BNUMBER:  B-260815.2
DATE:  September 11, 1995
TITLE:  Wyle Laboratories, Inc.

**********************************************************************

REDACTED DECISION
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.

Matter of:Wyle Laboratories, Inc.

File:     B-260815.2

Date:   September 11, 1995 

Richard B. Oliver, Esq., and Alison Heartfield, Esq., McKenna & Cuneo, 
for the protester. 
Michael A. Hordell, Esq., Mary Ann Gilleece, Esq., and Laura L. 
Hoffman, Esq., Gadsby & Hannah, for Sverdrup Corporation, an 
interested party.
Gregory H. Petkoff, Esq., and Martin C. O'Brien, Esq., Department of 
the Air Force, for the agency.
Peter A. Iannicelli, Esq., and Michael R. Golden, Esq., Office of the 
General Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Incumbent contractor's protest that the agency improperly 
downgraded its proposal in the evaluation because the protester's 
proposal relied heavily on historical examples to show how the 
protester would do the required work is denied where the request for 
proposals' evaluation provisions clearly required offerors to set 
forth their approaches to doing certain tasks, and the evaluators 
reasonably found that the protester's explanations of how the work 
would be accomplished were inadequate.

2.  Protest that the agency's technical evaluation and cost realism 
analysis of the awardee's proposed man-years and salaries/labor rates 
was inadequate is denied where the agency reasonably determined, after 
receiving advice from the Defense Contract Audit Agency, that:  (1) 
the awardee's proposed man-years were adequate to perform the work in 
accord with the awardee's proposed approach; (2) the awardee's 
proposed labor rates exceeded the required Service Contract Act rates; 
(3) the awardee's salaries/labor rates were comparable to the 
protester/imcumbent contractor's; and (4) the awardee would be able to 
recruit and retain competent personnel at its proposed salaries/labor 
rates.

3.  Contracting agency reasonably awarded contract on the basis of 
initial proposals without discussions where: (1) the request for 
proposals warned offerors that the agency might make award on an 
initial proposal basis; (2) the awardee's proposal received the 
highest ratings in the technical and management evaluations; (3) the 
awardee's proposed costs were the lowest by a large margin; (4) the 
awardee's proposal had no significant weaknesses requiring 
discussions; and (5) the awardee was rated as a low performance risk 
based upon a demonstrated performance record.

DECISION

Wyle Laboratories, Inc. protests the Department of the Air Force's 
award of an operational support services contract to Sverdrup 
Corporation pursuant to request for proposals (RFP) No. 
F04611-94-R-0026.  Wyle contends that the Air Force: (1) evaluated its 
proposal incorrectly; (2) did not conduct an adequate cost realism 
analysis and technical evaluation of Sverdrup's proposal; and (3) 
should have held discussions.[1] 

We deny the protest.

Issued on July 18, 1994, the RFP solicited offers for operations 
support services at the Phillips Laboratory, at Edwards Air Force 
Base, from the period from April 1, 1995, through September 30, 1999.  
The RFP contemplated award of a cost-plus-award-fee contract with an 
8-percent award fee.  The contractor will be required to reconfigure 
test facilities and systems, perform test operations, provide test 
operations support, and maintain test facilities and systems used to 
perform research and development of materials and hardware relating to 
propulsion and space systems.  

The RFP stated that award would be made to the responsible offeror 
whose proposal met the solicitation requirements and was determined to 
be the most advantageous to the government.  The RFP indicated that 
offers would be evaluated in the following three areas (listed in 
descending order of importance):  
(1) technical, (2) management, and (3) cost.  The technical area was 
to be evaluated on three equally weighted factors:  experimental 
facility/system modification, research and development test operations 
support, and research facility maintenance.  The management area was 
to be evaluated on four factors (listed in descending order of 
importance):  program management, safety and environmental compliance, 
quality assurance, and security.  Cost was to be evaluated for 
realism, completeness, and reasonableness, and the RFP stated that the 
government would calculate a most probable cost for each proposal.

