BNUMBER:  B-270698; B-270698.4; B-270698.5; B-270698.7
DATE:  April 10, 1996
TITLE:  Physician Corporation of America

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Physician Corporation of America

File:     B-270698; B-270698.4; B-270698.5; B-270698.7

Date:April 10, 1996

David R. Hazelton, Esq., Roger S. Goldman, Esq., C. Chad Johnson, 
Esq., and Robert Braumuller, Esq., Latham & Watkins, for the 
protester.
Peter L. Wellington, Esq., Daniel C. Sauls, Esq., and Mark J. 
Hulkower, Esq.,  Steptoe & Johnson, for Humana Military Healthcare 
Services, Inc., an intervenor.
Ellen C. Callaway, Esq., and Laurel C. Gillespie, Esq., Office of the 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, for the 
agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  In determining whether any action of a former government employee 
may have resulted in prejudice in favor of the awardee, the General 
Accounting Office will consider all relevant evidence, including 
whether the former government employee had access to competitively 
useful inside information generated prior to the protested 
procurement.  

2.  Protest that awardee obtained an unfair competitive advantage by 
virtue of its employment of former government employees is denied 
where either the government employees did not possess inside 
information that would provide an unfair competitive advantage or the 
record provides no basis for concluding that the awardee benefited 
from the inside information.

3.  Protest that awardee obtained an unfair competitive advantage from 
its alleged receipt of source selection sensitive information from a 
government employee is denied where the contracting officer furnished 
the information to all offerors.

4.  Protest that offeror's proposal should have been credited with 
more technical strengths and fewer weaknesses because its allegedly 
similar proposal in a prior procurement for the same type of services 
was credited with more strengths and fewer weaknesses is denied; each 
procurement action is a separate transaction and, thus, the evaluation 
conducted under one is not relevant to the propriety of the evaluation 
under another for purposes of a bid protest. 

DECISION

Physician Corporation of America (PCA) protests the award of a 
contract by the Office of Civilian Health and Medical Program of the 
Uniformed Services (OCHAMPUS) to Humana Military Healthcare Services, 
Inc. under request for proposals (RFP) No. MDA906-94-R-0002.  The RFP 
sought proposals to provide health care and associated administrative 
services in the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, 
South Carolina, and Tennessee, and in portions of Louisiana and 
Arkansas (Managed Care Support Regions 3 and 4) for Civilian Health 
and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) beneficiaries, 
who include military service retirees, their dependents, and 
dependents of active duty members.  PCA primarily argues that Humana 
obtained an unfair competitive advantage in the procurement by virtue 
of its employment of former government employees and its alleged 
receipt of source selection sensitive information from another 
government employee.  In addition, PCA challenges the evaluation of 
technical proposals and asserts that Humana's proposal failed to 
comply with mandatory solicitation requirements.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

Under the RFP, issued on August 1, 1994, offerors were required to 
propose three health care options--the TRICARE options--for CHAMPUS 
beneficiaries.  Specifically, the RFP required offerors to propose a 
health care system under which CHAMPUS beneficiaries could opt to 
obtain services:  (1) from providers of their own choosing on a 
fee-for-service basis, (2) from members of the contractor's preferred 
provider organization (PPO), or (3) from a contractor-established 
health maintenance organization (HMO).

The RFP stated that the government intended to award a fixed-price 
contract (with the price subject to specified adjustments during 
performance) for a base period with five 1-year options.  The 
fixed-price nature of the contract, however, was modified by a 
risk-sharing arrangement under which, in the event of health care cost 
overruns, the government and the contractor will share responsibility 
for absorbing the excess cost above a set percentage of the contract 
price.  Responsibility will continue to be shared under a formula set 
out in the RFP until the contractor has absorbed overruns equal to its 
cumulative net gains under the contract and the amount of contractor 
equity that it put at risk in its proposal.  At that point, the 
contract will begin to function on a cost reimbursement basis, with 
the government assuming total responsibility and paying for all 
additional health care costs.  An offeror's putting more equity at 
risk postpones the point of total government responsibility and is 
thus favorable to the government.  The RFP required that offerors 
place a minimum of $100 million at risk, but permitted them to exceed 
that minimum.

