BNUMBER:  B-271868.3
DATE:  September 3, 1996
TITLE:  Engineering & Environment, Inc.

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
                                                                                                                   
Matter of:Engineering & Environment, Inc.

File:     B-271868.3

Date:September 3, 1996

J. Randolph MacPherson, Esq., Sullivan & Worcester, for the protester.
Al Reisz, for Reisz Engineering, an intervenor.
Nicholas P. Reston, Esq., and  Michael J. O'Farrell, Jr., Esq., 
Department of the Army, for the agency.
Marie Penny Ahearn, Esq., David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, 
Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the 
preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest against exclusion of protester's lower-rated, lower-priced 
proposal for environmental support services from revised competitive 
range is denied where the relative weaknesses in, and risks associated 
with, protester's proposed approaches to sample task requirement and 
professional staffing were such that the proposal was less 
advantageous than the proposals included in the revised competitive 
range and lacked a reasonable chance for award.

DECISION

Engineering & Environment, Inc. (EEI) protests the Department of the 
Army's award of a contract to Reisz Engineering under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. DABT02-95-R-0002, for environmental support 
services at Fort McClellan, Alabama.  EEI challenges the agency's 
exclusion of its proposal from a revised competitive range.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The RFP, a 100-percent small business set-aside, contemplated award of 
a fixed-price requirements contract under which delivery orders would 
be issued for individual environmental engineering and remediation 
tasks, for a base period (the remainder of fiscal year 1996) and 3 
option years.  Award was to be made to the offeror submitting the 
proposal most advantageous to the government, that is, "[a] proposal 
that offer[s] value in meeting the requirements--quality performance 
with acceptable risk at a fair and reasonable price."  The 
solicitation provided for evaluation of "technical/managerial 
acceptability" and cost (price), stating that technical/management was 
"somewhat more important" than cost, but that cost would increase in 
importance as the quality differences between proposals decreased.  
With respect to cost, the RFP listed estimated hours for various 
required labor categories, for which offerors were to provide unit and 
extended prices, and stated that the evaluation would include 
consideration of cost reasonableness, total cost, and distribution of 
cost throughout the life of the contract.  With respect to the 
technical and management factors, the agency's source selection 
evaluation plan (SSEP) provided for point scoring proposals; 700 of 
the overall 1,000 points were available under the technical factor 
(including 450 points for an offeror's response to a required sample 
task) and the remaining 300 points were available under the management 
factor.  At issue here is the evaluation of EEI's proposal under (1) 
the technical subfactor for comprehension of the sample task 
requirement and, specifically, the subfactor element for 
implementability of the sample task solution (worth 50 weighted 
points, and the fourth most important sample task subfactor element), 
and (2) the management subfactor for compensation plan for 
professional employees (worth 10 weighted points, and the least 
important management subfactor).

Eleven proposals were received by closing time; seven--including EEI's 
and Reisz's--were included in the initial competitive range.  
Following discussions, the Army requested best and final offers 
(BAFO).  After evaluation of BAFOs, the contracting officer reduced 
the competitive range to four proposals; EEI's proposal was 
excluded.[1]

EEI's BAFO offered the lowest price ($1,579,370), but the Army 
determined that in a number of areas EEI's proposed 
technical/management approach was either less advantageous and/or 
posed a greater risk than the approaches in the revised competitive 
range proposals.  Among the areas of concern were (1) EEI's failure to 
provide adequate detail with respect to its sample task plan to 
implement tank removal and disposal, and (2) EEI's failure to propose 
professional salaries and a per diem/travel allowance sufficient to 
assure the delivery of uninterrupted high quality work.  Although only 
21 points separated the proposals, the contracting officer found that 
"[t]he true difference was that Reisz submitted an excellent proposal 
as compared to EEI's satisfactory proposal."  As a result, EEI's 
proposal was eliminated from the revised competitive range on the 
basis that it did not have a reasonable chance for award compared to 
the four superior proposals included in the range, all of which 
presented little or no technical/management risk and had realistic 
prices.  In making the award decision, the contracting officer 
essentially determined that the four revised competitive range 
proposals were technically/managerially equal, and thus made award to 
Reisz on the basis of its low price ($1,900,974).  EEI's protest 
ensued.  

