.

Our review shows that the requirement for benchmark testing in the RFP 
was clear, and was closely evaluated by the agency panel.  In IDP's 
case, evaluators expressed concern that there was a risk that IDP's 
equipment might not work as the benchmark tests indicated because the 
tests were not properly performed.  Other than its claim that any 
discrepancies were minor, IDP does not address the agency's concerns 
in this area, or otherwise show that they were unreasonable.  In 
addition, although certain summaries in the evaluation material 
describe the benchmark tests as invalid, there is no evidence that 
this was a pass-fail item as IDP argues.  Despite its failure to 
perform the benchmark tests properly--which IDP concedes--its proposal 
was nonetheless evaluated as offering the best value in its cluster, 
and IDP remained in the running for award.  Given the record here, we 
think the agency reasonably identified a risk in IDP's proposal based 
on its failure to perform these tests properly.

With respect to IDP's contention that the agency should have asked IDP 
to clarify its proposal, or held discussions with IDP, the RFP clearly 
indicated that, if possible, the agency would make award based on 
initial proposals.  In this regard, amendment A005 added the clause 
found at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  52.215-16, Alt. II, to 
advise potential offerors that their initial proposals should contain 
their best cost/price and technical terms.  In such cases, the burden 
is on the offeror to submit an initial proposal that adequately 
demonstrates its merits.  Norden Sys., Inc., B-255343.3, Apr. 14, 
1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  257 at 7-8.  The record shows that IDP's proposal 
contained numerous inconsistencies leaving the evaluators unsure about 
whether the proposed equipment would meet the agency's needs.  In 
addition, even within the few examples set forth herein, it appears 
that IDP did not meet the requirements for the internal hard drive 
speed, and may not have offered the required audible indicators for 
its laser scanner.  Given that the agency received several other 
proposals that demonstrated significantly greater merit, and given 
that the agency was able to accept one of those offers without 
discussion, we have no basis to disagree with the PTO's actions.[3]  
Id. 

DUNN'S PROTEST

The agency's evaluation of Dunn's proposal identified 16 technical 
weaknesses and 7 risks, resulting in an overall merit rating of 71.41, 
and a merit ranking of 9th of 17.  Dunn's price was [deleted] million, 
the third lowest.  When the agency performed its best value analysis, 
described above, Dunn's proposal was compared to the proposal 
submitted by IDP (the lowest-priced offeror) and another offeror 
(whose proposal presented the second lowest price).  For the record, 
we note that IDP's lower-priced proposal also received a higher score 
than Dunn's proposal.   After a  comparison of the three proposals in 
this cluster, Dunn's proposal did not emerge as the one offering the 
best value, and Dunn ultimately was not selected for award. 

Dunn argues that the agency's evaluation of its technical proposal was 
unreasonable and failed to follow the stated evaluation scheme.  In 
addition, Dunn argues that the agency unreasonably failed to hold 
discussions about the perceived technical deficiencies in its 
proposal, and about adverse reports of Dunn's past performance.  Dunn 
also contends that the agency's documentation of its cost/technical 
tradeoff was deficient, and failed to include an assessment by the 
SSO.

Technical Evaluation Issues

In its challenge to the agency's technical evaluation, Dunn argues 
that PTO improperly downgraded its proposal for failing to provide 
sufficient narrative information; considered the wrong documentation 
in its review; and reached unreasonable conclusions about several 
facets of the proposal.  These include:  the validity of its benchmark 
testing; inconsistencies in the proposal; the evaluation of its 
network interface card; whether its mouse and communications ports 
were integral to its motherboard; and the evaluation of its data bus 
speed and its proposed SIMMS (single in-line memory module) chips.  
After reviewing the record here, we find no basis for concluding that 
the agency's technical evaluation was unreasonable in any area but 
one--i.e., PTO's identification of the claimed Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) certification of Dunn's network interface card as a 
weakness.  While we agree with Dunn in this one area, we do not agree 
that this issue adversely affected its standing in this procurement in 
any material way.  To illustrate, we will set forth in detail three of 
Dunn's challenges, including the challenge to the evaluation of its 
network interface card.  

