Inspectors General: Information on Operational and Staffing Issues
(Letter Report, 01/04/99, GAO/AIMD-99-29).

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Inspector General Act of
1978, the basic authority governing statutory offices of inspector
general (IG), and the 10th anniversary of the Inspector General Act
Amendments of 1988, which extended the IG's basic reporting requirements
and established IG offices in additional government organizations. GAO
surveyed IGs and found that their work covers a broad spectrum of agency
programs and operations. In general, the IGs responded that they have
the expertise and resources necessary to assemble the staff needed to do
the major types of work for which they are responsible. Additionally,
although they generally anticipate the level of work to remain the same
or slightly increase across the range of areas they review, IGs
anticipated the greatest increase to be in information technology
reviews. IGs also indicated that they were generally satisfied with
their role and the overall legislation governing them, but did identify
certain potential areas for modification, which this report discusses in
detail.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-99-29
     TITLE:  Inspectors General: Information on Operational and Staffing 
             Issues
      DATE:  01/04/99
   SUBJECT:  Inspectors general
             Human resources utilization
             Personnel management
             Investigations by federal agencies
             Surveys
             Information resources management
             Auditors

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1999

INSPECTORS GENERAL - INFORMATION
ON OPERATIONAL AND STAFFING ISSUES

GAO/AIMD-99-29

IG Survey Results

(911874)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DFE - Designated Federal Entity
  ECIE - Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  GAGAS - generally accepted government auditing standards
  IG - Inspector General
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  PCIE - President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-281356

January 4, 1999

The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen Horn
Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Management,
 Information and Technology
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

The Honorable Charles E.  Grassley
Chairman
Special Committee on Aging
United States Senate

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the Inspector General Act of
1978, the basic authority governing statutory offices of inspector
general (IG), and the 10th anniversary of the Inspector General Act
Amendments of 1988, which extended the IGs' basic reporting
requirements and established IG offices in additional government
organizations.  The Inspector General Act of 1978, Public Law 95-452,
as amended, identified 26 federal establishments that are to have IGs
appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and 29 designated
federal entities (DFE)\1 that are to have IGs appointed by the agency
head.  The IG for the Central Intelligence Agency, who is also
appointed by the President with Senate confirmation, was established
under its own statute, Public Law 101-193.\2

Further, in July 1998, as part of the legislation restructuring the
Internal Revenue Service (Public Law 105-206), a Treasury Inspector
General for Tax Administration was established.  This IG is to be
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.  As of
December 11, 1998, this position had not yet been filled. 

This letter responds to your request that we survey IGs to obtain (1)
information on their organizational structure, staffing, and workload
and (2) their views on current policy issues affecting them.  To
obtain the requested information, we developed and sent two
questionnaires to the 57\3 statutorily established IGs--27 appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate and 30 appointed by the
heads of DFEs.  Responses were received from 56\4 of the 57 IGs.  We
did not independently verify the information the IGs provided. 

We performed our review between April 1998 and December 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We
requested comments on a draft of this report from the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) Acting Deputy Director for Management,
the Chairman of the Integrity Committee,\5 and all 57 IGs.  On
December 10, 1998, and December 14, 1998, respectively, we received
oral comments from the Integrity Committee and OMB that are discussed
in the "Agency Comments" section.  The Vice Chair of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Vice Chair of the
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) provided written
comments consolidating the comments of presidential and DFE IGs,
respectively.  These comments are discussed in the "Agency Comments"
section and are reprinted in appendixes VIII and IX, respectively. 
Appendix IV provides further details on our objectives, scope, and
methodology. 


--------------------
\1 The IG for the Government Printing Office (GPO) was established by
Public Law 100-504, which also established the DFE IGs, and has
similar duties and responsibilities as a DFE IG.  Therefore, for
purposes of this report, the term "designated federal entity"
includes the 29 organizations and GPO. 

\2 Appendix I provides additional background information on the
establishment of the IGs and the types of work they perform. 
Appendix II lists the presidentially appointed IGs and appendix III
lists the DFE IGs. 

\3 The questionnaires were not sent to the Treasury IG for Tax
Administration because the position was not established until July
22, 1998, which is after the date the questionnaires were sent. 

\4 The Office of the Inspector General for the Central Intelligence
Agency did not respond and therefore was not included in our survey
results. 

\5 The Integrity Committee is responsible for receiving, reviewing,
and referring for investigation allegations of wrongdoing against
certain staff members of the IG offices. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

IGs' work covers a broad spectrum of agency programs and operations. 
In general, the IGs responded that they have the expertise and
resources necessary to assemble the teams of staff needed to perform
the major types of work for which they are responsible. 
Additionally, while they generally anticipate the level of work to
remain the same or slightly increase across the range of areas they
review, IGs anticipated the greatest increase to be in information
technology reviews.  IGs also indicated that they were generally
satisfied with their role and the overall legislation governing them,
but did identify certain potential areas for modification, which are
discussed in detail in the policy issues section of this report. 


   PROFILE OF THE OFFICES OF THE
   INSPECTOR GENERAL
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

We sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain information on IG
organization structure, staffing, and workload.  The following series
of 11 questions and answers provide an overall profile of the 56 IGs
who responded.  More specifically, information is provided that
relates to the IGs' budget obligations, number and classification of
staff by occupational job series, career background and years of
experience of the current IGs, and techniques used by IGs to help
ensure the quality of the work. 

1.  What were the IG budget obligations for fiscal year 1997? 

For fiscal year 1997, IG reported obligations totaled $957 million. 
Of the reported amount, about $912 million (95 percent) was for the
presidential IGs and $45 million (5 percent) was for the DFE IGs. 
Figure 1 shows how these funds were distributed among the various
types of work performed by the IGs.  The largest single use of the
funds for the presidential and DFE IGs was for auditing--financial
and performance.  For the presidential IGs, about 46 percent of the
funds was devoted to auditing; similarly, DFE IGs spent about 47
percent of the funding on auditing. 

   Figure 1:  Reported IG
   Obligations by the Type of Work
   Performed for Fiscal Year 1997

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The percentages are based on reported obligations of $912
million for presidential and $45 million for DFE IGs.  The
percentages do not total 100 percent due to rounding. 

2.  How many and what types of staff were employed by the IGs as of
September 30, 1997? 

In fiscal year 1997, the IGs stated that they had a total of 9,348
staff of which 8,818 staff (94 percent) worked in presidential IG
offices and 530 (6 percent) worked in DFE IG offices.  As shown in
figure 2, these staff are classified in various types of occupational
job series.  The largest group of the IGs' staff (45 percent) are
auditors, with the next largest group--26 percent--being
investigators.  Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the occupational job
series held by the presidential and DFE IG staff.  The reported
distribution of the staff among the various occupations is
proportionately about the same for both the presidential and DFE IGs. 

   Figure 2:  Reported
   Distribution of the IG Staff
   Occupations

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  (1) The investigator category includes all of the
investigative job series--1800, 1801, 1810, and 1811.  (2) The
analyst category includes management, program, and other analysts. 
(3) The percentages are based on 9,348 staff. 

