BNUMBER:  B-271144.2; B-271144.3
DATE:  July 2, 1996
TITLE:  General Offshore Corporation-Riedel Company, a Joint Venture

**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:General Offshore Corporation-Riedel Company, a Joint Venture

File:     B-271144.2; B-271144.3

Date:July 2, 1996

Jacob B. Pompan, Esq., Neil H. Ruttenberg, Esq., and Gerald H. Werfel, 
Esq., Pompan, Ruffner & Werfel, for the protester.
William A. Roberts III, Esq., Lee Curtis, Esq., and Brian A. Darst, 
Esq., Howrey & Simon, for Global PCCI, a Joint Venture, the 
intervenor.
Virginia B. Sanaie, Esq., Department of the Navy, for the agency.
Henry J. Gorczycki, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of 
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the 
decision.

DIGEST

1.  Award of contracts to an offeror under a predetermined 
cost/technical tradeoff formula which the solicitation stated was 
intended to be strictly followed by the agency to determine the 
awardee is proper where, although the formula actually applied by the 
contracting agency was not consistent with that stated in the 
solicitation due to a flaw in the computer program used by the agency, 
the record shows that the award was made to the offeror whose proposal 
represents the best value proposal under a proper application of the 
stated tradeoff formula.

2.  Agency's upward adjustment of protester's proposed cost for a cost 
reimbursement contract is reasonable where the protester introduced 
labor overhead rate reductions in its best and final offer without a 
reasonable explanation for the reduction, or without providing 
documentation supporting the rate.

DECISION

General Offshore Corporation-Riedel Company, a Joint Venture, protests 
an award to Global PCCI, a Joint Venture, under request for proposals 
(RFP) No. N00024-93-R-4156, issued by the Department of the Navy, 
Naval Sea Systems Command, for management, maintenance and operation 
of Emergency Ship Salvage Material (ESSM) bases, and for services 
related to pollution control, underwater ship husbandry and salvage 
operations.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The RFP contemplated the award of two contracts for a base year with 4 
option years to a single offeror.  The first contract, for the 
management, maintenance and operation of ESSM bases, is a 
cost-plus-award-fee contract.  The other contract is for indefinite 
delivery/indefinite quantity type services related to pollution 
control, underwater ship husbandry and salvage operations, which 
contemplated either fixed-price or cost reimbursement orders for the 
services.  The RFP listed all of the required labor categories and 
positions for which offerers were required to propose specific 
personnel (referred to as "scheduled personnel"); non-scheduled 
services would be performed by additional, non-specified individuals 
(referred to as "non-scheduled personnel").  Offerors were required to 
include and identify in their cost proposals loaded "man-day rates" 
for each required labor category to include all components of cost.  
The RFP contemplated that work placed under the contracts would be 
based on these "man-day rates."

The RFP provided for a best value evaluation with technical factors of 
greater importance than cost.  The RFP listed the technical evaluation 
factors, their respective first, second, third and fourth-tier 
subfactors, and the relative importance of each factor or subfactor.  
Raw technical scores were converted to a weighted score on a 100-point 
scale.  

The RFP contained a specific cost/technical tradeoff methodology to be 
used for determining the proposal which represented the best value.  
This methodology was stated in the RFP as follows:

     "Technical factors, taken as a whole, are on the average more 
     important than cost; however, cost is an important factor.  The 
     degree of its importance will increase with the degree of 
     equality of proposals in relation to other factors on which 
     selection is to be based.  The [g]overnment is willing to pay a 
     premium over [the] lowest-priced technically acceptable offer for 
     a technically superior proposal offering the 'greatest value' to 
     the Government.  A 'decreasing cost effectiveness' methodology 
     will be employed to determine which proposal represents the best 
     value.  This methodology, which is based on a determination of 
     what premium(s) the Government is willing to pay across the range 
     of acceptable technical scores, permits award to an offeror with 
     a higher cost and also a higher technical rating than the Lowest 
     (cost) Technically Acceptable Proposal (LTAP) within 
     predetermined limits.  Specifically, each dollar proposed over 
     the LTAP will require an incrementally higher technical score 
     increase to remain equivalent to the LTAP.  The graph which 
     follows illustrates the curve representing equivalent proposals, 
     and is based on premiums established as follows:"

