BNUMBER:  B-261953.2; B-261953.6
DATE:  November 22, 1995
TITLE:  Rockwell International Corporation

**********************************************************************

REDACTED DECISION
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.

Matter of:Rockwell International Corporation

File:     B-261953.2; B-261953.6

Date:     November 22, 1995

Alan R. Yuspeh, Esq., David R. Francis, Esq., Jerone C. Cecelic, Esq., 
Natalie S. Manzo, Esq., and Michael W. Ambrose, Esq., Howrey & Simon, 
for the protester.
Gerard F. Doyle, Esq., Ron R. Hutchinson, Esq., Scott A. Ford, Esq., 
Alexander T. Bakos, Esq., and Scott W. Woehr, Esq., Doyle &  Bachman; 
and Steven A. Kaufman, Esq., Clayton S. Marsh, Esq., and James M. 
Lichtman, Esq., Ropes & Gray, for Beech Aircraft Corporation, the 
interested party.
Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., Duncan Butts, Esq., Jeffrey Watson, Esq., 
Janice Beckett, Esq., Mark Otto, Esq., and Robert McGrath, Esq., for 
the agency.
Aldo A. Benejam, Esq., and Christine S. Melody, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protester's contention that agency improperly evaluated proposals 
is denied where the record shows that the agency evaluated in 
accordance with the criteria announced in the solicitation, and the 
record reasonably supports the evaluators' conclusions.

2.  Contracting agency reasonably evaluated protester's performance 
risk as "moderate" on several evaluation factors based upon 
unfavorable information in "contractor performance assessment reports" 
and in responses to questionnaires reflecting the protester's recent 
poor performance on other contracts.

3.  Agency conducted meaningful discussions where the record shows 
that the agency held written and oral discussions based on items 
consistent with the weaknesses and deficiencies identified in the 
protester's proposal, and the protester was afforded several 
opportunities to address the specific areas of its proposal considered 
weak or deficient and requiring further explanation.

4.  Award to offeror submitting a higher-rated, slightly higher-cost, 
low risk proposal is unobjectionable where the evaluation scheme 
announced in the solicitation gave more weight to the technical 
factors than to cost, and the agency reasonably found that the 
awardee's technical superiority and low risk were worth the higher 
cost.

DECISION

Rockwell International Corporation protests the proposed award of a 
contract to Beech Aircraft Corporation under request for proposals 
(RFP) No. F33657-94-R-0006, issued by the Department of the Air Force 
for a joint primary aircraft training system (JPATS).  Rockwell 
challenges the proposed award on several grounds including that the 
agency's evaluation of proposals was flawed and that the agency failed 
to conduct meaningful discussions with Rockwell.

We deny the protests.

BACKGROUND

The objective of the JPATS procurement is to replace the Air Force's 
T-37B and the Navy's T-34C aircraft and associated ground based 
training systems (GBTS).  The primary mission of the JPATS aircraft 
and GBTS is to train entry-level Air Force and Navy student pilots in 
primary flying and to prepare them to transition into advanced 
training tracks leading to qualification as a military pilot.  The 
JPATS aircraft and GBTS will also provide entry-level officers with a 
basic understanding of airmanship prior to their designation as Naval 
Flight Officers or Air Force Navigators, as well as provide support 
and training for pilot instructors.

The RFP characterized the acquisition as a "fly-before-buy" 
procurement.  That is, the RFP stated that as part of the evaluation 
process, the government would fly each offeror's proposed aircraft to 
assess its performance and flying qualities.  Thus, in addition to 
written proposals, offerors were required to provide an evaluation 
aircraft with flying qualities which duplicated those of the proposed 
production aircraft.  

The RFP stated that the flight evaluation would assess the capability 
of each aircraft to train an entry-level student pilot with no prior 
flying experience to the proficiency level required by the primary 
pilot training syllabus.  Air Force and Navy test pilots and customer 
pilots would evaluate each aircraft.  In addition, the Air Force's 
Operational Test and Evaluation Center (AFOTEC) would perform an early 
operational assessment of each aircraft during the flight evaluation.  
Offerors were also required to provide a mock-up of the proposed 
cockpit, which was to be evaluated for various characteristics (e.g., 
anthropometric range capability, lighting checks, and other 
engineering components).

The RFP, issued on May 18, 1994, contemplated the award of two 
contracts to one offeror--a fixed-price incentive contract with award 
fee and economic price adjustments for the manufacturing development 
of a primary training aircraft, with options for varying quantities of 
production aircraft;[1] and a fixed-price contract for a base period 
with up to nine 1-year options for logistics support.

