BNUMBER:  B-259823.4
DATE:  July 3, 1995
TITLE:  Martin Marietta Corporation

**********************************************************************

DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Martin Marietta Corporation

File:     B-259823.4

Date:July 3, 1995

Thomas J. Madden, Esq., Jerome S. Gabig, Jr., Esq., and Charles R. 
Marvin, Jr., Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, for the 
protester.
Rand L. Allen, Esq., James J. Gildea, Esq., Phillip H. Harrington, 
Esq., David A. Vogel, Esq., and Paul A. Misener, Esq., Wiley, Rein & 
Fielding, for Westinghouse Electric Corporation, an interested party.
Wayne Wenzel, Esq., Shauna D. Russell, Esq., and Diane K. Townsend, 
Esq., Naval Sea Systems Command, for the agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq. and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

1.  Protest against agency determination that proposed sonar system is 
compliant with specification requirement for 360-degree coverage is 
denied where it appears from record that, although a matter of some 
uncertainty and considerable technical dispute, 360-degree coverage is 
at least theoretically possible and protester offers no conclusive 
evidence to the contrary.    

2.  Protest that agency improperly failed to disclose vital 
information concerning acceptability of glass reinforced plastic 
(fiberglass) sonar dome proposed by protester in prior stage of 
development process and proposed again in current stage is denied 
where record does not establish that agency possessed superior, vital 
knowledge concerning fundamental acceptability of fiberglass dome 
prior to receipt of proposals for current stage; agency did not view 
fiberglass dome as unacceptable until after receipt of proposals, 
protester was aware that fiberglass is an inferior material for sonar 
domes, and protester knew or should have known of need to maximize 
sonar effectiveness. 

DECISION

Martin Marietta Corporation (MMC) protests the Naval Sea Systems 
Command's (NAVSEA) exercise of a competitive, down-select option under 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation (WEC) contract No. N00024-92-C-6223, 
for the demonstration and validation (D&V) phase for the United 
States/United Kingdom Joint Cooperative Project for Surface Ship 
Torpedo Defense (SSTD).  MMC challenges the evaluation of proposals 
and argues that it was misled into offering a technical approach found 
to be unacceptable.[1]

We deny the protest.

The SSTD joint project seeks to combine equipment and technologies 
into a system that can successfully detect and defend against torpedo 
threats to surface ships.  The contemplated system consists of three 
major operational functions or subsystems:  (1) the Detection, 
Classification and Localization subsystem, which provides the sonar 
data and associated subfunctions needed to detect, classify and 
localize torpedo threats; (2) the Combat Control subsystem, which 
performs multi-sensor data fusion, threat evaluation, fire control 
solution generation, engagement scheduling, countermeasure employment, 
and command display and control; and (3) the Material Countermeasures 
subsystem, which utilizes towed or expendable countermeasures to 
divert threat torpedoes from their intended target or to inflict 
incapacitating physical damage to them.

The Memorandum of Understanding establishing the SSTD Joint 
Cooperative Project provided for a four-phase SSTD development and 
production program:  (1) Concept Evaluation, in which a feasibility 
study would be conducted; (2) D&V, in which contractors would conduct 
design tradeoff studies, develop a preliminary design, and produce 
advanced development models (ADM) in areas of high technical risk to 
validate the design approach; (3) Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD) (also called Full Scale Development); and (4) 
Production.  

During the Concept Evaluation phase, a request for proposals 
(RFP)--No. N00024-90-R-6066(Q)--was issued to solicit proposals for 
the D&V phase.  Proposals were received from consortia led by WEC, 
MMC, and General Electric Aerospace Corporation.  The agency reports 
that due to concerns over program risk having nothing to do with the 
content of the proposals received, but instead reflecting the 
complexity of the effort and the advanced technology required, it was 
determined that additional risk analysis was required prior to 
entering into the D&V phase.  Consequently, the RFP was amended to 
include a Risk Mitigation Phase (RMP) of approximately 15 months to 
precede the D&V phase.  The RMP phase became the basic contract 
effort, while the D&V phase was converted to option line items under 
the RFP.  Contracts were ultimately awarded to WEC (No. 
N00024-92-C-6223) and General Electric (No. N00024-92-C-6222) on 
January 28, 1992.  (During RMP, General Electric Aerospace was 
purchased by MMC; it was the General Electric proposal for RMP/D&V 
which formed the basis of the current MMC proposal for the D&V 
down-select competition.)

The objective of RMP was to perform further tests, trials and analyses 
in specific areas of high program risk, including such key areas of 
concern as the ability to detect, classify and localize torpedoes, 
material countermeasures, shipfitting, and threat definition.  
According to the agency, these efforts did not relate specifically to 
any particular contractor's design approach, but instead focused on 
the basic ability to perform these high risk functions using available 
technology.  The Joint Project Office (JPO) and the government 
laboratories of both the United States and the United Kingdom took the 
lead in this phase, with industry providing support via the RMP 
contracts. 