Six firms submitted proposals by the August 4, 1994, closing date for 
submission of initial proposals.  After evaluating proposals for 
technical and management merit, the Air Force determined that 
Sverdrup's proposal was "far superior" to all other proposals and that 
there was no need to hold discussions or solicit best and final 
offers.  The Air Force then conducted a cost analysis, incorporated 
recommendations made by the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA), 
determined the most probable cost for each proposal, and concluded 
that Sverdrup's lowest-cost proposal was both realistic and 
reasonable.  Accordingly, the Air Force determined that Sverdrup's 
proposal represented the best overall value and, on March 10, 1995, 
awarded the contract to Sverdrup.  After a debriefing conference, 
Wyle, the incumbent contractor, protested to our Office.  Contract 
performance by Sverdrup has been suspended pending our resolution of 
the protest, and, therefore, Wyle continues to perform the work under 
its existing contract with the Air Force.

Evaluating the relative merits of competing proposals is a matter 
within the discretion of the contracting agency since the agency is 
responsible for defining its needs and the best method of 
accommodating them.  Simms Indus., Inc., B-252827.2, Oct. 4, 1993, 
93-2 CPD  206.  In reviewing an agency's evaluation, we will not 
reevaluate proposals but instead will examine the agency's evaluation 
to ensure that it was reasonable and consistent with the stated 
evaluation criteria.  Id.  A protester's mere disagreement with the 
evaluators' judgment provides no basis for finding the evaluation 
unreasonable.  Id.; TRW Inc., B-258347, Jan. 11, 1995, 95-1 CPD  15.  
Here, Wyle protests that the evaluation of proposals was inconsistent 
with the RFP or otherwise unreasonable in a number of ways.  We 
examined the evaluation documents in light of Wyle's assertions and 
find that the evaluation of Wyle's proposal was both reasonable and 
consistent with the RFP.  

Wyle first contends that the Air Force improperly downgraded its 
proposal throughout the technical evaluation because the proposal 
emphasized historical examples rather than described its approach to 
performing the required work.  Wyle points out that the RFP's proposal 
preparation instructions specified that experience and background on 
similar projects should be included in the proposal, and, therefore 
Wyle argues that it reasonably believed its proposal should emphasize 
examples demonstrating how it had addressed various tasks described in 
the RFP in the past.  The protester states that its proposal contained 
historic examples and explanatory statements which together provided 
Wyle's technical approach.

While the proposal preparation instructions encouraged offerors to 
include historical examples to demonstrate their experience on similar 
projects, the RFP clearly required offerors to provide their own 
approach or methodology for doing the work for evaluation purposes.  
The RFP described the technical area evaluation in general, stating, 
"This criteria relates to the offeror's understanding of the technical 
requirements and soundness of proposed technical approach regarding 
experimental facility/system modification (factor), research and 
development test operations support (factor), and research facility 
maintenance (factor)." [Emphasis added.]  Regarding the experimental 
facility/system modification evaluation factor, the RFP specifically 
stated, "The offeror's approach will be evaluated for adequacy in 
modifying facilities and systems to comply with Government provided 
specifications."  [Emphasis added.]  Regarding the research and 
development test operations support factor, the RFP stated, "Test 
operations support will be evaluated for coherent, comprehensive 
approach to conducting test operations." [Emphasis added.]  Regarding 
the research facility maintenance factor, the RFP stated, "The 
offeror's proposed approach will be evaluated . . . ." [Emphasis 
added.]   
Contrary to Wyle's assertion, there is no evidence that the evaluators 
downgraded Wyle's proposal's technical rating because Wyle included a 
long list of examples of successfully completed, past contract work.  
In fact, the evaluation record is replete with statements showing that 
the evaluators were aware of Wyle's successful performance as the 
incumbent contractor and were convinced by that and by the proposal's 
examples that Wyle could do the work.  However, the evaluation record 
also contains numerous statements showing that the evaluators simply 
did not think that Wyle had done an adequate job of showing in its 
proposal how it would do the work.  For example, in evaluating Wyle's 
proposal on the experimental facility/ system modification factor, one 
evaluator stated:

 "Proposer has done this and is doing this type of work at [Phillips 
 Laboratory] but he did a relatively poor job of portraying his 
 ability to do this work in this proposal."

