BNUMBER: B-270397.2
DATE: May 16, 1996
TITLE: Matter of: The Futures Group International
**********************************************************************
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a
GAO Protective Order. This version has been redacted or approved by
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:The Futures Group International
File: B-270397.2
Date:May 16, 1996
Paul Shnitzer, Esq., and Mark D. Taylor, Esq., Crowell & Moring, for
the protester.
Alan A. Pemberton Esq., Covington & Burling, for Management Sciences
for Health, an intervenor.
Anna Chytla, Esq., Agency for International Development, for the
agency.
Jerold D. Cohen, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, GAO,
participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
1. Protest that a particular type of experience on the part of an
offeror's key contract employee was a prerequisite for award is denied
where the solicitation did not mandate such experience and where,
contrary to the protester's arguments, the agency's actions during
negotiations should not have led the protester to conclude that such
experience was mandatory and to structure its offer accordingly.
2. Protest that solicitation funding requirement and related cost
evaluation criterion were unfair is dismissed as untimely since it
concerns apparent solicitation improprieties that should have been
protested before proposals were due.
3. Protest that agency did not adequately justify selection of higher
cost offeror is denied where such offeror overall received a higher
evaluated cost score than did the protester; technical considerations
were worth four times as much as cost considerations and the awardee's
technical score was better than the protester's; and the selection
official reasonably determined that acceptance of the higher cost
offer was warranted given its technical advantages particularly with
respect to the offeror's proposed key contract employee.
DECISION
The Futures Group International (TFGI) protests the award of a
contract to Management Sciences for Health (MSH) under request for
proposals (RFP) No. 521-95-005, issued by the Agency for International
Development (AID). The solicitation sought offers for a
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to implement the Health Systems (HS) 2004
Project in Haiti. TFGI protests that the awardee's Chief of Party
(COP) lacks overseas experience as the COP of a large multisectoral
health project, which TFGI contends was a prerequisite for the award.
TFGI also protests that both MSH's and its own cost proposals were
unfairly evaluated, and that the selection of MSH's higher-cost offer
was improper.
We deny the protest.
BACKGROUND
The HS 2004 Project is intended to provide immediate support to the
government of Haiti in reestablishing and restructuring essential
health services throughout the country. The contract in issue
concerns the first of the project's two-phase approach--the contract's
objectives are to assist Haiti's Ministry of Public Health and
Population in its health reform policy efforts; support direct service
delivery; and support service to reinforce those two program
components.
Technical Evaluation
The RFP, issued on May 23, 1995, listed 13 personnel positions,
although it encouraged contractors to propose different mixes as
capabilities permitted. The first position listed was the COP/Senior
Health Administrator--the only individual specified as "key" (i.e.,
essential to the work)--who was to provide guidance and direction for
the project's implementation and for all contractor personnel; serve
as key counterpart to the Haitian Ministry Project Coordinator; and
act as contractor representative.
The RFP provided that proposals would be rated and ranked on the
specified evaluation factors, and that the offerors' technical and
cost scores would be used as guides in determining the proposal that
was the most advantageous to the government. The technical evaluation
was to constitute 80 percent of the offeror's score, and the cost
evaluation, 20 percent. Offerors were advised that cost would become
increasingly important as proposals approached technical equality, and
might be the deciding factor between proposals approximately equal in
technical merit.
The three technical evaluation factors were Quality and Responsiveness
of Proposal and Technical Approach, worth a total of 35 points;
Institutional Capabilities, worth a total of 16 points; and Personnel
Capabilities, worth a total of 29 points. The Personnel Capabilities
factor referenced the 13 listed personnel positions, and advised that
AID would evaluate the offeror's "ability to provide the anticipated
qualifications or another mix which is considered equal or better."
The two subcriteria in the Personnel Capabilities factor that
concerned the COP were:
"I. Qualifications of Senior Health Administrator, Health Policy
Advisor, the Public Sector Financial Management Advisor and the
HIS [Health Information Systems] advisor.
a. Type and number of years of relevant experience in
integrated health project implementation and the provision of
technical assistance to the public sector.
b. (for Senior Health Administrator) Type and number of years
as team leader of a large, complex, multidisciplinary technical
assistance effort in a developing country."
The first subcriterion was worth 6 points, and the second, 10 points.
