FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases Risk
Dramatically (Letter Report, 01/30/98, GAO/AIMD-98-45).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) year 2000 program, including
the reliability of its year 2000 cost estimate

GAO noted that: (1) FAA's progress in making its systems ready for the
year 2000 has been too slow; (2) at its current pace, it will not make
it in time; (3) the agency has been severely behind schedule in
completing basic awareness activities, a critical first phase in an
effective year 2000 program; (4) for example, FAA appointed its initial
program manager with responsibility for the year 2000 only 5 months ago,
and its overall year 2000 strategy is not yet final; (5) FAA also does
not know the extent of its year 2000 problem because it has not
completed most key assessment phase activities, the second critical
phase in an effective year 2000 program; (6) it has yet to analyze the
impact of systems' not being year 2000 date compliant, inventory and
assess all of its systems for date dependencies, develop plans for
addressing identified date dependencies, or develop plans for continuing
operations in case systems are not corrected in time; (7) FAA currently
estimates it will complete its assessment activities by the end of
January 1998; (8) until these activities are completed, FAA cannot know
the extent to which it can trust its systems to operate safely after
1999; (9) the potential serious consequences include degraded safety,
grounded or delayed flights, increased airline costs, and customer
inconvenience; (10) delays in completing awareness and assessment
activities also leave FAA little time for critical renovation,
validation, and implementation activities--the final three phases in an
effective year 2000 program; (11) with 2 years left, FAA is quickly
running out of time, making contingency planning for continuity of
operations even more critical; (12) FAA's inventory and assessment
actions will define the scope and magnitude of its year 2000 problem;
since they are incomplete, FAA lacks the information it needs to develop
reliable year 2000 cost estimates; and (13) FAA's year 2000 project
manager currently estimates that the entire program will cost $246
million based on early estimates from managers throughout the agency.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-98-45
     TITLE:  FAA Computer Systems: Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue 
             Increases Risk Dramatically
      DATE:  01/30/98
   SUBJECT:  Systems conversions
             Strategic information systems planning
             Information resources management
             Data integrity
             Computer software
             Cost analysis
             Air traffic control systems
             Computer software verification and validation
IDENTIFIER:  FAA Year 2000 Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

January 1998

FAA COMPUTER SYSTEMS - LIMITED
PROGRESS ON YEAR 2000 ISSUE
INCREASES RISK DRAMATICALLY

GAO/AIMD-98-45

FAA Computer Systems

(511533)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ATS - Air Traffic Services
  CIO - Chief Information Officer
  DOT - Department of Transportation
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  NWS - National Weather Service
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276525

January 30, 1998

The Honorable Constance A.  Morella
Chairwoman
The Honorable Bart Gordon
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Technology
Committee on Science
House of Representatives

The Honorable Stephen Horn
Chairman
The Honorable Carolyn B.  Maloney
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Government
 Management, Information and Technology
Committee on Government
 Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

Time is running out.  In 2 years, hundreds of computer systems that
are critical to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
operations--such as those used to monitor and control air traffic and
those used to target airline inspections--could fail to perform as
needed unless proper date-related calculations can be assured.  In
many systems, the year 2000 could be indistinguishable from 1900
because many systems use only two digits to designate the year.  In
this case, both would read "00," causing systems to malfunction or
fail unless corrections are made. 

In response to your September 4, 1997, letter, we reviewed the
effectiveness of FAA's Year 2000 program, including the reliability
of its Year 2000 cost estimate. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

FAA's progress in making its systems ready for the year 2000 has been
too slow.  At its current pace, it will not make it in time. 

The agency has been severely behind schedule in completing basic
awareness activities, a critical first phase in an effective Year
2000 program.  For example, FAA appointed its initial program manager
with responsibility for the Year 2000 only 6 months ago, and its
overall Year 2000 strategy is not yet final. 