At the time of the RMP/D&V contract awards, it was intended that both 
contractors would be carried through the D&V phase by means of the 
exercise of the D&V option in both contracts, and that a single 
contractor would subsequently be selected for EMD, based upon a 
limited competition between the two D&V contractors.  The agency 
contemplated that a detailed design would be produced by the joint 
project at the end of the EMD phase, followed by the award of a 
production contract based upon full and open competition.  However, 
delays and funding constraints following the RMP/D&V contract awards 
in January 1992 forced a restructuring of the project as part of which 
it was determined that only one consortium would be selected for the 
D&V contract.  The performance specification, statement of work (SOW) 
and contract options for D&V were revised, and issued to WEC and MMC 
(as the successor to General Electric), on    September 12, 1994, as a 
modification to their contracts.

The modification requested proposals for a fixed-price incentive 
contract to perform the D&V phase.  It generally advised that:

        "[o]fferors are to submit comprehensive, updated responses to 
        the requirements of this modification.  These responses will 
        be utilized to reassess the offeror's understanding of, and 
        capability to accomplish, the stated requirements.  The 
        reassessment will build on the Government's previous 
        evaluation of the offeror's original proposal.  Additionally, 
        the reassessment will focus on changes to the offeror's 
        original proposal and the evaluation of new data generated 
        through subsequent work, such as Risk Mitigation, which 
        substantiates claims contained in the offeror's original 
        proposal."

Although the instructions for preparation of the down-select proposals 
stated that an offeror was "only required to submit change pages to 
its original proposal," the modification specifically stated that the 
proposals "must clearly show how" the proposed concepts would meet or 
exceed the performance requirements in the SOW or specification.  
Likewise, the modification required offerors to "provide data in 
sufficient detail to:  . . . (2) provide performance predictions which 
illustrate that the offeror's design concept has the potential to meet 
or exceed the performance requirements for all proposed systems and 
specified operational modes." 

Award was to be made to "that responsible offeror whose offer, 
conforming to this modification, is considered to represent the best 
value to the government, price and other factors considered."  The 
modification provided for the evaluation of technical merit and price.  
The evaluation of technical merit was to include consideration of:  
(1) system effectiveness and (2) detection, classification and 
localization, which were "of equal importance and . . . more important 
than" (3) material countermeasures; these first three criteria were 
"significantly more important than" (4) combat control, (5) 
shipfitting and systems engineering, and (6) operations, all of which 
were of equal importance.  The modification stated that "[t]echnical 
content and scope is of paramount importance.  In determination of 
best value, the offeror should be aware that technical superiority is 
significantly more important than price."

Proposals were received from MMC and WEC on October 12, 1994.  
Although MMC's proposed target price [DELETED] was substantially lower 
than WEC's [DELETED], MMC's technical proposal was found to be 
unsatisfactory overall, while WEC's was rated good overall.

MMC proposed to satisfy the specification requirement for 360-degree 
coverage for first echelon units--e.g., aircraft carriers--through use 
of an improved version of an existing towed passive sonar array and a 
new bow-mounted passive sonar array.  Although MMC's proposal stated 
that the proposed bow sonar array could be furnished in either a 
"Removable or Permanent Fit Mounting," and could be given an 
"Intrusive/Integrated" mounting, the bow array was depicted in 
drawings with a semi-permanent, detachable mounting, in which the unit 
is held in place with hydraulic tensioning rods.  MMC's proposal 
stated that the sonar dome--which covers the sonar--and the array 
fairing (i.e., the transition between the dome and the hull) was 
"designed to be external to and non-intrusive of the ship's hull 
structure," and was "based upon the US Kingfisher . . . program" 
(which used a detachable sonar mounting).  The proposal described the 
sonar dome as made of a "Coated GRP," that is, of glass reinforced 
plastic (GRP) or fiberglass.

MMC's technical proposal was found to be unsatisfactory with respect 
to detection, classification and localization, systems effectiveness, 
and shipfitting and systems engineering.  Project evaluators assessed 
the new bow array sonar "as an area of major risk.  The main concerns 
are the risks associated with shipfitting and self noise."  With 
respect to shipfitting, the evaluators noted that:

        "[t]he typical production installation shown [in MMC's 
        proposal] has the dome and array mounted on a frame secured 
        externally to the hull.  Compared with the rigid ship 
        structure to which sonar arrays and domes are normally 
        installed, this will be prone to vibration.   Fairings are 
        required to create a smooth dome/hull interface.  These are 
        prone to movement or loss with the consequent rise in self 
        noise levels.  Additionally, as the fit is to take place with 
        the ship afloat, it will not be possible to put filler in the 
        gaps between fairing, hull and dome."

Concluding that "[t]he offeror pays insufficient attention to 
achieving fairness of form with his proposed mounting arrangements" 
for the dome, the evaluators reported that British experience "has 
shown that this is extremely difficult to achieve and it is crucial to 
self noise performance.  The self noise levels are substantially 
increased should the fairing be less than perfect."

The evaluators also expressed concern that the proposed ADM bow array 
sonar dome "is held in place by wire strops attached to the hull above 
the waterline.  Such an arrangement will lead to cable strum and 
cavitation at even modest ship speeds leading to high noise levels in 
the vicinity of the array."  In this regard, the evaluators noted that 
United States experience with the Kingfisher sonar array temporary 
mounting, from which MMC's mounting approach was derived, "indicated 
poor self noise, vibration, etc.," resulting in a decision not to use 
it for Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War.  