   Figure 3:  Reported Breakdown
   of IG Staff by Occupational Job
   Series

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  (1) The percentages are based on 8,818 presidential IG staff
and 530 DFE IG staff.  The investigator category includes all of the
investigative job series--1800, 1801, 1810, and 1811.  (2) The
analyst category includes management, program, and other analysts. 

3.  What percentage of IG staff hold advanced degrees? 

As shown in figure 4, the most common advanced degree cited for both
the presidential and DFE IG staff was a master's degree in business
administration.  Five percent of presidential IG staff and 9 percent
of DFE IG staff hold this degree.  The next most common advanced
degree cited among the IG staff was a Doctor of Jurisprudence for
DFEs.  The other master's and doctorate categories that were also
significantly represented included such diverse areas such as
finance, geography, psychology, and English.  An individual could
have more than one advanced degree. 

   Figure 4:  Reported Types of
   Advanced Degrees Held by IG
   Staff

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  (1) The percent is based on the 1,426 advanced degrees held
by 8,818 presidential IG staff and the 165 advanced degrees held by
530 DFE IG staff.  An individual could have more than one advanced
degree.  (2) Zero percent means that there are some, but that less
than 1 percent of the staff have advanced degrees in the two
categories--computer science and other doctorate. 

4.  What percentage of IG staff hold professional certifications? 

As shown in figure 5, the survey results indicate the Certified
Public Accountant certification as the largest category for both
presidential and DFE IG staff.  About 14 percent of presidential IG
staff and 20 percent of the DFE IG staff were shown to have this
certification.  The next largest category for presidential IG staff
was Certified Government Financial Manager.  The second highest
certification for the DFE IG staff was for a Certified Fraud
Examiner.  Some individuals had more than one certification. 

   Figure 5:  Reported
   Certifications Held by IG Staff

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  (1) The percent is based on the 2,935 certifications held by
8,818 presidential IG staff and the 245 certifications held by 530
DFE IG staff.  An individual could have more than one certification. 
(2) Zero percent means that there are some, but that less than 1
percent of the staff are certified management accountants. 

5.  What types of positions are in IG offices? 

The IG Act requires presidential IGs to have an Assistant IG for
Auditing and an Assistant IG for Investigations.  As shown in figure
6, all of the presidential IGs reported that they have both
positions.  Although the other positions are not required by statute,
89 percent of the presidential IGs also have a Deputy IG and 92
percent have a Legal Counsel within the IG's office. 

On the other hand, DFE IGs are not required to have an Assistant IG
for Auditing or Investigations.  However, approximately 70 percent
have an Assistant IG for Auditing and about 47 percent have an
Assistant IG for Investigations.  Further, the survey results showed
that about 60 percent of the DFE IGs have a legal counsel within the
IG's office. 

   Figure 6:  Reported Types of
   Positions in IG Offices

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  At the Department of Labor and the Small Business
Administration, the Assistant IG for Management also provides legal
counsel. 

6.  What are the career backgrounds and years of experience of the
current presidential IGs? 

The IG Act states that an IG should have demonstrated ability in
accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis,
public administration, or investigations.  As shown in figure 7, the
reported backgrounds of the 19 presidential IGs in office at the time
of our survey cover these disciplines.  Fourteen of the presidential
IGs noted that they have backgrounds in more than one discipline,
with two IGs having backgrounds in seven disciplines. 
Investigations, at 63 percent, is the predominant background overall
for the presidential IGs.  Public Administration at 47 percent and
law at 42 percent are the next highest. 

Before becoming an IG in their current agency, the presidential IGs
had 6 to 32 years of experience in various positions mostly in
management, IG-related positions, or investigations.  Nine of the IGs
were investigators and three had been IGs in other agencies. 

   Figure 7:  Reported Career
   Backgrounds of Presidential IGs

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 19 presidential IGs in office at the
time of our survey.  The percentages total more than 100 percent
because some have experience in more than one category. 

7.  What are the career backgrounds and years of experience of the
current DFE IGs? 

As with the presidential IGs, the reported background of the 28 DFE
IGs in office at the time of our survey cover each of the disciplines
in the IG Act.  Twenty of the DFE IGs indicated that they have
backgrounds in more than one discipline, with one having a background
in six disciplines.  As indicated by figure 8, auditing, at 61
percent, is the predominant background for the DFE IGs.  This is
almost double the percentage for presidential IGs.  Management
analyst, at 43 percent, is the next highest discipline among the DFE
IGs.  Compared to the presidential IGs, fewer DFE IGs--21 percent to
63 percent--have investigative backgrounds. 

The DFE IGs had 1 to 29 years of experience in various positions such
as management, IG-related positions, or investigations before
becoming an IG in their current agency.  Many of the DFE IGs were
previously auditors. 

   Figure 8:  Reported Career
   Backgrounds of the DFE IGs

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 28 filled DFE IG positions.  The
percentages total more than 100 percent because some have experience
in more than one category. 

8.  How many years have the IGs been in their current IG positions? 

As of June 1998, according to the survey results, 70 percent of the
IGs in filled positions had been an IG in their agency for 3 or more
years.  DFE IGs tended to be in their positions for a longer period
of time, with 15 DFE IGs having 6 to 10 years as the IG in their
respective agency.  As indicated in figure 9, the majority (68
percent) of the presidential IGs had 3 to 5 years in office.  The IG
at the General Services Administration had the most time as an IG at
the same agency, being in the position for almost 13 years. 

   Figure 9:  Reported Number of
   Years in the IG Position

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on the 19 presidential and 28 DFE IGs in
office at the time of our survey. 


9.  How many IG positions are vacant and what is the length of time
that the vacancy has existed? 

As of June 1998, nine IG positions were vacant.  As shown in figure
10, seven of these were presidential IG positions and two were DFE IG
positions.  They had been vacant from a period of 1 to 17 months.  It
is not unusual to have vacant IG positions.  In March 1990, we
reported\6 10 vacant IG positions.  Eight of these were presidential
IGs and two were DFE IGs. 

   Figure 10:  Reported Number of
   IG Positions Filled and Vacant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

10.  Do the IGs believe they have the ability to perform the work
they are responsible for? 

The type of work IGs are required to perform covers a broad spectrum
of agency programs and operations ranging from financial and
performance audits\7 to information technology reviews to
investigations.  Appendix I provides a more detailed description of
the various types of work performed by IGs.  With such diverse work,
IGs need the ability to establish multi-disciplinary teams to perform
these various reviews.  A key element of the IGs' ability to assemble
teams is the capability to obtain contractors and/or consultants, as
needed. 

