BNUMBER:  B-270509.2
DATE:  April 1, 1996
TITLE:  EG&G Management Systems, Inc.

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:EG&G Management Systems, Inc.

File:     B-270509.2

Date:April 1, 1996

Rand L. Allen, Esq., Paul F. Khoury, Esq., and David A. Vogel, Esq., 
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for the protester.
Kathleen C. Little, Esq., David R. Johnson, Esq., and Robert J. 
Rothwell, Esq., McDermott, Will & Emery, for Johnson Controls World 
Services, Inc., an intervenor.
Gregory Petkoff, Esq., and P. Alan Luthy, Esq., Department of the Air 
Force, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest that offerors should have been required to propose to the 
same assumption with respect to the amount of likely simultaneous test 
conduct at two radar target test sites is untimely because it 
challenges an alleged impropriety in the solicitation that should have 
been protested before the initial closing time for submission of 
proposals.

2.  Protest that agency unreasonably concluded that awardee proposed 
sufficient staffing to perform required radar target testing is denied 
where awardee demonstrated a sound understanding of the technical 
requirements and proposed innovative approaches to reducing manning, 
including using (1) [DELETED] techniques and [DELETED] analysis (to 
increase efficiency of operations by reducing [DELETED]), (2) a new 
computer system (to permit consolidation of staff positions), and (3) 
extensive cross-utilization of personnel.  

DECISION

EG&G Management Systems, Inc. protests the Department of the Air 
Force's award of a contract to Johnson Controls World Services, Inc. 
under request for proposals (RFP) No. F08635-95-C-0001, for operation 
and maintenance of the Radar Target Scatter (RATSCAT) facility at 
Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico.  EG&G challenges the 
evaluation of offerors' proposed staffing approaches.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The solicitation, issued on May 19, 1995, contemplated award of a 
cost-plus-award-fee contract for a 3-year base period, with 2 option 
years, for the operation and maintenance of RATSCAT.  RATSCAT's 
mission is to measure radar signals reflected off actual hardware 
(e.g., aircraft and missiles) and accurate sub-scale models in order 
to compute their radar cross-sections and predict how well the targets 
will be detected by various radar systems.  RATSCAT includes two 
separate test complexes:  (1) Mainsite, which is located on isolated 
alkali flats west of Holloman AFB, and (2) the RATSCAT Advanced 
Measurement System (RAMS), which is located approximately 40 miles 
northwest of Mainsite. 

As described in the solicitation, the "mission flow" process developed 
by EG&G, the prior incumbent contractor, in cooperation with the Air 
Force, generally includes: (1) long-term test planning, provisioning 
and subsystem readiness; (2) system characterization, during which 
measurements are taken at the test site in the period before actual 
testing commences in order to establish the signal image of the 
background, that is, of the entire test range minus the target, which 
will later be deducted from signal images recorded during the actual 
testing in order to determine the images due just to the target; (3) 
the actual conduct of testing at the test site; and (4) post-test data 
processing, which requires use of the test range computers, and report 
generation.  Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 17-44, 51-57, 75-85, 361-381. 

Because the targets whose radar signals are to be measured at RATSCAT 
may have state-of-the-art low-observable, stealth characteristics 
which are classified, the solicitation's statement of work (SOW) 
provided that "test operations are normally conducted at night for 
security purposes," and that therefore it was "imperative to maximize 
target data collection during hours of darkness."  The SOW 
specifically cautioned that:

        "The Contractor shall adjust work schedules to accommodate 
        seasonal changes in dusk to dawn hours . . . .  Test programs 
        are distributed over the year at both sites with some 
        simultaneous testing at both sites.  Actual testing periods 
        range from two or three days to as long as two months.  The 
        projected test schedule will require testing for a total of 
        four months per year at Mainsite and eight months per year at 
        RAMS.  These test period forecasts include 25% downtime at 
        RAMS and 30% downtime at Mainsite due to weather, security 
        considerations, equipment failures, and evacuations for [White 
        Sands Missile Range] testing.  The Contractor shall 
        cross-utilize test personnel for other contract requirements 
        when tests are not being conducted.  Overtime or extended work 
        weeks shall be used when necessary to accommodate the test 
        workload." 

