BNUMBER:  B-261953.5
DATE:  February 5, 1996
TITLE:  Cessna Aircraft Company

**********************************************************************

REDACTED DECISION
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release..
Matter of:Cessna Aircraft Company

File:     B-261953.5

Date:February 5, 1996

Terrence O'Donnell, Esq., Ari S. Zymelman, Esq., and Kevin M. Hodges, 
Esq., Williams & Connolly; and John S. Pachter, Esq., Jonathan D. 
Shaffer, Esq., and Christina M. Pirrello, Esq., Smith, Pachter, 
McWhorter & D'Ambrosio, for the protester.
Gerard F. Doyle, Esq., Ron R. Hutchinson, Esq., Scott A. Ford, Esq., 
Alexander T. Bakos, Esq., and Scott W. Woehr, Esq., Doyle &  Bachman; 
and Steven A. Kaufman, Esq., Clayton S. Marsh, Esq., and James M. 
Lichtman, Esq., Ropes & Gray, for Beech Aircraft Corporation, the 
interested party.
Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., Duncan Butts, Esq., Jeffrey Watson, Esq., 
Janice Beckett, Esq., Mark Otto, Esq., and Robert McGrath, Esq., for 
the agency.
Aldo A. Benejam, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protester's contention that agency improperly evaluated proposals 
is denied where the record shows that the agency evaluated in 
accordance with the criteria announced in the solicitation, and the 
record reasonably supports the evaluators' conclusions.

2.  Allegation that the agency's source selection advisory council 
(SSAC) improperly changed the source selection evaluation board's 
(SSEB) rating of protester's proposal for trainer aircraft under the 
"system safety" evaluation factor from blue (exceptional) to green 
(acceptable) is denied, where the record shows that the SSEB's rating 
was primarily based on the protester's twin-engine design, and, 
despite a specific request from the SSAC, the SSEB could not convince 
the SSAC that a twin-engine design resulted in a "safer" aircraft.

3.  Contracting agency reasonably evaluated protester's performance 
risk based upon unfavorable information in "contractor performance 
assessment reports" and in responses to questionnaires reflecting the 
protester's recent poor performance on other contracts.

4.  Contracting agency's life-cycle cost analysis involves the 
exercise of informed judgment and our Office will not question such an 
analysis unless it clearly lacks a reasonable basis.  Protester's 
contention that the agency's cost analysis was flawed is denied where 
the protester has not shown that the agency's approach was 
unreasonable.

5.  Where solicitation and agency's letter requesting best and final 
offers (BAFO) clearly required offerors to substantiate any BAFO price 
reductions, so that the agency could adequately assess and develop 
most probable life-cycle costs, agency's decision to rely on 
protester's pre-BAFO pricing was reasonable, where record shows that 
protester failed to substantiate significant price reductions in its 
BAFO.

DECISION

The Cessna Aircraft Company protests the proposed award of a contract 
to the Beech Aircraft Corporation under request for proposals (RFP) 
No. F33657-94-R-0006, issued by the Department of the Air Force for a 
joint primary aircraft training system (JPATS).  Cessna contends that 
the Air Force improperly evaluated technical proposals and that the 
agency's life-cycle cost evaluation was flawed.

We deny the protest.

BACKGROUND

The objective of the JPATS procurement is to replace the Air Force's 
T-37B and the Navy's T-34C aircraft and associated ground-based 
training systems (GBTS).  The primary mission of the JPATS aircraft 
and its GBTS is to train entry-level Air Force and Navy student pilots 
in primary flying and to prepare them to transition into advanced 
training tracks leading to qualification as a military pilot.  The 
JPATS aircraft and GBTS will also provide entry-level officers with a 
basic understanding of airmanship prior to their designation as Naval 
Flight Officers or Air Force Navigators, as well as provide support 
and training for pilot instructors.

The RFP characterized the acquisition as a "fly-before-buy" 
procurement.  That is, the RFP stated that as part of the evaluation 
process, the government would fly each offeror's proposed aircraft to 
assess its performance and flying qualities.  Thus, in addition to 
written proposals, offerors were required to provide an evaluation 
aircraft with flying qualities which duplicated those of the proposed 
production aircraft.

The RFP stated that the flight evaluation would assess the capability 
of each aircraft to train an entry-level student pilot with no prior 
flying experience to the proficiency level required by the primary 
pilot training syllabus.  Air Force and Navy test pilots and customer 
pilots would evaluate each aircraft.  In addition, the Air Force's 
Operational Test and Evaluation Center was to perform an early 
operational assessment of each aircraft.  Offerors were also required 
to provide a full-scale mock-up of the cockpit of the proposed 
production aircraft, which was to be evaluated for crew member 
accommodation characteristics, including anthropometric range 
capability, lighting checks, and other engineering components.

The RFP, issued on May 18, 1994, contemplated the award of two 
contracts to one offeror--a fixed-price incentive contract with award 
fee and economic price adjustments for the manufacturing development 
of a primary training aircraft, with options for varying quantities of 
production aircraft; and a fixed-price contract for a base period with 
up to nine 1-year options for logistics support.

Section M of the RFP stated that in evaluating proposals, the agency 
would consider three types of criteria:  (1) areas (related to 
important program characteristics); (2) assessment criteria (related 
to an offeror's proposal and ability to perform); and (3) cost/price 
and schedule.  The RFP listed the following evaluation areas in 
descending order of importance (factors within each area are shown in 
parentheses):  operational utility/technical (operational capability; 
crew accommodations; structural integrity; 
certification/qualification; aircraft missionization; and system 
safety); manufacturing and quality assurance (manufacturing; 
production control; and quality assurance); cost/price; logistics 
support (acquisition logistics; partial contractor logistics support 
(CLS); and total CLS for the Air Force and Navy);[1] management 
(aircraft management; and GBTS support and management); and schedule.  
The RFP stated that the manufacturing and quality assurance area was 
slightly more important than the cost/price area.[2]

The RFP further stated that, except for the cost/price and schedule 
area, the agency would apply three "assessment criteria" of equal 
importance (soundness of approach, understanding the requirements, and 
compliance with requirements) to the evaluation areas.  The RFP also 
identified "general considerations" (including, but not limited to, 
proposed contractual terms and conditions and the results of the early 
operational assessment of each offeror's evaluation aircraft).  The 
agency would also assess proposal and performance risk.  The RFP 
stated that the integrated assessment of the results of the evaluation 
would favor proposals that offered the best value to the government 
considering development risk and total system life-cycle cost.  The 
contracts were to be awarded to the offeror whose proposal was 
considered to be most advantageous to the government.

Seven offerors responded to the RFP by the time set on July 18, for 
receipt of initial proposals.  Air Force and Navy pilots conducted 
flight evaluations and a source selection evaluation board (SSEB) 
evaluated written proposals.  A performance review assessment group 
evaluated the offerors' past performance and a separate panel 
evaluated cost/price.  Based on the results of those evaluations, the 
agency eliminated one offeror's proposal from further consideration, 
and initiated discussions with the remaining six offerors.  Following 
initial discussions, the agency amended the RFP; requested and 
evaluated revised proposals; held further discussions; and requested 
best and final offers (BAFO).