EEI argues that its proposal was technically/managerially equal to 
Reisz's, and therefore should not have been eliminated from the 
revised competitive range.  Had its proposal been included, EEI 
concludes, it would have been in line for award based on its lower 
price (compared to Reisz's).

The evaluation of proposals and the determination of whether a 
proposal is in the competitive range are principally matters within 
the contracting agency's discretion, since agencies are responsible 
for defining their needs and for deciding the best method of meeting 
them.  Advanced Sys. Technology, Inc.; Engineering and Professional 
Servs., Inc., B-241530; B-241530.2, Feb. 12, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  153.  
Hence, it is not the function of our Office to evaluate proposals de 
novo; we will not disturb a competitive range determination absent a 
clear showing that it was unreasonable or in violation of procurement 
laws or regulations.  Institute for Int'l Research, B-232103.2, Mar. 
15, 1989, 89-1 CPD  para.  273.

Based on our review of the protest record, including the record of a 
hearing conducted by our Office,[2] we find some questionable areas of 
the technical evaluation--with respect to the sample task activities 
of cleaning and stenciling the tank and testing the tank for 
structural integrity--where, although the agency found that only EEI's 
proposal lacked sufficient detail and was otherwise lacking, in fact 
EEI's and Reisz's proposals appear to contain similar detail and types 
of information.  However, our review indicates that the agency has 
reasonably determined that, in other respects, EEI's proposal was less 
advantageous than the proposals included in the revised competitive 
range, such that EEI lacked a reasonable chance for award.  We discuss 
some areas of the evaluation below.

SAMPLE TASK 

EEI challenges the Army's evaluation of responses to the sample task 
requirement.  In this regard, offerors were to propose an approach to 
the excavation and remediation/disposal of contaminated soils--i.e., 
soils with a total petroleum hydrocarbon (TPH) concentration above 200 
mg/kg--at a site near the flight line on an Army air field and 
adjacent to a hangar, described as containing leaking fuels from a 
20,000 gallon underground storage tank that had been taken out of 
service.  The sample task further required the transportation of the 
excavated tank, soils, and other wastes to the installation's Defense 
Reutilization Management Office for ultimate disposal by the Army.  
The RFP advised offerors that their proposals "must provide evidence 
that you comprehend the scope of support and services that you will be 
required to provide for [t]he sample task" and indicate an "ability to 
assess problems, to develop recommendations, and to implement those 
recommendations in an effective and efficient manner." 

During discussions, the Army issued EEI an item for negotiation (IFN) 
on the implementability of its sample task approach, as follows:

        "The offeror should address a plan for tank removal and 
        disposal, inspection of the tank for structural integrity, and 
        planning and coordination of excavation activities.  The tank 
        vapors should be monitored prior to tank removal.  There 
        should be some presentation of systems modification at various 
        stages in the project where uncertainties may require this."

The Army determined that EEI's subsequent BAFO response "did not 
address this negotiation point in sufficient detail to allow the 
committee to fully assess [the] implementability" of its proposed 
approach.  In this regard, the agency stated at the hearing that it 
viewed EEI's removal/disposal plan as lacking in detail and procedure, 
particularly in the area of planning for contingencies, i.e., changing 
conditions occurring during the removal/disposal process, and as 
relatively less advantageous than Reisz's proposed approach.  
Specifically, the agency viewed Reisz's proposal as including more 
detail and proposed procedure in such areas as monitoring the tank 
vapor state for changed conditions, notifying appropriate agency and 
state officials of the existence of any gross TPH soil contamination 
levels, shoring up of the adjacent hangar if necessary, and providing 
for any ground water encountered in the excavation.  VT 
1:32:32-1:59:36; AT, side 2. 
   