Actual health care costs will be a function of a large number of 
variables, such as the number of CHAMPUS beneficiaries (and, in 
particular, the participation of beneficiaries in the HMO and PPO 
options), inflation, and the contractor's ability to manage health 
care utilization.  The RFP explained that offerors were to propose 
"trend factors," with appropriate justification, for many of these 
variables.  The RFP advised offerors that the agency would substitute 
its independent government cost estimate (IGCE) factors for those 
proposed by offerors in the case of trend factors over which the 
contractor was unlikely to have control (such as inflation).  With 
respect to the trend factors under the contractor's control (such as 
utilization management, the percentage of beneficiaries participating 
in the HMO and PPO options, and discounts offered by health care 
providers), the RFP provided for the agency to evaluate the realism of 
each proposed factor based on the agency's judgment about "the likely 
trends under the offeror's approach" and make appropriate adjustments.  
The total probable health care cost for a proposal would be the 
offeror's proposed health care cost, as modified above, plus a fixed 
administrative price and the offeror's health care profit.

The RFP stated that, in the selection of an awardee, technical content 
would be more important than cost.  Specifically, the weighting ratio 
was set out as            60 percent for technical and 40 percent for 
cost.  The technical score was the result of the evaluation of 14 
tasks that are to be performed, plus experience and performance.

OCHAMPUS received five proposals from four offerors, including Humana, 
PCA and two other firms, by closing time on March 3, 1995.  All 
proposals were included in the competitive range.  At the conclusion 
of discussions, OCHAMPUS requested submission of best and final offers 
(BAFO) by August 2.  Humana's BAFO received the highest weighted 
technical score (604.16 points), with 3 exceptional, 13 more than 
satisfactory and 0 unsatisfactory ratings; in contrast, PCA's BAFO 
received the second highest technical score (594.35), with 0 
exceptional, 8 more than satisfactory and 2 unsatisfactory ratings.  
In addition, Humana's BAFO was evaluated as offering the lowest cost 
to the government ($3,775,591,099), approximately 10 percent less than 
the evaluated cost ($4,197,243,479) of PCA's BAFO.  After calculation 
of cost scores and normalization of both technical and cost scores, 
Humana's BAFO received the highest overall "best buy" score (1,000 
points), while PCA's BAFO received the second highest (950.1).  Given 
the higher technical score and lower cost of Humana's BAFO, the source 
selection advisory council (SSAC) recommended award to Humana.  When 
the source selection official accepted this recommendation and 
selected Humana for award, PCA filed these protests with our Office.       

UNFAIR COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE

PCA primarily argues that Humana obtained an unfair competitive 
advantage in this procurement by virtue of its employment of former 
government employees and its alleged receipt of source selection 
sensitive information from another government employee.  Based upon 
our review of the record, and after conducting a hearing at which we 
took testimony concerning the alleged actions of the government 
employees, we conclude that OCHAMPUS reasonably determined not to 
exclude Humana from the competition on the basis of the alleged unfair 
competitive advantage. 