Evaluators also questioned the difference between the D&V and 
production versions of the bow array.  They noted that:

        "[t]he production version requires welded brackets and stops 
        and hydraulic rams in place of the cable strops.  Since the 
        ADM is mounted in a completely different manner to that 
        proposed for the production fit . . . it will not be possible 
        to extrapolate the expected production performance.  Thus, it 
        will not be possible to judge the acceptability of the 
        proposed production design. Therefore, the ADM approach is 
        considered unsatisfactory."

Further, the evaluators expressed concern that the use of hydraulics 
to hold the array and dome in position would bring machinery sources 
close to the sensor, thus degrading performance unless substantial 
vibration insulation was used.  In addition, the evaluators noted that 
although "[s]tiffening of the forward structure [plating] is necessary 
to reduce self noise," it was unlikely that adequate stiffening would 
exist on many types of ships without current bow-mounted sonar arrays.

The evaluators also questioned MMC's proposed use of a fiberglass 
(GRP) dome on the basis that "[t]he lightweight fiberglass dome 
concept is considered, from US and UK trials, to be a risk area since 
fiberglass domes tend to be noisy and also have high failure rates."  
As a result, the evaluators concluded that:

        "[t]he dome and installation is poorly designed and this will 
        cause high self noise effects which would severely degrade 
        detection performance.  The concept is, therefore, considered 
        flawed, and thus will not meet the requirements." 

The Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) likewise questioned MMC's 
proposed approach, finding that:  "[t]he dome and installation is 
poorly designed and this will cause high self noise effects which will 
severely degrade detection performance to an extent that it won't do 
the job.  The concept is, therefore, considered flawed and will not 
meet performance requirements."  In addition, the SSEB noted that 
MMC's proposed "schedule carries significant risk. . . .  [T]he main 
sea trial is late in D&V giving very little time for the important 
post trials analysis.  Should schedules . . . slip the overall program 
schedule will be impacted."  Although recognizing that MMC had 
indicated a willingness to consider alternatives to its non-intrusive 
mounting arrangement, the SSEB noted that "[t]he proposed mitigation 
measure of examining an intrusive design for [first echelon units] is 
tantamount to a unique sonar design and development for every class of 
ship and is therefore considered unsatisfactory on grounds of expected 
cost and time to fit."

The SSEB rated MMC's proposal as characterized by "high technical risk 
with attendant high cost and schedule risk."  The SSEB reported to the 
source selection advisory council (SSAC) and the source selection 
authority that MMC's proposed bow array sonar will be "ineffective"; 
according to the SSEB, MMC's approach to detection, classification and 
localization was "fundamentally flawed," such that "correction would 
require [a] new design concept."  The SSAC agreed, finding that MMC's 
proposal was unacceptable in that it contained design deficiencies of 
such magnitude that the necessary corrections or improvements would 
necessitate major revisions and require an entirely new technical 
proposal.[2]  Upon learning of the resulting, December 14 selection of 
WEC on the basis of initial proposals, MMC filed this protest with our 
Office.

MMC'S EVALUATION

Prior Evaluation

MMC disputes the JPO's determination that its proposal was technically 
unacceptable.  As an initial matter, MMC argues that the determination 
that its bow array mounting was unacceptable, the concern with respect 
to its proposal of a GRP (fiberglass) dome, and the overall conclusion 
that MMC's proposed approach will suffer from high self-noise which 
will severely degrade detection performance were unreasonable because 
these conclusions were inconsistent with those reached in the 
evaluation of its proposal for the 1992 contract, which allegedly was 
based on an identical mounting and fiberglass dome.  Indeed, according 
to the protester, the evaluators were precluded from reassessing MMC's 
approach by the terms of the modification, which indicated that in 
reassessing the offeror's understanding of, and capability to 
accomplish, the stated requirements, the reassessment would "build on 
the Government's previous evaluation of the offeror's original 
proposal."  We disagree.

While the modification stated that the evaluation for the down-select 
contract would "focus on changes to the offeror's original proposal" 
and "build on" the prior evaluation, neither this language, nor any 
other provision of the modification, precluded the agency from going 
beyond the prior evaluation or reaching different conclusions.  The 
modification required the submission of "comprehensive, updated 
responses to the requirements," which "clearly show how" the proposed 
concepts would meet or exceed the performance requirements, and 
provided for a "reassessment" of the proposal.  Implicit in the 
concept of a reassessment is the possibility that different 
conclusions may be reached.  Indeed, the modification mentioned one 
possible cause for a difference in conclusion when it indicated that 
the reassessment would also focus on the evaluation of new data; as 
discussed below, NAVSEA reports that additional data from recent sea 
trials of a British sonar influenced evaluators ultimately to conclude 
that MMC's proposed GRP dome was not merely a matter of concern, but 
in fact was unacceptable.  More generally, although clearly related in 
that they represent steps in the ultimate development and acquisition 
of an SSTD system, the 1990/1992 and 1994 competitions and awards were 
legally separate contracting actions.  We have previously recognized 
that each procurement stands on its own; the fact that an agency in a 
prior procurement reached one conclusion concerning the acceptability 
of an offeror's approach does not preclude that agency from 
subsequently reaching, upon further consideration, a different 
conclusion.  See generally  Cobra Technologies, Inc., B-238031 et al., 
Feb. 27, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  242.  