The SSEB evaluated BAFOs by assigning color/adjectival and risk 
ratings[3] to each factor announced in the RFP.  With the exception of 
"crew accommodations" and "production control," where Beech's proposal 
was rated "yellow" and "blue" respectively,[4] Beech's proposal was 
rated "green" under all other evaluation factors, with low proposal 
and performance risk.

Cessna's proposal[5] received final ratings of "yellow" with 
"moderate" proposal risk and "low" performance risk under the 
"operational capability" factor, and "blue" with low proposal and 
performance risk under "crew accommodations."  Under all other 
evaluation factors, Cessna's proposal was rated "green."  With the 
exception of "structural integrity," "manufacturing," and "production 
control," where Cessna's offer received proposal risk ratings of 
either "moderate" or "low-moderate," Cessna's proposal received 
proposal risk ratings of "low" under all other evaluation factors.  As 
for performance risk, except for a "moderate" rating under "aircraft 
missionization," Cessna's proposal received a rating of "low" risk 
under all other factors.  The agency developed a most probable 
life-cycle cost (MPLCC) of $14.597 billion for Beech and [DELETED] 
billion for Cessna.[6]   The evaluation results for Beech and Cessna 
were as follows:

                            [DELETED]

A source selection advisory council (SSAC) reviewed the results of the 
SSEB's final evaluation and presented its findings to the source 
selection authority (SSA).[7] Based on the SSAC's report, the SSA 
selected Beech for award.  This protest followed.[8]

PROTESTER'S CONTENTIONS

Cessna challenges several aspects of the evaluation of Beech's and 
Cessna's technical proposals, including proposal and performance and 
risk ratings.  Specifically, Cessna challenges the evaluation of 
proposals under the "system safety" and "operational capability" 
factors.[9]  Cessna also challenges the evaluation of Beech's proposal 
under the "crew accommodations" factor and maintains that the agency 
erred in assessing Beech's and Cessna's performance risk.  With 
respect to evaluated cost, Cessna challenges virtually every aspect of 
the agency's life-cycle cost evaluation.

EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS

System Safety

The SSEB rated Cessna's proposal "blue" with low proposal and 
performance risk under this factor, based primarily on Cessna's 
twin-engine design.  During 2 days of briefings, however, the SSAC 
members discussed at length whether Cessna's proposal warranted that 
rating, especially since it was based primarily on the proposed 
twin-engine design.  In view of recent technological and engineering 
advances, the SSAC members were particularly concerned with the 
relevance of certain information, such as historical accident rate 
data of single versus twin-engine aircraft, which formed the basis of 
the SSEB's rating.  The SSAC's concerns reflect what apparently is a 
long-standing debate in the industry surrounding the issue of whether 
an aircraft is inherently "safer" (and therefore deserving of a higher 
rating under the "system safety" factor) by virtue of having more than 
one engine.

Following those initial discussions, the SSAC requested that the SSEB 
submit additional information in support of Cessna's "blue" rating 
under this factor.  In response, the SSEB presented the SSAC a chart 
comparing "mishaps rates" between different single-engine and 
twin-engine aircraft.  Based on its review of that additional 
information, and following further discussions, the SSAC concluded 
that the SSEB had not shown that two engines necessarily result in a 
safer aircraft.  Not convinced by the SSEB's presentation, the SSAC 
assigned Cessna a "green" rating under "system safety."

Cessna contends that the SSAC's decision to change the SSEB's rating 
under this factor was unreasonable.  In support of its position, 
Cessna points to the "mishaps rates" data shown to the SSAC comparing 
twin- versus single-engine aircraft.  According to Cessna, the data 
conclusively show that a twin-engine design is "safer" than a 
single-engine aircraft, and thus its proposal deserved the "blue" 
rating initially assigned under this factor.

Source selection officials in negotiated procurements are not bound by 
the recommendations or evaluation judgments of evaluators.  Grey 
Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325.  Thus, 
source selection officials have broad discretion in determining the 
manner and extent to which they will make use of the technical and 
cost evaluation results, and their technical judgments are governed 
only by the tests of rationality and consistency with the stated 
evaluation criteria.  Id.; Oklahoma Aerotronics, Inc.--Recon., 
B-237705.2, Mar. 28, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  337.  Source selection officials 
may properly question the conclusions reached by a technical 
evaluation panel, and, where those conclusions are not convincing or 
lack support, we see nothing improper with selection authorities 
requesting additional information from the evaluators in support of 
their ratings.  See, e.g., Wyle Labs., Inc.; Latecoere Int'l., Inc., 
69 Comp. Gen. 648 (1990), 90-2 CPD  para.  107; Calspan Corp., B-255268, 
Feb. 22, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  136; Latecoere Int'l., Inc.--Advisory 
Opinion, B-239113.3, Jan. 15, 1992, 92-1 CPD  para.  70.  In reviewing a 
protest challenging an agency's technical evaluation, we examine the 
record to ensure that the agency's evaluation was reasonable and 
consistent with the stated evaluation criteria.  See Abt Assocs., 
Inc., B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  223.  Based on our review 
of the record, we find no basis to question the SSAC's decision to 
assign Cessna's proposal a "green" rating under "system safety."

The SSAC discussed this issue at length and concluded that although 
Cessna's aircraft offered several strengths as identified by the SSEB 
related to the twin-engine design, those strengths did not support a 
"blue" (exceptional) rating.  In this connection, the agency[10] 
points out that there are numerous factors which have far greater 
effects on accident rates, and hence system safety, than the number of 
engines.  For instance, the agency points out that a twin-engine 
aircraft that displays unsuitable flying characteristics to train 
entry-level student pilots with no previous flying experience may be 
less safe than a single-engine trainer aircraft without unsuitable 
characteristics.  The Air Force explains that a twin-engine aircraft 
with objectionable [DELETED] such as Cessna's, for example, which 
makes it difficult or impossible for a student to [DELETED].  In 
another example cited by the Air Force, a twin-engine aircraft such as 
Cessna's, which is difficult to [DELETED].

The record shows that the SSAC debated the issue of the relative 
safety of twin- versus single-engine aircraft, and that the SSAC's 
discussions took into account the dynamics of various relevant factors 
and characteristics of Cessna's aircraft, which interact to affect 
system safety.  The SSAC considered in its deliberations the strengths 
identified by the SSEB, based on Cessna's twin-engine design, and 
agreed with the SSEB's conclusion that some strengths in Cessna's 
proposal were attributable, in large part, to Cessna's twin-engine 
design.  The SSAC was not convinced, however, that those strengths 
warranted rating Cessna's aircraft "exceptional" with respect to 
safety, and requested the SSEB to further support its recommendation.