Section M of the RFP stated that in evaluating proposals, the agency 
would consider three types of criteria:  (1) areas (related to 
important program characteristics); (2) assessment criteria (related 
to an offeror's proposal and ability to perform); and (3) cost/price 
and schedule.  The RFP listed the following evaluation areas in 
descending order of importance (factors within each area are shown in 
parentheses):  operational utility/technical (operational capability; 
crew accommodations; structural integrity; 
certification/qualification; aircraft missionization; and system 
safety); manufacturing and quality assurance (manufacturing; 
production control; and quality assurance); cost/price; logistics 
support (acquisition logistics; contractor logistics support (partial 
CLS); and total CLS for the Air Force and Navy);[2] management 
(aircraft management; and GBTS support and management); and schedule.  
The RFP stated that the manufacturing and quality assurance area was 
slightly more important than the cost/price area.[3]

The RFP further stated that, except for the cost/price and schedule 
areas, the agency would apply three "assessment criteria" of equal 
importance (soundness of approach, understanding the requirements, and 
compliance with requirements) to the evaluation areas.  The RFP also 
identified "general considerations" (including, but not limited to, 
proposed contractual terms and conditions and the results of the early 
operational assessment of each offeror's evaluation aircraft).  The 
agency would also assess proposal and performance risk.  The RFP 
stated that the integrated assessment of the results of the evaluation 
would favor proposals that offered the best value to the government 
considering development risk and total system life-cycle cost.  The 
contracts were to be awarded to the offeror whose proposal was 
considered to be most advantageous to the government.

Seven offerors responded to the RFP by the time set on July 18 for 
receipt of initial proposals.  Air Force and Navy pilots conducted 
flight evaluations and a source selection evaluation board (SSEB) 
evaluated written proposals.  Based on the results of those 
evaluations, the agency eliminated one offeror's proposal from further 
consideration, and initiated discussions with the remaining six 
offerors.  Following initial discussions, the agency issued amendments 
to the RFP; requested and evaluated revised proposals; held oral 
discussions; and requested best and final offers (BAFO).

The SSEB evaluated BAFOs by assigning color/adjectival and risk 
ratings[4] to each factor announced in the RFP.  Beech's proposal was 
rated "green" under all evaluation factors, with the exception of 
"crew accommodations" and "production control," where its proposal was 
rated "yellow" and "blue," respectively,[5] with low proposal and 
performance risk.

Rockwell's proposal was rated "green" with low risk under all 
evaluation factors, with the exception of "operational capability" 
where Rockwell's proposal received a rating of "yellow" with "high" 
proposal risk and "moderate" performance risk;  and 
"certification/qualification," "aircraft missionization" 
"manufacturing," and "GBTS support" where its proposal was downgraded 
under either proposal or performance risk to "moderate."  The agency 
also developed a most probable life-cycle cost (MPLCC) of $14.597 
billion for Beech, and [DELETED] billion for Rockwell.[6]

A source selection advisory council (SSAC) reviewed the results of the 
SSEB's final evaluation and presented its findings to the SSA.[7]  
Based on the SSAC's report, the SSA selected Beech for award.  These 
protests followed.[8]

PROTESTER'S CONTENTIONS

Rockwell challenges the proposed award on several grounds.  Rockwell 
argues that the agency unreasonably evaluated its proposed corrective 
actions to deficiencies the Air Force identified in its evaluation 
aircraft, and improperly introduced an unannounced evaluation 
criterion into the process.  The protester further maintains that the 
agency did not treat Rockwell's and Beech's proposals equally in the 
evaluation and improperly evaluated Rockwell's proposal and 
performance risk.  The protester also contends that the Air Force's 
discussions with Rockwell were not meaningful, and that the agency's 
approach to discussions gave Beech an unfair advantage.  Finally, the 
protester challenges the agency's cost/technical tradeoff decision, 
arguing that had the agency conducted a proper evaluation, the SSA 
would have selected Rockwell for award.

EVALUATION OF PROPOSALS

Evaluation of Rockwell's Proposed Corrective Actions

A team of Air Force and Navy instructor and test pilots evaluated 
Rockwell's aircraft as part of the flight evaluation under the 
"operational capability" factor. Section M of the RFP explained the 
purpose of the evaluation under this factor as follows:

     "Operational capability.  Evaluates the performance, flying 
     qualities, and training mission accomplishment of the proposed 
     production aircraft.  The evaluation will integrate the results 
     of the [f]light [e]valuation with the results of the evaluation 
     of the written proposal for the production aircraft.  The 
     operational capability assessment will be a quantitative and 
     qualitative evaluation conducted by [g]overnment personnel to 
     assess the offeror's aircraft's suitability to perform a 
     65-sortie, 89-flying hour primary training syllabus given an 
     entry level student pilot with no previous flying experience."

The flight evaluation team flew 13 "sorties" of Rockwell's aircraft 
totaling almost 24 flight hours.  The team identified several 
weaknesses and deficiencies in Rockwell's aircraft, resulting in a 
rating of "yellow" (marginal) with a "moderate" proposal risk under 
this factor, and issued to Rockwell four clarification requests (CR) 
and five deficiency reports (DR).  Rockwell responded to each of the 
CRs and DRs, and the agency evaluated those responses.  With the 
exception of the three DRs at issue here, the evaluators concluded 
that Rockwell had resolved their concerns with respect to the 
remaining six items.

