BNUMBER:  B-270793; B-270793.2
DATE:  April 24, 1996
TITLE:  Vinnell Corporation

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Vinnell Corporation

File:     B-270793; B-270793.2

Date:April 24, 1996

Marcus B. Slater, Esq., Jennifer J. Zeien, Esq., and Lisa G. 
Henneberry, Fort & Schlefer, for the protester.
Thomas J. Madden, Esq., John J. Pavlick, Jr., Esq., Jerome S. Gabig, 
Esq., and Carla D. Craft., Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard and 
Civiletti, for Serv-Air, Inc., the intervenor.
Clarence D. Long III, Esq., and Scott W. Singer, Esq., Department of 
the Air Force, for the agency.
John L. Formica, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, 
participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency's assessment of an offeror's proposal as entailing 
"moderate" proposal risk under a single evaluation factor does not 
mandate an upward adjustment of the offeror's proposed costs where the 
record reflects that the agency reasonably considered the aspect of 
the offeror's proposal which it assessed as entailing "moderate" risk 
and determined that no cost adjustment was warranted.

2.  New and independent grounds of protest concerning specific aspects 
of the agency's cost realism analysis and proposal risk assessment are 
untimely where the protester knew, or should have known, of these 
protest bases upon its receipt of the agency report, but first raised 
these bases of protest in a supplemental protest and in its comments 
on the agency report filed more than 14 days after the protester's 
receipt of the agency report.

DECISION

Vinnell Corporation protests the award of a contract to Serv-Air, Inc. 
under request for proposals (RFP) No. F04689-95-R-0015, issued by the 
Department of the Air Force, for military housing maintenance and 
civil engineering services.

We deny the protests in part and dismiss them in part.

The RFP, issued on May 5, 1995, provided for the award of a 
cost-plus-award-fee contract, with certain fixed-price elements, for a 
base period of 1 year with four 1-year options.  The successful 
contractor will provide military housing maintenance and repair 
services for 806 dwellings, and all labor (including professional 
engineering and architectural services), equipment, materials, and 
supplies to support other facilities, and the equipment installed on 
those facilities, at the Onizuka Air Station and certain other Air 
Force facilities in Sunnyvale, Pleasanton, and Mountain View, 
California.

The RFP requested that each offeror submit a management/technical and 
a cost proposal, and provided detailed instructions for their 
preparation.  The solicitation stated that award would be made to the 
responsible offeror whose offer, conforming to the solicitation, 
represented the best value to the government; that the evaluation 
areas to be considered were, in descending order of importance, 
management, technical, and cost; and that cost was significantly less 
important than management and technical.  The solicitation listed the 
following management and technical evaluation criteria and factors:

     A. Management Criterion
          Factor 1: Key Personnel
          Factor 2: Program Management
     
     B. Technical Criterion
          Factor 1: Operations and Maintenance
          Factor 2: Environmental
          Factor 3: Military Family Housing
          Factor 4: Scenario
          Factor 5: Resource Management
          Factor 6: Engineering and Planning

The solicitation informed offerors that factors 1 and 2 within the 
management criterion were equal in importance, and that, under the 
technical criterion, factors 1, 2, and 3 were equal in importance, 
with factors 4 and 5 being less important than factors 1, 2, or 3, and 
factor 6 being the least important.  The RFP advised offerors that 
their proposals would be evaluated for proposal risk, which would 
involve the assessment of whether the proposed methods of 
accomplishing the requirements of the contract were, for example, 
risky, standard, or practical.  Offerors were also informed that their 
proposals would be evaluated for performance risk, which would involve 
the assessment of the agency's confidence in each offeror's ability to 
successfully perform as proposed based upon, among other things, the 
offeror's work record and experience.  The solicitation informed 
offerors that their cost proposals would be evaluated for realism, 
completeness, and reasonableness.

The agency received five proposals, including Vinnell's (the incumbent 
contractor) and Serv-Air's, by the RFP's closing date of July 7, 1995.  
In accordance with the applicable source selection plan, the 
management/technical proposals were evaluated for performance and 
proposal risk,[1] as well as under a color/adjectival rating 
scheme,[2] for each of the listed management and technical evaluation 
factors.  The proposals of Vinnell, Serv-Air, and another offeror were 
included in the competitive range.  Written and oral discussions were 
conducted, during which offerors were permitted to, among other 
things, comment on any concerns raised by the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) regarding the offerors' proposed direct and indirect 
cost rates.  Best and final offers (BAFO) were requested, received, 
and evaluated.