As a first example, Dunn's initial and supplemental protests take 
issue with PTO's evaluation of documentation included in the proposal.  
First, Dunn complains that the agency looked, almost by rote, in each 
of three areas of the proposal to assure that the solicitation's 
requirements were repeated in each place.  Dunn complains that this 
type of evaluation is unreasonable, and does not ultimately assess the 
relative merits of each proposal.  In our view, Dunn's complaint 
oversimplifies the agency's approach, misses the point of the discrete 
categories of information requested by the RFP, and mischaracterizes 
the agency's review of proposals.

As explained in response to the IDP protest, section L.25 of the RFP 
set forth several discrete requirements for the technical proposals 
here--a narrative discussion of the characteristics of offered 
products, additional technical documentation (photographs, brochures, 
engineering drawings), and completed matrices showing detailed 
specification compliance information and reliability statistics.  Id.; 
RFP  sec.  L.24.3.  As also explained in response to IDP's protest, PTO's 
evaluators reviewed the symmetry between the different portions of the 
proposal.

Despite Dunn's complaint that the agency unreasonably sought 
repetition of specification compliance in triplicate for each proposal 
and downgraded those which failed to provide it, the record shows that 
this is not how the materials were used.  While PTO correctly 
identified any inconsistency among narrative claims, supporting 
documentation, and the CLIN matrix--for example, spotting 
inconsistencies between the claimed configuration of Dunn's drive bays 
and the resolution and refresh rates claimed for its 17 inch 
monitor--there was no requirement that each of these discrete proposal 
sections address every element of the specification.  Thus, Dunn's 
complaint about the agency's approach to reviewing proposals is not 
supported by the record.

Dunn's supplemental protest also claims that the agency's evaluation 
of "documentation" violates section C.4.5 of the RFP, wherein PTO 
describes documentation to be provided with the equipment.  The 
provision begins, "[a]t workstation delivery, the Contractor shall 
furnish, at no additional cost, one copy per workstation of the most 
current version of user manuals . . . ."  Pointing to this section, 
Dunn argues that "[i]t is obvious from the [a]gency's [r]eport that 
PTO analyzed the wrong 'documentation' in its evaluation."  Dunn 
Supplemental Protest, October 31, 1996, at 5.  

Dunn's apparent assertion--that the agency erred because it considered 
documentation furnished with the proposal rather than the user manuals 
to be furnished at delivery--provides no basis for concluding that the 
agency evaluation was improper.  Dunn makes no attempt to explain how 
user manuals to be provided at the time workstations are delivered 
could be reviewed by evaluators and used to discriminate among 
offerors, and we will not consider this assertion further.

A second example of Dunn's challenge to the agency's evaluation of its 
technical proposal is its complaint that PTO unreasonably assessed a 
weakness against Dunn for its benchmark testing on its 17" monitor.  
In this regard, section L.25.3 of the RFP required offerors to submit 
the results of benchmark tests on their equipment using the same make 
and model offered, and configured as specified by the RFP.  As 
initially issued, the RFP sought a minimum non-interlaced resolution 
of 1280 x 1024 pixels for the monitor, and a refresh rate of 72 Hz.  
RFP  sec.  C.2.2.1.  The requirement for the refresh rate was later revised 
upwards--to 75 Hz.  RFP, Amend. A005, page 46 of 54.  In addition, 
amendment A005 included a question from an offeror about the 
appropriate setting for this element of the benchmark test, as 
follows:

     "Question/Comment 211:  What screen resolution should be used for 
     the benchmark tests for the Level 1 Workstation and the Level 2 
     Workstation?

     "Response:  The PTO intends that offerors use the section C.2.2 
     specified minimum screen resolution and color support for the 
     benchmarks.  The PTO will use that specified resolution in its 
     benchmark validations."

Id. at page 43 of 54.