Despite the specific request from the SSAC for support for the "blue" 
rating, the SSEB did not convincingly show the SSAC that Cessna's 
twin-engine design had any inherent safety advantages over a 
single-engine aircraft to warrant a rating of "exceptional" under this 
factor.  The SSAC's reason for changing the SSEB's initial rating was 
based on its extensive discussions, consideration of the SSEB's 
additional information, and the technical expertise of its members and 
their familiarity with the issues surrounding this debate.  Based on 
our review of the record, including the agency's explanation in 
response to the protester's allegation, we think that the SSAC 
reasonably could conclude that the protester's twin-engine design was 
not inherently safer than a single-engine aircraft, and that Cessna's 
proposal did not warrant a "blue" rating under this factor.  The 
protester's contention, that the SSAC's decision to change the SSEB's 
initial rating under this factor was arbitrary, is not supported by 
the record.  While Cessna disagrees with the SSAC's conclusions, that 
disagreement does not make the SSAC's final rating unreasonable.  
Calspan Corp., B-258441, Jan. 19, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  28.

The protester also contends that the agency's rating of Beech's 
proposal under this factor was unreasonable because Beech's proposal 
failed to comply with an RFP provision requiring that the proposed 
aircraft be fail-safe, "such that no single point failure, or 
combination of failures with a failure rate greater than 1 X 10-7 per 
flight can cause critical or catastrophic mishap. . . ."  In this 
connection, offerors were required to submit a preliminary analysis 
for all hazards with failure rate probabilities greater than 1 X 10-7.  
The agency states that the purpose of that analysis was to identify 
safety-critical areas, provide an initial evaluation of any hazards, 
and identify follow-up corrective actions to be taken to either 
eliminate, control, or otherwise mitigate the hazards to acceptable 
levels.  In accordance with this RFP provision, Beech submitted a 
preliminary hazards analysis and proposed corrections.

The record shows that the agency evaluated Beech's analysis, including 
proposed corrective actions, and Beech's proposed system safety 
program to eliminate or mitigate any hazards in its aircraft.  The 
evaluators concluded that the scope and depth of Beech's preliminary 
analysis adequately addressed all potential safety and environmental 
risks, and that Beech's proposed safety program would mitigate 
identified hazards to acceptable levels.  Based on our review of the 
record, we have no basis to question the agency's conclusions in this 
regard.[11]

Operational Capability

A team of Air Force and Navy pilots and engineers evaluated Cessna's 
aircraft as part of the flight evaluation under this factor.[12]  The 
flight evaluation team flew 13 "sorties" of the Cessna aircraft 
totaling almost 27 flight hours.  The team identified several 
deficiencies with the aircraft, and issued clarification requests (CR) 
and deficiency reports (DR) to Cessna.  The three most significant 
items that remained unresolved following discussions are briefly 
described below.

Two DRs and a CR concerned deficiencies with flying qualities of 
Cessna's aircraft.  [DELETED] informed Cessna that the evaluators had 
found it difficult to [DELETED].  That DR also stated that the 
[DELETED].

In [DELETED], the agency informed Cessna that [DELETED].  The DR also 
informed Cessna of a problem resulting from [DELETED].

In its responses to these items, Cessna proposed various changes 
either to the aircraft's external structural configuration or flying 
speeds.  According to Cessna, [DELETED].

After receipt of responses to the discussion items, the Air Force 
issued amendment No. 0002 to the RFP.  As relevant to this aspect of 
the protest, the contracting officer's cover letter to the amendment 
stated in part:

     "Amendment 0002 provides a number of changes to the solicitation.  
     Offerors are reminded, however, that additional aircraft [f]light 
     [e]valuations will not be conducted.  Proposed changes by 
     [o]fferors that may affect the flying qualities of their proposed 
     production aircraft (e.g., responses to [DRs], responses to 
     solicitation amendments, [BAFOs] etc.) will not change the 
     results of the [g]overnment's [f]light [e]valuation.  However, 
     any proposed changes that may affect flying qualities may affect 
     the [g]overnment's integrated evaluation.  The [g]overnment will 
     assess the potential of proposed changes to either enhance or 
     degrade aircraft performance or flying qualities. . . ."

Subsequently, the agency issued amendment No. 0003.  Although the 
protester submitted a revised proposal in response to these 
amendments, Cessna did not revise the modifications to the aircraft it 
had proposed earlier.  The agency evaluated Cessna's responses and 
concluded with respect to [DELETED] that while the probability was 
high that Cessna's proposed change would correct the [DELETED] 
deficiency, the effects of the [DELETED] on other flying qualities of 
the aircraft could not be assessed without another flight 
evaluation.[13]

With respect to DR [DELETED] the evaluators concluded that Cessna's 
proposal to [DELETED].  With respect to the CR, the evaluators 
concluded that Cessna's limited [DELETED] did not allow for an 
adequate evaluation of the aircraft's flying qualities [DELETED] which 
is essential to maintaining safe primary student operations.  Based on 
the evaluators' conclusions, Cessna's proposal received a final rating 
of "yellow" with "moderate" proposal risk under the "operational 
capability" factor.  The protester argues that the Air Force 
improperly evaluated its proposed changes in response to these 
deficiencies.[14]

The record shows that the SSEB reviewed Cessna's proposed changes and 
concluded that the impact of the solutions either could not be fully 
assessed without another flight evaluation, or that the changes 
significantly affected the flying qualities of the aircraft.  
Regarding DR [DELETED], the agency explains that because the aircraft 
[DELETED].  The evaluators found that Cessna's solution [DELETED] 
significantly affected some of the flying qualities and aerodynamic 
performance of the aircraft demonstrated during the initial flight 
evaluation.  The evaluators concluded that, while the proposed 
[DELETED] changes "may" correct the deficiency, the aircraft would 
have to be reflown to fully assess the effect of the [DELETED] on 
other flying qualities of the aircraft.

With respect to DR [DELETED] the evaluators found that while Cessna 
had committed to performing tasks after award that would improve the 
[DELETED], Cessna's proposed changes would affect some of the flying 
qualities and performance characteristics demonstrated and assessed 
during the flight evaluation.  For example, as a solution to this 
deficiency, Cessna proposed [DELETED].  The evaluators noted, however, 
that the aircraft was flight-tested based on [DELETED], and that the 
evaluation pilots noted deficiencies due to the [DELETED].  In the 
evaluators' opinion, [DELETED], as Cessna proposed, could magnify 
those deficiencies.[15]  Since Cessna's aircraft had not been 
evaluated at the proposed [DELETED], the evaluators concluded that the 
aircraft would have to be reflown to fully assess the proposed 
solutions and their impact on other flying qualities of the aircraft.

