BNUMBER:  B-270160.2
DATE:  April 10, 1996
TITLE:  SC&A, Inc.

**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:SC&A, Inc.

File:     B-270160.2

Date:April 10, 1996

Timothy B. Harris, Esq., and Donald G. Gavin, Esq., Wickwire Gavin, 
P.C., for SC&A, Inc., the protester.
David S. Cohen, Esq., and Carrie B. Mann, Esq., Cohen & White, for 
A.T. Kearney, Inc., the intervenor.
L. Carol Roberson, Esq., Environmental Protection Agency, for the 
agency.
Christine F. Davis, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of 
the General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the 
decision.

DIGEST

1.  Agency reasonably downgraded the protester's proposal for 
informational weaknesses stemming from a disorganized proposal format.

2.  Agency properly determined that the awardee can successfully avoid 
a potential organizational conflict of interest posed by one of its 
[DELETED] subcontractors because it reasonably found that the awardee 
could perform the limited amount of work involved without using the 
subcontractor's staff.

DECISION

SC&A, Inc. protests the award of a contract to A.T. Kearney, Inc. 
(ATK) under request for proposals (RFP) No. D400941M1, issued by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to obtain support for various 
radiation-related programs.

We deny the protest.

The RFP, issued on April 20, 1995, contemplated a cost-plus-fixed-fee, 
level-of-effort contract for 1 base year with 4 option years.  The RFP 
estimated that the government would order between 70,000 and 100,000 
direct labor hours per year.

The RFP identified various radiation-related programs for which 
technical support was sought, including:  (1) the oversight of the 
Department of Energy's (DOE) management of the Waste Isolation Pilot 
Plant (WIPP), a potential transuranic radioactive waste repository in 
southeastern New Mexico; (2) the development of radiation clean-up 
standards (the regulations and implementing guidance) applicable to 
contaminated Superfund sites; (3) the development of waste management 
regulations covering the disposal of radioactive waste generated 
during site remediation; and (4) the support of "other radiation 
programs" under a variety of environmental statutes.

The RFP statement of work (SOW) established 22 areas of technical 
support, calling for technical support that could be applied to one or 
more radiation programs.  The SOW did not designate precise tasks for 
the contractor to perform for any program, but provided that the 
contracting officer would issue work assignments designating the tasks 
during contract performance.  The RFP did not estimate the number of 
labor hours that the government might order with respect to any 
particular radiation program or any SOW technical support area.

The RFP stated a "best value" evaluation scheme, in which technical 
quality was more important than cost.  The cost evaluation included 
options and considered cost realism.  The RFP set forth the following 
technical evaluation matrix:

(1)  Overall Company Experience--10 points

(2)  Staff Qualifications, Experience and Availability--45 points

   (a)  Senior Health Physicists, Nuclear and Environmental 
   Engineers--5 points
   (b)  Project Manager--5 points
   (c)  Senior Technical Personnel with Policy, Economic or Legal 
Skills--5 points
   (d)  Experience Developing Environmental Rules, Managing 
Dockets--10 points
   (e)  Experience in Micro and Macro Economic Theory--2.5 points
   (f)  Ability to Support Public Outreach Programs--2.5 points
   (g)  Experience in Radiation and Environmental Measurements--2.5 
points
   (h)  Analytical Capability, Ability to Perform Quality Assurance 
Tests--5 points
   (i)  Experience in Arranging Public Meetings, Hearings and 
Forums--2.5 points
   (j)  Continuous Availability of Key Personnel--5 points

(3)  Management Plan--15 points

   (a)  Organizational Structure and Staffing Procedures--10 points
   (b)  Resource Allocation, Scheduling, Reporting Methods, Quality 
   Control, Conflict of Interest, Contingency Plans and Liaison with 
   EPA--5 points

(4)  Technical Approach--25 points

(5)  Participation in EPA's Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) Mentor 
Program--5 points

Like the SOW technical support areas, the technical evaluation 
criteria were designed to evaluate skills and resources that could be 
applied to one or more radiation programs specified by the RFP.