AID received five proposals by the July 6 due date, which were
evaluated by a technical evaluation committee comprised of three AID
employees and two senior officials of the Haitian government. The
average scores for the proposals submitted by MSH and TFGI were,
respectively, [deleted] points--including an average of [deleted]
points for the two COP-related subcriteria; and [deleted]
points--including an average score of [deleted] for the COP-related
subcriteria. The committee's
July 16 evaluation summary states the following with respect to MSH's
proposed COP, Mr. Paul Auxila:
"While the Chief of Party has corporate management experience, he
has no long term overseas experience in managing large
multidisciplinary technical assistance teams. Furthermore, Mr.
Auxila appears to have very specialized experience in HIS, not in
general public health management. Please provide additional
information on Mr. Auxila's ability to manage large
multidisciplinary teams and further justification for why he is
an appropriate candidate for this position."
Regarding TFGI's proposed COP, [deleted], the summary states:
"The proposed candidate does not have prior experience as a Chief
of Party managing large multisectoral public health teams in
developing countries. She also has a predominant experience in
the PVO [private voluntary organization] sector, not the public
sector. The evaluation committee suggests that The Futures Group
propose a candidate who has more experience in managing
multisectoral public health teams in an overseas setting
providing technical assistance to the public sector."
The contracting officer relayed the committee's concerns verbatim to
the respective offerors on August 1.
MSH responded with additional information about Mr. Auxila's
qualifications. TFGI responded with two alternatives for COP: TFGI
would (1) revise the team structure, naming [deleted] COP, supported
by several senior health advisors, or (2) maintain the original team
structure but replace [deleted] with a candidate to be proposed later.
TFGI also stated that [deleted--the second candidate] had served as
COP for a multisectoral health project in [deleted], detailing
[deleted] contributions to that and other efforts. In this respect,
TFGI initially had proposed [deleted--the second candidate] as
Director of Management Systems, charged with overseeing the project's
major technical support systems.
The technical evaluation committee then reevaluated proposals. MSH's
average score increased to [deleted]; the committee noted that the
additional information MSH had furnished regarding Mr. Auxila did not
substantially strengthen the firm's offer with respect to the COP.
TFGI's average total score increased to [deleted], with some increase
in the scoring for the two COP-related subcriteria. The committee
rejected TFGI's offer of [deleted] as COP, however. The committee
determined that [deleted--the second candidate] was not a "SENIOR
Health Administrator" and did not have "demonstrated experience" to
meet the RFP's express personnel requirement for the COP "to provide
guidance and direction for all aspects of project implementation and
all contractor personnel, to serve as key counterpart to the [Haitian
Ministry] Project Coordinator particularly on issues of
decentralization, and to serve as contractor representative in
dealings with USAID." The committee reiterated its "desire for the
offeror to propose someone who has had previous experience as a Chief
of Party managing large multisectoral public health team in developing
countries." In subsequent messages to the two offerors, the
contracting officer did not mention the COP to MSH, and relayed the
committee's COP concern almost verbatim to TFGI.
TFGI responded to the contracting officer's communication by offering
yet another COP candidate, [deleted].
The technical evaluation committee and the contracting officer then
interviewed the offerors' COP candidates, contacted references, and
reevaluated the proposals. Based largely on an encouraging interview
with MSH's Mr. Auxila and favorable input from his references, MSH
received an average score of [deleted] points for the two COP-related
subcriteria; MSH's total technical score was [deleted] points (up from
[deleted]). The interview with TFGI's [deleted--the third candidate]
was not as encouraging, nor were the references as favorable: TFGI
received an average score of only [deleted] points for the two
COP-related subcriteria,[1] and a total score of [deleted] points
(down from [deleted]). The technical evaluation committee recommended
award to MSH.
Cost Evaluation
The RFP provided that the offeror's cost proposal would be analyzed
based on five criteria, worth a total of 20 points, and for realism
and reasonableness. The five criteria and the points available under
each were:
(1) total price (cost plus fixed fee, or cost alone if no fee
were proposed):
12 points
(2) total fee or profit, with the maximum awarded to proposals
that did not
include any profit: 2 points
(3) direct labor costs: 2 points
(4) indirect costs: 2 points
(5) acceptance of and reasonableness of indirect cost ceilings
rates:
2 points.
TFGI's cost proposal was awarded [deleted] of the 20 available points;
MSH's cost proposal received [deleted] points.
