BNUMBER:  B-270505.2; B-270505.3
DATE:  September 12, 1996
TITLE:  Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corp., a joint venture

File:     B-270505.2; B-270505.3

Date:September 12, 1996

Rand L. Allen, Esq., Paul F. Khoury, Esq., Christopher R. Yukins, 
Esq., and Phillip H. Harrington, Esq., Wiley, Rein & Fielding, for the 
protester.
Kathleen C. Little, Esq., David R. Johnson, Esq., Robert J. Rothwell, 
Esq., McDermott, Will & Emery, for  H.B. Zachry Company, The Parsons 
Corporation, and Sundt Corp., a  joint venture, the intervenor.
Dennis J. Gallagher, Esq., Department of State, for the agency.
John L. Formica, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Where agency brought principal concerns about the protester's 
proposal to the attention of the protester and since various other 
weaknesses, both individually and in toto, did not prevent the 
protester from having a reasonable chance for award, the agency's 
failure to point out those other weaknesses did not deprive the 
protester of meaningful discussions; agency was not required to hold 
discussions regarding every weakness identified in the protester's 
proposal.

2.  Where a solicitation lists evaluation factors and subfactors in 
descending order of importance, each factor listed and each subfactor 
within each factor is of decreasing weight; such an evaluation scheme 
does not indicate that the subfactors of lower-weighted factors are 
necessarily of less individual weight than subfactors of 
higher-weighted factors.

3.  Agency scoring and weighting method used to evaluate and rank 
offers was consistent with the evaluation scheme stated in the 
solicitation and did not produce an irrational award selection result.

4.  Protester was not prejudiced by the agency's alleged waiver of a 
requirement that potential offerors have certain security clearances 
by an established date where the record does not evidence that had the 
protester been aware of the allegedly relaxed requirement, it would 
have submitted a different proposal that would have had a reasonable 
possibility of award.  

DECISION

Brown & Root, Inc. and Perini Corporation, a joint venture, protest 
the award of a contract to H.B. Zachry Company, The Parsons 
Corporation, and Sundt Corp., a joint venture (ZPS), under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. MEBCO-95-R-0300, issued by the Department of State 
to construct secure chancery facilities for the United States Embassy 
in Moscow, Russia.  Brown/Perini argues that the agency failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions, did not follow the evaluation criteria 
set forth in the solicitation in evaluating proposals and selecting 
ZPS' higher-priced proposal, and waived the requirement that all joint 
venture partners possess a top secret facility clearance by a certain 
date.

We deny the protest. 

Construction began on a new embassy compound in Moscow in 1979.  The 
compound encompasses eight buildings on a 10-acre site.  Construction 
has been completed on seven of the buildings, and these buildings are 
currently occupied.  The subject of this procurement, the New Office 
Building (NOB), is partially complete and, as presently constructed, 
is eight stories tall with a penthouse.  Construction of the NOB was 
halted in 1985 when it was discovered that clandestine listening 
devices had been installed in the NOB's framework.  Under the 
circumstances, the agency determined that security for the design and 
reconstruction of the NOB is critical.[1]

The work required under the RFP includes the completion of 
design/construction documentation for the NOB; the complete demolition 
of a nearby building and demolition of the NOB from the eighth floor 
to the sixth floor; the construction of a steel frame structure on top 
of the NOB's sixth floor slab through a tenth floor and penthouse; the 
completion of the NOB below the sixth floor; and the revision and 
upgrading of the building core to include, among other things, new 
heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC), plumbing, and 
electrical systems.  The contractor is required to provide, among 
other things, the necessary labor, housing, shipping, equipment, 
consultant services, materials for the design and construction of 
structures and landscaping, for a complete and fully operational 
embassy facility.