FAA also does not know the extent of its Year 2000 problem because it
has not completed most key assessment phase activities, the second
critical phase in an effective Year 2000 program.  It has yet to
analyze the impact of systems' not being Year 2000 date compliant,
inventory and assess all of its systems for date dependencies,
develop plans for addressing identified date dependencies, or develop
plans for continuing operations in case systems are not corrected in
time.  FAA currently estimates it will complete its assessment
activities by the end of January 1998.  Until these activities are
completed, FAA cannot know the extent to which it can trust its
systems to operate safely after 1999.  The potential serious
consequences include degraded safety, grounded or delayed flights,
increased airline costs, and customer inconvenience. 

Delays in completing awareness and assessment activities also leave
FAA little time for critical renovation, validation, and
implementation activities--the final three phases in an effective
Year 2000 program.  With 2 years left, FAA is quickly running out of
time, making contingency planning for continuity of operations even
more critical. 

FAA's inventory and assessment actions will define the scope and
magnitude of its Year 2000 problem; since they are incomplete, FAA
lacks the information it needs to develop reliable Year 2000 cost
estimates.  FAA's Year 2000 project manager currently estimates that
the entire program will cost $246 million based on early estimates
from managers throughout the agency. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

FAA is responsible for ensuring a safe, secure, and efficient
airspace system that contributes to national security and the
promotion of U.S.  airspace.  To fulfill these key missions, FAA
administers a wide range of aviation-related programs, such as those
to certify the airworthiness of new commercial aircraft designs, to
inspect airline operations, to maintain airport security, and to
control commercial and general aviation flights.\1

Integral to executing each of FAA's programs are extensive
information processing and communications technologies.  For example,
each of FAA's 20 en route air traffic control facilities, which
controls aircraft at the higher altitudes between airports, depends
on about 50 interrelated computer systems to safely guide and direct
aircraft.  Similarly, each of FAA's almost 100 flight standards
offices, responsible for inspecting and certifying various sectors of
the aviation industry (e.g., commercial aircraft, repair stations,
mechanics, pilot training schools, maintenance schools, pilots, and
general aviation aircraft), are supported by over 30 mission-related
safety database and analysis systems.  Because of the complexity of
the systems supporting FAA's mission, most of these systems are
unique to FAA and not off-the-shelf systems that can be easily
maintained by system vendors. 

FAA also has numerous, complex information processing interactions
with various external organizations, including airlines, aircraft
manufacturers, general aviation pilots, and other government
agencies, such as the National Weather Service (NWS) and the
Department of Defense.  Over the years, these organizations and FAA
have built vast networks of interrelated systems.  For example,
airlines' flight planning systems are linked to FAA's Enhanced
Traffic Management System, which monitors flight plans nationwide,
controls high traffic situations, and alerts airlines and airports to
bring in more staff when there is extra traffic.  As another example,
FAA facilities rely on weather information from NWS ground sensors,
radars, and satellites to control and route aircraft. 

FAA is headed by an administrator, who is supported by the chief
counsel, assistant administrators responsible for each of its five
staff offices, and associate administrators responsible for each of
its seven lines of business.  The chief counsel and five staff
offices handle crosscutting management functions (e.g., system
safety), while the seven lines of business are dedicated to specific
services (e.g., airport funding).  For the purpose of Year 2000
program planning, FAA refers to all of these 13 organizations as
"lines of business".  Figure 1 provides a visual summary of FAA's
management structure, highlighting the 13 lines of business. 

   Figure 1:  Organizational Chart
   Highlighting FAA's 13 Lines of
   Business

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\1 General aviation flights are any civil aircraft operations not
involving commercial activities, such as the transport of
revenue-paying passengers. 


   OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

In assessing actions taken by FAA to address the Year 2000 problem,
our objective was to determine the effectiveness of FAA's Year 2000
program, including the reliability of FAA's Year 2000 cost estimate. 

To satisfy this objective, we reviewed and analyzed key FAA
documents, including (1) Year 2000 guidance and draft performance
plan documents, (2) Year 2000 memorandums and cost estimation
worksheets, (3) minutes of FAA's Year 2000 steering committee, and
(4) the lines of businesses' Year 2000 project plans, monthly status
reports, and systems assessment documentation.  We also reviewed the
agency's Internet Web sites for Year 2000 information and newsletter
articles, plus FAA's documentation of various Year 2000 briefings. 
We used our Year 2000 assessment guide\2 to assess FAA's readiness to
achieve Year 2000 compliance. 