The evaluators noted that although Cessna may have flight-tested its 
proposed solutions to the deficiencies, Cessna subsequently stated 
during oral discussions that the data provided in its responses to the 
CR and DRs were based on qualitative or analytical predictions, not on 
data collected from an instrumented aircraft.[16]  Cessna did not 
present any new quantitative data with its proposed solutions.  
According to the evaluators, even though the protester's proposed 
changes affect only a portion of the flight envelope, those changes 
were of such significance--[DELETED]--that in order to verify whether 
the proposed solutions corrected the deficiencies, the aircraft would 
have to be reflown.  As explained in the contracting officer's cover 
letter to amendment No. 0002, quoted above, additional flight tests 
would not be conducted.

The protester argues that the Air Force failed to acknowledge that the 
proposed solutions to the DRs and the CR corrected the respective 
deficiencies, even without additional flight testing.  This argument 
is without merit.  The record shows that the evaluators carefully 
considered Cessna's proposed solutions and concluded that some of the 
problems identified during discussions remained unresolved.  
Specifically, the evaluators concluded that the problems related to 
the [DELETED] remained unresolved.  The evaluators also concluded that 
given the nature of the proposed solutions, in order to verify whether 
the deficiencies were corrected, Cessna's aircraft would have to be 
reflown--an additional step in the evaluation process that offerors 
were warned was not contemplated by the RFP, and would not be 
undertaken to verify the effectiveness or impact of the proposed 
solutions.  The fact that the initial rating of "yellow" assigned to 
Cessna's proposal under this factor remained unchanged following 
discussions does not compel a conclusion that the SSEB failed to 
recognize that Cessna's proposed solutions corrected the noted 
deficiencies.[17]  Rather, the final rating under this factor reflects 
the evaluators' reasonable conclusions based on their assessment of 
Cessna's responses to the DRs and the CR that certain deficiencies 
remained "open" or unresolved.

Unequal Evaluation

The protester also argues that the Air Force evaluated Cessna's and 
Beech's corrective actions in response to the discussion items in a 
disparate manner.  For instance, Cessna asserts that Beech's initial 
rating under the "operational capability" factor improved from 
"yellow" with "moderate" performance risk to "green" with "low" 
performance risk following discussions based on Beech's allegedly 
inadequate responses, while the Air Force did not raise Cessna's 
rating under this factor even though the protester provided adequate 
solutions.

Beech's initial proposal was downgraded under the "operational 
capability" factor primarily because the flight evaluation team was 
unable to assess the aircraft's [DELETED].    [DELETED].  The agency 
issued a DR to Beech identifying this deficiency.

In response to the [DELETED] DR, Beech submitted additional data which 
showed that its aircraft was [DELETED].  Specifically, Beech included 
a detailed table [DELETED]. The record shows that the agency analyzed 
Beech's response and concluded that the additional data satisfied the 
evaluators' concerns in this regard.  The evaluators further concluded 
that Beech's response did not affect any of the previously rated 
flying qualities.  In short, the record shows that the Air Force 
analyzed Beech's supplemental flight test data submissions addressing 
this particular deficiency and found that the data satisfied the 
evaluators' concerns.[18]  Accordingly, we think that the improved 
rating assigned to Beech's proposal under the "operational capability" 
factor reasonably reflects the SSEB's conclusion that the additional 
data Beech had provided satisfied the evaluators' initial concerns.

The fact that Cessna's rating under the "operational capability" 
factor did not improve following discussions does not show that the 
agency treated offerors differently, or that the agency's evaluation 
was unreasonable.  Rather, the final ratings reflect the fact that 
several of Cessna's responses did not reasonably convince the 
evaluators that the proposed fixes would not place at risk other 
flying qualities of the aircraft.[19]

Crew Accommodations

Section M of the RFP stated as follows:

 "The evaluation of this factor will be based on an assessment of the 
 offeror's [cockpit] mock-up. . . .  The anthropometric range 
 accommodated by each aircraft will be determined on the mock-up using 
 multivariate anthropometric measurement techniques.  The 
 [g]overnment's goal is to open flying careers to the widest possible 
 range of qualified applicants . . . .  Therefore, the JPATS 
 production aircraft shall accommodate not less than 80 [percent] of 
 the population of eligible women (Cases[20] 1-6 contained in the 
 "Systems Requirement Document"), and it is highly desired that the 
 JPATS production aircraft accommodate equal percentages of the 
 eligible population of men and women commensurate with appropriate 
 flight control forces and safe ejection capabilities . . . . "

Cessna argues that the Air Force improperly evaluated Beech's proposal 
under this factor because [DELETED].  The protester also contends that 
Beech failed to provide a functional ejection seat.

Following the initial evaluation, the SSEB concluded that [DELETED].  
As a result of these weaknesses, Beech's proposal received a rating of 
"yellow" (marginal) with moderate proposal risk under this factor.  
The agency issued a DR to Beech pointing out these deficiencies.

In its response to the DR, Beech explained that based on its own 
assessment, the Air Force's measurements were not accurate [DELETED].

The Air Force remeasured Beech's cockpit and concluded that all of the 
weaknesses and risks identified at the initial evaluation with respect 
to [DELETED] had been resolved.  In its final factor summary, the SSEB 
listed each of the weaknesses and risks noted at the initial 
measurement of Beech's cockpit and explained how each was resolved to 
its satisfaction following discussions.  For example, the SSEB noted 
that the problem with respect to [DELETED].  The evaluators 
specifically concluded that "[Beech's] cockpit will accommodate the 
desired population range (cases 1-7) to fly the aircraft (97 [percent] 
of eligible female pilot candidates which is essentially equal 
accommodation of both males and females) as measured in the cockpit 
mock-up."

Beech's final rating under this factor did not improve from the 
initial evaluation, however, primarily because of weaknesses and risks 
related to Beech's ejection seat.  In this connection, the evaluators 
found that Beech's proposed seat design [DELETED].  Beech was made 
aware of these problems throughout discussions, and the SSEB concluded 
that the problems with the seat essentially were weaknesses that could 
be overcome with close government monitoring.

Cessna's argument that Beech did not provide a functional ejection 
seat is not supported by the record.  What the record shows is that 
the evaluators considered Beech's ejection seat design to present some 
weaknesses and proposal risks, and downgraded Beech's proposal 
accordingly.  As a result of these remaining weaknesses and risks, 
Beech's initial rating of "yelllow" (marginal) with "moderate" risk 
remained unchanged following remeasurement of the cockpit mock-up.[21]  
Although Cessna argues that Beech's proposal deserved the lower "red" 
(unacceptable) rating under this factor, given the SSEB's 
conclusions--that the noted problems could be easily resolved--a 
rating of unacceptable was not warranted.  In our view, the SSEB's 
rating of Beech's proposal under this factor was reasonably based.

EARLY OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT

A Department of Defense Acquisition Board conducted a separate review 
of the JPATS procurement concurrent with the JPATS source evaluation 
and selection process.  The agency states that this separate review is 
the process by which the Secretary of Defense authorizes the military 
services to initiate and continue major acquisition programs such as 
the JPATS procurement.  As part of this review process, the Air Force 
was required to submit an early operational assessment (EOA) to the 
Secretary of Defense.  The EOA at issue here was conducted by the Air 
Force's Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC).

