BNUMBER:  B-274175; B-274246.2; B-274287
DATE:  November 25, 1996
TITLE:  Datacom, Inc.--Protests and Request for Costs

**********************************************************************

Matter of:Datacom, Inc.--Protests and Request for Costs 

File:     B-274175; B-274246.2; B-274287

Date:November 25, 1996

Joseph A. Camardo, Jr., Esq., and Robert D. Somerset, for the 
protester.
Sophia L. Rafatjah, Esq., for Tracor, Inc., an intervenor.
Nike Nihiser, Esq., Bradley S. Adams, Esq., Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., 
and Marian E. Sullivan, Esq., Department of the Air Force, for the 
agency.
Ralph O. White, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest that two sole source awards--one via a contract, one via a 
modification to an existing contract--are improper and result from 
poor planning on the part of the agency is denied where the record 
shows that the agency:  (1) properly justified its use of sole source 
authority; (2) was not responsible for the delay that occurred due to 
high-level political intervention in the procurement; and (3) limited 
the amount of the purchases to a quantity reasonably calculated to 
extend to the beginning of deliveries under a new contract to be 
awarded using full and open competition.

2.  Request for recommendation that protester be permitted to recover 
reasonable costs associated with pursuing an earlier protest is denied 
where the record shows that the protest in that case was rendered 
academic by a change in statute, not by agency corrective action.

DECISION

Datacom, Inc. protests the Department of the Air Force's decision both 
to award a contract (F09603-96-C-52442), and to issue a contract 
modification (modification P00156 to F33657-88-C-0026), on a 
sole-source basis to Tracor, Inc. for the purchase of the AN/ALE-47 
Countermeasures Dispenser System.  The contract award involves 
quantities of spare parts related to this system for use on F-16 
aircraft for the National Guard and the Air Force Reserve; the 
modification involves 22 AN/ALE-47 shipsets to be split between 
already-deployed C-17 aircraft earmarked for use in the Bosnia pullout 
scheduled to begin December 1996 (12 shipsets), and new C-17 aircraft 
where the items are needed as government-furnished equipment by 
January 31, 1997 (10 shipsets).  Datacom argues that the stated bases 
for these two sole source decisions do not withstand scrutiny and 
constitute an improper use of sole source procedures because the Air 
Force engaged in poor planning.  Datacom also requests that our Office 
recommend that it recover the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing 
an earlier protest related to those at issue here.

We deny the protests and deny Datacom's request for its earlier 
protest costs.

BACKGROUND

The AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispenser System (CMDS) is an electronic 
warfare system used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force to protect 
aircraft from hostile missile attacks.[1]  The system discharges chaff 
cartridges and decoy flares that distract ground-launched missiles 
aimed at aircraft.  Five distinct line replaceable units (LEU) 
comprise the system in varying numbers and configurations depending on 
the aircraft involved.

The original manufacturer of this equipment, Tracor, was awarded a 
contract for lots I to III of this system in 1988.  The record shows 
that the Air Force anticipated to "breaking out" the remaining need 
for these parts (lots IV to VII) and procuring the parts 
competitively.  However, before the Air Force could hold a competition 
for the parts included in lots IV to VII, various forces intervened 
and derailed the procurement.  A chronology of these events is set 
forth below.

On March 17, 1994, the Air Force published in the Commerce Business 
Daily (CAD) a notice seeking potential new sources for production lots 
IV to VII of the CMDS.  After receiving several expressions of 
interest, the Air Force, on January 30, 1995, released a draft RFP for 
the remaining production quantities of the system.  Prior to 
finalization of the RFP, the procuring center's small business 
representative recommended that the acquisition be set aside for small 
business competition.  After the contracting officer rejected the 
set-aside recommendation, and the decision was appealed to the head of 
the contracting activity--who also rejected the set-aside 
recommendation--the Secretary of the Air Force decided, on September 
12, 1995, that the procurement was appropriate for a total small 
business set-aside.  The Secretary's decision was based, in part, on a 
conclusion that there were at least six small businesses capable of 
producing this system.  

