National Weather Service: Closure of Regional Office Not Supported by
Risk Analysis (Letter Report, 07/31/97, GAO/AIMD-97-133).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed proposed staffing cuts
at the National Weather Service (NWS), focusing on the NWS analysis: (1)
supporting the planned closure of its southern regional headquarters
office; and (2) of alternative plans for maintaining its current
regional structure of four mainland offices.

GAO noted that: (1) NWS did not perform any documented risk analysis to
support its decision to close its southern regional headquarters office;
(2) accelerating the planned closure of this office was one of several
actions taken in response to a budget shortfall estimated by both the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and NWS to be
about $47 million for fiscal year 1997; (3) while acknowledging that no
risk analysis was conducted, NWS officials stated that, on the basis of
their professional judgment, no degradation of service would occur from
the closure because the southern region's responsibilities would be
transferred to other regional offices; (4) weather service users have
raised concerns, however, including whether the closure would adversely
affect weather services and jeopardize public safety and the protection
of property; (5) several alternative strategies for maintaining the
current regional structure were proposed by NWS regional offices; (6)
headquarters officials rejected these strategies primarily because they
did not meet the agency's overall staffing targets for the regions; and
(7) because of uncertainties surrounding NWS funding, the Secretary of
Commerce announced on June 25, 1997, that a decision to close the
southern regional office would be delayed for 60 days, to give outside
experts an opportunity to complete a review of NWS' budget and
operations.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-97-133
     TITLE:  National Weather Service: Closure of Regional Office Not 
             Supported by Risk Analysis
      DATE:  07/31/97
   SUBJECT:  Federal agency reorganization
             Federal downsizing
             Weather forecasting
             Budget cuts
             Strategic planning
             Information systems
             Human resources utilization
             Reductions in force
IDENTIFIER:  NWS Next Generation Weather Radar
             NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
             NWS Automated Surface Observing System
             NWS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1997

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE - CLOSURE
OF REGIONAL OFFICE NOT SUPPORTED
BY RISK ANALYSIS

GAO/AIMD-97-133

National Weather Service

(511427)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  FTE - full-time equivalents
  NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
  NWS - National Weather Service

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-277460

July 31, 1997

The Honorable Thad Cochran
United States Senate

The Honorable Bob Graham
United States Senate

The Honorable Kay Bailey Hutchison
United States Senate

The Honorable Connie Mack
United States Senate

The Honorable E.  Clay Shaw, Jr.
House of Representatives

This report is in response to your request that we review proposed
staffing cuts at the National Weather Service (NWS), a component of
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) within the
Department of Commerce.  The objective of our review, based on
subsequent discussions with your staff, was to assess the NWS
analysis supporting the planned closure of its southern regional
headquarters office, and its analysis of alternative plans for
maintaining its current regional structure of four mainland offices. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

NWS did not perform any documented risk analysis to support its
decision to close its southern regional headquarters office. 
Accelerating the planned closure of this office was one of several
actions taken in response to a budget shortfall estimated by both
NOAA and NWS to be about $47 million for fiscal year 1997.  While
acknowledging that no risk analysis was conducted, NWS officials
stated that, on the basis of their professional judgment, no
degradation of service would occur from the closure because the
southern region's responsibilities would be transferred to other
regional offices.  Weather service users have raised concerns,
however, including whether the closure would adversely affect weather
services and jeopardize public safety and the protection of property. 

Several alternative strategies for maintaining the current regional
structure were proposed by NWS regional officials.  Headquarters
officials rejected these strategies primarily because they did not
meet the agency's overall staffing targets for the regions.  Because
of uncertainties surrounding NWS funding, the Secretary of Commerce
announced on June 25, 1997, that a decision to close the southern
regional office would be delayed for 60 days, to give outside experts
an opportunity to complete a review of NWS' budget and operations. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

NWS' primary mission is to help protect life and property by
providing weather and flood warnings, public forecasts, and
advisories for all of the United States, its territories, adjacent
waters, and ocean areas.  NWS operations also support other agencies'
missions and the nation's commercial interests.  For example, NWS
provides specialized forecasts to support aviation safety and the
marine industry. 