Despite these directions, Dunn's benchmark data showed that its 
testing was performed using a resolution setting of 1024 x 768.  
Dunn's narrative description of its 17" monitor states "[t]he 
non-interlaced maximum resolution is 1024 x 768 at 72 Hz."  (For the 
record, Dunn's protest states that the resolution was set at 800 x 
600, and Dunn's CLIN matrix states the correct resolution--1280 x 
1024-- with a compliant refresh rate of 85 Hz.)  Faced with this 
information--with the exception of the protest claim, of course--PTO's 
evaluators concluded that Dunn's benchmark testing had not been 
performed in compliance with the testing requirements and could not be 
used to establish the conformity of the equipment.  

In its initial protest filing, Dunn argues that the statement in its 
narrative that the maximum resolution of its 17" monitor is "1024 x 
768 at 72 Hz." is a typographical error.[4]  Dunn Initial Protest, 
Sept. 20, 1996, at 6.  In its comments, Dunn concedes that 
"[a]pparently, Dunn did not notice one of hundreds of questions and 
answers in which PTO announced an 'intent,' but not a requirement, 
with respect to a display setting."  Dunn Comments on the Agency 
Report, Oct. 31, 1996, at 2.  

In our view, these arguments do not amount to a showing that the 
agency evaluation was unreasonable.  The RFP stated the requirement in 
uncertain terms, and the offeror's question included in amendment A005 
further amplified PTO's view of how the tests should be performed.  
Given Dunn's divergent responses outlined above, we do not see how the 
agency could have concluded that Dunn's equipment could comply with 
the resolution/refresh requirement, or could have been tested as 
compliant.  Finally, while we share Dunn's view of the difficulty of 
poring through the "hundreds of questions and answers" set forth in 
amendment 
A005, ultimately Dunn is responsible for errors of typography and 
oversight, not the agency.  See Infotec Dev., Inc., B-258198; 
B-258198.2; B-258198.3, Dec. 27, 1994, 95-1 CPD  para.  52 at 6 (an offeror 
bears the burden to submit an adequately written proposal, especially 
where the offeror is on notice that the agency intends to make award 
based on initial proposals without discussions).

Our third example of the technical issues raised here--and an area 
where we agree with Dunn--is the PTO's assessment of a weakness in 
Dunn's proposal for its failure to provide an FCC Class B certified 
network interface card (NIC) for the network printer.  RFP  sec.  C.2, 
entitled "Mandatory Specifications," stated 

     "[t]he Level 1 and Level 2 workstations and all peripherals shall 
     be FCC Class B certified.  All electronic components with 
     external connections that may be added to the workstations or 
     peripherals shall also be FCC Class B certified in order to 
     maintain the integrity of certification."

Within the CLIN matrix required to be completed by each offeror, under 
CLIN 016AC, entitled "Network Interface for Network Laser Printer," 
was a checklist of 14 discrete specification requirements applicable 
to this device.  The last of the 14 required the offeror to 
indicate--with a yes or no answer--whether the offered product was FCC 
class B certified.  Instead of answering yes or no, Dunn entered "FCC 
class A."  The evaluation panel cited this issue as one of Dunn's 16 
technical weaknesses.

The unavailability of FCC class B certification for the printer NIC 
had been brought to PTO's attention prior to the submission of 
proposals.  Specifically, an offeror asked a question, which was set 
forth in amendment A008, which asked:

     "Question/Comment 234:  The [g]overnment requires that the 
     network interface adapter for the network laser printer be FCC 
     Class B certified.  There are many network laser printers that 
     are FCC Class B certified; however, their accompanying network 
     interface adapters are only FCC Class A compliant.  We have been 
     able to confirm with several manufacturers that their network 
     interface adapters for their printers are only FCC Class A 
     compliant.  Our finding leads us to believe that vendors may not 
     be able to submit fully compliant proposals.  In light of the 
     discussion above, we request that the [g]overnment require FCC 
     Class A compliance for the network interface in lieu of FCC Class 
     B; or release the identities of the manufacturers that the 
     [g]overnment may know of that offer printers and network 
     interface adapters that are in compliance with all the 
     requirements of this solicitation.  