In evaluating Wyle's proposal in the research and development test 
operations support factor, the same evaluator stated:

 "They've done all of this type of work before (how well, I haven't a 
 clue) and it's amazing that they have given the absence of any 
 coherent management system or scheme.  Giving them the benefit of the 
 doubt, risk in this area is rated as low."

The protester also provided to our Office several extracts from its 
proposal which, according to Wyle, show that the proposal's narrative 
and historical examples combined to give a full description of Wyle's 
proposed technical approach.  After reviewing the excerpts, the 
evaluators' score sheets, and comparable portions of Sverdrup's 
proposal, we believe that the evaluation was reasonable.  For the most 
part, Wyle's descriptions of how it would do the work were general in 
nature while Sverdrup's proposal gave a much more detailed description 
of its approach.  The excerpts from Wyle's proposal presumably are 
isolated examples which cast the most favorable light on its proposal.  
These examples provide no reason for us to disagree with the 
evaluators' numerous comments that support the evaluators' view that 
Wyle's discussion did not warrant a higher rating.  Even though Wyle 
has apparently been performing successfully as the incumbent 
contractor, since an offeror is responsible for providing a full 
discussion of its technical approach and methodology within the four 
corners of the proposal, Wyle must suffer the consequences of failing 
to do so.[2]  See Laboratory Sys. Servs., Inc., B-256323, June 10, 
1994, 94-1 CPD  359; InterAmerica Research Assocs., Inc., B-253698.2, 
Nov. 19, 1993, 93-2 CPD  288.

The protester also contends that the evaluators unreasonably 
criticized its management proposal because Wyle's proposed program 
manager will work [DELETED] on the contract and its business manager 
and purchasing manager will [DELETED].  Wyle states that it is 
currently performing the contract for support services at Phillips 
Laboratory satisfactorily using such [DELETED]of personnel.

The agency explains that the support services contract that Wyle is 
presently performing encompasses both integration support services and 
operations support services.[3]  However, the Air Force has split the 
requirement into two different contracts, one for integration support 
services and the other for operation support services.  Therefore, the 
present RFP includes only operations support for Phillips Laboratory, 
and a separate procurement will be conducted in the future for the 
integration support services requirement.  The Air Force reports that, 
as the incumbent, Wyle is able to have its program manager, business 
manager, and purchasing manager [DELETED] under one contract; Wyle's 
proposal for the present operations support procurement is based on 
the assumption that Wyle will continue to perform the integration 
support effort. 

The evaluators reasonably were concerned that Wyle might not be 
selected for award of the follow-on integration support contract and 
therefore considered the [DELETED], which assumed Wyle would win the 
companion contract, to pose additional risk.  Wyle did not address how 
it would [DELETED] if it were no longer performing the integration 
support services work. The evaluators also considered the commitment 
of these key positions to the operations support effort [DELETED] to 
be inadequate in view of the complexity of the work and the [DELETED] 
organization proposed.  Thus, the evaluators considered this approach 
to be a management area weakness when evaluating the adequacy of 
Wyle's proposed resource levels for performing the management effort.  
Wyle's disagreement with the agency's assessment in this area provides 
no basis for finding the evaluation unreasonable.  Id.

The protester next contends that the evaluators unfairly downgraded 
its management proposal because reports of performance and cost 
problems would be generated too late to permit corrective action.  
Wyle argues that the evaluators were wrong because it proposed to use 
the [DELETED] system which is capable of generating cost and schedule 
information on a daily basis and Wyle stated in its management 
proposal that it planned to [DELETED].

The RFP required proposals to describe systems for tracking cost 
performance, schedule adherence, and technical performance; the RFP 
also required a discussion of how cost, schedule, and technical data 
would be collected, analyzed, and used to focus management attention 
to potential problem areas.  Wyle's proposal addressed identification 
of problem areas by stating that it would use [DELETED]  to generate 
"red flag" reports identifying schedule and budget problems at 
[DELETED] percent of budget or [DELETED] days to delivery; it did not 
state that the software was capable of generating reports on a daily 
basis.  