Standard of Review

A contracting officer may protect the integrity of the procurement 
system by disqualifying an offeror from the competition where the firm 
may have obtained an unfair competitive advantage, even if no actual 
impropriety can be shown, so long as the determination is based on 
facts and not mere suspicion.  NKF Eng'g, Inc., 65 Comp. Gen. 104 
(1985), 85-2 CPD  para.  638; Holmes and Narver Servs., 
Inc./Morrison-Knudson Servs., Inc., a joint venture; Pan Am World 
Servs., Inc., B-235906; B-235906.2, Oct. 26, 1989, 89-2 CPD  para.  379; 
Laser Power Technologies, Inc., B-233369; B-233369.2, Mar. 13, 1989, 
89-1 CPD  para.  267.  Where a protester alleges that the awardee has 
obtained an unfair competitive advantage by virtue of its employment 
of a former government employee, our role is to determine whether any 
action of the former government employee may have resulted in 
prejudice in favor of the awardee.  General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., 
B-245797.3, Sept. 23, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  196; FHC Options, Inc., 
B-246793.3, Apr. 14, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  366; Technology Concepts and 
Design, Inc., B-241727, Feb. 6, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  132.  In so doing, we 
typically consider whether the former government employee had access 
to competitively useful inside information, whether generated during 
the procurement in question or previously, see Central Texas College, 
71 Comp. Gen. 164 (1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  121, as well as whether the 
employee's activities with the firm were likely to have resulted in a 
disclosure of such information.[1]  See Textron Marine Sys., supra.  
These are the same questions to be considered in reviewing an 
allegation that source selection information has been disclosed to a 
competing contractor.  Guardian Technologies Int'l, B-270213 et al., 
Feb. 20, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  ___.

Employment of Former Government Employees

Humana Chief Executive Officer

PCA contends that Humana's hiring in (May 1994) of a retired Air Force 
colonel as its Chief Executive Officer (CEO) gave Humana an unfair 
competitive advantage in this procurement.  Prior to his retirement in 
1994, the CEO served as the Chief of the Managed Care Division, Office 
of the Air Force Surgeon General.  In that position, the CEO 
formulated policies, program procedures and positions on managed care 
initiatives, including TRICARE, for the Air Force Surgeon General and 
participated in Department of Defense working groups concerned with 
those issues.  Of particular relevance here, in the September/October 
1993 time period, the colonel contributed to the preparation of the 
draft statement of work (SOW) for the Managed Care Support Region 6 
solicitation, which was issued in November 1993.  Hearing Transcript 
(Tr.) at 265-274.  

PCA bases its claim of an unfair competitive advantage on the 
possibility that Humana's CEO may have had, indeed "presumably had," 
access to the undisclosed internal evaluation criteria developed for 
the Region 6 procurement.  In this regard, PCA notes that an 
individual who briefly served as the contracting officer for Region 6 
between November 1994 and January 1995 has executed a declaration 
stating that she "knew that [the CEO] had participated in the 
development of technical evaluation criteria for the Region 6 
procurement."  In addition, PCA more generally argues that Humana 
possessed an unfair competitive advantage simply as a result of the 
service of its CEO as a TRICARE procurement official.

We find that OCHAMPUS reasonably determined--on the basis of an 
extensive investigation into the relevant facts and 
circumstances--that Humana's employment of the CEO did not confer an 
unfair competitive advantage on Humana.  Humana's CEO testified at the 
hearing in this matter that he in fact had never seen or discussed the 
Region 6 evaluation criteria.  Tr. at 270-271.  This testimony was 
consistent with prior statements he gave to the Office of the Air 
Force Surgeon General in May 1994, and to OCHAMPUS during its 
pre-award investigation in September 1995.  In addition, declarations 
executed by officials familiar with the Region 6 procurement and 
responsible for development of the undisclosed     Region 6 evaluation 
criteria, including the chairman of the Region 6 source selection 
evaluation board (SSEB), corroborated the CEO's statements.  These 
statements also are supported by the fact that the criteria were only 
completed in August 1994, that is, 3 months after the CEO commenced 
work with Humana.  We find this evidence more persuasive than the 
statement of the individual who served briefly as the contracting 
officer for Region 6, particularly given that (1) she did not assume 
her position until November 1994, which was approximately 6 months 
after the CEO commenced work with Humana, and (2) the cited source for 
her knowledge in this regard, the government's Lead Agent for Region 
6, has contradicted her account.  In these circumstances, we accord 
her statement little weight.  We conclude that OCHAMPUS reasonably 
determined that Humana's CEO did not have access to the undisclosed 
internal evaluation criteria developed for Region 6. 

