BNUMBER:  B-270397.2 
DATE:  May 16, 1996
TITLE:  Matter of: The Futures Group International

**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:The Futures Group International

File:     B-270397.2

Date:May 16, 1996

Paul Shnitzer, Esq., and Mark D. Taylor, Esq., Crowell & Moring, for 
the protester.
Alan A. Pemberton Esq., Covington & Burling, for Management Sciences 
for Health, an intervenor.
Anna Chytla, Esq., Agency for International Development, for the 
agency.
Jerold D. Cohen, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO, 
participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest that a particular type of experience on the part of an 
offeror's key contract employee was a prerequisite for award is denied 
where the solicitation did not mandate such experience and where, 
contrary to the protester's arguments, the agency's actions during 
negotiations should not have led the protester to conclude that such 
experience was mandatory and to structure its offer accordingly.

2.  Protest that solicitation funding requirement and related cost 
evaluation criterion were unfair is dismissed as untimely since it 
concerns apparent solicitation improprieties that should have been 
protested before proposals were due.

3.  Protest that agency did not adequately justify selection of higher 
cost offeror is denied where such offeror overall received a higher 
evaluated cost score than did the protester; technical considerations 
were worth four times as much as cost considerations and the awardee's 
technical score was better than the protester's; and the selection 
official reasonably determined that acceptance of the higher cost 
offer was warranted given its technical advantages particularly with 
respect to the offeror's proposed key contract employee.

DECISION

The Futures Group International (TFGI) protests the award of a 
contract to Management Sciences for Health (MSH) under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. 521-95-005, issued by the Agency for International 
Development (AID).  The solicitation sought offers for a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to implement the Health Systems (HS) 2004 
Project in Haiti.  TFGI protests that the awardee's Chief of Party 
(COP) lacks overseas experience as the COP of a large multisectoral 
health project, which TFGI contends was a prerequisite for the award.  
TFGI also protests that both MSH's and its own cost proposals were 
unfairly evaluated, and that the selection of MSH's higher-cost offer 
was improper. 

We deny the protest. 

BACKGROUND

The HS 2004 Project is intended to provide immediate support to the 
government of Haiti in reestablishing and restructuring essential 
health services throughout the country.  The contract in issue 
concerns the first of the project's two-phase approach--the contract's 
objectives are to assist Haiti's Ministry of Public Health and 
Population in its health reform policy efforts; support direct service 
delivery; and support service to reinforce those two program 
components.

Technical Evaluation

The RFP, issued on May 23, 1995, listed 13 personnel positions, 
although it encouraged contractors to propose different mixes as 
capabilities permitted.  The first position listed was the COP/Senior 
Health Administrator--the only individual specified as "key" (i.e., 
essential to the work)--who was to provide guidance and direction for 
the project's implementation and for all contractor personnel; serve 
as key counterpart to the Haitian Ministry Project Coordinator; and 
act as contractor representative.  

The RFP provided that proposals would be rated and ranked on the 
specified evaluation factors, and that the offerors' technical and 
cost scores would be used as guides in determining the proposal that 
was the most advantageous to the government.  The technical evaluation 
was to constitute 80 percent of the offeror's score, and the cost 
evaluation, 20 percent.  Offerors were advised that cost would become 
increasingly important as proposals approached technical equality, and 
might be the deciding factor between proposals approximately equal in 
technical merit. 

The three technical evaluation factors were Quality and Responsiveness 
of Proposal and Technical Approach, worth a total of 35 points; 
Institutional Capabilities, worth a total of 16 points; and Personnel 
Capabilities, worth a total of 29 points.  The Personnel Capabilities 
factor referenced the 13 listed personnel positions, and advised that 
AID would evaluate the offeror's "ability to provide the anticipated 
qualifications or another mix which is considered equal or better."  
The two subcriteria in the Personnel Capabilities factor that 
concerned the COP were: 

     "I.  Qualifications of Senior Health Administrator, Health Policy 
     Advisor, the Public Sector Financial Management Advisor and the 
     HIS [Health Information Systems] advisor.

        a.  Type and number of years of relevant experience in 
     integrated health project implementation and the provision of 
     technical assistance to the public sector.

        b.  (for Senior Health Administrator) Type and number of years 
     as team leader of a large, complex, multidisciplinary technical 
     assistance effort in a developing country."