IGs responded that, in general, they have the ability to assemble
teams to perform their work.  The degree of ability varies somewhat,
depending on the type of work.  On average, IGs--presidential and
DFE--stated that they have a great to very great ability to assemble
teams for financial audits, inspections, and performance audits.  IGs
responded that they have a moderate to great ability to assemble
teams for information technology, economic analysis, and statistical
analysis and some to little ability to assemble teams for actuarial
analysis.  IGs also noted that they have the ability to assemble
teams for criminal investigations.  The presidential IGs stated that
they have a very great ability to assemble teams for criminal
investigations whereas, the DFE IGs stated that they have a great
ability to assemble such teams. 

Generally, the IGs said they do not use contractors and/or
consultants for most of their work.  The presidential IGs use them to
a moderate extent for financial statement audits and to some extent
for financial-related, computer security and actuarial work.  DFE IGs
use contractors and/or consultants to a great extent for financial
statement audits and to some extent for financial-related, economy
and efficiency audits, computer security, other information
technology work, and statistical analysis.  Contractors and/or
consultants, on average, are used to a little or no extent for most
other types of work such as program audits, inspections,
investigations, Year 2000,\8 Clinger-Cohen Act,\9 or economic
analysis. 


11.  How do the IGs ensure the quality of their work? 

The IGs responded that they use various means to ensure the quality
of their work, such as external quality control reviews and
established policies and procedures.  Generally accepted government
auditing standards\10 (GAGAS) guide auditors in auditing various
types of organizations.  These standards require audit organizations
conducting audits in accordance with these standards to have an
external quality control review every 3 years.  Such reviews are
commonly referred to as peer reviews and typically cover both
financial and performance audits.  The peer review, typically
performed by an IG in another agency, determines whether the
organization's internal quality control system is in place and
operating effectively.  These reviews are intended to provide
reasonable assurance that established policies and procedures and
applicable auditing standards are being followed.  Figure 11 provides
information on the number of peer reviews completed over the past few
years. 

   Figure 11:  Reported Year
   Covered by the Last Peer Review

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Peer review only applies to the IG audit function. 

At the time of our survey, all IGs had received peer reviews except
the Social Security Administration, which was established as an
independent agency in March 1995 and, therefore, had not yet been
required to have a review.  As shown in figure 12, most of the IGs
(47) received unqualified opinions\11 meaning that, for the period of
time covered by the peer review, their system of quality control for
the audit function complied with established quality standards.  Six
received qualified opinions, meaning that except for the deficiencies
identified and reported by the peer reviewers, the IG's system of
quality control was in conformance with established quality
standards.  Two IGs received adverse opinions.\12 This means that
their system of quality control had significant deficiencies and in
effect had not been designed and/or implemented in accordance with
established quality standards.  As a result, there were not
reasonable assurances that the audits were conducted in accordance
with prescribed standards. 

   Figure 12:  Reported Type of
   Opinion the IGs Received on
   Their Last Peer Review

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Peer review only applies to the IG audit function. 

About 80 percent of the IGs stated that the peer review process is
working to ensure adequate quality control to a moderate or greater
extent.  They had mixed views, however, on changing the current
process.  About 54 percent of the IGs favored changing the process,
while about 45 percent did not favor changing the process.  The
nature and extent of the work performed by peer reviewers and the
frequency of the reviews were the most common types of changes
suggested. 

Standard methodologies can also be used as a tool to help ensure
quality control.  The presidential IGs reported that they used
standard methodologies for virtually all of their work related to
financial audits, inspections, and investigations.  They noted that
standard methodologies were used less frequently for information
technology work and performance audits.  From an overall perspective,
the DFE IGs used standard methodologies to a lesser extent.  For
example, about 80 percent of the DFE IGs reported that they used a
standard methodology for financial audits and investigations.  For
other types of work such as inspections and information technology, a
standard methodology was used less often by the DFE IGs than the
presidential IGs.  The IGs reported that for most of their work the
standard methodologies they used were primarily developed in-house. 
Methodologies used for financial statement audits and some
information technology work were primarily developed by other federal
agencies.  Figure 13 shows the use of standard methodologies for the
various types of work performed by the IGs. 

   Figure 13:  Reported IG Use of
   Standard Methodologies

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Training is another area that can be used to help ensure that a
viable quality control system has been put into place.  GAGAS
requires IG staff performing financial and performance audits to
receive a minimum of 80 hours of continuing education and training
every 2 years.  According to the IG responses, as of December 31,
1997, almost all IG staff had met the requirement, with the range
being between 95 percent and 100 percent.  A similar training
requirement exists for the inspection staff.  PCIE's Quality
Standards for Inspections requires that each inspector receive 40
hours of continuing education and training every 2 years.  According
to the IGs' responses, on average, 94 percent of the staff had met
this requirement as of December 31, 1997.  Further, IGs noted that,
on average, 98 percent of the criminal investigative staff, which is
under job series 1811, had completed the entry level training as
defined by PCIE Quality Standards for Investigations. 

Having established procedures in place is another means that IGs have
for ensuring quality control.  Over 92 percent of the IGs noted that
they have procedures in place for performing financial and
performance audits and investigations.  Further, 86 percent of the
IGs stated that they have procedures in place for conducting
inspections.  A smaller percentage of the IGs, however, have
procedures in place for information technology work.  The survey
responses showed that 76 percent had procedures in place for Year
2000 work, 69 percent for computer security work, and 57 percent for
Clinger-Cohen Act related work. 

IGs have various other types of procedures to help ensure the quality
of their work.  These procedures include supervisory reviews,
internal reviews of reports prior to issuance, agency comments, peer
reviews, and referencing.  Most of these procedures involve an
independent review of the audit plan, the supporting workpapers,
and/or the report by individuals external to the staff performing the
audit or inspection work.  For example, referencing is a quality
control process whereby a professionally competent and independent
individual traces facts, figures, and dates from draft products to
the supporting workpapers.  This process is intended to ensure that
sufficient credible evidence exists to support the conclusions and
recommendations made in the report. 

These procedures are used to varying degrees for financial and
performance audits and their inspection and investigative work. 
Almost all of the IGs indicated that they use supervisory reviews and
internal reviews of all reports prior to issuance for their audits
and inspection work.  Agency comments is another procedure that is
heavily used for both audits and inspections.  In addition, as
discussed earlier, external quality control reviews, which are
required for audit work but not inspections, are also known as peer
reviews, and are used by over 90 percent of the IGs for their
financial and performance audit work, but less often (32 percent) for
inspections.  Figures 14 and 15 show the use of quality assurance
procedures for audits and inspections by the presidential and DFE
IGs, respectively.  In regard to investigations, figure 16 shows that
both presidential and DFE IGs primarily use supervisory reviews as
their main control procedure. 

   Figure 14:  Reported
   Presidential IG Use of Quality
   Assurance Procedures for Audits
   and Inspections

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 15:  Reported DFE IG Use
   of Quality Assurance Procedures
   for Audits and Inspections

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 16:  Reported IG Use of
   Quality Assurance Procedures
   for Investigations

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 26 presidential and 28 of the 30 DFE
IGs. 