Further, the CEO's general familiarity with the TRICARE program and 
his specific contribution to the preparation of the draft SOW for the 
Region 6 solicitation also do not establish any improper advantage.  
The relevant SOW was disclosed in the Region 6 solicitation and thus 
cannot be considered inside information.  Further, the mere employment 
of an individual who is familiar with the type of work required and 
helped prepare the specifications or SOW does not establish an unfair 
competitive advantage, where the individual was not privy to the 
contents of proposals or other inside information.  See Guardian 
Technologies Int'l, supra;  Textron Marine Sys., supra; ITT Fed. 
Servs. Corp., supra; General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., supra; FHC 
Options, Inc., supra.  We conclude that the record does not support 
PCA's contention that Humana's CEO possessed inside information that 
provided the firm an unfair competitive advantage.

Humana Utilization Management Director

Humana's parent company in December 1994, prior to submission of 
Humana's initial proposal for Regions 3/4 in March 1995, hired a 
retired colonel in the United States Air Force as its Director of 
Utilization Management (UM).  Prior to her retirement in 1994, the UM 
Director served as the Chief of Utilization Management in the Managed 
Care Division, Office of the Air Force Surgeon General.  In that 
position, the UM Director participated (August 1994) in the evaluation 
of the UM portion of the BAFO submitted by a third firm (neither 
Humana nor PCA) under the Managed Care Support Regions 9/10/12 
solicitation.  After being hired by Humana, she participated in 
preparing the UM and quality management (QM) portions of Humana's BAFO 
submitted on August 2.  PCA maintains that her employment gave Humana 
an unfair competitive advantage because of her knowledge of the 
undisclosed internal UM/QM evaluation criteria for Regions 9/10/12, 
which PCA asserts are similar to the internal UM/QM evaluation 
criteria for Regions 3/4.  

We conclude that OCHAMPUS reasonably determined that Humana's 
employment of the UM Director did not confer an unfair competitive 
advantage on Humana.  In this regard, OCHAMPUS has reviewed each of 
the increases in Humana's BAFO score under the evaluation subcriteria 
in the UM/QM area, which totaled 160 "raw" points or approximately 
48.8 weighted technical points, and concluded that these increases 
were attributable to factors that were unrelated to the undisclosed 
internal UM/QM evaluation criteria for Regions 9/10/12.  For example, 
OCHAMPUS found that 20 of the 160-point increase in the BAFO raw score 
resulted from Humana's response to requirements--not included in the 
Regions 9/10/12 procurement--concerning the military's lead agent in 
each region.  

OCHAMPUS further found that 80 of the 160 points were attributable to 
corrections and clarifications prompted by specific discussion 
questions and another 17 points were attributable otherwise to 
providing specific information requested by the agency.  For example, 
noting that Humana had submitted identical charts with respect to 
utilization rates experienced by Humana for differing time periods, 
OCHAMPUS advised Humana during discussions that

        "[t]he proposal has provided . . . access data from two time 
        periods that match the utilization reduction data.  However, 
        many of the charts in the second time period appear to be 
        copied from the first time period."

Humana's BAFO score increased by 45 points when it submitted the 
correct charts  (which demonstrated a [DELETED]).  Further, with 
respect to review staff qualifications, OCHAMPUS asked Humana four 
clarifying questions, three of which directed Humana either to resolve 
an inconsistency between charts or to explain the source of work load 
and productivity numbers, while the fourth requested Humana to explain 
its staffing rationale.  Humana's raw score increased 16 points when 
it deleted the confusing staffing charts and provided its staffing 
logic.  Humana's raw score increased by seven additional points when 
it responded to OCHAMPUS' direction during discussions to resolve an 
inconsistency in its initial proposal as to when it would require 
pre-authorization for psychoanalysis--[DELETED]--and also incorporated 
into its proposal the approach taken in its commercial business of 
[DELETED].