The first subcriterion was worth 6 points, and the second, 10 points.

AID received five proposals by the July 6 due date, which were 
evaluated by a technical evaluation committee comprised of three AID 
employees and two senior officials of the Haitian government.  The 
average scores for the proposals submitted by MSH and TFGI were, 
respectively, [deleted] points--including an average of [deleted] 
points for the two COP-related subcriteria; and [deleted] 
points--including an average score of [deleted] for the COP-related 
subcriteria.  The committee's
July 16 evaluation summary states the following with respect to MSH's 
proposed COP, Mr. Paul Auxila:

     "While the Chief of Party has corporate management experience, he 
     has no long term overseas experience in managing large 
     multidisciplinary technical assistance teams.  Furthermore, Mr. 
     Auxila appears to have very specialized experience in HIS, not in 
     general public health management.  Please provide additional 
     information on Mr. Auxila's ability to manage large 
     multidisciplinary teams and further justification for why he is 
     an appropriate candidate for this position."

Regarding TFGI's proposed COP, [deleted], the summary states:

     "The proposed candidate does not have prior experience as a Chief 
     of Party managing large multisectoral public health teams in 
     developing countries.  She also has a predominant experience in 
     the PVO [private voluntary organization] sector, not the public 
     sector.  The evaluation committee suggests that The Futures Group 
     propose a candidate who has more experience in managing 
     multisectoral public health teams in an overseas setting 
     providing technical assistance to the public sector."

The contracting officer relayed the committee's concerns verbatim to 
the respective offerors on August 1. 

MSH responded with additional information about Mr. Auxila's 
qualifications.  TFGI responded with two alternatives for COP:  TFGI 
would (1) revise the team structure, naming [deleted] COP, supported 
by several senior health advisors, or (2) maintain the original team 
structure but replace [deleted] with a candidate to be proposed later.  
TFGI also stated that [deleted--the second candidate] had served as 
COP for a multisectoral health project in [deleted], detailing 
[deleted] contributions to that and other efforts.  In this respect, 
TFGI initially had proposed [deleted--the second candidate] as 
Director of Management Systems, charged with overseeing the project's 
major technical support systems.

The technical evaluation committee then reevaluated proposals.  MSH's 
average score increased to [deleted]; the committee noted that the 
additional information MSH had furnished regarding Mr. Auxila did not 
substantially strengthen the firm's offer with respect to the COP.  
TFGI's average total score increased to [deleted], with some increase 
in the scoring for the two COP-related subcriteria.  The committee 
rejected TFGI's offer of [deleted] as COP, however.  The committee 
determined that [deleted--the second candidate] was not a "SENIOR 
Health Administrator" and did not have "demonstrated experience" to 
meet the RFP's express personnel requirement for the COP "to provide 
guidance and direction for all aspects of project implementation and 
all contractor personnel, to serve as key counterpart to the [Haitian 
Ministry] Project Coordinator particularly on issues of 
decentralization, and to serve as contractor representative in 
dealings with USAID."  The committee reiterated its "desire for the 
offeror to propose someone who has had previous experience as a Chief 
of Party managing large multisectoral public health team in developing 
countries."  In subsequent messages to the two offerors, the 
contracting officer did not mention the COP to MSH, and relayed the 
committee's COP concern almost verbatim to TFGI.

TFGI responded to the contracting officer's communication by offering 
yet another COP candidate, [deleted].

