Seized Drugs and Firearms: FBI Needs to Improve Certain Physical
Safeguards and Strengthen Accountability (Letter Report, 12/16/1999,
GAO/AIMD-00-18).

Pursuant to an congressional request, GAO reviewed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) controls over seized drugs and firearms, focusing
on whether the FBI: (1) put in place physical safeguards that if
operated effectively would help control access to and use of drug and
firearm evidence; and (2) maintained adequate accountability over such
evidence.

GAO noted that: (1) physical safeguards over drug and firearm evidence,
which include adequate storage facilities and control procedures, are
essential for guarding against theft, misuse, and loss of such evidence
and securing it for federal prosecutors; (2) each of the four FBI
offices GAO reviewed established physical safeguards in accordance with
key FBI policy provisions that if operated effectively would help
control access to and use of drug and firearm evidence; (3) however,
overcrowding and inadequate packaging of drug evidence and improper
maintenance of the night depository in the drug vault at one field
office increased the potential for theft, misuse, and loss of evidence
at that location; (4) GAO identified cases where firearms were not
certified as rendered safe in accordance with FBI policy; (5) the most
recent FBI internal inspections identified similar findings involving
the improper storage of drug evidence, inadequate ventilation in drug
vaults, and the lack of documentation certifying that firearms were
rendered safe, as well as weaknesses in physical access controls; (6)
the FBI's ability to account for drug and firearm evidence was hampered
by incomplete and missing information on chain of custody documents,
failure to promptly issue and reconcile reports used to verify the
location of evidence, and inadequate documentation for certain bulk drug
seizures; (7) evidence control personnel, however, were able to locate
each item selected for GAO's testing that was in storage at the field
offices, and for those items not in storage, they provided documentation
supporting the location or status of the item; (8) timely data entry and
data verification are key control procedures that help ensure data
records are complete and accurate; (9) GAO identified several instances
where evidence control personnel or agents entered evidence into the
FBI's Automated Case Support (ACS) system late without the required
explanatory memoranda; (10) GAO found discrepancies between information
recorded in the ACS system and information on written documents
associated with the evidence; (11) GAO noted numerous discrepancies
between the actual weight of drug items and the weight recorded on
attached evidence labels; and (12) the FBI's ability to account for drug
evidence was hindered by the lack of policies and procedures on how to
identify and address significant weight variances.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-00-18
     TITLE:  Seized Drugs and Firearms: FBI Needs to Improve Certain
	     Physical Safeguards and Strengthen Accountability
      DATE:  12/16/1999
   SUBJECT:  Data integrity
	     Inventory control systems
	     Law enforcement agencies
	     Firearms
	     Drug trafficking
	     Narcotics
	     Accountability
	     Internal controls
	     Search and seizure
IDENTIFIER:  Miami (FL)
	     New York (NY)
	     FBI Automated Case Support System
	     Dallas (TX)
	     San Diego (CA)

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Rev-LG logo.eps GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Attorney General

December 1999 SEIZED DRUGS AND FIREARMS

FBI Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards and Strengthen
Accountability

GAO/AIMD-00-18

  GAO/AIMD-00-18

Page 1 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms United States
General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Accounting and Information Management
Division

B-282211 Lett er

December 16, 1999 The Honorable Janet Reno The Attorney General

Dear Madam Attorney General: Since 1990, we have periodically
reported on government operations that we have identified as high
risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud,
abuse, and mismanagement. One of these operations is the

asset forfeiture program operated by the Department of Justice. As
we reported in January 1999, although some improvements have been
made to the program since we first designated it as a high risk
program in 1990, significant problems remain and continued
oversight is necessary to ensure that policies and procedures are
followed and that adequate safeguards are in place. 1

Related to asset forfeiture, Justice operations often involve the
seizure, custody, and disposition of evidence that is used by
federal prosecutors. A critical support function is controlling
evidence to help ensure that federal cases are not compromised or
weakened by challenges made by the defense about the existence,
completeness, or handling of evidence, or its

ties to defendants. Seized property, including items such as drugs
and firearms, are subject to forfeiture and typically remain in
the custody of the seizing agency until they are approved for
final disposition.

This report focuses on Justice's Federal Bureau of Investigation's
(FBI) controls over seized drugs and firearms. There is an
inherent risk of theft, misuse, and loss of drugs and firearms
because such evidence typically has a market or street value. In
addition, evidence can remain in the FBI's custody for significant
amounts of time due to the FBI's long- term investigations.
Another factor increasing this risk is changes in custody of the
evidence as the FBI often conducts its operations with other law
enforcement agencies, which can result in evidence being
transferred from one agency to another. 1 Major Management
Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice (GAO/OCG-99-
10, January 1999).

B-282211 Page 2 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Given this inherent risk, our audit objectives were to determine
whether the FBI (1) put in place physical safeguards that if
operated effectively would help control access to and use of drug
and firearm evidence and

(2) maintained adequate accountability over such evidence. To
accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials from FBI
headquarters and four selected FBI field offices and reviewed
pertinent policies and procedures

provided by the FBI concerning the safeguarding and handling of
drug and firearm evidence. Based on discussions with FBI
headquarters officials and a review of staffing levels for the
FBI's 56 field offices, we selected two of the largest field
offices-New York, New York and Miami, Florida-and two smaller
sized offices-Dallas, Texas and San Diego, California-at which to
perform our work.

At each of these four selected FBI field offices, we observed the
location and condition of storage facilities and physical
safeguards over drug and firearm evidence; randomly sampled and
tested recently acquired drug and firearm items; performed
inventory procedures for judgmentally selected

drug and firearm items; and observed FBI personnel weigh selected
drug items and compared the observed weights to the weights
recorded on evidence labels attached to the items. We also
obtained and reviewed the results of recent FBI field office
internal inspections to determine if issues we identified during
our fieldwork were indicative of more systemic concerns at the
FBI. 2 We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards from August 1998 through August

1999. See appendix I for a more detailed discussion of our scope
and methodology.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the
Attorney General or her designee. The Assistant Director for FBI's
Office of Public and Congressional Affairs provided us with
written comments, which are

discussed in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section and
are reprinted in appendix II.

2 The FBI provided copies of (1) electronic communications sent to
41 field offices and (2) documentation that summarizes the
inspection results for 3 other field offices that detail
deficiencies, and associated instructions and recommendations,
related to drugs and firearms that were identified by Evidence
Program Audits conducted during recent internal inspections.
According to the FBI Chief Inspector, there were no evidence
findings resulting from the most recent inspections at the other
12 FBI field offices.

B-282211 Page 3 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Results in Brief Physical safeguards over drug and firearm
evidence, which include adequate storage facilities and control
procedures, are essential for guarding against theft, misuse, and
loss of such evidence and securing it for federal prosecutors.
Each of the four FBI field offices we reviewed established
physical safeguards in accordance with key FBI policy provisions
that, if operated effectively, would help control access to and

use of drug and firearm evidence. However, overcrowding and
inadequate packaging of drug evidence and improper maintenance of
the night depository in the drug vault at one of the four FBI
field offices we visited increased the potential for theft,
misuse, and loss of evidence at that location. In addition, we
found inadequate ventilation in the drug vault at

one field office that could potentially negatively affect the
health and safety of evidence control personnel. At the four field
offices we reviewed, we also identified cases where firearms were
not certified as rendered safe in accordance with FBI policy.
Further, the most recent internal inspections for certain field
offices identified similar findings involving the improper storage
of drug evidence, inadequate ventilation in drug vaults, and the
lack of documentation certifying that firearms were rendered safe,
as well as weaknesses in physical access controls. Drug and
firearm evidence must also be accounted for completely and
accurately to help ensure that such evidence is not compromised
for federal prosecution purposes and is protected against the risk
of theft, misuse, and loss. However, the FBI's ability to account
for drug and firearm evidence was hampered at one or more of the
four field offices we reviewed by incomplete and missing
information on chain of custody

documents, failure to promptly issue and reconcile reports that
are used to verify the location of evidence, and/ or inadequate
documentation for certain bulk drug seizures. For example, with
regard to inadequate documentation for certain bulk drug seizures,
we identified two instances at one field office that involved a
total of about 770 kilograms of cocaine for

which there was no signed certification by any of the FBI
personnel who purportedly witnessed the destructions of most of
these drugs. 3 Notwithstanding these problems, evidence control
personnel at the four

FBI field offices we visited were able to locate each item
selected for our testing that was in storage at the field offices,
and for those items not in 3 One kilogram is the equivalent of
approximately 2. 2 pounds. About 453.6 grams is the equivalent of
1 pound.

B-282211 Page 4 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

storage, they provided documentation supporting the current
location or status of the item. Also, timely data entry and data
verification are key control procedures that help ensure that data
records are complete and accurate. We identified several instances
at three of the field offices we reviewed where evidence control
personnel or agents entered evidence into the FBI's Automated Case
Support (ACS) system late without the required explanatory
memoranda. For example, at one field office, 9 of the 50 selected
drug items we reviewed were not entered into the ACS system in a
timely manner and no required memoranda explaining the late data
entries were provided. In addition, at the four field offices, we
found discrepancies between information recorded in the ACS system
and information on

written documents associated with the evidence. The FBI's own
internal inspection teams reached similar conclusions pertaining
to accounting for seized drug and firearm evidence in a complete,
accurate, and timely manner.

While reviewing selected drug items in storage at the four field
offices, we noted numerous discrepancies between the actual weight
of drug items observed during our testing and the weight of these
items recorded on

attached evidence labels, which should reflect the current weight
of the item including packaging. Although many of the weight
variances involved only several grams, larger discrepancies
included a shortage of 269 grams of heroin and an overage of 3.9
kilograms of cocaine. The FBI's ability to account for drug
evidence was hindered by the lack of policies and

procedures on how to identify and address significant weight
variances. We are making several recommendations to address the
above issues. In commenting on this report, the FBI stated that
while the information contained in the draft was, for the most
part, factually accurate, it did have some concerns about the
report's focus and conclusions and recommendations. Nevertheless,
the FBI stated that it plans or has already taken actions relating
to four of our key recommendations, namely, our recommendations to
modify existing policy related to the weighing of drug

evidence, and our recommendation to review actions taken by the
New York Field Office to address various internal control
deficiencies. While the FBI neither concurred with nor took
exception to our recommendation to modify existing policy to
include guidance for updating records in the ACS system to reflect
identified changes in the weight of drug evidence, it is important
to note that, at the time of our review, there was no written

requirement to update the ACS system for any such changes.
Consequently,

B-282211 Page 5 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

the weight recorded in the ACS system may not represent the most
current weight recorded on the item's evidence label, thus
reducing the FBI's accountability over such drug evidence. The FBI
disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need to reinforce
adherence to certain existing FBI policies, stating that
recordkeeping issues we identified that were also found during its
own

internal inspections do not, in the aggregate or otherwise,
suggest inadequate accountability over drug evidence given the
overlapping internal control procedures in place. We disagree with
the FBI and, as discussed in this report, identified several
issues that we consider to be of a more severe nature at one or
more of the locations we visited and for which we did not identify
any redundant controls to compensate for the deficiencies.

