Financial Management: General Computer Controls at the Senate Computer
Center (Letter Report, 12/22/95, GAO/AIMD-96-15).

Computer controls at the Senate Computer Center failed to adequately
protect sensitive data, such as that related to payroll and personnel,
from unauthorized disclosure and modification. Specifically, GAO found
weaknesses in the Center's ability to (1) restrict access to sensitive
data, programs, and other computer resources; (2) monitor the activity
of users and programmers; (3) control changes to software; (4) segregate
data processing duties; and (5) provide for continued processing in the
event of emergencies or service interruption. In addition, the Senate
lacked a comprehensive strategic plan for securing Senate computer
resource that included the Center, the Office of Telecommunications, and
system users. The lack of such a plan could lead to security problems as
the Senate moves from a centralized mainframe processing to a
decentralized network distributed throughout the Senate.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-96-15
     TITLE:  Financial Management: General Computer Controls at the 
             Senate Computer Center
      DATE:  12/22/95
   SUBJECT:  Computer security
             Internal controls
             Legislative bodies
             Computer software documentation
             Strategic planning
             Financial management systems
             Data integrity
             Financial records
             Computer networks

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Majority and Minority Leaders, U.S.  Senate

December 1995

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT - GENERAL
COMPUTER CONTROLS AT THE SENATE
COMPUTER CENTER

GAO/AIMD-96-15

Senate Computer Center

(911714)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ACF2 -
  CA-ACF2 -
  ID -
  LANs - local area networks
  SCC - Senate Computer Center

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-266231

December 22, 1995

The Honorable Bob Dole
Majority Leader
United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas A.  Daschle
Minority Leader
United States Senate

As you requested, we audited the statements of disbursements,
receipts, and financing sources for the Office of the Secretary of
the Senate and the Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper for
fiscal year 1994 and reported thereon.\1 As part of our audit work,
we evaluated and tested the general computer controls over the
financial systems maintained and operated by the Senate Computer
Center (SCC) that processed financial information for the two
offices. 

General computer controls affect the overall security and
effectiveness of computer systems and operations as opposed to being
unique to any specific computer program, office, or operation.  They
include an entity's organizational structure, operating procedures,
software security features, and physical protection.  Such controls
are designed to ensure that (1) access to sensitive data is
restricted to prevent unauthorized changes and disclosure, (2) only
approved changes are made to computer programs, (3) computer staff
duties are properly segregated to reduce the risk of undetected
errors or fraud, and (4) back-up and recovery plans are adequate to
continue essential operations in the event of an emergency. 

We identified general computer control weaknesses which, although
mitigated by compensating controls for the financial statements we
audited, could affect the security and reliability of computer
operations for other Senate offices.  Accordingly, we are reporting
separately on the results of our computer control testing.  This
report summarizes our findings, which we discussed in detail with SCC
management.  Also, we identified weaknesses in controls over external
access to Senate computer resources, which we are reporting in a
separate letter with limited distribution due to its sensitive
nature. 


--------------------
\1 Financial Audit:  Office of the Secretary of the Senate for the
Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 1994 (GAO/AIMD-95-185, July 12, 1995)
and Financial Audit:  Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper
of the Senate for the Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 1994
(GAO/AIMD-95-186, July 12, 1995). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

SCC's general computer controls did not adequately protect sensitive
data files and computer programs, such as those related to payroll
and personnel, from unauthorized disclosure and modification. 
Specifically, we found weaknesses in SCC's ability to (1) restrict
access to sensitive data, programs, and other computer resources, (2)
monitor the activity of users and programmers, (3) control changes to
software, (4) segregate data processing duties, and (5) provide for
continued processing in the event of emergencies or service
interruption. 

In addition, the Senate did not have a comprehensive strategic plan
for securing Senate computer resources that included SCC, the Office
of Telecommunications, and system users.  The lack of such a
strategic plan contributed to the weaknesses we found and could lead
to significantly greater security exposures as the Senate moves from
a centralized mainframe processing environment to a decentralized
network environment distributed throughout the Senate. 

The effect of the general computer control weaknesses on the
statements of disbursements, receipts, and financing sources for the
two Senate offices we audited was mitigated by certain management
controls.  For example, the Senate Disbursing Office, a part of the
Office of the Secretary, performs various control procedures to
ensure that data are properly authorized and entered into the system,
including comparison of system reports with supporting documents. 
Also, both offices review monthly disbursement reports and reconcile
certain disbursement information to their own independent records. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The overall effectiveness of the Senate's computer controls is
dependent on the controls implemented by (1) SCC, which operates the
Senate mainframe computer, (2) system users, which include all Member
offices and Senate Committees, and (3) the Office of
Telecommunications, which maintains telecommunication equipment and
networks that link system users to the SCC mainframe and to other
users. 

