BNUMBER: B-260983.3
DATE: October 13, 1995
TITLE: Safeguard Maintenance Corporation
**********************************************************************
DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a
GAO Protective Order. This version has been redacted or approved by
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Safeguard Maintenance Corporation
File: B-260983.3
Date:October 13, 1995
Thomas J. Madden, Esq., Fernand A. Lavallee, Esq., and Carla Draluck
Craft, Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, L.L.P., for the
protester.
Donald M. Suica, Esq., Duane M. Zezula, Esq., and Corlyss Drinkard,
Esq., Department of the Treasury, for the agency.
Charles W. Morrow, Esq., and James A. Spangenberg, Esq., Office of the
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.
DIGEST
Protest that proposal was improperly excluded from the competitive
range is sustained where the procuring agency misevaluated the
proposal in three significant respects and the record indicates that
under a proper evaluation the proposal may have received a higher
technical score than at least one higher-priced competitive range
proposal.
DECISION
Safeguard Maintenance Corporation protests the exclusion of its
proposal from the competitive range under request for proposals (RFP)
No. IRS-94-0005, a total small business set-aside, issued by the
Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for
janitorial services.
We sustain the protest.
The IRS issued the RFP on April 21, 1994, to procure janitorial, lawn
and grounds maintenance, trash removal, snow removal, and related
services at the Martinsburg Computing Center (MCC), Martinsburg, West
Virginia, for a base period with 4 option years. The RFP solicited
technical proposals and line item prices for fixed price and
indefinite quantity work at the MCC main computing center and an MCC
annex that was under construction.[1] The RFP contained detailed
cleaning and quality requirements, including frequency of cleaning.
Among the services described in section J of the RFP was "utility
work," which required the contractor to provide hours on a daily
basis, beyond those required to perform the basic contract work, to
cover other work that may be ordered by the contracting officer's
technical representative (COTR).
Award under the RFP was to be made to the technically acceptable,
responsible offeror whose proposal was most advantageous to the
government, price and other factors considered. Technical
considerations were said to be more important than cost. There were
three technical factors described in the RFP, under each of which
various subfactors were described. The specific weights of the
factors and subfactors, expressed as a percentage on a 100-percent
scale, were disclosed. The technical factors and their respective
weights were "Management Capabilities"--40 percent, "Operating
Plan"--25 percent, and "Experience"--35 percent. Among the subfactors
of the management capabilities factor were "Organizational Plan"--10
percent, "Staffing"--10 percent, and "Training Programs"--4 percent.
Among the Subfactors of the operating plan factor was "Timeliness"--4
percent. The two subfactors of the experience factor were "Prime
Contractor's Project Experience"--25 percent and "Contract
Personnel"--10 percent.
On June 24, the IRS received 14 proposals in response to the RFP,
including Safeguard's. The proposals were evaluated by a two-member
technical evaluation panel (TEP) that used an adjectival and weighted
numerical rating system to determine each proposal's technical
score.[2] The initial TEP evaluation identified eight technically
"acceptable" proposals with point scores ranging from 48.70 to 88.60
points; Safeguard's proposal received a score of 51.20 points. The
IRS rejected the remaining proposals. Without conducting discussions,
the TEP then reevaluated the eight proposals and awarded revised
scores ranging from 39.40 to 89.35 points; Safeguard's proposal
received a score of 49.60 points.
Based upon there revised evaluation, the IRS established a competitive
range consisting of the three highest-ranked offers rated as follows:
OfferorPrice Points
Miracle Services, Inc.[DELETED]89.4
Potomac Valley Custodial Services[DELETED]79.6
Spotless Janitorial Services[DELETED]70.1
The IRS eliminated from the competitive range Safeguard's lower-rated
proposal priced at [DELETED]. The TEP summarized Safeguard's proposal
deficiencies as follows:
Safeguard's proposal reflects a lack of experience in ADP
[automatic data processing] facilities similar to the size and
complexity of MCC. Additionally, Safeguard's proposal did not
meet the SOW [statement of work] requirements in the subfactors
of Organizational Plan, Staffing and Training under the
Management Capabilities criterion."