     "Response:  The [g]overnment's FCC requirement states '...Level 1 
     and Level 2 workstations and all peripherals shall be FCC Class B 
     certified...'  The [g]overnment does not believe that CLIN 016AC 
     would necessarily or typically fall into either category 
     [workstation, peripheral].  Further the [g]overnment's market 
     research supports, in general, the assertion of only FCC Class A 
     compliance for this device category.  FCC Class A certification 
     is sufficient for CLIN 016AC."

RFP, Amend. A008 at 2.

While we agree with Dunn that it was unreasonable to cite FCC Class A 
certification as a weakness in its printer NIC--given PTO's 
acknowledgment of the unavailability of equipment meeting the 
requirement, and given the PTO's statement that the requirement 
probably does not apply to this item--we do not find that this issue 
resulted in any material change in Dunn's relative standing among the 
offerors.  When the agency performed its best value analysis of the 
three lowest-priced offerors, it did not examine the differences 
between scores.  Instead, the analysis compared the specific strengths 
and weaknesses of the offerors in this cluster.  For reasons not 
apparent in the record--but perhaps after noticing the relative 
unimportance of the certification issue given amendment A008--the PTO 
omitted the identified weakness related to Dunn's FCC Class A 
certification.  Thus, when the agency examined these three proposals 
to ascertain which offered the best value to the government, this 
issue in no way contributed to the conclusion that IDP, and not Dunn, 
offered the best value to the government within this cluster.  As a 
result, we conclude that the prejudice here was either non-existent or 
so minor as to have no meaningful effect on Dunn's standing in this 
competition.  See Textron Marine Sys., supra at 12-13 (prejudice not 
found where evaluation error is so minor as to preclude any meaningful 
change in the overall evaluation results).

Other Issues

Dunn also argues that the PTO unreasonably failed to hold discussions, 
failed to provide Dunn an opportunity to respond to adverse past 
performance information, and conducted an improper cost 
technical/tradeoff.  

With respect to the general decision to award without discussions, we 
addressed this issue in response to IDP's protest and need not revisit 
it here.  However, we will address two of Dunn's contentions that 
unique factors here required the agency to open discussions.  First, 
Dunn argues that our prior decision in The Jonathan Corp.; Metro 
Machine Corp., B-251698.3; B-251698.4, May 17, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  174, 
recon. den., Moon Eng'g Co., Inc., B-251698.6, Oct. 19, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  
233, mandates overturning the agency's decision not to hold 
discussions in this case.  Dunn claims that the agency and intervenor 
failed to distinguish this case because it cannot be distinguished.  
We disagree.

As an initial matter, Dunn correctly notes that a contracting 
officer's decision to make award on initial proposals is not 
unfettered.  The Jonathan Corp.; Metro Machine Corp., supra at 14.  We 
will review the exercise of such discretion to ensure that it was 
reasonably based on the particular circumstances of the procurement, 
including consideration of the proposals received and the basis for 
the selection decision.  Lloyd-Lamont Design, Inc., B-270090.3, Feb. 
13, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  71 at 6; Facilities Management Co., Inc., 
B-259731.2, May 23, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  274 at 8.  On the other hand, 
this discretion is quite broad, and in recent years has been expanded.  
For example, Congress has deleted the requirement originally set forth 
in the Competition in Contracting Act that an agency could only make 
award without discussions to the offeror with the lowest price or 
evaluated cost.  Compare 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2305(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1988) with 10 
U.S.C.  sec.  2305(b)(4)(A)(ii) (1994) (showing deletion of requirement 
applicable to defense agencies) and 41 U.S.C.  sec.  253b(d)(1)(B) (1988) 
with 41 U.S.C.  sec.  253(d)(1)(B) (1994) (showing deletion of requirement 
applicable to civilian agencies).  In addition, the FAR now provides 
that once the government has stated its intent to award without 
discussions, "the rationale for reversal of this decision shall be 
documented in the contract file."  FAR  sec.  15.610(a)(3) (FAC 90-31, Oct. 
1, 1995). 