The technical evaluation committee and the contracting officer then 
interviewed the offerors' COP candidates, contacted references, and 
reevaluated the proposals.  Based largely on an encouraging interview 
with MSH's Mr. Auxila and favorable input from his references, MSH 
received an average score of [deleted] points for the two COP-related 
subcriteria; MSH's total technical score was [deleted] points (up from 
[deleted]).  The interview with TFGI's [deleted--the third candidate] 
was not as encouraging, nor were the references as favorable:  TFGI 
received an average score of only [deleted] points for the two 
COP-related subcriteria,[1] and a total score of [deleted] points 
(down from [deleted]).  The technical evaluation committee recommended 
award to MSH.

Cost Evaluation 

The RFP provided that the offeror's cost proposal would be analyzed 
based on five criteria, worth a total of 20 points, and for realism 
and reasonableness.  The five criteria and the points available under 
each were:

     (1) total price (cost plus fixed fee, or cost alone if no fee 
     were proposed):
         12 points
     (2) total fee or profit, with the maximum awarded to proposals 
     that did not
         include any profit:  2 points
     (3) direct labor costs:  2 points
     (4) indirect costs:  2 points
     (5) acceptance of and reasonableness of indirect cost ceilings 
     rates:
         2 points.

TFGI's cost proposal was awarded [deleted] of the 20 available points; 
MSH's cost proposal received [deleted] points.

Selection

The combined technical and cost scores, and the estimated costs, for 
the four competitive range offerors, were:

     Offeror  Tech. Score   Cost Score   Total Score    Est. Cost

     MSH        [deleted]     [deleted]     [deleted]   $44,023,001

     Offeror A   [deleted]    [deleted]     [deleted]     [deleted]

     TFGI       [deleted]     [deleted]     [deleted]     [deleted]

     Offeror B   [deleted]    [deleted]     [deleted]     [deleted]
The contracting officer concluded that award to MSH was in the best 
interests of the government.

PROTEST AND ANALYSIS

Chief of Party 

TFGI protests that AID awarded the contract to an offeror that 
proposed a COP candidate who did not have long-term COP experience 
leading multisectoral health programs in developing countries, which 
TFGI maintains was a prerequisite for award.  The protester argues 
that this "baseline requirement" is evidenced by AID's advice to TFGI 
that the offeror had to propose a candidate with long-term COP 
experience in a multisectoral technical assistance effort in a 
developing country.  The protester notes that AID rejected TFGI's 
first candidate, [deleted], because she did not have COP experience, 
and rejected TFGI's second candidate, [deleted], because he lacked 
long-term experience.  TFGI complains that the prerequisite "severely 
constrained the search and increased the cost of the defined 
candidate"; the protester further notes that its third candidate, 
[deleted], met all qualifications but the offer nevertheless was 
downgraded in the final evaluation with respect to the COP-related 
subcriteria.  In contrast, TFGI complains, not only did AID not 
require that MSH's Mr. Auxila be replaced because he did not have COP 
experience, but MSH's score for the COP-related subcriteria increased 
throughout the evaluation.

TFGI argues:

     "When, as here, an agency specifies mandatory technical features 
     in its RFP and then insists upon those features during 
     negotiations, offerors will interpret these mandatory 
     requirements as prerequisites that had to be met to be eligible 
     for any award. . . .  When an agency determines to consider 
     proposals as acceptable even if they only comply with a portion 
     of the mandatory specifications, the agency should notify 
     offerors of this determination by written amendment. . . . The 
     fact that USAID did not notify TFGI of the relaxed requirement 
     being applied to MSH means that the competition was conducted on 
     an unequal basis. . . ."

AID points out that the RFP did not expressly require COP experience.  
AID further maintains that the agency did not require COP experience 
in the course of negotiations.  AID argues:

     "While the Committee indicated that prior Chief of Party 
     experience was desirable, it never suggested that such a 
     background was mandatory or required. . . .  Indeed, the 
     Committee stated that the weakness in TFGI's proposal could be 
     remedied by any candidate with more overseas experience in 
     managing multisectoral public health teams. . . .  Although such 
     experience is often acquired by individuals who previously worked 
     as Chiefs of Party, there are many other positions in the 
     international public health sector that could provide comparable 
     experience. . . ."