Discussions were conducted with the competitive range offerors, and
best and final offers (BAFO) were received by March 13, 1995. Because
the IRS determined that none of the BAFOs met all of the
requirements,[3] the IRS conducted a second round of discussions and
received revised BAFOs by March 15. Under the final evaluation,
Potomac Valley's BAFO, priced at [DELETED] was the highest rated with
a score of 83.8 points.[4] Spotless' BAFO, priced at [DELETED],
received a score of 78.3 points. Miracle's revised BAFO was rejected
as unacceptable for failing to propose sufficient hours. Award was
made to Potomac Valley on March 29.
Safeguard then protested the evaluation and exclusion of its proposal
from the competitive range.[5] The TEP Chairman, after reviewing the
protest, reevaluated Safeguard's proposal and lowered its score from
49.6 points to 32.6 points; in this reevaluation the Chairman
basically lowered Safeguard's score to zero for the training,
timeliness, and prime contractor's project experience subfactors.[6]
Safeguard contends that its proposal was unreasonably evaluated and
unequally evaluated as compared to the evaluation of the other
proposals. The specific subfactors that Safeguard asserts were
misevaluated were organizational plan, staffing, training, timeliness,
and prime contractor's project experience. Safeguard argues that but
for the agency's improper evaluation its proposal would have scored
comparably with the competitive range proposals and would have been
included in the competitive range.
In reviewing an agency's decision to exclude a proposal from the
competitive range, we look first to the agency's evaluation of
proposals to determine whether the evaluation had a reasonable basis.
Intown Properties, Inc., B-249036.3, Jan. 15, 1993, 93-1 CPD para. 45.
Although we will not independently determine the merits of a proposal,
in reviewing an agency's evaluation, we examine the record to ensure
that the evaluation was reasonable and consistent with the evaluation
criteria. A.G. Personnel Leasing, Inc., B-238289, Apr. 24, 1990, 90-1
CPD para. 416. Such judgments
by their nature are often subjective; nonetheless, the exercise of
these judgments in the evaluation of proposals must be reasonable and
must bear a rational relationship to the announced criteria upon which
competing offerors are to be selected. NITCO, B-246185, Feb. 21,
1992, 92-1 CPD para. 212.
Based upon our review, we find that the IRS unreasonably evaluated
Safeguard's proposal under the organizational plan, staffing, and
prime contractor's project experience subfactors and unreasonably
reevaluated Safeguard's proposal under the training and timeliness
subfactors, such that the record does not support the eIimination of
Safeguard's proposal from the competitive range.[7]
With regard to the organizational plan subfactor, the IRS awarded
Safeguard's proposal zero out of a possible 10 points. The basis for
this evaluation, as documented in the contemporaneous evaluation
sheets, was that Safeguard's proposal assertedly did not provide for
an on-site project manager, which the IRS alleges was required by the
RFP.
Under the organizational plan subfactor, the RFP required the
following information:
"[p]rovide a plan depicting the structure of the corporation; the
local office and the authority and responsibilities of the
on-site management to solve problems, assign work, hire
personnel; and the abilities and skills available for local
performance. Also important in this plan is the apparent intent
and ability of the corporate headquarters to support the
custodial operations at the [MCC]."
In addition, section G.1.3 of the RFP stated that the contractor shall
provide a "Project Manager" with the authority to make any no-cost
contract technical hiring and dismissal decisions, or special
arrangements regarding the contract. The RFP further stated that the
project manager shall be responsible for the overall management and
coordination of the contract, shall act as the central point of
contact for the government, and shall have full authority to act for
the contractor in the performance of the required services.[8]
Section H.19 advised that the project manager was required to possess
recent experience in the management of custodial
operations of the approximate size and complexity of the IRS
buildings.
