BNUMBER:  B-262051; B-262051.2
DATE:  November 21, 1995
TITLE:  Fluor Daniel, Inc.

**********************************************************************

REDACTED DECISION
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.

Matter of:Fluor Daniel, Inc.

File:     B-262051; B-262051.2

Date:     November 21, 1995

Kenneth B. Weckstein, Esq., Shlomo D. Katz, Esq., and Janine S. 
Benton, Esq., Epstein, Becker & Green, for the protester.
Kenneth S. Kramer, Esq., James M. Weitzel, Jr., Esq., and Lawrence E. 
Ruggiero, Esq., Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson, for Raytheon 
Support Services Company, an interested party.
Richard J. McCarthy, Esq., Department of Transportation, for the 
agency.
Tania L. Calhoun, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest that contracting agency improperly failed to conduct 
meaningful discussions with the protester is denied where the 
weaknesses first identified to the firm during its debriefing did not 
preclude award to the firm and did not render the firm's proposal 
deficient; agencies need not discuss every aspect of a proposal that 
receives less than the maximum score, but must only lead offerors into 
the areas of their proposals considered deficient.

2.  Protest that contracting agency improperly evaluated protester's 
technical/program management proposal is denied where the record shows 
that the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria.

3.  Protest that contracting agency's cost realism analysis improperly 
failed to upwardly adjust the awardee's evaluated costs associated 
with staffing is denied where the agency's explanation that the costs 
would likely not increase is not shown to be unreasonable or 
arbitrary.

4.  Protest that solicitation's relevant experience/past performance 
evaluation factor is a definitive responsibility criterion is denied 
where the requirement contains no specific and objective standards for 
the measurement of an offeror's ability to perform the contract; the 
protester's related argument that the contracting agency's evaluation 
improperly considered the experience and past performance of the 
awardee's parent corporation is denied where, given the relationship 
between the two firms described in the offeror's proposal, there is no 
basis to conclude that the agency acted unreasonably.

DECISION

Fluor Daniel, Inc. protests the award of a contract to Raytheon 
Support Services Company (RSSC) under request for proposals (RFP) No. 
DTFA01-94-R-00004, issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
for technical support services to implement the FAA's facilities and 
equipment programs in the Aviation System Capital Investment Plan.  
Fluor Daniel primarily argues that the FAA improperly failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions with the firm; improperly evaluated the 
offerors' technical/program management and business management 
proposals; and improperly conducted its cost realism analysis of 
RSSC's proposal.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The Aviation System Capital Investment Plan delineates the 
improvements in operational facilities and equipment planned for 
implementation in the National Airspace System (NAS) by the end of 
this century.  The Plan describes the specific facilities, systems, 
subsystems, and schedules that are in progress, or being planned, for 
NAS system expansion or replacement, including air traffic control 
computer and display systems, flight service systems, ground-to-air 
systems, interfacility communication systems, and maintenance and 
operations support systems.  The Plan also provides the basis for 
scheduling facilities and equipment installation project work 
throughout the FAA.

The solicitation, issued March 7, 1994, anticipated award of a 
cost-plus-fixed-fee, level-of-effort contract to supplement FAA 
facilities and engineering staff in accomplishing installation and 
implementation of the NAS over a 3-year base period, with up to two 
2-year option periods.  The contractor is to provide all labor, 
management, services, supplies, materiel, data, and facilities 
required to accomplish efforts ordered through the issuance of work 
releases.  Work shall include efforts in four areas:  facility site 
selection and recommendations; site preparation; environmental 
remediation; and installation and testing related to Plan programs.  
Section M of the RFP identified four evaluation areas:  
technical/program management, risk assessment, cost, and business 
management. 

The evaluation of technical/program management volumes was divided 
into two sections, with section B slightly more important than section 
A.  Under section A, evaluators would apply three equally important 
evaluation factors--understanding, approach, and resources--to each of 
the four work areas.[1]  Offerors were to focus on each of three types 
of facilities--voice communication facilities, radar facilities, and 
navigation aids/instrument landing system (ILS) facilities--in their 
discussion of all work areas save for environmental remediation.  For 
that work area, offerors were to evaluate any one of these facilities 
to identify hazardous materials and plan, develop, and execute a 
remediation plan.  Under section B, evaluators would consider each of 
six managerial plans provided by each offeror, including a staffing 
plan.  The technical/program management proposals would be given 
weighted numerical scores and would also be reviewed to identify any 
risks posed by the offeror's proposal. 