To fulfill its mission, NWS uses a variety of systems and manual
processes to collect, process, and disseminate weather data to and
among its network of field offices and regional and national centers. 
Many of these systems and processes are outdated. 

To address this obsolescence, during the 1980s NWS began modernizing
its observing, information processing, and communications systems to
improve the accuracy, timeliness, and efficiency of weather forecasts
and warnings.  The modernization includes four major systems
development programs. 

  -- The Next Generation Weather Radar, which is a program to acquire
     163 Doppler radars that are expected to increase the accuracy
     and timeliness of warnings for severe thunderstorms, tornadoes,
     and other hazardous weather events. 

  -- The Next Generation Geostationary Operational Environmental
     Satellite, a program to acquire, launch, and control five
     satellites for identifying and tracking severe weather events,
     such as hurricanes. 

  -- The Automated Surface Observing System, a program to replace
     human weather observers through automating and enhancing the
     current, largely manual methods of collecting, processing, and
     displaying information on surface weather conditions, such as
     temperature and precipitation. 

  -- The Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System, intended to
     integrate for the first time satellite, radar, and other data to
     support weather forecaster decision-making and communications. 

The modernization also includes upgrades to existing systems and
several smaller system acquisitions.  The total cost of the
modernization is estimated at about $4.5 billion. 

We have identified several weaknesses in NWS' actions to modernize
its operations and manage its information technology resources and
made numerous recommendations on how NWS can strengthen its
management of these resources.  In 1995 we designated the NWS
modernization as a high-risk area due to its cost, complexity, past
problems, and criticality to NWS' mission.\1 We again included the
modernization in our 1997 high-risk report because of continuing
concerns regarding cost increases and schedule delays associated with
the modernization.\2

In conjunction with the modernization program, NWS plans to
restructure its field offices.  As envisioned, this restructuring
would reduce the number of field offices from 254 to 118 and reduce
the number of mainland regional headquarters offices from 4 to 3. 
However, delays in implementing two major modernization systems--the
Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System and the Automated
Surface Observing System--have slowed progress in office
restructuring.  NWS now expects the modernization to be completed in
fiscal year 1999. 

As part of its restructuring, NWS had expected to close the southern
regional office after modernization was complete.  The deployment of
the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System was expected to
help facilitate this closure because the system would provide a means
for quick and easy communication among weather forecast offices, thus
handling the coordination function currently performed by the
regional offices.  Other southern regional functions were to be
transferred to the eastern and central regional headquarters offices. 

The NWS regional headquarters offices manage agency programs for
weather and flood warnings and forecast operations, including (1)
emergency preparedness; (2) modernization transition activities and
certification processes; (3) scientific, technical, and
administrative support to field offices; and (4) coordination of
multistate programs and projects.  The regional offices provide
management and technical support to field offices, which are
responsible for providing weather forecasts.  As shown in figure 1,
NWS has six regional headquarters offices--southern, western,
central, eastern, Alaska, and Pacific--with a total of 292 full-time
equivalents (FTE) as of September 30, 1996. 

   Figure 1:  Location,
   Jurisdiction, and Full-Time
   Equivalent Employees of Each
   NWS Regional Headquarters
   Office as of September 30, 1996

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



--------------------
\1 High-Risk Series:  Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, February 1995). 

\2 High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 


   SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

To assess the degree of NWS analysis in support of the planned
closure of the southern regional headquarters office, we reviewed NWS
documents, including a transition report on the closure, cost
comparisons of maintaining a four mainland regional structure versus
a three mainland regional structure, alternative plans for keeping
the four mainland regional structures intact, and the estimated cost
savings associated with the closure of the southern region.  In
addition, we interviewed NOAA and NWS officials about their closure
plan; the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the closure; and
alternative plans to keep the four mainland regions--southern,
western, central, and eastern--intact.  We also interviewed southern
region officials and weather service users in the region, including
representatives of the Texas Department of Public Safety's Division
of Emergency Management, the National Emergency Management Council of
America, the Texas Gulf Coast Emergency Management Association, and
the Florida Division of Emergency Management. 