Because of the overall security concerns and the agency's 
determination that "[t]ime is of the essence to reduce the risk of 
security compromise," the agency issued and approved a justification 
for other than full and open competition for this procurement.  The 
justification provided that in order "to maximize the base of 
competition while minimizing the exposure of national secrets," the 
procurement would be conducted by synopsizing the requirement in the 
Commerce Business Daily (CBD), issuing a request for information (RFI) 
to those respondents that met certain security requirements, and 
selecting for receipt of the RFP only those three potential offerors 
which, based upon their responses to the RFI, were determined by the 
agency to be best qualified.

The project was announced in the CBD on May 17, 1995.  The 
announcement contained a general description of the work contemplated 
and noted that the estimated value of the contract to be awarded 
exceeded $150 million and that the award of a firm, fixed-price 
contract was planned.  This CBD announcement also informed potential 
offerors that in order to be eligible to receive the RFI, they were 
required to have "SECRET facility and personnel clearances and SECRET 
safeguarding capability."  The CBD notice added that in order to 
"participate in the acquisition procedure" and receive the RFP, 
potential offerors were to have "TOP SECRET facility and personnel 
clearances together with SECRET safeguarding capability" by July 31.  
Potential offerors were also informed by this notice that the agency 
would sponsor potential offerors for top secret facility clearances 
only if they had at least secret clearances.  On May 31, a second CBD 
announcement was published, which extended from July 31 to October 30 
the date by which the top secret security clearances that were 
required for an offeror to "participate in the acquisition" and 
receive the RFP were to be effective.

Nine potential offerors responded to the CBD announcements and were 
determined to meet the established pre-qualification eligibility 
requirements.  The RFI was issued to each of these potential offerors, 
and six of the potential offerors responded by the August 18 RFI due 
date.  The responses, which in accordance with the RFI addressed only 
the technical aspects of the project and did not include any price 
information, were reviewed by the Pre-Selection Board (PSB).  The PSB 
determined three of the respondents to be best qualified and 
recommended that they be issued the RFP.  In so doing, the PSB noted 
that two of the joint venture respondents, including ZPS, had amended 
their joint venture agreements since submitting their RFI responses.  
Specifically, ZPS had deleted Sundt as a joint venture partner, and 
designated that firm as a consultant because it was not going to 
obtain the requisite security clearances by October 30, and another 
joint venture offeror had amended its agreement to delete one of the 
joint venturers from the joint venture and place it in a subcontractor 
status.  The PSB determined that the amendments by ZPS and the other 
joint venture offeror to their respective joint venture agreements had 
no impact on the selection of these joint ventures as best qualified 
to perform the project, and recommended that Zachry/Parsons, 
Brown/Perini, and the other joint venture receive the RFP.

The RFP was issued to each of these joint venture offerors on November 
1.  The RFP stated that the procurement process would proceed in two 
phases, with the first phase consisting of the offerors' submission of 
their specific plans, without any pricing information, as to how each 
would "achieve the requirements of the contract and the resources and 
experience that [they would] commit to the project if awarded the 
contract."  The RFP informed offerors that during the second phase 
they were to submit both a lump-sum price and a price breakout and any 
refinements necessary to the plans and resources proposed during the 
first phase.

The RFP provided for the award of a firm, fixed-price, award fee 
contract and informed the offerors that award would be made to the 
responsible offeror whose offer represented the best value to the 
government, price and other factors considered.  The RFP provided that 
price would be weighted as one third and the technical evaluation as 
two thirds in determining which offer represented the best value to 
the government, and set forth a formula implementing this 
price/technical ratio to be used to determine the relative standing of 
the offers, as well as sample calculations based upon hypothetical 
technical scores (on a 1,000-point scale) and hypothetical prices.  
The RFP cautioned that although an offeror may achieve the highest 
technical/price score under the formula, an award to the offeror 
submitting the highest-priced offer would only be made if the 
technical attributes of the offer were considered to justify the 
additional cost.  

