BNUMBER: B-265864
DATE: December 7, 1995
TITLE: Dr. Loren T. Wilkenfeld
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Matter of:Dr. Loren T. Wilkenfeld
File: B-265864
Date: December 7, 1995
DIGEST
A new employee received travel orders authorizing the shipment of her
household goods from her residence to her duty station. Although the
travel orders did not authorize the shipment of the employee's two
vehicles, the employee chose to have them shipped with her household
goods. The resulting debt for the excess costs of shipping the
vehicles may not be waived. Generally, debts resulting from excess
costs or excess weight charges may be considered for waiver only if
the employee is able to show that the costs were incurred in reliance
on an erroneous authorization from the agency. Although a
representative from the carrier may have provided the employee with
erroneous advice, the employee has not established that she received
any erroneous advice from an agency official.
DECISION
Dr. Loren T. Wilkenfeld requests reconsideration of our Claims Group's
settlement, Z-2942033-025, Mar. 23, 1995, denying her request for
waiver of her $1,794.99 debt to her agency for excess costs incurred
in the shipment of her automobiles to her duty station. The
settlement is affirmed.
BACKGROUND
Incident to her appointment to the Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Center (VAMC) in Salisbury, North Carolina, the agency issued
Dr. Wilkenfeld travel orders authorizing the shipment of her household
goods (HHG) to Salisbury, from her residence in Carlsbad, California,
using a government bill of lading (GBL). Although her travel orders
did not authorize the shipment of her two vehicles, Dr. Wilkenfeld had
the vehicles shipped to her duty station with her HHG. Because
automobiles are excluded from the types of HHG that may be shipped at
government expense, see Federal Travel Regulation (FTR) 41 C.F.R.
302-1.4(j)(i), the agency has sought to recover from Dr. Wilkenfeld
the excess costs for the shipment of the vehicles.
Dr. Wilkenfeld acknowledges that before her goods were picked up for
shipment, a VA official told her that the VA would not pay to have her
vehicles shipped. However, Dr. Wilkenfeld states that a
representative of the carrier told her that she could ship her
vehicles with her HHG for a handling charge of $113.50 per vehicle and
that she verified this information with Mr. Jerry Lanning, the agency
purchasing agent who arranged for the shipment of her HHG.
Mr. Lanning asserts that he told Dr. Wilkenfeld, as well as other new
hires, that "the government would pay the carrier for the move but
that charges related to the shipment of cars would have to be
reimbursed by the employee." This statement is corroborated by the
GBL, issued and signed by Mr. Lanning, which is the authorization
provided to the carrier. The GBL includes the statement, "Employee's
car has been authorized to ship at same time as HHG move and any
charges will be paid by government and then reimbursed by the
employee."
After the agency notified Dr. Wilkenfeld of its intention to collect
the excess charges, Dr. Wilkenfeld requested that the debt be waived
on the grounds that she was misled about her relocation entitlement
and that she had not been properly counseled. Our Claims Group denied
waiver, noting that there were no errors on Dr. Wilkenfeld's travel
orders, and that the carrier's representative who misinformed Dr.
Wilkenfeld was not a government employee and had no authority to speak
for the agency.
In her reconsideration request, Dr. Wilkenfeld again asserts that Mr.
Lanning personally informed her that the agency would pay to ship her
vehicles with her HHG. As proof, she submitted an copy of the
"Authorization for Payment of Moving Expenses" with a handwritten
note, which she says was added after she signed the form, stating "OK
to have car shpd at same time, Marsha handling." ("Marsha" refers to
the carrier's representative.) She also attached a copy of a
memorandum from the Salisbury VAMC's chief of staff to the facility's
director recommending waiver based on the recommendation of the
facility's traffic manager. Dr. Wilkenfeld further states that she
did not sign the GBL and therefore did not agree to pay for the
shipment of her vehicles. Finally, she notes that the charges for the
shipment of her vehicles were included in the amount of relocation
benefits reported to the Internal Revenue Service as taxable income to
her.[1]
OPINION
The Comptroller General may waive the collection of debts arising from
the erroneous payment of transportation allowances if "collection
would be against equity and good conscience and not in the best
interest of the United States," and provided further, that there is no
"indication of fraud, misrepresentation, fault, or lack of good faith"
attributable to the employee. 5 U.S.C. 5584(a) and (b)(1).
Generally, debts based on excess costs incurred in the shipment of an
employee's HHG are not subject to waiver since the agency simply is
recouping payments made in the normal course of business to satisfy
its obligation to the carrier. Edward L. Davis, B-252103, June 17,
1993. In some limited circumstances, we have granted waiver where an
employee was able to show that the excess charges resulted from the
erroneous authorization of agency officials. See Gunnery Sergeant
Robert S. Jackowski, USMC, B-229335, Oct. 21, 1988, in which excess
weight was shipped in reliance on a written authorization of an
erroneous weight allowance. For oral advice to rise to this level,
the employee must clearly show that the advice was given by an agency
official with the responsibility for providing advice and that it
clearly purported to provide the authorization on which the employee
relied. Edward L. Davis, supra. We do not believe Dr. Wilkenfeld has
met this test.
The handwritten note on the Authorization for Payment of Moving
Expenses does not establish that the agency provided Dr. Wilkenfeld
with erroneous advice. It is not clear who wrote the note, and it
does not purport to authorize including the cost of shipping the
vehicles with the cost of shipping the HHG. Although a representative
from the shipping company may have told her otherwise, since that
person was not an agency employee and not authorized to speak for the
agency, that person's erroneous advice may not serve as a basis for
waiver.
While Dr. Wilkenfeld insists that the GBL does not represent an
agreement on her part to pay for the shipment of the vehicles, that is
not why the GBL is relevant. Rather, the importance of the GBL is
that it shows what the government agreed to ship. In this case, the
GBL shows that Mr. Lanning, the purchasing agent who issued it, stated
on the GBL that the cost of shipping the vehicles would have to be
recouped from the employee.
The memorandum from the VAMC's chief of staff acknowledges the need to
provide better counseling to new employees in the future regarding
their relocation benefits. The memorandum does not acknowledge,
however, that any agency official provided Dr. Wilkenfeld with
erroneous advice. Absent such erroneous advice, we are not authorized
to grant waiver.
Finally, although the agency may have reported its shipment of Dr.
Wilkenfeld's vehicles as income to her, this report, which occurred
after the vehicles had been shipped, does not constitute erroneous
advice. As we noted, the travel orders themselves contained no errors
and the GBL correctly noted that the employee would be responsible for
any excess costs incurred for the shipment of her vehicles. Moreover,
no agency official acknowledges giving Dr. Wilkenfeld erroneous advise
regarding the shipment of her vehicles.
Accordingly, because Dr. Wilkenfeld has not established that she
relied on erroneous advice from an agency official, her debt may not
be considered for waiver.
/s/Seymour Efros
for Robert P. Murphy
General Counsel
1. Generally, relocation benefits are considered taxable income by the
federal and many state and local governments. However, the FTR also
provides for an allowance to help defray the additional taxes owed by
employees who are provided relocation benefits. See FTR Part 302-11.