BNUMBER: B-270509.2
DATE: April 1, 1996
TITLE: EG&G Management Systems, Inc.
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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a
GAO Protective Order. This version has been redacted or approved by
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:EG&G Management Systems, Inc.
File: B-270509.2
Date:April 1, 1996
Rand L. Allen, Esq., Paul F. Khoury, Esq., and David A. Vogel, Esq.,
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for the protester.
Kathleen C. Little, Esq., David R. Johnson, Esq., and Robert J.
Rothwell, Esq., McDermott, Will & Emery, for Johnson Controls World
Services, Inc., an intervenor.
Gregory Petkoff, Esq., and P. Alan Luthy, Esq., Department of the Air
Force, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Protest that offerors should have been required to propose to the
same assumption with respect to the amount of likely simultaneous test
conduct at two radar target test sites is untimely because it
challenges an alleged impropriety in the solicitation that should have
been protested before the initial closing time for submission of
proposals.
2. Protest that agency unreasonably concluded that awardee proposed
sufficient staffing to perform required radar target testing is denied
where awardee demonstrated a sound understanding of the technical
requirements and proposed innovative approaches to reducing manning,
including using (1) [DELETED] techniques and [DELETED] analysis (to
increase efficiency of operations by reducing [DELETED]), (2) a new
computer system (to permit consolidation of staff positions), and (3)
extensive cross-utilization of personnel.
DECISION
EG&G Management Systems, Inc. protests the Department of the Air
Force's award of a contract to Johnson Controls World Services, Inc.
under request for proposals (RFP) No. F08635-95-C-0001, for operation
and maintenance of the Radar Target Scatter (RATSCAT) facility at
Holloman Air Force Base (AFB), New Mexico. EG&G challenges the
evaluation of offerors' proposed staffing approaches.
We deny the protest.
BACKGROUND
The solicitation, issued on May 19, 1995, contemplated award of a
cost-plus-award-fee contract for a 3-year base period, with 2 option
years, for the operation and maintenance of RATSCAT. RATSCAT's
mission is to measure radar signals reflected off actual hardware
(e.g., aircraft and missiles) and accurate sub-scale models in order
to compute their radar cross-sections and predict how well the targets
will be detected by various radar systems. RATSCAT includes two
separate test complexes: (1) Mainsite, which is located on isolated
alkali flats west of Holloman AFB, and (2) the RATSCAT Advanced
Measurement System (RAMS), which is located approximately 40 miles
northwest of Mainsite.
As described in the solicitation, the "mission flow" process developed
by EG&G, the prior incumbent contractor, in cooperation with the Air
Force, generally includes: (1) long-term test planning, provisioning
and subsystem readiness; (2) system characterization, during which
measurements are taken at the test site in the period before actual
testing commences in order to establish the signal image of the
background, that is, of the entire test range minus the target, which
will later be deducted from signal images recorded during the actual
testing in order to determine the images due just to the target; (3)
the actual conduct of testing at the test site; and (4) post-test data
processing, which requires use of the test range computers, and report
generation. Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 17-44, 51-57, 75-85, 361-381.
Because the targets whose radar signals are to be measured at RATSCAT
may have state-of-the-art low-observable, stealth characteristics
which are classified, the solicitation's statement of work (SOW)
provided that "test operations are normally conducted at night for
security purposes," and that therefore it was "imperative to maximize
target data collection during hours of darkness." The SOW
specifically cautioned that:
"The Contractor shall adjust work schedules to accommodate
seasonal changes in dusk to dawn hours . . . . Test programs
are distributed over the year at both sites with some
simultaneous testing at both sites. Actual testing periods
range from two or three days to as long as two months. The
projected test schedule will require testing for a total of
four months per year at Mainsite and eight months per year at
RAMS. These test period forecasts include 25% downtime at
RAMS and 30% downtime at Mainsite due to weather, security
considerations, equipment failures, and evacuations for [White
Sands Missile Range] testing. The Contractor shall
cross-utilize test personnel for other contract requirements
when tests are not being conducted. Overtime or extended work
weeks shall be used when necessary to accommodate the test
workload."