Further, the contemporaneous evaluation record indicates that the bow 
array mounting and sonar dome in fact were the subject of evaluator 
concern during the 1990/1992 competition.  The evaluators questioned 
General Electric's reliance on the "Kingfisher" sonar program, asking 
General Electric during discussions to "[e]xplain how you plan to 
assess the risk of using the Kingfisher sonar over a wide range of 
operational environments over which it must operate.  Include a 
discussion of flow-induced hull vibration problems encountered during 
development."  In its response, General Electric recognized that 
"vibrational problems" had been encountered at "moderate to high 
operational speeds" during the development of Kingfisher.  The offeror 
maintained, however, that "[t]hese vibrations, resulting from cable 
and strut strum, were reduced to an acceptable level by addition of a 
fairing and the problem has not reoccurred."  Notwithstanding General 
Electric's response to the discussion question, however, the record 
indicates that the JPO's concerns with respect to the mounting 
approach were not resolved.  The evaluators concluded that "use of the 
Kingfisher array may be risky at high sea states and ship speeds due 
to potential reliability problems."  According to the evaluators, "UK 
trials have shown that poor bow array fitting/fairing can cause 
excessive self noise.  The proposed mounting has areas of likely 
turbulent flow . . . and the concept must be considered (and the 
offeror does . . . ) high risk."  Likewise, the SSEB expressed concern 
that "[t]he proposed bow array may have high levels of array 
self-noise (e.g. flow noise) and survivability problems. . . ."  
Indeed, in testimony given at the hearing conducted with respect to 
this protest, the chief engineer for the SSTD project testified that 
on two occasions subsequent to the 1992 RMP/D&V awards, he advised 
General Electric/MMC of the JPO's continuing concern with the 
potentially high self noise associated with their installation 
approach, focusing on the strumming vibration experienced with the 
Kingfisher.  Hearing Transcript (Tr.) at 275-281, 302.[3]  In 
addition, with respect to General Electric's proposed sonar dome, the 
SSEB noted that "[t]he lightweight fiberglass dome concept is 
considered, from US and UK trials, to be a risk area since fiberglass 
domes tend to be noisy and also have high failure rates.  The offeror 
seems to acknowledge this, since mountings and fairings are considered 
high risk and only medium risk after D&V."  In summary, neither the 
terms of the 1994 modification nor the conclusions reached in the 
1990/1992 competition precluded or rendered unreasonable the JPO's 
determination that MMC's down-select proposal was unacceptable.  

Dome

MMC argues that the JPO's concerns with respect to its proposed GRP 
(fiberglass) dome were unreasonable and did not furnish a basis for 
finding its proposal unacceptable.

Noting that MMC claimed that its proposed bow sonar array would 
achieve only slightly higher self-noise levels than found on the 
AN/SQS-53 surface ship sonar (the sonar on many American surface 
ships), NAVSEA responds that "the evaluators determined it will be 
impossible for [MMC] to achieve AN/SQS-53 self-noise levels using 
[GRP] material for its dome window."  The agency reports that GRP 
domes were investigated during the development of the AN/SQS-26/53 
sonar dome, and the initial development efforts at the United States 
Naval Undersea Warfare Center "proved that fiberglass domes would not 
achieve the low self-noise levels attained with reinforced rubber"; 
according to the agency, "[e]xtensive testing determined that the use 
of rubber composites was the only way to achieve the desired noise 
level."  The agency reports that:

        "[t]he essential property of rubber that makes it a very 
        suitable material for sonar window manufacture is that it has 
        wave speeds that are all sub-sonic.  This means that any 
        energy that gets into the material will not be radiated off as 
        an acoustic signal that will interfere with the hydrophone 
        array. [GRP] on the other hand has supersonic wave 
        (compressional) speeds that cause energy trapped within the 
        material to radiate off at certain critical angles.  This is 
        one of the problems experienced in the UK's submarine dome 
        program.  Surface ship sonar systems . . . have experienced 
        numerous acoustic problems with their [GRP] domes. . . .

        "The problems of [GRP] as a material, if the mounting at the 
        edges of a dome are not properly designed, are in fact 
        exceedingly complex. . . .  Attempts to mechanically isolate a 
        [GRP] dome from its attachment have failed in the past, as the 
        noise levels were increased by the isolated mounting of the 
        dome. . . .  In practice the dominating noise source was flow 
        induced dome vibrations. . . .  The way in which a dome is 
        mounted at the edges is critical. . . .  [T]he planned ADM 
        mounting arrangements would not hold the dome sufficiently 
        rigidly to prevent flow induced dome vibration with the 
        attendant self noise penalty."

In addition, NAVSEA maintains that recent sea trials (in early 1994) 
of a British sonar with a GRP dome, the results of which first became 
known to evaluators only during the evaluation of MMC's down-select 
proposal, were a significant factor in the JPO's determination that 
MMC's use of a GRP sonar dome was an unacceptable risk.  Joint project 
engineers testified that prior to the tests, self noise which had 
interfered with the detection capability of the British sonar had been 
primarily attributed to electrical interference, but that based on the 
sea trials it was determined that "there were significant self noise 
problems other than just the electrical noise problems and they . . . 
[were] associated with the fiberglass [dome]."  Tr. at 285-287, 
316-317, 626, 657.  According to the testimony, British technical 
authorities now consider "fiberglass to be a significant contributing 
factor to that self-noise."  Tr. at 626, 633-634, 638.  The agency 
concludes that "[i]f the AN/SQS-26/53 was deemed incapable of 
obtaining its noise goal with the use of Glass Reinforced Plastic 
windows, there is likewise no probability that the [MMC] ADM bow sonar 
dome will meet the Government's performance requirements as designed."