In addition to submitting the results of the AFOTEC's EOA to the 
Secretary of Defense, the Air Force decided that the SSA should also 
consider the results of the EOA in her source selection decision.  
Accordingly, section M of the initial RFP stated as follows:

 "The [g]overnment will conduct an [EOA].  This [EOA] is independent 
 of the Operation[al] Utility/Technical evaluation and will be 
 conducted concurrently with the Flight Evaluation.  The results of 
 the [EOA] of each aircraft will be presented to the [SSA] to be 
 considered as part of the source selection decision."

Subsequently, the agency amended this provision as follows:

 "The [g]overnment will conduct an independent [EOA]. In conducting 
 this assessment all relevant proposal information concerning 
 technical suitability and performance characteristics submitted by 
 the offerors, generated during the source selection process, and 
 received through discussions with offerors may be considered.  The 
 results of the [EOA] of each aircraft will be presented through the 
 [SSAC] to the [SSA] to be considered as part of the source selection 
 decision."

Cessna argues that the Air Force improperly compromised the role of 
the AFOTEC as an independent evaluation entity.  The protester relies 
on Department of Defense Directive 5000.1 (Feb. 23, 1991) to argue 
that the AFOTEC was designed to be an independent evaluation activity, 
separate from the procuring agency, as established in the initial RFP.  
Cessna maintains that the Air Force improperly altered the role of the 
AFOTEC in this procurement; prevented the AFOTEC from presenting its 
findings directly to the SSA; and improperly required the AFOTEC to 
change its initial conclusions.  As explained in greater detail below, 
we conclude that Cessna's allegations regarding the role of the AFOTEC 
in this procurement are untimely.  

Our Bid Protest Regulations require that protests based upon alleged 
improprieties in a solicitation which are apparent prior to the 
closing time for receipt of proposals must be filed prior to the 
closing time.  4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(1) (1995).  This rule includes 
challenges to alleged improprieties which did not exist in the initial 
solicitation but which are subsequently incorporated into the 
solicitation.  In such cases, the solicitation must be protested not 
later than the next closing time for receipt of proposals following 
the incorporation.  NASCO Aircraft Brake, Inc., B-237860, Mar. 26, 
1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  330.

Here, the amendment clearly announced two important changes to the 
manner in which the AFOTEC would conduct the EOA, which are central to 
the protester's complaint.  First, the amendment announced that the 
results would be presented through the SSAC, rather than directly to 
the SSA.  The amendment also informed offerors that in conducting the 
EOA, the AFOTEC would consider all relevant information submitted by 
the offerors, including proposed corrective actions generated during 
discussions.  Thus, since the RFP, as amended, announced that the 
AFOTEC could consider additional information including proposal 
modifications, and the results of discussions, Cessna either knew or 
should have known that the AFOTEC's final EOA could differ from its 
initial assessment, especially if the weaknesses and deficiencies 
initially noted were corrected following discussions.  If Cessna 
believed that the agency's approach as announced in the amendment 
"compromised" the role of the AFOTEC or its independence, or that the 
AFOTEC should not have reevaluated proposals based on new information 
provided during discussions, for instance, Cessna was required to 
raise these concerns prior to the time on March 10 established by the 
amendment for receipt of revised proposals.  Since Cessna did not do 
so, this aspect of the protest is untimely and will not be 
considered.[22]  See Stanford Telecomm., Inc., B-258622, Feb. 7, 1995, 
95-1 CPD  para.  50.

PAST PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

Cessna argues that the Air Force erred in assessing Beech's and 
Cessna's performance risk.  With respect to Beech, the protester 
argues that the agency failed to consider a recent guilty plea Beech 
entered in connection with disclosure violations related to a contract 
for the sale of aircraft to a foreign government.  With respect to its 
own proposal, the protester argues that the agency failed to update 
Cessna's past performance record to take into account a recent 
decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) 
favorable to Cessna.

We will review an evaluation of an offeror's performance risk to 
ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria, since the relative merit of competing proposals 
is primarily a matter of agency discretion.  See Dragon Servs., Inc., 
B-255354, Feb. 25, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  151.  An agency's evaluation of 
past performance may be based on its reasonable perception of 
inadequate prior performance, even where the contractor disputes the 
agency's interpretation of the facts.  See Pannesma Co. Ltd., 
B-251688, Apr. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  333.  Here, we have reviewed the 
record in light of the protester's arguments and find that it 
reasonably supports the Air Force's assessment of the protester's and 
Beech's past performance.

Performance Evaluation:  Beech

Cessna argues that the Air Force erred in assessing Beech's past 
performance because the agency ignored Beech's recent guilty plea 
arising from a foreign military sales (FMS) contract with the 
government of Egypt.  That plea stemmed from Beech's failure to 
certify to the government a subcontractor's payment of a contingent 
fee to a foreign company.[23]  The protester maintains that had the 
Air Force properly considered the plea agreement in its evaluation, 
Beech's performance risk scores would have been downgraded under 
several evaluation factors.  Cessna also contends that Beech misled 
the Air Force in its certification.

The RFP contained the clause entitled "Certification Regarding 
Debarment, Suspension, Proposed Debarment, and other Responsibility 
Matters," Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  sec.  52.209-5.[24]  In 
pertinent part, that clause states as follows:

 "(a)(1) The Offeror certifies, to the best of its knowledge and 
 belief, that--

 "(i) The Offeror and/or its Principals--

                    .     .     .     .     .

 "(B) Have [ ] have not [ ], within a [3]year period preceding this 
 offer, been convicted of or had a civil judgment rendered against 
 them for:  commission of fraud or a criminal offense in connection 
 with obtaining, attempting to obtain, or performing a public 
 (Federal, state, or local) contract or subcontract; violation of 
 Federal or state antitrust statutes relating to the submission of 
 offers; or commission of embezzlement, theft, forgery, bribery, 
 falsification or destruction of records, making false statements, or 
 receiving stolen property. . . ."

The record shows that Beech properly completed the certification in 
the affirmative and that Beech also provided a brief explanation of 
the circumstances surrounding the plea agreement.  The contracting 
officer referred the certification to the Air Force's Office of 
General Counsel, Contractor Responsibility Office (CRO).  The CRO 
reviewed Beech's certification and concluded that "[t]here are no 
issues of contractor integrity or responsibility that would affect the 
JPATS procurement process."  The record further shows that the SSA was 
fully briefed with respect to Beech's (and several other offerors') 
certification, and the conclusions reached by the CRO concerning 
Beech's eligibility for award.

Beech specifically disclosed the plea agreement in its proposal and 
briefly explained the circumstances leading to the plea; nothing on 
the face of the information Beech submitted to the agency called into 
question the correctness or sufficiency of the certification.  Thus, 
the record shows that the SSA had before her sufficient information 
concerning Beech's certification to permit her to incorporate that 
information and the CRO's conclusions in her integrated assessment of 
the merit of proposals, and ultimately to consider that information in 
her selection decision.

