BNUMBER:  B-272188.2
DATE:  September 18, 1996
TITLE:  Volmar Construction, Inc.

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Matter of:Volmar Construction, Inc.

File:     B-272188.2

Date:September 18, 1996

Bill Cosmas Giallourakis, Esq., for the protester.
Diane D. Hayden, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Behn Miller, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest challenging agency's rating of awardee's technical 
proposal on the ground that agency overlooked awardee's alleged lack 
of prime contractor experience is denied where the record shows that 
the contracting agency reasonably concluded that awardee's experience 
performing as both a prime contractor and subcontractor on numerous 
similar contracts, as well as the excellent ratings by its references 
and the management experience of its proposed key employees, warranted 
a highly satisfactory technical rating.

2.  Detailed cost analysis is not required in procurement 
contemplating award of a fixed-price contract where adequate price 
competition is obtained.

3.  Agency's determination that awardee's price is not unrealistic is 
unobjectionable where:  (1) adequate price competition was received; 
and (2) the agency compared the offerors' proposed prices with each 
other and the government's price estimate, and reasonably determined 
that awardee's prices were realistic. 

4.  Where agency reasonably determined that protester's and awardee's 
technical proposals were equally ranked, agency properly determined 
that awardee's lower-priced proposal represented the best value.

DECISION

Volmar Construction, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Omega 
Service Maintenance Corporation (OSMC) under request for proposals 
(RFP) No. N68950-95-R-0045, issued by the Department of the Navy for 
building facilities maintenance and repair services.  Volmar 
challenges the agency's technical evaluation of the awardee's proposal 
and contends that the agency should have downgraded OSMC's proposal 
based on its experience and past performance.  Volmar also contends 
that the Navy performed an improper price realism analysis, and that 
OSMC's proposed prices were unreasonably low.

We deny the protest.

OVERVIEW

The RFP was issued on January 17, 1996, and contemplated the award of 
a fixed-price indefinite quantity contract for a base year and 2 
option years.  Under the solicitation, offerors were required to 
provide all necessary maintenance and repair services for 931 housing 
units, 22 multi-unit garages, and 15 commercial/industrial buildings 
located at the Mitchel Field and Mitchel Manor housing complexes in 
Garden City and East Meadow, New York.

The RFP required submission of both technical and price proposals, and 
provided that contract award would be made to the offeror whose 
proposal was found most advantageous to the government based upon the 
agency's best value evaluation, under which technical and price 
factors were equally important.  The solicitation provided that 
technical proposals would be evaluated under the following, equally 
weighted technical subfactors:  management/procedural plan and past 
performance.  Price proposals were to be evaluated to determine 
reasonableness and realism.  The solicitation also incorporated 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  52.215-16, Alternate II, which 
advised offerors of the Navy's intent to award the contract on the 
basis of initial proposals without conducting discussions.

By the March 25 closing date, 11 proposals were received, including 
those submitted by OSMC and Volmar.  From April 1 through April 12, 
the technical evaluation board (TEB) evaluated technical proposals; 
both OSMC's and Volmar's received the highest overall technical rating 
of "highly satisfactory" for their technical proposals.[1]  A separate 
price evaluation board (PEB) concluded its evaluation of pricing 
proposals on April 15, and rated both Omega's and the protester's 
"acceptable."  On April 16, the results of the TEB's and PEB's 
evaluations were presented to the source selection board (SSB) for 
review.  On May 24, after reviewing and concurring in the TEB's 
findings that OSMC's and Volmar's proposals were essentially 
technically equivalent, the SSB selected OSMC for award based upon its 
lower proposed price.  On June 12, Volmar filed this protest.

PROTESTER'S CONTENTIONS

Volmar protests both the technical and price evaluation of OSMC's 
proposal.  First, Volmar challenges the "highly satisfactory" rating 
of OSMC's technical proposal; Volmar argues that because OSMC has 
operated primarily as a building maintenance repair subcontractor 
instead of a prime contractor on most of its similar contracts, its 
technical proposal should not have been rated equally with the 
protester's since the protester has extensive prime contractor 
experience.  Volmar also contends that the agency improperly failed to 
perform a cost realism analysis of the awardee's pricing proposal, and 
that alleged errors in the government estimate caused the PEB to 
improperly determine that OSMC's prices were realistic.