We do not agree with the protester that either the RFP, or AID during 
negotiations, established long-term COP experience in a multisectoral 
health effort in a developing country as a prerequisite for award so 
that either (1) MSH's offer could not be accepted because of Mr. 
Auxila's lack of experience in that regard, or 
(2) TFGI was misled into responding to a more restrictive requirement 
than was applied to MSH.

The RFP, by its terms, did not require the COP candidate to have the 
experience in issue.  Nothing in the RFP's listing of personnel 
position so mandates, although the listing's preamble does require, 
generally, fluency in French and/or Haitian Creole, "relevant prior 
experience working in developing countries," and individuals who are 
sensititive and accommodating to cultural differences and who are good 
team members.  Moreover, the first COP-related subcriterion, worth 6 
points, identified the evaluation considerations not just with respect 
to the COP, but for 4 of the 13 listed personnel positions, the 
COP/Senior Health Administrator and 3 others.  Offerors were advised 
that the evaluation committee, in considering those four candidates, 
would take into account the type and number of years of relevant 
experience--no specific experience was mandated.  The second 
subcriterion, which focused on the COP directly, advised offerors that 
the committee would consider the candidate's experience "as team 
leader of a large, complex, multidisciplinary technical assistance 
effort in a developing country."  Neither subcriterion expresses the 
mandate TFGI suggests.  

With respect to the evaluation and AID's discussions with TFGI, AID 
did not reject TFGI's first offered candidate, [deleted], because she 
did not have a particular degree and type of COP experience; in fact, 
TFGI was awarded an average of [deleted] of the 16 points available 
under the two COP-related subcriteria.  What the technical evaluation 
committee and the contracting officer did do, however, was identify to 
TFGI [deleted] weakness in terms of experience, and "suggest" that 
TFGI consider nominating "a candidate who has more experience in 
managing multisectoral public health teams in an overseas setting 
providing technical assistance to the public sector."  That type of 
concern appears appropriate under the subcriteria, and there clearly 
is nothing wrong in an agency's advising an offeror of proposal 
weaknesses and how to improve its offer--a fundamental feature of 
discussions in a negotiated acquisition.  See Federal Acquisition 
Regulation  sec.  15.610.  
Moreover, TFGI, in responding to that suggestion, could have 
endeavored to show AID that the committee was misreading [deleted] 
credentials, or that [deleted] in fact was a superior candidate in 
terms of experience.  TFGI's decision instead to substitute [deleted], 
who did have COP experience, or a candidate to be named later, was the 
offeror's choice, not a mandated change.  While TFGI evidently read 
more into the technical evaluation committee's concerns than a 
suggestion about how to improve its offer, that reading is not 
supported by the committee's express comments as relayed to TFGI by 
the contracting officer.

The technical evaluation committee did expressly reject [deleted--the 
second candidate] as a candidate.  We do not, however, believe that 
such rejection established a mandate for the COP experience in issue 
either. 

First, it appears that TFGI itself knew that [deleted] might be 
unacceptable when it nominated him, despite his COP experience in 
[deleted], since it advised AID that it also proposed revising the 
team structure, with [deleted] being supported by several senior 
health advisors; TFGI further offered, as an alternative, to replace 
[deleted--the first candidate] with a to-be-named candidate.