Prior to the closing time for receipt of initial proposals, the Air 
Force issued an amendment to the solicitation which included questions 
from potential offerors and the agency's answers.  One question, 
noting the SOW reference to "some simultaneous testing at both sites," 
asked:  "[t]o make the playing field level for all offerors, can 
'some' be quantified by a percentage of the time number?"  The Air 
Force answered that:

        "Testing varies substantially from year to year.  It is 
        difficult to predict what portion of the time simultaneous 
        testing at both sites might occur.  For FY [Fiscal Year] 95, 
        of 48 weeks of testing, 33 were simultaneous, or approximately 
        69%.  Currently in FY 96, there are 39 weeks scheduled of 
        which   21 are concurrent, or about 54%."

The Air Force received four proposals by the closing time on July 7.  
All proposals were included in the competitive range.  The Air Force 
questioned both offerors about their staffing approaches during the 
ensuing discussions.  EG&G had been performing under the prior 
contract with a staff of 93 full time equivalents (FTE).  The agency's 
independent cost estimate, assuming a significant decrease in the 
workload, was based on a staff of 79 FTEs and a total cost of $53.1 
million.  In its initial proposal, EG&G proposed [DELETED] FTEs at a 
cost of [DELETED] million.  During discussions, the Air Force, 
referring to the SOW requirement that the contractor "utilize 
sub-contracting, part time employees, cross-utilization and overtime 
to the maximum extent practicable to minimize the permanent contract 
workforce," observed that while EG&G proposed developing multi-skilled 
employees, cross-utilization and multi-tasking, it was "unclear how 
multi-skilled individuals would be used across diverse skill 
boundaries to minimize manning in test support, management, 
supervision and engineering."  In addition, the agency asked EG&G to 
clarify its reference, in explaining its staffing rationale, to a 
"nominal test configuration with typical data acquisition."  

In response, EG&G further explained its approach to cross-utilizing 
multi-skilled personnel to perform multiple tasks and additional roles 
beyond their primary area of responsibility.  In addition, EG&G 
explained that its staffing approach was based on certain assumptions, 
including the assumption of a 60-percent range time overlap between 
Mainsite and RAMS.

In its initial proposal, Johnson proposed [DELETED] FTEs at a cost of 
[DELETED] million.  Agency evaluators assigned Johnson's proposal a 
marginal (yellow) technical rating (as well as a marginal management 
rating), noting as one weakness that the proposal "[d]oes not 
adequately discuss 'dusk to dawn' operation and what this means in 
relation to the hours of operation."  During discussions, the Air 
Force, referencing the SOW requirement for dusk-to-dawn target data 
acquisition at RAMS and Johnson's proposal of [DELETED] at each site 
when simultaneous testing is required, asked Johnson:  "How will dusk 
to dawn testing be accomplished during the winter months where the 
dusk to dawn period exceeds twelve (12) hours?"  In response, Johnson 
explained that it assumed approximately 50 percent simultaneous 
testing at Mainsite and RAMS, and would [DELETED]; during simultaneous 
testing, one team would work a dusk-to-dawn shift at each site and the 
[DELETED] would be available "as 'fill-in' for absences and for shift 
relief to provide time off for the employees."  In addition, Johnson 
proposed to increase its staffing to [DELETED] FTEs.

At the conclusion of discussions, the Air Force requested best and 
final offers (BAFO).  Although the source selection evaluation team 
(SSET) evaluated EG&G's BAFO as "technically superior overall," 
offering the government the "greatest capacity" and the "least risk to 
ongoing/upcoming operations," the overall technical rating of 
Johnson's BAFO was the same as EG&G's--acceptable with low risk.  
Further, EG&G's evaluated cost of [DELETED] million for a total of 
[DELETED] FTEs was higher than Johnson's evaluated cost of [DELETED] 
million for a total of [DELETED] FTEs.  The source selection authority 
(SSA) concluded that the "small technical advantage" associated with 
EG&G's proposal "was clearly outweighed by Johnson Controls' 
significantly lower cost."  Upon learning of the resulting award to 
Johnson on November 3, EG&G protested to our Office. 