The evaluators reasonably were concerned because they believed the red 
flag reports generated at [DELETED] percent of budget or [DELETED] 
days to delivery would be issued far too late to permit management to 
take any meaningful corrective action.  Moreover, the evaluators noted 
that Wyle's management proposal proposed [DELETED] cost reports, but 
did not indicate how the reports would be used by Wyle to identify 
problem areas.  In view of the RFP's express requirement for a 
discussion of how cost, schedule, and technical data would be 
collected and used to focus management attention on potential problem 
areas, Wyle was downgraded because of its failure to more fully 
explain in its proposal the report-generating capabilities of the 
[DELETED] and how it intended to use those capabilities.  See 
Laboratory Sys. Servs., Inc., supra.  In the absence of a more 
detailed discussion of the report process in Wyle's proposal, we think 
the agency's evaluation of this area was reasonable.

The protester argues that its management proposal was unreasonably 
criticized by the evaluators because the proposal required employee 
reports concerning hazardous equipment and conditions to be reported 
to the [DELETED] who would then investigate the matter and determine 
whether the hazard report is valid.  Wyle claims that its hazard 
report validation process is good and that it is in strict accord with 
Air Force Regulation (AFR) 127-2 which governs Air Force hazard 
reporting programs.  

The RFP required offers to explain procedures used for identifying and 
correcting environmental or safety problems and specifically stated 
that safety/environmental programs would be evaluated as part of the 
management area evaluation.  The evaluators were concerned about 
Wyle's approach because they believed that the [DELETED] might have a 
conflict of interest [DELETED].  The evaluators thought a better 
approach would be to have someone on the safety staff, [DELETED] 
investigate and validate safety reports.  We think that the evaluation 
was reasonable.  Contrary to Wyle's assertion, our review of AFR 127-2 
reveals that it contemplates reporting of hazards directly (and even 
anonymously, if desired by the reporter) to appropriate safety staff, 
[DELETED].  The protester also contends that its management and 
technical proposals were unreasonably criticized by the evaluators as 
follows: 

 (1) Wyle proposed that one person act as both [DELETED].  The 
 evaluation team considered this staffing inadequate because one 
 person would be responsible for [DELETED] and the evaluators believed 
 that the [DELETED] program might suffer as a result.

 (2) Wyle's proposed [DELETED] functions were "passive during 
 [facitities/systems] modification efforts" required by the RFP.  The 
 evaluators were concerned because Wyle's proposed programs do not 
 actively insert [DELETED] into modification efforts.

 (3) Wyle proposed to initiate performance of various tasks with a 
 kick-off meeting even though the RFP did not require such meetings.  
 The evaluation panel believed this to be a sound technical management 
 practice, but considered the [DELETED] to be a weakness because the 
 kick-off meetings do not [DELETED].
 
After examining the protester's arguments, pertinent RFP provisions, 
the evaluation record, and the agency's response, we believe that the 
protester's challenges to these three evaluation findings are simply 
disagreements between the protester and the agency concerning the 
quality of Wyle's proposal.  As noted above, a protester's 
disagreement with the evaluators' judgment provides no basis for 
finding the evaluation unreasonable.  TRW Inc., supra.

The protester also alleges that the agency's cost realism evaluation 
of Sverdrup's proposal was inadequate.  The protester points out that 
Sverdrup's proposed costs are substantially less than Wyle's,[4] and 
states that Sverdrup could only achieve such a low cost by reducing 
the number of personnel on the contract and reducing wages and 
salaries.  Wyle states that any reduction in the number of employees 
or salaries from current levels is unrealistic and will eventually 
lead to a deterioration in services.  Therefore, Wyle argues that 
because Sverdrup proposed to [DELETED], the Air Force's technical 
evaluation should have considered Sverdrup's proposal as entailing 
greater performance risk.  Wyle further asserts that, because Sverdrup 
is not the incumbent and will therefore have to hire an entirely new 
work force, the Air Force should have evaluated Sverdrup's ability to 
hire and retain a qualified work force.  