Technical Score     Relative Cost Govt. Will Pay [percent of 
                                        LTAP]Ratio[[1]]

 65                 100                 --

 70                 115                 3 : 1

 75                 130                 3 : 1

 80                 145                 3 : 1

 85                 155                 2 : 1

 90                 160                 1 : 1

 95                 162.5               0.5 : 1

100                 165                 0.5 : 1
When plotted on a graph, the data from the table produce the following 
curve which was also included in the RFP:

The points falling directly on the curve represent equivalent 
proposals under the cost/technical selection methodology.  For 
example, assuming that a proposal with the lowest technically 
acceptable score of 65 also has the lowest (i.e., LTAP) cost, the 
proposal would be equivalent to a proposal with a score of 80 and a 
cost that is 145 percent of the LTAP, as well as equivalent to a 
proposal with a perfect score of 100 and a cost that is 165 percent of 
the LTAP, because all three of these proposals would be represented as 
points on the graph which fall directly on the curve illustrated in 
the RFP.

The RFP further stated:

     "Any point above the curve represents a proposal inferior to 
     those on the curve and will be ineligible for award.  Any point 
     below the curve represents a proposal superior to those on the 
     curve.  Such proposals have a technical-to-cost ratio of greater 
     value to the [g]overnment.  The [g]overnment will determine the 
     greatest value offeror and ultimate awardee from offers on or 
     below the curve.  The [g]overnment reserves the right to judge 
     which proposal reflects the required technical ability and which 
     proposal offers the greatest value to the [g]overnment."

Initial proposals were received from four offerors, including General 
Offshore and Global (the incumbent contractor).  Technical proposals 
were evaluated by a technical evaluation review panel, which reported 
the evaluation results to a contract award review panel (CARP).  
Concurrently, the contracting officer performed a cost realism 
analysis with the assistance of the Defense Contract Audit Agency 
(DCAA).

The agency conducted discussions and, by letter of October 13, 1995, 
requested best and final offers (BAFO).  BAFOs were received from all 
four offerors.  The final evaluation results were as follows:

Offeror     Technical
            Score[2]    Proposed Cost ($)Evaluated Cost ($)Best Value 
                                                Ranking

Global      89.1        26,604,387  27,292,837  1

General Offshore84.7    25,613,162  26,251,792  2

Offeror A   78.9        26,825,530  26,825,530  3

Offeror B   70.9        26,951,746  26,951,746  4
The offerors' evaluated costs reflect the adjustments made to proposed 
costs as a result of the cost realism analysis.  Specifically, while 
the proposed BAFO costs for General Offshore were based in part on a 
proposed labor overhead rate of [DELETED] percent and Global's BAFO 
costs were based on proposed labor overhead rates ranging from 
[DELETED] percent to [DELETED] percent (depending on the worksite), 
the agency's cost realism analysis adjusted both offerors' rates to 
[DELETED] percent.[3]

The contracting officer ranked proposals using a computerized 
spreadsheet program, which he had a Navy employee create some years 
ago for this purpose.  That program--which, as explained below, 
contained certain programming errors--purports to calculate best value 
ratings for the proposals received.  These ratings were derived from 
the "normalized cost" of proposals, calculated using the offerors' 
point scores and evaluated costs from the predetermined cost/technical 
tradeoff values stated in the RFP.  The "normalized costs" and the 
relative ratings derived directly therefrom represent the relative 
value of the proposals for best value comparison purposes, as 
contemplated by the RFP methodology.  

More specifically, under this methodology (as explained further 
below), the normalized cost of a proposal is a dollar amount 
essentially calculated by first determining the dollar value (the 
"premium earned") of a proposal's technical score above the minimum 
acceptable score of 65 points.  This is done by determining the 
relative cost percentage of the total technical score from the graph 
and table included in the RFP, based on the particular proposal's 
technical score as compared to a hypothetical baseline proposal rated 
at 65 points with an evaluated cost equal to the LTAP cost.  The LTAP 
cost is multiplied by the proposal's relative cost percentage to 
convert the relative cost percentage into a dollar value.  The LTAP 
cost is then subtracted from this dollar value to determine the 
premium earned.  The premium earned is in turn subtracted from the 
proposal's evaluated cost to determine the proposal's normalized 
cost.[4]  Under the computer program, the lowest normalized cost of 
all proposals was then supposed to be divided by the normalized cost 
of each proposal and multiplied by 100 to produce the rating for the 
respective proposal.  Proposals were then ranked from first to last 
with the highest rating representing the first in rank and thus the 
best value.