To the extent that Cessna alleges that Beech lacks business integrity, 
that is a challenge to an affirmative determination of responsibility 
which our Office will not review in the absence of a showing of 
possible fraud or bad faith on the part of contracting officials or a 
failure to apply definitive responsibility criteria.  John C. Holland 
Enters., B-216250, Sept. 24, 1984, 84-2 CPD  para.  336.  Neither exception 
applies here.  Further, contrary to Cessna's suggestion, the 
information Beech submitted concerning the plea agreement did not 
render the firm ineligible for award.  See, e.g., Pearl Properties; 
DNL Properties, Inc., B-253614.6; B-253614.7, May 23, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  
357; Universal Technologies, Inc.; Spacecraft, Inc., B-248808.2 et 
al., Sept. 28, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  212.

Performance Evaluation:  Cessna

The performance risk assessment group (PRAG) gave Cessna's proposal a 
performance risk rating of "moderate" under the "aircraft 
missionization" factor.  That rating was based primarily on 
unfavorable performance reports obtained from the Navy showing that 
Cessna had experienced several problems during its recent performance 
of a Navy contract, referred to as the Undergraduate Naval Flight 
Officer (UNFO) services contract.

The agency states that although nominally a services contract, the 
UNFO contract required some engineering development of off-the-shelf 
air-to-air ground radar equipment.  In its response to the Air Force's 
past performance questionnaire, the Navy reported that Cessna had 
experienced problems in meeting [DELETED] requirements and that 
contract specifications were changed so as to permit Cessna to meet 
those requirements.  The Navy also indicated that Cessna had 
difficulties in acquiring appropriate [DELETED] and had experienced 
problems in the areas of [DELETED].  The information obtained from the 
Navy showed that Cessna had been rated [DELETED] in most areas under 
the UNFO contract.  Based on its review of that information, the PRAG 
rated Cessna's performance risk under "aircraft missionization" as 
"moderate."  Cessna contends that the agency erred in this regard in 
view of the fact that the ASBCA[25] found that the performance 
problems and cost overruns reported under the UNFO contract were the 
result of the Navy's actions.

The protester argues that the evaluators had a duty to use the most 
current information available, and, thus, should have been aware of 
the ASBCA decisions.  We are aware of no requirement, however (and the 
protester does not cite to any) that a contracting agency search for 
information that contradicts or mitigates accurate, but unfavorable, 
past performance information.  Further, there is nothing to suggest 
that the reports the Navy provided to the Air Force concerning 
Cessna's performance problems under the UNFO contract were inaccurate 
or incomplete.[26]  

In addition, the record shows that in two separate CRs issued to 
Cessna, the Air Force specifically raised the performance problems the 
Navy reported on the UNFO contract.[27]  In its response, Cessna 
informed the Air Force that "Cessna's claims to recover the Navy 
responsible costs [under the UNFO contract] are currently in 
litigation."  The record shows, however, that the first ASBCA decision 
(No. 37726) on Cessna's UNFO contract claim had been issued 11 days 
prior to Cessna's response to the CRs; the second (No. 48118) was 
issued several weeks before oral discussions and nearly 3 months 
before BAFOs were due.  We think that it was incumbent upon Cessna to 
update its responses to the CRs concerning the UNFO contract, since, 
as the protester contends, the ASBCA decisions were favorable to 
Cessna, and the ASBCA decisions had been issued during the course of 
the evaluation process.  Although the protester was afforded several 
opportunities to do so, Cessna failed to inform the agency of the 
ASBCA decisions in its favor. Accordingly, we have no basis to 
disagree with the PRAG's assessment that based on the Navy's 
unfavorable reports, Cessna's proposal posed a "moderate" performance 
risk under "aircraft missionization."

MOST PROBABLE LIFE-CYCLE COST

Cessna takes issue with virtually every aspect of the Air Force's cost 
evaluation.  For example, Cessna contends that the Air Force 
misevaluated the costs associated with the number of times aircraft 
would be "stripped and repainted" and the frequency of required engine 
maintenance and overhauls.  Cessna also argues that the agency 
improperly disregarded its BAFO price reductions.  The protester also 
contends that the agency failed to take into account certain costs 
(such as different attrition rates); improperly adjusted labor costs 
for Cessna; and improperly included various other costs (such as the 
costs of inventory) in the evaluation.  In connection with these 
allegations, Cessna has presented its own analyses allegedly showing 
that either the assumptions underlying each of the agency's 
calculations are flawed, or that the agency applied incorrect figures.  
According to the protester, had the agency conducted a proper 
evaluation, it should have concluded that both of Cessna's proposals 
(i.e., the basic proposal and its "commercial" alternate) were lower 
in cost/price than Beech's proposal.  Specifically, according to 
Cessna's calculations, the agency should have found that its basic 
proposal was approximately [DELETED] lower in cost than Beech's 
proposal.[28]

In conducting a life-cycle cost analysis, procurement officials must 
make informed judgments as to the extent to which proposed prices 
represent a reasonable estimation of future costs.  Dynamic Energy 
Corp., B-235761, Oct. 6, 1989, 89-2 CPD  para.  325.  Such informed 
judgments are properly within the administrative discretion of the 
procuring agency, and its judgment is entitled to great weight since 
the agency is in the best position to assess the impact of various 
factors on future costs and must bear the impact of any difficulties 
or expenses that may result from a flawed cost analysis.  See Dynamic 
Energy Corp., supra.  Our review of the agency's cost analysis is 
limited to a determination of whether the evaluation was reasonable 
and consistent with the terms of the RFP.  See Corporate Air Servs. 
Inc., B-215053, Oct. 18, 1984, 84-2 CPD  para.  417.

In response to Cessna's numerous allegations, the agency has provided 
a detailed explanation of its calculations, including the assumptions 
underlying the cost panel's calculations in support of the MPLCC 
developed for Cessna, and the net impact of applying the protester's 
approach to the calculations.  The agency explains that, for the most 
part, even if it were to accept the protester's figures and 
assumptions, the impact on Cessna's MPLCC would be insignificant given 
the disparity of more than [DELETED] billion between Cessna's and 
Beech's MPLCC, and would not have affected the source selection 
decision.

We have reviewed the record in light of each of the protester's 
allegations, and agree with the agency that the protester's 
contentions lack merit.  To illustrate our conclusion, we briefly 
discuss two aspects of the agency's analysis with which the protester 
finds fault:  (1) "stripping and repainting" the aircraft; and (2) 
adjustments to Cessna's proposed BAFO reductions.

With respect to "stripping and repainting," Cessna asserts that the 
agency should have used a different number of aircraft as a basis to 
calculate the costs of these events.  The protester maintains that the 
Air Force based the estimated number of these events on the total 
anticipated fleet of aircraft (711), rather than the number of 
"primary aircraft authorized" (575).  The agency explains, however, 
that stripping and repainting, which is necessary to prevent corrosion 
and maintain uniform physical appearance, is a cost associated with 
the entire fleet, and not just with the 575 primary aircraft.  That 
is, the government intends to use all 711 aircraft contemplated under 
the contract in order to maintain a primary operational fleet of 575 
aircraft.  Thus, since all aircraft in the fleet would eventually 
undergo "stripping and repainting," we think that the agency 
reasonably used as a basis the total number of aircraft in the fleet.