--------------------
\6 Inspectors General:  Information on Vacancies and Previous
Experience (GAO/AFMD-90-64FS, March 7, 1990). 

\7 Financial audits include financial statement and financial related
audits.  Performance audits include economy and efficiency and
program audits and program evaluations. 

\8 Year 2000 computer system problems result from the inability of
computer programs at the year 2000 to interpret the correct century
from a recorded or calculated date having only two digits to indicate
the year.  Unless corrected, computer systems could malfunction or
produce incorrect information when the year 2000 is encountered
during automated data processing. 

\9 Clinger-Cohen Act encourages federal agencies to evaluate and
adopt best management and acquisition practices, and requires
agencies to base decisions about information technology investments
on quantitative and qualitative factors, and to use performance data
to demonstrate how the information technology expenditures support
improvements to agency programs. 

\10 Generally accepted government auditing standards are issued by
the Comptroller General of the United States in the Government
Auditing Standards, 1994 revision.  IGs are required to follow these
standards in their audit work. 

\11 An unqualified opinion means that there was reasonable assurance
that the policies and procedures were in place and that the generally
accepted government auditing standards were being followed. 

\12 In commenting on our draft report, one of the IGs that had
received an adverse opinion acknowledged receiving a qualified
opinion on the most recent peer review. 


   IGS' VIEWS ON CURRENT POLICY
   ISSUES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

As requested, we sent a questionnaire to all 57 IGs to obtain their
views on current policy issues affecting them.  These issues include
law enforcement authority, the semiannual report, the 7-day letter,
independence, and the effectiveness of PCIE, ECIE, and the Integrity
Committee.  These issues were identified through discussions with
congressional staff and review of congressional testimonies and other
publications such as those issued by the Congressional Research
Service.  Since the IGs' responses were anonymous, we were unable to
follow up and obtain additional information or clarification.  The
following nine questions and answers summarize the views of the 56
IGs who responded to this questionnaire. 

1.  What type of law enforcement authority do the IGs think they
should be granted on a permanent basis? 

Currently, law enforcement authorities have not been granted to IGs
across-the-board in public law.  The IGs that have law enforcement
authorities have acquired them through transfers from preexisting
offices, specific statutory grants, delegation by the agency head, or
special deputation by the Department of Justice.  The special
deputation can be granted on a case-by-case basis that is limited to
the scope and duration of a case or by a blanket authority that
covers a broader scope and is renewed after a period of time, as
specified in the memorandum of understanding with Justice.  In
general, the law enforcement authority provided to the IGs in
performing investigations include serving arrest warrants, making
arrests without warrants, carrying firearms, and serving search
warrants.  Figure 17 identifies the various types of law enforcement
actions that IGs can currently take. 

   Figure 17:  Reported Type of
   Law Enforcement Actions IGs Can
   Take

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 26 presidential and 30 DFE IGs. 
Percentages do not add to 100 because more than one type of authority
could have been checked. 

Most presidential IGs (81 percent) indicated that they had blanket
authority granted by the Department of Justice.  Most DFE IGs (60
percent) indicated that they did not have law enforcement authority
but could obtain assistance from other IGs or Justice, if needed. 
Only three presidential IGs and one DFE IG had statutory law
enforcement authority.  A few IGs (5) had case-by-case authority
granted by Justice. 

Figure 18 identifies the type of law enforcement authority the IGs
currently desire.  Most IGs--81 percent of the presidential and 57
percent of the DFEs--responded that they should have statutory law
enforcement authority.  In addition, 77 percent of the presidential
and 53 percent of the DFEs stated that blanket authority should be
indefinite, unless a problem occurs.  On a related issue, a
majority--58 percent of the presidential and 60 percent of the
DFEs--indicated that they should have testimonial subpoena authority. 

   Figure 18:  Reported Type of
   Law Enforcement Authority the
   IGs Believe They Should Have

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

2.  What are IG views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter? 

Section 5(d) of the IG Act, as amended, requires IGs to report
immediately to the agency head whenever the IG becomes aware of
"particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
relating to the administration of programs or operations." The agency
head, in turn, is to transmit the IG report, with the agency head's
comments, to the appropriate committees or subcommittees of the
Congress within 7 calendar days.  This is referred to as the 7-day
letter. 

The survey responses indicated that none of the IGs had used the
7-day letter during the period January 1, 1990, to April 30, 1998. 
Earlier surveys have shown that the 7-day letter had been used on
occasion by some IGs.  For example, a survey conducted by the
Inspections and Special Reviews Committee of PCIE in June 1986, and
updated in 1989, showed that the 7-day letter had been used on 10
occasions, by seven IGs. 

Although a 7-day letter has not been issued in recent years, the IGs
noted that it is a useful mechanism to encourage agencies to comply
with the IGs' requests.  A 10-year review of the IG Act by the House
Committee on Government Operations\13 found that the IGs viewed the
use of the 7-day letter as a last resort to attempt to force
appropriate action by the agency.  Our survey responses indicated
that the IGs continue to view the 7-day letter useful as a tool. 
Twelve of the 22 presidential IGs and 20 of the 24 DFE IGs that
responded to the question find it useful to a great or very great
extent.  Three IGs specifically stated that the threat of a 7-day
letter gets immediate results.  Another IG responded that it had
threatened the use of the letter twice and in each instance the
agency responded to the IG's request.  Figure 19 provides the IGs'
views on the usefulness of the 7-day letter. 

   Figure 19:  Reported IG Views
   on the Usefulness of the 7-Day
   Letter

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 22 of 26 presidential IGs and 24 of 30
DFE IGs.  Four presidential IGs and six DFE IGs responded that they
had no basis to judge.  Percentages do not add to 100 percent due to
rounding. 

3.  In the opinion of the IGs, should the current requirement for the
preparation of a semiannual report be modified, replaced, or
eliminated? 

Section 5(a) of the IG Act requires that each IG issue a semiannual
report to the Congress and agency management.  The IG Act outlines 12
specific areas that are to be covered by each semiannual report,
which are listed in appendix V.  Overall, the IGs responded that most
of the reporting requirements should remain.  However, the following
three requirements were the most frequently cited as needing change. 
The percent of IGs favoring each change is shown parenthetically. 

  -- Audits identifying questioned costs\14 and funds to be put to
     better use\15 (39 percent)

  -- Statistical tables of questioned costs (55 percent)

  -- Statistical tables of funds to be put to better use (57 percent)

While there was support for some changes to the reporting
requirements, only one IG supported elimination of the report and
eight IGs suggested substituting another document for the semiannual
report, such as the agency's accountability report or an annual
performance report. 

Thirty-five IGs stated that the reporting requirement should be
changed from semiannual to annual.  Further, the presidential IGs
indicated that the semiannual report is at least moderately useful to
the Congress, OMB, agency heads, and program managers.  The DFE IGs
noted that the report is of great use to the Congress, OMB, and
agency heads and of moderate use to program managers. 