The RFP also provided that EPA would evaluate proposals to determine 
the potential for organizational conflicts of interest on the part of 
offerors or proposed subcontractors, and advised that an offeror or 
proposed subcontractor involved in certain specified business 
activities might have a significant conflict that could prevent award.  
One of these activities was Superfund Response Action Contractor (RAC) 
work.  A RAC contractor, as defined by the RFP, performs clean-up 
actions at Superfund sites on the National Priority List, which are 
contaminated with radioactive waste.  This organizational conflict of 
interest provision was intended to preclude a contractor charged with 
cleaning up radiation-contaminated Superfund sites from developing the 
clean-up standards to which it would be subject.  The RFP required 
offerors and their proposed subcontractors to submit disclosure 
statements, which were to describe whether the firm, its affiliates, 
or subsidiaries had an actual or potential conflict of interest and, 
if so, how such conflicts could be avoided, mitigated, or neutralized.  
If the contracting officer found that an offeror's ability to produce 
unbiased work would be unavoidably compromised by its own or a 
subcontractor's corporate activities, the RFP provided for the 
rejection of the offeror's proposal.

This RFP is for a contract to supplement another radiation support 
services contract, which was awarded to the protester on August 24, 
1992, for a base year plus 4 option years.  The base year and first 
option year under the instant RFP overlap with the final 2 option 
years under SC&A's contract.  Pursuant to its contract, SC&A has 
supported the same, major radiation programs specified by the instant 
RFP, including the development of radiation clean-up standards 
applicable to Superfund sites.

SC&A and ATK submitted proposals on May 30, 1995.  Both proposed a 
team of [DELETED] subcontractors.[1]  One of ATK's proposed 
subcontractors was ICF, Inc., an affiliate of ICF Kaiser Engineering 
Group.  ICF Kaiser is a RAC, which provides radioactive clean-up 
assistance at various DOE sites where the radiation clean-up standards 
will apply.  Although ICF, Inc. does not itself perform RAC work, in 
1993, EPA determined, in connection with SC&A's current radiation 
support services contract where ICF was a subcontractor, that ICF was 
a RAC owing to its affiliation with ICF Kaiser.  Upon concluding that 
ICF was a RAC and that SC&A could not mitigate the conflict presented, 
EPA obtained a new contractor, The Cadmus Group, to perform the policy 
aspects of the work for which ICF had been proposed.  SC&A continued 
to perform the technical aspects of the work.  SC&A did not propose 
ICF as part of its subcontracting team for this procurement.  
[DELETED]

ATK's and SC&A's proposals were evaluated by a technical evaluation 
panel (TEP) and included in the competitive range.  Discussions were 
conducted.  Because ATK appeared to be "very reliant" on ICF in a 
discipline relevant to regulatory work [DELETED], the agency asked ATK 
during discussions what it would do if ICF were precluded from 
performing this work.  [DELETED]

The agency received BAFOs on September 22, 1995.  SC&A's BAFO cost was 
$26,683,485 and ATK's BAFO cost was $29,270,386.  SC&A's BAFO cost was 
about $2.6 million, or 9 percent, less than ATK's BAFO; 12.7 percent 
less than the government estimate of $30,576,060; and 21 percent less 
than SC&A's initial proposal cost of $33,784,337.    

ATK's technical proposal received a score of 89 out of 100 points, and 
SC&A's proposal received a score of 73.75 points.  The 15.25-point 
differential was primarily under the 45-point staff qualifications, 
experience and availability factor, where ATK's proposal received 42 
points and SC&A's proposal received 32.75 points.  The TEP found that 
ATK's "assembled team has excellent technical experience and 
capabilities to support the contract" and rated its staff superior to 
SC&A's under 8 of the 10 evaluated subfactors and equivalent to SC&A's 
under 2 of the 10 evaluated subfactors.  Although SC&A's proposed 
staff was considered at least adequate in all subfactors, it never 
received the maximum number of points under any subfactor, whereas 
ATK's proposal received a perfect score under 6 subfactors.  ATK's 
proposal also received higher scores under the 15-point management 
plan factor (12 points compared to SC&A's 10 points), the 25-point 
technical approach factor (22.5 points compared to SC&A's 20 points), 
and the 5-point SDB mentor program factor (4.5 points compared to 
SC&A's 3 points).  Both proposals received 8 out of 10 points for 
overall company experience.  

The source selection official (SSO) adopted the TEP's technical 
findings.  Because of ATK's clear superiority under the staff 
qualifications, experience, and availability factor, as well as its 
stronger management plan, technical approach, and commitment to the 
SDB mentor program, the SSO determined that the technical merit 
associated with ATK's proposal was "well worth" the $2.6 million cost 
premium.  EPA also noted that SC&A had dramatically decreased its BAFO 
costs by reallocating labor hours from the higher-paid to lower-paid 
individuals within each labor category, which EPA found increased the 
likelihood of either poor performance or cost overruns.  Although 
SC&A's cost proposal was considered less realistic than ATK's, the 
agency did not project SC&A's probable cost or rescore its technical 
proposal, since ATK's technical superiority was found to justify the 
$2.6 million cost premium.