In addition, FBI stated that we used the findings identified
during its own internal inspections to extrapolate systemic
inadequacies in the FBI's Evidence Program, regardless of the
circumstance or materiality. The FBI also emphasized that
maintaining appropriate physical safeguards and accountability is
an ongoing process as new policies and procedures are

continually implemented and new employees are continuously
introduced to evidence procedures. However, the FBI's internal
inspections are cited throughout our report to supplement our own
findings and illustrate that they may be indicative of more
systemic concerns. As such, and considering the continuous influx
of new policies, procedures, and personnel, the need for
reinforcement of adherence to the existing FBI policies listed in
our recommendation is valid.

Further, the FBI stated that it does not concur with our
recommendation to review existing policy to determine whether
current procedures for verifying evidence information entered into
the ACS system are adequate, or if the policy should be modified
to enhance the FBI's ability to detect and prevent data entry
errors. Based on the inaccuracies we found in the ACS system,
combined with similar results identified during several of the
FBI's own internal inspections, a review of existing policies and
procedures concerning verifying information entered into the ACS
system is justified.

Background The FBI is the principal investigative arm of the
United States Department of Justice. Title 28, United States Code,
Section 533, which authorizes the

Attorney General to appoint officials to detect crimes against the
United States, and other federal statutes, gives the FBI the
authority and

B-282211 Page 6 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

responsibility to investigate specific crimes. Currently, the FBI
has investigative jurisdiction over more than 200 categories of
federal crimes and will conduct an investigation if a possible
violation of federal law under

its jurisdiction has occurred. The FBI presents the information
and evidence gathered in the course of its investigation to the
appropriate U. S. Attorney or Department of Justice official who
determines whether or not prosecution or further action is
warranted. Prosecution is the

responsibility of federal prosecutors employed by the U. S.
Attorney's Offices or the Department of Justice. The FBI is a
field- oriented organization in which nine divisions and four
offices at FBI headquarters in Washington, D. C., provide program
direction and support services to field offices located in 56
major cities. 4 The field office locations were selected based on
crime trends, the need for regional geographic centralization, and
the need to efficiently manage resources. 5 Each field office is
normally overseen by a special agent in charge (SAC),

who is assisted by one or more assistant special agents in charge
(ASAC), squad supervisors who are responsible for investigative
work, and administrative officers who manage support operations
including evidence control.

FBI field offices face significant challenges in controlling
evidence where drugs and firearms are involved. Drug evidence can
range from bulk seizures weighing hundreds of kilograms to residue
on paraphernalia, such as clothing and pipes. Larger quantities of
drugs typically have a substantial street value and, therefore,
are inherently prone to theft. Regardless of

quantity and form, drug evidence may change hands several times
from seizure to disposition. For example, during a task force
operation, local law enforcement personnel may give drug evidence
to FBI agents, who then transfer it to FBI storage. This evidence
will often be transferred to off- site testing facilities, such as
those maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).
After analysis, the testing facility will return the

evidence to the FBI. Also, field office personnel destroy drugs
that are no 4 Fifty- five field offices are in the United States
and one is in Puerto Rico. 5 FBI field offices conduct their
official business both directly from their headquarters facilities
and through approximately 400 satellite offices, known as resident
agencies. Resident agencies are located based on similar criteria
as that used for field offices.

B-282211 Page 7 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

longer needed for prosecution. 6 Drug disposal involves
transporting the drugs from FBI storage facilities to off- site
destruction areas for incineration.

Firearms seized by FBI agents during the course of their
investigations can vary considerably. While some seizures may
involve a single handgun, others may result in the confiscation of
multiple weapons including shotguns, rifles, and automatic
pistols. Similar to drugs, firearms involve an inherent risk of
theft, misuse, and loss because they have market value and may
change hands several times from seizure to disposition. They may
be seized during joint operations with other law enforcement
agencies, transferred to FBI storage, and subsequently sent to the
FBI's Laboratory Division in Washington, D. C., or to local law
enforcement facilities for forensic examinations. In addition, in
cases in which the (1) firearms were confiscated from individuals
who are convicted of felonies and (2) federal

prosecutors are able to prove that the firearms were used to
commit crimes, the FBI will typically send the firearms to their
Laboratory Division to be destroyed. However, unlike illegal
drugs, under certain circumstances seized firearms must be
returned to their owners. For example, if the firearm was stolen
from a legitimate owner or if it is the property of a

suspect who is acquitted and will not waive ownership rights,
attempts must be made to return the firearm to the owner or
deliver it to a designated representative. 7 Policies to help
ensure that drugs and firearms are properly safeguarded and
accounted for while in FBI custody are developed primarily by FBI
headquarters personnel. Each field office is responsible for
implementing

the policies and supplementing them when the SAC determines that
it is necessary. Such policies include the establishment and
maintenance of evidence control rooms for the storage of evidence
and chain of custody documents, which are used to show who has
custody of specific evidence from the time it is acquired by the
FBI until it is disposed. In addition, FBI field offices employ an
evidence program manager and evidence control technicians who
accept evidence from agents and are responsible for

6 For bulk drug seizures, a certain amount of the drugs is
retained and stored as evidence pending conclusion of trials and
appeals, while most of the drugs may be destroyed in accordance
with FBI policy. 7 Return of the firearm to the owner, or delivery
to a designated representative, can take place only if the party
receiving the firearm may legally own a firearm and ownership of
such type of firearm is not prohibited by law.

B-282211 Page 8 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

helping to ensure that the evidence is properly secured,
protected, and recorded while it is in the FBI's custody. 8 As an
added control over field operations, each field office is supposed
to receive an internal inspection every 3 years. These inspections
are

coordinated by the FBI's Inspection Division and include a
comprehensive review of all field operations, including those
pertaining to safeguarding and accounting for drug and firearm
evidence. Internal inspections are performed by teams which
include experienced evidence control personnel from other field
offices who are knowledgeable about policies and

procedures related to seizure, storage, and disposition of drug
and firearm evidence. Each inspection typically involves a 100
percent inventory of drug evidence. According to the FBI's Chief
Inspector, once an inspection is completed, significant findings
are communicated to the field office SAC by

an electronic communication, which contains the details of the
findings and recommendations to correct noted deficiencies. Field
offices are required to respond to all findings within 30 days.
The response consists of the field office's written plan, or
actions taken, to correct the deficiencies

identified by the inspection team. Inspection team leaders review
the field office responses for adequacy; however, typically no
additional review or specific testing is performed by the
inspection team until the next inspection.

Certain Physical Safeguards Need Improvement

Physical safeguards, which include adequate storage facilities and
procedures, are needed to reduce the risk of theft, misuse, or
loss of drug and firearm evidence and help ensure that such
evidence is not compromised for federal prosecution purposes. In
addition, physical

safeguards can promote a safe working environment for FBI
personnel. The four FBI field offices included in our review have
physical safeguards in place that, if operated effectively, would
help control access to and use of drug and firearm evidence.
However, we identified storage problems involving drug evidence at
one field office that increase the potential for

theft, misuse, and loss of evidence. At another field office, we
noted that the drug vault did not have adequate ventilation for
odor control and the health and safety of evidence control
personnel. We also identified several firearms involving the four
field offices we reviewed that had not been certified as rendered
safe in accordance with FBI policy. In addition, the 8 According
to an FBI official, all FBI employees are drug tested before they
are hired and are

subject to additional random drug testing during employment at the
FBI.

B-282211 Page 9 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

most recent internal inspections for certain field offices
identified similar findings involving the improper storage of drug
evidence, inadequate ventilation in the drug vaults, and the lack
of documentation certifying that firearms were rendered safe, as
well as weaknesses in certain physical access controls.

Physical Safeguards Evidence control rooms at each of the four FBI
field offices we visited met key requirements set forth in FBI
policy. In accordance with policy, evidence was kept in designated
evidence control rooms used solely for the

storage of seized, recovered, or contributed property. 9 Doors to
the evidence control rooms used to store general evidence, such as
firearms, were secured with a combination lock, keypad access
control device, or similar locking system. As required by FBI
policy, drug evidence was stored in a separate evidence control
room, or drug vault, which was also

equipped with motion detectors and secured with a dual- entry
locking system. According to evidence control or security
personnel at each of the four field offices, the doors to the
evidence control rooms and drug vaults are equipped with security
alarms.

In addition, we observed various security devices, including
cameras, motion detectors, and door alarms, which according to FBI
personnel at the field offices, are operational and monitored by
field office personnel

24 hours a day. Officials at each of the four field offices also
stated that the alarms are routinely tested. However, due to the
sensitive nature of the evidence, we did not perform any
comprehensive tests to verify the operation of any of the security
devices mentioned above because we did not want to risk
compromising any of the evidence that may be needed for
prosecution purposes.

FBI policy also requires restricted access to drug and general
evidence control rooms to ensure that evidentiary property can
withstand defense challenges concerning custody of the evidence.
As required by the policy, we observed at each of the four field
offices we visited that two FBI

employees were needed to access the drug vault. Each field office
we visited limited the number of personnel who had access to the
drug vault and the general evidence control rooms, and we observed
that the doors to 9 FBI agents can collect evidence in various
ways; for example, it can be seized from a suspected criminal,
recovered from an abandoned crime scene, or contributed by a
cooperating law enforcement agency.

B-282211 Page 10 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

these areas remained locked unless a specific need for entry
arose. Further, in accordance with FBI policy, each of the four
field offices maintained access logs for their drug vault and
their general evidence control room and required every person
entering and exiting the secured areas to sign the log, including
their name, reason for entry, and the date and time of entry and
exit.