Monitoring Tank Vapors

EEI maintains that its proposal was similar to Reisz's with respect to 
monitoring the tank vapors for flammable/combustible gas.  
Specifically, EEI states, it proposed to "regularly test" both the 
excavation area and tank atmosphere with a combustible gas indicator 
until the tank had been removed from both the excavation and the site.  
EEI further notes that it specifically provided that "[r]eadings of 20 
percent or less of the lower flammable limit will be obtained before 
the tank is considered safe to remove from the ground" and that it 
would retest the tank after lifting it from the pit.

The Army responds that, although both proposals provided for testing 
of the tank vapors, Reisz's indicated that Reisz would closely monitor 
the tank vapor state to ensure that it had not changed, i.e., that it 
remained below the explosive limit.  AT side 2.  Specifically, Reisz 
provided that testing of the tank atmosphere and excavation site would 
be "performed prior to the start of each work day and hourly 
thereafter"; that its "safety and quality assurance manager will be 
responsible for assuring that organic vapor concentrations remain 
below the lower explosive limit of 19 percent"; and that "[c]onsistent 
readings of 19 percent or less of the lower explosive limit will be 
recorded before the tank is considered safe to remove from the 
ground."  On this basis the agency determined that Reisz's proposal 
was more advantageous than EEI's.  

The agency's determination was reasonable.  Reisz's plan for hourly 
testing, having one person specifically responsible for "assuring" 
that vapor concentrations do not exceed a lower explosive limit of 19 
percent, and requiring "consistent" readings below the lower explosive 
limit before the tank is considered safe to remove from the ground, 
reasonably indicated an approach to monitoring the tank that would be 
more likely to assure that the vapor state remains below the explosive 
limit.  In our view, the agency reasonably could view such a detailed 
and intensive program of close monitoring of the tank as superior to 
EEI's more general proposal to "regularly test" the area and tank.

Monitoring TPH Levels

EEI argues that its proposal was  similar to Reisz's in the manner in 
which it provided for the monitoring of TPH soil contamination levels 
(by means of organic vapor analyzer readings).  As noted by the 
agency, however, Reisz's proposal provided not only for taking soil 
readings, but also for communicating information on any gross TPH 
contamination--(i.e., beyond the 200 mg/kg value specified in the 
sample task as acceptable for backfilling)--to the appropriate agency 
and state officials.  VT 1:56:54.  In this regard, Reisz's proposal 
stated that:

     ". . . [i]f gross [TPH] contamination is noted at the stated or 
     imposed limits . . . the project manager will notify the 
     contracting officer's representative and directorate of 
     environmental management [at Fort McClellan] immediately that 
     further investigative work is needed.  The Alabama Department of 
     Environmental Management will be notified within 24 hours of the 
     discovery."  

EEI's proposal did not contain a similar notification provision.  This 
notification approach, not found in EEI's proposal, further supported 
the agency's determination that Reisz's proposal was superior in the 
area of contingency planning.

Shoring and Ground Water

As discussed at the hearing, shoring was another area in which the 
agency viewed Reisz's proposal as superior to EEI's.  VT 1:45:52.  As 
acknowledged by EEI in its comments on the agency report, Reisz's 
proposal provided that it would "[s]hor[e] the adjacent structure 
foundation [i.e., the hangar] . . . if the foundation's integrity is 
in question."  In contrast, EEI's proposal did not provide for such 
shoring.  Finally, in the area of contingency planning, the agency 
viewed Reisz's discussion of ground water as a further indication of 
the superiority of its proposal.  VT 1:56:10.  EEI denies that its 
proposal is significantly inferior to Reisz's in this area, noting 
that, like Reisz, it provided for measures such as plastic sheeting 
and berming to control ground water run off.  However, Reisz's 
proposal also discussed the documentation and pumping of any ground 
water that might be encountered.[3]  Again, we believe that the agency 
reasonably determined that Reisz's greater attention to detail made 
its proposal more advantageous in this area.[4]
 