When it became apparent that ATK's proposal represented the best 
value, the TEP and contracting officer evaluated its proposal for 
possible organizational conflicts of interest, in particular ATK's use 
of ICF, which EPA considered to be a RAC.  At that time, the radiation 
clean-up regulations, developed by SC&A and Cadmus, were essentially 
complete and were soon to be submitted to the Office of Management and 
Budget.  Because the agency "anticipated that further work on this 
regulation will continue to be supported by Cadmus and SC&A in their 
respective areas," the contracting officer and TEP determined that 
ICF's RAC status did not preclude award.  The contracting officer and 
TEP also concluded that, "[i]f, however, ATK were tasked with a work 
assignment to develop further cleanup regulations," ATK was not so 
dependent on ICF as to preclude award.

SC&A takes issue with numerous aspects of its technical evaluation.  
SC&A first contends that the TEP unfairly penalized its proposal based 
upon the erroneous finding that it failed to comply with the RFP 
proposal preparation instructions.  SC&A only specifically discusses 
two areas of its proposal that were allegedly misevaluated in this 
manner, namely, its overall company experience and the qualifications 
of its nuclear engineering staff.
 
The offeror has the burden of submitting an adequately written 
proposal, and an offeror's mere disagreement with the agency's 
judgment concerning the adequacy of the proposal is not sufficient to 
establish that the agency acted unreasonably.  Caldwell Consulting 
Assocs., B-242767; B-242767.2, June 5, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  530; Complere, 
Inc., B-227832, Sept. 15, 1987, 87-2 CPD  para.  254.  Here, SC&A 
demonstrated its staff's qualifications and experience through 
individual resumes and two matrices, but, unlike ATK, the protester 
provided virtually no supporting narrative to synthesize this 
information.  Similarly, under the overall company experience factor, 
SC&A presented project descriptions through matrices and synopses, 
instead of discussing relevant, detailed examples of its experience 
according to SOW tasks and RFP programs, as did ATK.  Although SC&A is 
correct that its proposal format did not violate the proposal 
preparation instructions, it did not enable the TEP to discern all 
that it needed to know to award the maximum points.  Under the 
circumstances, the TEP could reasonably downgrade the protester's 
proposal for the informational weaknesses stemming from SC&A's 
disorganized and superficial presentation.  See Cleveland 
Telecommunications Corp., 73 Comp. Gen. 303 (1994), 94-2 CPD  para.  105.

In any event, notwithstanding its proposal format, SC&A still received 
8 out of 10 points for overall company experience, which represented a 
"good proposal with some superior features."  Although the protester 
claims that the TEP underrated its radiological experience, which the 
protester addressed by summarizing 50 projects, EPA reasonably 
determined that the summaries lacked the detailed information 
necessary for the TEP to find the proposal superior in this area.  

Likewise, although the protester claims that the TEP disregarded 
evidence of nuclear engineering experience in various personnel 
resumes, the resumes do not establish the required professional 
experience in any depth or detail.  Notwithstanding the protester's 
claim that the TEP should have assumed the required experience because 
its nuclear engineers are employed under SC&A's current radiation 
support services contract, we note that SC&A did not reference this 
contract in its resumes and that, even if the TEP knew that the 
individuals were so employed, it had no legal or factual basis to 
speculate as to what their responsibilities might have been.  See 
Premier Cleaning Sys., Inc., B-255815, Apr. 6, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  241.  
In our view, SC&A's rating under the relevant subfactor (4 out of 5 
points for senior health physicists, nuclear and environmental 
engineers) was reasonable.

SC&A alleges that the TEP misevaluated the experience, qualifications 
andavailability of its proposed project manager.  The proposed project 
manager is also the deputy project manager under SC&A's current 
radiation support services contract.  In this capacity, he has managed 
22 WIPP-related work assignments, involving a total of 34,000 labor 
hours and $2.5 million in costs.  The TEP considered this contract 
management experience to be relatively minimal in relation to the 
financial and personnel demands of this substantially larger contract, 
although it acknowledged the proposed individual's good corporate 
management experience and strong technical skills.  Overall, this 
resulted in a score of 3.5 out of 5 points under the project manager 
subfactor, representing an "adequate proposal with some good 
features."  The protester has offered no persuasive objection to the 
TEP's rating, except to reiterate that the proposed individual had 
significant corporate management experience.  While this experience 
was considered, it was not viewed as interchangeable with contract 
management experience, a conclusion that we find reasonable in the 
absence of any reasoned objection by the protester.  See DAE Corp., 
Ltd., B-257185, Sept. 6, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  95.