In addition to processing financial systems, such as payroll and
other disbursements, the SCC mainframe processes other important and
confidential information, such as Senate personnel files, LEGIS--a
text retrieval system for bills and other legislative information,
and Capitol Police and other administrative files. 

System users operate about 260 local area networks (LANs) in the
Washington, D.C., area and across the country that communicate with
the mainframe and perform data processing functions for users. 
Overall, there are approximately 580 user accounts that allow access
to one or more programs run by SCC. 


   OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Our objective was to evaluate and test the general computer controls
over the financial systems maintained and operated by the Senate
Computer Center (SCC) that processed financial information for the
Office of the Secretary of the Senate and the Office of the Sergeant
at Arms and Doorkeeper.  General computer controls, however, also
affect the security and reliability of financial and nonfinancial
operations processed by SCC for other Senate offices. 

Specifically, we evaluated controls intended to

  protect data, files, and programs from unauthorized access;

  prevent unauthorized changes to systems and applications software;

  provide segregation of duties among applications and systems
     programmers, computer operators, security administrators, and
     other data center personnel;

  ensure recovery of computer processing operations in case of a
     disaster or other unexpected interruption; and

  ensure adequate computer security administration. 

To evaluate these controls, we identified and reviewed SCC's
information system general control policies and procedures.  Through
this review and discussions with SCC staff, including programming,
operations, and security personnel, we determined how the general
controls should work and the extent to which data center personnel
considered them to be in place.  We also reviewed the installation
and implementation of SCC's systems and security software. 

Further, we tested and observed the operation of general controls
over SCC information systems to determine whether they were in place,
adequately designed, and operating effectively.  Our tests included
attempts to obtain access to sensitive data and programs, which were
performed with the knowledge and cooperation of SCC officials. 


To assist in our evaluation and testing of general controls, we
contracted with the public accounting firm of Deloitte & Touche LLP. 
We determined the scope of our contractor's audit work, monitored its
progress, and reviewed the related work papers to ensure that the
resulting findings were adequately supported. 

We performed our work at the Senate Computer Center in Washington,
D.C., from April 1995 through July 1995 in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards. 

During the course of our work, we met with SCC officials to discuss
our work and they informed us of the steps they planned to take or
had taken to address our findings.  At the conclusion of our work, we
provided a draft of this report to Senate officials who said that
they concurred with our findings, conclusions, and recommendations. 


   ACCESS TO COMPUTER RESOURCES
   NOT ADEQUATELY CONTROLLED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Two basic internal control objectives for any information system are
to protect data from unauthorized changes and to prevent unauthorized
disclosures of sensitive data.  Without effective access controls,
the reliability of a computer system's data cannot be maintained,
sensitive data can be accessed and changed, and information can be
inappropriately disclosed. 

SCC had computer security weaknesses that could result in
unauthorized access to the system's data, files, and programs.  These
weaknesses included ineffective (1) implementation of SCC's access
control software and (2) practices to authorize, monitor, and review
user access.  During the course of our work, SCC officials advised of
actions they had taken or planned to take to address some of the
weaknesses we identified. 


      INEFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION
      OF ACCESS CONTROL SOFTWARE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

SCC has implemented CA-ACF2, a commercially available access control
software package, to control its primary financial management system
and certain batch processing.\2 However, ACF2 was not implemented to
control access to other mainframe programs, including parts of the
payroll system, LEGIS, the Capitol Police system, and other
administrative systems.  While many programs have built-in security
features, such features typically are not as comprehensive or
stringent as those provided by ACF2.  Common deficiencies in such
programs include a lack of audit trails for user activity and few, if
any, password management controls (for example, forced password
changes and minimum character length passwords). 

By not implementing ACF2 over all its systems and programs, SCC has
forfeited many of the control benefits provided by the software, and
must maintain expertise in the security administration for each of
these systems and programs.  For example, at least one system not
under ACF2 requires the use of a single shared password for access. 
Since all users share the same password, the system cannot provide an
audit trail of a particular user's activity, thereby limiting user
accountability. 

SCC officials advised us that they did not plan to implement ACF2
over other mainframe applications due to (1) indications that, for
some programs, less rigorous security measures are preferred by user
management to provide easier accessibility, (2) resource constraints,
and (3) intentions to transition from the mainframe to a
decentralized network environment.  However, as the transition may
not be completed for up to 5 years, we believe that it is important
for SCC management to assess its ongoing risks of not implementing
ACF2 completely and take appropriate actions. 