The primary purpose of a sample task requirement is to test offerors' 
understanding of the technical requirements of the contemplated 
contract.  See Fluor Daniel, Inc., B-262051; B-262051.2, Nov. 21, 
1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  241.  In view of Reisz's more detailed and 
comprehensive discussion of its sample task approach and, in specific, 
its greater attention to assuring safe operations, we conclude that 
the Army could reasonably evaluate Reisz's proposal as demonstrating a 
greater understanding of the technical requirements and, on that 
basis, find EEI's proposal to be technically inferior to Reisz's.[5]

PROFESSIONAL STAFFING

EEI's BAFO also was evaluated as less advantageous than Reisz's in the 
area of staffing.  In this regard, offerors were to describe their (1) 
management approach and understanding of the contract requirements, 
(2) "ability to provide uninterrupted high quality work," and (3) 
compensation plan, "setting forth salaries and fringe benefits 
proposed for the professional employees who will work under this 
contract."  In addition, the RFP incorporated by reference the clause 
at Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  52.222-46, Evaluation of 
Compensation for Professional Employees, which provides for an 
assessment of offerors' ability to provide uninterrupted, high-quality 
work, considering the realism of the proposed professional 
compensation and its impact upon recruiting and retention.  The FAR 
provision specifically provides that the "compensation levels proposed 
should reflect a clear understanding of work to be performed and 
should indicate the capability of the proposed compensation structure 
to obtain and keep suitably qualified personnel to meet mission 
objectives."  The FAR provision cautions that "[p]rofessional 
compensation that is unrealistically low or not in reasonable 
relationship to the various job categories, since it may impair the 
contractor's ability to attract and retain competent professional 
service employees, may be viewed as evidence of failure to comprehend 
the complexity of the contract requirements."   

During discussions, the agency issued EEI the following IFN:

        "The offeror does not describe a connection between pay levels 
        and providing uninterrupted quality of work.  Quality of work 
        is contingent on a variety of reasons other than pay, e.g., 
        management, location, benefits.  Since the offeror plans to 
        recruit for the project on site, there is no guarantee that he 
        will be able to find and retain employees to provide 
        uninterrupted high quality work for the duration of the 
        project."

In addition, the agency issued the following two related cost IFNs to 
EEI on professional staffing:

        "Concern if the contractor can get the professional staffing 
        at the hourly rates provided in the proposal.  Does contractor 
        intend to hire these employees locally."

        "No cost for travel and per diem identified."

In its BAFO, EEI stated that it "will establish a full service office 
at Anniston, Alabama [location of Fort McClellan]" and "[e]mployees 
will be hired locally."  EEI explained that it "propose[d] to staff 
the [Fort] McClellan office with 12 full-time positions," with its 
"home office . . . provid[ing] personnel to fill 5 positions, i.e. 35 
percent of the staff requirements of the project office."  The 
protester further explained that "t]he project manager will activate 
the recruiting program upon arrival at site"; "[t]he recruitment will 
continue and 5 to 8 positions will be filled within 60 days after 
contract award to attain the 75 percent staffing level"; and "[t]he 
remaining positions [will be] filled as needed in response to 
temporary or sudden workload fluctuations, with the support to be 
provided by the subcontractors identified in the proposal."
     
EEI also revised its proposed hourly wage rates and stated that it 
planned to use a salary structure with starting salaries equivalent to 
GS-11, senior level salaries equivalent to GS-12, and the project 
manager's salary equivalent to GS-13.  With respect to per diem/travel 
costs, EEI added a BAFO line item for $1,000 (per year) to the RFP's 
price schedule, and designated it "travel in accordance with [federal 
travel regulations] procedures."  EEI explained in its BAFO that the 
"[e]stimated travel cost is included in the bid schedule," and that 
"[a]ll travel cost will be charged in accordance with government 
regulations."  EEI claimed that its compensation practices would be 
"consistent with the requirements outlined in FAR  sec.  52.222-46," and 
stated that it did "not anticipate a problem in providing 
uninterrupted high quality work."