The three DRs at issue concerned deficiencies with flying qualities of 
Rockwell's aircraft. [DELETED]

In its responses to those DRs, Rockwell proposed either aerodynamic 
changes to the external configuration of its aircraft or modifications 
to the aircraft's flight control system.  For example, in response to 
DR [DELETED]

On January 24, 1995, the Air Force issued amendment No. 0002 to the 
RFP.  As relevant to this aspect of the protest, the contracting 
officer's cover letter to the amendment stated in part:

     "Amendment 0002 provides a number of changes to the solicitation.  
     Offerors are reminded, however, that additional aircraft [f]light 
     [e]valuations will not be conducted.  Proposed changes by 
     [o]fferors that may affect the flying qualities of their proposed 
     production aircraft (e.g., responses to [DRs], responses to 
     solicitation amendments, [BAFOs] etc.) will not change the 
     results of the [g]overnment's [f]light [e]valuation.  However, 
     any proposed changes that may affect flying qualities may affect 
     the [g]overnment's integrated evaluation.  The [g]overnment will 
     assess the potential of proposed changes to either enhance or 
     degrade aircraft performance or flying qualities. . . ."

Subsequently, the agency issued amendment No. 0003.  Although the 
protester submitted a revised proposal in response to these 
amendments, Rockwell did not revise the aircraft modifications it had 
proposed in response to DRs [DELETED].   The evaluators found that the 
issues raised in those [DELETED] DRs remained unresolved, and 
concluded that each of the proposed solutions constituted extensive 
changes that placed at risk, without another flight evaluation, nearly 
all of the flying qualities/performance aspects of the evaluation 
aircraft.  As a result, the initial rating of "yellow" assigned 
Rockwell's proposal under the "operational capability" factor remained 
unchanged, and Rockwell's proposal risk rating under this factor was 
downgraded to "high."

Rockwell argues that the agency either did not consider its solutions, 
or failed to give due credit to its proposed corrective actions.  
Rockwell also maintains that the Air Force's approach to evaluating 
its responses to DRs [DELETED] introduced an unannounced evaluation 
criterion into the process.  In this connection, Rockwell points to 
labels in the SSAC's briefing charts which indicated to the SSA 
whether its proposed corrections affected the aircraft's flying 
qualities.

In reviewing a protest challenging an agency's technical evaluation, 
we examine the record to ensure that the agency's evaluation was 
reasonable and consistent with the stated evaluation criteria.  See 
Abt Assocs., Inc., B-237060.2, Feb. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  223.  Based 
on our review of the record here, we find no basis to question the 
agency's evaluation of Rockwell's proposed corrective actions.

The record shows that the SSEB reviewed Rockwell's proposed changes 
and concluded that the solutions affected the aerodynamic performance 
of the aircraft.  For instance, with respect to Rockwell's proposed 
solution to the [DELETED] DR, the evaluators found that while the 
proposed changes appeared to improve the [DELETED], the aircraft would 
have to be reflown to verify correction of the deficiency.

[DELETED] In addition, as already noted, the evaluators found that in 
order to verify whether the proposed solutions corrected the 
deficiencies, the aircraft would have to be reflown.  As a result of 
the deficiencies that remained unresolved, the initial rating of 
"yellow" (marginal) assigned to Rockwell's proposal under the 
"operational capability" factor remained unchanged, and the proposal 
risk rating was downgraded to "high."

The record does not support Rockwell's position that the Air Force 
failed to adequately consider its proposed solutions to the noted 
deficiencies.  What the record does show is that Rockwell provided 
either insufficient data or limited analyses to convince the 
evaluators that the noted deficiency was corrected.  With the 
exception of the corrections in response to DR [DELETED], it appears 
that Rockwell's solutions [DELETED]. With respect to DR [DELETED], the 
record shows that the SSEB carefully considered Rockwell's proposed 
solution, and concluded that the aircraft would have to be reflown to 
verify whether the proposed [DELETED] cured the deficiency.  The fact 
that the ratings the SSEB assigned Rockwell's proposal under the 
"operational capability" factor did not improve following discussions 
does not mean that the evaluators failed to consider Rockwell's 
responses.  Rather, the final ratings of "yellow" (marginal) and 
"high" proposal risk reflect the evaluators' reasonable conclusions 
based on their assessment of Rockwell's responses to the DRs that some 
of the deficiencies remained unresolved.

Unequal Evaluation

The protester also argues that the Air Force evaluated Rockwell's and 
Beech's corrective actions in response to the DRs in a disparate 
manner.  For instance, Rockwell asserts that Beech's initial rating 
under the "operational capability" factor improved from "yellow" to 
"green" following discussions based on Beech's proposed solutions, 
while Rockwell's rating did not improve under the same factor even 
though the protester provided similar data.  Rockwell also argues that 
the SSEB rated Beech's proposal "blue" under the "production control 
and quality assurance" factor for achieving some of the RFP's 
"desired" characteristics, but failed to assign a similar rating to 
Rockwell's proposal under the "crew accommodations" factor even though 
Rockwell's proposal met or exceeded the RFP's "desired" 
characteristics in that area.

In this regard, Beech's initial proposal was downgraded under the 
"operational capability" factor because the flight evaluation team was 
unable to assess the aircraft's [DELETED]. [DELETED].  The agency 
issued DRs to Beech identifying these deficiencies and Beech responded 
to the DRs.