To supplement the analyses noted above, we interviewed FAA's Year
2000 product team members, the Year 2000 program manager, FAA's
deputy chief information officer, and representatives from each of
FAA's 13 lines of business. 

We performed our work at the Federal Aviation Administration in
Washington, D.C., the Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma, and the William J.  Hughes Technical Center in
Atlantic City, New Jersey.  Our work was performed from February
through November 1997, in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.  We requested comments on a draft of
this product from the Secretary of Transportation or his designee. 
On January 6, 1998, we obtained oral comments from Transportation and
FAA officials, including representatives from the Office of the
Secretary of Transportation and FAA's Chief Information Officer. 
Their comments are discussed in the "Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation" section of this report. 


--------------------
\2 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  An Assessment Guide
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept.  1997). 


   HIGH RISK OF YEAR 2000
   COMPLICATIONS CAN BE REDUCED
   THROUGH STRUCTURED APPROACH AND
   RIGOROUS PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

On January 1, 2000, computer systems worldwide could malfunction or
produce inaccurate information simply because the date has changed. 
Unless corrected, such failures could have a costly, widespread
impact.  The problem is rooted in how dates are recorded and
computed.  For the past several decades, systems have typically used
two digits to represent the year--such as "97" for 1997--to save
electronic storage space and reduce operating costs.  In such a
format, however, 2000 is indistinguishable from 1900.  Software and
systems experts nationwide are concerned that this ambiguity could
cause systems to malfunction in unforeseen ways, or to fail
completely. 

Correcting this problem will not be easy or inexpensive, and must be
done while such systems continue to operate.  Many of the
government's computer systems were developed 20 to 25 years ago, use
a wide array of computer languages, and lack full documentation. 
Systems may contain up to several million lines of software code that
must be examined for potential date-format problems. 

The enormous challenge involved in correcting these systems is not
primarily technical, however, it is managerial.  Agencies' success or
failure will largely be determined by the quality of their program
management and executive leadership.  Top agency officials must
understand the importance and urgency of this undertaking, and
communicate this to all employees.  The outcome of these efforts will
also depend on the extent to which agencies have institutionalized
key systems-development and program-management practices, and on
their experience with such large-scale software development or
conversion projects.  Accordingly, agencies must first assess their
information resources management capabilities and, where necessary,
upgrade them.  In so doing, they should consider soliciting the
assistance of other organizations experienced in these endeavors. 

To assist agencies with these tasks, we have prepared a guide that
discusses the scope of the challenge and offers a structured,
step-by-step approach for reviewing and assessing an agency's
readiness to handle the Year 2000 problem.\3 The guide describes in
detail the following five phases, each of which represents a major
Year 2000 program activity or segment: 

  -- Awareness.  This phase entails defining the Year 2000 problem,
     gaining executive level support and sponsorship, and ensuring
     that everyone in the organization is fully aware of the issue. 
     Also, during this phase, a Year 2000 program team is established
     and an overall strategy is developed. 

  -- Assessment.  This phase entails assessing the Year 2000 impact
     on the enterprise, identifying core business areas, inventorying
     and analyzing the systems supporting the core business areas,
     and prioritizing their conversion or replacement.  Also, during
     this phase, contingency planning is initiated and the necessary
     resources are identified and secured. 

  -- Renovation.  This phase deals with converting, replacing, or
     eliminating selected systems and applications.  In so doing, it
     is important to consider the complex interdependencies among the
     systems and applications. 

  -- Validation.  This phase deals with testing, verifying, and
     validating all converted or replaced systems and applications
     and ensuring that they perform as expected.  This entails
     testing the performance, functionality, and integration of
     converted or replaced systems, applications, databases, and
     interfaces in an operational environment. 

  -- Implementation.  This phase entails deploying and implementing
     Year 2000 compliant systems and components.  Also, during this
     phase, data exchange contingency plans are implemented, if
     necessary. 


--------------------
\3 GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept.  1997. 