The Secretary's decision calling for a total small business set-aside 
resulted in extensive congressional interest.  First, by letter dated 
November 21, 1995, a U.S. senator requested that the procurement be 
held in abeyance until the Air Force evaluated the impact of the 
decision to proceed with a small business set-aside on cost, risk, and 
industrial mobilization preparedness.  On January 22, 1996, report 
language in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
1996 Conference Report, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-450, 104th Congress, 
2d Sess. 617 (1996), directed the Air Force "to delay any procurement 
action regarding lots IV through VII of the AN/ALE-47 until 14 days 
after the date on which the Air Force has provided the congressional 
defense committees with a report that assesses the cost and 
acquisition strategy related to the introduction of new suppliers for 
the system."

The Air Force provided its report to Congress on May 3, 1996, and 
advised that it would continue with a total small business set-aside 
for the remaining portion of the production quantities of the system.  
The record shows that the Air Force report generated letters of 
opposition from at least four additional senators, and one 
representative.  The record also shows that several members of 
Congress expressed support for the decision to set aside this 
procurement for small business.  

In addition to expressions of interest by letter, on June 11, 1996, 
the Fiscal Year 1997 House Appropriations Committee Report, H.R. Rep. 
No. 104-617, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1996), directed the Air Force 
not to introduce any new supplier for this system.  In conference with 
the Senate, the House position was modified to require instead that 
the Air Force drop its plans for a small business set-aside.  
Specifically, on September 30, 1996, the President signed the 
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
___ Stat. ___ (1996), which provides at section 8107 that: 

     "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Air Force shall 
     not introduce any new supplier for the remaining production units 
     for the AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispenser System without 
     conducting a full and open competition that will include, but not 
     be limited to, small businesses."

Meanwhile, the Secretary of the Air Force reversed her earlier 
decision, and decided on July 17, 1996, to pursue a full and open 
competition in lieu of a small business set-aside.  By memorandum 
dated July 26, Air Force acquisition personnel were authorized to 
proceed with the competition for the procurement of lots IV to VII, 
but were advised that:

     "In the event urgent requirements exist for the AN/ALE-47 (such 
     as C-17 or National Guard [line replacement units] requirements), 
     you are authorized to develop an alternate strategy (using either 
     new or existing contractual vehicles) to meet these requirements, 
     subject to any statutory or regulatory approvals."

Memorandum from Maj. Gen. John W. Hawley to Warner Robins Air 
Logistics Center acquisition personnel, July 26, 1996.

Datacom's protests challenge the use of sole source procedures to meet 
the two requirements identified in the July 26 memorandum.[2]

The National Guard and Air Force Reserve Procurements

The record here shows that as early as March 1994, the Air Force F-16 
program office identified a need for AN/ALE-47 parts for the National 
Guard and Air Force Reserve above the anticipated levels covered by 
the lots III and IV procurements.  At that time, the F-16 program 
office asked that steps be taken to increase the purchase levels in 
those lots.  As set forth above, no progress was made in the overall 
procurement for subsequent production parts because of the controversy 
over how the parts would be procured.

In December 1995, amidst the debate over the appropriate method for 
procuring these parts, agency acquisition personnel received a request 
to procure 133 of 1 of the LRUs for the AN/ALE-47 system, the 
dispenser, for the National Guard and Air Force Reserve.  After 
issuing a solicitation, the Air Force received 11 proposals (including 
one from Datacom) prior to the January 19, 1996, deadline for proposal 
submission.  On January 24, the Air Force buyer was directed to cancel 
the solicitation, and was advised that the program office had 
decreased its need substantially, and would fill any remaining need 
from existing stock.  The solicitation was formally canceled on 
February 23.