Selection
The combined technical and cost scores, and the estimated costs, for
the four competitive range offerors, were:
Offeror Tech. Score Cost Score Total Score Est. Cost
MSH [deleted] [deleted] [deleted] $44,023,001
Offeror A [deleted] [deleted] [deleted] [deleted]
TFGI [deleted] [deleted] [deleted] [deleted]
Offeror B [deleted] [deleted] [deleted] [deleted]
The contracting officer concluded that award to MSH was in the best
interests of the government.
PROTEST AND ANALYSIS
Chief of Party
TFGI protests that AID awarded the contract to an offeror that
proposed a COP candidate who did not have long-term COP experience
leading multisectoral health programs in developing countries, which
TFGI maintains was a prerequisite for award. The protester argues
that this "baseline requirement" is evidenced by AID's advice to TFGI
that the offeror had to propose a candidate with long-term COP
experience in a multisectoral technical assistance effort in a
developing country. The protester notes that AID rejected TFGI's
first candidate, [deleted], because she did not have COP experience,
and rejected TFGI's second candidate, [deleted], because he lacked
long-term experience. TFGI complains that the prerequisite "severely
constrained the search and increased the cost of the defined
candidate"; the protester further notes that its third candidate,
[deleted], met all qualifications but the offer nevertheless was
downgraded in the final evaluation with respect to the COP-related
subcriteria. In contrast, TFGI complains, not only did AID not
require that MSH's Mr. Auxila be replaced because he did not have COP
experience, but MSH's score for the COP-related subcriteria increased
throughout the evaluation.
TFGI argues:
"When, as here, an agency specifies mandatory technical features
in its RFP and then insists upon those features during
negotiations, offerors will interpret these mandatory
requirements as prerequisites that had to be met to be eligible
for any award. . . . When an agency determines to consider
proposals as acceptable even if they only comply with a portion
of the mandatory specifications, the agency should notify
offerors of this determination by written amendment. . . . The
fact that USAID did not notify TFGI of the relaxed requirement
being applied to MSH means that the competition was conducted on
an unequal basis. . . ."
AID points out that the RFP did not expressly require COP experience.
AID further maintains that the agency did not require COP experience
in the course of negotiations. AID argues:
"While the Committee indicated that prior Chief of Party
experience was desirable, it never suggested that such a
background was mandatory or required. . . . Indeed, the
Committee stated that the weakness in TFGI's proposal could be
remedied by any candidate with more overseas experience in
managing multisectoral public health teams. . . . Although such
experience is often acquired by individuals who previously worked
as Chiefs of Party, there are many other positions in the
international public health sector that could provide comparable
experience. . . ."
We do not agree with the protester that either the RFP, or AID during
negotiations, established long-term COP experience in a multisectoral
health effort in a developing country as a prerequisite for award so
that either (1) MSH's offer could not be accepted because of Mr.
Auxila's lack of experience in that regard, or
(2) TFGI was misled into responding to a more restrictive requirement
than was applied to MSH.
The RFP, by its terms, did not require the COP candidate to have the
experience in issue. Nothing in the RFP's listing of personnel
position so mandates, although the listing's preamble does require,
generally, fluency in French and/or Haitian Creole, "relevant prior
experience working in developing countries," and individuals who are
sensititive and accommodating to cultural differences and who are good
team members. Moreover, the first COP-related subcriterion, worth 6
points, identified the evaluation considerations not just with respect
to the COP, but for 4 of the 13 listed personnel positions, the
COP/Senior Health Administrator and 3 others. Offerors were advised
that the evaluation committee, in considering those four candidates,
would take into account the type and number of years of relevant
experience--no specific experience was mandated. The second
subcriterion, which focused on the COP directly, advised offerors that
the committee would consider the candidate's experience "as team
leader of a large, complex, multidisciplinary technical assistance
effort in a developing country." Neither subcriterion expresses the
mandate TFGI suggests.