   FAA YEAR 2000 AWARENESS
   ACTIVITIES NOT YET COMPLETED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

Institutional Year 2000 awareness is the first step in effectively
addressing the Year 2000 problem.  FAA has initiated awareness
activities, including conducting a Year 2000 problem awareness
campaign, drafting a Year 2000 agencywide plan, issuing a Year 2000
guidance document for project-level plan development, and
establishing a program management organization.  However, FAA fell
behind in other key awareness activities, such as finalizing the
agency's Year 2000 strategy, in part due to its late designation of a
program manager. 


      FAA HAS INITIATED YEAR 2000
      ACTIVITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

FAA recognizes that the upcoming change of century poses significant
challenges to the agency.  It began Year 2000 problem awareness
activities in May 1996, and during the ensuing 3 months established a
Year 2000 product team and designated it as the focal point for Year
2000 issues within FAA.  Also, FAA established a Year 2000 steering
committee.  Since then, the Year 2000 product team and steering
committee have (1) sponsored an awareness day and held assessment and
testing practices workshops, (2) set up Web pages and published a
newsletter article to provide information on the Year 2000 problem,
and (3) briefed FAA's management on the agency's Year 2000 problem. 
In addition, in September 1996, the product team issued the FAA
Guidance Document for Year 2000 Date Conversion.  This guide was
intended to assist the lines of businesses within FAA in planning for
the conversion of their computer systems to handle processing of
dates in the year 2000 and beyond. 


      FAA LATE IN DESIGNATING YEAR
      2000 PROGRAM MANAGER,
      LEADING TO DELAYS IN YEAR
      2000 PLAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

It is essential that agencies appoint a Year 2000 program manager and
establish an agency-level program office to manage and coordinate
Year 2000 program activities.  The problem and solutions involve a
wide range of dependencies among information systems:  the need to
(1) centrally develop or acquire conversion and validation standards,
inspection, conversion, and testing tools, (2) coordinate the
conversion of crosscutting information systems and their components,
(3) establish priorities, and (4) reallocate resources as needed. 

However, FAA did not establish a program manager who had
responsibility for Year 2000 program management until July 1997.\4
This contributed to key awareness activities being delayed. 
Specifically, FAA experienced delays in establishing the agencywide
Year 2000 plan needed for timely initiation and effective execution
of the key awareness and assessment phase activities. 

Because FAA was slow to designate a program manager, it is only now
finalizing its agencywide plan for achieving Year 2000 compliance. 
The September 1997 draft of this document outlines the FAA strategy
and management approach to address the Year 2000 century date change. 
Specifically, it

  -- defines the Year 2000 program management structure and
     responsibilities;

  -- adopts the five-phase management process, including the
     awareness, assessment, renovation, validation, and
     implementation phases that are being used throughout the
     government to manage and measure agencies' Year 2000 programs;

  -- calls for awareness and assessment activities to be completed
     expeditiously;

  -- provides for completion of the three remaining program
     phases--renovation, validation, and implementation; and

  -- establishes performance indicators and reporting requirements. 

FAA's Year 2000 project manager provided a draft of this plan to the
Administrator on December 1, 1997, but does not have any estimate as
to when this document will be signed by the Administrator and made
final.  Without an official agencywide Year 2000 strategy, FAA's
executive management is without a road map for achieving Year 2000
compliance. 

Further, the lack of an approved strategy means that FAA's program
manager lacks the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies.  As a
result, each line of business will have to decide if, when, and how
to address its Year 2000 conversion, irrespective of agency
priorities and standards.  This reinforces our existing concerns with
FAA's CIO not being in the proper place in the organization to
develop, maintain, and enforce information technology initiatives. 
We have repeatedly recommended that FAA adopt a management structure
similar to that of the department-level CIOs as prescribed in the
Clinger-Cohen Act.\5 The Department of Transportation (DOT) and FAA
have disagreed with this recommendation because they believe that the
current location of the CIO, within the research and acquisition line
of business, is effective.  We disagree.  FAA's CIO does not report
directly to the Administrator and thus does not have organizational
or budgetary authority over those who develop air traffic control
systems or the units that maintain them.  Further, the agency's long
history of problems in managing information technology projects
reflects the need for change. 


