BNUMBER:  B-266251
DATE:  May 13, 1996
TITLE:  Dr. Jamshid Jamshidian-Waiver-Expenses of Extra Local Move
Incident to a Permanent Change of Station

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Matter of:Dr. Jamshid Jamshidian-Waiver-Expenses of Extra Local Move 
          Incident to a Permanent Change of Station

File:     B-266251

Date:May 13, 1996

DIGEST

1.  Debts based on excess costs incurred in the shipment of an 
employee's household goods are generally not subject to waiver since 
the costs are not erroneous.  Although waiver may be granted in some 
limited circumstances where employee can demonstrate that excess 
charges resulted from the erroneous authorization of agency officials, 
such circumstances are not present in this case.  Employee's waiver 
request is denied.

2.  The government's liability for the cost of transporting household 
goods incident to a permanent change of station is limited to the 
constructive cost of transporting the property in one lot by the most 
economical route from the last official station of the transferring 
employee to the new official station, not to exceed 18,000 pounds, the 
authorized weight limit.  Thus, the total cost of an extra local move 
is chargeable to the employee if the net weight of the goods shipped 
from old station to new station equaled or exceeded 18,000 pounds.  If 
total weight of the goods, including weight of local move, did not 
equal or exceed the 18,000 pound limit, then employee is liable only 
for any excess costs above the constructive cost of transporting the 
property in one lot by most economical route from the employee's 
personal residence near his last official station to his residence 
near his new official station.

DECISION

Dr. Jamshid Jamshidian, an employee of the Veterans Administration, 
appeals our Claims settlement certificate[1] denying his claim for 
waiver of his debt to the United States in the amount of $704.75 
arising from an extra local shipment of household goods, incident to a 
permanent change of station in September 1994.  For the reasons stated 
below, waiver is denied.

BACKGROUND

In September 1994, Dr. Jamshid Jamshidian was transferred from the 
Veteran's Administration (VA) Medical Center in Los Angeles, 
California, to the VA Medical and Regional Office Center in Wichita, 
Kansas.  In connection with his transfer, he shipped his household 
goods from his residence in Los Angeles, California, to his new 
residence near the VA Medical Center in Wichita, Kansas.  On August 
30, 1994, prior to his transfer, Dr. Jamshidian was briefed by the 
relocation coordinator for the VA Medical Center in Los Angeles 
concerning the agency's policy on movement of household goods.  
According to the coordinator, Dr. Jamshidian telephoned her prior to 
the move scheduled for Thursday, September 15, 1994, to ask if the 
moving company could drop off a couch and a couple of boxes belonging 
to his daughter at a nearby location in Westwood, California, prior to 
delivery of his remaining household goods to Wichita, Kansas.  The 
coordinator called the moving company who responded that the 
transportation of a couch and a couple of boxes could be handled as an 
"extra drop at origin" without incurring any additional cost.  In a 
memorandum dated October 21, 1994, the coordinator stated that she 
therefore had agreed to Dr. Jamshidian's request and then had 
telephoned him to relay this information.

According to agency officials,[2] Dr. Jamshidian subsequently and 
unilaterally changed two elements of the understanding between himself 
and Ms. Jackson:  (1) he changed the move date from Thursday, 
September 15, 1994, to Saturday, September 17, 1994, a nonworking day 
for agency relocation officials; and (2) he changed the number and 
types of goods to be transported locally from a previously authorized 
couch and a couple of boxes to include the following:  two barrels (or 
dish packs or drums), five cartons less than 3 cubic feet, five 
3-cubic foot cartons, three 4ï¿½ cubic foot cartons, two mattresses, and 
one corrugated container.  Since the change in the number of goods to 
be packed and transported involved more time and labor on the part of 
the movers, they changed the category from "extra drop at origin," a 
category causing no additional costs, to "local move," a category that 
resulted in additional charges of $704.75.  Because the date was 
changed from Thursday to Saturday, a nonworking day for agency 
relocation officials, neither the movers nor Dr. Jamshidian were able 
to contact agency officials regarding the local movement of the extra 
goods prior to the actual move taking place.