Vinnell's BAFO received a rating of "blue" under the key personnel 
factor of management and ratings of "green" under the other management 
factor and under each of the technical factors.  Vinnell's proposal 
was also rated as having "low" proposal and performance risk under 
each of the technical and management factors.  The agency determined, 
based upon its comparison of Vinnell's proposal with the agency's 
independent government estimate, and review of Vinnell's proposed 
direct and indirect rates, person-years of effort, labor mix, and 
other direct rates and costs, that Vinnell's cost proposal was 
realistic, complete, and reasonable, and made no adjustments to 
Vinnell's proposed cost of $49,295,711.

Serv-Air's proposal received a rating of "green" under each of the 
evaluation factors, and was rated as having "moderate" proposal risk 
under the program management factor and "low" proposal risk under each 
of the other technical and management factors.  Serv-Air's proposal 
was rated as having "low" performance risk under all factors.  The 
agency, through the same methods it had used in evaluating Vinnell's 
proposal, determined that Serv-Air's cost proposal was realistic, 
complete, and reasonable, and made no adjustments to Serv-Air's 
proposed cost of $46,361,820.

The cognizant source selection official determined that Serv-Air's 
proposal represented the best overall value to the government under 
the evaluation criteria and factors set forth in the solicitation, and 
award was made to Serv-Air on December 18.  

After being informed that Serv-Air had received the award and being 
debriefed by the agency, Vinnell filed a protest with our Office, 
specifically asserting that the agency improperly "failed to conduct 
any cost realism analysis or other cost analyses" of the offerors' 
proposals, and that because of this "Serv-Air's management proposal 
was improperly evaluated."  Specifically, Vinnell pointed out that 
Serv-Air's proposal provides for the use of its "Capella" computer 
system to automate certain administrative functions and to justify 
"fewer personnel than would be required absent utilization of such a 
program."  Vinnell notes that although the agency evaluated Serv-Air's 
proposal as having "moderate" risk under the program management factor 
because of its concerns with "Capella" and Serv-Air's attendant 
staffing level, it made no adjustment to Serv-Air's proposed costs.  
The protester argues that the agency's failure to make any upward cost 
adjustment here was unreasonable.
  
When an agency evaluates a proposal for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not 
dispositive because, regardless of the costs proposed, the government 
is bound to pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs.  
Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  15.605(c).  Consequently, a cost 
realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the 
extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represents what the 
contract should cost, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.  
McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2; B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 
CPD  para.  51.  Because the contracting agency is in the best position to 
make this cost realism determination, our review of an agency's 
judgment in this area is limited to determining whether the agency's 
cost evaluation was reasonably based and not arbitrary.  Infotec Dev., 
Inc., B-258198 et al., Dec. 27, 1994, 95-1  para.  52.

First, we note that the agency, in response to Vinnell's initial 
argument that the agency failed to perform any cost realism analysis, 
described and documented its analysis in its report responsive to the 
protest.  The only specific aspect of the cost analysis that Vinnell 
protested (in its initial protest) involves its contention that 
Serv-Air's probable costs should have been increased to account for 
the evaluated moderate risk under the program management factor 
relating to Serv-Air's use of the Capella computer system.[3]

The record shows that Serv-Air proposed the use of its "Capella" 
computer system as part of its management and technical approach.  
According to Serv-Air, Capella "'automates' 20 major functional 
support areas," such as purchasing, planning and estimating, and job 
cost accounting.  Essentially, all of the information needed for the 
management of the contract by Serv-Air will be maintained on Capella.  
For example, as described by Serv-Air, the administrative work, such 
as preparing work-orders, planning the work to be accomplished, 
checking to see if the required materials are available, establishing 
work schedules, managing inventory levels, and estimating and tracking 
associated costs, are performed on-line.  Serv-Air maintains that 
because Capella automates the necessary administrative processes, it 
can perform the administrative tasks quicker and more efficiently than 
they have been performed historically.  Serv-Air adds that because, 
for example, the work schedules and inventory levels are continually 
accessed and updated by the personnel administering the contract, the 
information maintained on Capella remains current, which further 
enhances Serv-Air's ability to efficiently schedule and perform the 
work required.

The agency found in its evaluation of Serv-Air's management/technical 
proposal that, as described by Serv-Air, Capella will provide 
"critical information for decision-making and management of the 
contract at all levels of [Serv-Air's] organization," and would 
"benefit . . . the Government because it should reduce time in 
contract management and save cost in manning reductions."  However, 
the agency confirmed during discussions that Serv-Air had not used, 
and was not using, Capella in the performance of any contracts, and 
that although Serv-Air's proposed key personnel "have over 230 years 
of related experience and proven similar experience," they apparently 
did not have experience with Capella or training as to its operation.  
The agency concluded here that Serv-Air's proposed management 
approach, which relied heavily on the successful implementation of 
Capella, could "potentially cause some disruption of schedule, 
increase in cost, or degradation of performance" because, among other 
things, Serv-Air's proposed time savings and manning reductions may 
not be realized.  The agency thus assessed Serv-Air's proposal as 
having "moderate" proposal risk under the program management factor.  
As mentioned previously, the agency did not make any upward 
adjustments to Serv-Air's proposed costs because of this risk 
assessment.  