With respect to the evaluation and AID's discussions with TFGI, AID
did not reject TFGI's first offered candidate, [deleted], because she
did not have a particular degree and type of COP experience; in fact,
TFGI was awarded an average of [deleted] of the 16 points available
under the two COP-related subcriteria. What the technical evaluation
committee and the contracting officer did do, however, was identify to
TFGI [deleted] weakness in terms of experience, and "suggest" that
TFGI consider nominating "a candidate who has more experience in
managing multisectoral public health teams in an overseas setting
providing technical assistance to the public sector." That type of
concern appears appropriate under the subcriteria, and there clearly
is nothing wrong in an agency's advising an offeror of proposal
weaknesses and how to improve its offer--a fundamental feature of
discussions in a negotiated acquisition. See Federal Acquisition
Regulation sec. 15.610.
Moreover, TFGI, in responding to that suggestion, could have
endeavored to show AID that the committee was misreading [deleted]
credentials, or that [deleted] in fact was a superior candidate in
terms of experience. TFGI's decision instead to substitute [deleted],
who did have COP experience, or a candidate to be named later, was the
offeror's choice, not a mandated change. While TFGI evidently read
more into the technical evaluation committee's concerns than a
suggestion about how to improve its offer, that reading is not
supported by the committee's express comments as relayed to TFGI by
the contracting officer.
The technical evaluation committee did expressly reject [deleted--the
second candidate] as a candidate. We do not, however, believe that
such rejection established a mandate for the COP experience in issue
either.
First, it appears that TFGI itself knew that [deleted] might be
unacceptable when it nominated him, despite his COP experience in
[deleted], since it advised AID that it also proposed revising the
team structure, with [deleted] being supported by several senior
health advisors; TFGI further offered, as an alternative, to replace
[deleted--the first candidate] with a to-be-named candidate.
More importantly, in rejecting [deleted--the second candidate] the
committee, in its comments as related to TFGI by the contracting
officer, essentially only found that [deleted], specifically, could
not offer the precise capabilities required by the RFP of the
COP/Senior Health Administrator: provide guidance and direction for
all aspects of the project, serve as key counterpart to the Haitian
Ministry Project Coordinator, and serve as contractor representative.
Whereas the technical evaluation committee previously had "suggested"
that TFGI "propose" a COP candidate with more public-sector related
experience than [deleted], the committee here stated its "desire" that
TFGI propose a COP candidate with previous COP experience managing a
large team. That statement, in our view, essentially was a reaction
to the nomination of an individual who was not acceptable irrespective
of his COP experience, for reasons tied directly to the solicitation's
express requirements. We think the most reasonable reading of the
statement is not that the agency was changing RFP evaluation factors
and RFP requirements, but rather that if TFGI were going to nominate
for COP an individual who had COP experience, such experience should
have been managing a large multisectoral team in a developing country.
In sum, we do not agree that AID's rejection of [deleted] established
COP experience of that sort as a prerequisite for award despite the
lack of any such requirement in the RFP itself.
Finally, we see no basis to question the relationship of the COP
evaluations to the two COP-related subcriteria. The subcriteria
focused on type and relevance of experience, pubic sector technical
assistance, and leadership capabilities with respect to complex
overseas efforts. The evaluation of Mr. Auxila--particularly the
interview and reference checks--established him as an excellent
candidate in all respects. While AID recognized that [deleted--the
third candidate] had certain highly relevant experience, the
contracting officer, who participated in the interviews, reports:
"However, several of [deleted] responses raised questions about
his management style. For example, he viewed the role of the
contractor in a dominant fashion and minimized the function of
the Haitian Ministry of Health. Some of [deleted] responses
showed that he had difficulty with understanding output based
financing even though the TFGI proposal specifically addressed
this point. Moreover, when asked about his ability resolve
conflicting situations, [deleted] provided a troubling answer.
He stated that while serving as a Chief of Party in [deleted], he
resigned from his position because he could not resolve various
disagreements with the Government of [deleted] and the USAID
Mission. Although he was the Chief of Party in charge of the
project, he repeatedly blamed others for inability to resolve
issues and did not take any personal responsibility."
One of the technical evaluators, speaking for the entire committee,
adds that [deleted] "came across as having minimized the role of the
[Haitian] Ministry of Health in implementing this project." The
evaluator states that the interview "raised certain questions
concerning his management style and his ability to handle conflict."
In addition, two AID Missions that were contacted indicated that
[deleted] "had difficulties in establishing effective working
relationships, particularly with foreign governments."
The evaluation of proposals in a negotiated procurement must be both
reasonable and in accord with the stated evaluation criteria. See
Mobility Sys. and Equip. Co., B-261072, Aug. 8, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 66.