In response to the [DELETED] DR, Beech proposed a different [DELETED].  
The agency evaluated Beech's responses and concluded that Beech's 
solution to [DELETED].  The agency also found that the change to 
performance or flying qualities was minimal, with a high probability 
that the proposed solution would correct the problem.  The record 
further shows that the additional data Beech provided concerning 
[DELETED] satisfied the evaluators' concerns in this regard.  Beech's 
proposed solution to the [DELETED] DR was a relatively simple design 
change considered to have minimal impact on the performance or flying 
qualities of the aircraft, and Beech's supplemental flight test data 
submissions were evaluated and found to satisfy the evaluators' 
concerns.[9]  Accordingly, we think that the improved rating assigned 
to Beech's proposal under the "operational capability" factor 
reasonably reflects the SSEB's conclusion.  

The fact that Rockwell's rating under the "operational capability" 
factor did not change following discussions does not show that the 
agency treated offerors differently, or that the agency's evaluation 
was unreasonable.  Rather, the final ratings reflect the fact that 
several of Rockwell's responses did not reasonably convince the 
evaluators that the proposed fixes would not place at risk other 
flying qualities of the aircraft.

Rockwell also challenges the evaluation of its proposal under several 
other factors, including "crew accommodations," "structural 
integrity," and "aircraft management."  We have reviewed the record, 
including Rockwell's proposal, the agency's evaluation materials, and 
the protester's submissions.  Based on our review, we find no basis 
for concluding that the evaluation of Rockwell's proposal under those 
factors was unreasonable, or that Beech was accorded preferential 
treatment in the evaluation as Rockwell contends.  Rockwell's mere 
disagreement with the agency evaluators does not itself render the 
evaluation unreasonable.  Allied-Signal Aerospace Co., B-250822; 
B-250822.2, Feb. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  201.[10]  To illustrate, we 
discuss the evaluation of the protester's proposal under the "crew 
accommodations" factor, where Rockwell argues that given the several 
features of its cockpit considered as strengths by the evaluators, its 
proposal should have received a rating of "blue" (rather than "green") 
under this factor.[11]

The final evaluation results show that while the SSEB noted several 
strengths in Rockwell's proposal under the "crew accommodations" 
factor, none of the strengths distinguished Rockwell's proposal from 
the rest under this factor.  For instance, the record shows that all 
offerors proposed to accommodate the desired pilot population sizes 
(of both men and women) and that this feature was listed as a strength 
in Rockwell's proposal as well.  Other features of Rockwell's cockpit 
mock-up also shared several strengths with other offerors' proposals.  
While the evaluators considered these features strengths in Rockwell's 
proposal, the evaluators considered Rockwell's [DELETED] to be a 
weakness.  In addition, the evaluation documents show that Rockwell 
proposed the minimum required [DELETED].  Based on these results, we 
have no basis to conclude that the rating of Rockwell's proposal under 
the "crew accommodations" factor was unreasonable.

Unannounced Evaluation Criterion

In the briefing charts to the SSAC and SSA, the SSEB used labels to 
indicate whether the offerors' proposed solutions to deficiencies 
identified during discussions had either "significant" (S) or "no 
significant" (NS) impact on the aircraft's flying qualities.  As 
already explained, since the evaluators were concerned over the impact 
Rockwell's proposed changes could have on the aircraft's flying 
qualities, the SSEB's briefing charts summarizing the evaluation of 
Rockwell's proposal show the letter "S" under the "operational 
capability" factor, reflecting the evaluators' concerns.  Rockwell 
maintains that by including that label in the briefing charts, the 
agency improperly introduced an unannounced criterion into the 
evaluation process.

We do not view the labels used by the SSEB in its briefing charts as 
separate ratings that constitute an unannounced evaluation criterion.  
Rather the "S/NS" labels the Air Force used in the final evaluation 
briefing charts simply reflected the evaluators' concerns--made known 
to Rockwell throughout discussions--regarding the extent to which the 
proposed corrections affected or placed at risk other flying qualities 
of Rockwell's aircraft.  In view of the RFP's requirement that the 
evaluation aircraft possess flying qualities that duplicated those of 
the proposed production aircraft, we see nothing objectionable in the 
agency's approach of indicating to the SSA the evaluators' conclusions 
regarding the degree to which Rockwell's proposed corrections placed 
at risk other aspects of the aircraft's flying qualities.

PERFORMANCE AND PROPOSAL RISK EVALUATION

The Air Force rated Rockwell's performance risk as "moderate" under 
three factors--"operational capability," "aircraft missionization," 
and "GBTS support and GBTS management"--primarily due to Rockwell's 
poor performance under another Air Force contract (the AC-130U Gunship 
Replacement Program, referred to in the record as the "Gunship" 
contract).  The agency also downgraded Rockwell's proposal risk 
ratings to "moderate" under the "certification/qualification" and 
"manufacturing" factors.  Rockwell argues that these ratings were 
unwarranted because the Gunship contract is "irrelevant" to the JPATS 
procurement.  In this connection, Rockwell asserts that the Gunship 
contract was a developmental contract,[12] while the JPATS RFP 
contemplates a production contract.  Rockwell also maintains that some 
of the features of the Gunship contract are different from or more 
complex than the requirements under the JPATS RFP.