More importantly, in rejecting [deleted--the second candidate] the 
committee, in its comments as related to TFGI by the contracting 
officer, essentially only found that [deleted], specifically, could 
not offer the precise capabilities required by the RFP of the 
COP/Senior Health Administrator:  provide guidance and direction for 
all aspects of the project, serve as key counterpart to the Haitian 
Ministry Project Coordinator, and serve as contractor representative.  
Whereas the technical evaluation committee previously had "suggested" 
that TFGI "propose" a COP candidate with more public-sector related 
experience than [deleted], the committee here stated its "desire" that 
TFGI propose a COP candidate with previous COP experience managing a 
large team.  That statement, in our view, essentially was a reaction 
to the nomination of an individual who was not acceptable irrespective 
of his COP experience, for reasons tied directly to the solicitation's 
express requirements.  We think the most reasonable reading of the 
statement is not that the agency was changing RFP evaluation factors 
and RFP requirements, but rather that if TFGI were going to nominate 
for COP an individual who had COP experience, such experience should 
have been managing a large multisectoral team in a developing country.  
In sum, we do not agree that AID's rejection of [deleted] established 
COP experience of that sort as a prerequisite for award despite the 
lack of any such requirement in the RFP itself.  

Finally, we see no basis to question the relationship of the COP 
evaluations to the two COP-related subcriteria.  The subcriteria 
focused on type and relevance of experience, pubic sector technical 
assistance, and leadership capabilities with respect to complex 
overseas efforts.  The evaluation of Mr. Auxila--particularly the 
interview and reference checks--established him as an excellent 
candidate in all respects.  While AID recognized that [deleted--the 
third candidate] had certain highly relevant experience, the 
contracting officer, who participated in the interviews, reports:

     "However, several of [deleted] responses raised questions about 
     his management style.  For example, he viewed the role of the 
     contractor in a dominant fashion and minimized the function of 
     the Haitian Ministry of Health.  Some of [deleted] responses 
     showed that he had difficulty with understanding output based 
     financing even though the TFGI proposal specifically addressed 
     this point.  Moreover, when asked about his ability resolve 
     conflicting situations, [deleted] provided a troubling answer.  
     He stated that while serving as a Chief of Party in [deleted], he 
     resigned from his position because he could not resolve various 
     disagreements with the Government of [deleted] and the USAID 
     Mission.  Although he was the Chief of Party in charge of the 
     project, he repeatedly blamed others for inability to resolve 
     issues and did not take any personal responsibility."

One of the technical evaluators, speaking for the entire committee, 
adds that [deleted] "came across as having minimized the role of the 
[Haitian] Ministry of Health in implementing this project."  The 
evaluator states that the interview "raised certain questions 
concerning his management style and his ability to handle conflict."  
In addition, two AID Missions that were contacted indicated that 
[deleted] "had difficulties in establishing effective working 
relationships, particularly with foreign governments."

The evaluation of proposals in a negotiated procurement must be both 
reasonable and in accord with the stated evaluation criteria.  See 
Mobility Sys. and Equip. Co., B-261072, Aug. 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD  para.  66.  
We see no basis to object to AID's evaluation in that regard.

Cost Evaluation

Cost was worth 20 of the 100 points available in the evaluation of 
proposals.  For the first cost evaluation criterion--total 
price--TFGI, which proposed the lowest cost, was awarded [deleted], 
and MSH was awarded [deleted] points. The two offerors' scores for the 
other four criteria were

            Criterion       Points AvailableTFGI ScoreMSH Score

Total fee/profit                    2.00     [deleted]   [deleted]

Direct labor costs                  2.00     [deleted]   [deleted]

Indirect costs                      2.00     [deleted]   [deleted]

Indirect cost ceiling rates         2.00     [deleted]   [deleted]

Subtotal                            8.00     [deleted]   
[deleted]Total inclusive of price evaluation      20.00   [deleted]   
                                                     [deleted]
The RFP required the contractor to provide a total of $26.1 million in 
subgrants or subcontracts to health care providers to provide basic 
care, and for national programs in family planning, reproductive 
health, and other efforts.  TFGI's proposed fee of [deleted]--for 
which the offeror received [deleted] points--included the cost to 
provide that subgrant/subcontract money.  TFGI also, however, 
suggested in its best and final offer (BAFO) alternative funding or 
reimbursement approaches that would allow TFGI to reduce much of its 
fee.  MSH proposed a fee of [deleted] for its part of the 
subgrant/subcontract effort, but no fee if it received payment through 
a letter of credit (LOC) arrangement.  The LOC procedure permits a 
prime contractor to obtain fast repayment from AID of the money passed 
by subgrant/subcontract.  Since the contracting officer decided to 
authorize payment by LOC, MSH's evaluated fee, for which it received 
[deleted] points, was only [deleted].  