--------------------
\4 Organizationally, FAA's Year 2000 program manager position reports
to the Chief Information Officer (CIO), who heads the Office of
Information Technology. 

\5 Air Traffic Control:  Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed
for FAA Systems Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb.  3, 1997) and Air
Traffic Control:  Immature Software Acquisition Processes Increase
FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar.  21, 1997). 


   FAA DOES NOT KNOW THE FULL
   EXTENT OF ITS YEAR 2000 PROBLEM
   BECAUSE IT HAS NOT COMPLETED
   ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

FAA has not completed key assessment activities, placing it at
enormous risk of not achieving Year 2000 compliance by January 1 of
that year.  Specifically, FAA has not (1) assessed the severity of
its Year 2000 problem and (2) completed the inventory and assessment
of its information systems and their components.  Also, while FAA has
initiated other key assessment phase activities on individual
projects, it has not completed determining priorities for system
conversion and replacement, developing plans for addressing
identified date dependencies, developing validation and test plans
for all converted or replaced systems, addressing interface and data
exchange issues among internal and external systems, and initiating
the development of business continuity plans in case systems are not
corrected in time.  FAA states that it expects to complete assessment
phase activities by the end of January 1998. 


      FAA DOES NOT KNOW THE LIKELY
      FULL IMPACT OF ITS YEAR 2000
      PROBLEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

Developing and publishing a high-level assessment of the severity of
the Year 2000 issue provides executive management and staff with a
broad overview of the potential impact the century change could have
on the agency.  Such an assessment provides management with valuable
information on which to rank the agency's Year 2000 activities, as
well as a means of obtaining and publicizing management commitment
and support for necessary Year 2000 initiatives. 

Unfortunately, FAA has only begun to assess the severity of the
impact of Year 2000-induced failures.  The Year 2000 Financial
Oversight Team, established in October 1997, has been tasked with
identifying the impact of Year 2000 failures on FAA's operations,
programs, and priorities.  This assessment will be focused primarily
on key mission critical systems and is to be provided to FAA
management in February 1998. 

On the basis of our discussions with FAA personnel, it is clear that
FAA's ability to ensure the safety of the National Airspace System
and to avoid the grounding of planes could be compromised if systems
are not changed.  For example, the Host Computer System, the
centerpiece information processing system in FAA's en route centers,
relies on the date to determine which day of the week it is when the
system is initialized.  This information triggers the use of
different prescheduled flight plans.  That is, carriers use different
flight plans and times on a Monday than they do on a Saturday. 
Because January 1, 2000, is a Saturday, and January 1, 1900, was a
Monday, uncorrected date dependencies could lead to the Host using
incorrect flight plans.  This could result in delayed flights.  While
FAA officials stated that they believe this problem has been solved,
they acknowledged that other unforeseen problems may exist because
they have not yet completed assessments of the impact of the Year
2000 problem. 

External organizations are also concerned about the impact of FAA's
Year 2000 status on their operations.  FAA recently met with
representatives from airlines, aircraft manufacturers, airports, fuel
suppliers, telecommunications providers, and industry associations to
discuss the Year 2000 issue.  At this meeting, participants raised
the concern that their own Year 2000 compliance was irrelevant if FAA
was not compliant because of the many system interdependencies. 
Airline representatives further explained that flights could not even
get off the ground on January 1, 2000, unless FAA is substantially
Year 2000 compliant--and that would be an economic disaster.  Because
of these types of concerns, FAA has now agreed to meet regularly with
industry representatives to coordinate the safety and technical
implications of shared data and interfaces. 


      INVENTORY AND ASSESSMENT OF
      INFORMATION SYSTEMS ARE
      INCOMPLETE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2

An agencywide inventory and assessment of information systems and
their components provides the necessary foundation for detailed Year
2000 program planning.  A thorough inventory ensures that all systems
are identified and linked to a specific business area or process, and
that all agencywide, crosscutting systems are considered while
detailed assessments determine (1) the criticality of the various
systems and (2) how they should be handled (through conversion,
replacement, retirement, or no remedial action). 