The record shows that the specifics of the case here bear little 
resemblance to the issues raised in Jonathan.  There, our Office first 
concluded that the cost realism review was flawed, The Jonathan Corp.; 
Metro Machine Corp., supra at 13, then noted the uniquely close 
relationship between the issues presented in that case, and questions 
already drafted by the agency.  Id. at 14-15.  Under those 
circumstances, we recommended that when the agency revisited its cost 
evaluation, it also open discussions to address the very issues--i.e., 
a large discrepancy between the government's cost estimate and the 
offerors' proposed costs--that had led to the unusual cost realism 
adjustments.  Id. at 15. 

Here, nearly half of the acceptable proposals were evaluated within 
the upper half of the good range, or excellent.  In addition, while 
many of the discrepancies and issues noted in the evaluations might 
have been easily addressed, there were no overwhelming themes or 
recurrent issues suggesting that the offerors misunderstood the 
agency's requirements in any major way.  This is in sharp contrast to 
the situation in Jonathan where there was a recurring pattern of large 
discrepancies between the government's cost estimate and the offerors' 
proposals.  Id.  Under these circumstances, regardless of how much 
Dunn would have preferred the opportunity to address the government's 
concerns about its proposal, the record overall does not support a 
conclusion that the agency unreasonably awarded based on initial 
proposals.[5]

Second, Dunn argues that FAR  sec.  15.610(c)(6) required the agency to 
open discussions with Dunn to permit it to address adverse reports 
about its past performance.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
conclude this provision has no application in a situation where the 
agency makes award based on initial proposals. 

FAR  sec.  15.610(a) explains the situations where a contracting officer is 
not required to hold discussions.  One of the situations set forth 
therein, paragraph (a)(3), is that offerors were notified of the 
government's intent to make award without discussions, and the 
contracting officer does not later conclude that such discussions have 
become necessary--the situation here.  The next paragraph, 15.610(b), 
explains that if the situations in 15.610(a) do not apply, then 
discussions shall be held.  Paragraph (b) also relegates the content 
of such discussions to the contracting officer's judgment except for 
the requirements set forth in paragraphs (c) and (d).  These 
provisions, when read in the context of the whole section, clearly 
delineate matters that must be considered when discussions are held.  
They do not, on their own, operate to mandate discussions when none 
are held otherwise.  Accordingly, the requirement in 15.610(c)(6) is 
not triggered in the situation here.

Finally, Dunn argues that the agency conducted an improper 
cost/technical tradeoff, because the decision of the SSO is tersely 
encapsulated in a one-page decision adopting the recommendation of the 
SSEB.  Dunn's argument overlooks the detailed Best Value Analysis 
prepared by the SSEB, which is separate from the evaluation of 
proposals and which sets out the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
all offerors in support of the selection decision.  We have reviewed 
this document and find that it reasonably summarizes the relative 
standing of all the offerors--even to the extent of excluding the 
weakness unreasonably assessed against Dunn's printer NIC for offering 
FCC Class A certification--and presents a sound basis for selecting 
the proposal that offers PTO the best value.  The SSO's decision to 
adopt the findings in the Best Value Analysis as his own in no way 
indicates that he failed to exercise his own judgment in this matter.  
Allied Technology Group, Inc., B-271302; B-271302.2, July 3, 1996, 
96-2 CPD  para.  4 at 10.      

I-NET'S PROTEST

PTO's evaluation of I-Net's proposal was dramatically different from 
its evaluation of the two proposals discussed above.  The evaluation 
of technical merit rated the proposal as outstanding, and identified 
several strengths and one weakness that can only be described as de 
minimis.  However, because of a relatively lower rating in the area of 
past performance, I-Net's overall merit rating was 84.57, placing it 
second in merit behind Hughes.  I-Net's price, on the other hand, was 
[deleted] million, the [deleted] proposal received, and more than 
[deleted] million higher than Hughes' price.  When the agency compared 
I-Net's proposal within the cluster of similarly-priced proposals, 
I-Net easily proceeded to the second level for comparison.  In the 
second level of review within the Best Value Analysis, the agency 
concluded that I-Net's proposal compared favorably with Hughes in two 
areas but overall offered no compelling reason to pay an additional 
[deleted] million for I-Net's proposal over Hughes' proposal--with its 
merit rating of 89.48 versus I-Net's rating of 84.57.