We performed our work at NOAA headquarters in Washington, D.C., and
at NWS headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland, from May 1997 through
July 9, 1997.  Our work was performed in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards.  We requested comments on a
draft of this report from the Secretary of Commerce or his designee. 
NOAA provided comments, which are discussed in the "Agency Comments
and Our Evaluation" section and are reprinted in appendix I.  The
comments have been incorporated into the report where appropriate. 


   PLANNED CLOSURE OF SOUTHERN
   REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

According to the former director\3 of NWS and its deputy for
operations, the southern regional headquarters office had been
earmarked for closure since 1982.  At that time, NWS was considering
a three mainland regional structure in an effort to streamline
regional operations.  The former director told us that since both the
central and southern regional headquarters are located in the central
part of the United States,\4 closing one of the headquarters appeared
to be the most economical solution. 

According to the former director, an internal NWS analysis showed it
to be more cost-effective to close the southern region and keep the
central region open.  He explained that several other NOAA and NWS
facilities were collocated within the area of the central regional
office--a weather service office, a NOAA administrative support
center, and the National Reconditioning Center.\5 In contrast, he
said there were no other NWS activities collocated in the southern
regional area.  He also mentioned that southern region functions,
such as hurricane and severe weather support, could be provided by
both the eastern and central regional headquarters, whereas the
reverse was not the case.  The southern region, for example, could
provide only limited support on winter weather warnings.  The former
director was unable to provide us with a copy of the analysis
providing these reasons for closing the southern rather than the
central regional office, explaining that NWS may not have documented
its analysis. 

Despite attempts in the President's annual budget proposals between
fiscal years 1982 and 1993 to close the southern region, the Congress
continued to restore funding to keep it open.  In 1993, the Senate,
concerned that the closing would have an adverse effect on the pace
of modernization, directed in its report accompanying the
appropriations act that "any decision on consolidation of NWS
regional headquarters be made by the Administrator of NOAA only after
a careful review of the savings involved and of the impact on the NWS
activities in the southern region."\6

In response, the Department of Commerce's former chief financial
officer, in a January 28, 1994, letter, told the Chairman,
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary, Senate
Committee on Appropriations, that NOAA had determined that
consolidating NWS regions at this time would be disruptive.  She said
that, as the largest region, the southern region was responsible for
managing the modernization over a 10-state area,\7 along with its
day-to-day national public safety mission.  She said that NOAA would,
therefore, delay the consolidation until the modernization in 1998. 
However, due to delays in the implementation of the Advanced Weather
Interactive Processing System, the modernization is now scheduled to
be completed in 1999 at the earliest.  NWS planned to move from a
four mainland regional structure to one with three mainland regional
offices after modernization. 


--------------------
\3 The Secretary of Commerce reassigned the director of NWS to other
duties within NOAA on June 25, 1997. 

\4 The central regional headquarters office is located in Kansas
City, Missouri; the southern region is located in Fort Worth, Texas. 

\5 The National Reconditioning Center provides depot-level
maintenance, reconditioning, and quality assurance of NWS operational
equipment in support of NWS and other NOAA meteorological,
hydrological, and oceanographic equipment programs. 

\6 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1994 (U.S.  Senate Report
103-105, July 22, 1993). 

\7 Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Texas. 


   BUDGET SHORTFALL PROMPTS
   PROPOSAL TO CLOSE SOUTHERN
   REGION AHEAD OF SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

As part of an effort to downsize the federal government, NWS had to
operate within a tighter budget in fiscal year 1997 and anticipates
reduced budget levels planned for the outyears.  According to NWS'
deputy for operations, the estimated budget shortfall totalled about
$47 million.  As shown in table 1, the appropriation for base
operations was about $27 million less than in 1996.  In addition, she
said, NWS had to absorb another $20 million\8 for pay-related
inflation, personnel separations, and NOAA-wide and departmental
costs.  These figures were confirmed by the Administrator of NOAA. 
We did not independently verify this information. 