The TEP also considered the proposed project manager's availability 
under the continuous availability of key personnel subfactor, where 
SC&A's proposal earned 3 out of 5 points, representing an "adequate" 
rating.  In its proposal, SC&A represented that its proposed project 
manager would make 90 percent of his time available to support the 
instant contract.  SC&A never explained how the proposed project 
manager would fulfill such a commitment in light of his role as deputy 
project manager under SC&A's ongoing radiation support services 
contract, despite receiving a discussion question on this matter.  
SC&A claims that it was not required to address this issue because the 
instant contract "will subsume the work that could have been performed 
under the two remaining option years of SC&A's current contract."  The 
protester has offered no evidence to support this proposition; indeed, 
SC&A knew months before it submitted its BAFO that EPA had exercised 
the third option of its current contract, extending performance 
through May 1996.  Given SC&A's failure to address how its proposed 
project manager would divide his time between the overlapping 
contracts, we think that the TEP could reasonably downgrade its 
proposal under the continuous availability of key personnel subfactor.

The protester next claims that the TEP improperly penalized its 
proposal for offering to use subcontractor staff to perform those 
policy, legal, and economic aspects of the contract work where SC&A's 
in-house capabilities were weak.  SC&A essentially argues that the TEP 
should have attached little significance to weaknesses arising from 
such use of subcontractors because less than 23 percent of the 
contract work will involve policy, legal, or economic analysis.  We 
disagree.  

First, the protester has no way of knowing how much policy, legal, or 
economic work will be required under this task order contract because 
this was not estimated in the RFP.  Second, even if EPA ultimately 
orders minimal work in these areas, it is entitled to have confidence 
in its contractor's ability to perform that work.  In this case, 
SC&A's economic subcontractors had potential organizational conflicts 
of interest and SC&A did not adequately explain how it would perform 
the work should such conflicts arise.  This weakness reasonably caused 
the protester's proposal to receive 1.5 out of 2.5 points (an 
"adequate" rating) under the micro and macro economic theory 
experience subfactor.  In a similar vein, SC&A proposed to use 
subcontractor staff as task managers under the senior technical 
personnel with policy, economic, or legal skills subfactor--an 
arrangement that the TEP considered questionable because EPA can only 
communicate directly with prime contractor staff.  The TEP reasonably 
assigned an "adequate" rating (3 out of 5 points) under the applicable 
subfactor to reflect this weakness and other informational weaknesses.

Finally, in its initial protest, SC&A challenged its technical 
evaluation for a variety of additional reasons, to which the agency 
report fully responded.  In its comments, SC&A never substantively 
responded to the agency's explanations, although it stated that its 
failure to respond did not constitute an abandonment of any protest 
ground.  We have reviewed each of these contentions and find them 
without merit.  See J&J Maintenance, Inc., B-244366.2, Mar. 7, 1994, 
94-1 CPD  para.  177; MAR, Inc., B-246889, Apr. 14, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  367.

The evaluation of proposals is a matter within the discretion of the 
contracting agency.  Our Office will only question the agency's 
evaluation where it lacks a reasonable basis or conflicts with the 
stated evaluation criteria for award.  General Servs. Eng'g, Inc., 
B-245458, Jan. 9, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  44.  Here, as described above, we 
find no basis for concluding that the evaluation was unreasonable.  

SC&A also challenges the propriety of the cost/technical tradeoff, 
arguing that its proposal was technically superior to ATK's or at 
least not so technically inferior as to justify the cost premium 
associated with selecting ATK's proposal.  

Other than the specific contentions discussed above, SC&A has cited no 
evidence to support its allegation that its proposal should have been 
rated technically superior to ATK's.  As also discussed above, we find 
reasonable the TEP's evaluation, on which the SSO based his 
determination that ATK's proposal was significantly technically 
superior.  The SSO, finding that ATK was clearly superior in terms of 
staff qualifications, experience, availability, and other factors, 
determined that the difference in technical merit between the two 
proposals was significant enough to justify the payment of the 
associated cost premium, even assuming SC&A's ability to perform in 
accordance with its proposed costs, which was questioned.[2]  Agency 
officials have broad discretion in determining the manner and extent 
to which they will make use of the technical and cost evaluation 
results; cost/technical tradeoffs may be made subject only to the test 
of rationality and consistency with the established evaluation 
factors.  Institute of Modern Procedures, Inc., B-236964, Jan. 23, 
1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  93.  A protester's mere disagreement with the 
agency's judgment does not render that judgment unreasonable.  Systems 
& Processes Eng'g Corp., B-234142, May 10, 1989, 89-1 CPD  para.  441. We 
see nothing on this record which establishes that the tradeoff 
decision here was other than reasonable.