The adjectival risk assessment analysis would assess and evaluate 
potential risks associated with the selection of each offeror's 
overall proposal for fulfilling the solicitation's requirements.  Cost 
proposals would be analyzed for completeness, reasonableness, and 
realism.  Finally, business management proposals would be evaluated 
under three equally important sections, including relevant 
experience/past performance.  Each section would be rated acceptable 
or unacceptable.  All sections had to be rated acceptable in order for 
the business management proposal to be rated acceptable overall.

The technical/program management factor was slightly more important 
than risk assessment, but risk assessment would become relatively more 
significant as the difference in the technical/program management 
scores diminished.  Cost was less important than risk assessment and 
would become relatively more significant if the difference between the 
technical/program management scores diminished and the risk assessment 
was relatively equal among proposals.  Business management would be 
rated either acceptable or unacceptable.  An integrated assessment of 
all evaluation areas would be considered by the source selection 
official (SSO) in determining which proposal provided the greatest 
overall value to the government, and that proposal would be selected 
for award of the contract.

The FAA received initial proposals from three offerors, including 
Fluor Daniel and RSSC, by the August 4 closing date.  A technical 
evaluation team (TET), risk assessment team, cost evaluation team, and 
business management evaluation team evaluated their respective 
portions of the initial proposals, all three of which were included in 
the competitive range.  Two rounds of face-to-face discussions were 
conducted, and best and final offers (BAFO) were submitted on February 
15, 1995.  After the evaluators reviewed the BAFOs, one offeror was 
eliminated from further consideration.  The source evaluation board 
(SEB) reviewed the evaluator teams' reports and prepared its own 
report, listing the final evaluation results as follows:

                              RSSC             Fluor Daniel

Technical/Program Management  76.45                72.88

Risk Assessment                Low                  Low

Cost                      $881,696,968         $874,524,483

Business Management        Acceptable           Acceptable
The contracting officer prepared a report for the SSO which stated 
that both offerors submitted conforming proposals and both were 
capable of performing the contract and otherwise eligible for award.  
RSSC's proposal had a higher technical/program management score than 
Fluor Daniel's proposal based on higher scores in three of four 
technical work areas and all six management plans, and contained twice 
as many strengths.  Moreover, RSSC's proposal contained 12 positive 
discriminators and 1 negative discriminator, while Fluor Daniel's 
proposal contained 6 positive discriminators and no negative 
discriminators.[2]  

In his source selection decision, the SSO stated that he had 
considered the SEB report, the oral presentation, and the 
solicitation's evaluation factors, and, based on his consideration of 
the integrated assessment of all evaluation areas, determined that 
RSSC submitted the proposal which satisfied the solicitation's 
requirements and provided the greatest overall value to the 
government.  The SSO determined that RSSC's technical advantage was of 
greater significance than the overall slightly lower proposed cost of 
Fluor Daniel, and that the higher technical/program management score 
earned by RSSC, combined with a risk and cost equivalency between the 
proposals, warranted award to that firm.  The contract was awarded to 
RSSC on June 22 and, after its June 30 debriefing, Fluor Daniel filed 
its initial protest in our Office.  The firm's supplemental protest 
followed its receipt of the agency report.

TECHNICAL/PROGRAM MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS

Discussions

Fluor Daniel argues that a number of the weaknesses attributed to 
section A of its technical/program management proposal were first 
disclosed to the firm during its debriefing.  As a result, the 
protester contends that it was deprived of meaningful discussions.

