BNUMBER:  B-258243.7
DATE:  September 7, 1995
TITLE:  Kay and Associates, Inc.

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DOCUMENT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
A protected decision was issued on the date below and was subject to a 
GAO Protective Order.  This version has been redacted or approved by 
the parties involved for public release.
Matter of:Kay and Associates, Inc.

File:     B-258243.7

Date:September 7, 1995

Laura K. Kennedy, Esq., Kevin P. Connelly, Esq., and G. Matthew Koehl, 
Esq., Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, for the protester.
Thomas J. Madden, Esq., James F. Worrall, Esq., and Jerome S. Gabig, 
Jr., Esq., Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civiletti, for Beech Aerospace 
Services, Inc., an interested party.
William P. McGinnies, Esq., Department of the Treasury, for the 
agency.
David A. Ashen, Esq., and John M. Melody, Esq., Office of the General 
Counsel, GAO, participated in the preparation of the decision.

DIGEST

Protest that agency did not conduct a meaningful cost/technical 
tradeoff before making award to higher-rated, higher-cost offeror for 
aircraft maintenance services, is denied where (1) cost was less 
important than the technical factors and (2) the source selection 
authority identified specific technical discriminators in the 
awardee's proposal which were likely to assure a highly motivated, 
productive and stable work force, and increase the operational 
readiness and mission capability of the aircraft; contrary to 
protester's argument, there is no requirement that selection of a 
higher cost proposal be justified through an exact quantification of 
the dollar value to the agency of the proposal's technical 
superiority.

DECISION

Kay and Associates, Inc. protests the determination of the Department 
of the Treasury, U.S. Customs Service, to affirm its previous award of 
a contract to Beech Aerospace Services, Inc., under request for 
proposals (RFP) No. CS-94-004, for aircraft maintenance and related 
services.  Customs again selected Beech's proposal as most 
advantageous to the government after having reopened negotiations and 
requested revised best and final offers (BAFO) pursuant to the 
corrective action recommended in our decision Serv-Air, Inc.; Kay and 
Assocs., Inc., B-258243 et al., Dec. 28, 1994, 96-1 CPD  para.  ___.   Kay 
challenges the evaluation of cost proposals and the overall 
cost/technical tradeoff.

We deny the protest.

The RFP contemplated the award of a cost-plus-award-fee contract for a 
base year with 4 option years to maintain aircraft used by Customs to 
detect, interdict, track and apprehend aircraft, ships and land 
vehicles attempting to smuggle contraband into the United States.  The 
RFP provided that the contractor "shall provide program management, 
aircraft maintenance, logistics, supply and Electronic Data Processing 
(EDP) support requirements necessary to ensure that Customs has the 
numbers, types and properly configured aircraft available where and 
when required to meet all Customs aviation operational commitments."

The solicitation generally provided for award to be made to the 
offeror "whose proposal offers the best value to the Government in 
terms of technical and cost rather than to the proposal offering the 
lowest estimated cost."  The RFP listed three specific technical 
evaluation factors:  (1) technical approach--including staffing, 
methodology and past performance--and (2) quality management, which 
were of equal importance and "four times greater than" (3) phase-in 
and phase-out.  The solicitation stated that cost was less important 
than--"not as critical as"--the technical factors.  Cost proposals 
were to be evaluated for allowability, allocability, realism and risk.  
The RFP cautioned that the agency "is concerned with the quality and 
stability of the work force to be employed on this contract. . . .  
The cost proposal will be considered in terms of its impact upon 
recruiting and retention, its realism, and its consistency with the 
technical proposal."

Six proposals were received by the closing time.  Four--including 
Kay's, Beech's and Serv-Air's--were included in the competitive range.  
Following discussions with the offerors, the agency requested best and 
final offers (BAFO).  Based upon its evaluation of BAFOs, Customs 
determined that Beech's proposal, which received a technical rating of 
outstanding (blue), was technically superior to the other proposals, 
which received ratings of good (green), and that it offered the 
overall best value to the government.  Upon learning of the award to 
Beech, Kay and Serv-Air protested to our Office.