MMC does not deny that rubber is superior to fiberglass for sonar 
domes.  A consultant retained by MMC for this protest has noted that 
"[t]he characteristics of rubber makes it a superb substance for a 
sonar dome," while counsel for the protester acknowledges that "rubber 
is marginally better than fiberglass in terms of preventing noise from 
radiating within the bow dome."  MMC and its consultant, however, 
argue that it was unreasonable for the joint project evaluators to 
conclude that the fiberglass dome proposed by MMC would necessarily 
suffer from high self noise; they contend that "by applying 
state-of-the-art techniques in baffling and constrained layer damping 
in the construction of the dome, the difference in self-noise between 
that dome [proposed by MMC] and a rubber dome would be relatively 
insignificant."  As evidence that fiberglass is acceptable, MMC notes 
that fiberglass domes have been extensively used on submarines.  Tr. 
at 323, 444.  As for the sea trials of the British sonar cited by the 
agency as evidence of the unsatisfactory character of fiberglass for 
use in sonar domes, MMC points out that the draft report on the 
trials, issued in early 1995, does not specifically refer to 
fiberglass as a cause of the self-noise.

The procuring agency has the primary responsibility for evaluating the 
technical information supplied by an offeror and determining the 
technical acceptability of the offeror's proposal; we will not disturb 
a determination with respect to technical acceptability unless it is 
shown to be unreasonable.  See Intelligent Env'ts, B-256170.2, Nov. 
28, 1994, 94-2 CPD  para.  210.  A protester's mere disagreement with the 
agency's technical judgment does not establish that it was 
unreasonable.  See Diversified Technical Consultants, Inc., B-250986, 
Feb. 22, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  161.

MMC's arguments do not establish that the agency's determination as to 
MMC's proposed fiberglass sonar dome was unreasonable.  The fact that 
fiberglass domes have been used on submarines does not establish that 
the evaluators were unreasonable in concluding, based on the latest 
information available, that use of a fiberglass sonar dome on a 
surface ship could result in such self-noise as to interfere with the 
detection, classification, and localization of incoming torpedoes in 
sufficient time to take defensive action and permit compliance with 
the overall effectiveness requirements.  In this regard, testimony at 
the hearing indicated that a submarine, with an intrusive, streamlined 
bow dome, operating below the surface where wave action and associated 
turbulence create significantly greater ship vibration, operates in an 
"absolutely different," more benign noise environment than do the 
surface ships to be defended here.  Tr. at 335-336, 518, 636-637.  
Moreover, the record indicates that problems in fact have been 
encountered with fiberglass domes on British submarines; fiberglass 
has been seen as a "suspect material" in the British submarine program 
for approximately 20 years and is considered to be "acoustically 
sub-optimum."  Tr. at 626-628, 633-634, 649-650.  Likewise, NAVSEA 
reports that the United States has experienced many acoustic problems 
with GRP submarine bow domes.  (Although consultants retained by MMC 
submitted declarations questioning NAVSEA's position in this regard, 
we note that a sonar expert at the British Defense Research Agency 
(DRA) testified to consultations with the Naval Undersea Warfare 
Center, during which technical personnel indicated that they likewise 
consider fiberglass a "problem material."  Tr. at 650-651.)  

As noted by MMC, the draft report on the recent sea trials of a 
British sonar does not specifically refer to fiberglass when listing 
four possible causes of the significant, "unacceptably high level of 
self noise" affecting the sonar dome, which is made of fiberglass.  
However, the draft report was published by the DRA, the agency which 
conducted the sea trials, and a DRA sonar expert testified that 
fiberglass was viewed as a significant contributing factor to dome 
self-noise.  Tr. at 334, 626-628.  Furthermore, the report does list 
"flow noise" as a possible cause of dome self-noise and states that 
"[i]t is clear that the design of the dome, its material, mounting 
arrangement and sitting are all contributing to high levels of self 
noise which limit passive detection ranges against torpedoes."  
(Emphasis added.)  Again, the material of which the tested dome was 
made is fiberglass, and testimony at the hearing indicated that the 
fiberglass material comprising a dome affects flow noise.  Tr. at 
648-649.  Thus, the DRA report does in fact call into question the use 
of fiberglass as a material for sonar domes; the report does not belie 
the agency's position that the British sea trials indicated that there 
was a substantial risk that use of a GRP sonar dome would result in 
significant self-noise.  