In evaluating Rockwell's performance risk, the Air Force's performance 
risk assessment group (PRAG) considered unfavorable information 
contained in 34 contractor performance assessment reports (CPAR) and 
in responses to questionnaires covering Rockwell's recent performance 
on several projects, including the Gunship contract.  For example, the 
PRAG found that Rockwell's aircraft under the Gunship contract failed 
to meet [DELETED].   Recognizing that Rockwell could not meet contract 
requirements, the Air Force restructured that program, thereby 
essentially relaxing some of the requirements.  Rockwell's performance 
rating under that contract subsequently improved from "yellow" 
(marginal) to "green" (acceptable) in its most recent CPAR.  The PRAG 
also found that Rockwell's [DELETED] were weak on both the Gunship 
contract and on another project, referred to in the record as the B-1B 
contract.  In addition, the PRAG found that there were numerous 
[DELETED] and that Rockwell had failed to respond to Air Force 
concerns on the Gunship contract.

In response to the agency's CR item on the Gunship and B-1B contracts, 
Rockwell argued, as it does in this protest, that the Gunship contract 
was not relevant to the JPATs procurement, and pointed out several 
steps it had taken to improve the problems encountered under both 
contracts.  Rockwell also argued that the Air Force had caused some of 
the problems.  The PRAG concluded, however, that [DELETED].

Although Rockwell offers various explanations that provide a more 
favorable view of Rockwell's performance, there was sufficient 
evidence in the record for the Air Force to conclude that the firm had 
performance problems relevant to the factors at issue.  An agency's 
evaluation of past performance may be based on the procuring agency's 
reasonable perception of inadequate prior performance, even where the 
contractor disputes the agency's interpretation of the facts.  See 
Pannesma Co. Ltd., B-251688, Apr. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  333.  Based on 
our review of the record, we think that the "moderate" risk rating 
assigned Rockwell's proposal under these factors is consistent with 
the PRAG's conclusions based on the unfavorable information contained 
in the CPARs.[13]  

Rockwell's contention that the Gunship contract is irrelevant to the 
JPATS procurement is without merit.  In our view, Rockwell's failure 
to [DELETED] for instance, were aspects of Rockwell's performance 
relevant to the PRAG's assessment.  The fact that specific features of 
the Gunship contract may be different from requirements under the 
JPATS RFP does not render Rockwell's poor performance under that 
contract "irrelevant" to the PRAG's assessment.

DISCUSSIONS

Rockwell argues that the agency's discussions with the firm were 
flawed in several respects.  For instance, the protester argues that 
the Air Force should have informed Rockwell in the request for BAFOs 
that the evaluators' concerns regarding the aircraft's [DELETED] had 
not been resolved.  The protester also maintains that the agency 
improperly failed to inform Rockwell that the evaluators considered a 
[DELETED] Rockwell imposed on its evaluation aircraft to be a 
deficiency.  The protester also contends that the agency did not treat 
Beech and Rockwell equally during discussions.[14]

The requirement for meaningful discussions with offerors is satisfied 
by advising them of deficiencies in their proposals and affording them 
the opportunity to satisfy the government's requirements through the 
submission of revised proposals.  Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  
15.610(c)(2) and (5); TM Sys., Inc., B-228220, Dec. 10, 1987, 87-2 CPD  para.  
573.  Here, based on our review of the record, we conclude that the 
agency's discussions with Rockwell were meaningful.

As discussed earlier, the agency issued several CRs and DRs 
specifically identifying those areas of Rockwell's evaluation aircraft 
found deficient or requiring further explanation.  Specifically, DRs 
[DELETED] pointed out deficiencies with respect to the aircraft's 
[DELETED].  In addition, the oral questions the Air Force prepared for 
Rockwell addressed each one of the issues remaining unresolved.[15]  
The record shows that the Air Force issued to Rockwell detailed items 
for the oral discussions, tailored for the particular deficiencies 
noted in the DRs.  The record is thus clear that the agency pointed 
out to Rockwell during both written and oral discussions those areas 
of its proposal found weak or deficient and requiring further 
clarification or correction.

Rockwell's allegation that the agency failed to inform it that its 
proposed corrective actions were outside an acceptable range of 
solutions is simply without merit.  As described above, after 
evaluating its responses to the DRs, the Air Force issued to Rockwell 
questions for oral discussions.  The record shows that those questions 
clearly placed Rockwell on notice that based on their evaluation of 
Rockwell's proposed solutions, the evaluators remained concerned over 
the impact those corrective actions could have on the flying qualities 
and performance characteristics of the production aircraft.  The 
record shows that the agency specifically informed Rockwell throughout 
the discussions that the evaluators believed that the design changes 
Rockwell proposed in response to DRs [DELETED] significantly affected 
the flying qualities of its aircraft; that the proposed modifications 
placed at risk, without another flight evaluation, nearly all of the 
flying qualities evaluated during the initial flight evaluation; and 
that the agency would not conduct another flight evaluation.  Thus, 
Rockwell was made aware of the agency's concerns and was given ample 
opportunity to submit other solutions to the deficiencies that would 
not impact on the flying qualities of the evaluation aircraft, and 
chose not to do so.