TECHNICAL EVALUATION

Volmar challenges the technical evaluation of OSMC's proposal on the 
ground that the "highly satisfactory" rating was not reasonable in 
light of OSMC's lack of prime contractor experience; its lack of 
experience in performing contracts worth more than $1.5 million; and 
its smaller size.  Additionally, Volmar contends that OSMC's technical 
proposal did not warrant a "highly satisfactory" rating because its 
personnel's work experience was gained solely during in-house 
employment for the Navy.

In reviewing protests against allegedly improper evaluations, it is 
not our role to reevaluate proposals.  Rather, our Office examines the 
record to determine whether the agency's judgment was reasonable and 
in accord with the RFP's stated evaluation criteria.  ESCO Inc., 66 
Comp. Gen. 404 (1987), 87-1 CPD  para.  450.  A protester's mere 
disagreement with the agency's conclusions does not render the 
evaluation unreasonable.  Id.  Further, source selection officials in 
negotiated procurements have broad discretion in determining the 
manner and extent to which they will make use of the technical and 
price evaluation results subject only to the tests of rationality and 
consistency with the RFP's evaluation criteria.  Bunker Ramo Corp., 56 
Comp. Gen. 712 (1977), 77-1 CPD  para.  427; Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 
Comp. Gen. 1111 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325.  In this case, although Volmar 
contends that OSMC's alleged lack of prime contractor experience and 
smaller size render the agency's "highly satisfactory" rating of its 
technical proposal unreasonable, our review of OSMC's technical 
proposal and the agency's rationale for the rating shows the agency's 
evaluation to be reasonable.

As noted above, the RFP set out two equally weighted technical 
evaluation factors.  The first, management/procedural plan, had three 
equally weighted subfactors, one of which was experience.  The second 
technical evaluation factor was past performance.  Volmar's and OSMC's 
proposals received "highly satisfactory" ratings under each of the 
subfactors and factors, for overall ratings of "highly satisfactory."

With respect to Volmar's challenge to the agency's evaluation of 
OSMC's experience and past performance, the RFP did not limit offerors 
to demonstrating only prime contractor experience.  On the contrary, 
the solicitation made it clear that all relevant experience and past 
performance would be evaluated and specifically directed offerors to 
submit information on all contracts and subcontracts completed during 
the last 3 years.

As evidence of relevant experience, OSMC submitted a list of 17 
contracts with corresponding details, including the contract price, 
completion date, any claims submitted, and the type of work performed.  
To demonstrate its specific building maintenance expertise, OSMC 
listed 10 facilities and housing maintenance contracts, most performed 
at Navy facilities.  To demonstrate its expertise with boiler and 
heating, ventilation, and air conditioning maintenance, OSMC listed 
four Navy contracts.  OSMC also listed three Navy grounds and 
maintenance contracts.  Although Volmar correctly points out that OSMC 
worked as a subcontractor under several of the listed contracts, as 
explained below, the TEB took this into account, and, we find, reached 
reasonable conclusions.

First, for the majority of the listed contracts, OSMC served as the 
prime contractor.  Next, all of the contract references listed in 
OSMC's proposals were contacted; these references advised the TEB that 
OSMC had a "superior record of performance" and "rated [OSMC's] 
quality of work, timeliness and cooperation no lower than excellent."  
The TEB also noted that regardless of OSMC's past subcontractor 
status, its proposed key personnel demonstrated direct supervisory and 
management experience which is essentially analogous to the type of 
project control and oversight typically exercised by a prime 
contractor.  For example, OSMC's proposed project manager has served 
as a project manager for facilities maintenance contracts at two Navy 
installations in New Jersey; additionally, OSMC's proposed quality 
control and safety supervisors have successfully managed the daily 
operations at a public works contract office and the facility 
maintenance requirements at a Navy construction training center in 
California.  Even OSMC's proposed service call and preventative 
maintenance foremen have relevant oversight responsibility and work 
experience in similar types of project work.