Further, the record indicates that the detection of quiet electric 
torpedoes, one of the specification requirements, is very difficult, 
especially when high levels of self-noise are present to interfere 
with sonar detection.  Tr. at 637-638.  In this regard, according to 
NAVSEA, major sonar self-noise problems have been frequently 
encountered on surface ships.  Further, the record indicates that 
fiberglass domes have been associated with high self-noise levels on 
British and American surface ships and submarines.  Indeed, MMC itself 
concedes that rubber is superior to fiberglass with respect to its 
inherent self-noise characteristics.  Although the protester argues 
that the difference with respect to self-noise can be rendered 
relatively insignificant by applying state-of-the-art techniques in 
baffling and constrained layer damping to a fiberglass dome, and the 
evaluators agree that a number of techniques can reduce self-noise, 
Tr. at 318, 323, the evaluators found that MMC's proposal lacked 
adequate details concerning its mitigation measures.  For example, 
although MMC referred to a "Dome-Coated GRP," it never described the 
coating to be applied to the dome.  Tr. at 318, 329, 657-658.  
Further, hearing testimony indicated that the inherent acoustic 
superiority of rubber over fiberglass is considerable.  Tr. at 651.  
Moreover, the record supports the agency's position that the history 
of fiberglass domes on surface ships indicates that it is often 
difficult in practice to eliminate high levels of self-noise.  

Based on this record, we find that MMC has not established that the 
evaluators were unreasonable in concluding that MMC's proposed use of 
fiberglass for the sonar dome, an approach which has often resulted in 
high levels of self-noise in the past, posed an unacceptable risk of 
creating such self-noise as to interfere with the specification 
performance requirements with respect to detecting, classifying, and 
localizing incoming torpedoes.  

MMC further argues that even if its proposed bow sonar array was 
ineffective because of self-noise, its bow sonar was "only essential 
for meeting the requirements of a portion of two [of the 26 specified 
threat] scenarios where the torpedo was directly off the bow"; 
according to the protester, its overall "average system effectiveness 
score" was acceptable and the agency thus was precluded from finding 
its proposal unacceptable.  

This argument is without merit.  The modification nowhere permitted an 
offeror to propose a system which is effective in some of the threat 
scenarios set forth in the system specification but not in others, and 
MMC's position in this regard appears inconsistent with express 
provisions of the modification.  Paragraph 3.1.2 of the system 
specification generally provided that "[t]he SSTD System shall provide 
torpedo warning such that torpedo countermeasures can be executed," 
while paragraph 3.1.5.1(a) of the SOW required the contractor to 
"[d]emonstrate that his systems meet the performance requirements of 
Table 3-1 [with respect to specific effectiveness requirements for 
each torpedo type] in the [threat] scenarios shown in Tables 4-1 and 
4-2 of the US/UK SSTD Joint Project System Specification. . . ."  
Paragraph 4.2 of the system specification provided that "[t]able 4-1 
presents scenarios which shall be used to determine that proposed 
systems meet the capability requirements of Table 3-1 for ship types 
in each echelon required by each specific scenario."  (Emphasis 
added.)   The plain language of these provisions contemplated 
demonstrated effectiveness for all threat scenarios.  Although the 
system specification elsewhere appeared to permit the averaging of 
effectiveness ratings between the torpedoes in a particular attack 
salvo, we find no provision (and MMC points to none) which permits the 
averaging of effectiveness between scenarios.  MMC's interpretation 
seems unreasonable, moreover, since it would permit the offer of an 
SSTD system which would allow the sinking of a first echelon unit, 
such as an aircraft carrier, subject to attack as set forth in certain 
threat scenarios so long as the ship was well protected in other 
scenarios.  (MMC's position in this regard also is inconsistent with 
its claim, discussed below, that WEC's proposal should have been found 
unacceptable because it allegedly did not meet the system 
specification requirement for a 360-degree sonar defensive 
capability.)

We conclude that the JPO reasonably determined that MMC's proposed use 
of fiberglass for the sonar dome posed an unacceptable risk of 
creating such self-noise as to preclude compliance with the 
specification performance requirements with respect to detecting, 
classifying and localizing incoming torpedoes in time to take 
defensive measures and overall system effectiveness, and that this 
noncompliance was a material deviation from the mandatory 
specification requirements.  Accordingly, this was a proper basis for 
rejecting MMC's proposal, and we need not consider MMC's challenge to 
the JPO's determination that its proposed mounting approach was also 
unacceptable.   

WEC'S EVALUATION

MMC contends that WEC's proposal was technically unacceptable and 
could not form the basis for award; according to the protester, the 
agency was therefore required to open discussions with all offerors.  
MMC primarily argues that WEC's proposed approach will not meet the 
specification requirement for 360-degree coverage.  WEC proposed to 
satisfy the specification requirement for 360-degree coverage for 
first echelon units through use of a [DELETED].  MMC alleges that 
because [DELETED] are inherently limited in their ability to detect 
acoustic signals which approach [DELETED] from the endfire 
region--that is, towards 0 degrees relative to [DELETED]--WEC's 
[DELETED] will be unable to meet the performance requirements with 
respect to torpedoes approaching the target ship from ahead of its 
bow.  MMC maintains further that turbulence along the sides of the 
ship will create noise and interfere with signal reception by WEC's 
[DELETED].

The agency acknowledges that the signal detection capability of 
[DELETED] is degraded as the angle of the signal approaches true 
endfire--0 degrees relative to [DELETED].  See, e.g., Tr. at 677.  
Indeed, agency evaluators recognized when evaluating WEC's proposal 
that [DELETED], which had been used on submarines, had not been 
demonstrated on surface ships, and that there was some risk that 
[DELETED] would be unable to achieve 180-degree coverage [DELETED].  
The evaluators also recognized that performance of [DELETED] may be 
degraded by hull vibration-induced noise.  However, based in part on 
the results of a test [DELETED] on the aircraft carrier USS Kennedy, 
the JPO ultimately concluded that WEC's overall system, [DELETED], 
would satisfy the 360-degree coverage requirement.  Likewise, NAVSEA 
maintains that when the proposed [DELETED], they will provide 
sufficient forward coverage such that WEC's proposed system will meet 
the overall coverage requirements.  