The RFP, as amended, stated the following technical "evaluation 
factors and subfactors . . . in descending order of importance":

     1.  Management Plan

        a.  Organization and Staffing Plans
        b.  Concept of Operations
        c.  Personnel Management Plan
        d.  Subcontract Plan

     2.  Construction Plan

        a.  Construction Contractor Quality Control Plan
        b.  Network Analysis System Plan
        c.  Special Approaches/Techniques 
        d.  Safety and Accident Prevention Plan

     3.  Security Plan

        a.  Security Contractor Quality Plan
        b.  Cleared American Guard Program
        c.  Transit Security Plan
        d.  Industrial Security and Special Access Program Plan
        e.  Physical Security Plan

     4.  Logistics Plan

        a.  Availability of Materials and Equipment
        b.  Construction Camp Plan
        c.  Operation of the Moscow Embassy Buildings Control Office                
        (MEBCO) Secure Warehouse in Moscow

     5.  Impact Minimization Plan

The RFP provided detailed instructions for the preparation of the 
offerors' proposals and requested, among other things, that offerors 
organize the technical volumes of their proposals to respond to the 
evaluation factors and subfactors.  

With regard to the actual scoring of proposals under the stated 
technical factors and subfactors, the source selection plan, which was 
not disclosed to offerors, provided a grading form for use in 
evaluating proposals that set forth the following point scoring system 
and the corresponding adjectival ratings:  9 to 10 points for an 
"excellent" response; 7 to 9 points for a "very good" response; 4 to 7 
points for a "good" response; 2 to 4 points for a "fair" response; and 
0 to 2 points for a "poor" response.

The agency received first phase proposals from Brown/Perini, ZPS, and 
the third offeror by the closing date of January 19, 1996.  A proposal 
was submitted by ZPS, rather than Zachry/Parsons, because Sundt had 
received the requisite security clearances on November 21, and the 
agency, upon Zachry/Parsons' request, agreed to the submission of an 
offer from ZPS.

After the first phase responses were evaluated by a source evaluation 
board (SEB), discussions were held in which various proposal 
weaknesses and clarifications were brought to the offerors' attention.  
Second phase responses were then received and evaluated.  Additional 
written discussion questions were issued to each of the three offerors 
and the responses thereto received and considered.  Brown/Perini's 
proposal was rated at 636.5 out of 1,000 technical points at a price 
of $134,628,482, ZPS' proposal was rated at 762.5 points at a price of 
$144,505,938, and the third offeror's proposal was rated at 678.5 
points at a price of $169,499,973.  The agency calculated 
Brown/Perini's proposal's overall score using the formula set forth in 
the RFP, which, as explained above, considers the proposal's technical 
score and price, as 889.8 points, ZPS' as 977.2 points, and the third 
offeror's as 858 points.

The agency then compared the offerors' proposals and determined that 
although ZPS' proposal was 7.4 percent higher in price than 
Brown/Perini's, its technical score was 16.5 percent higher, with its 
technical proposal being rated higher than Brown/Perini's under 14 of 
the 17 evaluation factors/subfactors, and equal to Brown/Perini's 
under another evaluation factor/subfactor.  The agency concluded that 
because, among other things, "ZPS' proposal [was] the most thorough 
and comprehensive of its competitors with plans that are the most 
completely developed with the best attention to detail . . . [and] are 
in the highest state of readiness," ZPS' proposal represented the best 
overall value to the government.  ZPS was awarded the contract on May 
2, and after requesting and receiving a debriefing, Brown/Perini filed 
these protests.

Brown/Perini first protests that the agency failed to conduct 
meaningful discussions with it.  Brown/Perini, listing each of the 
weaknesses in its proposal as identified by the agency during the 
debriefing and virtually every weakness identified by the SEB in its 
memorandum to the Source Selection Officer (SSO), argues that the 
agency acted improperly in not advising it of each of these perceived 
weaknesses during discussions.  Brown/Perini contends that if the 
agency had pointed out during discussions each of the weaknesses 
identified by the agency, it "could have revised its proposal or 
otherwise taken steps to rectify the weaknesses."  