Agencies are required to conduct meaningful discussions with all 
competitive range offerors.  Price Waterhouse, B-254492.2, Feb. 16, 
1994, 94-1 CPD  168.  For discussions to be meaningful, agencies must 
generally point out weaknesses, excesses, or deficiencies in proposals 
that require amplification or correction, and afford offerors an 
opportunity to revise their proposals to satisfy the government's 
requirements.  Id.  This does not mean that offerors are entitled to 
all-encompassing discussions or that an agency must "spoon-feed" an 
offeror as to each and every item that must be revised, added, deleted 
or otherwise addressed to improve a proposal; rather, an agency must 
only lead offerors into the areas of their proposals considered 
deficient.  SeaSpace Corp., B-252476.2, June 14, 1993, 93-1 CPD  462.  
Agencies need not discuss every aspect of the proposal that receives 
less than the maximum score, Medland Controls, Inc., B-255204; 
B-255204.3, Feb. 17, 1994, 94-1 CPD  260, or identify relative 
weaknesses in a proposal that is technically acceptable but presents a 
relatively less desirable approach than others.  SeaSpace Corp., 
supra.  In this case, because the weaknesses in section A of Fluor 
Daniel's technical/program management proposal did not preclude award 
to the firm, and did not render Fluor Daniel's proposal deficient, we 
cannot conclude that the FAA was required to raise these weaknesses in 
discussions with Fluor Daniel.  

It is undisputed that the FAA considered Fluor Daniel's proposal to be 
fully acceptable and to have fully satisfied the solicitation's 
requirements.  Further, the documents specifically referred to by the 
SSO as those bearing upon his selection decision do not discuss any 
offeror's weaknesses.  In fact, these weaknesses were of so little 
significance to the ultimate decision that they were not even 
mentioned in the SEB report, or the contracting officer's report to 
the SSO, which only listed the offerors' strengths and 
discriminators.[3]  In this incremental evaluation process, the last 
place that any weaknesses are addressed is the TET's final technical 
evaluation report.  As discussed below, a review of this report and 
the underlying evaluation documents confirms that these weaknesses 
were not significant factors in the evaluation process or the 
selection decision.

For example, as to the three weaknesses at issue under site 
preparation--Fluor Daniel's discussion of ILS power systems, cable 
cuts, and topographic surveys--only one evaluator considered the first 
to be a weakness in the initial evaluation, and he deemed it minor.  
Although, during the BAFO evaluation, that same evaluator 
characterized the weakness as significant, and also made note of the 
other two weaknesses as significant, we do not believe that this one 
evaluator's adjectival assessment is controlling, given the contents 
of the SEB report, SSO report, and source selection document.  
Further, even if all of the raw points by which Fluor Daniel's BAFO 
was conceivably downgraded for these weaknesses were restored, its 
weighted score for both the site preparation area and the 
technical/program management proposal overall would change very 
little.  We view this as additional evidence that these weaknesses 
were not significant in the evaluation and selection decision. 

Next, the weaknesses identified under installation and test--Fluor 
Daniel's discussion of operational constraints during testing 
procedures and development of an installation procedure--were 
considered to be minor or moderate, and were noted by only one 
evaluator.[4]  Although most of these weaknesses were not noted until 
the BAFO evaluation, Fluor Daniel's installation and test raw score 
increased rather than decreased thereafter, which would not be 
expected if the weaknesses were significant.  See Nat'l Academy of 
Conciliators, B-241529, Feb. 19, 1991, 91-1 CPD  181. 

As a final matter, Fluor Daniel contends that the FAA failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions with the firm because the record 
contains inconsistencies as to the number of weaknesses attributed to 
the firm's proposal and because all of the weaknesses do not track 
back and forth throughout the process of the procurement.  However, 
the overriding concern in the evaluation process is that the final 
results accurately reflect the actual merits of the proposals, not 
that they be mechanically traceable back to the results initially 
given by the individual evaluators.  See Dragon Servs., Inc., 
B-255354, Feb. 25, 1994, 94-1 CPD  151; The Cadmus Group, Inc., 
B-241372.3, Sept. 25, 1991, 91-2 CPD  271.  It is the ultimate 
evaluation by the agency which is governed by the tests of rationality 
and consistency with the RFP evaluation criteria, not the assessment 
by lower-level evaluation teams or boards.  See Contel Fed. Sys., 71 
Comp. Gen. 11 (1991), 91-2 CPD  325.  The evaluation of proposals 
here was a cumulative process during which the group leaders and the 
TET chairman reviewed individual evaluator findings to validate or 
reconcile opposing points of view; consolidate duplicate findings; 
arbitrate differences; and discard insubstantial findings.  After 
receiving BAFOs, the individual evaluators prepared comparison sheets 
to identify changes in findings and scores from the initial 
evaluation, and, again, the group leaders and TET chairman reviewed 
these findings to consolidate duplicate weaknesses and to reconcile or 
explain opposing points of view for the preparation of the final TET 
report.  In our view, the extremely detailed and notated record in 
this case belies Fluor Daniel's assertions of impropriety on the part 
of the FAA.