In its initial and supplemental protests, I-Net argues that the 
agency's technical evaluation was unreasonable based on the assessment 
of three minor weaknesses in its proposal.  I-Net also argues that the 
technical evaluation was significantly flawed because--in I-Net's 
view--the evaluators did not evaluate technical proposals in 4 of 9 
elements under one of the technical evaluation subfactors.  I-Net 
challenges the agency's assessment of its past performance in two 
areas, and argues that the evaluation of its management proposal was 
unreasonable in three areas.  In addition, like Dunn, I-Net argues 
that the agency improperly made award without holding discussions and 
alleges that the SSO failed to make the cost/technical tradeoff 
decision.[6]  According to I-Net, if the evaluation had been properly 
performed, it would have been the offeror with the highest merit 
rating, and PTO would have been required to perform a cost/technical 
tradeoff to decide if I-Net's greater merit justified its higher 
price.

We have reviewed I-Net's protest contentions in detail and conclude 
that I-Net has failed to show that the evaluation of its proposal was 
unreasonable or inconsistent with the stated evaluation criteria.  To 
illustrate, we will set forth here in detail I-Net's claim that the 
evaluators failed to rate its proposal under 4 of 9 evaluation 
criteria--a significant portion of I-Net's supplemental protest--and 
two representative claims that its technical proposal and past 
performance were misevaluated.

With respect to I-Net's challenge to whether the agency properly 
completed its technical evaluation, I-Net argues that the evaluation 
was incomplete and flawed because the evaluators generally did not 
complete their scoresheets in certain areas.  The details of this 
claim are set forth below.  

The RFP here identified three subfactors under the technical 
evaluation factor.  These were:  product quality and technical 
sufficiency; lifecycle service quality; and commerciality.  The 
evaluation guidelines for the review of product quality and technical 
sufficiency were set forth in the RFP at section M.6.1.1.1.  For ease 
of reference, they are included here in their entirety:

     "The PTO will assess the performance, specification compliance, 
     reliability claims, and environmental and physical 
     characteristics of proposed products.  Evaluation will include a 
     review of the results of [o]fferor-conducted benchmark testing.  
     Emphasis will be on the completeness of the product solution and 
     documentation, individual product characteristics and the degree 
     to which offered products meet or exceed requirements, and 
     ergonomic considerations.  The PTO will consider all these 
     elements equally important and additional technical merit will be 
     accorded offered products or components which have achieved high 
     rankings in the marketplace.  

     "In the Operational Capabilities Demonstration to be conducted 
     following determination of competitive range, the PTO will 
     validate [o]fferor-conducted benchmark testing and will test for 
     the Pentium floating point unit flaw.  At that time the PTO will 
     also test software compatibility, performance in and impact on 
     the operational characteristics, accessibility of device 
     adjustments and controls, and documentation usability."

In evaluating each offeror's response under the product quality and 
technical sufficiency subfactor, the evaluators prepared a list of 
nine elements drawn from the paragraphs quoted above.[7]  The 
scoresheets consisted of a matrix with a separate cell for each of 
these nine elements.  I-Net's contention, in essence, is that the 
evaluation was improper because the evaluators did not complete four 
of the nine cells related to this subfactor on their scoresheets.

The agency responds that the four elements identified by I-Net were 
generally not scored because these elements were related to 
assessments that would be made after the operational capabilities 
demonstration (OCD) described in the second paragraph of section 
M.6.1.1.1, quoted above.[8]  Since the OCD was to take place after 
creation of the competitive range, and since award was based on 
initial proposals without the establishment of a competitive range, no 
demonstration took place.  For this reason, the evaluators generally 
did not complete these cells on their evaluation matrix or merely 
indicated that they were waiting for the OCD.