Safeguard's proposal contained an organizational chart[9] and
narrative describing the structure of its corporation and
organization. The proposal described its local office as well as the
authority and responsibilities of on-site management to solve
problems, assign work, and hire personnel. It further described the
skills available for local performance as well as its ability to
support the MCC operation. Safeguard proposed a project manager,[10]
who was to be located off-site and who was to assist in the on-site
management, which was to be led by a specifically identified on-site
supervisor.[11] Safeguard assigned the contract functions that the
RFP reserved to the project manager under G.1.3 to the on-site
supervisor, including no-cost hire and fire decisions. As indicated
in Safeguard's proposal, the on-site supervisor was to report directly
to the project manager and the project manager was "to assist the
on-site supervisor in the daily routine of job performance and project
personnel management," but the right to hire or fire the on-site
supervisor was reserved to the company president.
We find, however, no requirement in the RFP for the project manager to
be located on-site; neither do we find any suggestion of a preference
for an on-site project manager.[12] Moreover, the IRS has not pointed
to any provision in the RFP precluding the delegation of these project
manager duties, or otherwise explained why Safeguard's proposal did
not meet the substance of the IRS' requirements, given that Safeguard
proposed an on-site management figure with the same authority
reflected in G.1.3 and experience required by H.19.[13]
While the IRS may have considered an on-site project manager to be
more desirable and might have properly lowered Safeguard's score in
light of this concern, since the RFP did not require an on-site
project manager and since Safeguard met the requirement to have an
on-site management official with the appropriate authority and
experience, we find that the IRS had no reasonable basis for scoring
Safeguard's proposal with zero points for this subfactor. See
Gardiner, Kamya & Assocs., B-258915.2, Apr. 12, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 193;
J.M. Cashman, Inc., B-233773, Apr. 14, 1989, 89-1 CPD para. 380.
Based upon its post-protest reevaluation, the IRS nevertheless argues
that the zero score is justified because the organizational chart and
narrative allegedly are ambiguous in that the relationships between
the corporate president, project manager, and on-site supervisor
assertedly cannot be clearly discerned from the submitted material.
As indicated by our foregoing discussion, we find no real ambiguity in
Safeguard's proposal. For example, while IRS makes much of the
alleged confusion attendant with the use of the terms on-site program
manager and program manager in Safeguard's proposal in addition to
on-site supervisor and project manager, we note that the term on-site
program manager only appears in a part of the organizational plan with
a heading that is clearly marked "[r]esponsibility for work
performance - on-site supervisor," so it is obvious that this term is
synonymous with on-site supervisor. Further, the proposal clearly
reflects that its reference to program manager is synonymous with
Safeguard's proposed project manager, since within its corporate
structure this is identified as being the same individual--the TEP
Chairman concedes that Safeguard inserted the name of its
program/project manager in the space in the RFP provided for
identifying a project manager, Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 16--so
there should have been no reasonable basis for confusion. Also, IRS'
argument that Safeguard's narrative, which indicates that the on-site
supervisor reports directly to the program manager, may conflict with
the organizational chart, which assertedly could be read as indicating
that the on-site supervisor reports to the president, is belied by any
reasonable reading of Safeguard's proposal, which clearly shows the
respective roles and responsibilities of these individuals.
In sum, the IRS had no reasonable basis to award Safeguard's proposal
zero points for the organizational plan subfactor. See Gardiner,
Kamya & Assocs., supra; J.M. Cashman, Inc., supra. While the IRS may
have had a reasonable basis to award less than a perfect score for
this subfactor, we find, based on our review of Safeguard's
organizational plan and IRS' evaluation of the competitive range
proposals, that Safeguard's proposal could have received as many as 8
points under a proper evaluation for this subfactor.
Under the staffing subfactor, Safeguard also received zero of the 10
possible points. As indicated by the contemporaneous documentation,
the IRS determined that Safeguard's proposal failed to provide
sufficient explanation and assurance of the availability, on a timely
basis, of personnel of the right skill mix and levels of competence to
assure contract performance[14] for two reasons: (1) the project
manager was not located on-site[15] and (2) Safeguard's proposal
failed to propose 34 utility hours per week for both the MCC main
building and annex, which the IRS asserts was required by the RFP.
First, as discussed above, there was no requirement that the program
manager be located on-site and the record indicates that this
individual can respond to IRS within the 4 hours required by the RFP.