The protester contends that since the agency assessed Serv-Air's 
management proposal as having "moderate" risk because of its concerns 
with Capella, the agency was also required to adjust Serv-Air's 
proposed costs upwards.  In support of this contention, the protester 
points to a statement appearing in the source selection advisory 
council (SSAC) report that should problems occur with Capella, 
"work-arounds may include using standard methods and/or hiring 
additional staff," and to a statement made by the source selection 
authority (SSA) in his source selection decision that the risk 
associated with Serv-Air's management approach associated with its 
proposed use of Capella "is minimized by the availability of existing 
management systems and/or additional personnel."  The protester 
concludes that because the agency recognized that Serv-Air's Capella 
system entailed "moderate" risk, and that a possible remedy should the 
system not work as planned would be to add personnel, the agency acted 
unreasonably in not adjusting Serv-Air's proposed costs upwards to 
account for the costs associated with adding these personnel.    

We find nothing unreasonable with the agency's determination not to 
upwardly adjust Serv-Air's proposed costs because of the agency's 
concerns with Serv-Air's use of Capella.  The agency considered the 
administrative efficiencies offered by Capella and their impact on the 
labor hours required for successful performance of the contract, and 
weighed these considerations against Serv-Air's lack of experience 
with the system.  Although the agency concluded that there was 
"moderate" risk associated with Serv-Air's use of Capella, there is 
nothing in the record indicating that the agency believed, or should 
have believed, that it was more likely than not that Serv-Air would 
not perform at its proposed costs.  In this regard, a government cost 
realism determination is no more than an informed judgment of what 
costs should be reasonably incurred by acceptance of a particular 
proposal.  See CACI, Inc.--Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71 (1984), 84-2 CPD  para.  
542.

The fact that there is some risk associated with an aspect of a 
proposal does not mean that an agency cannot regard the costs of 
performance, as proposed, as realistic, inasmuch as risk is simply a 
reflection of the degree to which what is proposed may or may not 
happen.  Specifically, a proposal that is assessed as having moderate 
risk is one that, according to the agency's source selection plan, 
"[c]an potentially cause some disruption of schedule, increase in 
cost, or degradation of performance.  However, special contractor 
emphasis and close government monitoring will probably be able to 
overcome difficulties."  That being so, we see no reason why an agency 
should be required, in performing a cost realism analysis, to adjust 
costs to reflect what may not happen in circumstances where the agency 
believes that what is proposed is most likely to happen.  

Vinnell argues in a supplemental protest, filed with our Office on 
February 9, that  the agency unreasonably evaluated Serv-Air's 
proposal under the technical factors as having "low" rather than 
"moderate" proposal risk, basically contending that since Capella was 
a prominent aspect of Serv-Air's technical approach, the evaluated 
risks associated with its use should have also been considered in 
evaluating proposal risk under the technical factors.  In this 
protest, Vinnell also argues that the agency improperly failed to 
account for the effect of Serv-Air's acquisition by the Raytheon 
Company during the pendency of this procurement in its evaluation of 
various aspects of Serv-Air's proposal.  In its comments on the agency 
report, filed with our Office on February 12, the protester again 
raises these two supplemental arguments, and also asserts that the 
agency's cost realism analysis is flawed because the agency failed to 
upwardly adjust Serv-Air's proposed costs to account for what Vinnell 
characterizes as the agency's acknowledgment of "a significant 
shortfall in Serv-Air's manning, independent of its evaluation of 
Capella."

Our Bid Protest Regulations require that protests not based upon 
solicitation improprieties be filed not later than 14 calendar days 
after the basis of protest is known, or should have been known, 
whichever is earlier.  Bid Protest Regulations,  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2) 
(1996).  The protest bases set forth in Vinnell's supplemental protest 
and comments are based upon information contained in the agency report 
on the protest, which was received by Vinnell on January 26; Vinnell's 
supplemental protest and comments on the agency report were filed, 
respectively, 15 and 18 days after Vinnell's receipt of the agency 
report.  Thus, we consider these supplemental protest grounds untimely 
filed. 

Vinnell nevertheless contends that the arguments raised in its 
supplemental protests and comments on the agency report are 
"inextricably intertwined" or "embodied" in its initial protest to our 
Office.  The timeliness of specific bases of protest raised after the 
filing of a timely protest depends upon the relationship the 
later-raised bases bear to the initial protest.  GE Gov't Servs., 
B-235101, Aug. 11, 1989, 89-2 CPD  para.  128.  Where the later raised bases 
present new and independent grounds for protest, they must 
independently satisfy our timeliness requirements; conversely, where 
the later raised bases merely provide additional support for an 
earlier, timely raised protest basis, we will consider the 
later-raised arguments.  Id.