As a preliminary matter, we fail to see how I-Net has been harmed by 
any of these claimed omissions.  First, there is no showing that the 
agency failed to evaluate proposals under this subfactor as described 
in the initial paragraph of section M.6.1.1.1.  Second, the decision 
to rate these elements appears consistent with the second paragraph of 
section M.6.1.1.1, which clearly indicated that there would be no OCD 
until the agency established a competitive range.  Third, the record 
does not support a conclusion that some offerors were evaluated under 
some of these identified elements and others were not.  

Nonetheless, I-Net's claim instead seems to be that there was an 
overriding failure of agreement amongst even the agency evaluators 
about which of these elements were to be reviewed and which were to 
wait for the OCD.  Thus, I-Net argues that the overall review of the 
product quality and technical sufficiency subfactor was irrational.  

Our review of the evaluators scoresheets and the comments entered into 
each of the matrix cells leads us to conclude that there was no 
misunderstanding by the evaluators, and no irrationality.  Although 
there is not complete uniformity in how the evaluators completed their 
scoresheet matrix, the materials show that three of the four 
evaluators indicated that three of the nine elements could only be 
evaluated in a comprehensive manner after completion of the OCD.  This 
did not stop some of the evaluators from indicating strengths that 
were apparent from the written materials, but in several instances, 
there is a clear recognition of the dichotomy--i.e., that certain 
conclusions could be reached on the basis of the written materials, 
while the overall assessment of these elements should wait until 
completion of the OCD.  

A fourth evaluator entered findings in three of the cells at issue 
here, but left one blank.  Although I-Net argues that this is further 
evidence of an irrational evaluation, we do not reach the same 
conclusion.  This evaluator appears to be making preliminary findings 
based on the written materials--in fact, that is all he can do given 
the fact that no OCD has occurred--but failing to expressly indicate 
that these findings will be supplemented by OCD test results.  In 
short, our review does not show that the evaluation in this area is 
irrational or unreasonable.

With respect to I-Net's challenges to specific evaluation results, 
I-Net claims that the agency unreasonably concluded that the 
technology enhancement (or hardware upgrade) process in its technical 
proposal was unclear.  In this regard, although
 I-Net was rated as outstanding, one of the evaluators noted that the 
technology enhancement (hardware upgrade) process was not very clear.  
Specifically, the evaluator commented that I-Net did not describe in 
any great detail how it transmitted news of technical enhancements or 
upgrades to its customers.

In response to I-Net's claim, we reviewed pages 8 through 11 of 
section 3 of its technical proposal, wherein I-Net describes its 
approach in this area.  After explaining in detail for nearly three 
full pages how I-Net helps its own employees keep up with technical 
developments, it concludes with one general paragraph claiming a 
practice of ad hoc presentations of new technologies to "clients who 
have shown a particular interest in new products or technical areas."  
I-Net Technical Proposal, section 3.0 at 10.  In our view, there was 
nothing unreasonable in the evaluator's modest conclusion that the 
proposal was unclear in explaining how these new developments would be 
communicated to customers, and in fact, our review lends credence to 
her conclusion.  

I-Net also complains that the PTO unreasonably stated that the 
proposal contained a minor weakness under the production and delivery 
capability subfactor under the management factor because the agency 
misunderstood a delivery schedule matrix provided with its management 
proposal.  Specifically, the evaluators concluded that the delivery 
period for three CLINs exceeded the 30 day requirement for deliveries 
established by the RFP.  

In the introduction to its management proposal, I-Net states that 
"PTO's 30 day delivery requirements demand in some cases that I-NET 
hold key, long lead time components in inventory until needed for 
order fulfillment and delivery."  I-Net Management Proposal, 
Introduction at 12.  In contrast, in a delivery schedule matrix 
provided at the end of section 1.0, I-Net shows time periods in excess 
of 30 days in response to the following question:  "[w]hat is the 
typical delivery time between order acceptance and delivery to 
customer?"  Id., section 1.0, matrix following page 7.  According to 
I-Net, it was unreasonable to interpret this matrix as suggesting that 
I-Net would not meet the delivery requirement because the matrix shows 
suppliers' delivery times, not I-Net's delivery times.  