Thus, this reason does not provide a basis for a zero rating under the
staffing subfactor. Id.
With respect to utility work, section J of the RFP required the
contractor to provide daily "utility work" at the discretion of the
COTR; the contractor is required to make available the "indicated
[utility] man hours," which are stated to be 6 hours per day Monday
through Friday and 2 hours per day on Saturday and Sunday.[16] The
utility hours "may be for any location or type of work specified
within the scope of [the] contract" and would be used to "service high
public use areas, high complaint, special cleaning requirements, or in
assisting in the loading, unloading, and/or distribution of supplies,
carpets, furniture or other items."
The IRS argues that the RFP required 34 weekly utility hours per
building, primarily relying on the language in section B that required
separate pricing for the main MCC building and the annex.[17] See Tr.
at 86-88. The IRS contends that because offerors were required to
provide the services contained in section J at both buildings and
section J required 34 utility hours, the RFP required 34 utility hours
per building.
However, as indicated above, under section J, the designated 34
utility hours may be used for "any location." The RFP did not
explicitly state that 34 utility hours would be required per building.
Accordingly, we find that the RFP's requirement for such hours is
ambiguous at best.[18] In addition, none of the competitive range
offerors proposed more than a total of 34 utility hours in their
initial offers. While one of these offerors (the awardee) also
received a zero score under this subfactor apparently for this reason,
the record shows that the other two competitive range offerors
received perfect or near perfect scores under this factor, even though
their proposals did not evidence 34 utility hours per building.[19]
Under these circumstances, the IRS appears to have had no reasonable
basis for downgrading Safeguard's proposal for its asserted failure to
propose adequate utility hours. J.M. Cashman, Inc., supra.
In defending the protest and in the reevaluation, the IRS reports that
Safeguard's zero rating was justified because the proposal failed to
provide sufficient explanation and assurance of the personnel of the
right skill mix and levels of competence and experience. These post
hoc reasons are not supported by the record.
Specifically, while the IRS argues that Safeguard's organizational
plan contained contradictions that would result in no enforceable
commitment from Safeguard to provide any management figures-which, as
discussed above, IRS claims are unknown--our review, as explained
above, confirms that Safeguard's proposal clearly described its
management structure, and we note that the same management figures
are reiterated in the section of Safeguard's proposal describing its
staffing. Thus, contrary to the IRS' assertions, Safeguard's
management was clearly discussed in an unambiguous way and the
management figures are identifiable.[20]
The record actually suggests that Safeguard's proposal provided all
requested information and should have received a high rating for the
staffing subfactor. Safeguard proposed to staff the contract with 14
employees, one of whom was the program/project manager on Safeguard's
current staff, and the rest of whom were from the incumbent's staff,
including Safeguard's proposed on-site supervisor who, as previously
noted, served as the project manager under the incumbent contract See
Tr. at 28. Safeguard provided the resumes and employment applications
of these individuals, which indicated immediate availability at the
start of the contract.[21] In addition, the proposal contained
Safeguard's detailed manpower estimates, which exceeded the
government's, and its labor hour staffing plans for the buildings.
Although the IRS argues that the lack of actual commitment from any
incumbent employees was critical in now determining that Safeguard did
not provide adequate assurance of the availability of personnel, the
RFP did not require offerors to provide any evidence of employment
commitments. The non-incumbent competitive range offerors, whose
proposals received perfect or near perfect ratings for this subfactor,
also proposed to hire the employees of the incumbent, but did not
provide any more evidence of commitments from these individuals than
did Safeguard; to the contrary, the record shows that Safeguard's
proffered evidence of the availability of personnel was on a par with,
and in one case more extensive than, that reflected in the competitive
range proposals.
In light of the above, we find that the IRS' zero rating of
Safeguard's proposal under the staffing subfactor was unjustified, and
that Safeguard may have been entitled to as much as a perfect score
for this subfactor, particularly given the information reflected in
its proposal as compared to that reflected in higher-rated competitive
range proposals.