On August 2, one week after the July 26 direction to proceed with 
procurements of AN/ALE-47 parts, the Air Force buyer received a new 
purchase request from the F-16 program office for three AN/ALE-47 
LRUs--i.e., spare parts--for the National Guard and Air Force Reserve.  
This request sought 274 dispensers, 191 safety switches, and 21 Flight 
Line Payload Simulators (FLPS).  According to the request, these items 
are to be provided as government-furnished material for the Electronic 
Warfare Management System modification for the F-16 National Guard/Air 
Force Reserve Theater Airborne Reconnaissance System pod.

On August 7, the Air Force published a CBD notice indicating the 
agency would award a sole source contract to Tracor for these items.  
A justification and approval (J&A) document was prepared citing the 
authority set forth at 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(c)(1) (1994), permitting the 
use of other than competitive procedures when the supplies or services 
needed by the agency are available from only one responsible source, 
and no other product will satisfy the agency's needs.  Datacom's first 
protest followed.

The C-17 Procurement

The Air Force's inability to move forward on its competitive 
procurement also impacted its ability to outfit C-17 aircraft with 
AN/ALE-47 systems.  In the agency report, the contracting officer 
explained that the initial C-17 requirement was for 44 shipsets, but 
only 22 had been funded at the time the agency negotiated its lot III+ 
procurement from Tracor in December 1995.[3]  The Air Force explains 
that the negotiations for the lot III+ procurement had to be complete 
by the end of December 1995 to avoid a break in production.  Thus, the 
22 shipsets sought here were not purchased as part of the lot III+ buy 
and the contracting officer hoped that the items might be addressed 
through the upcoming competitive procurement.

The contracting officer further explained that in April or May 1996, 
it became apparent that the competitive procurement would not occur in 
time to meet the remaining requirements for shipsets for the C-17.  In 
June, Air Force procurement personnel concluded that an additional 
purchase for these items would be required.  This need became even 
more acute because of a decision to use the C-17 to support the Bosnia 
pullout (originally ordered by the President to start in December 
1996).  Thus, the Air Force determined that it needed 12 shipsets by 
November 30 to retrofit the previously-delivered C-17 aircraft slated 
for use in the pullout but lacking the CMDS.  Agency officials also 
included an additional 10 shipsets needed for delivery by January 31, 
1997, to assure that C-17 aircraft in production would be combat-ready 
when delivered.

To meet these needs the Air Force prepared a J&A to support its 
decision to procure the 22 shipsets via a modification, if possible, 
to Tracor's existing contract.  The J&A cited the authority set forth 
at 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(c)(2), permitting other than competitive 
procedures when the agency's need is of such an unusual and compelling 
urgency that the government would be seriously injured unless the 
agency is permitted to limit the number of sources.  Here, the J&A set 
forth the urgent need to support missions in Bosnia and, potentially, 
the Far East.  In addition, the J&A limited the buy to Tracor on the 
basis that only Tracor could meet the accelerated delivery schedule, 
and then only by using existing materials to build the items.  The Air 
Force awarded the contract modification on August 30, and Datacom's 
second protest followed.

DISCUSSION

In both of these protests, Datacom essentially argues that the Air 
Force is barred from using sole source procedures because it has not 
performed the proper planning to ensure that its needs will be met 
using competitive procedures.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
disagree with Datacom's general challenge, as well as with its 
specific challenges to each procurement.