Contrary to Rockwell's assertions, there is no support in the record 
that the agency considered its proposed corrective actions to be 
outside a predetermined range of acceptability.  Rather, the record 
clearly shows that the agency considered Rockwell's responses to the 
CRs and DRs, and specifically informed the protester during written 
and oral discussions of its concerns over the impact the corrective 
actions had on the aircraft's flying qualities.  Further, to the 
extent that Rockwell argues that the Air Force should have informed it 
in its request for BAFOs of weaknesses or deficiencies remaining in 
its proposal, agencies are not required to notify offerors of 
deficiencies remaining in their proposals or to conduct successive 
rounds of discussions until such deficiencies are removed.  See Hughes 
Training, Inc., B-256426.4, Jan. 26, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  154.  In our 
view, the Air Force's approach to discussions was reasonable.[16]

With respect to the [DELETED] Rockwell's proposal stated that its 
aircraft's test [DELETED]. As a result of that [DELETED] the 
evaluators were unable to fully assess certain aspects of the 
evaluation aircraft such as [DELETED] performance and [DELETED] 
characteristics.  Rockwell maintains that had the agency raised its 
concerns [DELETED] during discussions, it could have provided 
additional data to satisfy the agency's concerns.

As already explained, the RFP required offerors to provide an 
evaluation aircraft capable of performing maneuvers in accordance with 
an established syllabus, and that possessed flying qualities (e.g., 
aerodynamics, controls, and center of gravity, etc.) which duplicated 
those of the proposed production aircraft.  Clearly, by placing a 
[DELETED] the protester either knew or should have known that the 
evaluators' ability to fully assess the flying qualities and 
performance characteristics of the aircraft would be seriously 
limited.  Rockwell, aware of that [DELETED] was obligated to submit 
sufficient [DELETED] flight data with its proposal to demonstrate 
that, without the [DELETED] its production aircraft would meet the 
RFP's minimum performance requirements.[17]   See Cyber Digital, Inc., 
B-255225, Feb. 18, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  123.  Given the RFP's requirement 
and given that Rockwell was well aware of the effect that the 
[DELETED] would have on its evaluation aircraft, we think that the 
agency was not required to remind the protester during discussions 
that its aircraft could not be fully evaluated as a result of the 
[DELETED].

Rockwell also contends that the agency conducted unequal discussions 
because the Air Force allegedly provided Beech with opportunities to 
present more information during oral discussions than Rockwell was 
permitted to provide.  In this regard, offerors were limited to only 
one "viewgraph" for each oral question the Air Force issued.[18]  
Rockwell complains that the Air Force asked Beech 28 questions 
regarding a particular issue, thereby allowing Beech to prepare 28 
viewgraphs in response to that item, and that Rockwell was not asked a 
similar number of questions regarding any of its remaining 
deficiencies.

Contracting agencies have wide discretion in determining the nature 
and scope of negotiations.  While discussions must provide offerors 
with an equal opportunity to revise their proposals, the content and 
extent of discussions are within the discretion of the contracting 
officer.  See Tritech Field Eng'g, Inc., B-255336.2, April 13, 1994, 
94-1 CPD  para.  261.  Since the number and type of deficiencies, if any, 
will vary among proposals, there is no requirement that all offerors 
receive the same number or type of discussion questions.  Textron 
Marine Sys., B-255580.3, Aug. 2, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  63.  Rather, the 
agency should individualize the evaluated deficiencies of each offeror 
in its conduct of discussions.  Pan Am World Servs., Inc.; et al., 
B-231840, et al., Nov. 7, 1988, 88-2 CPD  para.  446; Indian Community 
Health Servs., Inc., B-217481, May 15, 1985, 85-1 CPD  para.  547.  Because 
the degree of deficiencies in proposals will vary, the amount of 
specificity or detail of discussions will also vary among the 
offerors.  Pope Maintenance Corp., B-206143.3, Sept. 9, 1982, 82-2 CPD  para.  
218.

The record clearly shows that Beech and Rockwell were each presented 
with CRs and DRs and oral discussion items, tailored to the specific 
deficiencies identified in their written proposals or in their 
respective evaluation aircrafts.  The fact that Beech was presented 
with a different number of questions on any particular issue than was 
Rockwell is simply a reflection of the results of the evaluation of 
proposals and the offerors' responses to the CRs and DRs, rather than 
any inequality in the treatment of offerors.  For example, in response 
to one DR, Beech included a detailed table of test points for 
[DELETED] "runs" Beech had conducted since the flight evaluation.  
During oral discussions, the Air Force asked Beech the same two 
questions with respect to [DELETED].  Different runs from the 
[DELETED] listed in Beech's response (and, thus, Beech was permitted 
to present one viewgraph in response to each question).  Accordingly, 
the record shows that the number of viewgraphs Beech presented was a 
function of Beech's detailed responses to DRs, and not the result of 
unequal treatment of offerors.  Moreover, Rockwell had ample 
opportunity to submit additional information to satisfy the Air 
Force's concerns in its responses to the CRs and DRs; in its revised 
proposal in response to the RFP's amendments; during oral discussions; 
and in its BAFO.  All offerors, including Rockwell, were requested to 
submit a BAFO after oral discussions, and were permitted to make any 
changes to their offers deemed appropriate based on the written and 
oral discussions.  Thus, Rockwell was afforded the same opportunities 
as the other offerors to respond to the agency's concerns.  If 
Rockwell believed that it did not respond fully to the agency's 
concerns during discussions, the firm could have done so in its BAFO.  
See Ways, Inc., B-255219, Feb. 17, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  120.  There is no 
support in the record for the protester's suggestion that offerors 
were not treated equally during discussions.[19]

COST/TECHNICAL TRADEOFF

Rockwell argues that the selection of Beech's proposal was improper 
because the SSA placed undue weight on two aspects of Beech's 
MPLCC--low production cost and low fuel usage.  Rockwell maintains 
that the SSA's reliance on those two components of cost essentially 
made them unannounced evaluation criteria.  According to the 
protester, had the agency conducted a proper evaluation, the SSA would 
have realized that Rockwell's proposal represented the best value to 
the government.