The protester also contends that the cost realism analysis should have 
found that Sverdrup's proposed wages and manning levels were too low 
and that Sverdrup would not be able to hire the bulk of its work force 
from Wyle's present work force [DELETED].  To support its argument, 
Wyle submitted a chart comparing the salaries Wyle presently pays 
employees to Sverdrup's proposed salaries for the same or similar 
labor categories.  Wyle alleges in its chart that Sverdrup [DELETED] 
than Wyle presently pays [DELETED] and asserts that, on average, 
Sverdrup will pay wages that are approximately [DELETED] less than 
Wyle presently pays.  

Where an agency evaluates proposals for the award of a cost 
reimbursement contract, an offeror's proposed estimated costs of 
contract performance are not dispositive because, regardless of the 
costs proposed, the government is bound to pay the contractor its 
actual and allowable costs.  Sabre Sys., Inc., B-255311, Feb. 22, 
1994, 94-1 CPD  129.  Consequently, a cost realism analysis must be 
performed by the agency to determine the extent to which an offeror's 
proposed costs represent what the contract should cost, assuming 
reasonable economy and efficiency.  Because the contracting agency is 
in the best position to make this cost realism determination, our 
review is limited to determining whether the agency's cost realism 
analysis is reasonable.  Id.

This portion of Wyle's protest is grounded in several basic premises.  
The first premise is that Sverdrup proposed to do the work utilizing 
significantly less labor hours than the government estimated and set 
forth in the RFP and that Sverdrup did not justify its reduction in 
labor hours.  The second is that Sverdrup's wages are drastically 
lower than Wyle's for virtually every labor category.  The third is 
that Sverdrup will be unable to hire up to [DELETED] of Wyle's 
incumbent work force, [DELETED] because Wyle's workers would not be 
willing to work for Sverdrup [DELETED] in view of the extra 
work/responsibilities they would have to assume because of the first 
two premises.  However, the record shows that Wyle's basic premises 
are flawed.  More significantly, the record shows that the Air Force 
carefully considered these issues in its evaluation and reasonably 
determined that Sverdrup's approach would allow it to do the work with 
low performance risk.  

The RFP's proposal preparation instructions contained a matrix showing 
the estimated number of man-years for each job title that would be 
needed to perform the work.  The RFP stated that the estimates were 
for information purposes only and that offerors were free to deviate 
from the government's man-year estimates and to substitute their own 
labor categories, provided the proposal supported any deviations with 
a detailed rationale.  That is precisely what Sverdrup did in its 
proposal.  

Sverdrup proposed approximately [DELETED] than in the government 
estimate for the first year of the contract with similar [DELETED] for 
each of the other years.  The record shows that the evaluators were 
aware of Sverdrup's deviations from the RFP's estimates and that they 
gave Sverdrup's proposal close scrutiny because of the [DELETED].  The 
evaluators also noted that Sverdrup eliminated some job titles and 
substituted some of its own job titles for those set forth in the RFP.  
The evaluation team examined Sverdrup's proposal and concluded that 
Sverdrup's proposed skill mix and man-hours were sufficient to perform 
the work given the technical and management approaches proposed by 
Sverdrup.  The evaluators noted that Sverdrup's approach to the work 
included innovations that allowed it [DELETED].  The technical 
evaluation team also examined other [DELETED] innovations proposed by 
Sverdrup and concluded that Sverdrup had the ability to perform the 
technical and management effort with the proposed manning levels and 
staffing mix. 

The salary comparison chart submitted by Wyle to support its protest 
is not entirely accurate and is misleading in some respects.  For 
example, Wyle used the average of Sverdrup's proposed rates for 
several different levels of engineering positions, rather than setting 
out Sverdrup's actual salaries by engineering level or using a 
weighted average based upon the number of man-years for each position.  
Thus, some of Sverdrup's engineers are actually paid more than the 
average salary set forth in Wyle's chart.  The truth is that, while 
Sverdrup's proposed salaries were [DELETED] than Wyle's, Sverdrup's 
salaries were not [DELETED] as Wyle alleges.  In addition, Sverdrup's 
proposed wages are in fact [DELETED] Wyle's for some critical 
positions, most notably [DELETED].  