In general, the overriding mandate of the Competition in Contracting 
Act (CICA)
is for "full and open competition" in government procurements, which 
is obtained through the use of competitive procedures.  10 U.S.C.  sec.  
2304(a)(1)(A).  With respect to the spare parts needed for the 
National Guard and the Air Force Reserve, the Air Force used the 
exception to full and open competition authorized by 10 U.S.C.  sec.  
2304(c)(1)--i.e., that there is only one source capable of meeting the 
agency's needs.  Marconi Dynamics, Inc., B-252318, June 21, 1993, 93-1 
CPD  para.  475; Sperry Marine, Inc., B-245654, Jan. 27, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  
111.  To use noncompetitive procedures under 10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(c)(1), 
the agency must execute a written J&A with sufficient facts and 
rationale to support the use of the specific authority, 
10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(f)(1)(A),(B); Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  
6.302-1(d)(1); 6.303; 6.304, and publish a notice in the CBD to permit 
potential competitors to challenge the agency's intent to procure 
without full and open competition.  
10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(f)(1)(C).  Our review of an agency's decision to 
conduct a sole source procurement focuses on the adequacy of the 
rationale and conclusions set forth in the J&A.  When the J&A sets 
forth reasonable justifications for the agency's actions, we will not 
object to the award.  Turbo Mechanical, Inc., B-231807, Sept. 29, 
1988, 88-2 CPD  para.  299. 

With respect to the 22 shipsets needed for the C-17, the Air Force 
relies on different authority, and the requirements that flow from 
that authority are slightly different.  Where an agency's needs are of 
such an unusual and compelling urgency that the government would be 
seriously injured if the agency is not permitted to limit the number 
of sources from which it solicits bids or proposals, the agency may 
use noncompetitive procedures pursuant to the authority set forth at 
10 U.S.C.  sec.  2304(c)(2).  All Points Int'l, Inc., B-260134, May 22, 
1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  252.  This authority is limited by 10 U.S.C.  sec.  
2304(e), which requires agencies to request offers from as many 
sources as practicable.  An agency may limit a procurement to only one 
firm if it reasonably determines that only that firm can properly 
perform the work in the available time.  Lundy Technical Center, Inc., 
70 Comp. Gen. 588 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  609.  Although an agency is 
required to prepare a J&A to support its claims of unusual and 
compelling urgency, it may do so after contract award when preparation 
and approval would unreasonably delay the acquisition.  FAR  sec.  
6.302-2(c)(1); 6.303-1(e).  We will object to the agency's 
determination only where the decision lacks a reasonable basis.  All 
Points Int'l, Inc., supra.

We first consider Datacom's contention that the Air Force's failure to 
complete a competitive procurement of these items is due to poor 
planning by agency personnel.  In this regard, 10 U.S.C.  sec.  
2304(f)(5)(A) prohibits award of a contract using other than 
competitive procedures as a result of a lack of advance planning by 
contracting officials.  Honeycomb Co. of Am., B-225685, June 8, 1987, 
87-1 CPD  para.  579, aff'd, B-225685.2, Sept. 29, 1987, 87-2 CPD  para.  313.  On 
both of these procurements, the protester correctly points out that 
the Air Force was aware of its needs at least as early as 1994.

As an initial matter, there is no dispute with the protester's 
contention that the Air Force could have avoided these two sole source 
purchases if it had proceeded as originally planned in late 1994 and 
early 1995.  However, we do not agree that the circumstances here 
support a conclusion that the Air Force has failed to plan 
sufficiently to meet its needs.  Rather, it appears that the Air Force 
would have completed this procurement but for concerns about the 
utilization of small business which led to intervention from outside 
the agency.

The record shows, for example, that nearly 2 years ago, Air Force 
personnel appropriately identified the possibility that the AN/ALE-47 
system could be set aside for a small business competition, and set 
out to compete the procurement.  The record also shows, however, that 
this procurement has been the subject of two separate decisions by the 
Secretary of the Air Force regarding its suitability for a small 
business set-aside; several instances of report language and statutory 
changes imposed by congressional oversight committees; and significant 
input from key members of Congress offering their respective views on 
how the procurement should be handled.[4]  