SC&A next protests that ATK is ineligible for award because ATK's 
subcontractor ICF has a significant organizational conflict of 
interest that can not be mitigated or avoided.  SC&A observes that ICF 
is a RAC contractor and therefore cannot support EPA's radiation 
clean-up standards.  The protester argues that ATK's inability to use 
ICF to support the standards presents an incurable conflict that 
should have precluded award to ATK.[3]

Contracting officials are to avoid, neutralize, or mitigate 
significant potential conflicts of interest so as to prevent unfair 
competitive advantages or conflicting roles that could impair a 
contractor's objectivity.  Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  
9.504(a), 9.505.  Because conflicts may arise in factual situations 
not expressly described in the relevant FAR sections, the regulation 
advises contracting officers to examine each situation individually 
and to exercise "common sense, good judgment, and sound discretion" in 
assessing whether a significant potential conflict exists and in 
developing an appropriate way to resolve it.  FAR  sec.  9.505.  Inasmuch 
as the contracting agency has discretion to determine whether an 
actual or apparent conflict of interest will arise, and to what extent 
a firm should be excluded from the competition, we will not overturn 
the agency's determination unless it is shown to be unreasonable.  See 
Aetna Gov't Health Plans, Inc.; Foundation Health Fed. Servs., Inc.; 
B-254397.15 et al., July 27, 1995, 74 Comp. Gen.     , 95-2 CPD  para.  129; 
Meridian Corp., B-246330.4, Sept. 7, 1993, 93-2 CPD  para.  129.  

The record reflects that ICF's only significant conflict of interest 
concerned radiation clean-up standards, one of the several programs 
covered by the RFP.  At the time of the cost/technical tradeoff, the 
contracting officer knew that EPA would obtain support in developing 
and implementing the radiation clean-up standards predominantly 
through SC&A's and Cadmus's contracts.  The contracting officer found 
that this would substantially mitigate the potential for any conflict 
of interest arising from ICF's RAC status.  The contracting officer 
further found that, in the event ATK received a work assignment 
relating to the clean-up standards, ATK and its remaining [DELETED] 
subcontractors would have sufficient expertise to successfully perform 
any work assignment in support of this radiation program without using 
ICF.  Although EPA initially questioned ATK's dependence on ICF staff 
in one technical support area relevant to regulatory work [DELETED], 
ATK's BAFO response showed that its staff of 47 [DELETED] analysts 
included only [DELETED] ICF members, none of whom was needed to serve 
in a key personnel position.  Thus, the contracting officer determined 
that "there was sufficient depth of experience represented by ATK and 
its entire team of proposed subcontractors to adequately perform the 
work in every SOW area without requiring any unique skills resident 
only in [ICF]."  Based on our review of the record, we find reasonable 
EPA's determination that the potential organizational conflict of 
interest posed by ICF could be avoided and was not a bar to an award 
based on ATK's proposal.[4]

SC&A finally protests that the award is invalid because, at the time 
of the BAFO evaluation, the agency knew that a major RFP program--the 
development of the radiation clean-up standards--would not be 
supported via the instant contract and that the RAC conflict of 
interest restriction associated with that program would not be 
enforced.  That being the case, SC&A claims that EPA should have 
amended the solicitation by deleting the obsolete program, 
recalculating the solicited level of effort in light of the program's 
elimination, and removing the associated RAC conflict of interest 
restriction.  See FAR  sec.  15.606(a).  

EPA responds that its requirements have not changed.  The agency 
advises that, although SC&A and Cadmus have substantially developed 
the radiation clean-up regulations, EPA may require support from ATK 
under this contract to implement the regulations, which will include 
such work as evaluating public and agency comments and developing the 
implementing guidance.  The agency advises that "there are no 
guarantees" that the implementation work will be completed within the 
time remaining under SC&A's or Cadmus's respective contracts, which is 
why "the requirement for technical support in the implementation of 
the regulation . . . is still included in the [ATK] contract."