In a negotiated procurement, there is no requirement that award be 
made on the basis of lowest cost unless the RFP so specifies.  Henry 
H. Hackett & Sons, B-237181, Feb. 1, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  136.  
Cost/technical tradeoffs may be made, and the extent to which one may 
be sacrificed for the other is governed only by the tests of 
rationality and consistency with the established evaluation factors.  
Grey Advertising, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 1111 (1976), 76-1 CPD  para.  325.  
Awards to offerors with higher technical scores and higher costs are 
proper so long as the result is consistent with the evaluation 
criteria, and the procuring agency reasonably determines that the 
technical difference is worth the cost premium.  Bendix Field Eng'g 
Corp., B-241156, Jan. 16, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  44.

The protester's allegation that the SSA placed undue weight on 
unannounced evaluation criteria is without merit.  The source 
selection decision document shows that the SSA based her decision on 
an integrated review of the evaluation results, including the terms 
and conditions agreed to during negotiations, and the results of the 
early operational assessment of the aircrafts.

The record shows that the SSA specifically considered several 
strengths of Beech's proposal under the most important evaluation 
factors, and concluded that Beech's proposal provided the best value 
to the government overall.  For instance, the SSA noted that Beech 
proposed the only aircraft with no weaknesses under the "operational 
capability" factor, and that Beech's aircraft was the only aircraft 
that met the primary flight training requirements without 
modifications or additional student pilot training.  The SSA also 
noted that Beech's aircraft was tolerant to five of six common student 
errors and displayed excellent spin performance.  The SSA's decision 
also specifically cites specific strengths the evaluators noted with 
respect to Beech's proposed cockpit.  The SSA found that Beech 
proposed a superior approach over other offerors with respect to 
manufacturing and quality assurance, and logistics support.  The SSA 
specifically noted that Beech's proposal satisfied all scheduling 
requirements, and that Beech's past and current performance on other 
contracts earned the proposal performance and proposal risk ratings of 
"low" under all evaluation factors.  While the SSA noted that Beech's 
MPLCC was not the lowest, the SSA specifically found that Beech's 
MPLCC was only slightly higher than the lowest evaluated MPLCC in the 
competition.

Based on her integrated assessment, the SSA concluded that the 
superior characteristics of Beech's proposal and that firm's lower 
performance and proposal risks were worth its slightly higher cost. 
Contrary to the protester's suggestion, the SSA did not accord undue 
weight to Beech's low production cost and low fuel usage.  Rather, 
these were only two aspects which the SSA considered in her assessment 
of Beech's proposal.[20]  Based on our review of the record, we find 
that the SSA reasonably concluded, consistent with the RFP, that 
Beech's proposal presented the best value to the government.  See 
DynCorp, B-245289.3, July 30, 1992, 93-1 CPD  para.  69. 

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. The RFP was structured so as to permit the agency to acquire 
varying quantities of aircraft during several fiscal years depending 
on its needs.  For instance, contract line item number (CLIN) 3001 
stated that for fiscal year 1996, the contractor is to provide from 1 
to 6 production aircraft, with a "target" quantity of 3 production 
aircraft.  Similarly, for fiscal year 1997, CLIN 4001 called for the 
contractor to provide from 9 to 15 aircraft, with a target quantity of 
12.  For each CLIN, offerors were to submit unit prices per aircraft 
for the range of quantities under each CLIN. 

2. Offerors were required to submit proposals for supporting two 
approaches for CLS--(1) a combination of partial CLS for the Air Force 
and total CLS for the Navy, and (2) total CLS for the Air Force and 
the Navy.  The RFP stated that although the Air Force would evaluate 
both approaches, only one would be included in the acquisition.  The 
proposed award to Beech was based on the partial CLS approach.

3. Within the "operational utility/technical" area, the "operational 
capability" and "crew accommodations" factors were of equal 
importance, with each one of those two factors being more important 
than the remaining factors within this area.  The factors within each 
of the other areas were of equal importance.

4. The color/adjectival ratings are blue (exceptional); green 
(acceptable); yellow (marginal) and red (unacceptable).  Risk ratings 
were high, moderate, or low.

5. Beech's proposal received a proposal risk rating of "moderate" 
under the "crew accommodations" factor.

6. In its agency report to our Office, the Air Force states that it 
discovered mathematical errors in the MPLCC figures developed for 
Beech and Rockwell that were presented in the final briefing to the 
source selection authority (SSA).  These errors apparently occurred in 
transferring figures from spreadsheets to briefing charts, and 
omitting some items that should have been included.  The agency states 
that the correct figures further widen the difference between Beech's 
and Rockwell's MPLCC by $59 million.