OCHAMPUS found that 43 of the 160-point increase in Humana's BAFO raw 
score was attributable to Humana's including in its BAFO UM/QM plan 
information already found elsewhere in its initial proposal.  For 
example, the SOW required the contractor to

        "use review criteria published by InterQual, Inc . . . in 
        their most current version as the criteria for screening 
        medical and inpatient surgical care for first level review.  
        The contractor may use additional criteria . . . only when 
        they are not addressed by InterQual."

In addition, the solicitation referred offerors to review criteria 
published by Health Management Strategies, International, Inc. (HMSI) 
for reviews of mental health care.  Agency evaluators noted that 
Humana's initial UM plan did not discuss using [DELETED], but 
considered the impact of this to be minimal since these were discussed 
elsewhere in its proposal.  Humana's BAFO technical score increased by 
5 points when it responded as directed to OCHAMPUS' direction during 
discussions to [DELETED].  Likewise, Humana's BAFO score increased by 
5 points when it responded as specifically directed by OCHAMPUS and 
included in its BAFO clinical quality management program plan a 
discussion of [DELETED]--which had been included elsewhere in its 
initial proposal--and [DELETED].

We find that the record shows that the answers to the questions in the 
UM/QM area which led to the increases in Humana's score (1) were 
reasonably suggested by the questions themselves, (2) resulted from 
preexisting information (such as charts initially not furnished or 
information initially included elsewhere in its proposal), (3) 
reflected the incorporation of Humana commercial practice, or (4) 
concerned areas and approaches not addressed by the Regions 9/10/12 
criteria.  We thus conclude that OCHAMPUS reasonably determined that 
the increases in Humana's BAFO score under the UM/QM evaluation 
subcriteria generally did not appear to be attributable to any 
knowledge of the undisclosed internal UM/QM evaluation criteria for 
Regions 9/10/12. 

Furthermore, not only is there no evidence in Humana's BAFO changes 
that they resulted from any knowledge of the Regions 9/10/12 internal 
UM/QM evaluation criteria, the evidence in the record indicates that 
it was unlikely such knowledge would even have been available to 
Humana.  Specifically, the record shows that the   Regions 9/10/12 
BAFO evaluators were prohibited from making or retaining copies of the 
internal evaluation criteria and, because the copier was in an open 
area outside the office of the chairman of the SSEB, it is unlikely 
that they were able to do so.  Tr. at 171, 237-238, 252-253.  As a 
result, Humana's UM Director was unlikely to have had a copy of the 
Regions 9/10/12 criteria available to her when assisting in preparing 
Humana's Regions 3/4 BAFO.  Further, since the Regions 9/10/12 
criteria were quite detailed, the passage of time between the service 
of the UM Director as a Regions 9/10/12 BAFO evaluator in August 1994 
and the commencement of the Regions 3/4 negotiations on May 16, 1995 
made it unlikely that the UM Director could have remembered 
significant portions of the Regions 9/10/12 internal UM/QM evaluation 
criteria in sufficient detail and with sufficient reliability so as to 
base Humana's Regions 3/4 BAFO on it.  See Textron Marine Sys., supra; 
General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., supra.[2] [3]

Likewise, we find no merit to PCA's argument that other aspects of the 
government service of Humana's UM Director required a finding that 
Humana had gained an unfair competitive advantage in the Regions 3/4 
procurement from hiring her to assist in the preparation of its BAFO.  
Thus, while PCA asserts that an unfair competitive advantage resulted 
merely from the UM Director's familiarity with the TRICARE concept and 
community and having served on an OCHAMPUS SSEB, the mere employment 
of an individual who is familiar with the type of work required, but 
who is not privy to the contents of proposals or other inside 
information, does not itself confer an unfair competitive advantage.  
Textron Marine Sys., supra.  Likewise, while PCA speculates that the 
UM Director may have played a significant role in the Region 6 
procurement which amounted to participation in the restructuring of 
the Region 6 TRICARE RFP, even if Humana's UM Director was involved in 
rewriting the Region 6 solicitation (which OCHAMPUS denies), 
participating in preparing specifications or a SOW which is 
subsequently released to the public does not itself confer an unfair 
competitive advantage.  Id.[4]  Finally, PCA claims that given her 
position and alleged role in restructuring the Region 6 RFP, the UM 
Director "may well have been involved in the review of [the Region 6 
internal] evaluation criteria."  This amounts to no more than 
unsupported speculation and, moreover, is contradicted by the 
statements of the Region 6 procurement officials most likely to be 
aware of the facts, including two Region 6 contracting officers and 
the chairman of the Region 6 SSEB.[5]