With regard to the prime contractor's project experience subfactor,
the IRS awarded Safeguard 13.75 out of 25 points. In the post-protest
reevaluation, the IRS changed this score to zero. The sole reason
that IRS downgraded Safeguard's proposal under this subfactor in the
initial evaluation was that it contained no evidence that the listed
projects involved janitorial experience at ADP centers. See Tr. at
67-68, 77-78, 129.
Under this subfactor, the RFP advised offerors to "[l]ist at least
three projects of similar size and complexity to the subject project,"
to "[b]e certain to emphasize experience in custodial operations in
ADP centers, and that "[g]reater experience would receive greater
emphasis." The RFP also cautioned that the proposal may be ranked
lower if the customer point of contact--who can verify the quality of
contract performance--cannot he reached by the government because of
misinformation provided in the proposal.
Safeguard's proposal listed 28 custodial projects in response to this
subfactor, but did not specifically mention that any of the projects
involved an ADP center. The protester argues that the fact that the 28
projects involved custodial experience should have been discerned from
the prefatory language introducing the projects; and indeed the
record, as developed during this protest, reflects that all of the
listed 28 projects did involve ADP centers. See Tr. at 132, 134-136,
141-149. Since an offeror has the burden of submitting an adequately
written proposal, an agency may downgrade a proposal for lack of
detail pertaining to the requirements of an RFP, or consider a more
detailed proposal superior, if the proposal fails to include requested
information. Formal Management Sys., Inc., B-259824, May 3, 1995,
95-1 CPD para. 227; SBS Technical Servs., B-259934, Apr. 19, 1995, 95-1
CPD para. 205. Thus, in light of the specific direction to emphasize ADP
centers, Safeguard ran the risk of being downgraded by failing to
clearly do so.[22] See Baker Support Servs., Inc., B-257054.2, Jan.
20, 1995, 95-1 CPD para. 29.
Nevertheless, the TEP Chairman testified that during the evaluation he
specifically noticed that the IRS headquarters complex was among the
projects listed by Safeguard and acknowledged that he was personally
aware that this building possessed significant ADP space that was
maintained by Safeguard. Tr. at 131-132, 135-136. He also testified
that he believed that he is specifically precluded from taking into
account this personal knowledge in an evaluation. Tr. at 145.
However, an agency may properly use information known by its own
evaluators, as with any other references, to aid in the evaluation of
proposals, including evaluating offeror experience, and may not simply
ignore personally known information about an offeror's prior
experience merely because it was not mentioned in the proposal. See
G. Marine Diesel; Phillyship, B-232619; B-232619.2, Jan. 27, 1989,
89-1 CPD para. 90; Inlingua Schools of Languages, B-229784, Apr. 5, 1988,
88-1 CPD para. 340. Thus, the TEP Chairman's personal knowledge that the
IRS headquarters complex listed in Safeguard's proposal contained ADP
space, for which Safeguard provided custodial services, was
appropriate for consideration during the initial evaluation. Since
the RFP only required 3 projects to be listed (Safeguard listed 28
projects), and the IRS was aware that Safeguard had at least one
project with directly relevant experience, it would seem that
Safeguard would be entitled to as many as 4 more points than the 13.75
points awarded under the initial evaluation.[23] In this regard, our
review reveals that Spotless listed only two projects involving ADP
centers in its proposal and was only downgraded by 4 points for this
reason.
As noted above, the post-protest reevaluation of the TEP Chairman also
resulted in a lowering of Safeguard's score for the training subfactor
from 1.6 of 4 possible
points to zero points, and for the timeliness subfactor from 1.8 of 4
possible points to zero points. While we cannot say IRS' initial
scores for these subfactors were unreasonable, we find no support for
the reevaluation resulting in zero scores for these subfactors.
With regard to the training subfactor, Safeguard's proposal described
training programs applicable both to supervisory and other personnel
"to improve, enhance, and ensure [that they] are able to perform the
[contract] tasks." IRS' primary complaint about Safeguard's training
proposal was that it contained no believable "commitment" to provide
the training described, which IRS described as confusing. Our review
indicates that Safeguard's proposal addressed the training
requirements as indicated in the RFP, and while we cannot find, on
this record, that the initial score for this subfactor was
unwarranted, there is no support for a zero rating, since Safeguard's
proposal described a training program that, if implemented, was
apparently acceptable. J.M. Cashman, Inc., supra.