With respect to adjustments to Cessna's BAFO, the protester alleges 
that the agency unreasonably determined that Cessna had failed to 
adequately support its BAFO cost reductions.  Specifically, Cessna 
alleges that the agency arbitrarily determined that its reductions in 
[DELETED] for instance, were not adequately supported.  According to 
the protester's calculations these errors resulted in overestimating 
its MPLCC by nearly [DELETED].

The RFP placed the burden of adequately documenting BAFO cost or price 
reductions on the offerors.  In this connection, several RFP 
provisions reminded offerors of the requirement to present "adequate 
supporting documentation to ensure that the cost/price proposal" was 
understood by the cost panel.  The RFP also reminded offerors to 
provide a description of the scope, limitations, and qualifications of 
the acquisition and CLS cost proposals, so as to allow the cost panel 
to adequately identify and analyze the offerors' costing methods.  In 
particular, section L of the RFP stated that offerors' "budgetary 
estimates for the acquisition contract outyears were to include 
assumptions, ground rules, methodology, and substantiating data."  In 
addition to these specific RFP instructions, the contracting officer's 
letter requesting BAFOs warned offerors that "[a]ny change 
incorporated in your BAFO must be fully explained, substantiated, and 
tracked to your previous proposal."  That letter went on to say that 
unsupported BAFOs or cost/price changes that were not adequately 
explained or lacked traceability to technical proposals "may not be 
considered credible in the final evaluation."

The record shows that while Cessna reduced its BAFO prices by what the 
agency considered to be a significant amount [DELETED], the cost panel 
concluded that contrary to the RFP's specific instructions, Cessna had 
not adequately supported its reductions.  Specifically, the evaluators 
concluded that rather than providing any explanatory rationale, Cessna 
had only provided cursory, conclusory statements for its BAFO 
reductions, which made it virtually impossible for the cost panel to 
trace the basis for the reductions.

For example, in its BAFO Cessna reduced its proposed [DELETED].

The cost panel concluded that while Cessna's statements might 
summarize the basis for its reductions, those statements, without more 
detailed documentation, were virtually meaningless in view of the 
magnitude of the reductions.  Specifically, the panel concluded that 
BAFO reductions based only on Cessna's [DELETED] statements did not 
provide the level of detail necessary for the government to develop an 
accurate MPLCC for Cessna.

The protester's argument that the agency's actions in this regard were 
unreasonable is without merit.  The record shows that in developing 
Cessna's MPLCC, the cost panel thoroughly reviewed Cessna's BAFO 
reductions and concluded that, given the lack of substantiation, 
Cessna's BAFO prices could not form the basis for predicting outyear 
life-cycle costs.  Rather than relying on Cessna's BAFO, the panel 
relied on what it had considered to be adequately substantiated, 
accurate data--Cessna's pre-BAFO prices.  

As already explained, the RFP contained specific instructions for 
offerors to provide detailed explanations with their BAFO to allow the 
cost panel to fully assess the basis of any price reductions.  The 
agency's letter requesting BAFOs also warned offerors of the 
consequences of their failure to adequately substantiate BAFO price 
reductions.  We have reviewed the information Cessna submitted with 
its BAFO and agree with the agency's position that in several 
respects, Cessna simply failed to provide sufficiently detailed 
explanations to allow the agency's cost panel to "trace" Cessna's BAFO 
reductions, or accurately forecast life-cycle costs for Cessna.  
Accordingly, we think that the cost panel's decision to rely on 
Cessna's pre-BAFO pricing information in developing certain aspects of 
the protester's MPLCC was reasonable.  See AmerInd, Inc., B-248324, 
Aug. 6, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  85.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. Offerors were required to submit proposals for supporting two 
approaches for CLS--(1) a combination of partial CLS for the Air Force 
and total CLS for the Navy; and (2) total CLS for the Air Force and 
the Navy.  The RFP stated that although the Air Force would evaluate 
both approaches, award would be based on only one approach.  The 
proposed award to Beech was based on the partial CLS approach.

2. Within the "operational utility/technical" area, the "operational 
capability" and "crew accommodations" factors were of equal 
importance, with each one of those two factors being more important 
than the remaining factors within this area.  The factors within each 
of the other areas were of equal importance.

3. The color/adjectival ratings were blue (exceptional); green 
(acceptable); yellow (marginal) and red (unacceptable).  Risk ratings 
were high, moderate, or low.

4. Beech's proposal received a proposal risk rating of "moderate" with 
"low" performance risk under the "crew accommodations" factor.

5. Cessna submitted two proposals, identified in the record as 
alternates "1" (the basic proposal) and "2," both of which were 
evaluated by the SSEB.  Cessna's basic proposal retained all of the 
model contract clauses included in the RFP; in its alternate "2" 
(which the protester refers to as its "commercial" proposal), Cessna 
proposed changes to several model contract clauses.  Cessna's 
"commercial" proposal received "moderate" proposal risk ratings under 
"aircraft missionization" and "aircraft management."  Both proposals 
received identical ratings in every other respect.

6. The MPLCC developed for Cessna's "commercial" proposal was 
[DELETED] billion, slightly less than the MPLCC developed for Cessna's 
basic proposal.

7. The Secretary of the Air Force was the SSA for this procurement.

8. The Rockwell International Corporation, another unsuccessful 
offeror, also filed protests in our Office challenging the award to 
Beech.  In our decision, Rockwell Int'l Corp., B-261953.2; B-261953.6, 
Nov. 22, 1995, 96-1 CPD  para.     , we denied Rockwell's protests.

9. In its initial protest, Cessna also challenged the evaluation of 
its proposal under the "certification/qualification," "aircraft 
missionization," and "manufacturing" factors.  In its comments on the 
agency report, Cessna expressly stated that it was not pursuing these 
specific issues.

10. Beech also asserts that Cessna's theory that twin-engine aircraft 
are inherently safer than single-engine aircraft trivializes a very 
complex issue involving several factors, of which the number of 
engines is but one.  Some of those factors include operational 
environment, adequacy of training and supervision, reliability and 
worthiness of aircraft structure and engines, flying characteristics, 
and other design features which interact to determine the relative 
safety of any aircraft.  The record indicates that there is 
considerable debate in the industry concerning this issue.

11. Cessna also contends that the Air Force improperly "coached" Beech 
throughout discussions and held unequal discussions with Beech and 
Cessna.  We have reviewed the voluminous record in these protests, 
particularly regarding written and oral discussions, and conclude that 
there is no evidence that the Air Force "coached" or otherwise treated 
offerors unequally during the discussions.  Cessna's arguments in this 
regard are simply without any support in the record.