Twenty- four of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection
results we reviewed-including those for the Dallas and New York
Field Offices- documented one or more physical safeguard concerns.
For example, eight of the inspections for field offices not
selected for our review found that evidence control rooms, either
at the field office or an associated resident agency, did not have
either a bureau- approved intrusion detection system,

motion detector, or alarm. Seven of the inspections for field
offices not selected for our review identified evidence control
rooms or temporary storage areas with inadequate locking systems,
such as no keyless entry or no dual locking system as required by
FBI policy. In addition, seven inspections, which included the
Dallas and New York Field Offices, cited instances involving (1)
improper access to evidence control rooms by FBI personnel, such
as an unauthorized employee accessing the evidence control room
unaccompanied by the evidence

control technician, or (2) an evidence control technician having
sole access to the drug and valuable evidence control room. At
seven field offices not selected for our review, inspection teams
also determined access logs were either not used or were not being
properly completed by persons entering the evidence control rooms.
For example, some entries did not include the

reason for access, the date and time of entry, or the signatures
of all persons accessing the area. Other physical safeguard
concerns listed in one or more of the inspections included (1)
congested conditions in storage areas and (2) an inadequate number
of vault witnessing officials. Storage of Drugs and Firearms

Overcrowded and cluttered evidence control rooms, and unsealed and
damaged evidence packaging, increase the risk of theft, misuse,
and loss of evidence and the risk that critical drug evidence can
be compromised and subject to challenges by the defense. At the
New York Field Office, we found that the drug vault was
overcrowded and contained numerous items that were not stored in
an orderly manner, and we observed drug items that were
inadequately sealed or were kept in damaged packaging. In
addition,

FBI policy states that some drugs, including marijuana and
cocaine, are highly odoriferous and require more than normal
ventilation for odor

B-282211 Page 11 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

control and for health and safety reasons. At the Dallas Field
Office, we noticed a strong odor emanating from the drug vault and
were told by evidence control personnel that the drug vault did
not have exterior ventilation as required by FBI policy. Also, at
each of the four field offices we reviewed, we identified firearms
that had not been certified as rendered

safe in accordance with FBI policy. Firearms that are not rendered
safe prior to storage can create unsafe conditions for FBI
personnel as well as for others who may require access to the
evidence. At the New York Field Office, we observed that shelves
in the storage area were overcrowded and drug evidence was stacked
on the floor to an extent that made it difficult for evidence
control personnel to walk through the room and readily retrieve
items we selected for review. Further, the temporary storage bin
for the night depository, which dropped directly into the drug
vault, included a large pile of drug items that had not been moved

and stored in an orderly manner on shelves within the vault. In
addition, a drug evidence bag was leaking and some drug evidence
was stored in crushed and open boxes. We also observed a bulk
seizure comprised of approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine that
had not been packaged and

sealed in accordance with FBI policy. Although seized over 11
months prior to our visit, the drug evidence was stored in two
large seed bags in the same state as it had been acquired-50
bricks of cocaine individually wrapped with brown tape or duct
tape. Following our observation, evidence control personnel
notified the case agent who scheduled a date to enter the vault
and seal the evidence. According to the Evidence Program Manager,
the evidence was sealed on March 11, 1999.

In addition, evidence control personnel stated that the night
depository, which we observed, contained drug evidence held for
periods ranging from about 2 weeks to over 2 months. Because FBI
agents frequently make drug seizures outside normal business
operating hours, FBI policy allows field offices to maintain night
depositories. However, the policy requires the contents from the
night depositories to be removed at the beginning of each workday
by an evidence control technician, accompanied by the vault
witnessing official, and drug evidence is to be properly stored in
the drug

vault. According to the Evidence Program Manager, although the New
York Field Office has over 1,000 agents, it had only 2 designated
vault witnessing officials at the time of our review. Because such
a limited number of personnel had authorization to participate in
opening and entering the

vault, it was difficult to promptly transfer drugs from the night
depository to a proper storage location within the vault.

B-282211 Page 12 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Twenty- seven of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection
results we reviewed-including those for the New York Field Office-
identified drug items (or drug and valuable items) 10 that had not
been properly sealed, wrapped, labeled, or stored. For example,
two of these inspections, for offices not involved in our review,
specifically noted instances of damaged or open storage boxes that
allowed access to drugs. In addition, at one field office not
selected for our review, the inspection results state that a
review of 19 drug and valuable items determined a 100 percent
noncompliance of proper handling and sealing, and the inspection
team at this office found

that drugs and valuables, as well as items of general evidence
were commingled and improperly stored. Further, the most recent
internal inspection of the New York Field Office, which was
completed on

January 29, 1999, found that the physical condition and
organization of the field office's drug vault were inadequate.

According to the results of the New York Field Office internal
inspection, the poor condition of the drug vault made it difficult
to conduct the inventory audit or to locate evidence. 11 Similar
to our observations, the inspection noted specific instances in
which either the evidence was improperly sealed or evidence boxes
appeared to have been broken open

from the weight of other stacked evidence boxes. In addition, the
inspection identified a grate, located about 1 foot off the ground
that reportedly could easily be pried open and allow for direct
entry into the vault. According to the inspection results, the
drug vault should be

reorganized and, as appropriate, old items destroyed to make room
for new evidence. The inspection results also stated that the
grate should be secured to avoid unauthorized entry.

10 While some inspection teams report on drug and valuable
evidence separately, other inspections combine the results of drug
and valuable evidence reviews. 11 According to the results of the
New York Field Office inspection, the inspection auditors
discontinued efforts to complete a 100 percent physical inventory
due to time constraints. At the time of discontinuance, 79 of 1,
625 drug items could not be physically located or otherwise
accounted for by evidence control personnel.

B-282211 Page 13 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

According to the New York Field Office's Administrative SAC and
the Evidence Program Manager, responsibility for the maintenance,
recordkeeping, and storage of drug evidence was transferred to New
York's Administrative Division only about 1 month prior to our
November 1998 visit. 12 These officials reported that subsequent
to the January 1999 inspection, the drug vault has been relocated
and any physical conditions

or concerns that were issues have been alleviated by the move. In
addition, according to these officials, numerous drug items have
been resealed and documented for proper storage according to
policy, and evidence control technicians in the New York Field
Office will not accept any evidence into storage that is not
properly sealed or documented.

In addition to the drug storage concerns discussed above, FBI
policy requires that field office drug vaults which are used
exclusively for drug and/ or valuable evidence, have exterior
ventilation for both the storage of such odoriferous substances
and for the health and safety of evidence control personnel. At
the Dallas Field Office, we were told by evidence control
personnel that the drug vault did not have exterior ventilation as
required by FBI policy. Four of the 44 internal inspection results
we

reviewed, which include the New York Field Office, also reported
that these offices did not have adequate exterior ventilation in
their drug vaults, and inspection teams instructed these four
field offices to take steps to ensure such ventilation is
established. Regarding firearm evidence, FBI policy states that
firearms are not to be accepted by evidence control personnel for
storage until they have been examined by a field office firearms
instructor and rendered safe. The policy requires the firearms
instructor to sign and date the certification on the lower left-
hand corner of a chain of custody document, designating that

such examination has been performed. 13 12 According to the
January 1999 internal inspection results, control and custody of
the Drug Evidence Program was transferred from the Drug Branch of
the Criminal Division to the Evidence Control Unit of the
Administrative Division effective October 5, 1998. 13 Although
specific procedures for rendering a firearm safe are not described
in the policies we were provided, according to the FBI Evidence
Program Manager, the procedures used by FBI agents in rendering a
weapon safe include inspecting firearms each time they are

handled to ensure they are safe and unloaded.

B-282211 Page 14 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

In our sample of 113 firearms acquired by the four selected FBI
field offices, we found 3 firearms in storage that lacked
documentation certifying that the weapon had been rendered safe.
14 We also identified four other firearms that were certified as
rendered safe; however, the certifications for these firearms were
dated between 1 and 39 days after the date they had been accepted
for storage by evidence control personnel. In addition, we found
11 firearms that had been certified as rendered safe, but the
certifications were not dated as required by policy.

Similarly, 11 of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection
results we reviewed-including that for the New York Field Office-
reported a lack of certification that the firearms were rendered
safe. For example, inspection results for three field offices not
selected for our review identified the following: At one field
office, there was no documentation certifying that firearms had
been rendered safe for 70 percent of the items tested by the

inspection team; at a second field office, about 40 percent of the
items reviewed lacked certifications that firearms had been
rendered safe; and at a third field office, the inspection team
found no certifications for any of the reviewed firearms stored in
the evidence control room.

Accountability Over Drug and Firearm Evidence Needs Strengthening

Written policies covering documentation, record maintenance, and
independent verification requirements are essential for
maintaining adequate accountability for drug and firearm evidence.
Such procedures lower the risk of theft, misuse, and loss of
evidence, and the risk that evidence can be compromised for
prosecution purposes while in FBI

custody. According to FBI policy, the intrinsic value of drug
evidence requires the establishment of strict, documented
accountability. FBI policy requires drug and firearm evidence to
be tracked from acquisition to disposition with documents
including chain of custody forms, Charge- Out Reports, and
disposition memoranda. The policy also requires drug and

firearm evidence to be entered within established time frames into
the FBI's ACS system.

14 We also identified two firearms in storage at resident agencies
that, according to the case agents who had custody of the
firearms, had not been certified as rendered safe by a firearms
instructor. According to the FBI Evidence Program Manager,
firearms not submitted for storage are not required to be
certified as rendered safe by a firearms instructor. However,
according to this official, FBI agents are knowledgeable in the
handling of weapons and, after acquiring a firearm, will remove
the ammunition thereby rendering the weapon safe.

B-282211 Page 15 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

We identified incomplete or missing documentation for the custody
and disposition of specific items selected for testing. In
addition, certain field offices did not generate and reconcile
reports-in accordance with FBI policy-that identify agents who
maintain custody of drug and firearm

evidence. We also found that FBI personnel did not always document
the reason for late data entry of drug and firearm evidence into
the ACS system, and we identified discrepancies between
information recorded in the ACS system and the information found
on written documents associated with the evidence. Recent internal
inspections for certain field offices noted similar deficiencies.
Further, we found that the FBI had no written policies or
procedures to identify and address significant discrepancies
between the actual weight of drug items at any time prior to

destruction and the recorded weight of the items on attached
evidence labels, which should reflect the current weight of the
item including packaging. However, at the four field offices we
visited, evidence control personnel were able to locate each item
selected for testing that was in storage during our review, and
for items not in storage, they provided documentation supporting
the current location or status of the items. For example, for

drug items not in storage because they had been transferred to DEA
for analysis, we were provided a copy of a DEA form showing
signatures of FBI and DEA personnel confirming the laboratory's
receipt of the evidence.

Chain of Custody Documentation

FBI policy requires its personnel to establish and maintain a
chain of custody (a tracking document) for seized, recovered, and
contributed drugs and firearms. This written chain of custody must
include the signatures of the agent who initially seized or
collected the drugs or firearms, the evidence control technician
who placed the evidence in storage, and any other FBI personnel
who assumed custody of the evidence

for any purpose until the evidence is disposed of. It must also
include the reason for the transfer of custody and the time and
date of any custody change. In addition, it is important for the
written chain of custody to include either the barcode number or
the case number and exhibit number

for the specific item in order to conclusively relate the document
to a particular piece of evidence. The proper maintenance of chain
of custody documents is a key internal control over seized drugs
and firearms because custody of such evidence can change several
times from seizure to disposition, and the document must be able
to withstand defense challenges during judicial proceedings.

B-282211 Page 16 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

During our review, we identified various deficiencies in chain of
custody documentation at the four field offices we visited.
Specifically, of the 50 drug items reviewed at the New York Field
Office, evidence control personnel were not able to provide a
written chain of custody form for one drug item tested; and for
three other drug items, the written chain of custody provided had
neither a barcode nor a case number and exhibit number to
conclusively relate it to a particular piece of evidence. In
addition, of the total of 159 drug items reviewed at the four
field offices, we identified six cases for which either the time
or date of a custody change,

or the reason for the change, was omitted from the written chain
of custody. And for two other drug items, although we observed the
evidence in the vault, the evidence control technician did not
sign the written chain of custody when the evidence was accepted
for storage.