The Army concluded that EEI's proposal to hire 65 percent of its work 
force locally--interpreted as within a 30-mile radius of 
Anniston--posed a significant performance risk.  The agency questioned 
EEI's ability to recruit and hire the highly educated and experienced 
personnel required by the RFP for performance of the contract--e.g., 
engineers and geologists required to possess bachelor of science 
degrees and 3 to 5 years experience at a minimum--from the local area 
around Fort McClellan, a post scheduled for closure within 3 years, 
and thus unable to offer long-term employment opportunities, at the 
wages and per diem/travel costs proposed by the protester.

In this same connection, the Army evaluated EEI's proposed salary 
rates as unrealistically low.  While EEI indicated in its BAFO that 
its proposed salaries were based on the GS pay scales provided for in 
the solicitation as the equivalent rates for federal hires under the 
Service Contract Act, and which were used by the government in 
developing its independent government estimate (IGE), the agency's 
cost evaluation committee noted that the proposed price of EEI's 
proposal was $418,300 lower than the IGE.  The evaluators compared the 
IGE labor rates to EEI's rates and determined that the significant 
difference between the two was that the IGE rates included per diem 
costs, while the protester's rates did not.  VT 2:15:23.  
(Essentially, the IGE rates were based on the assumption that the 
professional staff positions would not be available locally, and that 
payment of a per diem thus would be necessary.)  In this regard, the 
evaluators determined that, even without considering travel costs, the 
line item of $1,000 per contract year for per diem/travel which EEI 
added in its BAFO was understated with respect to the likely per diem, 
estimated to be at least $336,920 (based on a rate of $85.00 per day, 
or $10.62 per hour, multiplied by 31,725 total estimated hours for the 
technical positions for the 4 contract years.  VT 2:20:10).  The 
agency concluded that the protester's professional wage rates were 
unrealistic because they did not include per diem and per diem was not 
otherwise provided for in sufficient amounts elsewhere in the 
proposal.  In addition, the evaluators noted that EEI proposed the 
lowest wage rates of the seven offerors in the initial competitive 
range for 11 of the 13 required technical positions.  VT 2:11:33.  
This comparison further indicated to the agency that EEI's proposed 
compensation plan was unrealistic.   

The Army reportedly expected EEI to respond to the IFNs in this area 
with a detailed justification of its staffing approach, indicating, 
for example, that the firm had completed a market survey to determine 
the availability of the personnel needed to perform the contract.  EEI 
did not do so, and the agency believed this called into question the 
firm's ability to assure the delivery of uninterrupted, high quality 
work, creating a significant management risk.  In this regard, the 
agency reports, if the required positions cannot be filled, or if they 
are filled with less qualified personnel, the result could be 
additional cost, delays, poor performance, and unmet regulatory 
deadlines.     

EEI argues that its intention to hire staff locally was limited to 
only 37.5 percent of the professional staff (or two to five people), 
not the 65 percent assumed by the Army.  According to the protester, 
this should have been evident to the agency from (1) EEI's proposal to 
transfer five home office personnel to the project office, (2) the 
areas of work that would be performed by EEI and its subcontractors, 
and (3) the additional EEI home office personnel who would be 
available to the project.  According to the protester, the Army should 
have known that, at most, EEI was planning to recruit only 50 percent 
of the project office staff, and that three of the staff to be hired 
were nonprofessional staff, none of which would be difficult to 
obtain.  As for the remaining professional staff to be hired, EEI 
contends that a market survey was unnecessary because of the proximity 
of the large urban centers of Atlanta, Georgia; Birmingham, Alabama; 
and Huntsville, Alabama, each of which is located within 100 miles of 
the Fort McClellan/Anniston area, since there is no shortage of the 
required specialized technical personnel in those markets. 