Prior to the closing time for receipt of initial proposals, the Air
Force issued an amendment to the solicitation which included questions
from potential offerors and the agency's answers. One question,
noting the SOW reference to "some simultaneous testing at both sites,"
asked: "[t]o make the playing field level for all offerors, can
'some' be quantified by a percentage of the time number?" The Air
Force answered that:
"Testing varies substantially from year to year. It is
difficult to predict what portion of the time simultaneous
testing at both sites might occur. For FY [Fiscal Year] 95,
of 48 weeks of testing, 33 were simultaneous, or approximately
69%. Currently in FY 96, there are 39 weeks scheduled of
which 21 are concurrent, or about 54%."
The Air Force received four proposals by the closing time on July 7.
All proposals were included in the competitive range. The Air Force
questioned both offerors about their staffing approaches during the
ensuing discussions. EG&G had been performing under the prior
contract with a staff of 93 full time equivalents (FTE). The agency's
independent cost estimate, assuming a significant decrease in the
workload, was based on a staff of 79 FTEs and a total cost of $53.1
million. In its initial proposal, EG&G proposed [DELETED] FTEs at a
cost of [DELETED] million. During discussions, the Air Force,
referring to the SOW requirement that the contractor "utilize
sub-contracting, part time employees, cross-utilization and overtime
to the maximum extent practicable to minimize the permanent contract
workforce," observed that while EG&G proposed developing multi-skilled
employees, cross-utilization and multi-tasking, it was "unclear how
multi-skilled individuals would be used across diverse skill
boundaries to minimize manning in test support, management,
supervision and engineering." In addition, the agency asked EG&G to
clarify its reference, in explaining its staffing rationale, to a
"nominal test configuration with typical data acquisition."
In response, EG&G further explained its approach to cross-utilizing
multi-skilled personnel to perform multiple tasks and additional roles
beyond their primary area of responsibility. In addition, EG&G
explained that its staffing approach was based on certain assumptions,
including the assumption of a 60-percent range time overlap between
Mainsite and RAMS.
In its initial proposal, Johnson proposed [DELETED] FTEs at a cost of
[DELETED] million. Agency evaluators assigned Johnson's proposal a
marginal (yellow) technical rating (as well as a marginal management
rating), noting as one weakness that the proposal "[d]oes not
adequately discuss 'dusk to dawn' operation and what this means in
relation to the hours of operation." During discussions, the Air
Force, referencing the SOW requirement for dusk-to-dawn target data
acquisition at RAMS and Johnson's proposal of [DELETED] at each site
when simultaneous testing is required, asked Johnson: "How will dusk
to dawn testing be accomplished during the winter months where the
dusk to dawn period exceeds twelve (12) hours?" In response, Johnson
explained that it assumed approximately 50 percent simultaneous
testing at Mainsite and RAMS, and would [DELETED]; during simultaneous
testing, one team would work a dusk-to-dawn shift at each site and the
[DELETED] would be available "as 'fill-in' for absences and for shift
relief to provide time off for the employees." In addition, Johnson
proposed to increase its staffing to [DELETED] FTEs.
At the conclusion of discussions, the Air Force requested best and
final offers (BAFO). Although the source selection evaluation team
(SSET) evaluated EG&G's BAFO as "technically superior overall,"
offering the government the "greatest capacity" and the "least risk to
ongoing/upcoming operations," the overall technical rating of
Johnson's BAFO was the same as EG&G's--acceptable with low risk.
Further, EG&G's evaluated cost of [DELETED] million for a total of
[DELETED] FTEs was higher than Johnson's evaluated cost of [DELETED]
million for a total of [DELETED] FTEs. The source selection authority
(SSA) concluded that the "small technical advantage" associated with
EG&G's proposal "was clearly outweighed by Johnson Controls'
significantly lower cost." Upon learning of the resulting award to
Johnson on November 3, EG&G protested to our Office.