With regard to the timeliness subfactor, section C.3 of the RFP
required all service calls to "be addressed within 5 minutes in an
emergency and within 15 minutes for routine service requests." The
initial low rating under this subfactor and the zero rating on
reevaluation were based on a statement in Safeguard's proposal that
responses to service calls would be made within 1 hour. Tr. 169-170.
However, the proposal also contained repeated specific promises that
Safeguard would comply with the required 5- and 15-minute response
times. Tr. at 170-172. While we cannot say Safeguard's initial
rating was not warranted, we do not find the assignment of zero points
in the post-protest reevaluation was justified; we note that this type
of problem is easily resolvable during discussions. See Caldwell
Consulting Assocs., B-242767; B-242767.2, June 5, 1991, 91-1 CPD para.
530.
In conclusion, our review indicates that Safeguard's proposal was
misevaluated in three significant respects,[24] and that had the
proposal been properly evaluated the proposal may well have received a
higher technical score than did the lowest-rated but more costly offer
that was included in the competitive range, with the result that
Safeguard's proposal would have been included in the competitive
range.
We recommend that the IRS reevaluate proposals consistent with this
decision and establish a new competitive range as appropriate, and
proceed with meaningful discussions, receipt of BAFOs, and a new
selection decision. If Potomac Valley is then determined to be not
entitled to the award, Potomac Valley's contract should be terminated
and award made to the offeror found to be cost advantageous under the
RFP evaluation criteria. Alternatively, if it is no longer feasible,
in light of the time that has elapsed since the award was made, to
reopen the competition, the IRS, rather than exercise the options in
the contract, should conduct a new procurement. Safeguard is also
entitled to recover its costs of filing and pursuing the protest,
including reasonable attorneys' fees, 4 C.F.R sec. 21.6(d) (1995), and
since the basic contract period has been performed for which Safeguard
did not have fair opportunity to compete, its proposal preparation
costs. 4 C.F.R. 21.6(d) (2); see Pacific Util. Equip. Co., B-259942,
May 16, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 114. The protester should submit its
certified claim for costs directly to the agency within 60 days of
receipt of this decision. 4 C.F.R. sec. 21.6(f)(1).
The protest is sustained.
Comptroller General
of the United States
1. Although the RFP work statement described the services to be
performed at the annex as optional services, the contract
automatically required these services to be performed upon completion
and occupancy of the annex.
2. The TEP assigned raw point scores under each subfactor based upon a
decimal point scale from 0.0 to 1.0, which were equated with
adjectival ratings. A numerical rating from .8 to 1.0 represented an
"exceptional" rating, from .5 to .7 an "acceptable" rating, from .1 to
.4 a "marginal" rating, and 0 an "unacceptable" rating. Each
proposal's point scores were calculated by multiplying each
subfactor's percentage weight by the decimal point score awarded by
the TEP for that subfactor and adding the weighted scores to arrive at
a total score.
3. As discussed in detail below, none of the competitive range
proposals met IRS' requirement that the contractor provide 34 utility
hours per building.
4. Potomac Valley was the incumbent contractor for these services.
5. On April 5, the IRS notified this Office of its determination to
override the stay and proceed with performance under the contract
based upon urgent and compelling circumstances. See 4 C.F.R. sec.
21.4(b) (1995).
6. None of the other proposals was reevaluated.
7. As discussed further below, we find the TEP Chairman's post-protest
reevaluation was generally unreasonable. While we consider the
record, including statements and arguments made in response to a
protest, in determining whether an agency's selection decision is
supportable, we accord greater weight to contemporaneous source
selection materials than to documents which were prepared in response
to protest contentions. Alliant Techsvstems, Inc; Olin Corp.,
B-2602l5.4; B-260215.5, Aug. 4, 1995, 95-2 CPD para. 79. This
reevaluation is particularly questionable since none of the other
proposals was reevaluated.