In addition, the implementation of ACF2 over the financial management
system and batch processing is not fully effective.  The technical
options that SCC has implemented to control access to the information
on its mainframe negate many of the control benefits that the
software offers.  For example, ACF2 was implemented to allow up to 20
security violations, such as attempts to access data for which the
user is not authorized, to occur in a single job or session before it
is canceled.  Similarly, a user was permitted up to 500 invalid
password attempts daily before ACF2 denied access.  By allowing such
a high number of violations and invalid password attempts to occur,
SCC increased the risk of unauthorized access and improper use or
disclosure of sensitive Senate data.  SCC officials advised us that
they have begun changes to these ACF2 control settings, such as
reducing the limits on the number of security violations and invalid
password attempts. 

Other password controls were weakened due to ineffective ACF2
implementation.  While a user's identification (ID) typically follows
a standard format that makes it easily deduced, passwords are used to
authenticate the user and thus should be difficult to deduce, kept
secret, and frequently changed.  Most SCC users were only required to
change their passwords every 180 days; some users were not required
to change their passwords at all.  In addition, SCC had not
implemented a shorter password expiration period for users having
special system or security privileges. 

Moreover, SCC's current security policies did not prevent users from
reusing the same password indefinitely.  The longer a user is allowed
to use the same password, the greater the risk that an unauthorized
user may discover and use another user's ID/password combination. 
SCC management advised us that it was reviewing password policies and
had reduced the password change requirement to 90 days for some users
and to 30 days for some special privileges and was investigating ways
to restrict others. 


--------------------
\2 In computer operations, batch processing is the processing of a
group of related transactions or other items at periodic intervals. 


      IMPROVED CONTROLS NEEDED
      OVER AUTHORIZATION,
      MONITORING, AND REVIEW OF
      USER ACCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

Organizations can reduce the risk that unauthorized changes or
disclosures occur by (1) granting employees authority to read or
modify only those programs and data that are necessary to perform
their duties and (2) periodically reviewing this authority and
modifying it to reflect changes in job responsibilities and
terminations in employment. 

Having unused or unneeded user accounts increases the risk that an
unauthorized user will discover and use such an account without
prompt detection.  In a sample of 38 SCC accounts, we found 3
assigned to individuals who had separated from Senate employment from
5 to 15 months earlier.  We also found that 159, or over one quarter
of the accounts, had not been used in more than 6 months.  We noted
that another 79 had never been used, of which 64 had existed for more
than 120 days.  Because initial passwords\3 may be easily guessed,
these inactive accounts present an increased risk that passwords will
be compromised and unauthorized access allowed. 

We also identified 30 user IDs and passwords that were shared by
staff in certain departments, even though these staff members have
individual accounts.  The use of shared IDs and passwords undermines
the effectiveness of monitoring because individual accountability is
lost and increases the risk of password compromise. 

In addition, SCC's implementation of ACF2 allowed for unnecessary
access to sensitive data and programs.  Both operations and
programming personnel in SCC's Central Services Division had a level
of access that was not necessary for performance of their regular job
duties and could increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure or
modification of sensitive data.  For example, 11 applications
programmers had the ability to change on-line payroll data, 11 could
alter vendor information, and 2 could change financial data. 
Moreover, this level of access could not be monitored because no
record, or log, of the access was created. 

We identified another area in which SCC could improve its access
monitoring controls.  Specifically, SCC did not implement session
timeouts, which automatically log off a user's terminal after a
specified period of inactivity, over all of its programs.  Lack of
session timeouts increases the risk of unauthorized access to
unattended terminals. 

SCC management was reviewing its access authorization and monitoring
procedures at the time of our review and had taken or planned to take
several corrective actions.  Specifically, SCC management indicated
that the security administrator had begun to log and monitor user
access to determine what programs and files are being used.  This
information will be used as a basis for removing access privileges
where they are not used or needed.  However, where unrestricted
access is deemed necessary, management plans to log and monitor it. 
Also, SCC management advised us that inactive user IDs were being
removed from the system.  Finally, SCC management was reviewing
shared user IDs and passwords and planned to reduce or eliminate
them. 


--------------------
\3 The initial password for a new user is assigned by the security
administrator and must by changed the first time the user logs on. 


   OTHER GENERAL CONTROLS NOT
   EFFECTIVE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

In addition to access controls, a computer system typically has other
important general controls to ensure the integrity and reliability of
data.  These general controls include policies, procedures, and
control techniques to (1) prevent unauthorized changes to system
software, (2) provide appropriate segregation of duties among
computer personnel, and (3) ensure continuation of computer
processing operations in case of an unexpected interruption.  SCC had
weaknesses in the general controls over each of these areas, although
its management had made or planned to make improvements in several
areas. 