Moreover, although Volmar views the fact that OSMC's experience is 
almost exclusively on Navy contracts as a weakness, in light of OSMC's 
familiarity with Navy operations and the Navy's quality control 
techniques, we think the TEB reasonably concluded that OSMC's 
experience on Navy procurements in fact constituted a significant 
technical strength.  Moreover, although Volmar contends that OSMC's 
smaller size and lack of experience on procurements worth more than 
$1.5 million warrants concern as to OSMC's capabilities and resources, 
we think the TEB could reasonably reach the conclusion it did in light 
of OSMC's positive performance record notwithstanding these concerns.  

In sum, given the fact that OSMC does in fact hold prime contractor 
experience, and in light of its strong references and the noted 
strengths of its proposed personnel, we think the TEB reasonably 
concluded that OSMC's technical proposal warranted a "highly 
satisfactory" rating.

PRICING EVALUATION

For their pricing proposals, offerors were required to complete and 
submit the solicitation's pricing schedule, which required unit and 
extended prices for 40 fixed- price contract line item numbers (CLIN) 
and 27 indefinite quantity CLINs.  The solicitation also asked 
offerors to submit the following cost/price information:  a breakdown 
of direct labor costs; direct material costs (identifying the 
quantity, type, and unit price); subcontracting costs; overhead costs; 
general and administrative costs; profit; and a FAR  sec.  52.230-1 
disclosure statement.[2]  With regard to price evaluation, as noted 
above, the RFP provided that price proposals would be evaluated "to 
determine reasonableness and realism of price."

Volmar contends that the Navy improperly evaluated OSMC's prices, 
which, Volmar argues, are unreasonably low.  In making this argument, 
Volmar contends that because the RFP required submission of cost data, 
the Navy was required to perform a cost realism analysis of OSMC's 
proposal.

As a preliminary matter, there is simply no requirement that a cost 
realism analysis be performed in every instance where an RFP requires 
offerors to submit cost data.  Research Management Corp., 69 Comp. 
Gen. 368 (1990), 90-1 CPD  para.  352.  Rather, where, as here, adequate 
price competition is achieved, and a fixed-price contract is 
contemplated, contracting agencies are not required to assess cost 
realism.  Id.    This is because cost realism (a measurement of the 
likely cost of performance in a cost reimbursement contract) is 
generally not a factor in the evaluation of proposals where a 
fixed-price contract is to be awarded because the government's 
liability is fixed, and the risk of cost escalation is borne by the 
contractor.  See PHP Healthcare Corp.; Sisters of Charity of the 
Incarnate Word, B-251799 et al., May 4, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  366.

However, since the risk of poor performance when a contractor is 
forced to provide services at little or no profit is a legitimate 
concern in evaluating proposals, an agency in its discretion may, as 
it did here, provide for a price realism analysis in the solicitation 
of fixed-price proposals.  The FAR provides a number of price analysis 
techniques that may be used to determine whether prices are reasonable 
and realistic, including comparison of the prices received with each 
other, FAR  sec.  15.805-2(a) (FAC 90-39), and comparison of proposed 
prices with an independent government estimate.  FAR  sec.  15.805-2(e).  
The depth of an agency's price realism analysis is a matter within the 
sound exercise of the agency's discretion.  Cardinal Scientific, Inc., 
B-270309, Feb. 12, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  70.  

In this case, the record shows that in order to assess price realism 
and reasonableness, the PEB performed five separate price analyses 
during its evaluation of pricing proposals.  First, the PEB compared 
each offeror's total price (base year and 2 option years) to the 
government estimate.  Next, the PEB evaluated what percentage of each 
offeror's proposed prices was allocated to the 15 highest-priced CLINs 
in the solicitation.  The PEB then analyzed the ratio in each 
offeror's pricing proposal between its fixed-price CLINs and 
indefinite quantity CLINs and compared this figure to the 
fixed-price/indefinite quantity CLIN ratio in the government estimate.  
Finally, the PEB compared each offeror's total price by CLIN to the 
average and the mean of the CLIN prices in all 11 proposals.