Similarly, of the 24 firearm items reviewed at the Dallas Field
Office, the written chain of custody form for two of the items had
neither a barcode nor a case number and exhibit number to
conclusively relate it to a particular piece of evidence. In
addition, one of the 36 firearm items reviewed in New York did not
have a reason for transfer of the evidence recorded on the written
chain of custody.

Moreover, the chain of custody did not always adequately reflect
the current status or location of the drug evidence. In the San
Diego Field Office, we verified that 10 of the 23 drug items we
reviewed involved drugs that were taken directly to the DEA
laboratory for analysis rather than initially stored. Although
transporting drug evidence for analysis prior to storage is an
acceptable procedure, FBI policy requires the chain of custody to
disclose that the evidence has been forwarded to the DEA
laboratory. However, the chain of custody forms for 9 of these 10
cases did not show the item had been forwarded to the DEA
laboratory. FBI officials at the San Diego Field Office
acknowledged that the chain of custody

should reflect evidence transported to DEA or picked up from DEA,
and they stated that they would ensure this would be done in the
future.

Thirteen of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we
reviewed, which include the New York Field Office, identified
deficiencies in the chain of custody. For example, the inspection
team at the New York Field Office cited failure to properly
document the chain of custody for 609, or over 44 percent, of the
1, 377 drug items examined. In addition, other inspection results
for three offices not involved in our review cited

deficiencies found on chain of custody forms, including (1) 17
percent of drug and valuable items reviewed at one field office
did not have

B-282211 Page 17 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

signatures, (2) forms for about 5 percent of drug and valuable
items examined at another field office were incomplete, and (3) at
a third field office, the final disposition was not recorded for
68 disposed drug and valuable items.

Reconciliation of ChargeOut Reports

FBI policy requires evidence control personnel to generate and
reconcile Charge- Out Reports that identify agents who have had
custody of drug or firearm evidence for more than 60 days.
According to FBI policy, evidence may be charged out to FBI
employees who have an official need. For example, a case agent may
charge- out an item that is needed by the Assistant U. S. Attorney
(AUSA) for trial. Even though the agent forwards the evidence to
the AUSA, the chain of custody will continue to reflect that the
agent has custody of the evidence. The Charge- Out Report
procedure requires FBI personnel to routinely verify the location
of evidence, thus ensuring appropriate custody and allowing for
periodic review of the need

to hold evidence or return it to storage. According to FBI policy,
the reports must be run every week or every 2 weeks depending on
the size of the field office. They must be distributed to
supervisory officials, who in turn, forward them to the person who
currently has custody of the evidence so that person can determine
whether the evidence needs to remain in their custody or be
returned to storage. The results of this reporting process, either
the return to storage or the recharging- out of the evidence, must
be recorded in the ACS system by the evidence control technician.
Based on inquiries of FBI personnel at each of the four field
offices included in our review, during the 1997- 1998 time frame,
only the Miami Field Office typically generated the reports every
2 weeks as required. According to a Miami official, the reports
are still run every 2 weeks and are routed to the appropriate
supervisor and agent. Because Miami is a large office, it
generally takes approximately 30 days to distribute the

report and follow up on its return. According to the official,
each time the report is sent out, a deadline is set for its return
to the evidence control personnel. According to an Intelligence
Research Specialist who had been responsible for evidence at the
New York Field Office, Charge- Out Reports were not routinely
prepared and distributed because this was an extremely large task
in New York due to the magnitude of evidence in custody. The
official stated that it was very difficult and time consuming to
reconcile the Charge- Out Report because the report was not a
priority with many agents whose responses are necessary to
complete the reconciliation. However,

B-282211 Page 18 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

according to the New York Field Office's Administrative SAC and
the Evidence Program Manager, since the Administrative Division
has taken responsibility for drug evidence, evidence control
technicians have reinstituted the dissemination of the Charge- Out
Report in accordance with FBI policy.

An official at the Dallas Field Office stated that during the
1997- 1998 time frame, the Charge- Out Reports were prepared every
60 days. However, currently, the reports are run every 2 weeks as
required by policy, and it takes approximately 2 to 3 weeks to
receive the report back from the

agents and reconcile it. Finally, the evidence control technician
at the San Diego Field Office stated that, as in the past, Charge-
Out Reports are currently prepared once a month, and a 2- week
deadline is set for reconciling the report.

Ten of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we
reviewed, which include the New York Field Office, cited problems
related to Charge- Out Reports. For example, the inspection team
at an office not selected for our review identified a failure to
send charge- out reminders and to recharge out evidence kept at
one of the office's storage facilities. According to the
inspection team, Charge- Out Reports for this facility had not
been run for about a year and a half, and items had not been
recharged out to the appropriate agents, which is necessary to
maintain accountability for the items in the ACS system. At two
other offices not selected for our review, inspection teams
identified numerous items that had not been appropriately
recharged out during the inspection period.

Documentation for Bulk Drug Seizures FBI policy requires that
written notification of a bulk drug seizure be sent to the U. S.
Attorney with a copy directed to the AUSA no later than 5

workdays after the seizure, and the letter should provide the date
after which the bulk of the evidence may be destroyed. 15 The
policy also requires FBI personnel to witness and certify the
destruction of all drugs. Further, to facilitate accountability
for drugs from seizure to disposition, the FBI requires that all
drug evidence be labeled, and that bulk seizures be

photographed in accordance with FBI policy. According to the
policy 15 The letter also informs the U. S. Attorney that a
written request for an exception to the destruction process must
be submitted to the SAC. If no request for an exception to the
destruction is received, the bulk of the drug evidence may be
disposed without further contact with the U. S. Attorney.

B-282211 Page 19 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

related to handling bulk seizures, the drugs must be photographed,
and each photograph must display the case file number; names of
the seizing agents; date, time, and place of seizure; the
estimated weight of the total

seizure; and the exhibit number of the seizure. In addition, a
yardstick, ruler, or other measuring device must be positioned in
each photograph to provide a true scale to the bulk seizure. These
requirements, including

initially establishing the date after which the bulk of the
evidence can be destroyed, completing documents that certify the
destruction of bulk drug evidence, and appropriately labeling and
photographing such evidence, are valuable tools for promoting
timely destruction of bulk evidence, safeguarding the evidence
against the risk of loss or misuse, and ensuring adequate
documentation of the type and volume of evidence for use by
federal prosecutors.

We noted inadequate documentation for certain bulk drug seizures
at two of the four selected field offices we visited. 16 We
identified two bulk seizures of cocaine that were made by FBI
agents in the New York Field

Office for which critical documentation related to disposition and
destruction was missing. 17 In one case, FBI records indicated
that approximately 450 kilograms of cocaine were seized on
November 25, 1997.

In another case, the records indicated that about 320 kilograms of
cocaine were seized on December 17, 1997. Although FBI policy
requires that written notification of the seizures be sent to the
U. S. Attorney within 5

workdays of the seizure, documenting the date after which the bulk
of the evidence may be destroyed, notification letters for these
bulk seizures were prepared only after we had brought this issue
to the attention of FBI personnel, which was about a year after
the seizures.

In addition, although the FBI obtained written approval from the
AUSA to destroy these drugs prior to their disposal, there was no
documentary evidence supporting the destruction of either bulk
seizure, which

according to FBI policy must include the witnessing of the
destruction by FBI officials. According to written chain of
custody documents, most of the

16 Due to data entry procedures for recording evidence in the
FBI's ACS system which provided our universe of items for
sampling, 19 of the 50 drug items randomly selected for our review
in New York involved different parts of 4 bulk drug seizures; and
8 of the 46 drug items randomly selected for our review in Miami
involved different parts of 5 bulk seizures. In Dallas, our review
included 2 bulk seizures, representing 2 of the 40 drug items
reviewed; and in San Diego, none of the 23 drug items reviewed
involved a bulk drug seizure. 17 Seventeen of the 50 drug items
randomly selected for our review in New York involved different
parts of these two bulk drug seizures.

B-282211 Page 20 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

450 kilograms of cocaine was destroyed on December 19, 1997, and
most of the 320 kilograms of cocaine was destroyed on April 21,
1998. In response to our inquiries regarding the missing
documentation, FBI personnel prepared documents dated November 24,
1998, which described the circumstances of each destruction,
including how, when, and where the destruction took place; persons
witnessing the destruction; and which items were destroyed and
which were retained as evidence. The documents, however, were not
signed or initialed by any of the persons listed as having
witnessed the destruction.

As discussed earlier in this report, we observed a bulk seizure of
approximately 50 kilograms of cocaine in the New York Field Office
that had not been packaged or sealed in accordance with FBI
policy. This bulk seizure also did not have evidence labels
containing signatures of the sealing and witnessing agents.
Similar to the above cases, prior to our visit, there was no
documentation that the U. S. Attorney had been notified in writing
about the bulk seizure. Likewise, although FBI policy requires
written notification of a bulk drug seizure be sent to the U. S.
Attorney

within 5 workdays of the seizure, for the five bulk seizures
involving drug items selected for our review at the Miami Field
Office, this written notification was sent to the U. S. Attorney
after the time specified by policy for three of these seizures
(21, 26, and 89 days, respectively), and

notification letters for the other two seizures were not prepared
or were not provided.

Further, for each of the four bulk seizures that contained drug
items we reviewed in the New York Field Office, photographs of the
evidence did not comply with FBI policy. Specifically, none of the
photographs we were provided showed the (1) names of the seizing
agents, (2) date, time, and place of seizure, and (3) estimated
weight of the total seizure. Also, none of the photographs
contained a measuring device to show a true scale of the evidence.

Internal inspection results provided by the FBI indicate similar
problems have been identified at other field offices. For example,
the inspection team at a field office not selected for our review
reported that the documentation prepared for two drug destructions
provided neither any description of the items destroyed, nor the
initials of the persons who participated in the destruction. An
internal inspection for another field office not selected for our
review found that one exhibit consisting of 30 boxes, that had
been entered into evidence in 1991, had no identifying labels on
the boxes. In addition, the inspection results for another field
office not included in our

B-282211 Page 21 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

review revealed that no bulk seizures held in evidence storage at
the time of the inspection, which included about 250 kilograms of
cocaine, had been photographed as required by FBI policy.

Data Entry of Drug and Firearm Evidence Timely data entry and data
verification are key control procedures that

help ensure that data records are complete and accurate. FBI
policy requires agents to submit documentation related to seized
drugs and firearms to evidence control personnel for entry into
the ACS system within 10 calendar days of seizure. 18 Evidence
control personnel have an

additional 10 calendar days to actually enter the information into
the system. In some field offices, agent personnel directly enter
their own evidence into the ACS system. In such instances, FBI
policy provides that

the agent has 10 calendar days from the date the property is
acquired to enter the information into the ACS system and send
appropriate documentation to evidence control personnel. According
to the policy, agents or evidence control personnel must prepare
memoranda explaining the circumstances surrounding late
submissions or entries, respectively, and copies of these
documents must be maintained in the evidence control room.