8. The RFP further stated that the project manager or designated
representative must respond within 4 hours after being notified of the
existence of a problem.
9. The chart is a line chart that depicts the president at the head
with a vertical line drawn below to the center of the next level that
reflects two individuals labeled program managers on a horizontal line
opposite from each other. Two diagonal lines, which connect with the
center line leading to the president, are drawn below this level, one
going to the on-site supervisor at MCC and the other going to another
Safeguard program manager.
10. Safeguard identified this individual by name in the space provided
in G.1.3 for designating the project manager, and this individual was
the designated program manager appearing on the level of Safeguard's
organizational chart below the president with a diagonal line drawn
between the program manager and the proposed on-site supervisor at MCC
on the level below on the organizational chart.
11. Safeguard proposed the incumbent contractor's project manager to
be its on-site supervisor.
12. The protester persuasively argues that the RFP requirements
reasonably can be interpreted to permit an off-site project manager
because, under G.1.3, the project manager is only responsible for the
overall management and coordination of the contract and is permitted
to act through a designated representative, and because the RFP
contains a 4-hour limit for the project manager to respond to the
agency.
13. Save for the express titles, our review reveals that the structure
of Safeguard's organization was consistent with those offers in the
competitive range, in that an on-site management figure was proposed
to carry out the day-to-day activities
contained in sections G.1.3 and H.19 of the RFP, who was in turn to be
supervised by an off-site manager. While the IRS contends that
Safeguard's proposal's restriction of its project manager's ability to
fire the on-site supervisor, by reserving this authority in the
president, and the assignment of the project manager's duties to the
on-site supervisor, contravenes the terms of G.1.3, we are not
persuaded that Safeguard's proposed structure radically departed from
the intent of that provision.
14. The staffing subfactor required offerors' proposals to contain
this information.
15. The IRS determined that Safeguard's designated program manager may
not be available on a timely basis because the individual also was
listed in its organizational plan as a program manager on another
project.
16. This totals 34 hours per week.
17. Under the line item entitled "Fixed Price Work" for both the main
building and the annex the RFP stated as follows:
"BASIC SERVICES: Contractor shall provide the janitorial
and related services as described in Sections C, G, H, &
J."
18. The TEP Chairman testified that historically the IRS had used only
30 percent of the required 34 utility hours and that all utility hours
are generally not used, Tr. at 93, so it may be reasonable to conclude
that the RFP actually intended that the 34 utility hours was to cover
both buildings.
19. Moreover, the record shows that the agency made award to Potomac
Valley, even though its BAFO still only specified 34 utility hours for
the main building, despite several rounds of discussions where this
was a subject. Although the IRS now argues that the awardee met the
requirement because it agreed to additional utility hours at the
awardee's expense, the fact remains that the awardee's staffing charts
only actually proposed a total of 34 utility hours, as was the case
with Safeguard's proposal. Tr. at 100-104.
20. While the IRS cited the inability to identify management figures
and the prospect that Safeguard's project manager might have
conflicting responsibilities, we note that Spotless's proposal was
rated highly for staffing, ever though it proposed an interim project
manager, who also had other responsibilities, to serve for only the
first 6 months of the contract with the actual project manager to be a
"promising local West Virginian" to be identified after start of the
contract. Tr. at l60-162.
21. Safeguard represented that it had permission to use the resumes
and also furnished a separate letter from the incumbent's project
manager granting Safeguard permission to use this individual's resume
for the on-site supervisor position.
22. The competitive range proposals stressed ADP center custodial
experience in most of the projects listed.
23. We find no support in the record for IRS' reevaluation resulting
in a zero score for this subfactor. IRS' newly advanced reasons that
it could only contact two of the listed points of contact after this
protest was filed and that Safeguard's description of each custodial
services project was identical do not justify a zero rating. J.M.
Cashman, Inc., supra.
24. We also note that the IRS evaluated Safeguard's proposal with a
lower score for the contract personnel subfactor of the experience
factor than the competitive range proposals. This score seems
questionable, inasmuch as Safeguard proposed the incumbent work force
and the incumbent protect manager to be the on-site supervisor.