In our view, each of the later-raised arguments raised in Vinnell's 
supplemental protest and comments on the agency report constitute new 
and independent bases of protest, rather than additional supporting 
material for its earlier protest contentions.  Specifically, Vinnell's 
later-raised argument concerning the reasonableness of the agency's 
"low" proposal risk assessment of Serv-Air's proposal under the 
technical factors provides no support for, and is distinct from, its 
argument that Serv-Air's proposed costs should have been adjusted 
upwards because its proposal received a "moderate" proposal risk 
rating under the program management factor of management.  That is, 
the later-raised argument challenges the agency's evaluation of 
proposal risk, whereas the initial argument involves a challenge to 
the propriety of a distinct aspect of the agency's cost evaluation; a 
challenge to an agency's evaluation of proposal risk under a specific 
evaluation factor is distinct from, and provides no support for, an 
assertion that the agency's evaluation of cost proposals was flawed.  
Similarly, the protester's specific arguments that the agency 
unreasonably failed to consider in the cost and technical evaluation 
the effect of Serv-Air's acquisition by Raytheon is not "inextricably 
intertwined" with Vinnell's initial assertion that the agency "failed 
to conduct any cost realism analysis or other cost analysis" of the 
offerors' proposals.  Additionally, Serv-Air's argument, in its 
comments on the agency report, that the agency cost realism analysis 
is flawed because it failed to account for a "significant shortfall in 
Serv-Air's manning . . . independent of Capella" is, by its very 
terms, independent of the protester's initial protest against the 
failure to upwardly adjust Serv-Air's costs because of Capella.

Vinnell argues, in the alternative, that its later-raised protest 
bases are timely because they are based upon documents received from 
the agency on January 31 in response to Vinnell's complaints that the 
agency report as issued failed to include a number of documents 
specifically requested by Vinnell in its initial protest.

Although the documents received by Vinnell on January 31 provide 
additional support for Vinnell's supplemental protest bases, it is 
clear from our review of the record that Vinnell knew or should have 
known of each of its supplemental protest bases upon its receipt of 
the agency report on January 26.  This report consisted of 12 
notebooks of documents, including, among other things, the source 
selection evaluation board (SSEB) report, the SSAC report, and DCAA 
and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) reports.  The SSEB and SSAC reports 
provide summaries of Serv-Air's proposal, and a factor-by-factor 
evaluation summary that sets forth the ratings of the proposal.  These 
reports describe in some detail Serv-Air's proposed 
management/technical approach and the agency's evaluation of the 
proposals under each of the evaluation criteria and factors.

Specifically, the narrative descriptions in the SSEB and SSAC reports 
contain considerable information regarding Serv-Air's Capella system 
and the agency's views as to its merits; it is clear from the 
narratives that Capella was integral to Serv-Air's entire proposal, 
and that the agency determined that it entailed a "low" proposal risk 
with regard to the technical  factors.  As such, Vinnell should have 
known from these documents alone of its protest basis regarding the 
agency's determination that under the technical factors Serv-Air's 
proposal posed "low" rather than "moderate" proposal risk.  Similarly, 
because the DLA, DCAA, SSEB and SSEC reports discuss Serv-Air's 
acquisition by Raytheon, and there is no mention in the SSEB and SSAC 
reports of the impact of that acquisition on Serv-Air's proposed costs 
or technical ratings, it should have been readily apparent to Vinnell 
that the agency had not accounted for the effect of the acquisition on 
the merits of and risks associated with Serv-Air's 
management/technical approach and proposed costs in its evaluation of 
Serv-Air's proposal.  Finally, Vinnell's protest basis concerning the 
agency's acknowledgment of "a significant shortfall in Serv-Air's 
manning, independent of Capella," is based upon the deficiency reports 
and clarification requests issued by the agency and Serv-Air's 
responses, all of which were included in the agency's report.

In sum, Vinnell's supplemental protests were untimely filed more than 
14 days after the bases of protest were known or should have been 
known, and will not be considered.

The protest is denied in part and dismissed in part.

Comptroller General
of the United States   

1. The evaluation ratings for proposal risk and performance risk were 
high, moderate, and low.

2. The color/adjectival ratings were blue/exceptional, 
green/acceptable, yellow/marginal, and red/unacceptable.

3. Vinnell also argued in its initial protest that the agency 
improperly evaluated its management/technical proposal, acted 
improperly by permitting offerors to amend their initial proposals in 
response to discussions, and evaluated proposals under an unstated 
evaluation factor.  The agency in its report submitted in response to 
this protest addressed in detail each of these arguments.  Vinnell 
subsequently informed our Office that it was not pursuing these 
protest grounds.