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  15.610(c)(2) (FAC 90-31) 
requires that a contracting agency "[a]dvise the offeror of 
deficiencies in its proposal so that the offeror is given an 
opportunity to satisfy the [g]overnment's requirements"; we review the 
adequacy of agency discussions to ensure that agencies point out 
weaknesses that, unless corrected, would prevent an offeror from 
having a reasonable chance for award.  Department of the Navy--Recon., 
72 Comp. Gen. 221 (1993), 93-1 CPD  para.  422.  An agency is not required 
to afford offerors all-encompassing discussions, however, nor is it 
required to discuss every aspect of an offeror's proposal that 
receives less than the maximum score.  DAE Corp., B-259866; 
B-259866.2; May 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  12.  Neither is an agency required 
to advise an offeror of a minor weakness that is not considered 
significant, even where the weakness subsequently becomes a 
determinative factor between two closely ranked proposals.  Volmar 
Constr. Inc., B-270364; B-270364.2, Mar. 4, 1996, 96-1 CPD  para.  139; 
Booz, Allen & Hamilton, B-249236.4; B-249236.5, Mar. 5, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  
209.  Contracting agencies have wide discretion in determining the 
nature and scope of discussions, and their discretion will not be 
questioned unless it is clearly shown to be without a rational basis.  
Textron Marine Sys., B-255580.3, Aug. 2, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  63.
 
The record shows that the agency conducted two rounds of written 
discussions with Brown/Perini, wherein the protester was apprised of 
the principal areas of concern regarding its proposal, e.g., the 
protester's incomplete industrial security plan and its proposed guard 
service subcontractor.  A variety of relative weaknesses that caused 
Brown/Perini's proposal to be rated less than perfect were not pointed 
out to the protester, e.g., concerns about the lines of command in the 
protester's proposed organization, just as such relative weaknesses 
were not pointed out to ZPS; in this regard, both these firms' 
proposals were rated at least "good" for all subfactors.  The 
existence of these weaknesses did not keep Brown/Perini from having a 
reasonable chance for award; Brown/Perini was very much in the 
competition, and ultimately was not selected for award simply as a 
result of a cost/technical tradeoff made by the selection official.  
Accordingly, since the principal concerns about its proposal were 
brought to the protester's attention and since the various other 
concerns, both individually and in toto, did not prevent the protester 
from having a reasonable chance for award, the agency's failure to 
point out those other concerns did not deprive the protester of 
meaningful discussions. 

The protester further contends that the agency did not conduct equal 
discussions, pointing out that during discussions the agency 
"suggested to ZPS that ZPS should move its security functions 
in-house," although "there was no suggestion that ZPS' original plan 
to subcontract its security functions might render the plan 
unacceptable."

ZPS stated in its first phase proposal that it intended to "assign all 
security planning, management, and operational responsibilities . . . 
to its security subcontractor, [DELETED]."  Although four of the five 
members of the SEB did not, in their narratives, consider this aspect 
of ZPS' proposal to be a significant weakness, the SEB assigned ZPS' 
proposal a rating of only 4 out of 10 points under the applicable 
evaluation subfactor.  This rating was the lowest received by either 
ZPS or Brown/Perini under any of the evaluation factors/subfactors.  
Further, one member of the SEB found ZPS' proposed subcontracting of 
the management of the security program to constitute "a major flaw to 
the point of being a deficiency."  The SEB noted in its report to the 
SSO that there was a "minority of one" which considered ZPS' proposed 
subcontracting of the security program to be a major flaw, and set 
forth that member's reasoning.  The SSO subsequently approved "[t]he 
minority report . . . to the effect that ZPS' plan to subcontract the 
security management function is considered to be a weakness and ZPS 
should be afforded the opportunity to revise its plan."  Accordingly, 
during discussions the agency requested that ZPS, among other things, 
"clarify how [it would] achieve project objectives with a 
subcontractor responsible for security management."