4.  Do the IGs generally believe that they have sufficient
independence in the performance of their work? 

The independence of the IGs is central to the success of the IG
concept.  Each IG reports to and is under the general supervision of
the agency head or in the case of a presidential IG, the official
next in rank, to the extent delegated.  However, these individuals,
with a few specified exceptions, cannot prevent or prohibit the IG
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or
investigation or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any
audit or investigation.  Under the IG Act, as amended, the heads of
three Departments--Defense, Justice, and Treasury--may prevent the IG
in his or her department from initiating or proceeding with an audit
or investigation in order to prevent disclosure of information
relating to national security, on-going criminal investigations, and
other matters outlined in the IG Act.  If the department heads take
this action, the IG Act provides for written notification to the
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, and other specified committees and
subcommittees.  Similar exceptions are provided for the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Federal Reserve Board.  In addition, the
IGs are required to follow GAGAS, which require IGs and individual
auditors to be free from personal and external impairments to
independence. 

As shown in figure 20, the survey results indicated that 81 percent
of the presidential IGs and 73 percent of the DFE IGs responded that
they have the level of independence needed to accomplish their
mission.  On the other hand, 15 percent of the presidential and 27
percent of the DFE IGs indicated that they do not have sufficient
independence, but they did not identify specific areas in which they
felt their independence was being compromised.  The IGs did suggest
some options for enhancing independence.  The most frequently cited
option was to allow IGs to submit their budget request directly to
OMB and the Congress rather than going through the agency review
process.  Other suggestions included ensuring that the removal of an
IG is only for cause, clarifying the general supervision clause of
the IG Act, and establishing term limits.  Since these responses were
part of the anonymous questionnaire, we were unable to obtain more
specific information. 

   Figure 20:  Reported Extent to
   Which the IGs Believe That They
   Have Sufficient Independence

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 26 presidential and 30 DFE IGs. 

5.  What are IG views regarding term limits and the process for
identifying potential IG candidates? 

In recent hearings\16 questions have been raised as to whether or not
the IGs should have term limits.  Term limits would mandate that IGs
have a fixed period of time that they could serve as IG at their
respective agency.  The IGs' survey responses indicate that while the
IGs had varying views on this issue, neither the presidential IGs nor
the DFE IGs favored term limits for their particular group.  Their
perception of the impact of term limits also varies.  Some view it as
enhancing independence, while others view it as inhibiting
independence.  The following provides a breakdown of the
responses.\17

Of the Presidential IGs,

  -- 39 percent favored term limits for presidential IGs,

  -- 35 percent favored term limits for DFE IGs,

  -- 58 percent did not favor term limits for presidential IGs, and

  -- 31 percent did not favor term limits for DFE IGs. 

Of the DFE IGs,

  -- 40 percent favored term limits for presidential IGs,

  -- 37 percent favored term limits for DFE IGs,

  -- 47 percent did not favor term limits for presidential IGs, and

  -- 57 percent did not favor term limits for DFE IGs. 

Another key IG issue is the process for identifying potential IG
candidates.  We asked the IGs for their views on establishing a list
of potential candidates that could be used as a source when vacancies
occur.  The survey responses showed that the presidential and DFE IGs
have different views on establishing a list of potential IG
candidates.  Fifty percent of the presidential IGs were of the
opinion that a list should be established for all IGs, while 35
percent were not in favor of establishing any type of list, and 8
percent believed a list should be developed for only presidential
IGs.  In regard to the DFE IGs, 50 percent did not want any list
established, while 33 percent favored the establishment of a list for
all IGs, and 10 percent indicated other ways of identifying
candidates, such as open competition, establishment of an IG
candidate development program, and the creation of a board.  However,
when asked who should develop the list, there was general agreement
that, if such a list was established, it should be developed by PCIE,
ECIE, and OMB. 

6.  In the opinion of the IGs, are changes needed in the
organizational structure of the DFE IGs? 

The Congress enacted the Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988\18
to establish statutory IGs at 33\19 DFEs.  The amendments provided
for the entity heads to appoint their inspectors general.  The powers
and duties extended to the DFE IGs are essentially the same as those
provided to presidentially appointed IGs. 

As shown in figure 21, the majority\20 of the DFE IGs--approximately
53 percent--expressed satisfaction with the current organization
structure and operating environment, and therefore, did not favor any
change.  Fifteen percent of the presidential IGs were of the same
opinion.  However, some respondents--both presidential and
DFE--expressed the opinion that some change was warranted.  For
example, 30 percent of the DFE IGs and 23 percent of the presidential
IGs believed that consideration should be given to cross-servicing
among the presidential and DFE IGs.  Similarly, 23 percent of the DFE
IGs and 15 percent of the presidential IGs favored cross-servicing
among the DFE IGs.  Additionally, the topic of reorganizing some of
the DFE IGs offices has been discussed within the IG community and at
congressional hearings.  Therefore, we asked the IGs their opinion on
this matter.\21 From an overall perspective, the presidential IGs
were more in favor of combining the DFEs.  Specifically, 27 percent
of the presidential IGs favored combining the smaller DFE IGs under
several DFE IGs, whereas, only 7 percent of the DFE IGs supported
this alternative.  Similarly, 15 percent of the presidential IGs
supported the idea of combining all of the DFEs under a new
presidentially appointed IG; 10 percent of the DFEs supported this
approach. 

   Figure 21:  Reported IG Views
   on Suggested Changes in DFE IG
   Organization

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 26 presidential and 30 DFE IGs. 
Percentages add to more than 100 percent because more than one option
could have been chosen. 

7.  Do the presidential IGs view PCIE as an effective organization? 

PCIE is an interagency council established in March of 1981 by
Executive Order No.  12301.  PCIE is primarily comprised of the
presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed IGs and chaired by
OMB's Deputy Director for Management.  An IG member serves as the
Vice Chair.  Members of PCIE are identified in appendix VI. 

The purpose of PCIE is to identify, review, and discuss areas of
weakness in federal programs and to develop plans for coordinated
governmentwide activities to address problems and promote economy and
efficiency in federal programs.  According to PCIE's annual report
for fiscal year 1996, A Progress Report to the President, PCIE works
to address integrity, economy, and effectiveness issues that
transcend individual agencies and to increase the professionalism and
effectiveness of IG personnel throughout government. 

As shown in figure 22, 46 percent of the presidential IGs responded
that PCIE was a moderately effective organization.  However, about 35
percent responded that PCIE was moderately to very ineffective.  Both
sides presented pros and cons of PCIE's effectiveness.  The
presidential IGs noted that PCIE is a good forum for the exchange of
information and discussion of common issues among IGs.  It is also
viewed as useful in providing professional training to its
personnel--both audit and investigative.  However, some presidential
IGs stated that it is difficult to reach agreement or consensus in
PCIE meetings because of the diversity of its membership with
representatives bringing to meetings different agendas based on their
respective agency's missions.  Further, according to some IGs, PCIE
needs to better address governmentwide issues and projects. 