According to FAA's April 1997 Year 2000 guidance document, it
expected to have completed inventories of its computer systems and
components by May 31, 1997.  However, FAA still had not finished them
when we completed audit work in November 1997.  This inventory did
not contain all systems, support software, firmware,
telecommunications equipment, and desktop computers.  According to
FAA's November 15, 1997, quarterly Year 2000 report to DOT, its
inventory included 619 systems.  These systems comprise approximately
18,000 subsystems and 65 million lines of software code.  In
commenting on a draft of this report, a Year 2000 program official
told us that the inventory of systems was completed on December 29,
1997, with other inventory items expected to be completed later. 

In addition, FAA has not completed assessing (1) the criticality of
the computer systems in its inventory or (2) how the systems should
be handled.  Of the 619 systems in its inventory when it reported to
DOT on November 15, FAA identified 329 as mission-critical, 278 as
nonmission-critical, and 12 as undetermined, meaning that they have
not yet been categorized as mission-critical or nonmission-critical. 
These numbers will likely continue to grow as the inventory nears
completion.\6

In mid-November, FAA provided data to DOT on the number of mission
critical systems it had assessed and whether it had determined that
they should be replaced, retired, left alone, or converted to Year
2000 compliancy.  DOT requested validation of these assessments and
refined these numbers for its November quarterly report to the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB).  In that report, DOT stated that FAA
had completed assessments of only 84, or about 25 percent, of its 329
mission-critical systems.  That is, FAA had not determined how to
handle its remaining 245 mission critical systems. 

Of the 84 completed assessments, DOT reported that 34 are Year 2000
compliant, 8 are to be replaced with new compliant applications, 2
are being retired, and 32 are being repaired.  The remaining 8
systems are in the process of being certified compliant.  Figure 2
summarizes the completed assessments' results. 

   Figure 2:  Results of Completed
   Assessments

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

FAA reported that assessment of the remaining mission-critical
systems will continue through the end of January 1998. 


--------------------
\6 In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA officials stated that
as of December 29, 1997, FAA's inventory of 741 systems included 420
mission-critical systems, 284 nonmission-critical systems, and 37
systems whose criticality was as yet undetermined. 


      OTHER KEY ASSESSMENT PHASE
      ACTIVITIES ARE LIKEWISE
      INCOMPLETE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3

Other key assessment phase activities include determining priorities
for system conversion and replacement, developing plans for
addressing identified date dependencies, developing validation and
test plans for all converted or replaced systems, addressing
interface and data exchange issues among systems, and developing
contingency plans for continuing operations in case systems are not
corrected in time.  FAA has just begun these activities. 

In October 1997, FAA established a Year 2000 Financial Oversight Team
with responsibilities for determining priorities for system
conversion and replacement, and recommending sources for funding Year
2000 activities to FAA management.  At the conclusion of our audit
work, Year 2000 program officials told us that they provided
preliminary recommendations to FAA management in December 1997, with
final recommendations to follow in February 1998. 

Also, FAA's draft Year 2000 plan calls for each of the 13 lines of
business to (1) develop plans for addressing identified date
dependencies, (2) develop plans for validating and testing all
converted or replaced systems, (3) address interface and data
exchange issues among systems, and (4) develop a realistic
contingency plan, including establishing manual or contract
procedures, to ensure the continuity of core processes.  To date,
most of the lines of business have developed plans for addressing
identified date dependencies.  Some of these plans include
requirements for testing converted or replaced systems, addressing
interface and date exchange issues, and developing contingency plans;
other plans, however, do not address these items.  Regardless, not
all of these plans have been finalized.  The program manager told us
that she was working with the responsible organizations and planned
to finalize their plans by the end of December 1997.  At the
conclusion of our review, these plans had still not been finalized. 


   DELAYS IN COMPLETING AWARENESS
   AND ASSESSMENT LEAVE LITTLE
   TIME FOR CRITICAL RENOVATION,
   VALIDATION, AND IMPLEMENTATION
   ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Renovation, validation, and implementation activities are the three
critical final phases in correcting Year 2000 vulnerabilities.  FAA
has started the renovation process for some of the systems with
completed assessments.  However, because of the agency's delays in
completing its awareness and assessment activities, time is running
out for FAA to renovate its systems, validate these conversions or
replacements, and implement its converted or replaced systems. 