We identified a total of 13 out of 229 drug or firearm items we
reviewed at the New York, Dallas, and Miami Field Offices where
evidence control personnel or agents entered evidence in the ACS
system late without the required explanatory memoranda. Nine of
these items were drug exhibits at the New York Field Office, which
were left in the night depository for more than 10 days without
being entered into the ACS system. Four of these nine items were
not properly entered into the ACS system for over 2

months subsequent to the date they were acquired. The other four
items entered late into the ACS system without the required
memoranda explaining the late data entry involved firearm evidence
that was not

submitted for storage by the agent. For each of these four items,
the initial data entry into the ACS system occurred over 40 days
after the items were acquired. Twelve of the 44 FBI field office
internal inspection results we reviewed showed similar problems
involving delinquent submission of evidence or 18 When an
acquiring agent maintains the evidence rather than submitting it
for storage, the agent may submit a data loading form (draft FD-
192) to communicate to the evidence control technician the
information that is to be entered into the ACS system.

B-282211 Page 22 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

late data entry and failure to submit the required explanatory
memoranda. At one field office not selected for our review, the
inspection team determined that 77 percent of the drug items
reviewed were submitted

and/ or processed after 10 days, and the required memoranda
documenting the delinquent submission and/ or processing was not
found in the respective files. The inspection teams for New York
and eight other field offices not selected for our review reported
late submission of evidence, ranging from 6 drug and valuable
items submitted late at one field office to 174 drug items
submitted late at another office. Inspection teams for Dallas and
one other field office not selected for our review reported that
personnel failed to submit the required memoranda explaining the
circumstances for late data entry of drug and valuable items into
the ACS

system. According to these inspection results, about 6 percent of
the evidence examined at the Dallas office, and about 5 percent of
the evidence examined at the other field office, was entered past
the 10- day limit without

the required memoranda explaining the late entries. We also noted
in performing our work at the four selected field offices that the
FBI has procedures to verify information regarding evidence as it
is initially recorded into the ACS system. Specifically, according
to FBI policy, after entering evidence items into the ACS system,
a copy of the automated

record is submitted to the supervisory special agent, primary
relief supervisor, ASAC, or SAC for initialing, and is then filed
in the investigative case file. A Dallas Field Office official
reported that, at this point, the case agent's supervisor is
checking the printed copy for accuracy. In addition, according to
the Dallas official, not only are the entries in the ACS system
verified, but the manual system of storing evidence is also
reviewed by periodic inventories and audits as well as by internal
inspections performed by FBI headquarters about every 3 years.
Further, according to a Miami official, verification of data input
is done when evidence is entered into storage because the evidence
control technician reviews all of the data entered into the ACS
system and compares it to the physical evidence prior to placing
the evidence into storage. Any errors noted at that time are

modified by the evidence control technician. Although the FBI has
these procedures for verifying data input, we identified 15 out of
229 drug or firearm items we reviewed at the Dallas, New York, and
Miami Field Offices that involved discrepancies between
information recorded in the ACS system and information on the
written

chain of custody or the evidence label, which is attached to the
evidence item. These discrepancies involved the acquisition date
of the evidence and the names of acquiring, sealing, or witnessing
agents handling the evidence.

B-282211 Page 23 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Various reasons were provided for these discrepancies, including
that multiple agents had participated in the seizure and packaging
of the evidence, and the information entered into the ACS system
was an error. In addition, we noted one drug item at the San Diego
Field Office was recorded in the ACS system in 1992 with a weight
of 47.3 grams; however, the weight on the item's evidence label
was 473 grams. According to the evidence control technician, this
was a typing error that has been corrected in the ACS system.

Thirteen of the 44 FBI field office internal inspection results we
reviewed, which include the New York Field Office, also documented
instances of incorrect information in the ACS system. For example,
similar to our findings, the inspection results for one field
office not selected for our review listed multiple deficiencies.
The deficiencies identified included (1) the names of the sealing
and witnessing officials listed on the evidence label not
corresponding to the names listed in the ACS system, and (2) the
acquired date and name of the acquiring agent listed on the
written chain of custody form not matching the date and name
listed in the ACS system. In addition, at another field office not
selected for our review, certain information on 48 percent of the
chain of custody forms for drug and

valuable items reviewed by the inspection team did not match
information recorded in the ACS system. Further, the inspection
results for two other field offices not selected for our review
each noted one of the following deficiencies related to this area:
(1) inaccurate disposition records in the ACS system reflecting
destruction of evidence that was found in storage and (2) no
record in the ACS system of final disposition for drugs and
valuable items no longer in storage.

B-282211 Page 24 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Accounting for Drug Quantities

Quantity is a key factor for describing and fully accounting for a
drug item. Thus, it is important for the FBI's inventory records
to clearly show the quantity of each item in storage or custody.
In addition, established thresholds for weight discrepancies and
systematic internal validations of drug amounts can help ensure
that significant unexplained changes in the

quantity of a drug item do not go undetected and unaddressed while
in FBI custody. FBI policy recognizes the importance of
documenting the amount of drugs seized. It requires that two
agents be responsible for ensuring that all drug evidence is
initially weighed using scales capable of weighing in gram
increments, or counted, and recorded on evidence labels before the

evidence is sealed and transmitted to a lab for analysis or placed
in storage. 19 However, we found that the FBI written policies we
were provided had no procedures to identify and address
significant discrepancies between the weight of items recorded on
attached evidence

labels, which should reflect the current weight of the item
including packaging, and the actual weight of the drug item at any
time prior to destruction. 20

19 FBI requires drug evidence, except for certain bulk seizures,
to be weighed when it is initially acquired and submitted as
evidence, as well as each time it is removed, opened, and
repackaged. DEA also weighs drug items sent by FBI for analysis.
After DEA completes a drug analysis, the drugs are repackaged,
sealed, and marked with a DEA gross weight after analysis. Both
the FBI and the DEA weights are placed on the drug item's evidence
label and should include the weight of the drug and packaging. 20
DEA has set 2 grams or 0.2 percent (whichever is greater) as a
threshold for a significant weight variance for drugs in its
custody.

B-282211 Page 25 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Federal financial accounting standards and related supplemental
guidance have highlighted the importance of accurately accounting
for nonvalued seized and forfeited property, including seized
drugs. Specifically, the Statement of Federal Financial Accounting
Standard (SFFAS) No. 3, Accounting for Inventory and Related
Property, issued in October 1993, requires the disclosure of all
material forfeited property, including those items with no
financial value. One such disclosure is an analysis of changes in
seized property, that would include the amount of seized property,
including drugs, (1) on hand at the beginning of the year, (2)
acquired

during the year, (3) disposed of during the year, and (4) on hand
at the end of the year. 21

Recently issued supplemental guidance for SFFAS No. 3 states that
amounts for certain drugs, including cocaine and heroin, should be
based on weight. 22 For example, the standard unit of measurement
for such illegal drugs should be kilograms. In addition, according
to the guidance, material amounts of other seized drugs should be
separately reported by liquid weight, dry weight, number of
tablets, or other appropriate measures.

21 The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) has
recently issued an exposure draft, Seized Property and Forfeited
Assets Systems Requirements (JFMIP- SR- 99- 7, June 1999), that
covers systems requirements for seized property and forfeited
assets. According to the exposure draft, a system component that
covers the custody of seized and forfeited property must have the
capability to provide information to allow the independent
verification that each item of seized property is in the physical
or constructive custody of the government and that the recorded
quantity is accurate.

22 Reporting on Non- Valued Seized and Forfeited Property, Federal
Financial Accounting and Auditing Technical Release Number 4, July
31, 1999, issued by the Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee
(AAPC), which is a permanent committee sponsored by the Federal
Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB).

B-282211 Page 26 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Ninety of the 140 drug items we reviewed for weight variances at
the four selected field offices had differences between weights
recorded on evidence labels and weights we observed when the items
were reweighed by evidence control personnel. 23 The variances we
observed ranged from about 1 gram to 269 grams for the 24 items
that were lighter when reweighed, and ranged from about 1 gram to
3. 9 kilograms for the 66 items that were heavier. Although many
of the variances involved only several grams, we identified at
least one item in each field office where the

observed weight was substantially less than the recorded weight.
24 For example, the weight recorded by DEA on the evidence label
for seized heroin, which was in the custody of the Miami Field
Office, was 541.8 grams. However, the weight we observed was 273
grams, a shortage of close to 50 percent from the DEA- recorded
weight. While field office personnel attributed this weight
discrepancy to weight approximations and

packaging material, it did not appear that any packaging had been
added or taken away after DEA sealed the drug item, listed the
gross weight after analysis on the label, and returned it to the
Miami Field Office. FBI personnel experienced difficulty in
attempting to explain weight discrepancies for certain drug items
we reviewed. For such items, a single obvious cause of the weight
variance was not evident, but multiple factors that could
influence the weight of an item were cited to explain the
difference. For example, the explanation for an observed shortage
of about 13 grams of one drug item in the Miami Field Office
included (1) the agent inadvertently recorded the weight in error,
(2) scales used by the agent may

not have been properly calibrated, and (3) the observed weight did
not include the packaging. While we could not validate or
determine the extent agent error or scale calibration affected the
shortage, all of the items we observed being weighed included
packaging.

23 Fourteen of the 140 drug items we observed being weighed did
not have a weight recorded on the item's evidence label.
Therefore, we could not determine whether there was a weight
variance between the observed weight and the recorded weight on
the label for these 14 items. 24 For each of these items, the
observed shortage was over 50 grams, and these discrepancies
ranged from about 3 percent to about 50 percent of the recorded
weight.

B-282211 Page 27 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Regarding packaging material, FBI policy requires drugs, along
with the original container, to be initially weighed after being
placed in a plastic evidence pouch. However, evidence control
personnel stated that, in many instances, this may not have been
done. Rather, according to these

personnel, in such instances, the evidence was initially weighed
without the evidence pouch. 25 Although there were cases where it
appeared that the weight discrepancy could have been caused by the
weight of packaging material, there were other cases for which all
of the discrepancy could not be explained by the weight of such
material. In such cases, scale calibration

and/ or dehydration or deterioration of the drug was often cited
as a partial explanation of the weight variance. As mentioned
earlier, many of the weight variances we identified involved only
several grams and these differences were often attributed by FBI
officials to scale calibration. FBI field office officials
acknowledged that the FBI does not have a policy regarding the
calibration of scales, and

according to these officials, scales used to weigh drug evidence
are not frequently calibrated. 26 25 Evidence pouches are of
different sizes and weights but typically weigh about 22 grams.