The record shows that the agency closely examined Sverdrup's proposed 
labor rates.  The Air Force reports that almost all of the positions 
are governed by the Service Contract Act and that its review shows 
that Sverdrup fully complies with the Act's required wage rates.  The 
record also shows that the Air Force compared Sverdrup's proposed 
rates to Wyle's and that Sverdrup's rates for [DELETED]  Wyle's rates.  
Based upon this comparison, the agency's cost team reasonably 
concluded that Sverdrup's wages and salaries were comparable to 
Wyle's.  The Air Force also reasonably and properly verified 
Sverdrup's costs, including wages, with the DCAA before concluding 
that Sverdrup's cost proposal was realistic and reasonable.  

The Air Force also reports that its review of Sverdrup's past and 
present performance gave no indication that Sverdrup had any 
difficulty in recruiting or retaining a competent work force.  In this 
connection, the agency reports that it is a common industry practice 
to hire a portion of the incumbent's work force upon being awarded a 
follow-on contract.  The agency contends that the unemployment rate in 
the area of Edwards Air Force Base is very high for the type of 
workers required on this contract and, faced with the prospect of 
losing their jobs if Wyle does not win the future integration support 
services contract, Wyle's employee's might very well decide to take 
positions with Sverdrup to work on the present contract, [DELETED] if 
offered the opportunity.  In any event, while Sverdrup's proposal 
estimated it would [DELETED] of the incumbent work force, Sverdrup 
clearly indicated in its proposal that most of the key personnel 
[DELETED].  Sverdrup also indicated that, in cases where it was 
unsuccessful in hiring one of Wyle's incumbent employees, it would 
[DELETED] and, if necessary, would [DELETED] until it was able to hire 
a new employee.  The Air Force considered Sverdrup's hiring plan and 
reasonably concluded that Sverdrup had sufficient resources and 
experience to fill the positions with competent personnel.  See Sabre 
Sys., Inc., supra.

Based upon the above discussion, we conclude that the Air Force's 
technical and cost evaluations of Sverdrup's proposal were reasonable.  
See GTT Indus., Inc., B-253461.2, Dec. 1, 1993, 94-1 CPD  164; Sabre 
Sys., Inc., supra.

The protester also contends that the Air Force should have conducted 
discussions instead of awarding the contract on the basis of initial 
proposals.  Wyle argues that all of the evaluators' concerns regarding 
its proposal could easily have been clarified during discussions and 
corrected in a best and final offer, if necessary.  Therefore, Wyle 
contends that the Air Force's decision to award the contract to 
Sverdrup on the basis of initial proposals without conducting 
discussion was unreasonable.[5]  We do not agree.

The record shows that after very thorough evaluations of all the 
factors in the technical and management areas and of proposed costs, 
Sverdrup's lowest-cost proposal received the highest technical and 
management ratings.  Two other offers were also both lower in overall 
cost and superior to Wyle's in both the technical and management area 
evaluations.  Individual evaluators examined proposals on the 
technical and management evaluation areas and related factors and 
risk; the individual evaluators supported their findings with 
descriptive narratives.  Then, the evaluators together agreed upon 
consensus ratings for each proposal, using  predetermined color 
codes[6] to rate relative merit.  

The final evaluation results for the four highest rated offers were as 
follows:

Offeror    Technical  Management  Perf. Risk  Cost[7]

Sverdrup   [DELETED]  [DELETED]   [DELETED]   [DELETED]  

Offeror      A[DELETED][DELETED]  [DELETED]   [DELETED]  

Offeror      B[DELETED][DELETED]  [DELETED]   [DELETED]  

Wyle       [DELETED]  [DELETED]   [DELETED]   [DELETED]
The cover letter accompanying the RFP clearly notified offerors that 
award might be made without discussions.  The RFP also included 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR)  52.215-16, Alternate III, which 
warned that the agency intended to evaluate proposals and award a 
contract without discussions and advised offerors that their initial 
offers should therefore contain their best terms from a price and 
technical standpoint.   