We sustained Kay's protest on the basis that Customs had failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions concerning its cost proposal.  Although 
Kay's initial cost proposal indicated that its historic general and 
administrative (G&A) rates for 1991, 1992, and 1993 were approximately 
[DELETED] percent, it offered G&A rates of [DELETED] percent for labor 
and [DELETED] percent for materials for the years 1994-1999 based upon 
assumptions concerning future business volume, including the impact of 
the contemplated contract.  The proposal also stated that "[Kay] will 
accept a G&A ceiling rate arrangement in any contract awarded as a 
result of this proposal."  While noting that the proposed rates were 
significantly lower than "recent actuals," the Defense Contract Audit 
Agency (DCAA) found the rates to be "reasonable and acceptable, so 
long as they are to be ceilings."  Customs, however, did not discuss 
with Kay either DCAA's concerns or Kay's willingness to accept capped 
rates.  Instead, when Kay in its BAFO reduced its proposed G&A rates 
for labor and materials to [DELETED] and [DELETED] percent, 
respectively, again indicating that it "will accept a G&A ceiling 
rate," Customs adjusted Kay's G&A rate upward to [DELETED] percent in 
its most probable cost evaluation.  Although we agreed in our prior 
decision with Customs's position that Kay's proposal could reasonably 
be read as not including a contractually binding cap, we found that 
the agency improperly had failed to conduct discussions concerning 
Kay's apparent willingness to cap its G&A costs.  (We denied Kay's 
remaining arguments and Serv-Air's protest.)  We recommended that the 
agency reopen discussions with Kay in order to ascertain the 
appropriate G&A rates to be used in determining the G&A costs which 
would be incurred if the agency accepted Kay's proposal; conduct 
discussions with all other competitive range offerors; and request new 
BAFOs.

In response to our recommendation, Customs reopened discussions with 
offerors.  Customs then requested BAFOs limited to changes in cost 
proposals.  After further discussions, Customs requested an additional 
round of cost BAFOs.  Customs determined that Beech's revised BAFO 
offered the overall best value to the government.  Although Beech's 
proposal offered the highest proposed ($144,343,065) and evaluated 
($148,660,391) costs, approximately 9 percent higher than Kay's 
($132,493,716 proposed; $136,445,875 evaluated), the technical 
advantages of Beech's proposal, which was rated outstanding, were 
found to warrant its higher cost.  Kay thereupon filed this protest 
with our Office.

COST RISK

Customs characterized Kay's proposal as offering a high cost 
risk--i.e., a risk that the total actual cost would vary significantly 
from the proposed cost.  Customs based its assessment of a high cost 
risk in part on its determination that:  (1) Kay's failure to propose 
any labor rate escalation (other than that required by Department of 
Labor wage rate determinations) over the 5 years of the contract would 
lead to a high turnover rate and low employee morale; (2) Kay's 
proposal of low pay rates for management and supervisory personnel 
could lead to the departure of supervisors familiar with the aircraft 
and site operations; and (3) Kay's failure to offer a shift 
differential--for working other than standard daytime shifts--to any 
shift employees (other than employees covered by a union agreement at 
one site), when all shift employees were currently being paid shift 
differential premiums, could lead to the departure of shift employees.  
Customs concluded that higher compensation than proposed by Kay (and 
evaluated) may be necessary in order to motivate and retain a 
productive work force.  In addition, Customs questioned Kay's offer in 
its revised BAFO to cap its G&A rate at [DELETED] percent; the agency 
expressed concern that Kay could seek to recover the estimated 
$[DELETED] million cost of the cap as part of overhead and/or that the 
cap would result in a disincentive to quality performance since the 
cost of the cap greatly exceeded Kay's share of the fee and Kay "would 
be working for little or no profit."