Evaluation of Fluor Daniel's Proposal

Fluor Daniel argues that eight weaknesses assigned to section A of its 
technical/program management proposal "do not exist," and that the FAA 
overlooked relevant information provided in its proposal.  

We have already reviewed most of these weaknesses in the context of 
Fluor Daniel's allegation that it was deprived of meaningful 
discussions.  As we stated there, these weaknesses were not 
significant factors in the evaluation process or the selection 
decision.  Thus, even if we were to find that the agency improperly 
assessed these weaknesses, it is not clear that such a finding would 
have any effect on the selection decision.  In any event, in 
considering such a protest, we examine the record to determine whether 
the agency's evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria and applicable statutes and regulations.  ESCO, 
Inc., 66 Comp. Gen. 404 (1987), 87-1 CPD  450.  As the following 
examples of the weaknesses under the most important work area show, 
the FAA reasonably evaluated Fluor Daniel's proposal.[5] 

In the section of Fluor Daniel's proposal devoted to ILS site 
preparation, the firm's list of typical tasks for a new ILS included 
the installation of uninterruptible power supply and power 
conditioning.  The FAA believed the proposal improperly implied that 
these power systems are installed with Category I ILS systems.  Fluor 
Daniel argues that the FAA should have known it was referring to a 
Category III ILS because the installation and test work area of its 
proposal referred to such an ILS.  However, offerors were required to 
provide "pointers" between work areas whenever references in one work 
area also applied to another, and Fluor Daniel did not do so here.  
Offerors bear the burden for failing to submit an adequately written 
proposal, donald clark Assocs., B-253387, Sept. 15, 1993, 93-2 CPD  
168, and contracting agencies are not obligated to go in search of 
needed information which the offeror has omitted or failed adequately 
to present.[6]  Telos Field Eng'g, 
B-251384, Mar. 26, 1993, 93-1 CPD  271.

The FAA also criticized Fluor Daniel's discussion of ILS site 
preparation because the firm did not mention the importance of 
topographic surveys in ILS site preparation.  While Fluor Daniel's 
proposal did include the phrase "topographic surveys," the evaluator's 
concern lay in the firm's failure to discuss the importance of 
topographic surveys to ILS site preparation.   

Finally, Fluor Daniel's discussion of site preparation for 
communications facilities included its approach to minimizing 
disruptions in these facilities.  The FAA criticized the firm for 
failing to mention the potential disruptions from cable cuts because 
they were a "possibility of communication facility site preparation 
work on airports."  While the protester argues that it did mention 
these potential disruptions, the passages to which it points do not 
clearly refer to field cables at airports, the subject at issue.  We 
also reject Fluor Daniel's contention that a reference to cable cuts 
in the ILS section of its proposal was sufficient to allay the 
agency's concern.  This weakness is specifically identified with voice 
communications facilities, not ILS facilities.

In a related argument, Fluor Daniel contends that the FAA arbitrarily 
lowered its scores for the site preparation work area between the 
initial proposal and the BAFO.  In our view, the FAA has adequately 
explained its evaluation here.  The evaluator at issue was the group 
leader for this work area.  During the evaluation of initial 
proposals, his written comments were not factored into the proposal 
scoring, but, during the BAFO evaluation, he became an evaluator as 
well, with proposal scoring responsibilities.  That he was more 
critical of Fluor Daniel's proposal than other evaluators were does 
not make the evaluation arbitrary.  

Evaluation of RSSC's Proposal 

Fluor Daniel argues that the FAA improperly evaluated RSSC's business 
management proposal under the staffing plan consideration.  