Upon completion of the shipment, the VA paid the carrier for the 
shipment, including $704.75 for the extra local move.  Thereupon, the 
VA attempted to collect the cost of the local move from Dr. Jamshidian 
who disputed the claim on the basis that:  (1) this amount is owed by 
the government to the carrier; or (2) the amount should be absorbed by 
the carrier who should not have transported the goods.  On April 4, 
1995, the Department of Veteran's Affairs' Committee on Waivers and 
Compromises denied Dr. Jamshidian's request that the debt be waived 
since, by changing the date of the move and increasing the amount of 
goods in the local move, Dr. Jamshidian had not followed the prior 
agreement made with VA officials and was at fault.

Dr. Jamshidian appealed the agency's decision to this Office which 
also denied his request for waiver because there was no indication 
that the debt was caused by government error, a prerequisite for a 
waiver.  Dr. Jamshidian now appeals from the Claims settlement 
certificate contending again that he is not responsible for the debt.  
According to Dr. Jamshidian, VA officials authorized the local move 
and are thus responsible for the debt or, in the alternative, the 
carriers were at fault for moving unauthorized goods and should bear 
the cost.

ANALYSIS

The authority for the transportation of household goods at government 
expense pursuant to a transfer of an employee is contained at 5 U.S.C.  sec.  
5724(a)(2) (1994).  The term "household goods" is defined in the 
Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) as all personal property associated 
with the home and all personal effects belonging to an employee and 
the immediate family when shipment or storage begins which can be 
legally accepted and transported as household goods by an authorized 
commercial carrier.[3]  The authorized weight limit that may be 
transported or stored at government expense is 18,000 pounds.[4]

Matters involving transportation costs follow a long-standing practice 
of the government in arranging transportation of employees' and 
service members' household goods incident to transfers of duty 
stations.  The government contracts with commercial carriers using 
government bills of lading (GBL).  Upon completion of the shipment, 
the government pays the carrier and collects any excess charges from 
the member or employee for exceeding his or her authorized weight 
allowance or for extra services.[5]

Dr. Jamshidian disputes liability for the debt.  His first contention 
is that the agency travel official initially suggested that the local 
move was permissible and informed the carrier to perform this move.  
Secondly, he contends that he was given an option to move the 
household goods on the weekend, that nobody ever advised him that 
household goods should not be moved at this time, and that the 
carrier's consent to his request that the move be changed from a 
weekday to a weekend implied approval by the agency.  His third 
contention is that the household goods involved in the local move 
could not have included two barrels, as reported, since he never had 
barrels in his house.

The agency travel clerk does not disagree with Dr. Jamshidian's first 
contention that she authorized an extra local move and so informed the 
carrier.  She disagrees, however, with his second contention that he 
was given an option to move the household goods on the weekend and 
that no one ever advised him to the contrary.  Under her signature of 
September 30, 1994 (a couple of weeks after the move), the official 
form authorizing an extra local movement of household goods 
specifically provided that "week end packing and loading was (sic) not 
authorized" and that only one couch and a couple of boxes were 
specifically authorized, not a "full apartment" of household goods.  
Dr. Jamshidian does not dispute that the agency was not asked about 
the weekend change or that only one couch and a couple of boxes were 
authorized to be moved, nor does he dispute the fact that 18 
containers were subsequently moved instead.

Dr. Jamshidian, however, asserts that nobody ever advised him that 
household goods could not be moved on the weekend and that the 
carrier's consent to this request implied approval by the agency.  
This disagreement need not be resolved.  The significance of Dr. 
Jamshidian changing the loading and shipping date to the weekend meant 
that neither the carrier nor Dr. Jamshidian could contact the travel 
office to approve or disapprove the extra charge resulting from the 
numerous additional containers that Dr. Jamshidian now wished to be 
transported as part of the local move.  Had the move occurred on the 
weekend without the additional cartons, it would have been considered 
an extra stop with no charge just as if it had occurred on the 
previously scheduled weekday.

As to the claimant's contention that he was charged for shipment of 
barrels when he never had barrels in his house, the carrier's shipping 
order form describes various rates for containers based on their size.  
Large items include "barrels, dish packs and drums, etc." and are 
priced at a higher container rate than other items, such as cartons or 
wardrobe containers.  The freight bill indicates two such large 
containers were shipped along with 16 other smaller containers, but 
doesn't indicate whether or not the two large containers included 
barrels.  Since Dr. Jamshidian does not dispute the cost or the number 
of large containers shipped for the local move but rather that no 
barrels were included among them, one can reasonably infer that the 
two large containers could have been either dish packs or drums or 
some other large container.