The CARP reviewed the technical and cost evaluations, and found that 
Global's proposal was "clearly technically superior, and falls within 
the 'best value' premium for award," and that only award to Global 
would be consistent with the evaluation plan and award methodology 
stated in the RFP, and recommended award to Global.

The contracting officer, who was authorized under the Source Selection 
Plan to make the final source selection, concurred with the CARP 
recommendation.  The contracting officer determined that Global's 
technical proposal was outstanding and technically superior overall; 
that Global's evaluated cost was only 3.97 percent above the LTAP cost 
represented by General Offshore's evaluated cost; and that, based on 
his calculations, only award to Global would be consistent with the 
stated evaluation and award methodology.  On January 30, 1996, after 
obtaining authority to execute the contracts, the contracting officer 
awarded the contracts to Global.

General Offshore's protests followed, challenging both the award under 
the cost/technical tradeoff methodology and the adjustment of overhead 
rates in the cost realism analysis.[5]  

COST/TECHNICAL TRADEOFF METHODOLOGY

General Offshore alleges that, given the close technical evaluation 
scores of its and Global's BAFOs, the BAFOs were essentially 
equivalent, and thus General Offshore's lower-cost BAFO represented a 
better value.  Alternatively, it alleges that, using the computerized 
spreadsheet program relied upon by the contracting officer to rank 
proposals, General Offshore's proposal is ranked number one and thus 
is the best value.

During the course of this protest, the Navy stated that, in addition 
to the undisputed error in the final technical scores, see footnote 2, 
supra, there was an error in the spreadsheet program which rendered 
the spreadsheet-generated rankings unreliable for determining the best 
value proposal under the stated cost/technical tradeoff methodology.  
The contracting officer therefore provided his own calculations of the 
normalized costs of proposals--$11,778,028 for Global and $11,970,817 
for General Offshore--and ranked proposals, with the lowest normalized 
cost representing the best value proposal.  Since Global also has the 
lowest normalized cost under the contracting officer's calculations, 
the Navy contends that the award to Global was proper.

Agencies must evaluate proposals in accordance with the criteria 
established in the RFP.  Telecommunications Management Corp., 57 Comp. 
Gen. 251 (1978), 78-1 CPD  para.  80.  Source selection officials have broad 
discretion in determining the manner and extent to which they will 
make use of the technical and cost evaluation results subject only to 
the tests of rationality and consistency with the RFP evaluation 
criteria.  Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  
325.  While evaluation point scores or adjectival ratings alone are 
not indicative of the relative value of proposals, and generally 
should be used as a guideline for intelligent decision-making, such 
that a selection decision should reflect the procuring agency's 
considered judgment of the significance of the difference in scores or 
ratings, M.D. Oppenheim & Co., P.A., 70 Comp. Gen. 213 (1991), 91-1 
CPD  para.  98, we have consistently upheld source selection decisions which 
rely solely on mathematical cost/technical tradeoff methodologies 
where the application of such a methodology is consistent with the 
source selection scheme stated in the RFP.  See, e.g., Douglas County 
Aviation, Inc., et al., 64 Comp. Gen. 888 (1985), 85-2 CPD  para.  345; 
Tulane Univ., B-259912, Apr. 21, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  210.  

Notwithstanding the protester's contentions, the fact that point 
scores are close does not necessarily indicate that proposals are 
essentially equal; rather, agencies may reasonably decide that a 
relatively minor point differential represents actual superiority of 
the higher-rated proposal.  M.D. Oppenheim & Co., P.A., supra.  Here, 
the record shows that the Navy considered the higher technical score 
of Global--both as part of the original selection decision and during 
the course of this protest-- to reflect actual superiority.  
Specifically, Global's proposal was found superior to General 
Offshore's in the areas of personnel, management, ESSM-type 
experience, corporate organization, and oil and hazardous material 
spill contingency planning.   The protester has not refuted the 
agency's explanations of the technical ratings, made specific 
responses to the agency's explanations justifying the point scores 
awarded, or contended with any support that Global's technical rating 
may be too high or General Offshore's rating too low.  Accordingly, 
the protester's contention that the point scores alone demonstrate 
that the two proposals are essentially equal is not supported by the 
record. 