FAA's delays are further magnified by the agency's poor history in
delivering promised system capabilities on time and within budget.\7
FAA's weaknesses in managing software acquisition will also hamper
its renovation, validation, and implementation efforts.\8

Given the many hurdles FAA faces and the limited amount of time left,
planning for business continuity becomes ever more urgent for FAA so
that its mission-critical business processes and supporting systems
continue to function through the millennium.  Such business
continuity planning defines the assumptions and risk scenarios,
business service objectives, time frames, priorities, tasks,
activities, procedures, resources, responsibilities, and the specific
steps and detailed actions for re-establishing functional capability
for mission critical business processes in the event of prolonged
disruption, failure, or disaster. 


--------------------
\7 Advanced Automation System:  Implications of Problems and Recent
Changes (GAO/T-RCED-94-188, Apr.  13, 1994); High-Risk Series:  An
Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb.  1995); and High-Risk Series: 
Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb.  1997). 

\8 GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar.  21, 1997. 


   UNTIL ASSESSMENTS ARE COMPLETE,
   COST ESTIMATES WILL REMAIN
   INCOMPLETE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

Reliable program cost estimates require a thorough and complete
definition of a program's scope and components.  However, FAA has yet
to completely define the scope of its Year 2000 program.  As noted
above, FAA has not yet completed its inventory of systems or its
assessment of which systems are critical and how to handle them.  As
a result, the current Year 2000 program cost estimate of $246 million
will likely change once FAA has a better handle on its inventory and
determines how to handle the various systems.  FAA acknowledges the
uncertainty of its current cost estimate due to incomplete inventory
and assessment information. 

Even after assessments are completed and estimates finalized, FAA's
cost estimates could still be of questionable reliability.  We have
previously reported on FAA's weaknesses in reliably estimating the
cost of its software-intensive Air Traffic Control projects and
recommended that FAA correct its weak cost estimating practices by
institutionalizing defined estimating processes.\9 FAA agreed with
our recommendation and has initiated efforts to improve its
processes. 

Regardless of the eventual cost estimate, uncertainty surrounds
funding of FAA's Year 2000 activities.  For example, only $18 million
of the $246 million is currently in the fiscal year 1998 budget.  At
the same time, however, OMB has stated that, because of DOT's
disappointing progress on the Year 2000 issue, it has established a
rebuttable presumption that it will not fund any DOT requests for
information technology investments in the fiscal year 1999 budget
unless they are directly related to fixing the Year 2000 problem. 
Further, according to a December 4, 1997, briefing to the
Administrator, FAA has been directed by OMB to reprogram existing
funds from lower priority projects to its Year 2000 program. 


--------------------
\9 Air Traffic Control:  Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
Billion Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
Jan.  22, 1997). 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

Should the pace at which FAA addresses its Year 2000 issues not
quicken, and critical FAA systems not be Year 2000 compliant and
therefore not be ready for reliable operation on January 1 of that
year, the agency's capability in several essential areas--including
the monitoring and controlling of air traffic--could be severely
compromised.  This could result in the temporary grounding of flights
until safe aircraft control can be assured. 

Avoiding such emergency measures will require strong, active
oversight.  Yet an approved strategy containing detailed plans,
milestones, and valid cost estimates--all vital considerations--is
still lacking.  This is due, at least in part, to incomplete
assessment of agency vulnerabilities.  Such incomplete assessment is
cause for concern.  It means that FAA has no way of knowing at this
time how serious its Year 2000 date software-coding problem is--or
what it will cost to address it. 

FAA's delays to date are very troubling.  Given the rapidly
approaching millennium, such delays are no longer acceptable.  Until
all inventorying and assessments have been completed--set for the end
of January 1998--FAA will not be able to effectively or efficiently
marshal the available resources, both human and financial, that will
be needed to do the job.  Once the degree of vulnerability has been
determined, a structured approach--such as that provided in our
assessment guide\10 --can offer a road map as to the effective use of
such resources.  Unless critical renovation, validation, and
implementation activities are completed in time, and sound
contingency plans are available, FAA risks not successfully
navigating the change to the new millennium. 