7. The Secretary of the Air Force was the SSA for this procurement.

8. The Cessna Aircraft Company, another unsuccessful offeror, has also 
filed protests (B-261953.3; B-261953.4; and B-261953.5) challenging 
the proposed award to Beech.  The issues raised in Cessna's protests 
will be addressed in a separate decision.

9. In addition to quantitative flight test data concerning [DELETED].

10. Rockwell also suggests that the SSEB was biased in its evaluation 
of proposals.  Prejudicial motives will not be attributed to 
contracting officials on the basis of unsupported allegations, 
inferences, and suppositions as advanced by Rockwell.  See Avogadro 
Energy Sys., B-244106, Sept. 9, 1991, 91-2 CPD  para.  229.  Nothing in the 
record indicates bias or bad faith on the part of the evaluators.

11. Rockwell claims that in light of the number, size, and 
sophistication of the offerors, the paucity of "blue" ratings shows 
that the agency's evaluation was unreasonable.  Except for its general 
contention, however, the protester has not presented any evidence 
showing that the agency's approach to evaluating proposals was 
unreasonable.  Moreover, to the extent that Rockwell is challenging 
the specific lower ratings assigned to other unsuccessful offerors' 
proposals, Rockwell is not an interested party to raise this 
allegation.  See 4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.0(a) (1995).  The proper parties to 
raise this allegation are the other unsuccessful offerors, each of 
whom has a more direct interest in the outcome of such a challenge.  
See, e.g., Integrated Sys. Group, Inc., B-246446, Feb. 21, 1992, 92-1 
CPD  para.  213.

12. The Gunship contract was a fixed-price contract to design, 
develop, test, and produce 13 side-firing AC-130U Gunship aircraft 
utilizing C-130H airframes.

13. Rockwell asserts that the CPARs were biased due to pending 
litigation.  In this connection, Rockwell states that at the time the 
CPARs were prepared, the firm had several claims pending against the 
Air Force under the Gunship contract.  Rockwell contends that the 
unfavorable information in the CPARs was a deliberate attempt by the 
agency to buttress its defense to the pending claims.  This argument 
is speculative at best.  In any case, Rockwell does not deny that 
there were performance problems under the Gunship contract.  Rather, 
Rockwell insists that any performance problems on that project were 
attributable to the type of contract involved and to government 
action.  [DELETED].

14. In its protest, Rockwell also argued that the Air Force had failed 
to raise during discussions that the AFOTEC evaluation had detected 
difficulties regarding [DELETED]. The agency responded to this 
allegation in its report, and the protester does not take issue with 
the agency's position in this regard.  Accordingly, we consider the 
issue abandoned.  See Heimann Sys. Co., B-238882, June 1, 1990, 90-1 
CPD  para.  520.

15. For instance, the agency's discussion item addressing the 
[DELETED].

16. Rockwell argues that the RFP stated that the procurement would be 
conducted in accordance with Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement Appendix AA, "Formal Source Selection for Major 
Acquisitions."  According to Rockwell, that regulation required that 
the Air Force inform it in the request for BAFOs of any deficiencies 
remaining in its proposal.  As already explained, we think that the 
agency's approach to discussions was reasonable.  In any case, such 
regulations are internal instructions to aid agency personnel and do 
not provide outside parties with any legal rights.  See Sabreliner 
Corp., B-242023; B-242023.2, Mar. 25, 1991, 91-1 CPD  para.  326, n. 16.

17. In any event, the [DELETED] DR, placed Rockwell on notice that the 
evaluators were concerned with difficulties related to the aircraft's 
[DELETED] characteristics.  Rockwell had ample opportunity to provide 
additional [DELETED] data in response to this DR, and failed to do so.

18. To the extent that Rockwell challenges the agency's approach of 
limiting offerors to one viewgraph per discussion item, this 
allegation is untimely.  See 4 C.F.R.  sec.  21.2(a)(2).  If Rockwell 
objected to the agency's one viewgraph per item rule, it was required 
to raise its objections within 10 days of learning of the agency's 
approach, or by April 10.  Entwistle Co., B-248464.2, Nov. 2, 1992, 
92-2 CPD  para.  296.  Since Rockwell did not file its protests until July, 
this allegation is untimely.

19. The protester relies on our decision in National Medical Staffing, 
Inc., B-259402; B-259402.2, Mar. 24, 1995, 95-1 CPD  para.  163, to argue 
that the Air Force conducted unequal discussions.  In that case, 
unlike the facts here, we concluded that the agency's discussions were 
flawed and sustained the protest because the agency failed to advise 
the protester during discussions of weaknesses in its proposal, while 
it advised two other offerors of the same weaknesses in their 
proposals.  As already explained, that was not the case here.

20. Even a cursory review of the source selection document shows that 
Rockwell's contention that the SSA placed undue weight on Beech's low 
production cost and low fuel usage is meritless.  After a detailed 
discussion of the strengths of Beech's proposal under the most 
important evaluation factors, the SSA noted that "Beech exhibited the 
lowest most probable production cost and low fuel usage."  Given the 
SSA's detailed analysis of the strengths and benefits of Beech's 
proposal under several factors, it cannot be said that the SSA placed 
undue weight on those two components of the MPLCC in her selection 
decision.