As for the cost/technical tradeoff methodology used to rank proposals 
for award, the protester challenges the contracting officer's use of 
normalized costs to determine the best value BAFO, arguing that the 
ratings calculated from the software program should determine the 
awardee.[6]  Based on our review, we find that the comparison of the 
normalized costs calculated by the contracting officer is consistent 
with the cost/technical tradeoff methodology stated in the RFP and 
demonstrates that Global was properly selected for award.

As indicated above, the normalized costs were calculated by first 
converting each proposal's relative cost percentage determined from 
the table and graph given in the RFP into a dollar value from which 
the LTAP price was subtracted to yield what the contracting officer 
termed the "premium earned" over the assumed hypothetical baseline 
proposal with a technical score of 65 and a cost equal to the LTAP 
cost.  Thus, the premium earned essentially quantifies in dollars the 
value to the government of a proposal's technical score in excess of 
the minimum acceptable score of 65 points.

Here, the LTAP cost is the evaluated cost of General Offshore's BAFO 
($26,251,792).  Thus, the premium earned by Global's proposal is 
$15,514,809 (i.e., the difference between the LTAP cost and the 
product of the LTAP cost multiplied by Global's relative cost value of 
159.1 percent, which is determined using Global's technical score and 
the values from the table in the RFP, see footnote 1, supra).  The 
premium earned by General Offshore's proposal is $14,280,975 (i.e., 
the difference between the LTAP cost and the product of the LTAP cost 
multiplied by General Offshore's relative cost value of 154.4 
percent).  This calculated "premium earned" is then subtracted from 
each offeror's evaluated BAFO cost to yield the normalized cost.  
Here, the normalized cost of Global's BAFO is $11,778,028 (i.e., 
Global's evaluated cost of $27,292,837 less its premium earned of 
$15,514,809), and that of General Offshore's BAFO is $11,970,817 
(i.e., its evaluated cost of $26,251,792 less its premium earned of 
$14,280,975).  

The normalized cost reflects a proposal's value to the government at 
the proposed cost considering the value of the proposal's technical 
score in excess of the minimum acceptable score of 65 points.  
Therefore, the lower the normalized cost of a proposal, the better 
value it is to the government under the stated cost/technical tradeoff 
methodology.  Since the normalized costs are derived using the 
relative cost values under the cost/technical tradeoff methodology 
stated in the RFP, the use of normalized costs to determine the best 
value is consistent with the stated cost/technical tradeoff 
methodology.  In other words, this calculation is one method of 
essentially quantifying how far each proposal's value falls below the 
"decreasing cost effectiveness curve" set out in the RFP to determine 
which proposal falls furthest below the line and therefore represents 
the best value as the proposal with the best technical-to-cost ratio 
under the RFP evaluation methodology.[7]  Here, Global's normalized 
cost is lower than General Offshore's, and indeed lower than that of 
any other BAFO, therefore Global's BAFO represents the best value 
under the stated cost/technical tradeoff methodology.  

As noted by the protester, we have verified that applying the correct 
technical ratings and evaluated costs in the Navy's computerized 
spreadsheet program ranks General Offshore's proposal as the best 
value by a slight margin.  While the protester argues that this 
mandates that award be made to itself, we have also verified that the 
spreadsheet program contains errors which renders the program 
unreliable for ranking proposals under the stated methodology and that 
the calculation of the normalized costs described above is consistent 
with the RFP.  Since the contracting officer--i.e., the designated 
source selection authority in this case--has determined to strictly 
adhere to the best value methodology and has reassessed the ranking of 
BAFOs using the normalized costs of BAFOs at the corrected technical 
scores, the award to Global is consistent with the cost/technical 
tradeoff methodology stated in the RFP.  The erroneous results 
generated by the defective software program provide no basis for 
disturbing the award.

EVALUATION OF OVERHEAD RATES

General Offshore challenges the agency's cost evaluation based on its 
contention that the Navy unreasonably projected the protester's labor 
overhead rate above its proposed rate of [DELETED] percent in 
calculating General Offshore's evaluated cost.