      STRENGTHENED CONTROLS NEEDED
      OVER SOFTWARE CHANGES AND
      MAINTENANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

The integrity of an information system depends upon management's
clear understanding and documentation of the system.  Formal
processes for developing and maintaining software are important tools
to assist management in ensuring that all changes to software meet
user specifications, are appropriately reviewed and authorized, and
include adequate security measures. 

SCC did not have a formal change control process to document
management's authorization and approval of routine and emergency
changes to systems software.  Change control procedures for the major
financial programs have not been formalized to ensure that only
authorized changes are made to programs and data.  Inadequate
management of system software changes and maintenance, including the
lack of documentation, also increased the risk that back-up and
recovery procedures could not be effectively performed. 

Also, we found instances of (1) the unintended creation of access
paths to computer resources and (2) situations in which SCC staff
were unsure of the purpose of undocumented systems software
functions.  Both of these weaknesses increased the risk of security
or reliability breaches.  For example, the operating system contained
the names of five programs that no longer existed, introducing the
risk that an unauthorized program could be run under one of those
program names to gain unauthorized access to programs and data files. 

SCC officials were reviewing software change and maintenance
procedures and planned to formalize them.  Also, SCC management
advised us that unused program names have been eliminated. 


      INADEQUATE SEGREGATION OF
      COMPUTER DUTIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

One fundamental technique for safeguarding programs and data is the
appropriate segregation of duties and responsibilities of computer
personnel to reduce the risk that errors or fraud will go undetected. 
At SCC, we found inadequate segregation of duties, particularly in
the granting of powerful security privileges. 

SCC has explicitly assigned two systems programmers to assist in the
security administration of the access control software.  Under normal
circumstances, back-up security staff should report to the security
administrator and have no programming, operations, or librarian
duties.  Because these individuals have both systems and security
administrator privileges associated with their user accounts, they
can eliminate any audit trail of their activity in the system.  SCC
officials indicated that they were reviewing this issue and
considering several steps to mitigate the risks of assigning dual
responsibilities. 

In addition, SCC has assigned powerful ACF2 security functions to
many user accounts for which these privileges represent a significant
security exposure.  For example, 49 accounts could bypass all ACF2
controls (including the creation of audit trails, known as logging),
allowing the user full and virtually undetectable access to all
files, programs, and other system resources.  This level of authority
should generally be limited to emergency IDs, which are activated
with management approval on a temporary, as-needed basis to handle
problems or emergencies.  SCC officials advised us that they are
assessing the granting of full access to such a large number of
individuals and have begun to reduce or eliminate such access.  In
the interim, to mitigate the risks associated with unlogged access to
sensitive files, they have changed their procedures to ensure that
all updates to order entry and payroll files are logged. 

Further, controls over security administration could be improved if
the data security administrator reported directly to the SCC Director
to provide adequate authority and independence in security matters. 
Currently, the data security administrator reports to the assistant
director of the Educational Services and Support Division.  The data
security administrator, therefore, had customer service
responsibilities, which may not be compatible with the duties
associated with systems security.  SCC management was considering the
role and organizational placement of the data security administrator
at the conclusion of our work. 


      DISASTER RECOVERY AND
      CONTINGENCY PLANNING NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

An agency must ensure that it is adequately prepared to cope with a
loss of operational capability due to an earthquake, fire, accident,
sabotage, or any other operational disruption.  A detailed, current,
and tested disaster recovery plan is essential to ensure that the SCC
information system can promptly restore operations and data, such as
payroll processing and records, in the event of a disaster. 

Prior to its move to its current location in 1992, SCC had an
arrangement with the Library of Congress to provide back-up
operations on its mainframe in the event of an emergency.  However,
the two mainframes are no longer compatible, so the Library of
Congress back-up site cannot be used.  SCC has developed a back-up
capability on its mainframe in the event a portion of the machine
goes down.  However, in the event that the entire SCC was
incapacitated, back-up processing would not be readily available. 

SCC has advised us that the Sergeant at Arms has since contracted
with a commercial vendor to provide off-site back-up processing
facilities in the event of an emergency.  Further, SCC management has
advised us that it has begun to develop a disaster recovery plan. 
Once developed, it will be important that SCC implement and
periodically test the plan at the back-up facility, identifying the
objectives and expected results for use in evaluating test results. 


   COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC
   COMPUTER SECURITY PLAN NEEDED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The Senate's lack of a comprehensive strategic plan for computer
security administration contributed to the general control weaknesses
in SCC operations.  Such a plan would consider all Senate computer
resources, and include SCC, the Office of Telecommunications, and
users in a comprehensive policy for security awareness and
administration. 