The evaluation of the staffing plan included four areas:  ability to 
provide personnel; recruitment program; overall qualification and 
experience levels of work force; and qualifications, including 
education and experience levels, of proposed personnel.  In its review 
of the last area, the FAA noted that 34 of the 456 non-key personnel 
proposed by RSSC did not meet at least one of the basic requirements 
specified in the solicitation--19 lacked an educational requirement, 
11 did not meet the minimum experience requirements, 3 lacked both 
education and experience, and 1 lacked specific project management 
experience.  As a result, RSSC was assessed both a weakness under this 
consideration and a low risk under the risk assessment analysis.  This 
concern also represented the sole negative discriminator identified in 
RSSC's technical/program management proposal.  In contrast, Fluor 
Daniel proposed two unqualified non-key personnel and was assigned a 
strength under this consideration, as well as a positive discriminator 
overall.

Fluor Daniel argues that the evaluation must be arbitrary because, 
despite the distinction between the two proposals in terms of the 
number of unqualified non-key personnel proposed, both received 
similar point scores in this area.  However, when technical proposals 
are point scored, the closeness of the scores does not necessarily 
indicate that the proposals are essentially equal.  See Integrity 
Private Sec. Servs., Inc., B-254513, Oct. 25, 1993, 93-2 CPD  249.  
Fluor Daniel fails to consider other variables within the scope of 
this area, such as the fact that additional points were given for 
higher educational and experience levels.  In addition, Fluor Daniel 
was assessed a positive discriminator here, and RSSC was not.  On the 
whole, Fluor Daniel has not provided us any reason to find this 
evaluation unreasonable.[7]  See McDonnell Douglas Corp., B-259694.2; 
B-259694.3, June 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD  51. 

COST REALISM ANALYSIS

Fluor Daniel argues that the FAA's cost realism analysis of Raytheon's 
proposal improperly failed to consider the cost impact of Raytheon's 
proposal of 34 non-key personnel who did not meet all of the RFP's 
minimum requirements, as discussed above.  The protester contends that 
the FAA should have considered that qualified personnel cost more than 
unqualified personnel, and that the actual cost difference between the 
offers may be greater than reflected in the cost realism analysis.
 
When agencies evaluate proposals for the award of a cost reimbursement 
contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs are not dispositive 
because, regardless of the costs proposed, the government is bound to 
pay the contractor its actual and allowable costs.  Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  15.605(d).  Consequently, a cost 
realism analysis must be performed by the agency to determine the 
extent to which an offeror's proposed costs represent what the 
contract should cost, assuming reasonable economy and efficiency.  
CACI, Inc.--Fed., 64 Comp. Gen. 71 (1984), 84-2 CPD  542.  Because 
the contracting agency is in the best position to make this cost 
realism determination, our review of an agency's exercise of judgment 
in this area is limited to determining whether the agency's cost 
evaluation was reasonably based and not arbitrary.  General Research 
Corp., 70 Comp. Gen. 279 (1991), 91-1 CPD  183, aff'd, American 
Management Sys., Inc.; Dept. of the Army--Recon., 70 Comp. Gen. 510 
(1991), 91-1 CPD  492; Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111 
(1976), 76-1 CPD  325.

The FAA explains that, for many labor categories, the minimum 
requirements included both general experience in specialized skill 
areas and specialized experience related to the particular skill 
category, and that many of the individuals who failed to meet the 
minimum experience requirements had more than the required number of 
years of experience, but less than the required general experience.  
In all likelihood, the FAA asserts, the actual labor rates proposed 
were higher, rather than lower, than the actual costs of personnel who 
only met the minimum requirements but had less specialized 
experience--any cost adjustment would have been downward, rather than 
upward.