COMMON BASIS FOR EVALUATION
EG&G argues that Johnson's BAFO was based on an understanding of the
solicitation requirements materially different from EG&G's
understanding. Specifically, EG&G notes that offerors based their
staffing approaches on different assumptions with respect to the
amount of simultaneous test conduct.
According to the Air Force, the requirement to perform actual test
conduct was crucial in determining the required level of overall
staffing. In this regard, the Air Force maintains that activities
other than actual test conduct:
". . . do not drive the need for manpower the way test conduct
does. Test conduct is a peak load condition for the
contractor's manpower. It requires numerous personnel from a
variety of skill categories to be present or quickly
available. SOW 3.1 also requires that test conduct take place
during the full dusk to dawn period. Together these factors
mean that test conduct periods require the contractor to
deliver a large number of employee man-hours each night on
which testing is conducted. . . . Therefore, the contractor
must size its organization to be capable of delivering these
man-hours. Test set-up and post-processing are simply not the
big drain on man-hours that test conduct is. They are often
performed in a much more diffuse way with a much lower level
of manpower. . . . Additionally, unlike test conduct, there
is no SOW requirement that these activities take place during
the dusk to dawn period. . . . Much of this work can be
accomplished in standard 8 hour shifts in the daylight hours."
In calculating the period of simultaneous testing at the two RATSCAT
sites--and thus the period of greatest demand on staffing
resources--EG&G assumed that downtime did not reduce the period of
actual test conduct. Tr. at 60-62, 176-177. Applying a factor of 60
percent to determine the period of simultaneous actual test conduct at
the two sites, a factor slightly less than midway between the 69
percent factor for FY 1995 and 54 percent factor for FY 96 which were
referenced by the agency in its response to the request for
clarification of the requirement, EG&G calculated that there would be
at least 2.4 months of actual simultaneous test conduct.
In contrast, as originally explained by its proposal manager in
response to EG&G's protest, Johnson based its proposal on the
assumption of 1.4 months of simultaneous test conduct. Specifically,
Johnson calculated this figure by "subtracting from the Mainsite
four-month test requirement the 30 percent downtime factor for the
Mainsite that was included in [the SOW]. To this 2.8 month figure,
[Johnson] applied a factor of 50 percent simultaneous testing to yield
an approximate 1.4 months simultaneous testing proposal assumption."
(Although the chairman of the SSET testified that the likely downtime
would not permit a reduction in time spent on site, he indicated that
the panel considered downtime in calculating the amount of
simultaneous test conduct as 2 months. Tr. at 255-256, 392-397,
435.)[1] EG&G concludes that offerors were not competing on a common
basis and that this discrepancy renders the evaluation invalid.
According to the protester, the Air Force should reopen negotiations
and clarify its requirements.
In effect, EG&G is arguing that offerors should have been required to
propose to the same assumption with respect to the amount of
simultaneous test conduct. Our Bid Protest Regulations contain strict
rules for the timely submission of protests. These rules specifically
require that a protest based upon alleged improprieties in a
solicitation that are apparent at the time of receipt of initial
proposals must be filed before that closing time. Section 21.2(a)(1),
60 Fed. Reg. 40,737, 40,740 (Aug. 10, 1995) (to be codified at 4
C.F.R. sec. 21.2(a)(1)); Engelhard Corp., B-237824, Mar. 23, 1990, 90-1
CPD para. 324. These timeliness rules reflect the dual requirements of
giving parties a fair opportunity to present their cases and resolving
protests expeditiously without unduly disrupting or delaying the
procurement process. Air Inc.--Recon., B-238220.2, Jan. 29, 1990,
90-1 CPD para. 129.
As discussed, when asked prior to closing time to "make the playing
field level" by quantifying the amount of simultaneous testing, the
Air Force declined to do so on the ground that: "Testing varies
substantially from year to year. It is difficult to predict what
portion of the time simultaneous testing at both sites might occur."