Development and implementation of a comprehensive strategic plan will
become more important as SCC and its customers continue moving from
an environment in which all major applications are processed on a
mainframe to a decentralized network environment distributed
throughout the Senate.  In a distributed processing environment, an
integrated security plan is crucial for coordinating control over
multiple locations, numerous hardware and software installations, and
numerous paths of communication.  For example, given the large number
of possible access sites throughout the Senate, external access is a
significant area of exposure and should be considered in any overall
security plan.  Without a comprehensive strategy, duplication of some
controls and omission of others are likely to occur, adversely
affecting both efficiency and effectiveness. 


   WEAKNESSES DID NOT AFFECT
   FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF
   RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

As part of our audits of receipts and disbursements, we evaluated
assertions made by the Secretary of the Senate and the Sergeant at
Arms and Doorkeeper that internal controls in place on September 30,
1994, were effective in safeguarding assets from material loss,
assuring material compliance with relevant laws and regulations, and
assuring that there were no material misstatements in the financial
statements.\4 We considered the effect of general computer control
weaknesses and determined that other management controls mitigated
their effect on the statements of disbursements, receipts, and
financing sources for the two audited entities. 

Both of these offices use SCC resources to process financial
information that is essential to their operations.  The Senate
Disbursing Office, a part of the Office of the Secretary, uses SCC to
process payroll and personnel information and to maintain vendor
information.  The Senate Disbursing Office maintains its own
accounting system, which is used to process other disbursements and
report all Senate financial transactions.  The Sergeant at Arms and
Doorkeeper uses SCC to process its accounting and equipment inventory
systems. 

The Senate Disbursing Office performs various control procedures to
ensure that data are properly authorized and entered into the system,
including comparison of system reports with supporting documents at
various stages of processing.  Also, the Senate Disbursing Office
distributes monthly reports to the Secretary of the Senate and the
Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper that list payroll and other
disbursements made on their behalf.  The offices then review the
monthly reports for accuracy.  Both the Secretary of the Senate and
the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper reconcile the nonpayroll
information to their own independent records to ensure that
disbursements are consistent with the approved requests for payment
that they submitted.  Any differences discovered by reviews or
reconciliations are discussed with the Senate Disbursing Office and
resolved.  Finally, the Secretary of the Senate publishes a
semiannual public report that summarizes payroll information by
employee and details the individual disbursements of the entire
Senate. 


--------------------
\4 See GAO/AIMD-95-185 and GAO/AIMD-95-186 for a detailed discussion
of our testing of receipts and disbursements. 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

The Senate's general computer control weaknesses could result in
serious breaches in the security of its sensitive data and programs,
such as those related to payroll and personnel.  A comprehensive
strategic plan that integrates and controls access and processing for
all Senate files, programs, and data is crucial to ensuring that
Senate computer resources are adequately safeguarded.  As the Senate
moves to a distributed processing environment, development and
implementation of a comprehensive computer security plan will become
even more important. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

To correct the existing weaknesses at the Senate Computer Center, we
recommend that you direct the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper to take
the following actions. 

  Develop and implement policies and procedures to limit access for
     the system's users to only those computer programs and data
     needed to perform their duties.  Access controls should be
     improved by (1) effectively utilizing SCC's access control
     software, including assessing ongoing risks of incomplete
     implementation and taking appropriate control measures, (2)
     strengthening procedures to authorize, monitor, and review user
     access, and (3) implementing session timeout procedures. 

  Develop and implement policies and procedures for controlling
     software changes, including requiring documentation for the
     purpose of the change, management review and approval, and
     independent testing. 

  Provide for appropriate segregation of computer duties, including
     upgrading the position of data security administrator to allow
     for appropriate independence and authority. 

  Develop, implement, and test a disaster recovery plan for all
     critical SCC operations. 

In addition, to improve Senatewide computer security, we recommend
that you direct that the Senate develop and implement a comprehensive
strategic plan that integrates and controls access and processing for
all Senate files, programs, and data. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to the Sergeant at Arms and
Doorkeeper of the U.S.  Senate and to the Secretary of the Senate. 
Copies will be made available to others upon request. 

Please contact me at (202) 512-9489 if you or your staffs have any
questions.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
I. 

David L.  Clark
Director, Audit Oversight
and Liaison


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I


   ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
   MANAGEMENT DIVISION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Shannon Cross
Robert Dacey
Francine Delvecchio
Sharon Kittrell
Crawford Thompson


*** End of document. ***