While Fluor Daniel discounts this explanation as an "after-the-fact" 
rationalization, we consider the entire record, including statements 
and arguments made in response to a protest, in determining whether an 
agency's decision is supportable.  Dyncorp, 71 Comp. Gen. 129 (1991), 
91-2 CPD  575.  We have no reason to dispute the FAA's view that the 
cost of minimally acceptable personnel would not differ significantly 
from the cost of the personnel proposed by RSSC, or that it would be 
less than that cost.  Further, while Fluor Daniel's protest set forth 
a methodology under which RSSC's evaluated costs should be adjusted 
upward by $5 million, the FAA's cogent criticisms of that 
methodology's assumptions have not been specifically answered by the 
protester.  In any event, even if RSSC's evaluated cost were adjusted 
upward by $5 million, the difference between the offerors' evaluated 
costs would be less than 1.5 percent of the value of the procurement.  
Given the technical advantages of RSSC's proposal, evaluated as having 
twice as many strengths and positive discriminators as Fluor Daniel's 
proposal, we cannot conclude that such a difference would be 
significant.[8]

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT PROPOSALS

Fluor Daniel argues that the relevant experience/past performance 
factor applied in evaluating business management proposals is a 
definitive responsibility criterion which RSSC did not meet because 
the relevant experience/past performance it described was not its own, 
but that of the firm's parent and affiliated companies.  Fluor Daniel 
argues that the FAA should have rated Raytheon unacceptable under this 
consideration or, at the least, assessed it a risk.  

The requirement at issue is as follows:

     "The offeror's Relevant Experience/Past Performance will be 
     evaluated to assess how well the offeror has performed on past 
     contracts of a similar nature and magnitude as the [initial 
     contract].  Evaluation criteria are equal in importance and will 
     consist of

        a.Related corporate and technical experience on contracts of a 
          similar nature, magnitude, and complexity;
        b.Demonstrated ability to meet schedule and cost constraints;
        c.Demonstrated ability to achieve program objectives;
        d.Quality of services delivered on past efforts; and
        e.Inputs with respect to the offeror's schedule, cost, and 
          quality      performance on past contracts obtained from 
          outside sources (i.e., Government and industry points of 
          contact) familiar with the offeror's past efforts."

Definitive responsibility criteria are specific and objective 
standards established by an agency for use in a particular procurement 
for the measurement of an offeror's ability to perform the contract.  
These special standards of responsibility limit the class of offerors 
to those meeting specified qualitative and quantitative qualifications 
necessary for adequate contract performance, e.g., unusual expertise 
or specialized facilities.  FAR  9.104-2; Topley Realty Co., 65 Comp. 
Gen. 510 (1986), 86-1 CPD  398; Tutor-Saliba Corp., Perini Corp., 
Buckley & Co., Inc., and O & G Indus. Inc., A Joint Venture, B-255756, 
Mar. 29, 1994, 94-1 CPD  223.

The requirement at issue here is not a definitive responsibility 
criterion.  It contains no specified qualitative or quantitative 
qualifications and, moreover, does not even require an offeror to 
possess the experience described.  Fluor Daniel's argument that the 
requirement is a definitive responsibility criterion because it calls 
for an evaluation of experience "separate from the technical 
evaluation" not only overlooks the absence of these qualifications but 
fails to recognize that the technical, or non-cost, considerations 
here were broken out into the technical/program management and 
business management volumes.  See, e.g., Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 
B-256346, June 14, 1994, 94-1 CPD  365; Noslot Cleaning Servs., Inc., 
B-251264, Mar. 18, 1993, 93-1 CPD  243; Rolen-Rolen-Roberts Int'l; 
Rathe Prods., Inc./Design Prod., Inc., B-218424 et al., Aug. 1, 1985, 
85-2 CPD  113.  

To the extent that Fluor Daniel challenges the evaluation itself, we 
have no reason to find the FAA's consideration of the experience of 
RSSC's parent corporation improper.  The RFP does not require that the 
relevant experience/past performance of the offeror be restricted to 
that offeror.  Cf. Tutor-Saliba Corp., Perini Corp., Buckley & Co., 
Inc., and O & G Indus. Inc., A Joint Venture, supra.  Moreover, RSSC's 
proposal specifically states that it is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Raytheon Service Company, the incumbent contractor here, and that each 
shares the same top management and many of the support functions.  The 
record also shows that Raytheon will act as an "interdivisional" to 
RSSC on this contract, and will provide mainly management effort.  
Where the experience of an affiliated corporation is clearly related 
to an offeror's proposed contract performance, it may be reasonable 
for an agency to give credit for the affiliate's related experience.  
See Contract Servs. Co., Inc., B-246604.2 et al., June 11, 1992, 92-1 
CPD  508.  Given the relationship between RSSC and Raytheon described 
in RSSC's proposal, as well as Raytheon's proposed participation in 
this effort, we cannot conclude that it was unreasonable for the 
agency to consider Raytheon's experience in its evaluation.  In any 
event, even if Raytheon's experience had not been considered, there is 
no reason to believe that RSSC's business management proposal would 
have been rated unacceptable under this factor or assessed a risk, 
given the unchallenged experience possessed by its proposed 
subcontractors.[9]  Fluor Daniel's argument to the contrary amounts to 
a mere disagreement with the agency's evaluation.   See Laidlaw 
Environmental Servs., Inc., supra.