The agency instead furnished its most recent data on the extent of
simultaneous testing in 1995 and as scheduled in 1996. As a result,
offerors had the discretion to reach their own conclusions with
respect to the amount of simultaneous test conduct when preparing
their staffing approaches. To the extent EG&G believed this was an
improper basis for proposal preparation and evaluation, it was
required to protest this apparent RFP deficiency prior to the closing
time for receipt of initial proposals. As it failed to do so, the
argument is untimely.
In any case, it is not apparent that the protester was prejudiced by
the alleged deficiency. Competitive prejudice is an essential element
of every viable protest. Lithos Restoration, Ltd., 71 Comp. Gen. 367
(1992), 92-1 CPD para. 379. Where no reasonable possibility of prejudice
is shown or is otherwise evident from the record, our Office will not
sustain a protest. Colonial Storage Co.--Recon., B-253501.8, May
31, 1994, 94-1 CPD para. 335.
During the hearing in this matter, the Air Force presented a
spreadsheet summarizing the manning approach in each proposal and
allocating each offeror's proposed staff among the various contract
functions. (Under the offerors' cross-utilization, each employee
performs a number of functions.) Although EG&G has generally claimed
that it could have reduced its work force by [DELETED] FTEs had the
agency stated that it anticipated that only 2 months of simultaneous
testing would be required (the number used in the evaluation), the
agency's spreadsheet calculations indicate that only [DELETED] of the
[DELETED] additional FTEs proposed by EG&G are accounted for by EG&G's
larger test operations staff, the functional work group that would be
most directly impacted by changes in peak test workload. (According
to the Air Force, EG&G's larger management and administrative staff
accounts for another [DELETED] additional personnel, while its larger
maintenance staff accounts for its remaining [DELETED] additional
FTEs.)
Further, the Air Force asserts, and the record suggests, that not all
of the [DELETED] additional FTEs in the test operations area are
related to the greater amount of simultaneous test conduct assumed by
EG&G. For example, the Air Force and Johnson, unlike EG&G, assumed
that a new Data Acquisition and Processing System (DAPS)--which had
been under development by EG&G under the prior contract and was
scheduled to become operational during the new contract--would permit
the consolidation of a radar technician with a data technician
position on each test operations shift, for a savings of three FTEs.
In fact, the RFP specifically referenced this consolidation of
functions, stating that:
"A new computer subsystem . . . (DAPS), provides common
architecture, common software, common hardware and a common
operator interface for both [the Integrated Radar Measurement
System at Mainsite] and the RAMS radar system, and allows a
single operator to acquire and process data. DAPS affords the
capability to acquire and process a large volume of data
rapidly. All RATSCAT radar systems will eventually have a
DAPS."
EG&G argues that a radar technician responsible for reviewing radar
signals as they are acquired so as to detect errors cannot
simultaneously conduct data processing, suggesting that its proposal
included extra personnel for this function among the [DELETED]
additional FTEs. Thus, it appears that the potential prejudice to
EG&G from the failure to quantify the simultaneous testing requirement
is limited to fewer than [DELETED] FTEs.
It is not clear precisely what impact these additional FTEs had on
EG&G's proposed cost--EG&G does not quantify the effect based on the
positions involved. However, when EG&G's proposed costs are allocated
equally over its proposed FTEs, even reducing its test operations
staff by all [DELETED] FTEs would reduce its cost only by
approximately [DELETED] million, leaving EG&G's cost [DELETED] higher
than Johnson's. In addition, as the agency notes, since EG&G's
proposal's "small technical advantage" was due at least in part to its
greater staffing (for example, the proposal was evaluated as offering
the government the "greatest capacity"), that advantage would
necessarily diminish as its staffing decreased. Again, we are well
aware that these calculations are far from precise; however, in the
absence of other evidence or argument from EG&G showing that the
calculations are grossly incorrect, we believe they provide a
reasonable basis for concluding that prejudice has not been
established.