In our view, the Air Force's efforts here are in marked contrast to 
the situations where we have sustained protests of sole source 
procurements on the basis that the agency failed to complete advance 
procurement planning.  For example, in TeQcom, Inc., B-224664, Dec. 
22, 1986, 86-2 CPD  para.  700, and Freund Precision, Inc., 66 Comp. Gen. 90 
(1986), 86-2 CPD  para.  543, agency officials failed to take steps to allow 
potential offerors to qualify as competitors when there was sufficient 
time to do so.  Instead, the situation here is analogous to the one 
discussed in our recent decision in Sprint Communications Co., L.P., 
B-262003.2, Jan. 25, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  24.  In the Sprint decision, the 
agency made extensive efforts to complete a competitive procurement, 
but despite its best efforts, outside events--specifically, tremendous 
changes in the nature of the telecommunications industry--interrupted 
and stymied the agency's ability to proceed with a competition, making 
an interim sole-source purchase necessary.  In this case, the Air 
Force's procurement efforts were made against a backdrop of 
congressional inquiry and legislative actions.  Simply put, we cannot 
fault the Air Force for failure to complete its procurement in the 
face of congressional report language directing the agency to go no 
further in its effort to hold a competition of any kind.  Thus, while 
we understand Datacom's frustration with the course of this 
procurement, we do not agree that the Air Force has acted improperly.

With respect to Datacom's specific allegations regarding the decision 
to purchase the F-16 parts for the National Guard and Air Force 
Reserve, the protester argues that the agency incorrectly concluded 
that technical data are unavailable for the FLPS; unreasonably stated 
that only Tracor could produce the items in the time required; failed 
to conduct a market survey; and failed to negotiate a fair market 
price for the parts.  We have reviewed Datacom's arguments and 
conclude that they raise issues irrelevant or immaterial to the Air 
Force's conclusion that a sole source contract is needed.  

For example, the Air Force does not base its decision here on the lack 
of available data.  It is based on the conclusion that none of the 
potential offerors would be able to produce a first article for 
approval and then production articles within the time by which the Air 
Force would need these items.  The purchase here is for parts needed 
between March and December 1997.  The Air Force J&A estimates that 
potential offerors would need 180 days to produce a first article for 
testing, plus 90 days government evaluation time, plus 120 days for 
delivery of production items.  

Although Datacom argues it could produce its first articles in less 
time than the government estimate, the Air Force defends its estimate 
on the basis that the estimate was a good faith attempt to quantify 
the time required to produce the items and that none of the small 
businesses seeking to produce this system has yet produced it.  Under 
the circumstances here, since the Air Force is proceeding with a full 
and open competition, and since it seeks to purchase only a limited 
number of items to meet its needs until completion of its competitive 
buy, we have no basis to overturn this procurement based solely on 
Datacom's claim that it can build the items more quickly.

Similarly, with respect to Datacom's specific challenge to the 
purchase of these parts for installation in C-17 aircraft--more than 
half of which need to be installed before the C-17s could be used in 
the Bosnia pullout originally scheduled for December 1996--we conclude 
the Air Force's justification for this purchase is even more sound.  
Datacom cannot argue that it can produce the AN/ALE-47 shipsets in 
time for their use in the aircraft destined for Bosnia, but instead 
challenges the Air Force's decision to use the C-17 in this operation, 
and challenges the inclusion of the 10 shipsets for installation in 
new aircraft.  With respect to the first issue, neither Datacom, nor 
our Office, can dictate military policy.  The bid protest function has 
no role in a decision about which aircraft will best suit the 
government's needs in this upcoming operation.  With respect to 
Datacom's argument that the Air Force has unreasonably included in 
this purchase an additional 10 shipsets to assure that newly 
manufactured C-17 aircraft arrive combat ready, we again agree with 
the Air Force.  In our view, the inclusion of these additional subsets 
in this limited purchase to assure the readiness of aircraft to be 
manufactured between now and the time the agency can procure 
additional parts via a full and open competition, is a reasonable 
exercise of the agency's statutory authority to make such purchases.

In sum, given that the record shows that the Air Force issued its RFP 
to procure its upcoming needs for the AN/ALE-47 on August 30, 1996, 
and has made a reasonable effort to limit the sole source procurements 
here to its interim requirements, and given our conclusion that the 
delay is not the result of poor agency planning, we deny Datacom's 
challenge to the agency's use of sole source procedures for these two 
purchases.