Where, as here, an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs of 
contract performance are not dispositive because, regardless of the 
costs proposed, the government is bound to pay the contractor its 
actual and allowable costs.  Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  
15.605(c); Sabre Sys., Inc., B-255311, Feb. 22, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  129.  
Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be performed by the agency 
to determine the extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represent 
what the contract should cost, assuming reasonable economy and 
efficiency.  CACI, Inc.-Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71 (1984), 84-2 CPD  para.  542.  
Because the contracting agency is in the best position to make this 
cost realism determination, our review is limited to determining 
whether the agency's cost realism analysis is reasonably based and not 
arbitrary.  General Research Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 279 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  
183, aff'd, American Management Sys., Inc.; Department of the 
Army--Recon., 70 Comp. Gen. 510 (1991), 91-1 CPD  para.  492.

The Navy's cost realism analysis here was based in part on DCAA's 
pre-BAFO review of General Offshore's proposed labor overhead rates.  
DCAA took no exception to the rate of [DELETED] percent which General 
Offshore initially proposed for scheduled personnel.  However, DCAA 
did report that the rate for non-scheduled personnel should be 
increased from the proposed rate of [DELETED] percent to [DELETED] 
percent because General Offshore had not proposed to use additional 
personnel to perform non-scheduled services, as contemplated by the 
RFP, and thus had not included all of the overhead components in this 
rate that would be attributable to non-scheduled personnel.  In 
addition, DCAA reported that, since General Offshore's joint venture 
was new and had no historical overhead rates, the proposed rates were 
only based on the offeror's projections of costs.  DCAA did not review 
the assumptions upon which these projections were based and thus 
qualified its verification of these rates, stating that the offeror's 
actual rates could vary significantly from the projected rates, and 
that the Navy therefore should not consider these rates "as audit 
approved or recommended" by DCAA.

During discussions, the Navy advised General Offshore that it 
considered its overhead rate for non-scheduled personnel to be 
unrealistically low.  In response, General Offshore sought 
clarification about the distinction between scheduled and 
non-scheduled personnel, stating that if non-scheduled services are 
performed by additional personal, "then the overhead rate would be 
billed at [DELETED] [percent]."  The Navy advised General Offshore 
that indeed non-scheduled services were to be performed by additional 
personnel.  

In its BAFO, General offshore proposed an overhead rate of [DELETED] 
percent for both categories of labor overhead, stating that the 
decrease from the rate of [DELETED] percent was "due to the increased 
volume in the direct labor base when we included the [additional] 
non-scheduled [personnel]."  The BAFO provided no support for the rate 
of [DELETED] percent.

The contracting officer determined that there was no reasonable basis 
for the overhead rate to decrease with the addition of personnel to 
the labor base because the costs comprising overhead increase 
proportionally to the increase in personnel.  Therefore, the 
contracting officer did not consider General Offshore's proposed rate 
of [DELETED] percent to be reasonable, and increased that projected 
rate to [DELETED] percent in his cost realism analysis.

The record shows that the components of labor overhead pools of the 
respective offerors are only those costs required under state or 
federal laws, such as social security contributions, unemployment 
insurance, and the costs of labor compensation fringes required under 
applicable Service Contract Act wage determinations.  Since such costs 
vary directly with the number of employees in the labor base, we find 
reasonable the contracting officer's rationale for rejecting the 
offeror's explanation that its proposed decrease in overhead rate was 
due to an increase in its labor base.  Moreover, General Offshore's 
BAFO did not provide support for the newly proposed rate.  Since an 
offeror is responsible for supporting the cost elements in its 
proposal, including claimed overhead rates, we think the agency 
reasonably disregarded the proposed rate decrease here.  See Radian, 
Inc., B-256313.2; B-256313.4, June 27, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  104.

The contracting officer also did not consider General Offshore's 
initially proposed rate of [DELETED] percent to be realistic and 
instead used a [DELETED]-percent rate for cost realism evaluation 
purposes.  The contracting officer's stated rationale for this 
increase was that General Offshore was a newly formed joint venture 
whose rates could vary substantially vary from those proposed; that 
the cost elements of the overhead cost pools should be essentially the 
same for General Offshore as for Global (the incumbent contractor); 
and that there was no apparent basis for the offerors' rates to differ 
from the actual rates experienced under the incumbent contract which, 
according to DCAA, were in excess of [DELETED] percent.  