TFGI maintains that the related portion of its fee could have been 
eliminated had AID not required the contractor to provide the 
subgrant/subcontract money.  TFGI further protests that it was not 
fair to accept a no-fee proposal from MSH.  We dismiss TFGI's 
arguments as untimely. 

As to the propriety of the requirement that the contractor provide the 
funding, our Bid Protest Regulations require that a protest of an 
apparent solicitation impropriety be filed before proposals are due.  
4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(1) (1996).  AID's RFP was clear as to the funding 
requirement.  TFGI, however, did not protest the requirement and its 
ramifications until it lost the competition.

TFGI's protest also is untimely, and for the same reason, to the 
extent it challenges AID's decision to accept MSH's no-fee proposal.  
It should have been evident to TFGI from the inclusion of the funding 
provision in the RFP and the wording of the cost evaluation criterion 
for total price--"cost plus fixed fee or cost alone if no fee were 
proposed"--that a non-profit competitor might well receive 2 full 
points under that criterion.  Moreover, the subject was addressed in 
an amendment to the RFP issued before initial proposals were due 
relaying a series of offeror-AID question and answer exchanges.  One 
potential competitor complained that the RFP provision for the cost 
evaluation criterion in issue that maximum points would be awarded to 
a proposal that did not include profit "appears to penalize for-profit 
organizations or any other organization which charges a fee as opposed 
to an organization that does not charge a fee."  AID responded that it 
believed the RFP provision reasonable.  In fact, TFGI's own business 
proposal shows that the company knew that the requirement gave 
non-profit competitors the flexibility to offer no fee for providing 
the subgrant/subcontract funds based on LOC procedures whereas 
for-profits like TFGI did not have that option.  In sum, TFGI clearly 
knew the evaluation ramifications of the subgrant/subcontract 
requirement before submitting its initial proposal.  Since TFGI waited 
until it lost the competition to protest the matter, the issue is 
untimely.[2]

TFGI also protests that in awarding TFGI only [deleted] of the 2 
points available for reasonableness of indirect cost ceilings rates, 
AID misunderstood the firm's offer in that regard.  In response, AID 
concedes that TFGI is correct, and should have received the full 2 
points.  TFGI's evaluated cost score thus should have been [deleted] 
points (instead of [deleted]), and its total score should have been 
[deleted] points (instead of [deleted]).  The protest on this issue 
therefore is academic. 

Selection

The RFP provided that the technical and cost point scores would be 
used as a guide in determining which proposal was most advantageous to 
the government, and that award would be made to the responsible 
offeror whose proposal, conforming to the solicitation, "is most 
advantageous to the government, the above technical and cost factors 
considered."  (The RFP also described the award basis as the proposal 
with combined technical and cost considerations that offered "the 
greatest value to the U.S. Government.")  TFGI protests that AID has 
not justified the decision to award to the higher cost offeror, MSH.  

TFGI further argues that without the COP-related evaluation changes 
from the first to the third round of discussions, which TFGI maintains 
were unfair based on the COP-related protest issue discussed above, 
TFGI's technical score would have been so close to MSH's (TFGI 
calculates a [deleted] difference) that award to MSH at a higher cost 
could not have been merited.  TFGI further argues that it should have 
received a higher cost evaluation score anyway, in that MSH should not 
have received [deleted] points for its no-fee proposal; MSH's 
[deleted] fee should have been considered under the 12-point total 
price evaluation criterion; and AID did not properly evaluate TFGI's 
proposal with respect to indirect cost ceilings rates.  The 
protester's calculations, taken together, yield a higher total score 
for TFGI.