The record thus provides no basis for concluding that Humana acquired 
an unfair competitive advantage in the Regions 3/4 procurement from 
using its UM Director to assist in the preparation of its BAFO.

Disclosure of Source Selection Sensitive Information

PCA contends that Humana was the recipient of source selection 
sensitive information during the procurement which gave it an unfair 
competitive advantage.  
The record indicates that in May 1995, after submission and evaluation 
of initial proposals but before submission of BAFOs, one of the five 
co-chairpersons of the Regions 3/4 SSEB contacted several of the 
offerors regarding possible future employment after his forthcoming 
retirement.  After being contacted by telephone by the co-chairman, 
Humana's CEO advised OCHAMPUS of the contact.  OCHAMPUS immediately 
relieved the co-chairman of his evaluation duties and undertook an 
investigation.  This investigation established that the co-chairman 
was distributing a resume in which he described his most recent 
experience as director of managed care for Regions 3/4 as:  "Director 
of $4.5 billion managed care contract for 6 states in the southeast 
region of the United States.  This contract will establish a triple 
option managed care delivery system for 1.7 million beneficiaries."  
(Although the co-chairman advised OCHAMPUS that with the permission of 
Humana's CEO he had sent a copy of his resume to the CEO (and so 
testified at the hearing), he had no knowledge as to whether Humana's 
CEO had received the resume, and the latter individual denied 
receiving it (and so testified at the hearing).  Tr. at 24-26, 49-51, 
330.)  While the contracting officer determined that release of the 
aggregate IGCE without disclosure of its components would afford no 
competitively useful information (since an offeror could not determine 
where to reduce its costs), he nevertheless advised all offerors in 
writing that:

     "It has been brought to my attention that certain information has 
     inadvertently been provided to one or more offerors.
  
     "We are continuing this acquisition by ensuring impartiality and 
     preferential treatment for none.  Therefore, this information is 
     to be provided to all offerors.

     "The following is extracted from the document containing the 
     aforementioned information

             '. . . $4.5 billion managed care contract for 6 states in 
             the southeast region of the United States.  This contract 
             will establish a triple option managed care delivery 
             system for 1.7 million beneficiaries.'" 

According to PCA, only Humana could benefit from the contracting 
officer's letter, and it would have benefited whether or not its CEO 
in fact received a copy of the resume, since the CEO would have 
realized the significance of the contracting officer's letter coming 
as it did shortly after he reported to OCHAMPUS the co-chairman's 
contact.  Tr. at 329.  PCA notes that it unsuccessfully asked OCHAMPUS 
for more information concerning the source of the excerpt; the 
protester argues that this information was of no value without an 
indication of its source.  