The evaluation of OSMC's proposals showed that its proposed prices 
were reasonably close to the mean and average proposal prices and the 
government estimate.  OSMC's total proposed price constituted 73 
percent of the government estimate; the other prices ranged from 55 
percent to 191 percent of the government estimate.  Additionally, 
almost 90 percent of OSMC's proposed prices were allocated to the 15 
highest-priced CLINs.  This was within the general range of proposed 
prices, all of which exceeded the ratio in the government estimate, 
ranging from 74 percent to 97 percent, compared to 60 percent in the 
government estimate.  OSMC's fixed-price work/indefinite quantity work 
ratio--58 percent--was comparable to the government estimate ratio--51 
percent, and within the range of the ratios in the other proposed 
prices, which ran from 32 percent to 62 percent.  Finally, OSMC's 
total price and individual CLIN prices were 73 percent of the mean and 
71 percent of the average prices.  Based on this evaluation, which 
found OSMC's proposed CLIN and total prices consistent with or 
reasonably close to its competitors' and the government estimate, the 
PEB concluded that OSMC's proposed price was realistic and reasonable.

In its protest, Volmar contends that the pricing evaluation performed 
by the PEB was unreasonable because of alleged errors in the 
government estimate.  Specifically, Volmar contends that the Navy 
based the government estimate on wage rates that do not reflect the 
applicable wage rates required by the Service Contract Act (SCA), 41 
U.S.C.  sec.  351- 358 (1994), and the Davis-Bacon Act (DBA), 40 U.S.C.  sec.  
276a(a) (1994).

Contrary to Volmar's contentions, we are not persuaded that the agency 
used incorrect SCA and DBA wage rates in its government estimate 
calculation.  Whereas Volmar insists the government estimate is 
erroneous because it did not rely on the highest wage rate for each 
job category, for many of the CLIN job categories lower wage rates can 
be--and in preparation of the government estimate were--applied.  For 
example, whereas Volmar contends that the SCA "General Maintenance 
Worker" wage ($15.05 per hour) must be used for the grounds 
maintenance CLINs, the agency points out that the lower-priced SCA 
"Gardener" ($11.84) or "Laborer, Grounds Maintenance" ($10.28) wage 
rate also could be applied.  The record shows that throughout the 
protester's examples, wherever a choice existed between wage 
categories, Volmar consistently selected a more expensive category 
than relied upon by the government.  The agency also points out that 
where CLIN work can be fulfilled by supervisory or management 
positions, SCA and DBA wage standard compliance is not mandatory.  
Given the different reasonable approaches which may be followed in 
assigning labor wage rates to the CLIN work required under the RFP, we 
see no basis to conclude that the government estimate is flawed in 
this case.

In view of the agency's use of FAR-authorized price analysis 
techniques, and given the number of proposals submitted and the 
proximity of OSMC's proposed prices to the mean and average prices and 
the government estimate, we have no basis to question the agency's 
determination that OSMC's proposed prices were realistic.  See 
Northern Virginia Serv. Corp., B-258036.2; B-258036.3, Jan. 23, 1995, 
95-1 CPD  para.  36; PHP Healthcare Corp., B-251933, May 13, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  
381.

CONCLUSION

Our review of the record shows that the agency reasonably rated OSMC's 
technical proposal as "highly satisfactory" and performed a reasonable 
price analysis.  Under these circumstances, where OSMC's technical 
proposal was equally ranked with Volmar's, the contracting agency 
properly selected OSMC for award based on its lower-priced proposal.  
See Koba Assocs., Inc., B-251356, Mar. 25, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  267.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States    

f:\projects\pl\2721882.wp5

1. Both technical and price proposals were evaluated using adjectival 
ratings of highly satisfactory, acceptable, unacceptable but 
susceptible to being made acceptable, and unacceptable.

2. FAR  sec.  52.230-1 requires contractors to submit a disclosure 
statement to ensure that the contractor's accounting practices are in 
compliance with the Cost Accounting Standards and any applicable cost 
regulations.