We think the contracting officer did adequately justify the award to 
MSH notwithstanding the [deleted] difference between MSH's estimated 
cost and TFGI's. In selecting MSH, the contracting officer noted the 
offerors' technical, cost, and total scores, and the estimated costs 
of their proposals.  He stated that even though MSH's estimated cost 
was slightly higher than the lowest estimated cost (TFGI's), MSH's had 
been found to be the most reasonable; MSH's total fee and indirect 
cost estimates were the lowest of the competitive range offerors; and 
MSH had proposed no fee.  He concluded that despite its cost, "based 
on the strong technical showing and the foregoing analysis . . . award 
to MSH is in the best interests of the Government. . . ."  He 
continued by summarizing MSH's "key" technical advantages:

     "MSH enhanced the quality of their technical approach in the area 
     of output based financing, the vision and credentials of the 
     Chief of Party (Paul Auxila), the Corporation's plan to manage 
     its subcontractors and the internal consistency between the 
     written proposal and the COP's vision as to the principal 
     directions the project should take."

We recognize that this justification is not particularly extensive.  
Nevertheless, it does, in our view, reflect a reasoned decision that 
it was worth [deleted] to accept MSH's reasonable-cost offer in light 
of the firm's technical superiority overall, and particularly the 
capabilities of Mr. Auxila as the contractor's key person.  The source 
selection official in a negotiated procurement has broad discretion in 
determining the manner and extent to which to make use of the 
technical and cost evaluation results; cost/technical tradeoffs may be 
made, and the extent to which one may be sacrificed for the other is 
governed by the test of rationality and consistency with the 
established evaluation factors.  See Family Realty, B-247772, July 6, 
1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  6.

Moreover, we do not accept TFGI's calculations or their asserted 
ramifications.  First, we see no reason to discount the third-round 
evaluation scores for the COP-related subcriteria since, as discussed 
above, we do not believe that MSH was improperly evaluated, or that 
TFGI was misled to its prejudice, regarding the qualifications for a 
COP candidate.  Second, we have dismissed as untimely TFGI's protest 
on the LOC/no-fee issue.  Finally, although we appreciate AID's 
concession about the evaluation of indirect cost ceilings rates--so 
that TFGI's cost score should have been [deleted] rather than 
[deleted] and its total score should have been [deleted] points rather 
than [deleted], in light of MSH's higher technical and total scores 
([deleted] ); AID's satisfaction with the reasonableness of MSH's 
cost; and AID's concerns about [deleted--TFGI's third candidate], we 
see no reasonable possibility on this record that such increase would 
have led to award to TFGI.  In this respect, TFGI has not contested 
AID's assessment of [deleted--the third candidate] except to point out 
that he had long-term COP experience of the sort TFGI deemed 
necessary.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. AID reports that TFGI was awarded [deleted] points for the two 
subcriteria.  

2. It is not clear whether TFGI also is protesting AID's evaluation of 
TFGI's offer inclusive of the full fee, as opposed to accepting TFGI's 
BAFO suggestions regarding alternative funding and reimbursement 
methods.  In any event, TFGI's suggestions do not appear to reflect 
approaches accommodated by the RFP's language, so that they could not 
be accepted based on the solicitation as issued; AID's evaluation was 
consistent with the RFP provision, which TFGI should have protested 
before entering the competition, as discussed above.  Further, TFGI 
did not mention that aspect of the evaluation to our Office until well 
after it appears the company knew that the evaluated cost of its offer 
included the full proposed fee.  Our Regulations require that a 
protest of other than an apparent solicitation impropriety be filed 
within 14 days after the protester should have known its protest 
basis, 4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2)--TFGI did not meet that filing 
requirement.