COMMON BASIS FOR EVALUATION

EG&G argues that Johnson's BAFO was based on an understanding of the 
solicitation requirements materially different from EG&G's 
understanding.  Specifically, EG&G notes that offerors based their 
staffing approaches on different assumptions with respect to the 
amount of simultaneous test conduct. 

According to the Air Force, the requirement to perform actual test 
conduct was crucial in determining the required level of overall 
staffing.  In this regard, the Air Force maintains that activities 
other than actual test conduct:

        ". . . do not drive the need for manpower the way test conduct 
        does.  Test conduct is a peak load condition for the 
        contractor's manpower.  It requires numerous personnel from a 
        variety of skill categories to be present or quickly 
        available.  SOW 3.1 also requires that test conduct take place 
        during the full dusk to dawn period.  Together these factors 
        mean that test conduct periods require the contractor to 
        deliver a large number of employee man-hours each night on 
        which testing is conducted. . . .  Therefore, the contractor 
        must size its organization to be capable of delivering these 
        man-hours.  Test set-up and post-processing are simply not the 
        big drain on man-hours that test conduct is.  They are often 
        performed in a much more diffuse way with a much lower level 
        of manpower. . . .  Additionally, unlike test conduct, there 
        is no SOW requirement that these activities take place during 
        the dusk to dawn period. . . .  Much of this work can be 
        accomplished in standard 8 hour shifts in the daylight hours."

In calculating the period of simultaneous testing at the two RATSCAT 
sites--and thus the period of greatest demand on staffing 
resources--EG&G assumed that downtime did not reduce the period of 
actual test conduct.  Tr. at 60-62, 176-177.  Applying a factor of 60 
percent to determine the period of simultaneous actual test conduct at 
the two sites, a factor slightly less than midway between the 69 
percent factor for FY 1995 and 54 percent factor for FY 96 which were 
referenced by the agency in its response to the request for 
clarification of the requirement, EG&G calculated that there would be 
at least 2.4 months of actual simultaneous test conduct.  

In contrast, as originally explained by its proposal manager in 
response to EG&G's protest, Johnson based its proposal on the 
assumption of 1.4 months of simultaneous test conduct.  Specifically, 
Johnson calculated this figure by "subtracting from the Mainsite 
four-month test requirement the 30 percent downtime factor for the 
Mainsite that was included in [the SOW].  To this 2.8 month figure, 
[Johnson] applied a factor of 50 percent simultaneous testing to yield 
an approximate 1.4 months simultaneous testing proposal assumption."  
(Although the chairman of the SSET testified that the likely downtime 
would not permit a reduction in time spent on site, he indicated that 
the panel considered downtime in calculating the amount of 
simultaneous test conduct as 2 months.  Tr. at 255-256, 392-397, 
435.)[1]   EG&G concludes that offerors were not competing on a common 
basis and that this discrepancy renders the evaluation invalid.  
According to the protester, the Air Force should reopen negotiations 
and clarify its requirements. 

In effect, EG&G is arguing that offerors should have been required to 
propose to the same assumption with respect to the amount of 
simultaneous test conduct.  Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict 
rules for the timely submission of protests.  These rules specifically 
require that a protest based upon alleged improprieties in a 
solicitation that are apparent at the time of receipt of initial 
proposals must be filed before that closing time.  Section 21.2(a)(1), 
60 Fed. Reg. 40,737, 40,740 (Aug. 10, 1995) (to be codified at 4 
C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(1)); Engelhard Corp., B-237824, Mar. 23, 1990, 90-1 
CPD  para.  324.  These timeliness rules reflect the dual requirements of 
giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving 
protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the 
procurement process.  Air Inc.--Recon.,  B-238220.2, Jan. 29, 1990, 
90-1 CPD  para.  129.