Kay challenges Customs's assessment.  According to Kay, it has neither 
the intention nor the opportunity under the contemplated contract to 
circumvent the cost cap.  Further, Kay points out that it stated in 
its BAFO that it was offering lower G&A rates based on an anticipated 
increase in business volume that would lower actual G&A.  Kay claims 
that if Customs had raised its concerns in this regard during 
discussions, it could have furnished additional information 
demonstrating its ability to absorb any excess G&A costs and still 
earn a reasonable profit performing the contract.  Kay argues that 
Customs's failure to raise this matter during the reopened discussions 
constituted a failure to conduct meaningful discussions.

Competitive prejudice is an essential element of a viable protest, and 
where no competitive prejudice is shown or is otherwise evident, our 
Office will not sustain a protest even if a deficiency in the 
procurement is evident.  See Latins Am., Inc., 71 Comp. Gen. 436 
(1992), 92-1 CPD  para.  519; Anamet Labs., Inc., B-241002, Jan. 14, 1991, 
91-1 CPD  para.  31.

It is clear from the record that neither Customs's failure to discuss 
its concerns with respect to Kay's proposed G&A cap nor its underlying 
evaluation in this regard resulted in competitive prejudice to Kay.  
In justifying the selection of Beech's proposal, the source selection 
official (SSA) explained in the source selection statement that:

        "[Beech's] proposal will best fulfill the stated goals of 
        attracting and retaining a qualified workforce to perform the 
        maintenance services upon the Customs aircraft fleet.  More 
        specifically, I determine as follows:

          [Beech's] outstanding technical features are worth an 
          additional cost of $2.4 million per year (9 percent overall) 
          to the Customs Service as compared to [Kay's] proposal.

          .  .     ..    .

        "In light of the foregoing findings and determinations I have 
        made, I find that [Beech]  offers the best value to the 
        Customs Service.  This finding is further buttressed by the 
        fact that I find that [Beech] presents the lowest cost risk to 
        the Customs Service over the course of the contract."

We think it is clear from the record that, as maintained by Customs, 
the SSA determined that Beech's proposal offered the best value to the 
government even before consideration of the evaluated cost risk of 
Kay's proposal.  In this regard, as indicated above, the SSA first 
determined that the technical strengths of Beech's proposal warranted 
the approximately $12 million additional cost relative to the 
evaluated cost of Kay's proposal, that is, the cost of Kay's proposal 
when the G&A cost cap is given full effect.  Only then did the SSA 
consider the effect of the evaluated cost risk of Kay's proposal, 
finding that it "further buttressed" the results of the above 
cost/technical tradeoff.  (Further, as discussed below, we find 
reasonable Customs's position that the technical strengths of Beech's 
proposal justified award to Beech even without consideration of the 
cost risk of Kay's proposal.)  In any case, Customs's characterization 
of Kay's proposal as offering a high cost risk was based on a number 
of factors beyond the proposed G&A cost cap:  inadequate labor rate 
escalation; low pay rates for management and supervisory personnel; 
and failure to offer a shift differential to most shift employees.  
Given Customs's determination that Kay's compensation package was 
insufficient to assure retention of a knowledgeable, motivated and 
productive work force, the agency could reasonably assign significant 
cost risk to Kay's proposal irrespective of any consideration of the 
proposed G&A cost cap.

Kay challenges Customs's failure to assign any cost risk to Beech's 
proposal to account for the fact that Beech did not propose to charge 
G&A on its estimated $55.1 million in reimbursable materials to be 
acquired under the contemplated contract.  [DELETED]  Again, however, 
it is clear that the evaluation of Beech's proposal in this regard did 
not result in competitive prejudice to Kay since, even if Beech's cost 
in this area was understated, there is no basis for concluding that 
adjusting them up to the level of Kay's would have materially affected 
the assessment of cost risk.  Certainly, there is no reason to believe 
that the outcome of the cost/technical tradeoff would have been 
different even if the agency had added as much as [DELETED] percent, 
or $[DELETED] to the evaluated cost ($148,660,391) of Beech's 
proposal.  Customs denies that Kay was prejudiced by the evaluation of 
cost risk, and we find its position to be reasonable.  See MR&S/AME, 
An MSC Joint Venture, B-250313.2, Mar. 19, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  245.