26 DEA requires DEA field office management to ensure that scales
used to weigh drugs are calibrated at least annually.

B-282211 Page 28 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

In addition, one drug item at the Miami Field Office had an
observed weight of 3.9 kilograms more than the FBI- recorded
weight on the box. 27 According to the description of the
evidence, this item involved approximately 11 kilograms of
cocaine; however, the observed weight of the box including the
evidence was 14. 9 kilograms. A Miami FBI official told us that
agents often record the amount of bulk drugs as the number of
kilo- sized bricks. By counting bricks rather than weighing the
evidence, the weight recorded is an estimate, that does not
include the weight of packaging materials, such as the wrappings
on the individual bricks of the drug and the box and tape used to
seal the evidence. 28 When seized drugs are controlled based on
estimated rather than actual weights, the FBI cannot be assured
that the entire quantity of drugs has been placed under prescribed
safeguards.

At the time of our review, FBI policy provided to us did not
define a weight variance threshold covering drug items in FBI
custody. FBI policy requires squad supervisors to prepare a
memorandum of explanation when DEA reports a variance of 1 percent
or more between the initial weight of a drug item submitted for
testing by FBI personnel and the weight observed by DEA upon
receipt. However, we noted that once drug evidence was

packaged and the weight or amount was recorded on the evidence
label, there was no additional FBI requirement to validate the
item's weight subsequent to initial weighing and prior to
destruction.

In addition, prior to our review, there was no requirement for the
weight of a drug item to be recorded in the ACS system. However,
as of November 1998, the ACS system was modified to include a
mandatory data entry field

to capture drug weight. According to the FBI Evidence Program
Manager, the FBI had been developing this modification for about 9
months prior to its implementation. Further, according to other
FBI personnel, no official policy for recording the weight of drug
exhibits in the ACS system has been

written yet; however, FBI field offices have been informally
advised to 27 We did not observe a weight recorded on this drug
item's evidence label. 28 FBI policy provides that bulk drug
seizures, except those consisting of marijuana, must be packaged
in boxes or cartons and each box should be marked with the number
of packages it contains. According to the policy, entire bulk drug
seizures, excluding marijuana, will be submitted to the DEA
laboratory, which will determine the exact weight of the drugs.
For bulk marijuana seizures, however, only a representative sample
is submitted to the DEA laboratory for weighing and analysis. The
policy states that it is imperative that precise weighing
procedures are conducted and documented in bulk marijuana seizures
because enhanced penalties and mandatory minimum sentencing
guidelines are weight- based.

B-282211 Page 29 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

enter the weight in the new drug field while formal policies on
this point are being completed. Although the weight of drug items
are now to be recorded in the ACS system when the item is
initially entered as evidence, there are no procedures in place to
systematically validate the weight of these items while they are
in FBI custody. For example, there is no requirement to validate
the weight of a drug item returned from DEA following analysis.

Further, there is no written requirement to update the ACS system
with the newly established DEA weight. In addition, drug evidence
is not weighed as part of typical FBI inventory or internal
inspection procedures. Consequently, although the weight of the
drug item will be recorded in the ACS system, it may not represent
the most current weight recorded on the item's evidence label,
which reduces the FBI's accountability over such drug evidence.

Conclusion The FBI has established numerous policies and
procedures to control and safeguard drug and firearm evidence in
its custody. However, based on our work at the four FBI field
offices and results of the FBI's most recent

internal inspections of its field offices, specific actions are
needed to address concerns with certain physical safeguards over
drugs and firearms and strengthen accountability over such
evidence. Such actions will help reduce the potential for theft,
misuse, or loss of drug and firearm evidence and, therefore, the
risk of evidence being compromised for federal prosecution
purposes while in FBI custody. Further, certain actions pertaining
to providing adequate ventilation for drug vaults and certifying
that firearms are rendered safe prior to storage will help ensure
a safe and healthy environment for FBI personnel.

Recommendations We recommend that the Attorney General require
that the Director of the FBI take the appropriate steps to
reinforce FBI field offices' adherence to

existing FBI policies regarding  handling and storage of drug
evidence, including sealing drug items in accordance with FBI
policy using appropriate labeling procedures and storing evidence
in an orderly manner to avoid damage to stored items;  adequate
exterior ventilation being afforded to all drug vaults;

B-282211 Page 30 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

 rendering firearms safe, including having a firearms instructor
sign and date the certification on the chain of custody prior to
evidence control personnel accepting the firearm for storage;
written chain of custody forms always including a barcode number
or

case number and exhibit number; a signature; and the date, time,
and reason for custody transfer of evidence from one party to
another;  Charge- Out Reports being prepared and reconciled at
intervals required

by policy;  field office personnel, in accordance with
requirements set forth in

policy, preparing and sending written notification of bulk drug
seizures to the U. S. Attorney within 5 workdays of the seizure,
preparing and maintaining documentary evidence supporting the
destruction of drug evidence, and taking adequate photographs of
bulk seizures;  drug and firearm evidence being entered into the
ACS system within

established time frames or, for evidence entered after the time
frame allowed by FBI policy, proper documentation explaining that
the late data entry was completed by evidence control personnel or
agents and was reviewed by appropriate supervisory officials; and
field office personnel weighing seized drugs in accordance with
FBI

policy, with the weight to include the original container and any
packaging material used to seal the evidence.

We also recommend that the Attorney General require that the
Director of the FBI review actions taken by the New York Field
Office to determine if such actions will adequately alleviate the
overcrowded conditions in the drug vault; ensure that all drug
items in storage are properly packaged, sealed, and labeled; and
ensure that the contents of the night depository are routinely
removed in accordance with FBI policy.

In addition, we recommend that the Attorney General require that
the Director of the FBI review existing policy to determine
whether current procedures for verifying evidence information
entered into the ACS system are adequate, or if the policy should
be modified to include additional procedures to enhance the FBI's
ability to detect and prevent data entry errors.

Further, we recommend that the Attorney General require that the
Director of the FBI modify existing FBI policy to include  a
requirement to weigh all seized drugs, including bulk seizures, on

properly calibrated scales;

B-282211 Page 31 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

 guidance establishing thresholds for defining significant weight
discrepancies of drug evidence;  procedures for identifying and
addressing such discrepancies; and  guidance for updating records
in the ACS system to reflect identified

changes in the weight of drug evidence. Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that while
the information contained in the draft was, for the most part,
factually accurate, it did have some concerns about the report's
conclusions and recommendations. The FBI also had concerns about
the report's focus that are discussed in further detail in
appendix II. Nevertheless, the FBI stated

that it plans or has already taken actions relating to four of our
key recommendations, namely, our recommendations to modify
existing policy related to the weighing of drug evidence, and our
recommendation to review actions taken by the New York Field
Office to address various internal control deficiencies.

The FBI stated that our recommendations to modify existing policy
related to the weighing of drug evidence were well- founded and
discussed actions that will be taken. Specifically, agents will be
required to check the

recorded weight of all drug evidence retrieved from any laboratory
to identify any significant weight discrepancies from the original
weight, and that any discrepancies in weights that fall outside a
normal expected range resulting from testing procedures will be
investigated and the results documented in an investigative file.
The FBI also concurred with our recommendation regarding the
calibration of scales and stated that it is currently revising
policy to require that all seized drugs, including bulk seizures,
be weighed on properly calibrated scales. While the FBI neither
concurred with or took exception to our recommendation to modify
existing policy to include guidance for updating records in the
ACS system

to reflect identified changes in the weight of drug evidence, it
is important to note that, at the time of our review, there was no
written requirement to update the ACS system for any such changes.
Consequently, the weight recorded in the ACS system may not
represent the most current weight recorded on the item's evidence
label, thus reducing the FBI's accountability over such drug
evidence. The FBI stated that it has already taken action
regarding our recommendation to review steps performed by the New
York Field Office to address various internal control
deficiencies. On September 2, 1999, we

provided our draft report, including recommendations, to the
Department

B-282211 Page 32 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

of Justice for comment. According to the comments we received from
the FBI, the New York Field Office's Evidence Program was
reinspected in September 1999, and that inspection found that the
New York Field Office

had appropriately addressed the issues identified in the FBI's
previous inspection. However, the FBI also stated that the
inspectors issued additional instructions to the New York Field
Office to further assist the office in ensuring full compliance
with all evidence policies and procedures. We were not provided
specifics as to the results of the September inspection; however,
the FBI noted in its comments that the field office had relocated
the drug control room to a larger facility, had resealed and
repackaged every drug item, and addressed issues regarding the
night depository, all of which were included in our
recommendation.

The FBI disagreed with our recommendation concerning the need to
reinforce adherence to certain existing FBI policies. The FBI
stated that recordkeeping issues we identified which were also
found during its own

internal inspections do not, in the aggregate or otherwise,
suggest inadequate accountability over drug evidence given the
overlapping internal control procedures in place. The FBI also
stated that it believes that we used the findings identified
during its own internal inspections to extrapolate systemic
inadequacies in the FBI's Evidence Program, regardless of the
circumstance or materiality. The FBI emphasized that maintaining
appropriate physical safeguards and ensuring accountability is an
ongoing process as new policies and procedures are continually

implemented and new employees are continuously introduced to
evidence procedures.

We believe that our recommendation to reinforce FBI field offices'
adherence to certain existing FBI policies is valid. As stated in
our report, FBI policy requires the establishment of strict,
documented accountability for drug evidence because of the
intrinsic value of such evidence. Several of the issues discussed
in this report, which we consider to be of a more

severe nature, involved deficiencies in accountability controls
for drug items at one or more of the locations we visited where we
did not identify overlapping controls that compensated for the
deficiencies. For example, during our review, we identified
various deficiencies in required chain of

custody documentation at the four field offices, including the
omission of either the time or date of a custody change, the
reason for the change, or the current location or status of the
drug evidence. Strict documentation on the chain of custody is a
key internal control over seized drugs and firearms because
custody of such evidence can change several times from seizure to
disposition and the document must be able to withstand defense
challenges

B-282211 Page 33 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

during judicial proceedings. In another example, we found that
only one of the four selected field offices had typically
generated Charge- Out Reports every 2 weeks as required by policy.
Charge- Out reporting is an important

internal control procedure the FBI uses to routinely verify
whether agents who have custody of specific drug or firearm
evidence need to continue to hold the evidence or return it to
storage. No overlapping control was

evident to us at any of the four selected field offices that could
routinely detect and/ or prevent drug or firearm evidence from
being inappropriately maintained outside FBI storage facilities.

Further, as stated in our report, 13 of 44, and 10 of 44 FBI field
office internal inspection results we reviewed identified
deficiencies in the chain of custody and problems related to
Charge- Out Reports, respectively. Consequently, such deficiencies
and problems are not isolated concerns involving only a few field
offices. The above noted findings along with the

fact that FBI, as stated in its comments to our report, is
continuously implementing new policies and introducing new
employees to evidence procedures and that such changes undoubtedly
will cause some confusion and noncompliance with operating
standards, supports the need for reinforcement of the existing FBI
policies listed in our recommendation.