We do not view this as an indication of unequal discussions.  The SEB 
(as evidenced by its scoring of this aspect of ZPS' proposal as only a 
four) and the SSO perceived ZPS' initial proposal to subcontract the 
management of the security function to be a significant weakness; 
therefore, this was an appropriate matter to point out to ZPS.  We 
think the agency's approach to discussions was evenhanded, as 
indicated by the fact that Brown/Perini was apprised during 
discussions of an analogous weakness in it proposal, the 
incompleteness of its industrial security plan, which had been 
initially scored at 4.5.  Thus, while an agency may not conduct 
prejudicially unequal discussions, SeaSpace, B-241564, Feb. 15, 1991, 
91-1 CPD  para.  179, the record simply provides no support for the 
protester's factual assertion that unequal discussions occurred here. 

Brown/Perini next protests that the scoring and weighting method used 
by the agency in its evaluation of technical proposals was 
inconsistent with the RFP's stated evaluation and award criteria.  
Specifically, Brown/Perini argues that in addition to the weights 
descending from evaluation factor to evaluation factor, as well as 
descending from subfactor to subfactor within each evaluation factor, 
the weights had to descend subfactor to subfactor throughout each of 
the 16 subfactors, in order to be consistent with the RFP's statement 
that "the evaluation factors and subfactors . . . [are] listed in 
descending order of importance."  For example, Brown/Perini notes that 
the 10-point weighting of the Organization and Staffing Plan 
evaluation subfactor--the first-listed subfactor under the 
first-listed Management Plan evaluation factor (weighted at 35 
points)--as well as the lesser weightings of the lower-listed 
subfactors of this primary factor, were all less than the 11-point 
weighting assigned the Construction Contractor Quality Control 
evaluation subfactor--which was the first-listed subfactor under the 
second-listed Construction Plan evaluation factor (weighted at 25 
points).  According to the protester, this was improper because all of 
the subfactors of the primary technical evaluation factor should be 
weighted greater than the Contractor Quality Control subfactor to be 
consistent with the evaluation scheme designated in the RFP.     

To be reasonable, an interpretation of solicitation language must be 
consistent with the solicitation when read as a whole and in a manner 
that gives effect to all of its provisions.  Stabro Labs. Inc., 
B-256921, Aug. 8, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  66.  The protester's interpretation 
of the RFP is unreasonable because it renders meaningless the RFP's 
listing of the evaluation factors.  That is, under the protester's 
interpretation of the RFP, the agency would have had to list only the 
16 evaluation subfactors and inform offerors that the subfactors were 
listed in descending order of importance.  In order to give meaning to 
the RFP's listing of evaluation factors as well as evaluation 
subfactors, the RFP can only reasonably be read as providing that the 
evaluation factors are listed in descending order of importance, and 
that each of the subfactors within the evaluation factors is listed in 
descending order of importance.  Accordingly, the weights accorded to 
the evaluation subfactors and factors are not, as argued by the 
protester, inconsistent with the terms of the RFP. 

Brown/Perini also argues that the scoring and weighting method used by 
the agency in its evaluation of offers, considered in conjunction with 
the mathematical formula used in the ranking of offers, "grossly 
exaggerated the importance of individual technical problems--and their 
dollar worth to relative price--far beyond the 2 to 1 ratio required 
by the [s]olicitation."  Specifically, the protester argues that 
because proposals could receive a raw score of 4 to 7 points under 
each evaluation subfactor where they met the minimum requirements of 
the RFP, and up to 10 points if they were considered outstanding, the 
scoring system was "tilted . . . toward technically excessive 
proposals."  With regard to the mathematical formula set forth in the 
RFP and the weighting system used by the agency, the protester points 
out that, for example, a 1-point loss in the raw score assigned to its 
proposal under the most significant evaluation subfactor (Organization 
and Staffing Plans) of the most significant evaluation factor 
(Management Plan) equated to an overall loss of 10 points because of 
the weighting of 10 assigned to this subfactor.  The protester then 
calculates, using the mathematical formula set forth in the 
solicitation to determine a total overall score for each offeror's 
proposal considering both technical merit and price, that in order to 
offset the initial raw score loss of 1 point, it would have had to 
drop its price by $3 million.  The protester concludes that such a 
system is unreasonable and inconsistent with the RFP.[2]