As discussed, when asked prior to closing time to "make the playing 
field level" by quantifying the amount of simultaneous testing, the 
Air Force declined to do so on the ground that:  "Testing varies 
substantially from year to year.  It is difficult to predict what 
portion of the time simultaneous testing at both sites might occur."  
The agency instead furnished its most recent data on the extent of 
simultaneous testing in 1995 and as scheduled in 1996.  As a result, 
offerors had the discretion to reach their own conclusions with 
respect to the amount of simultaneous test conduct when preparing 
their staffing approaches.  To the extent EG&G believed this was an 
improper basis for proposal preparation and evaluation, it was 
required to protest this apparent RFP deficiency prior to the closing 
time for receipt of initial proposals.  As it failed to do so, the 
argument is untimely.

In any case, it is not apparent that the protester was prejudiced by 
the alleged deficiency.  Competitive prejudice is an essential element 
of every viable protest.  Lithos Restoration, Ltd., 71 Comp. Gen. 367 
(1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  379.  Where no reasonable possibility of prejudice 
is shown or is otherwise evident from the record, our Office will not 
sustain a protest.  Colonial Storage Co.--Recon., B-253501.8,   May 
31, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  335.

During the hearing in this matter, the Air Force presented a 
spreadsheet summarizing the manning approach in each proposal and 
allocating each offeror's proposed staff among the various contract 
functions.  (Under the offerors' cross-utilization, each employee 
performs a number of functions.)  Although EG&G has generally claimed 
that it could have reduced its work force by [DELETED] FTEs had the 
agency stated that it anticipated that only 2 months of simultaneous 
testing would be required (the number used in the evaluation), the 
agency's spreadsheet calculations indicate that only [DELETED] of the 
[DELETED] additional FTEs proposed by EG&G are accounted for by EG&G's 
larger test operations staff, the functional work group that would be 
most directly impacted by changes in peak test workload.  (According 
to the Air Force, EG&G's larger management and administrative staff 
accounts for another [DELETED] additional personnel, while its larger 
maintenance staff accounts for its remaining [DELETED] additional 
FTEs.)  

Further, the Air Force asserts, and the record suggests, that not all 
of the [DELETED] additional FTEs in the test operations area are 
related to the greater amount of simultaneous test conduct assumed by 
EG&G.  For example, the Air Force and Johnson, unlike EG&G, assumed 
that a new Data Acquisition and Processing System (DAPS)--which had 
been under development by EG&G under the prior contract and was 
scheduled to become operational during the new contract--would permit 
the consolidation of a radar technician with a data technician 
position on each test operations shift, for a savings of three FTEs.  
In fact, the RFP specifically referenced this consolidation of 
functions, stating that:

        "A new computer subsystem . . . (DAPS), provides common 
        architecture, common software, common hardware and a common 
        operator interface for both [the Integrated Radar Measurement 
        System at Mainsite] and the RAMS radar system, and allows a 
        single operator to acquire and process data.  DAPS affords the 
        capability to acquire and process a large volume of data 
        rapidly.  All RATSCAT radar systems will eventually have a 
        DAPS."

EG&G argues that a radar technician responsible for reviewing radar 
signals as they are acquired so as to detect errors cannot 
simultaneously conduct data processing,  suggesting that its proposal 
included extra personnel for this function among the  [DELETED] 
additional FTEs.  Thus, it appears that the potential prejudice to 
EG&G from the failure to quantify the simultaneous testing requirement 
is limited to fewer than [DELETED] FTEs.  

It is not clear precisely what impact these additional FTEs had on 
EG&G's proposed cost--EG&G does not quantify the effect based on the 
positions involved.  However, when EG&G's proposed costs are allocated 
equally over its proposed FTEs, even reducing its test operations 
staff by all [DELETED] FTEs would reduce its cost only by 
approximately [DELETED] million, leaving EG&G's cost [DELETED] higher 
than Johnson's.  In addition, as the agency notes, since EG&G's 
proposal's "small technical advantage" was due at least in part to its 
greater staffing (for example, the proposal was evaluated as offering 
the government the "greatest capacity"), that advantage would 
necessarily diminish as its staffing decreased.  Again, we are well 
aware that these calculations are far from precise; however, in the 
absence of other evidence or argument from EG&G showing that the 
calculations are grossly incorrect, we believe they provide a 
reasonable basis for concluding that prejudice has not been 
established.