The FBI also stated that it does not concur with our
recommendation to review existing policy to determine whether
current procedures for verifying evidence information entered into
the ACS system are adequate, or if the policy should be modified
to include additional procedures to enhance the FBI's ability to
detect and prevent data entry errors. As noted in the report,
during our review, we identified 15 out of 229 drug or firearm
items at three FBI field offices that involved discrepancies
between

information recorded in the ACS system and information on the
written chain of custody or the evidence label. In addition, 13 of
the 44 internal inspection results we reviewed also documented
instances of incorrect

information in the ACS system. As such, a review of existing
policies and procedures concerning verifying information entered
into the ACS system is justified.

This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal
agency is required by 31 U. S. C. 720 to submit a written
statement on actions taken on these recommendations. You should
submit your statement to the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform within 60
days of the date of this report. You must also send a written
statement to the House and Senate Committees on

B-282211 Page 34 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Appropriations with the agency's first request for appropriations
made over 60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Fred Thompson,
Senator Joseph Lieberman, Representative Dan Burton,
Representative Henry A. Waxman, Representative Stephen Horn, and
Representative Jim Turner in their capacities as Chair or Ranking
Minority Member of Senate or House

Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this
report to Louis J. Freeh, Director of the FBI; Robert L. Ashbaugh,
Acting Inspector General, Department of Justice; and the Honorable
Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies
will be made available to others upon request. If you have any
questions regarding this report, please contact me at (202) 512-
3406. Key contributors to this assignment were Kenneth Rupar,
Linda Sanders, and Ellen Wolfe.

Sincerely yours, Gary T. Engel Associate Director Governmentwide
Accounting and

Financial Management Issues

Page 35 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Page 36 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Appendix I Scope and Methodology Appendi x I

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials from FBI
headquarters and four selected field offices concerning the
processes and procedures that are used to physically safeguard
seized drugs and firearms and to account for such evidence
completely and promptly. We requested all pertinent FBI policies
and procedures and were provided and reviewed

various sections from the FBI's Manual of Administrative
Operations and Procedures and Manual of Investigative Operations
and Guidelines related to handling drug and firearm evidence.
Based on discussions with FBI headquarters officials and a review
of staffing levels for the 56 field offices, we selected two of
the largest field offices-New York, New York and Miami, Florida-
and two smaller sized offices-Dallas, Texas and San Diego,
California-as locations to perform our work. According to FBI
officials, due to the location and size of the field offices, each
of them typically involves a significant volume of drug and
firearm seizures.

At each of the four field offices, we observed the location and
condition of storage facilities and other physical safeguards
including cameras, motion detectors, combination locks, and video
monitors that the field offices had put into place to control
access to and use of drug and firearm evidence. We also asked FBI
personnel about the operation of the physical safeguards. However,
due to the sensitive nature of the evidence, we did

not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of
specific physical safeguards because we did not want to risk
compromising any of the evidence that may be needed for
prosecution purposes. Also, we did not perform security
assessments of the interior of the drug vaults because FBI policy
prohibits non- FBI personnel from entering the vaults beyond
designated thresholds. However, we were able to accomplish our
objectives because we could see most of the contents of the vaults
from these thresholds.

In addition, we performed specific tests on selected drug and
firearm evidence items. To determine whether the four selected FBI
field offices maintained adequate accountability for recently
acquired drug and firearm evidence and properly safeguarded the
evidence subsequent to seizure, we selected a random sample of
drug and firearm items that each office

entered into the FBI's ACS system between October 1, 1997, and
August 31, 1998. Based on the size of the universe of drug and
firearm items entered into the ACS system during this period, we
statistically sampled the following number of cases at each
location: New York-50 drug items and

36 firearm items; Miami-46 drug items and 33 firearm items;
Dallas-40 drug items and 24 firearm items; and San Diego-23 drug
items and 20 firearm items. For selected items, our tests included
determining whether (1) the

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

ACS system accurately recorded the description and location of the
item, (2) the chain of custody document was complete, and (3) for
those items in storage at the field office, the item was properly
packaged, sealed, and labeled. In addition, we judgmentally
selected 10 of the drug items at each location, observed evidence
control personnel weigh each of the 10 items, and compared the
observed weight to the weight recorded by FBI or DEA personnel on
each item's evidence label. For this procedure, we judgmentally
selected items that involved various types and amounts of drugs.

To further test the field offices' accountability for acquired
drug and firearm evidence, we obtained for each office a list of
drugs and a list of firearms in inventory as of or near the date
of our visit. We selected 10

items from each drug and firearm inventory list and for each item
verified that it was in storage. We also selected 15 items from
each of the drug vaults and firearm storage areas and traced the
items to the appropriate inventory lists to verify that the items
were recorded in a complete manner. For each of these 25 drug
items selected at each location, we also observed

FBI personnel weigh the item and compared the observed weight to
the weight recorded on the item's evidence label. Each of the drug
and firearm items was judgmentally selected based on one or more
of the following: the length of time in storage, the type of
evidence, and the specific location of the evidence in the drug
vault or evidence control room. We selected items

that had been in storage for long periods of time because of the
inherent risk associated with long- term storage. We also selected
different types of drug and firearm evidence, such as marijuana
and cocaine, and handguns and rifles, respectively. In addition,
we selected drug and firearm items from a variety of locations
within each drug vault or evidence control room.

Appendix I Scope and Methodology

Page 38 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected field
offices are indicative of more systemic concerns, we requested a
copy of the section of the most recent FBI Internal Inspection
Report for each FBI field office that covers procedures and
internal controls over seized drugs and

firearms. FBI provided the results of Evidence Program Audits for
44 FBI field offices. We reviewed these documents which detail
deficiencies identified during those offices' most recent internal
inspections. 1 These 44 inspections were performed between June
1996 and June 1999. Because we received the documents near the end
of our fieldwork, we did not

follow- up with each of the field offices to determine the extent
actions had been taken to correct noted deficiencies.

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards from August 1998 through August
1999. We requested written comments on a draft of this report from
the Attorney General or her designee. The Assistant Director for
FBI's Office of Public and Congressional Affairs provided us with
written comments, which are

discussed in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section and
are reprinted in appendix II.

1 The FBI provided copies of (1) electronic communications sent to
41 field offices, and (2) documentation that summarizes the
inspection results for 3 other field offices which detail
deficiencies, and associated instructions and recommendations,
related to drugs and

firearms that were identified by Evidence Program Audits conducted
during recent internal inspections. According to the FBI Chief
Inspector, there were no evidence findings resulting from the most
recent inspections at the other 12 FBI field offices.

Page 39 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Appendi x II

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear
at the end of this appendix.

See comment 1. See comment 2.

See comment 3.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 40 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1. See comment 4. See comment 5. See comment 5.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 41 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 6. See comment 7. See comment 8.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 42 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 8. See comment 9.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 43 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1. See comment 10.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 44 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1. See comment 11. Now on p. 26.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 45 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 12. Now on p. 28.

See comment 4.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 46 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

See comment 1. See comment 1.

See comment 6. See comment 1.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 47 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

The following are GAO's comments on the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's letter dated November 22, 1999. GAO Comments 1.
See Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section.

2. In our notification letter to the Assistant Attorney General
for Administration, dated July 31, 1998, informing him of our
work, we stated that as part of our review of the status of
Justice's Asset Forfeiture Program, we were initiating a review of
seized drugs and weapons at the FBI. We stated in the letter that
the focus of the effort would be on controls over the seizure,
storage, and disposition of drugs and weapons.

During our initial meetings at FBI headquarters, FBI officials
questioned the purpose and focus of our review, expressing the
concern that the control of seized drugs and firearms at the FBI
was a function of the Evidence Program rather than the Asset
Forfeiture Program. At each of these meetings, we explained to FBI
officials that seized property, including items such as drugs and
firearms, is subject to forfeiture and we

therefore would be considering such activity when updating our
assessment of the Asset Forfeiture Program high- risk area.
Recognizing this fact and that seized drugs and firearms typically
remain in the custody of the seizing agency until approved for
final disposition, effective controls over such evidence are
needed to help ensure that such items are not compromised. Because
the Evidence Program at the FBI is responsible for safeguarding
and accounting for such evidence, it became the focal point of

our work instead of the Asset Forfeiture Program.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 48 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

As stated in our report, Justice operations, including those at
the FBI, often involve the seizure, custody, and disposition of
evidence that (1) may be subject to forfeiture and (2) can remain
in the seizing agency's custody for significant amounts of time
due to long- term investigations. We also state in our report
that, as we reported in January 1999, although some improvements
have been made to the Asset Forfeiture Program operated by
Justice, significant problems remain and continued oversight is
necessary to ensure that policies and procedures are followed and
that adequate safeguards are in place. 1 Our High- Risk Series of
reports, which is updated every 2 years and was most recently
issued in January 1999, noted

that the federal government faces difficult problems managing a
reported $1. 8 billion in property seized by Justice and the
Department of the Treasury as of September 30, 1997. 2 We
specifically stated that Justice had reported that its asset
forfeiture information systems had been inadequate for tracking
the life cycle of an asset from its seizure through its ultimate
disposition. We also noted that, in September 1998, the Justice
Inspector General reported that at most of the Immigration and
Naturalization

Service Border Patrol stations his staff visited, they found
problems with the management of seized drugs. The High- Risk
Series report, however, did not include the specific issues
concerning FBI seized drugs and firearms identified in this report
because we had not completed our fieldwork at the time the High-
Risk Series report was issued. 3. The FBI correctly noted that our
review did not include an evaluation of the internal review of the
Evidence Program routinely conducted by the FBI's Office of
Inspections, nor was there any review of the FBI's follow- up

procedures to determine whether deficiencies identified during
these inspections had been fully addressed. The purpose of our
review was to identify and assess the FBI's internal controls
related to seized drugs and

firearms. As noted in our report, we used the results of the FBI's
internal inspections to supplement our own findings and further
illustrate that they may be indicative of more systemic concerns.
In addition, we did not receive the internal inspection results
for the majority of the 56 FBI field offices until August 1999,
which was near the end of our fieldwork. Therefore, we did not
follow- up with each of the field

1 Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of
Justice (GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1999). 2 High- Risk Series: An
Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 49 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

offices to determine the extent to which actions had been taken to
correct noted deficiencies.

4. The FBI stated that it feels our draft report materially
overstates potential weaknesses in internal controls over drug and
firearm evidence, and inappropriately concludes that there are
risk factors affecting access and accountability of drugs and
firearms which simply do not exist. We disagree. Our report does
not address potential weaknesses in internal controls, but rather
reports on internal control deficiencies we found during our
review. Our conclusions are based on our observations and

findings as documented throughout this report. The FBI's statement
that risk factors affecting access and accountability of drugs and
firearms simply do not exist at the FBI is not consistent with
other statements in its comments on this report as well as with
the results and its own characterization of its ongoing internal
inspections.