                                Table 1
                
                 NOAA's View of Fiscal Year 1997 Budget
                               Shortfall

                        ((Dollars in millions))

----------------------------------------------------------  ----------
Reduction in NWS budget base for fiscal year 1997             $-27.5\a
Inflationary costs for fiscal year 1997                           -9.7
Estimated separation costs                                        -5.0
Additional share of department costs                              -5.9
Reprogramming of funds for the National Hurricane Center           0.7
======================================================================
Net shortfall                                                   $-47.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The NWS budget for fiscal year 1997 was $27.5 million less than
the amount appropriated in fiscal year 1996.  Of this amount, $17
million in reductions was requested by the Administration in the
President's fiscal year 1997 budget, and $10.5 million was based on
congressional action. 

Source:  Dr.  D.  James Baker, Administrator of NOAA, in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, Committee
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, U.S.  Senate, May 15, 1997. 

To address this shortfall, NWS initiated a number of measures, both
temporary and permanent.  Temporary actions included freezing
operational equipment replacements, reducing central logistics
quantities, deferring central communications network operations and
maintenance, and reducing operational supplies and stock levels. 
According to the former director and the deputy for operations, these
measures--which total about $10.8 million--must be restored in fiscal
year 1998 if NWS is to carry out its mission.  Further, NWS officials
did not fill 118 vacant positions in fiscal year 1997.  In commenting
on a draft of this report, the Department stated that these positions
were not filled in order to mitigate the effect of
reductions-in-force in the southern regional headquarters and the
national capital area.\9 The Department added that by holding these
vacancies, NWS was able to provide the maximum level of placement
opportunities for employees directly affected by the
reduction-in-force.  NWS officials consider these positions critical,
however, and plan to fill them in fiscal years 1997 and/or 1998. 

Permanent measures included reducing staff in the national capital
area, streamlining central computer operations, reducing field
outreach activities, and curtailing most nonoperational travel. 
Another permanent measure was to accelerate the closure of the
southern region.  As shown in figure 2, by the closure of the
southern region, NWS expected to go from a 6 region structure to a 5
region structure which included three mainland regions, with a total
of 233 FTEs (representing a reduction of 59 FTEs) as of October 1,
1998. 

   Figure 2:  Location,
   Jurisdiction, and Full-Time
   Equivalent Employees of Each
   NWS Regional Headquarters
   Office After the Planned
   Closure of the Southern
   Regional Office as of October
   1, 1998

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\8 The $20 million includes a $715,000 one-time reprogramming of
funds for the National Hurricane Center in Miami. 

\9 The national capital area refers to all NWS organizations managed
directly by NWS headquarters in Silver Spring, Maryland, and includes
the national centers and NWS systems development teams and
operations. 


   ACCELERATION OF CLOSURE NOT
   SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTED RISK
   ANALYSIS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

According to the former director of NWS, the decision to accelerate
the closure of the southern region was based on (1) the agency's need
to address budget reductions and (2) the fact that it was already
scheduled for closure in fiscal year 1999, upon completion of the
modernization.  The former director said that he met with the
Administrator of NOAA on various dates from August through December
1996 to discuss staff cutting options available to address the fiscal
year 1997 budget shortfall.  Among the options proposed by the former
director were (1) closing the southern region, (2) consolidating the
six regional offices into one, and (3) reducing staff at the four
mainland regional offices.  He indicated that the Administrator
rejected both the consolidating the six regional offices into one
option and the reducing staff at the four mainland regions option. 

The Administrator of NOAA told us that he provided overall guidance
to the former director of NWS to address the budget shortfall and
that specific cuts within this broad guidance were to be decided by
NWS.  Specifically, he stated that the guidance mandated (1) no cuts
to weather forecast offices and river forecast centers, (2) no impact
on the scheduled completion of the modernization, and (3) no direct
impact on the weather service warning system.  In December 1996, NWS
proposed and NOAA approved a decision to close the southern region,
effective September 30, 1997. 