Thus, we conclude that Dr. Jamshidian is liable for any excess costs 
caused by the changes he initiated.  However, the amount of the debt 
is subject to the considerations discussed in the following 
paragraphs.

The cost of transporting household goods may be paid by the government 
if the point of destination is the new official station or some other 
point selected by the employee, or if the destination for part of the 
property is the new official station and the remainder is shipped to 
one or more other points.[6]  However, the total amount which may be 
paid by the government shall not exceed the cost of transporting the 
property in one lot by the most economical route from the last 
official station of the transferring employee to the new official 
station.[7]

In this case, Dr. Jamshidian is entitled to reimbursement for the 
constructive cost of transportation of household goods from his 
private residence in Los Angeles, California, to his residence near 
his new official duty station in Wichita, Kansas, not to exceed 18,000 
pounds, the authorized weight limit.  The record does not indicate 
what the constructive cost would be, but does indicate that the weight 
of the household goods transported to Wichita, Kansas, apparently not 
including the local move, was estimated at 18,300 pounds, 300 pounds 
in excess of the maximum.  That the household goods totaled more than 
18,000 pounds is further evidenced by the fact that on January 31, 
1995, officials at the Austin Finance Center lowered the amount of 
extra insurance required for the additional weight over 18,000 pounds.  
Since the employee apparently received the maximum reimbursement for 
transportation of household goods to Wichita, Kansas, the local move 
would constitute a charge in excess of the maximum allowable amount.  
However, if the total weight of the goods, including the weight of the 
local move, did not equal or exceed the 18,000 pound limit, then Dr. 
Jamshidian would only be liable for any excess costs above the 
constructive cost of transporting all of the goods in one lot by the 
most economical route from his old personal residence to his new 
residence.

As to the waiver request, the Comptroller General may waive an 
employee's debt arising out of an "erroneous payment" of travel, 
transportation, and relocation expenses if collection of the erroneous 
payment "would be against equity and good conscience and not in the 
best interest of the United States."[8]  A corollary to this rule, 
however, is that employees' or members' resulting debts that do not 
arise out of "erroneous" payments are not subject to consideration for 
waiver under 5 U.S.C.  sec.  5584 (1994).  Consequently, debts based on 
excess costs incurred in the shipment of an employee's household goods 
are not generally subject to waiver since the costs are not erroneous.  
The agency is simply recouping payments made in the normal course of 
business to satisfy its obligation to the carrier.  Edward L. Davis, 
B-252103, June 17, 1993.  For example, an employee of the Department 
of Veterans Affairs who shipped household goods under a GBL with 
excessive weight could not be relieved of her liability for the cost 
of shipping the excess pounds, notwithstanding her claim that she was 
given erroneous advice by the carrier and by an agency official.  
Loren R. Wilkenfeld, B-265864, Dec. 7, 1995.

In some limited circumstances, we have granted waiver where an 
employee was able to show that the excess charges resulted from the 
erroneous authorization of agency officials.  See Robert S. Jackowski, 
B-229335, Oct. 21, 1988, where excess weight was shipped in reliance 
on a written authorization of an erroneous weight allowance.  For 
error to rise to this level for waiver, however, the employee must 
clearly show that the advice was given by an agency official with the 
responsibility for providing advice and that it clearly provided the 
authorization on which the employee relied.  We do not believe Dr. 
Jamshidian has met this test.  Consequently, his waiver request is 
denied.

/s/Seymour Efros
for Robert P. Murphy
General Counsel

1. Z-2942505-025, July 27, 1995.

2. See April 4, 1995, decision of Committee on Waivers and 
Compromises, Department of Veterans Affairs.

3. FTR  sec.  302-1.4(j) (1991), 41 C.F.R.  sec.  302-1.4(j) (1995).

4. 5 U.S.C.  sec.  5724(a)(2) (1994), FTR  sec.  302-8.2(a) (1992), and 41 
C.F.R.  sec.  302-8.2(a) (1995).

5. FTR  sec.  302-8.3(b) (1989), 41 C.F.R.  sec.  302-8.3(b) (1995).

6. FTR  sec.  302-8.2(e) (1989), 41 C.F.R.  sec.  302-8.2(e) (1995).

7. Ibid.

8. 5 U.S.C.  sec.  5584 (1994).