JOHNSON'S STAFFING APPROACH

EG&G argues that the agency unreasonably concluded that Johnson 
proposed sufficient staffing to perform the testing requirements.  

In reviewing an evaluation, we consider whether it was in accord with 
the criteria listed in the solicitation and otherwise was reasonable.  
Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 69 Comp. Gen. 284 (1990), 90-1 CPD  para.  
203; John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc., B-258158 et al., Dec. 21, 1994, 
95-1 CPD  para.  35. 

The Air Force found Johnson's staffing approach as fully developed in 
its BAFO to be acceptable on the basis of a number of factors, 
including the increase in Johnson's staffing to [DELETED] FTEs, the 
addition of better qualified staff, its demonstration of a sound 
understanding of the technical requirements, and its innovative 
approaches to reducing manning.  For example, the agency found that 
Johnson had proposed an innovative [DELETED] concept under which it 
would use [DELETED] techniques and [DELETED] analysis to increase 
efficiency of operations by reducing [DELETED].  The agency noted that 
Johnson had proposed extensive cross-utilization of personnel, 
including both training employees to perform several work functions 
and cross-utilizing employees between the two test sites.  As noted by 
the agency with respect to the conduct of testing, "[i]f it is known 
in advance that a certain amount of downtime is likely to occur, 
prudent management will often allow the contractor to have other, less 
time-sensitive work available to be accomplished by test support 
personnel, even though one cannot predict just when the downtime will 
happen or its exact length.  This cross utilization reduces the 
overall level of needed manpower."  (The protester's RATSCAT 
engineering manager agreed that downtime could be used to perform 
other work.  Tr. at 62, 144.)  

In addition, the Air Force accepted Johnson's proposal of a DAPS 
Specialist job classification combining data acquisition and 
processing responsibilities with DAPS and radar operation and 
maintenance responsibilities; by training DAPS Specialists to perform 
routine radar operation and maintenance tasks, the agency believed 
that the need for radar technician support would be reduced.  As for 
the system characterization phase which precedes actual test conduct, 
the agency notes that in contrast to EG&G's view that this phase 
extends for 1 or more weeks (and that Johnson's proposed staffing is 
inadequate for this amount of system characterization), another 
similar test range performs this work in as little as 1 or     2 days.  
Tr. at 24-36, 79-87, 216-219, 292-294, 364-382.  Finally, the agency 
viewed Johnson's proposal to rotate [DELETED] test support teams 
between two sites as sufficiently likely to reduce worker fatigue 
during periods of simultaneous test conduct as to make an overall 
lower manning level acceptable.  Clearly, the agency specifically 
considered Johnson's ability to perform as required in light of its 
staffing plan.  As indicated, the agency had specific reasons for 
concluding that the proposed staffing would be adequate--in part, it 
simply disagreed with EG&G's assumptions in many regards--and we find 
that those reasons are logical.  Thus, there is no basis for 
questioning the Air Force's determination that Johnson proposed 
adequate staffing.[2]   

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. In its February 15, 1996 submission to our Office, the Air Force 
reported that it was currently projecting 7 to 8 weeks of simultaneous 
test conduct for the February to November 1996 time period.  The 
agency emphasized, however, that many scheduled test programs do not 
occur, or occur later than scheduled.  Tr. at 437. 

2. EG&G's argument here reflects its view that Johnson's staffing is 
inadequate for the amount of simultaneous testing (2.4 months) EG&G 
assumed.  However, as discussed above, the solicitation did not 
provide for use of a 2.4 month assumption in proposal preparation and 
evaluation.  As for Johnson's statement, after award and in response 
to EG&G's protest, that it assumed only 1.4 months of simultaneous 
test conduct, this is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the 
evaluation.  The agency was not aware of this assumption when 
evaluating BAFOs; the evaluation was based on the actual organization 
and staffing in Johnson's BAFO, and the agency found these to be 
adequate to support 2 months of simultaneous testing.