According to NWS' deputy for operations, the decision to accelerate
the closure of the southern region was based on "professional
judgment" rather than on any documented risk analysis.  She did say,
though, that several internal cost analyses were conducted to support
NWS' decision to close the region.  For example, a December 5, 1996,
cost analysis showed that a general reduction-in-force, involving NWS
headquarters and a four mainland region structure, would result in a
cumulative savings of about $11.5 million.  In contrast, a more
targeted reduction-in-force, focusing on some NWS headquarters staff
and the closure of the southern regional headquarters office, would
result in savings of about $15.4 million, according to NWS.  And, in
another cost analysis, prepared in May 1997, and limited to just the
closure of the southern region, NWS expected to save $4.5 million in
fiscal year 1998 and each subsequent year through the closing. 

However, according to cost information provided by NWS, the decision
to close the southern region, although triggered by the agency's
budget demands, will actually result in additional costs of about
$661,000 in fiscal year 1997.  This is primarily due to delays in
staff termination.  According to information provided by NWS' deputy
for operations, of the 49 people in the southern region as of May 27,
1997, 22 are expected to be reassigned to other positions within NWS,
18 have not been placed, and 9 have accepted financial enticements to
retire.  If the southern region was closed on September 30, 1997,
$4.4 million in savings would result, beginning in fiscal year 1998,
according to NWS. 

Emergency management officials we interviewed expressed concern that
the risks of the closing would not be worth the NWS-claimed budget
savings.  Some of these officials believed that the closing would
have a direct effect on the people living in the areas covered by the
southern region, including a loss of public confidence in NWS
warnings, an increase in property damage, and loss of lives.  One
official pointed out that the effects of NWS' budget cuts were
already being felt.  Other emergency officials were concerned that
the planning and training for hurricanes, tornadoes, and other severe
weather events would not be performed as effectively by the other
regional offices. 

NWS' deputy for operations recognized that the closing would result
in some loss of service to users in the southern region.  However,
she said that there would be no degradation in NWS' ability to issue
system warnings.  To alleviate some user concerns, she said NWS plans
to reassign two hurricane experts from the southern region to the
central region, which does not have meteorologists experienced with
hurricanes.  NWS also plans to reassign a computer specialist to the
eastern regional office.  According to the deputy for operations, the
experts have been identified and have agreed to report to their new
locations. 

Our discussions with the eastern and central regional office
directors also raised concerns about the closure and the transferring
of functions to their regions.  The director of the eastern regional
headquarters office was very concerned that his office would be
taking on far greater responsibilities than could be managed.  The
director of the central region reserved judgment as to whether his
office could provide the necessary support to the six additional
states it will be assuming. 


   NO VIABLE, DOCUMENTED
   ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPED FOR
   MAINTAINING CURRENT REGIONAL
   STRUCTURE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

NWS headquarters did not, according to its deputy for operations,
develop any documented alternative plans that would enable it to keep
intact the current regional structure of four mainland offices and to
meet the budget shortfall and minimize adverse impact to weather
service users.  However, she stated that several alternative
proposals in support of keeping the southern region were prepared by
the regional offices. 

According to one proposal submitted by the 6 regional directors in
June 1996, each mainland regional office would have a staff of 45
FTEs for a total of 180 FTEs, and an overall regional structure of
240 FTEs.\10 According to NWS' deputy for operations, this proposal
was rejected because it fell short of the agency's goal of reaching
an overall regional staffing level of 189 FTEs and also because NWS
believed that an across-the-board reduction-in-force in all four
mainland regions was seen as costing more than closing one regional
office in terms of staff morale as well as funds. 

In a May 9, 1997, memorandum to the former director of NWS, the 4
mainland regional directors reaffirmed their June 1996 position
favoring the current management structure of 6 regions.  They stated
that any plans to restructure the regions should wait until the
modernization is complete.  Two of the regional directors informed
the former director of NWS on June 6, 1997, however, that while they
signed the reaffirmation letter, they could not effectively run their
regions with a staff of 42-45 FTEs per regional office.  One regional
director stated that given the choice of 3 mainland regions with a
staff of 60 or 4 regional offices with staffs of 42-45 or fewer, he
would have to support the 3 region structure. 

The deputy director of the southern region also prepared a proposal
in April 1997, giving each of the 4 mainland regional offices 45
FTEs.  This proposal was similarly rejected for exceeding the
regional staffing target of 189. 