As for its proposed staff salaries, EEI maintains that the evaluators' 
conclusion that the rates were unrealistic is based on an incomplete 
comparison of EEI's and Reisz's BAFO prices.  According to the 
protester, although EEI's unit labor prices were lower than Reisz's 
for 11 of the 13 professional staff labor categories, for 5 of the 13 
categories the offerors proposed virtually identical prices; for 3 
more categories EEI's prices were lower because of Reisz's reliance 
upon an "overpriced large business subcontractor"; and for 3 of the 
remaining 5 categories, EEI already had on its staff, or under 
subcontract, the professional staff personnel at the prices proposed.  
As a result, EEI maintains, the evaluators' conclusion that EEI's 
prices were unrealistically low is supported by the difference in 
proposed prices for only two labor categories--the regulatory 
specialist and staff scientist--and the differences were related to 
the cost structure and competitive pricing strategies of the two 
offerors, rather than the understatement of cost by EEI.  With respect 
to per diem/travel, EEI asserts that its proposed price included more 
than $183,000 in overhead to cover travel and per diem costs and that 
a "simple comparison" of EEI's initial proposal pricing and required 
cost breakdown with EEI's BAFO pricing and response to the standard 
cost format would have revealed this.   

We find that the evaluation in this area was reasonable.  First, the 
agency reasonably questioned EEI's ability to hire professional staff 
locally at the wages proposed.  Although EEI challenges the agency's 
assumption that it had proposed to hire up to 65 percent (8 positions) 
of its professional staff locally, we note that in describing its 
plans for hiring the required professional staff, EEI's BAFO 
specifically stated--in sections entitled "Compensation Plan for 
Professional Employees" and "Staffing and Recruiting Plan"--that it 
intended to "staff the [Fort] McClellan office with 12 full-time 
positions"; its "home office [would] provide personnel to fill 5 
positions, i.e. 35 percent of the staff requirements of the project 
office"; and the remaining "5 to 8 positions" would be recruited "at 
site."  In addition, EEI responded to the agency's IFN on professional 
staffing salaries and local hiring by stating that "it will establish 
a full service office at Anniston, Alabama[;] [e]mployees will be 
hired locally," and there was no clear indication in the firm's 
proposal that three of the positions it stated would be recruited at 
site were non-professional, as the protester now contends.  Moreover, 
the fact that the discussion in this regard appeared in the section of 
the firm's BAFO entitled "Compensation Plan for Professional 
Employees" (emphasis added) reasonably could have led the agency to 
assume that the five to eight positions to be recruited were all 
professional positions.[6]  Similarly, EEI's proposal did not clearly 
define its intended local area of recruitment as including areas as 
far away as Atlanta, Birmingham, and Huntsville.  In these 
circumstances, we believe that the agency reasonably read the 
protester's proposal as indicating that up to 65 percent of EEI's 
professional staff--or as many as eight positions--would be recruited 
from the immediate local area of Fort McClellan in Anniston, 
Alabama.[7] [8]

Further, given its reasonable determination that the professional 
staff would not be available locally in the Fort McClellan/Anniston 
area at EEI's professional staffing rates, we think the agency could 
reasonably view the apparent lack of any significant per diem in EEI's 
proposal as evidence of the unrealistic character of its staffing 
approach.  While the protester argues that $183,000 in the firm's BAFO 
overhead amount was available to cover per diem and travel costs for 
non-locally recruited staff, that was not explained in or otherwise 
apparent from the firm's BAFO; instead, the firm's BAFO specifically 
indicated a per diem/travel amount of only $1,000 per contract year, 
significantly less than the $336,920 in per diem the agency determined 
would be necessary.  (The protester has not challenged the agency's 
estimate in this regard.)  In these circumstances, we find that the 
agency reasonably downgraded EEI's BAFO for failure to demonstrate a 
clear ability to assure timely acquisition of the necessary 
professional staffing, either through its proposed local recruitment 
or through travel from other areas.  
        