We have long recognized that contracting agencies have broad latitude 
in determining the particular method of proposal evaluation to be 
utilized.  Francis & Jackson, Assocs., 57 Comp. Gen. 244 (1978), 78-1 
CPD  para.  79; Augmentation, Inc., B-186614, Sept. 10, 1976, 76-2 CPD  para.  
235.  The only requirements are that the method provide a rational 
basis for source selection and be consistent with the evaluation 
criteria set forth in the solicitation.  See Grey Advertising, Inc., 
55 Comp. Gen 1111 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325; Tracor Jitco, Inc., 54 Comp. 
Gen. 896 (1975), 75-1 CPD 253, and 55 Comp. Gen. 499 (1975), 75-2 CPD  para.  
344.

We find the scoring and weighting system as well as the RFP formula 
used by the agency in its evaluation of proposals and ranking of 
offers for award reasonable and consistent with the terms of the RFP.  
As indicated previously, the scoring system provided for the 
evaluation of proposals under each of the evaluation subfactors on a 0 
to 10-point scale with the scoring being directly related to the 
agency's determination of technical merit.  The raw scores were then 
converted to weighted scores by application of multipliers--ranging 
from 11 to 2--reflecting the relative weight accorded to the 
particular subfactor.  Such a system is clearly consistent with the 
RFP's admonishment that the agency is "more concerned with obtaining 
superior management, technical excellence and high quality resources 
than with making an award at the lowest price," its statement that 
technical merit would be considered twice as important as price, and 
the listing of evaluation factors and subfactors in descending order 
of importance, and we fail to see how it produces an irrational result 
in the circumstances here.  Indeed, in this case, the agency did not 
simply rely upon the results of the RFP formula in making the award 
selection, but documented the reasons why ZPS' proposal was 
technically superior (e.g., its higher ratings in 14 of the 17 
technical factors/subfactors) and warranted the price premium.

Brown/Perini finally asserts that the agency improperly waived for ZPS 
the requirement set forth in the CBD notices and RFI that offerors 
possess a top secret facility clearance by October 30.  

As explained previously, ZPS found that only Zachry and Parsons, and 
not Sundt, would possess the requisite top secret facility clearance 
by October 30.  It became apparent with regard to Sundt, which 
possessed a secret facility clearance, that even though the agency had 
requested that the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office 
(DISCO) process a top secret facility clearance for ZPS by letter 
dated June 29, the upgrade of Sundt's clearance to top secret would 
not be completed by October 30.[3]  Because of this, ZPS deleted Sundt 
from the joint venture and designated Sundt as a consultant.  Sundt 
received its top secret facility clearance on November 21, and after 
receiving notification that Sundt had obtained the requisite 
clearance, the agency permitted Zachry/Parsons to modify its joint 
venture agreement to add Sundt prior to the date for submission of 
first phase proposals under the RFP.

The agency states that, in its view, "[i]ts decision to permit the 
Sundt Corp. to rejoin the Zachry/Parsons joint venture was consistent 
with both the letter and the intent of the requirements stated in the 
[CBD]."  The agency explains that the requirement for offerors to 
obtain a top secret facility clearance by October 30 was established 
solely to ensure that there would be no delay in the issuance of the 
RFP and subsequent award of the contract, and that once it determined 
that permitting Sundt to rejoin the Zachry/Parsons joint venture would 
not delay the procurement in any way, it was proper to allow this 
action.  The agency argues that, in any event, the protester was not 
prejudiced by this action.