There is some uncertainty and considerable technical dispute as to 
whether WEC's proposed [DELETED] will afford sufficient detection 
capability with respect to torpedoes approaching from ahead of the 
ship that WEC's system will offer the required 360-degree coverage.  
MMC has submitted declarations from technical consultants, and its 
consultants have testified, as to the theoretical impediments to 
[DELETED] detection capability.  Tr. at 449-483, 491-514, 515-549.  
However, the record also includes declarations and testimony from 
government sonar experts and a technical consultant retained by WEC 
indicating that the proposed [DELETED] can be placed on ships so as to 
avoid significant interference from turbulence, and that when 
[DELETED], the [DELETED] will furnish the required 360-degree 
coverage.  Tr. at 668-687, 692-710, 713-791.  Further, somewhat 
fragmentary test results from the USS Kennedy trials, while not 
conclusively establishing that the proposed [DELETED] will offer the 
requisite coverage in the forward sector, appear to offer some support 
for the agency's position that [DELETED] could potentially provide 
such coverage.  We are left to conclude that, while perhaps difficult 
to achieve, 360-degree coverage is at least theoretically possible 
with WEC's proposed [DELETED]; there is no conclusive evidence to the 
contrary.  This being the case, we have no basis for concluding that 
the agency unreasonably determined that WEC's proposed system could 
meet the coverage requirements such that the proposal was technically 
acceptable in this regard.

In summary, having reviewed MMC's arguments with respect to the 
acceptability of its own proposal and that submitted by WEC, and based 
on the record before us, we find no basis for questioning the JPO's 
determination that WEC's down-select proposal, but not MMC's, was 
technically acceptable.

NOTICE 

MMC alleges that it had no notice that its semi-permanent bow sonar 
array mounting and GRP sonar dome were considered by the JPO to be 
fundamentally unacceptable.  MMC argues that it was unfairly misled by 
the JPO into offering an SSTD approach in its down-select proposal 
which the JPO knew or should have known would be fundamentally 
unacceptable by (1) the fact that the JPO found General Electric's 
1990 proposal of the same approach to be acceptable; (2) general 
statements from the JPO that "[a]ll objectives and exit criteria of 
the Risk Mitigation Program have been achieved and the US/UK SSTD 
Joint Project is technically on a solid footing and ready to enter the 
[D&V] Phase," and that "[o]bjectives of D&V can be successfully 
achieved with low to moderate risk"; (3) the failure of the JPO to 
advise MMC that the JPO considered MMC's approach to be fundamentally 
flawed; (4) the addition to a list of factors to be considered by the 
contractor in performing the required impact studies on subsystem 
location of the possibility of SSTD approaches not requiring 
drydocking for installation (which allegedly indicated to MMC the 
JPO's interest in nonpermanent installation approaches which did not 
require drydocking); and (5) the statement in the modification 
requesting down-select proposals that the contemplated reassessment of 
the offeror's understanding and capability would "build on the 
government's previous evaluation of the offeror's original 
proposal."[4]

MMC maintains that it was improper for the JPO to withhold vital 
knowledge concerning the fundamental acceptability of its approach.  
In support of its position, MMC cites our decision in EER Sys. Corp., 
B-248904.3, Mar. 8, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  211, wherein we recognized that 
"under the well established doctrine of superior knowledge, where the 
government possesses special knowledge not shared by the contractor, 
which is vital to the performance of the contract, the government has 
an affirmative duty to disclose such knowledge to the contractor."  
See also Helene Curtis Indus. v. the United States, 312 F.2d 774 (Ct. 
Cl. 1963); Globe Woolen & Co. v. Utica Gas and Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 
378, 380 (N.Y. 1918).  Further, asserting that the 1992 awards were in 
effect only a competitive range determination and that the RMP effort 
thus constituted discussions, MMC contends that the JPO's failure to 
advise it of JPO's concerns with respect to the semi-permanent 
mounting approach and GRP dome prior to the submission of proposals in 
1994 amounted to a failure to conduct meaningful discussions.  
Moreover, even if the RMP effort is not considered to be discussions, 
MMC argues, the contracting officer abused his discretion under 
Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  15.610 by not affording MMC an 
opportunity to cure the perceived deficiencies in its proposal.  

MMC's arguments do not furnish a basis for questioning the award to 
WEC.  First, as discussed above, although the 1992 RMP/D&V and 1994 
down-select awards were related in that they represented steps in an 
overall development and production process, they were legally separate 
procurements.  We do not find persuasive MMC's contention that the 
1994 down-select proposals were best and final offers concluding a 
process that commenced with the submission of initial proposals in 
1990.  The 1992-1993 RMP effort was not an extended period of 
negotiations, but instead a period of contract performance, for which 
the contractors were paid for their participation.  Thus, the JPO made 
award to WEC on the basis of its initial down-select proposal.  Since 
WEC's down-select proposal was the only acceptable proposal at the 
time of award, MMC's having reasonably been found to be technically 
unacceptable, the JPO was not required to conduct discussions prior to 
making award.  See Analytical Chemists, Inc., B-256037, Apr. 29, 1994, 
94-1 CPD  para.  283; see generally Infotec Dev., Inc., B-258198 et al., 
Dec. 27, 1994, 95-1 CPD  para.  52; A. G. Crook Co., B-255230, Feb. 16, 
1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  118.