As noted above, although EEI's proposal was lower priced than Reisz's, 
the solicitation provided that cost was less important than 
technical/management considerations and it was such considerations 
that led the contracting officer to conclude that Reisz's proposal was 
a superior, "excellent" proposal (as compared to EEI's merely 
"satisfactory" proposal).  Given the relative weaknesses in, and risks 
associated with, EEI's proposed approaches to the sample task 
requirement and professional staffing, we believe that its BAFO 
reasonably could be found to be sufficiently less advantageous than 
Reisz's proposal (the lowest-rated proposal in the revised competitive 
range), such that EEI lacked a reasonable chance for award 
notwithstanding its lower proposed price.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. The total evaluated scores for the offerors in the revised 
competitive range ranged from Reisz's 922 points to 938 points; EEI's 
proposal received 901 total points.

2. The hearing commenced with a video teleconference (with references 
indicated in videotape (VT) time), and it concluded with a telephone 
conference (with references indicated in audiotape (AT) side).    

3. For example, Reisz noted that:

     ". . . [I]n the unlikely event that ground water or free/floating 
     product is encountered in the tank excavation, pumping may 
     generate phase-separated material.  If this occurs [Reisz] will 
     recover free product for resale if practicable.  Non-hazardous 
     waste generated during the project will be recycled whenever 
     practicable.  Waste disposal for non-recyclables will be 
     conducted on a daily basis, and [an] approved disposal location 
     will be utilized."

4. We also note that, at the hearing, the agency cited Reisz's 
approach to plugging holes in the tanks as an additional area where 
Reisz's proposal was superior.  AT side 2.  Although EEI questions the 
agency's position on the basis that both proposals discussed plugging 
or capping all accessible holes in the tank, our review of the 
proposals indicates that Reisz's proposal went beyond the plugging of 
accessible holes, providing in addition for the plugging of corrosion 
holes.  In this regard, the American Petroleum Institute Recommended 
Practice No. 1604, "Removal and Disposal of Used Underground Petroleum 
Storage Tanks," referred to by the protester, recommends the plugging 
of both accessible holes and corrosion holes in underground storage 
tanks. 

5. We further note that the agency has expressed concern that EEI's 
original proposal contained many typographical errors and 
misspellings.  Although these errors were corrected in EEI's BAFO and 
the firm was not downgraded in this regard, the agency maintains that 
because it will depend on the quality of the data and written reports 
generated by the contractor during the performance of this 
environmental support services contract, similar problems in this 
regard could result in additional costs for the government if checking 
the accuracy of data and correcting reports becomes necessary.  The 
agency notes that none of the other proposals exhibited a 
corresponding inattention to detail.  This was a proper basis for 
comparing the relative merits of the proposals.  See Pannesma Co. 
Ltd., B-251688, Apr. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  333 ("sloppy proposal" that 
reflected a "casual approach" a proper consideration for evaluation).  

6. Indeed, since the RFP provided for 13 categories of professional 
staff, the agency would have had no reason to believe that the total 
10 to 13 positions the protester discussed in its BAFO as being filled 
from either its home office or recruitment were other than 
professional positions.

7. The agency was not required to piece together disparate parts of 
the firm's proposal and compare them to the RFP in order to discern 
what the protester actually intended concerning its professional staff 
hiring.  See Interaction Research Inst., Inc., B-234141.7, June 30, 
1989, 89-2 CPD  para.  15.  Rather, it was the protester's responsibility to 
submit an adequately written proposal.  See Herndon Science and 
Software, Inc., B-245505, Jan. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  46.  The protester 
did not do so in this area, and as a result, it must bear the 
responsibility for any miscommunication of its intentions that may 
have occurred.

8. While EEI also maintains that, as claimed in its proposal, there 
were sufficient back-up staff resources available from its home office 
and its subcontractors to assure uninterrupted quality work, the 
agency reasonably viewed these resources as not negating its concern 
with the protester's intended primary method of obtaining staff, i.e., 
local recruitment.  In our view, the agency reasonably could view the 
potential for delay resulting from the expected failure of EEI's 
proposed primary recruitment effort as representing a risk to timely, 
successful contract performance.