We think, however, that a reasonable offeror receiving the contracting 
officer's letter, advising of the need to disclose to all offerors 
certain "inadvertently" disclosed information concerning the size of 
the contract and expected beneficiary population in order to assure 
that no offeror received an advantage from its prior release, would 
assume that the information in question was source selection sensitive 
information.  In our view, offerors receiving the contracting 
officer's letter, which in effect validated the significance of the 
information with respect to projected contract size and beneficiary 
population, were not significantly worse off than an offeror also 
receiving the resume from the co-chairman (without explanation of this 
information) in evaluating the significance of the information.  In 
any case, we note that the record indicates that the figure of 1.7 
million beneficiaries--which referred to the total number of 
beneficiaries of the military health care system, rather than just 
CHAMPUS beneficiaries--set forth in the co-chairman's resume was 
derived from publicly available information which also was included on 
the data tapes furnished all offerors.  Tr. at 34, 63-65.  As such, 
this information was not inside information the possession of which 
would give rise to an unfair competitive advantage.  See Textron 
Marine Sys., supra; Person-Sys. Integration, Ltd., B-243927.4, June 
30, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  546; General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., supra.

The record thus provides no basis for concluding that Humana acquired 
an unfair competitive advantage in the Regions 3/4 procurement from 
the actions of the SSEB co-chairman.

OTHER ISSUES   

PCA asserts that award to Humana was improper because its proposal was 
noncompliant with mandatory solicitation requirements.  The protester 
points out that the agency's final evaluation summary identified four 
"weaknesses" in Humana's proposal (which, we note, were in low risk 
areas) which "can be resolved post award."  (The prior report of the 
SSAC apparently characterized them as "issues that must be addressed 
by the Contracting Officer on a post-award basis.")  PCA argues that 
these matters precluded award to Humana.

A contracting agency properly may determine that a proposal is 
technically acceptable where it is in substantial, although not total, 
compliance with a solicitation requirement.  Intermagnetics Gen. 
Corp., B-255741; B-255741.3, May 10, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  302; Sabreliner 
Corp., B-248640; B-248640.4, Sept. 14, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  222.  The 
propriety of such a determination turns on whether it prejudices any 
other offeror and whether the proposal meets the agency's needs.  Id.  
OCHAMPUS determined that Humana's BAFO satisfied all material 
solicitation requirements and that the weaknesses referred to above 
were minor, easily correctable weaknesses which did not preclude 
award.  PCA has not shown this determination to have been 
unreasonable.  In any case, our review indicates that PCA could not 
have been prejudiced by OCHAMPUS' treatment of Humana since PCA itself 
benefited from similar flexibility--PCA's proposal was found to be 
acceptable notwithstanding the fact that it received unsatisfactory 
evaluation ratings in two areas and included five weaknesses, one 
which was considered to be of medium risk, which would have to have 
been resolved after award.

In addition, PCA questions Humana's compliance with the solicitation 
requirement that offerors place a minimum of $100 million of equity at 
risk.  The protester generally argues that it was improper for Humana 
to rely on the financial resources of its parent corporation to comply 
with this requirement, and specifically asserts that the fact that the 
indemnity and guarantee agreement from its parent which Humana 
included in its business proposal appeared to be missing pages and did 
not specify the specific amount of funding to be provided required 
rejection of Humana's proposal.

This argument is without merit.  No provision in the solicitation 
precluded offerors from relying on the resources of their corporate 
parent in performing the contract.  (Indeed, we note that three of the 
four offerors proposed to rely on the resources of their corporate 
parent.)  In the absence of such a prohibition, we have recognized 
that where an offeror represents in its proposal that resources of its 
parent company will be committed to the contract, the agency properly 
may consider such resources in evaluating its proposal.  Military 
Newspapers of Virginia, B-249381.2, Jan. 5, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  5; see 
Unison Transformer Servs., Inc., 68 Comp. Gen. 74 (1988), 88-2 CPD  para.  
471.  Further, no provision in the solicitation established a required 
form to be used to document a parent's commitment of resources to the 
contract.  Humana generally represented in its technical proposal that 
its corporate parent [DELETED], and specifically stated that its 
corporate parent [DELETED].  We find nothing improper in OCHAMPUS 
taking this commitment into account. 

PCA also challenges the evaluation of its technical proposal, arguing 
that its proposal should have been credited with more technical 
strengths and fewer weaknesses.  PCA's proposal was credited with more 
strengths and fewer weaknesses under its Region 6 approach; PCA 
generally maintains that since its        Region 6 approach was the 
same as its Region 3/4 approach, the strengths and weaknesses should 
have been the same. 