--------------------
\10 GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, Sept.  1997. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

Urgent action is imperative to improve the management effectiveness
of FAA's Year 2000 program and thus the likelihood of its success. 
Accordingly, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct
that the Administrator of FAA, take the actions necessary to expedite
the completion of overdue awareness and assessment activities.  At a
minimum, the Administrator should

  -- finalize an agencywide plan which provides the Year 2000 program
     manager the authority to enforce Year 2000 policies and outlines
     FAA's strategy for addressing the Year 2000 date change;

  -- assess how its major business lines and the aviation industry
     would be affected if the Year 2000 problem were not corrected in
     time, and use the results of this assessment to help rank the
     agency's Year 2000 activities, as well as a means of obtaining
     and publicizing management commitment and support for necessary
     Year 2000 initiatives;

  -- by January 30, 1998, complete inventories of all information
     systems and their components, including data interfaces;

  -- by January 30, 1998, finish assessments of all systems in FAA's
     inventory to determine each one's criticality and to decide
     whether each system should be converted, replaced, or retired;

  -- determine priorities for system conversion and replacement based
     on systems' mission-criticality;

  -- establish plans for addressing identified date dependencies;

  -- develop validation and test plans for all converted or replaced
     systems;

  -- craft Year 2000 contingency plans for all business lines to
     ensure continuity of critical operations; and

  -- make a reliable cost estimate based on a comprehensive inventory
     and completed assessments of the various systems' criticality
     and handling needs. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11

DOT and FAA officials provided oral comments on a draft of this
report.  These officials generally concurred with the report's
findings, conclusions, and recommendations.  FAA's Chief Information
Officer (CIO) stated that FAA recognizes the importance of addressing
the Year 2000 issue and plans to implement our recommendations. 

The CIO stated that FAA's administrator had not yet signed the
agencywide Year 2000 plan and that its Year 2000 program manager
retired at the end of December 1997.  FAA plans to hire a new acting
program manager from outside the agency.  Given the limited amount of
time left to address Year 2000 issues, delays in finalizing the
agencywide plan and the turnover of senior management further risk
FAA's chance of success. 

Representatives from the Air Traffic Services (ATS) line of business,
the organization responsible for operational air traffic control
systems, commented that their organization has made significant
progress in addressing the Year 2000 problem and that they do not
have the problems that FAA has overall.  ATS officials stated that
they have in place a Year 2000 project plan, repair process and
standards, and a quality assurance plan for system renovations. 
While we acknowledge these steps by ATS, the pace of progress must
increase if ATS and FAA are to address the Year 2000 problem in time. 

FAA officials also offered some specific comments directed to
particular language in the draft report.  These comments have been
incorporated into the report where appropriate. 


--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.1

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 30
days from its date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations, and their Subcommittees on
Transportation; the Subcommittee on Aviation, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science and Transportation; and the Subcommittee on
Aviation, House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.  We
are also sending copies to the Secretary of Transportation, the
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, and other
interested congressional committees and subcommittees.  Copies will
also be made available to others upon request.  Please contact me at
(202) 512-6253 or by e-mail at [email protected] if you have
any questions concerning this report.  Major contributors to the
report are listed in appendix I. 

Joel C.  Willemssen
Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
   MANAGEMENT DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Rona B.  Stillman, Chief Scientist for Computers and
Telecommunications
Keith A.  Rhodes, Technical Director
Randolph C.  Hite, Senior Assistant Director
Colleen M.  Phillips, Assistant Director
Tamara Lilly, Senior Information Systems Analyst
Michael P.  Fruitman, Communications Analyst
Madhav Panwar, Technical Assistant Director
Naba Barkakati, Technical Assistant Director
Ronald E.  Famous, Senior Information Systems Analyst


   ATLANTA FIELD OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

Glenda C.  Wright, Senior Information Systems Analyst

*** End of document. ***