Request for Reimbursement of Costs

Datacom requests a ruling from our Office that it be permitted to 
recover the reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its earlier 
protest of the July 17 decision by the Secretary of the Air Force to 
rescind her earlier decision to procure lots IV to VII of the 
AN/ALE-47 using a small business set-aside.  Datacom argues that the 
passage of section 8107 of the Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, ___ Stat. ___ (1996)--which made its 
protest academic and resulted in dismissal of the protest by our 
Office--was corrective action by the agency. 

Under our Bid Protest Regulations, when an agency takes corrective 
action in response to a clearly meritorious protest, prior to our 
issuing a decision on the merits, we may declare the protester to be 
entitled to recover reasonable costs of filing and pursuing its 
protest, including attorneys' fees.  Bid Protest Regulations, section 
21.8(e), 61 Fed. Reg. 39,039, 39,047 (1996) (to be codified at 4 
C.F.R.  sec.  21.8(e)).  We will make such a recommendation only where an 
agency unduly delays taking such corrective action.  Oklahoma Indian 
Corp.--Claim for Costs, 70 Comp. Gen. 558 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  558.  A 
protester is not entitled to costs where, under the facts and 
circumstances of a given case, the agency has taken reasonably prompt 
action.  Dynair Elecs., Inc.--Request for Declaration of Entitlement 
to Costs, B-244290.2, Sept. 18, 1991, 91-2 CPD  para.  260.

In this case, however, the protest became academic for reasons 
unrelated to the protest allegations.  The record shows that the 
matter here was under consideration by the Congress well before the 
time Datacom filed its protest, and the Congress, not the Air Force, 
passed a new law with specific application to this procurement.  It 
was this law that rendered the protest academic, not corrective action 
by the Air Force.  In fact, we fail to understand how Datacom can 
argue that the statute here was corrective action, when the statute 
ensured that Datacom could not prevail in its protest.  Where a 
protest is rendered academic by actions outside the control of the 
agency, we have no basis to conclude that the agency took corrective 
action in response to the protest, and no basis for awarding costs 
under section 21.8.  Red River Service Corp.--Entitlement to Costs, 
B-259462.2, Sept. 11, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  106.  

Datacom also argues that our Office should assess costs against the 
Air Force as a sanction because the agency failed to advise both the 
protester, and our Office, of the pending language in the 
Appropriations Act that would render this protest academic.  We do not 
interpret our authority to recommend award of protest costs in 
corrective action cases to extend to assessing protest costs as a 
sanction against agency behavior unrelated to corrective action.  See 
H. Watt & Scott General Contractors, Inc.--Request for Declaration of 
Entitlement to Costs, B-257776.3, Apr. 6, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  183 (award 
of protest costs not available as a sanction against an agency's 2 
month delay in providing requested documents).

The protests and the request for costs are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States  

1. The following aircraft use this system:  F-16, HH-60, C-130, C-141, 
C-17, C-4, F/A-18, MH-47, VH-60 VH-3, V-22 and the E-8.

2. Datacom also protested the July 17 decision by the Secretary of the 
Air Force to rescind her earlier decision to procure lots IV to VII of 
the AN/ALE-47 using a small business set-aside.  This protest, 
B-274246, was dismissed on October 16, 1996, as academic after the 
President signed the Fiscal Year 1997 Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act on September 30, which directed the Air Force not 
to use a small business set-aside for this procurement.

3. In addition to the purchase lots originally anticipated, the Air 
Force procured an interim lot, lot III+, directly from Tracor in early 
1996, to cover the gap between Tracor's deliveries and deliveries from 
whichever source received award from either the small business 
competition or the full and open competition. 

4. For example, the letters from members of Congress include a letter 
from the chairman and ranking minority member of one of the defense 
oversight committees.