The protests are denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. Site preparation and installation and test were equally important, 
and each was more important than site selection, which was slightly 
more important than environmental remediation. 

2. Discriminators were positive or negative attributes that were not 
evident in the proposals of one or more of the other offerors, and 
therefore tended to differentiate one proposal from another in either 
a positive or negative manner.  

3. As noted above, RSSC's proposal received twice as many strengths 
and positive discriminators as Fluor Daniel's proposal, and Fluor 
Daniel's proposal had no negative discriminators.

4. In a related matter, the FAA's notice to the firm, during 
discussions, that it had not fully addressed schedules or included 
sufficient time for completion of portions of the effort was 
sufficient to lead it to the weakness concerning its scheduling of 
leased communications circuits.  See Medland Controls, Inc., supra.  
Similarly, Fluor Daniel's weaknesses concerning its proposal of a 
limited scenario under environmental remediation did not require 
discussion.  The requirements for this work area are akin to a sample 
task requirement, wherein an offeror's response is the basis for 
evaluating its understanding of the requirements.  Agencies are not 
obligated to point out deficiencies, let alone the mere weaknesses at 
issue here, in sample tasks, since to do so would defeat the primary 
purpose of the sample task scenario--to test the offeror's 
understanding.  See Syscon Servs., Inc., 68 Comp. Gen. 698 (1989), 
89-2 CPD  258; NDI Eng'g Co., B-245796, Jan. 27, 1992, 92-1 CPD  
113.  In any event, the evaluators considered Fluor Daniel's proposal 
to be acceptable in this regard, and only believed that its failure to 
select a more imaginative scenario precluded its receipt of additional 
credit.  See Northern Virginia Serv. Corp., B-258036.2; B-258036.3, 
Jan. 23, 1995, 95-1 CPD  36.

5. Since most of the allegations here have been fully rebutted by the 
agency, with no meaningful response from the protester, we see no 
purpose in discussing them further.

6. Similarly, Fluor Daniel's insistence, in the context of its 
scheduling and quality control weakness, that it was not required to 
provide "pointers" within work areas, only between them, is 
unpersuasive.  The fact that it was told to cross-reference between 
work areas does not imply, by omission, that it need not 
cross-reference within a work area where appropriate.

7. Fluor Daniel's allegation that the source selection decision was 
based upon insufficient information is baseless, since the SSO was 
provided with the SSO briefing charts; final technical/program 
management evaluation, risk evaluation, cost evaluation, and business 
management evaluation reports; SSO report; section M of the RFP; and 
the source selection plan prior to making his decision.  Further, 
given the SSO's access to these detailed documents, we reject Fluor 
Daniel's assertion that his reference to the offerors' point scores 
means that his decision was based solely on those scores.  

8. Given our conclusions here, we decline to consider Fluor Daniel's 
argument that the FAA should have given Raytheon's proposal a risk, 
under the risk assessment analysis, not only for the technical impact 
of these unqualified personnel, but for the cost impact.

9. In its supplemental comments, Fluor Daniel cobbles together bits 
and pieces of prior GAO decisions to cast aspersions upon RSSC's past 
performance record.  However, since Fluor Daniel was on notice of 
these publicly available details at the time it filed its supplemental 
protest, but did not raise them in any detail until it filed its 
supplemental comments, they are untimely and will not be considered.  
Management Sys. Applications, Inc., B-259628; B-259628.2, Apr. 13, 
1995, 95-1 CPD
 216.