We need not decide the propriety of the agency's decision to let Sundt 
rejoin the Zachry/Parsons joint venture because we find, from this 
record, that there was no reasonable possibility that the protester 
was prejudiced by the agency's allegedly improper action.  In this 
regard, competitive prejudice is an essential element of every viable 
protest, and we will not sustain a protest where the record does not 
establish prejudice.  Lithos Restoration, Ltd., 71 Comp. Gen. 367 
(1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  379.  

The protester's argument that it was prejudiced by the alleged waiver 
of the October 30 deadline for ZPS primarily focuses on what, in the 
protester's view, were the competitive advantages ZPS gained from 
being able to add Sundt as a joint venturer.  However, in cases such 
as this, where the protester argues that an agency waived a certain 
requirement, prejudice does not mean that, had the agency failed to 
waive the requirement, the awardee would have been unsuccessful.  
Compare Corporate Jets, Inc., B-246876.2, May 26, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  471 
(agency's waiver for the awardee of a personnel experience requirement 
set forth in an RFP was not prejudicial where there is no reasonable 
possibility that had the protester been aware of the relaxed 
requirement it would have been in line for award) with Global Assocs., 
Ltd., B-271693; B-271693.2, Aug. 2, 1996, 96-2 CPD  para.  100 (agency's 
conduct of post-BAFO discussions with only the awardee to allow the 
awardee to revise its unacceptable proposal to make it compliant with 
a mandatory FAR clause was prejudicial because the agency could have 
either rejected the awardee's proposal or allowed the protester the 
same opportunity to revise its proposal).  Rather, the pertinent 
question in such cases as this is whether the protester would have 
submitted a different offer that would have had a reasonable 
possibility of being selected for award had it known that the 
requirement would be waived.  SCI Sys.--Recon., B-258786.2, July 17, 
1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  35; RGI, Inc., B-243387.2; B-243387.3, Dec. 23, 1991, 
91-2 CPD  para.  572.  

Brown/Perini also generally argues that had it been aware that the 
security requirements might be relaxed, it might have added other 
firms to its joint venture that may have made its proposal more 
desirable to the agency.  However, as pointed out by the agency, the 
only firm identified by the protester in support of its argument, 
[DELETED], had no security clearance at all (as opposed to Sundt, 
which possessed a secret clearance), and because of this, could not 
have received the RFI (receipt of which required a secret clearance).  
Further, based upon the agency's experience with DISCO, [DELETED], 
because it lacked even a secret clearance at the outset of the 
procurement process, would not have been able to obtain a top secret 
clearance prior to the submission of first phase offers as did Sundt.  
As such, we fail to see how [DELETED] could have been added to the 
Brown/Perini joint venture in a manner that, as the protester 
contends, would have made its proposal more desirable, since it 
appears from the record that the addition of that firm to the joint 
venture would have rendered the joint venture ineligible for receipt 
of the RFI, and, based upon the timetable set forth by the agency, the 
RFP.  In sum, we are not persuaded by Brown/Perini's arguments that 
had it been aware that the agency would relax the requirement it would 
have submitted a different proposal that would have had a reasonable 
possibility of award, and thus find that Brown/Perini was not 
prejudiced by the agency's actions.

The protest is denied.[4]

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. Sections of certain documents relevant to this protest are 
classified at varying levels.  Although the relevant portions of these 
documents were reviewed during our consideration of this protest, the 
classified sections of these materials are not described or referred 
to in any way in this decision.  

2. Although the protester's calculations are not repeated here, they 
appear correct, and neither the agency nor the intervenor has argued 
otherwise.

3. DISCO is responsible for administering the Department of Defense's 
National Industrial Security Program. 

4. Brown/Perini has made a number of other related contentions during 
the course of this protest having to do with the agency's conduct of 
the procurement and selection of ZPS for award.  Although these 
contentions may not be specifically addressed in this decision, each 
was carefully considered by our Office and found either to be 
insignificant in view of our other findings, or invalid based upon the 
record as a whole.