12. Section M of the RFP described the purpose of the evaluation under 
this factor as follows:

        "Operational capability.  Evaluates the performance, flying 
        qualities, and training mission accomplishment of the proposed 
        production aircraft.  The evaluation will integrate the 
        results of the [f]light [e]valuation with the results of the 
        evaluation of the written proposal for the production 
        aircraft.  The operational capability assessment will be a 
        quantitative and qualitative evaluation conducted by 
        [g]overnment personnel to assess the offeror's aircraft's 
        suitability to perform a 65-sortie, 89-flying hour primary 
        training syllabus given an entry level student pilot with no 
        previous flying experience."

13. The evaluators noted that the change to performance or flying 
qualities was [DELETED].

14. Cessna argues that the Air Force used an unstated evaluation 
criterion in its evaluation of proposals under the "operational 
capability" factor, and that in so doing, the Air Force deprived 
Cessna of a meaningful opportunity to correct deficiencies.  Cessna 
also contends that the Air Force improperly "compressed" all technical 
color/adjectival scores into the "green" (acceptable) range, thus 
making it virtually impossible to distinguish between proposals of 
different technical merit.  Rockwell also raised these issues in its 
protests, and they were addressed and disposed of in our decision in 
Rockwell Int'l Corp., supra.

15. The evaluators also noted that [DELETED].

16. Cessna had apparently removed flight test instrumentation and 
recorders from its evaluation aircraft after the flight evaluation.

17. In fact, the record shows that based on the SSEB's initial 
evaluation, the agency identified several weaknesses and risks 
associated with the aircraft's [DELETED].  The record shows that the 
agency identified these problems during discussions with Cessna, and 
the protester's solutions resolved these problems to the SSEB's 
satisfaction.  The protester's argument that the agency failed to 
consider or recognize that its proposed solutions corrected 
deficiencies in its proposal, is without merit.

18. In addition [DELETED].

19. Cessna also challenges the agency's evaluation of its "commercial" 
or alternate "2" proposal.  In this connection, Cessna argues that the 
Air Force improperly downgraded the risk ratings the agency assigned 
to its alternate proposal and failed to consider the cost advantages 
associated with that proposal.   Cessna's arguments notwithstanding, 
the RFP did not encourage or favor "commercial" proposals.  Rather, 
the RFP merely permitted offerors to propose exceptions and deviations 
to the terms and conditions of the JPATS RFP and required offerors to 
provide a detailed rationale in support of the alternate proposal.  We 
have reviewed the record, including Cessna's alternate "2" proposal, 
the agency's evaluation materials, and the protester's submissions in 
this regard.  The record shows that the evaluators were not convinced 
by Cessna's rationale for the changes Cessna made in its alternate 
proposal.  Based on our review, we find no basis to question the 
agency's downgrading of Cessna's alternate "2" proposal under two risk 
factors.  Cessna's mere disagreement with the agency evaluators does 
not render the evaluation of its alternate proposal unreasonable.  
Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., B-250822; B-250822.2, Feb. 19, 1993, 93-1 
CPD  para.  201.

20. Each of these "cases" is a group of nine body dimensions used to 
describe the threshold population required to be accommodated.  The 
agency states that accommodation of a seventh case was a desired goal, 
but not an RFP requirement.

21. The remeasurement of the cockpit mock-up also allowed Cessna to 
correct several weaknesses in its cockpit, resulting in an improvement 
of the rating assigned Cessna's proposal under this factor from 
[DELETED].

22. To the extent that Cessna argues that the AFOTEC's evaluation was 
unreasonable, we have reviewed the record in this regard and find no 
basis to question the AFOTEC's final EOA report.  The record shows 
that each instance in which the AFOTEC changed Cessna's or Beech's 
initial ratings was the result of the AFOTEC's assessment of the 
offerors' responses to CRs and DRs.  Specifically, with respect to the 
protester's proposal, the record shows that the AFOTEC found that 
Cessna's proposed changes to its aircraft required additional testing, 
and reasonable downgraded the proposal accordingly.  Cessna's mere 
disagreement with the AFOTEC's judgment do not render the final EOA 
unreasonable.  See Mentor Technologies, Inc., B-258009, Nov. 17, 1994, 
94-2 CPD  para.  195.

23. The contract in question was for the sale of six Beech aircraft to 
Egypt.  Beech was required under the FMS program to file 
certifications with the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSSA) 
identifying any foreign components or services used in fulfilling the 
contract as well as any contingent fees paid in connection with the 
foreign sale.  Motorola, a subcontractor to Beech on the FMS contract, 
paid a contingent fee to an Egyptian firm in connection with the 
contract.  In its certifications to DSSA, however, Beech failed to 
identify that services had been procured from the Egyptian firm or 
that a contingent fee had been paid to that company in connection with 
the contract.  Beech was charged with furnishing a false certificate 
to DSSA.  The record shows that in May 1995, Beech entered a plea of 
guilty to one misdemeanor count resulting in fines and sanctions 
totaling more than $1 million.

24. The purpose of this certificate is to assist the contracting 
officer in determining an offeror's responsibility.  FAR  sec.  9.408. Even 
if that Cessna were correct that Beech's certification was deficient, 
the failure to properly complete the certification would not require 
the rejection of its proposal.  See Universal Technologies, Inc.; 
Spacecraft, Inc., B-248808.2 et al., Sept. 28, 1992, 92-2 CPD  para.  212; 
see also Intermountain Elec., Inc., B-236953.2, Jan. 31, 1990, 90-1 
CPD  para.  143.

25. The decisions, Cessna Aircraft Co., ASBCA No. 37726, Dec. 12, 
1994, 95-1 BCA  para.  27,373, and Cessna Aircraft Co., ASBCA No. 48118, 
Mar. 6, 1995, 95-1 BCA  para.  27,560, involved claims for equitable 
adjustments based upon constructive changes to contract 
specifications.  The agency points out that none of the disputes in 
decision No. 48118 involved technical issues that would bear on 
Cessna's performance risk assessment.  The agency also states that the 
Navy has appealed decision No. 48118 to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.

26. Further, the agency challenges Cessna's position that Cessna was 
not at fault, arguing that the Board left open the question of the 
degree of fault between the Navy and Cessna.  The agency states that 
the allocation of missionization risk/fault to Cessna alone could 
reasonably support a "moderate" performance risk assessment even if 
the PRAG had been made aware of the ASBCA decision.

27. Cessna also argues that the Air Force failed to conduct meaningful 
discussions with the firm because the agency did not give Cessna any 
notice that it believed that Cessna had failed to meet original 
[DELETED] with respect to the UNFO contract.  Contrary to the 
protester's assertions, the record shows that the Air Force informed 
Cessna during discussions of the performance problems the Navy 
reported under the UNFO contract.

28. Cessna also states that under a proper evaluation, its 
"commercial" alternate proposal would have been approximately 
[DELETED] lower in cost/price than Beech's proposal.