Second, the record does not support MMC's contention that the JPO 
possessed superior, vital knowledge concerning the fundamental 
acceptability of MMC's approach prior to the submission of the 
down-select proposals.  Again, during discussions with General 
Electric during the 1990/1992 competition, the JPO specifically 
questioned General Electric's semi-permanent--"Kingfisher"--bow sonar 
array mounting, citing the "flow-induced hull vibration problems 
encountered during development," that is, the very problems which led 
to it being found unacceptable in 1994.  In addition, on two occasions 
subsequent to the 1992 RMP/D&V awards, the chief engineer for the SSTD 
project advised General Electric/MMC of the JPO's continuing concern 
with respect to the potentially high self-noise associated with their 
installation approach, focusing on the strumming vibration experienced 
with the Kingfisher.  Although MMC complains that it was not 
specifically told that the continued offer of this approach would be 
unacceptable, we believe that it was placed on reasonable notice of 
the essential nature of the JPO's continuing concerns in this regard 
such that, as an experienced contractor, it could reasonably be 
expected to take them into account in preparing its proposal.

As for MMC's offer of the fiberglass sonar dome, it is clear from the 
record that the JPO for some time has viewed the use of fiberglass for 
sonar domes as a weakness.  As discussed above, the SSEB noted in 1991 
that "[t]he lightweight fiberglass dome concept is considered, from US 
and UK trials, to be a risk area since fiberglass domes tend to be 
noisy and also have high failure rates."  Indeed, the record indicates 
that fiberglass has been seen as a "suspect material" in the British 
submarine program for approximately 20 years and has been associated 
with acoustic problems on United States surface ships and submarines.  
However, NAVSEA maintains that the results of the early 1994 sea 
trials of a British sonar with a GRP dome, which first became known to 
evaluators only during the evaluation of MMC's down-select proposal, 
were a significant factor in the determination that MMC's use of a GRP 
sonar dome was an unacceptable risk.  Again, prior to the tests, 
self-noise which had interfered with the detection capability of the 
British sonar had been primarily attributed to electrical 
interference, but based on the sea trials it was determined that there 
were significant self-noise problems associated with the fiberglass 
dome.  In our view, the fact that General Electric's 1990/1991 
proposal was found acceptable, notwithstanding its inclusion of a 
fiberglass dome, supports the agency's position that a fiberglass dome 
was not viewed as unacceptable prior to receipt of the down-select 
proposals.  

Furthermore, we think the essential nature of the JPO's concern with 
respect to the acoustic properties of fiberglass was or should have 
been known to the MMC team.  MMC acknowledges that rubber is a 
material superior to fiberglass for domes with respect to preventing 
noise from radiating within the sonar dome and interfering with sonar 
detection and it does not claim that it was unaware of this when 
preparing its down-select proposal.  Nor does it claim to have been 
unaware of the challenges posed by the need to detect quiet electric 
torpedoes.  (Indeed, inasmuch as it claims to include experienced 
contractors in its team, it could hardly make such a claim.)  Rather, 
it appears that it simply made a cost/technical tradeoff, selecting 
fiberglass because it was easier to work with and less expensive, and 
in the expectation that the acknowledged acoustic inferiority of the 
material could be mitigated.  There thus is no basis for concluding 
that the JPO had superior knowledge that should have been imparted to 
MMC; the MMC team knew or should have known of the essential nature of 
the JPO's concerns in this regard.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States

1. Inasmuch as significant portions of the record are classified, the 
following unclassified discussion is necessarily somewhat general.

2. During the protest proceedings, NAVSEA stipulated that "[a]lthough 
the Source Selection Evaluation Board determined that the Martin 
proposal contained other weaknesses, the deficiencies associated with 
the bow array sonar design were pivotal to the SSAC's determinations 
that the Martin proposal was unacceptable and that it was not 
necessary to enter into discussions."

3. Although MMC generally denies receiving any post-award notice as to 
the agency's continued concern with respect to vibration caused by its 
proposed installation method, see, e.g., Tr. at 340, we find the 
testimony and sworn statement of the SSTD chief engineer to be 
credible since the concern reportedly expressed to General 
Electric/MMC was the same concern stated in the 1990/1992 evaluation 
documents and the expression of the concern is consistent with the 
action of the JPO in submitting the written question concerning this 
matter to General Electric during discussions.

4. Although MMC also claims that it was advised by the JPO during the 
RMP effort to retain its previously proposed bow array approach, it is 
clear from our review of the record that MMC in fact was advised, in 
response to its suggestion of the possibility of relying only on its 
towed sonar array, of the agency's view that a hull-mounted sonar 
array was necessary as a supplement to the towed array.  There is no 
basis in the record for concluding that MMC was advised again to 
propose the same semi-permanent bow sonar array mounting and GRP sonar 
dome.