While it appears that less work relating to the radiation clean-up 
regulations may be assigned to this contract than the RFP suggests, we 
cannot find that EPA was required to amend the RFP and obtain revised 
proposals for this reason.  In this regard, we note that the RFP did 
not describe precise tasks to be performed; did not guarantee that EPA 
would issue work assignments for the radiation clean-up standards; did 
not estimate the number of hours that the agency may order with 
respect to any program; and did not define the evaluation criteria in 
terms of particular programs, but in terms of broadly applicable 
technical skills.  Moreover, EPA reports that it anticipates that the 
same total level of effort stated in the RFP will be ordered.  In any 
case, the record does not support SC&A's suggestion that it was 
somehow prejudiced by EPA's failure to amend the RFP.[5] 

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States
f:\projects\pl\2701602r.wp5

1. Contrary to SC&A's allegation, ATK did not eliminate one of its 
subcontractors in its best and final offer (BAFO).

2. SC&A also challenges EPA's conclusion that its cost proposal was 
less realistic than ATK's.  SC&A's counsel received the Source 
Selection Document, which discloses this cost evaluation issue, on 
November 22, 1995, but did not raise the issue until filing report 
comments on December 19.  SC&A's initial protest of the cost/technical 
tradeoff, which is confined to the allegation that EPA misjudged the 
relative technical merit of the two proposals, does not encompass 
SC&A's subsequent challenge to its cost evaluation.  To raise this new 
and independent cost evaluation issue, SC&A was required to protest by 
December 6.  Since it did not, the issue is untimely and will not be 
considered.  See Bid Protest Regulations, section 21.2(a)(2), 60 Fed. 
Reg. 40,737, 40,740 (Aug. 10, 1995)(to be codified at 4 C.F.R.  sec.  
21.2(a)(2)); Metrica, Inc., B-270086; B-270086.2, Feb. 8, 1996, 96-1 
CPD  para.  135.

3. Counsel for SC&A received ATK's and its proposed subcontractors' 
proposals, including conflict of interest disclosures, on December 4, 
1995.  Two days later, on December 6, SC&A filed a supplemental 
protest regarding ICF's alleged conflict of interest.  In the protest, 
SC&A's counsel advised that "counsel has not completed review of the 
[conflict of interest] disclosures. . . .  It is clear that in the 
event it is discovered that there are material misrepresentations 
and/or omissions in [ATK's] proposal (including that of its 
subcontractors), SC&A has 14 days" from the December 4 document 
production to file a protest.  On January 18, in its comments to the 
supplemental agency report, SC&A protested that EPA misevaluated the 
conflict of interest disclosures of ATK and [DELETED] other 
subcontractors.  These additional conflict of interest allegations 
should have been raised by December 18 to be considered timely.  Bid 
Protest Regulations, section 21.2(a)(2), supra.

4. The record in this case is virtually bereft of contemporaneous 
documentation on any organizational conflict of interest issue.  The 
contracting officer did not document her findings on the assumption 
that such findings need be documented only where a significant 
conflict precludes award.  The contracting officer is mistaken.  FAR  sec.  
9.504(d) requires a contracting officer to document her findings "when 
a substantive issue concerning potential organizational conflict of 
interest exists."  In our view, the significance of ICF's RAC status 
and the agency's anticipated need for support in the pertinent RFP 
program was a "substantive issue" that should have been documented.  

5. SC&A has submitted an affidavit from its president, stating that, 
but for the RAC restriction, SC&A "would have considered using its 
prior subcontractor [ICF]" and "would have also considered including 
as team members certain companies [that] . . . possess outstanding 
credentials in radioactive waste clean-up."  SC&A does not state that 
it would use a different set of subcontractors if the RAC restriction 
were lifted, nor has it shown how a new subcontracting team would 
improve its proposal.  For example, it is not apparent how the use of 
subcontractors with outstanding credentials in radioactive waste 
clean-up would strengthen SC&A's proposal, if EPA does not intend to 
acquire support for the radiation clean-up standards, as alleged.  
Also, the weaknesses in SC&A's proposal were not attributable to its 
subcontracting team, which the TEP considered "very good," but were 
attributable to SC&A as a prime contractor.  These weaknesses, as well 
as various informational weaknesses in SC&A's proposal, would not 
change regardless of which subcontractors SC&A proposed.  See, e.g., 
Hughes Georgia, Inc., B-244936, B-244936.2, Nov. 13, 1991, 91-2 CPD  para.  
457.