Our review of the record reveals nothing unreasonable in PTO's 
decision to question whether I-NET will meet the needed delivery times 
for these three items.  First, the statement in the narrative cannot 
be termed a clear promise to meet the delivery time requirement.  
Rather, the statement is a recognition of steps that need to be taken 
to meet the requirement.  Second, as stated earlier, discrepancies 
between the narrative and the CLIN matrix are valid areas for agency 
concern.  Finally, despite I-Net's claim regarding the meaning of the 
matrix in its proposal, this is not clear from the face of the matrix.  
As a result, we see no basis to conclude that the agency acted 
unreasonably in assessing this minor weakness in I-Net's proposal.  
Koehring Cranes & Excavators; Komatsu Dresser Co., supra.

CONCLUSION

Our review here leads us to conclude that the government benefited 
from an extraordinarily broad competition in response to this 
procurement.  It received 20 proposals--each representing significant 
effort--with 17 evaluated as acceptable, or susceptible to being made 
acceptable.  Its highest-rated proposal, the one submitted by Hughes, 
fell at the median of all offered prices.  If anything, the challenges 
here show that the offerors generally understood the requirements of 
the solicitation and that there were no major issues indicating a 
misunderstanding between the government and those who sought to sell 
it this equipment.  

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. Specifically, within the technical factor, product quality and 
technical sufficiency would be slightly more important than lifecycle 
service quality and commerciality.  Lifecycle service quality and 
commerciality were equally important.  Within the past performance 
factor, the two subfactors were equally important.  Within the 
management factor, the first two subfactors were equally important, 
and the third subfactor was less important.    

2. PTO concluded that IDP's proposal did not meet the following 
solicitation requirements:  (1) minimum base random access memory 
(RAM) of 32 megabytes (MB); (2) MS-DOS operating system software 
version 6.22; (3) a 3-button mouse; (4) bar code reader with audible 
indicators; (5) 133 MHz microprocesser for level 2 workstation; (6) 
data transfer rate of 10 MB or faster for internal hard drive; (7)-(9) 
specified non-interlaced resolutions at specified refresh rates for 
17-inch, 21-inch, and 24-inch monitors; and (10) potential upgrade to 
96 MB on motherboard without removing initially installed 32 MB 
memory.

3. IDP also challenges the cost/technical tradeoff performed by the 
PTO, arguing that the tradeoff was unreasonable and that the SSO did 
not make an independent decision.  We address these issues in our 
response to Dunn's protest.  

4. For the record, if Dunn is correct there are numerous typographical 
errors here.  The RFP required a resolution of 1280 x 1024 at 75 Hz.; 
Dunn offered 1024 x 768 at 72 Hz.

5. For the record, we find particularly unpersuasive Dunn's assertion 
that "certainly 10 minutes of discussions could have rectified any 
misunderstandings."  Dunn's Initial Protest, Sept. 20, 1996, at 4.  
Discussions with 14 to 17 offerors for $150 million worth of computer 
equipment involving--in Dunn's words--"hundreds of questions and 
answers" and complex specifications could not have been completed in 
10 minutes.  Such discussions would likely have involved a significant 
commitment of agency resources.

6. Because I-Net's contentions in these two areas are not 
significantly different from those raised by Dunn, we will not 
consider them again.

7. These elements were:  (1) completeness of product solution; (2) 
performance; (3) specification compliance (meets or exceeds); (4) 
reliability; (5) environment and physical characteristics; ergonomics 
(control, etc.); (6) ease of installation, integration and performance 
in impact on PTO environment, ergonomics; (7) compatibility with PTO 
statement of work; (8) operational characteristics; and (9) 
documentation completeness, presentation, usability. 

8. The RFP provides additional guidance on this issue at section 
M.5.3., entitled "Final Evaluation and Operational Capabilities 
Demonstration."  As its title suggests, this provision is consistent 
with the agency's response that the OCD would not take place until 
after determination of a competitive range.