COST/TECHNICAL TRADEOFF

Kay argues that Customs did not conduct a meaningful cost/technical 
tradeoff.  According to Kay, the agency did not adequately take into 
account the fact that the evaluated cost of Kay's proposal at the 
conclusion of the reopened negotiations was approximately $12.2 
million lower than Beech's; the protester argues that the agency 
should have quantified the additional value offered by Beech's 
technical advantages.  Kay maintains that its proposal, not Beech's, 
would have been rated the best value had Customs done so since, 
notwithstanding the fact that Beech's was rated outstanding and Kay's 
was rated good, Kay believes the proposals were close technically.  
(Kay expressly states that it does not challenge the results of the 
technical evaluation.)

In a negotiated procurement, there is no requirement that award be 
made on the basis of lowest cost unless the RFP so specifies.  Henry 
H. Hackett & Sons, B-237181, Feb. 1, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  136.  
Cost/technical tradeoffs may be made in deciding between competing 
proposals; the propriety of such a tradeoff turns not on the 
difference in technical scores or ratings per se, but on whether the 
agency's judgment concerning the significance of that difference was 
reasonable and adequately justified in light of the RFP evaluation 
scheme.  Brunswick Defense, B-255764, Mar. 30, 1994, 94-1 CPD  para.  225.  
Federal Acquisition Regulation  sec.  15.612(d)(2) requires that 
documentation supporting the selection decision show the relative 
differences among proposals as well as their strengths, weaknesses and 
risks along with the basis and reasons for the decision.  There is no 
requirement, however, that selection of a higher-cost proposal be 
justified through an exact quantification of the dollar value to the 
agency of the proposal's technical superiority.  Picker Int'l, Inc., 
B-249699.3, Mar. 30, 1993, 93-1 CPD  para.  275.  Further, even where a 
selection official does not specifically discuss the cost/technical 
tradeoff in the selection decision document, we will not object to the 
tradeoff if it is clearly supported by the record.  Maytag Aircraft 
Corp., B-237068.3, Apr. 26, 1990, 90-1 CPD  para.  430.

The record supports the agency's cost/technical tradeoff.  While Kay 
contends that the technical evaluation results  were "very close," it 
is clear from the record that the overall rating of Beech's technical 
proposal as outstanding represented a considered determination that it 
offered significant technical advantages relative to the proposals 
(including Kay's) rated only good.  In this regard, the SSA identified 
specific technical discriminators warranting Beech's higher cost.  For 
example, noting that the incumbent had experienced an employee 
turnover rate of 17 percent in recent years, the SSA concluded that 
Beech's proposal of annual [DELETED]-percent pay raises and higher 
than required benefits would act as an incentive to assure a highly 
motivated, productive and stable work force.  In contrast, Customs 
determined that Kay's overall compensation package--with inadequate 
labor rate escalation, low pay rates for management and supervisory 
personnel, and no shift differential for most shift employees--was 
insufficient to assure retention of a knowledgeable, motivated and 
productive work force.  As another example, the SSA found that Beech's 
proposal to [DELETED] would shorten turnaround times by at least 3 
days and thereby directly increase operational readiness and mission 
capability.  Further, the SSA found that Beech's proposal of a 
[DELETED] would increase aircraft life expectancy and thereby reduce 
Customs's acquisition costs.  The SSA also considered it a strength 
that Beech had proposed [DELETED] which would enable the agency to use 
[DELETED] lower stock levels and reduce aircraft downtime/increase 
operational readiness.  Given the fact that cost was less important 
than the technical factors, we think that the agency's determination 
that the technical advantages offered by Beech's proposal warranted 
its approximately 9-percent higher evaluated cost relative to the cost 
of Kay's proposal, was reasonable.

The protest is denied.

Comptroller General
of the United States