   Figure 22:  Reported Extent to
   Which the Presidential IGs
   Believe That PCIE Is Effective

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 26 presidential IGs. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the presidential IGs noted
that PCIE has provided valuable service to the IG community.  They
noted that PCIE has developed governmentwide standards for audits,
investigations, and inspections.  In addition, PCIE maintains two
training centers that are used for the benefit of all IGs. 
Additionally, the IGs commented that PCIE has worked collectively on
various projects and governmentwide issues.  For example,
representatives from nine IGs conducted an assessment of the Internal
Revenue Service's inspection service.  Further, the IGs noted that
PCIE has developed forums for the discussion and exchange of
information related to the Year 2000 problem and the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.\22

8.  Do the DFE IGs view ECIE as an effective organization? 

ECIE was established in 1992 by Executive Order No.  12805.\23 ECIE
membership consists primarily of the DFE IGs and is chaired by OMB's
Deputy Director for Management.  An IG member serves as the Vice
Chair.  The entire ECIE membership is identified in appendix VII. 
The purpose of ECIE is the same as PCIE, that is, to identify,
review, and discuss areas of weakness in federal programs; and
develop plans for coordinated governmentwide activities to address
problems and promote economy and efficiency in federal programs. 

As shown in figure 23, the vast majority of DFE IGs--80
percent--indicated that ECIE is an effective organization, with 10
percent responding very effective and 70 percent responding
moderately effective.  The DFE IGs noted that ECIE facilitates
communication and sharing of common community issues among IGs as
well as provides a forum to discuss and keep abreast of current
issues.  A few DFE IGs stated that ECIE facilitates coordination and
information sharing between ECIE and OMB.  In addition, some DFE IGs
stated that their size often precludes them from having the necessary
resources to undertake common projects.  Since all of these responses
were part of the anonymous questionnaire, we were unable to follow up
with the DFE IGs to obtain more details on the specific concerns they
raised. 

   Figure 23:  Reported Extent to
   Which the DFE IGs Believe That
   ECIE Is Effective

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  This figure is based on 30 DFE IGs. 

9.  What are the presidential IGs views on the effectiveness of PCIE
Integrity Committee? 

The Integrity Committee was established by PCIE in January 1995 for
the purpose of receiving, reviewing, and referring for investigation,
allegations of wrongdoing against certain staff members of the IG
offices.  The committee replaced a working group that reviewed
allegations against IGs and their principal deputies.  In March 1996,
Executive Order No.  12993 formalized the process and established the
membership of the Integrity Committee. 

The Integrity Committee is chaired by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) representative to PCIE.  Other members include
the Special Counsel, Office of the Special Counsel; the Director,
Office of Government Ethics; and three or more IGs, representing both
PCIE and ECIE.  In addition, the Chief of the Public Integrity
Section, Department of Justice Criminal Division, serves as an
advisor. 

Allegations received by PCIE are assigned to the Integrity Committee
for processing and review.  Allegations that the Integrity Committee
deems to be worthy of further review are referred to the Department
of Justice, Public Integrity Section, to determine if the allegation,
if proved, would constitute a violation of federal criminal law.  If
it is determined that a criminal investigation is warranted, the
Public Integrity Section can investigate the allegation or refer it
to the FBI.  If it is determined that a criminal investigation is not
warranted or that the investigation substantiated misconduct but
prosecution is declined, the allegation is returned to the Integrity
Committee for an administrative review. 

If a noncriminal allegation is determined to warrant referral, the
Integrity Committee can (1) refer the allegation to the head of the
affected agency for a response, (2) request an uninvolved IG, or its
staff on detail, to conduct an investigation, or (3) refer the
allegation to an appropriate governmentwide agency for review.  For
example, the Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel, who as a
member of the Integrity Committee participates in the review of all
allegations, can ask that particular allegations be referred to that
office for investigation. 

Upon completion of the agency's follow-up, investigation, or review,
the agency head notifies the Integrity Committee of the results and
what action, if any, should be taken against the subject of the
allegation.  If the committee concurs with the agency's findings, the
matter is closed with a letter to PCIE Chair and others as
appropriate.  If the Integrity Committee does not concur with the
investigation, the matter is to be referred back to the agency head,
or to another agency, for appropriate action.  The matter is not to
be closed until the committee concurs with the agency's investigative
findings. 

The majority of the presidential IGs--58 percent--stated that the
Integrity Committee was effective in handling allegations of
wrongdoing against an IG or an IG staff member.  However, about 31
percent of the presidential IGs responded that the Integrity
Committee was ineffective.  Some IGs raised concern that the process
of handling allegations took too long and did not adequately address
noncriminal or administrative allegations. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Chairman of the
Integrity Committee noted that although the number of cases has
doubled since 1990, the time required to process cases has declined. 
According to the Chairman, it took approximately 28 months to process
cases in 1990, but in 1998 it took only about 4 months to process
cases.  Additionally, the Chairman stated that about 93 percent of
the allegations the Integrity Committee receives are determined to be
unsubstantiated, insufficiently supported, or frivolous or to fall
outside of the Committee's purview. 


--------------------
\13 The Inspector General Act of 1978:  A 10-Year Review, House
Committee on Government Operations, H.R.  Rep.  No.  100-1027,
October 3, 1988. 

\14 Questioned costs arise because the IG believes that there has
been (1) an alleged violation of a provision, (2) inadequate
documentation of costs, and/or (3) unnecessary expenditure of funds. 

\15 This refers to agency funds that could be used more efficiently
if agency management implemented IG recommendations. 

\16 Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and
Technology, House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, April
21, 1998, and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, September 9,
1998. 

\17 We asked each IG whether or not they favored term limits for (1)
Presidential IGs and (2) DFE IGs.  In responding to this question,
the IGs could select all that applied. 

\18 Public Law 100-504. 

\19 Currently there are 30 DFE IGs. 

\20 In responding to this question, the IGs could select more than
one option. 

\21 Three presidential IGs did not respond to this question.  We were
not able to identify who these IGs were because this question was in
the anonymous questionnaire. 

\22 The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993--commonly
referred to as the Results Act--requires agencies to develop
strategic goals tied to agency missions, identify performance
measures associated with those goals, and implement annual
results-oriented performance reports linked to budget requests. 

\23 Executive Order 12625, January 27, 1988, established the
Coordinating Conference, which consisted primarily of the DFE IGs. 
The Coordinating Conference evolved into ECIE. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The IGs and OMB generally agreed with the contents of the report, and
OMB generally agreed with the comments provided by PCIE and ECIE. 
Additionally, ECIE noted that the report presents the survey results
in a clear and objective manner.  ECIE provided technical comments
that we have incorporated where appropriate.  The Chairman of the
Integrity Committee commented only on the IGs' responses related to
the Committee.  We have incorporated these comments as appropriate. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Vice Chairs and Ranking
Minority Members of the House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight and its Subcommittee on Government Management, Information
and Technology; the Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Special
Committee on Aging; the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, House and Senate Committees
on Appropriations, House and Senate Committees on the Budget; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and the 57 IGs.  Copies
will also be made available to others upon request. 