Our analysis, however, showed that while the three alternative
proposals prepared by the regional offices exceeded the overall
regional staffing target of 189, NWS' three mainland regional
structure also exceeded that ceiling.  Specifically, if the southern
regional headquarters office was closed and its functions were
transferred to the central and eastern regions, the new regional
staffing level would be 233--44 over the target. 

In addition, according to NWS' deputy for operations, the proposal
from the deputy director of the southern region was flawed in that it
failed to factor in additional non-labor costs of $900,000 for the
four-region structure, and it overstated the costs to close the
southern region by $500,000 and to consolidate the central and
eastern regions by about $300,000.  NWS further stated that reducing
staffing levels at each of the four mainland offices increases the
potential risk to the modernization program and operational
infrastructure because this risk would be spread to all four mainland
regions.  Officials felt that the closure of the southern region
would limit this potential risk to just one region. 


--------------------
\10 The Alaska and Pacific regions were expected to have a total
staffing level of 60 FTEs. 


   RECENT DEVELOPMENT AFFECTING
   CLOSURE OF THE SOUTHERN REGION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

On June 25, 1997, the Secretary of Commerce, saying that a great deal
of uncertainty had been raised recently regarding the funding needed
by NWS to continue to perform its essential services, announced that
he had appointed an outside special advisor on weather services to
the Administrator of NOAA.  According to the Secretary's
announcement, the special advisor, assisted by expert consultants,
will conduct a rigorous evaluation of NWS' budget and operations and
report back to him within 60 days.  He also announced that the
closure of the southern region would be deferred until the review has
been completed.  To keep the modernization effort on track, the
Secretary announced that the Department would be submitting a
reprogramming request to cover unanticipated expenses for fiscal year
1997. 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

Recognizing that NWS, like many other federal agencies, must make
unpopular decisions in order to downsize and streamline its
operations to meet budgetary constraints, it is nonetheless important
that such decisions be thoroughly analyzed and justified in terms of
costs, benefits, and risks.  By not completing and documenting a risk
analysis to support its decision to close the southern regional
headquarters office, NWS does not have an adequate basis on which to
assure weather service users in that area that they will not be
exposed to unnecessary risk.  Similarly, NWS would have benefited
from a documented analysis of alternative plans that would have
demonstrated the best approach for addressing the budget shortfall,
while minimizing the negative impact on weather service operations. 


   RECOMMENDATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

To ensure that weather service users are not adversely affected by a
decision to restructure NWS offices, we recommend that, prior to
making any decision to close the southern regional headquarters
office, the Secretary of Commerce direct that the Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, complete a
documented analysis of the risks associated with a range of
alternative actions to address NWS budget shortfalls.  This analysis
should also include a set of actions to minimize any risk associated
with office restructuring to meet present and future budgetary goals. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department of Commerce
stated that it found the report to be factual and reflective of a
fair and objective review process.  The Department concurred with our
recommendation and reiterated that NWS management used its
professional judgment in making the decision to close the southern
regional headquarters office.  The Department also stated that the
risks associated with the decision to accelerate the closing of the
southern regional office and its alternatives, while fully reviewed,
were not documented.  The Department stated that it will document its
analysis of the risks associated with the planned closing of the
southern regional headquarters office by October 1, 1997.  The
Department also provided several comments on the draft report for
clarification purposes.  We have incorporated these comments as
appropriate in the report. 


--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.1

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the
contents of this report earlier, we will not distribute it until 14
days from its date.  At that time, we will send copies of this report
to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House Committee
on Science; Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation; House and Senate Committees on Appropriations; House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight; Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs; and Director, Office of Management and Budget. 
We are also sending copies to the Secretary of Commerce and to the
Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
Copies will also be made available to other parties upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-6253, or by e-mail at
[email protected], if you have any questions concerning this
report.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II. 

Joel C.  Willemssen
Director, Information Resources Management




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE
============================================================== Letter 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

Helen Lew, Assistant Director
Timothy E.  Case, Senior Information Systems Analyst
Tonia L.  Johnson, Senior Information Systems Analyst
Michael P.  Fruitman, Communications Analyst


*** End of document. ***