We see no basis to object to AID's evaluation in that regard.
Cost Evaluation
Cost was worth 20 of the 100 points available in the evaluation of
proposals. For the first cost evaluation criterion--total
price--TFGI, which proposed the lowest cost, was awarded [deleted],
and MSH was awarded [deleted] points. The two offerors' scores for the
other four criteria were
Criterion Points AvailableTFGI ScoreMSH Score
Total fee/profit 2.00 [deleted] [deleted]
Direct labor costs 2.00 [deleted] [deleted]
Indirect costs 2.00 [deleted] [deleted]
Indirect cost ceiling rates 2.00 [deleted] [deleted]
Subtotal 8.00 [deleted]
[deleted]Total inclusive of price evaluation 20.00 [deleted]
[deleted]
The RFP required the contractor to provide a total of $26.1 million in
subgrants or subcontracts to health care providers to provide basic
care, and for national programs in family planning, reproductive
health, and other efforts. TFGI's proposed fee of [deleted]--for
which the offeror received [deleted] points--included the cost to
provide that subgrant/subcontract money. TFGI also, however,
suggested in its best and final offer (BAFO) alternative funding or
reimbursement approaches that would allow TFGI to reduce much of its
fee. MSH proposed a fee of [deleted] for its part of the
subgrant/subcontract effort, but no fee if it received payment through
a letter of credit (LOC) arrangement. The LOC procedure permits a
prime contractor to obtain fast repayment from AID of the money passed
by subgrant/subcontract. Since the contracting officer decided to
authorize payment by LOC, MSH's evaluated fee, for which it received
[deleted] points, was only [deleted].
TFGI maintains that the related portion of its fee could have been
eliminated had AID not required the contractor to provide the
subgrant/subcontract money. TFGI further protests that it was not
fair to accept a no-fee proposal from MSH. We dismiss TFGI's
arguments as untimely.
As to the propriety of the requirement that the contractor provide the
funding, our Bid Protest Regulations require that a protest of an
apparent solicitation impropriety be filed before proposals are due.
4 C.F.R. sec. 21.2(a)(1) (1996). AID's RFP was clear as to the funding
requirement. TFGI, however, did not protest the requirement and its
ramifications until it lost the competition.
TFGI's protest also is untimely, and for the same reason, to the
extent it challenges AID's decision to accept MSH's no-fee proposal.
It should have been evident to TFGI from the inclusion of the funding
provision in the RFP and the wording of the cost evaluation criterion
for total price--"cost plus fixed fee or cost alone if no fee were
proposed"--that a non-profit competitor might well receive 2 full
points under that criterion. Moreover, the subject was addressed in
an amendment to the RFP issued before initial proposals were due
relaying a series of offeror-AID question and answer exchanges. One
potential competitor complained that the RFP provision for the cost
evaluation criterion in issue that maximum points would be awarded to
a proposal that did not include profit "appears to penalize for-profit
organizations or any other organization which charges a fee as opposed
to an organization that does not charge a fee." AID responded that it
believed the RFP provision reasonable. In fact, TFGI's own business
proposal shows that the company knew that the requirement gave
non-profit competitors the flexibility to offer no fee for providing
the subgrant/subcontract funds based on LOC procedures whereas
for-profits like TFGI did not have that option. In sum, TFGI clearly
knew the evaluation ramifications of the subgrant/subcontract
requirement before submitting its initial proposal. Since TFGI waited
until it lost the competition to protest the matter, the issue is
untimely.[2]
TFGI also protests that in awarding TFGI only [deleted] of the 2
points available for reasonableness of indirect cost ceilings rates,
AID misunderstood the firm's offer in that regard. In response, AID
concedes that TFGI is correct, and should have received the full 2
points. TFGI's evaluated cost score thus should have been [deleted]
points (instead of [deleted]), and its total score should have been
[deleted] points (instead of [deleted]). The protest on this issue
therefore is academic.
Selection
The RFP provided that the technical and cost point scores would be
used as a guide in determining which proposal was most advantageous to
the government, and that award would be made to the responsible
offeror whose proposal, conforming to the solicitation, "is most
advantageous to the government, the above technical and cost factors
considered." (The RFP also described the award basis as the proposal
with combined technical and cost considerations that offered "the
greatest value to the U.S. Government.") TFGI protests that AID has
not justified the decision to award to the higher cost offeror, MSH.