The major contributors to this letter are listed in appendix X.  If
you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at
(202) 512-6240. 

Linda D.  Koontz
Associate Director, Audit Oversight and Liaison


ESTABLISHMENT OF THE INSPECTORS
GENERAL AND THE WORK THEY PERFORM
=========================================================== Appendix I

The importance of legislative underpinnings for auditing in the
federal government dates back almost half a century to the Accounting
and Auditing Act of 1950, which held federal agency heads responsible
for internal controls, including appropriate internal audit.  The
need to strengthen this requirement became evident when, in 1976, GAO
began to issue a series of reports on reviews at 157 fiscal offices
in 11 major federal organizations.  These reports indicated
widespread and serious internal control weaknesses that resulted in
the waste of government money through fraud and mismanagement. 

We reported that federal agencies did not use their internal auditors
to examine their financial operations and when they did, no action
was taken on the auditors' recommendations.  We also found that
internal audit groups were not independent, they were underfunded and
understaffed, audit efforts were fragmented among several offices,
and problems found by the audits were not communicated to the agency
heads.  With rare exceptions, the executive agencies had not
adequately monitored, assessed or reviewed their own operations and
programs.  As a result, the Congress passed the Inspector General Act
of 1978 (IG Act), Public Law 95-452, as amended.  The IG Act
established Inspector General offices in federal departments and
agencies to create independent and objective units responsible for
(1) conducting and supervising audits and investigations, (2)
providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, and (3) detecting and
preventing fraud and abuse in their agencies' programs and
operations. 

Subsequently, two interagency councils were established to provide a
coordinating mechanism for the IGs.  Through these councils, IGs are
to identify, review, and discuss areas of weakness in federal
programs; and develop plans for coordinated governmentwide activities
to address problems and promote economy and efficiency in federal
programs.  The President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE)
was established in March of 1981 by Executive Order No.  12301 and is
primarily comprised of presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed
IGs.  The Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) was
established in May 1992 by Executive Order No.  12805 and consists
primarily of the DFE IGs.  The Office of Management and Budget's
(OMB) Deputy Director for Management chairs both of these councils. 
An IG member of each council serves as the vice chair.  Appendix IV
and V contain complete lists of PCIE and ECIE membership. 

To carry out their mandate, IGs perform various types of work
including financial and performance audits, investigations, and
inspections.  The types of work performed by the IGs are highlighted
below. 

Financial statement audit provides reasonable assurance about whether
the financial statements of an audited entity represent fairly the
financial position, results of operations, and cash flows in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles based on
audits conducted in accordance with GAGAS. 

Financial related audits include determining whether (1) financial
information is presented in accordance with established or stated
criteria, (2) the entity has adhered to specific financial compliance
requirements, or (3) the entity's internal control structure over
financial reporting and/or safeguarding assets is suitably designed
and implemented to achieve the control objectives. 

Investigation is a planned systematic search for relevant, objective,
and sufficient facts and evidence derived through interviews, record
examinations, and the application of other approved professional
investigative techniques.  Investigations may be administrative,
civil, or criminal in nature. 

Inspection is a process, other than an audit or an investigation,
that is aimed at evaluating, reviewing, studying, and analyzing the
programs and activities of a department or agency for the purposes of
providing information to managers for decision-making, for making
recommendations for improvements to programs, policies, or
procedures, and for administrative action.  Inspections include
providing factual and analytical information, monitoring compliance,
measuring performance, assessing the efficiency and effectiveness of
operations, and conducting inquiries into allegations of fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement. 

Performance audit is an objective and systematic examination of
evidence for the purpose of providing an independent assessment of
the performance of a government organization, program, activity, or
function in order to provide information to improve public
accountability and facilitate decision-making by parties with
responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action.  Performance
audits include economy and efficiency audits, program audits, and
program evaluations, which are highlighted below. 

  -- Economy and efficiency audits include determining (1) whether
     the entity is acquiring, protecting, and using its resources
     economically and efficiently, (2) the causes of inefficiencies
     or uneconomical practices, and (3) whether the entity has
     complied with laws and regulations on matters of economy and
     efficiency. 

  -- Program audits include determining (1) the extent to which the
     desired results or benefits established by the legislature or
     other authorizing body are being achieved, (2) the effectiveness
     of organizations, programs, activities, or functions, and (3)
     whether the entity has complied with significant law and
     regulations applicable to the program. 

  -- Program evaluations are systematic studies conducted
     periodically to assess how well a program is working.  Program
     evaluations include (1) assessing the extent to which a program
     is operating as it was intended, (2) assessing the extent to
     which a program achieves its outcome-oriented objectives, (3)
     assessing the net effect of a program by comparing program
     outcomes with an estimate of what would have happened in the
     absence of the program, and (4) comparing a program's outputs or
     outcomes with the costs to produce them. 

Clinger-Cohen Act implementation encourages federal agencies to
evaluate and adopt best management and acquisition practices used by
both private and public sector organizations and requires agencies to
base decisions about information technology investments on
quantitative and qualitative factors such as costs, benefits, and
risks of those investments and to use performance data to demonstrate
how well the information technology expenditures support improvements
to agency programs. 

Year 2000 computer system problem results from the inability of
computer programs at the year 2000 to interpret the correct century
from a recorded or calculated date having only two digits to indicate
the year.  Unless corrected, computer systems could malfunction or
produce incorrect information when the year 2000 is encountered
during automated data processing. 

Oversight of Nonfederal Audits ensures that audit work performed by
nonfederal auditors complies with applicable federal standards. 

Operation of Hotlines receives and analyzes allegations of waste,
fraud, or abuse in connection with the programs and operations of
their respective agencies. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, one IG responded that the
office performs administrative enforcement activities which are
authorized by the Fraud Civil Remedies Act and similar legislation. 


LIST OF PRESIDENTIALLY APPOINTED
INSPECTORS GENERAL
========================================================== Appendix II

  -- Agency for International Development

  -- Central Intelligence Agency

  -- Corporation for National and Community Service

  -- Department of Agriculture

  -- Department of Commerce

  -- Department of Defense

  -- Department of Education

  -- Department of Energy

  -- Department of Health and Human Services

  -- Department of Housing and Urban Development

  -- Department of the Interior

  -- Department of Justice

  -- Department of Labor

  -- Department of State

  -- Department of Transportation

  -- Department of the Treasury

  -- Department of Veterans Affairs

  -- Environmental Protection Agency

  -- Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

  -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

  -- General Services Administration

  -- National Aeronautics and Space Administration

  -- Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  -- Office of Personnel Management

  -- Railroad Retirement Board

  -- Small Business Administration

  -- Social Security Administration


LIST OF DESIGNATED FEDERAL ENTITY
INSPECTORS GENERAL
========================================================= Appendix III