JOHNSON'S STAFFING APPROACH
EG&G argues that the agency unreasonably concluded that Johnson
proposed sufficient staffing to perform the testing requirements.
In reviewing an evaluation, we consider whether it was in accord with
the criteria listed in the solicitation and otherwise was reasonable.
Information Sys. & Networks Corp., 69 Comp. Gen. 284 (1990), 90-1 CPD para.
203; John Brown U.S. Servs., Inc., B-258158 et al., Dec. 21, 1994,
95-1 CPD para. 35.
The Air Force found Johnson's staffing approach as fully developed in
its BAFO to be acceptable on the basis of a number of factors,
including the increase in Johnson's staffing to [DELETED] FTEs, the
addition of better qualified staff, its demonstration of a sound
understanding of the technical requirements, and its innovative
approaches to reducing manning. For example, the agency found that
Johnson had proposed an innovative [DELETED] concept under which it
would use [DELETED] techniques and [DELETED] analysis to increase
efficiency of operations by reducing [DELETED]. The agency noted that
Johnson had proposed extensive cross-utilization of personnel,
including both training employees to perform several work functions
and cross-utilizing employees between the two test sites. As noted by
the agency with respect to the conduct of testing, "[i]f it is known
in advance that a certain amount of downtime is likely to occur,
prudent management will often allow the contractor to have other, less
time-sensitive work available to be accomplished by test support
personnel, even though one cannot predict just when the downtime will
happen or its exact length. This cross utilization reduces the
overall level of needed manpower." (The protester's RATSCAT
engineering manager agreed that downtime could be used to perform
other work. Tr. at 62, 144.)
In addition, the Air Force accepted Johnson's proposal of a DAPS
Specialist job classification combining data acquisition and
processing responsibilities with DAPS and radar operation and
maintenance responsibilities; by training DAPS Specialists to perform
routine radar operation and maintenance tasks, the agency believed
that the need for radar technician support would be reduced. As for
the system characterization phase which precedes actual test conduct,
the agency notes that in contrast to EG&G's view that this phase
extends for 1 or more weeks (and that Johnson's proposed staffing is
inadequate for this amount of system characterization), another
similar test range performs this work in as little as 1 or 2 days.
Tr. at 24-36, 79-87, 216-219, 292-294, 364-382. Finally, the agency
viewed Johnson's proposal to rotate [DELETED] test support teams
between two sites as sufficiently likely to reduce worker fatigue
during periods of simultaneous test conduct as to make an overall
lower manning level acceptable. Clearly, the agency specifically
considered Johnson's ability to perform as required in light of its
staffing plan. As indicated, the agency had specific reasons for
concluding that the proposed staffing would be adequate--in part, it
simply disagreed with EG&G's assumptions in many regards--and we find
that those reasons are logical. Thus, there is no basis for
questioning the Air Force's determination that Johnson proposed
adequate staffing.[2]
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. In its February 15, 1996 submission to our Office, the Air Force
reported that it was currently projecting 7 to 8 weeks of simultaneous
test conduct for the February to November 1996 time period. The
agency emphasized, however, that many scheduled test programs do not
occur, or occur later than scheduled. Tr. at 437.
2. EG&G's argument here reflects its view that Johnson's staffing is
inadequate for the amount of simultaneous testing (2.4 months) EG&G
assumed. However, as discussed above, the solicitation did not
provide for use of a 2.4 month assumption in proposal preparation and
evaluation. As for Johnson's statement, after award and in response
to EG&G's protest, that it assumed only 1.4 months of simultaneous
test conduct, this is irrelevant to the reasonableness of the
evaluation. The agency was not aware of this assumption when
evaluating BAFOs; the evaluation was based on the actual organization
and staffing in Johnson's BAFO, and the agency found these to be
adequate to support 2 months of simultaneous testing.