Each procurement action is a separate transaction; thus, the 
evaluation conducted under one is not relevant to the propriety of the 
evaluation under another for purposes of a bid protest.  Shirley 
Constr. Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 62 (1990), 90-2 CPD  para.  380; Transact 
Int'l, Inc., B-241589, Feb. 21, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  196.  PCA's 
evaluation under a prior procurement does not demonstrate that the 
current evaluation was unreasonable.  Since PCA has not shown that 
OCHAMPUS' overall technical evaluation conclusions for the Regions 3/4 
procurement, as explained by the agency in its report responding to 
PCA's protest, were unreasonable, its protests in this regard provide 
no basis to question the award to Humana. 

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States    

1. We reject the position of OCHAMPUS and Humana that since the source 
selection information allegedly involved here was obtained by the 
former government employees during a different procurement, it cannot 
have provided an improper competitive advantage.  OCHAMPUS' and 
Humana's position is based primarily on their interpretation of the 
procurement integrity provisions of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy (OFPP) Act, as amended, 41 U.S.C.  sec.  423 (1994), as prohibiting 
the disclosure of only source selection information generated during 
the current procurement in question.  See generally Federal 
Acquisition Regulation  sec.  3.104-4(c)(2).  However, our review of these 
matters is not aimed at enforcement of the OFPP Act; the 
interpretation and enforcement of the Act are primarily matters for 
the procuring agency and the Department of Justice.  ITT Fed. Servs. 
Corp., B-253740.2, May 27, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  30.  Our role in resolving 
such allegations is solely to determine whether any action of the 
former government employee may have resulted in prejudice in favor of 
the awardee.  General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., supra.  In making this 
determination, we will consider all relevant evidence, including 
whether the former government employee had access to competitively 
useful inside information generated prior to the protested 
procurement.  See, e.g., Central Texas College, supra; Stanford 
Telecommunications, Inc., Feb. 7, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  50; ITT Fed. Servs. 
Corp., supra; Textron Marine Sys., B-255580.3, Aug. 2, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  
63; General Elec. Gov't Servs., Inc., supra. 

2. Our conclusions above are also consistent with the results of 
Humana's investigation (conducted with the assistance of outside 
counsel) into the activities of the UM Director, and the testimony of 
Humana's CEO and an outside UM/QM consultant who participated with 
Humana's UM Director in preparing the UM/QM portions of Humana's BAFO.  
Both the reported results of Humana's investigation and the testimony 
of Humana's witnesses support Humana's contention that its UM Director 
gave no outward indication of relying on any knowledge of the       
Regions 9/10/12 internal UM/QM evaluation criteria, or other inside 
information, when assisting in the preparation of Humana's Regions 3/4 
BAFO in these areas.  Tr. at 317, 320-326, 467-483. 

3. PCA also argues that Humana's use of its UM Director to assist in 
preparing its BAFO resulted in an unfair competitive advantage with 
respect to the evaluation of its cost proposal; according to the 
protester, Humana's higher technical score in the UM/QM area 
translated into a more favorable evaluation of its proposed trend 
factors, and thus a lower evaluated cost.  However, in view of our 
conclusion that the increases in Humana's BAFO technical score in the 
UM/QM area did not appear to be attributable to any knowledge of the 
undisclosed internal UM/QM evaluation criteria for Regions 9/10/12, 
there is no basis for concluding that Humana acquired an unfair 
competitive advantage with respect to its cost proposal as a result of 
its improved technical score.

4. The record indicates that the UM Director was involved in policy 
discussions during the period of the Region 6 procurement concerning 
the extent to which TRICARE contractors should perform UM in military 
hospitals and clinics in the direct care system, not the CHAMPUS 
system.  Tr. at 110-114.

5.[DELETED].