  -- Amtrak

  -- Appalachian Regional Commission

  -- Consumer Product Safety Commission

  -- Commodity Futures Trading Commission

  -- Corporation for Public Broadcasting

  -- Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

  -- Farm Credit Administration

  -- Federal Communications Commission

  -- Federal Election Commission

  -- Federal Housing Finance Board

  -- Federal Labor Relations Authority

  -- Federal Maritime Commission

  -- Federal Reserve Board

  -- Federal Trade Commission

  -- Government Printing Office

  -- Legal Services Corporation

  -- National Archives and Records Administration

  -- National Credit Union Administration

  -- National Endowment for the Arts

  -- National Endowment for the Humanities

  -- National Labor Relations Board

  -- National Science Foundation

  -- Panama Canal Commission

  -- Peace Corps

  -- Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation

  -- Securities and Exchange Commission

  -- Smithsonian Institution

  -- Tennessee Valley Authority

  -- United States International Trade Commission

  -- United States Postal Service


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix IV

Our objectives were to obtain (1) information on IG organization,
staffing, workload, and operational issues and (2) the views of the
IGs on policy issues affecting them such as term limits, law
enforcement authority, semiannual reporting, and the IG selection
process.  To accomplish our objectives, we developed and administered
two questionnaires to obtain information from the IGs.  One
questionnaire was for attribution and requested information regarding
the IGs' organizational structure, staffing, and workload.  At your
request, the other questionnaire was anonymous and requested the IGs'
views on current policy issues.  Because this questionnaire was
anonymous, we were unable to contact the IGs and obtain
clarification, additional details, or missing responses.  Prior to
sending out the questionnaires, we pretested them with the IGs from
the Smithsonian Institution and the Office of Personnel Management
and revised them as necessary. 

The questionnaires were sent to all 57 IGs--27 presidentially
appointed and 30 DFE IGs.  We received responses for each
questionnaire from 56 IGs.  We did not independently verify the
information provided by the IGs.  In addition, we reviewed the
testimony presented at the April 21, 1998, hearing held by the
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and Technology,
House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and the September
9, 1998, hearing held by the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
to ascertain the current IG policy issues. 

We performed our review between April 1998 and December 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We
requested comments on a draft of this report from the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) Acting Deputy Director for Management,
the Chairman of the Integrity Committee,\1 and all 57 IGs.  On
December 10, 1998, and December 14, 1998, respectively, we received
oral comments from the Integrity Committee and OMB that are discussed
in the "Agency Comments" section.  The Vice Chair of the President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Vice Chair of the
Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE) provided written
comments consolidating the comments of presidential and DFE IGs,
respectively.  These comments are discussed in the "Agency Comments"
section and are reprinted in appendixes VIII and IX, respectively. 


--------------------
\1 The Integrity Committee is responsible for receiving, reviewing,
and referring for investigation allegations of wrongdoing against
certain staff members of the IG offices. 


SEMIANNUAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT, AS
AMENDED
=========================================================== Appendix V

Subsecti
on        Section 5(a) Reporting Requirements
--------  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
1         A description of significant problems, abuses and deficiencies
          relating to the administration of programs and operations

2         A description of the recommendations for corrective action made by the
          IG during the reporting period with respect to significant problems,
          abuses, or deficiencies

3         An identification of each significant recommendation described in
          previous semiannual reports on which corrective action has not been
          completed

4         A summary of matters referred to prosecutive authorities and the
          prosecutions and convictions which have resulted

5         A summary of each report made to the head of the establishment when
          the IG judges that there has been an unreasonable refusal to provide
          requested information or assistance

6         A listing, subdivided according to subject matter, of each audit
          report issued by the IG during the reporting period and for each audit
          report, where applicable, the total dollar value of questioned costs
          and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better
          use

7         A summary of each particularly significant report

8         Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the
          total dollar value of questioned costs for audit reports
          a. for which no management decision had been made
          b. which were issued during the reporting period
          c. for which management decision was made during the period
          d. for which no management decision had been made by the end of the
          period

9         Statistical tables showing the total number of audit reports and the
          dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use by
          management, for audit reports
          a. for which no management decision had been made
          b. which were issued during the reporting period
          c. for which management decision was made during the period
          d. for which no management decision had been made by the end of the
          period

10        A summary of each audit report issued before the commencement of the
          reporting period for which no management decision had been made by the
          end of the reporting period, an explanation of the reasons such
          management decision has not been made, and a statement concerning the
          desired timetable for achieving a management decision on each such
          report

11        A description and explanation of the reasons for any significant
          revised management decision made during the reporting period

12        Information concerning any significant management decision with which
          the IG is in disagreement
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

MEMBERSHIP OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY
========================================================== Appendix VI

  -- OMB's Deputy Director for Management serves as the chairperson

  -- All presidential appointed IGs

  -- Vice Chairperson of ECIE

  -- Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management

  -- Associate Deputy Director for Investigations of the Federal
     Bureau of Investigation

  -- Director of the Office of Government Ethics

  -- Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel

  -- Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management


MEMBERSHIP OF THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY
========================================================= Appendix VII

  -- OMB's Deputy Director for Management serves as the chairperson

  -- All DFE IGs

  -- Vice Chairperson of PCIE

  -- Controller of the Office of Federal Financial Management

  -- Associate Deputy Director for Investigations of the Federal
     Bureau of Investigation, or their designee

  -- Director of the Office of Government Ethics, or their designee

  -- Special Counsel of the Office of Special Counsel, or their
     designee

  -- Deputy Director of the Office of Personnel Management, or their
     designee




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VIII
COMMENTS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY
========================================================= Appendix VII

supplementing those in the report text appear at the end of this
appendix. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments regarding the presidential IG views
contained in the December 10, 1998, letter from PCIE. 

GAO COMMENTS

1.  The report has been revised accordingly. 

2.  In responding to the anonymous questionnaire, the presidential
IGs were provided an opportunity to give their views and opinions on
the effectiveness of PCIE.  Of the 26 presidential IGs, 21 (or
approximately 81 percent) provided written comments, which are
summarized in the report.  The written comments from 16 of the 21 IGs
did not fully reflect the information discussed in the December 10,
1998, letter.  However, we have revised the report to include the
additional views presented in the letter. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IX
COMMENTS FROM THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY AND
EFFICIENCY
========================================================= Appendix VII


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix X

ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

Jackson W.  Hufnagle, Assistant Director
Edith A.  Pyles, Assistant Director
Darby W.  Smith, Assistant Director
Clarence A.  Whitt, Senior Accountant
James F.  Loschiavo, Supervisory Social Science Analyst
Cristina T.  Chaplain, Communications Analyst

KANSAS CITY FIELD OFFICE

Dieter M.  Kiefer, Assistant Director

SAN FRANCISCO FIELD OFFICE

Perry G.  Datwyler, Senior Evaluator
RoJeanne Liu, Senior Evaluator/Computer Specialist
Thomas P.  Monahan, Senior Evaluator

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Jacquelyn Hamilton, Attorney


*** End of document. ***