TFGI further argues that without the COP-related evaluation changes
from the first to the third round of discussions, which TFGI maintains
were unfair based on the COP-related protest issue discussed above,
TFGI's technical score would have been so close to MSH's (TFGI
calculates a [deleted] difference) that award to MSH at a higher cost
could not have been merited. TFGI further argues that it should have
received a higher cost evaluation score anyway, in that MSH should not
have received [deleted] points for its no-fee proposal; MSH's
[deleted] fee should have been considered under the 12-point total
price evaluation criterion; and AID did not properly evaluate TFGI's
proposal with respect to indirect cost ceilings rates. The
protester's calculations, taken together, yield a higher total score
for TFGI.
We think the contracting officer did adequately justify the award to
MSH notwithstanding the [deleted] difference between MSH's estimated
cost and TFGI's. In selecting MSH, the contracting officer noted the
offerors' technical, cost, and total scores, and the estimated costs
of their proposals. He stated that even though MSH's estimated cost
was slightly higher than the lowest estimated cost (TFGI's), MSH's had
been found to be the most reasonable; MSH's total fee and indirect
cost estimates were the lowest of the competitive range offerors; and
MSH had proposed no fee. He concluded that despite its cost, "based
on the strong technical showing and the foregoing analysis . . . award
to MSH is in the best interests of the Government. . . ." He
continued by summarizing MSH's "key" technical advantages:
"MSH enhanced the quality of their technical approach in the area
of output based financing, the vision and credentials of the
Chief of Party (Paul Auxila), the Corporation's plan to manage
its subcontractors and the internal consistency between the
written proposal and the COP's vision as to the principal
directions the project should take."
We recognize that this justification is not particularly extensive.
Nevertheless, it does, in our view, reflect a reasoned decision that
it was worth [deleted] to accept MSH's reasonable-cost offer in light
of the firm's technical superiority overall, and particularly the
capabilities of Mr. Auxila as the contractor's key person. The source
selection official in a negotiated procurement has broad discretion in
determining the manner and extent to which to make use of the
technical and cost evaluation results; cost/technical tradeoffs may be
made, and the extent to which one may be sacrificed for the other is
governed by the test of rationality and consistency with the
established evaluation factors. See Family Realty, B-247772, July 6,
1992, 92-2 CPD para. 6.
Moreover, we do not accept TFGI's calculations or their asserted
ramifications. First, we see no reason to discount the third-round
evaluation scores for the COP-related subcriteria since, as discussed
above, we do not believe that MSH was improperly evaluated, or that
TFGI was misled to its prejudice, regarding the qualifications for a
COP candidate. Second, we have dismissed as untimely TFGI's protest
on the LOC/no-fee issue. Finally, although we appreciate AID's
concession about the evaluation of indirect cost ceilings rates--so
that TFGI's cost score should have been [deleted] rather than
[deleted] and its total score should have been [deleted] points rather
than [deleted], in light of MSH's higher technical and total scores
([deleted] ); AID's satisfaction with the reasonableness of MSH's
cost; and AID's concerns about [deleted--TFGI's third candidate], we
see no reasonable possibility on this record that such increase would
have led to award to TFGI. In this respect, TFGI has not contested
AID's assessment of [deleted--the third candidate] except to point out
that he had long-term COP experience of the sort TFGI deemed
necessary.
The protest is denied.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. AID reports that TFGI was awarded [deleted] points for the two
subcriteria.
2. It is not clear whether TFGI also is protesting AID's evaluation of
TFGI's offer inclusive of the full fee, as opposed to accepting TFGI's
BAFO suggestions regarding alternative funding and reimbursement
methods. In any event, TFGI's suggestions do not appear to reflect
approaches accommodated by the RFP's language, so that they could not
be accepted based on the solicitation as issued; AID's evaluation was
consistent with the RFP provision, which TFGI should have protested
before entering the competition, as discussed above. Further, TFGI
did not mention that aspect of the evaluation to our Office until well
after it appears the company knew that the evaluated cost of its offer
included the full proposed fee. Our Regulations require that a
protest of other than an apparent solicitation impropriety be filed
within 14 days after the protester should have known its protest
basis, 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.2(a)(2)--TFGI did not meet that filing
requirement.