Specifically, the FBI stated that in 1999, a policy was
implemented to require self- inspections by the field offices
every 18 months, and the Evidence Program is one of the areas to
receive this additional scrutiny. The FBI also states that this
new review process was designed as an

additional detection system whereby field office management could
more effectively and promptly identify and resolve problems within
their own areas of responsibility. In addition, the FBI states
that it takes general exception to the overall conclusion and tone
of the report. We believe that our overall conclusion is balanced
and adequately supported by our findings that are documented
throughout the report. Our conclusion acknowledges that the FBI
has

established numerous policies and procedures to control and
safeguard drug and firearm evidence, and we state that based on
our work at the four FBI field offices and the results of the
FBI's most recent internal inspections of its field offices,
specific actions are needed to address concerns with certain
physical safeguards over drugs and firearms and to strengthen
accountability over such evidence. The tone of the report is
neutral and objective, and in fact, we believe that some of the
FBI's

comments present a more negative picture of the control
environment than can be found in our report. For example, FBI's
comments state that the New York Field Office was found to have
material deficiencies in its Evidence Program, and that
mismanagement and inadequate training

produced a litany of serious deficiencies. Our report does not
characterize the deficiencies we identified as serious or
material. Instead, our report provides the observations we made
during our visit to the New York Field

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 50 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Office, states the reasons for the deficiencies noted and the
corrective actions taken according to New York Field Office
officials, and recommends that the FBI review these corrective
actions.

5. We agree that the FBI shows determination to identify and
correct deficiencies in its own Evidence Program. As stated in the
report, the FBI has established numerous policies and procedures
to control and safeguard

drug and firearm evidence in its custody, and as an added control
over field operations, each field office is supposed to receive an
internal inspection every 3 years. However, field office internal
inspections performed on a rotating basis every 3 years are not a
substitute for ongoing initiatives to keep accountability records
current and accurate. Instead, inspections

serve as a barometer of the success of the FBI's efforts to carry
out its policies and procedures on an ongoing basis. Therefore, in
order to strengthen physical safeguards and improve
accountability, it is necessary to reinforce adherence to the
existing policy requirements we included in our recommendation.

6. The FBI's internal inspection findings are cited throughout our
report to supplement our own findings and illustrate that they may
be indicative of more systemic concerns. Although we did not
identify any similar problems at the four FBI field offices we
visited, we thought it significant that 24 of the 44 internal
inspection results we reviewed documented one or more physical
safeguard concerns, including evidence control rooms with no
bureau- approved intrusion detection system, motion detector, or
alarm;

inadequate locking systems; and instances of improper access
including an unauthorized employee accessing the evidence control
room or an evidence control technician having sole access to the
evidence control room. However, we did not include in our report
any specific recommendation to address these internal control
deficiencies as identified by the FBI's internal inspections
because these circumstances were not evident at any of the four
FBI field offices we visited. Further, the scope of our review was
designed primarily to determine whether weaknesses in

controls existed that increase the risk that evidence could be
lost, stolen, or misused or compromised for federal prosecution
purposes. It was not our intent to specifically determine whether
the evidence had in fact been lost, stolen, or misused or
compromised.

7. The FBI states that overlapping controls and procedures have
been established to ensure adequate safeguards even if one or more
of the internal controls are lacking. We disagree. Although
multiple controls have been designed to safeguard the evidence, if
one or more controls are not

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 51 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

effectively implemented, the FBI's ability to safeguard evidence
will be diminished. As such, the FBI's own internal inspection
process requires all identified deficiencies to be corrected. Each
of the internal controls play an important role in safeguarding
evidence from inappropriate access, and we did not identify any
redundant controls to fully compensate for deficiencies we cited
in this report.

The FBI further states that in the cases cited from the internal
inspection findings, there was no indication that (1) evidence had
been lost, stolen, or misused; (2) any case was jeopardized
because of chain of custody issues; or (3) any evidence control
rooms were without a locking system, monitored by at least one
surveillance camera, and/ or entry was controlled

by dual access. We believe these statements are not accurate or
are misleading. First, as stated in our report, inspection
auditors at the New York Field Office had to discontinue efforts
to complete a 100 percent physical inventory of drug items due to
time constraints, and at the time of discontinuance, 79 of 1,625
drug items could not be physically located or otherwise accounted
for by evidence control personnel. Second, while we agree that the
internal inspection results we were provided did not mention

any case that was jeopardized because of chain of custody issues,
we were also not provided any documentation showing that this was
an issue considered or evaluated during the internal inspections.
And third, although no internal inspection findings cited
instances of evidence control rooms that had no locking system,
seven inspections found inadequate locking systems for evidence
storage areas, including no keyless entry or no dual locking
system as required by FBI policy. In addition, as stated in our
report, seven inspections cited instances involving improper
access to

evidence control rooms by FBI personnel, such as an unauthorized
employee accessing the evidence control room unaccompanied by the
evidence control technician, or an evidence control technician
having sole access to the drug and valuable evidence control room.

8. Our report states that at seven field offices not selected for
our review, inspection teams determined that access logs were
either not used or were not being properly completed by persons
entering the evidence control rooms. We did not report this as a
programwide concern and, because we

did not identify this as an internal control deficiency at any of
the four field offices we visited, did not make a specific
recommendation to address this issue. The FBI states that given
the number of access logs that it maintains and

the sheer number of entries made into the logs, errors will be
made. The

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 52 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

comments also note that there is no basis for suggesting that
evidence is tainted or that other items in the evidence control
room are in jeopardy merely because information is missing from
access logs. They said that the FBI compensates for such
administrative lapses through overlapping controls and procedures
that enable responsible officials to maintain accountability. We
disagree. Complete and accurate information on access

logs is necessary to track persons entering evidence control areas
to ensure only those persons approved for access and with valid
reason for access are allowed to enter the secured areas and
handle evidence. Not using or properly completing access logs
decreases the FBI's ability to safeguard evidence in its custody,
and we did not identify any overlapping controls to substitute for
or diminish the importance of this internal control. 9. We
recognize that the placement of drug items in storage boxes within
the evidence control room serves as a layer of protection against
loss;

however, improperly sealed, wrapped, labeled, or stored drug items
diminish the FBI's ability to protect the evidence against
unauthorized access. Similar to the two internal inspections that
cited instances of damaged or open storage boxes which allowed
access to drugs, during our review at one field office, we
observed one drug evidence package that was

leaking and one bulk drug seizure comprised of approximately 50
kilograms of cocaine that had not been packaged or sealed in
accordance with FBI policy. Although the FBI purports that the
absence of this protection in some instances for a limited period
of time hardly suggests weaknesses in internal controls, this bulk
drug seizure that we observed

was stored in two large seed bags in the same state in which it
had been acquired for over 1 year. A strict adherence to existing
FBI policies regarding sealing, labeling, and storing drug
evidence will strengthen the FBI's ability to guard against the
risk of loss, theft, or misuse of the evidence. 10. Our primary
objective in testing the controls over the safeguarding of
firearms was to determine whether control procedures existed and
were being followed. The scope of our testing did not include
determining if the

firearms themselves were rendered safe. FBI policy requires
firearms to be examined and rendered safe by a firearms instructor
prior to being accepted for storage by evidence control personnel,
with the firearms instructor signing and dating a certification
that this examination was performed. During our review at the four
FBI field offices, 18 of the 113 firearms selected for our sample
did not fully comply with this policy.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 53 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

Areas of noncompliance involved 3 firearms in storage that lacked
certification that the weapons had been rendered safe; 4 firearms
that were certified as rendered safe, but the certifications were
dated after the date

the firearms had been accepted for storage; and 11 other firearms
that had been certified as rendered safe, but the certifications
were not dated. These examples of noncompliance form the basis for
our recommendation that the FBI reinforce adherence to existing
FBI policies regarding rendering

firearms safe, including having a firearms instructor sign and
date the certification on the chain of custody prior to evidence
control personnel accepting the firearm for storage. The FBI's
comment that the basis for our recommendation appears to stem from
our findings in two offices related

to a total of three firearms that lacked required information on
associated chain of custody documents is incorrect. The particular
examples cited in the FBI's comments are found in the report to
document various deficiencies in chain of custody documentation,
not as examples of the

inadequate documentation certifying the examination and rendering
safe of firearms. 11. We do not agree that our recorded weight of
a drug item at the Miami Field Office was incorrect. We did not
weigh the drug items ourselves. Instead, we observed FBI personnel
weigh the evidence and recorded the results of their weighing
activity. This process included two GAO personnel observing an FBI
official placing each drug item on a scale, repeating the observed
weight to the FBI official to obtain agreement, and one GAO

member recording the weight on a data collection instrument while
the other GAO member present reviewed the recorded information.

For one drug item at the Miami Field Office, the DEA recorded
weight on the evidence package was 541. 8 grams, while the weight
we observed was 273 grams. During our visit, we asked the field
office officials to explain this discrepancy. Their written
response included that the weight variance was the difference of
the weight of the drug item sealed and the weight of the item
without packaging as recorded by DEA. However, during a subsequent
meeting involving these officials, we pointed out that the DEA

recorded weight on the drug item included packaging, so the
explanation provided was not reasonable. We were then told by an
FBI official that the weight of 541.8 grams may have been recorded
in error by DEA. However, other than the statement in the FBI's
comments to the report, we had not been provided any additional
explanation or documentation pertaining to this weight
discrepancy, and at no time was there any discussion that we may
have recorded the weight in error.

Appendix II Comments From the Federal Bureau of Investigation

Page 54 GAO/AIMD-00-18 Seized Drugs and Firearms

12. Another drug item we observed at the Miami Field Office
consisted of a sealed box that was marked as 11 kilograms and was
described in the ACS system as 11 kilograms. Our observed weight
of this drug item was 14. 9 kilograms; however, this weight was
not recorded on the box or in the description of the item found in
the ACS system. As stated in our report,

according to a Miami FBI official, agents often record the amount
of bulk drugs as the number of kilo- sized bricks. By counting
bricks rather than weighing the evidence, the weight recorded is
an estimate that also does not include the weight of packaging
materials, such as the wrappings on the individual bricks of the
drug and the box and tape used to seal the

evidence. The FBI recognizes that referring to the size of a drug
item rather than the actual weight of the item may be problematic
and that the term package should be used in lieu of kilogram
unless referring specifically to the

item's weight, and we agree. However, we continue to believe that
recording estimated package sizes rather than actual weights
diminishes the FBI's assurance that entire quantities of drugs are
placed under prescribed safeguards. The FBI's concurrence with our
recommendation to modify existing policy to require that all
seized drugs, including bulk seizures, be weighed on properly
calibrated scales will help to alleviate potential problems
associated with recording the number of packages comprising a drug
item rather than the actual weight of the evidence including
packaging. (901785) Lett er

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