General Offshore contends that it was unreasonable to apply the actual 
overhead rates of the incumbent contractor because it alleges that its 
insurance rates and labor fringe costs would be lower than the 
incumbent's.  However, even if we were to accept these allegations as 
persuasive and were to find that the Navy should have applied the 
overhead rate of [DELETED] to determine General Offshore's evaluated 
cost, our review of the normalized costs under this assumption shows 
that Global's BAFO would still be the best value under the 
cost/technical tradeoff methodology stated in the RFP.  

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The ratio represents the rate at which the relative cost percentage 
                                        points increase for a 
                                        corresponding increase in 
                                        technical score.  A technical 
                                        score of 65 is the lowest 
                                        technically acceptable score, 
                                        and the chart is based on the 
                                        assumption that the LTAP will 
                                        have a technical score of 65.  
                                        As indicated in the following 
                                        graph set forth in the RFP, 
                                        the ratio for a given 
                                        technical score on the table 
                                        applies to the interval of 
                                        technical scores greater than 
                                        the preceding technical score, 
                                        up to and including the given 
                                        technical score.  Thus, for a 
                                        technical score of 83 points, 
                                        the respective interval is 80 
                                        through 85 and the applicable 
                                        ratio is the one corresponding 
                                        to the technical score of 85 
                                        (i.e., 2:1).  The ratio value 
                                        must be multiplied by the 
                                        number of points in the 
                                        interval to produce the 
                                        relative cost percentage 
                                        points earned for the 
                                        technical points in that 
                                        interval (i.e., the ratio 
                                        value is 2; the number of 
                                        points in the interval is 83 - 
                                        80 = 3; the relative cost 
                                        percentage points earned for 
                                        the interval is 2 x 3 = 6).  
                                        The total relative cost 
                                        percentage corresponding to 
                                        the technical score of 83 is 
                                        the sum of the percentage 
                                        points earned for this 
                                        interval and the total 
                                        percentage points stated in 
                                        the table for the next lowest 
                                        technical score of 80 (i.e., 6 
                                        + 145 = 151).  Thus, under the 
                                        example, the relative cost for 
                                        a technical score of 83 is 151 
                                        percent of the LTAP.

2. During the course of this protest, the agency discovered errors in 
            the technical scores for General Offshore and Global, and 
            increased each of these offerors' scores slightly to 
            reflect the correct scores resulting from evaluations.  
            The protester does not dispute the corrected scores.  The 
            agency determined that the corrected scores did not change 
            the ranking of proposals under the tradeoff methodology.  
            The scores in this table are the corrected scores.

3. The proposed costs of the other two offerors were not adjusted 
because the agency determined that they were not in contention for 
award.

4. As explained further below, under this methodology, the lowest 
normalized cost represents the best value.  

5. General Offshore's protest raised other issues, including 
allegations of unfair competitive advantages enjoyed by Global as the 
incumbent, a lack of meaningful discussions, and an unreasonable 
evaluation of proposed general and administrative costs.  The Navy's 
reports and Global's submissions to the record specifically addressed 
and refuted all of these allegations.  In responding to these 
submissions, the protester requested that we decide these
protest issues on the record, but did not provide any evidence to 
either support its allegations or otherwise refute the agency's or 
Global's positions.  We have reviewed the record and find no basis to 
sustain any of these protest issues.

6. General Offshore also notes that the contracting officer's 
calculations now justifying the award were created after award, 
contending that the software program created prior to award must be 
used to determine the awardee.  However, while documentation, such as 
the normalized cost calculations based on the corrected technical 
scores in this protest, which were developed after award and in 
response to a protest, may warrant less weight than other evidence in 
the record, we do consider such information together with the entire 
record, where, as here, the protester has had an opportunity to 
comment on the documentation.  Akal Sec., Inc., B-261996, Nov. 16, 
1995, 96-1 CPD  para.  33.

7. Alternatively, the curve can be replotted through the actual LTAP 
proposal using the same formula illustrated by the table and graph 
included in the RFP, in which case any proposal whose value falls 
below the replotted curve would represent a better value than the 
actual LTAP proposal.  Under this replotting, General Offshore's LTAP 
proposal would fall on the line and Global's proposal below the line.  
We have found no method of applying this tradeoff formula to the point 
scores and evaluated costs that could produce any result other than 
the one reached here and be consistent with the tradeoff formula 
illustrated in the RFP.