The source selection authority reasonably concluded that Sverdrup's 
initial proposal represented the best overall value and that 
discussions were unnecessary because Sverdrup's proposal:  (1) was the 
lowest-cost proposal [DELETED];[8] (2) received the highest technical 
and management ratings; (3) demonstrated a good performance record; 
and (4) had no significant weaknesses.  In these circumstances, there 
is no basis to overturn the agency's selection of Sverdrup on an 
initial proposal basis  See Hornet Joint Venture, B-258430.2 Jan. 27, 
1995, 95-1 CPD  55. 

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General 
of the United States

1. The protester raised a host of issues and arguments in its several 
letters to our Office.  While we reviewed all of the issues and the 
voluminous arguments supporting them, they provided no basis for 
overturning the agency's decision to award to Sverdrup.  We will 
address only the most significant issues and arguments in this 
decision.

2. Apparently, Wyle prepared its proposal based on the belief that all 
of the evaluators were knowledgeable concerning Wyle's current 
performance.  This was not the case nor was the agency required to use 
evaluators specifically familiar with Wyle's work.

3. The integration support services are heavily oriented towards 
spacecraft integration engineering and are provided primarily to the 
Space Experiments Directorate.

4. Sverdrup's proposed costs plus award fee were [DELETED] and the 
agency estimated the most probable cost to be [DELETED]; Wyle's 
proposed costs plus award fee were [DELETED], and the agency estimated 
the most probable cost to be [DELETED].

5. In a related vein, Wyle argues that its proposal should have 
received a higher overall rating.  To support this argument, Wyle 
submitted a proposed numerical scoring scheme in which each color 
rating was given a numerical point-range.  For example, Wyle proposes 
that a green rating would have a range of from 2.5 to 3.5 points.  
Under this new scheme, Wyle attempts to rescore its entire proposal by 
averaging the point-scores for the various technical evaluation 
factors to achieve higher overall color ratings.  However, in order to 
establish the unreasonableness of the evaluation, it is not enough 
that the protester disagree with the agency's judgment or that the 
protester point to alternative methods available to the agency.  See 
Payco Am. Corp., B-253668, Oct. 8, 1993, 93-2 CPD  214.  Here, Wyle 
simply has not shown that the evalutors' judgment was unreasonable.  
See TRW Inc., supra.

6. The color codes were blue = exceptional; green = acceptable; yellow 
= marginal; red = unacceptable.

7. Proposed costs do not include proposed award fee.

8. In a related matter, Wyle contends that the agency's comparison of 
Wyle's and Sverdrup's costs was faulty because Sverdrup's proposed 
labor costs for fiscal year 1995 were based upon only 9 months of 
performance while Wyle's were based upon 12 months.  The RFP stated 
that only 9 months of services would be required during fiscal year 
1995 (from January 1, 1995, through September 30, 1995); therefore, 
Wyle erred when it proposed on the basis of 12 months.  Wyle's 1995 
proposed labor costs were [DELETED] (including overhead and 
administrative and general expenses); adjusting its labor costs to 
reflect only 9 months of work would, therefore, amount to a reduction 
of approximately [DELETED].  However, Wyle's total proposed costs plus 
fee were about [DELETED] more than Sverdrup's (see note 4 above).  
Thus, because Wyle's total proposed costs would still exceed 
Sverdrup's by roughly [DELETED], and because Sverdrup's proposal was 
rated as significantly superior to Wyle's in the two most important 
evaluation areas (i.e., technical and management), we do not believe 
that Wyle suffered any competitive prejudice.  See PHP Healthcare 
Corp.; Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word,
B-251799 et al., May 4, 1993, 93-1 CPD  366.  In this regard, we note 
that, in addition to Sverdrup's proposal, two other offers were lower 
in cost than Wyle's and were also rated as superior to Wyle's in both 
the technical and management area evaluations.