Seized Drugs and Weapons: DEA Needs to Improve Certain Physical
Safeguards and Strengthen Accountability (Letter Report, 11/30/1999,
GAO/AIMD-00-17).

As part of its asset forfeiture operations, the Justice Department often
seizes and stores evidence--including drugs and weapons--that is later
used by federal prosecutors. In fiscal year 1998, the Justice
Department's Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reported that its agents
seized more than 275,000 kilograms of illegal drugs. Each of the four
DEA laboratories and division offices GAO visited had physical
safeguards in place that, if used effectively, could help control access
to and use of drug and weapon evidence. However, GAO found instances of
inadequate packaging of drug and weapon evidence and overcrowded drug
vaults that could increase the risk of theft, misuse, and loss.
Moreover, GAO found that some requirements, such as chemists' returning
drug evidence to a vault within five working days after analysis and
laboratories destroying drugs within 90 days of receiving authorization,
were not always met. GAO also found weaknesses in DEA's accountability
over drug and weapon evidence, including (1) incomplete and missing
documentation, such as chain of custody documentation; (2) inaccurate
recordkeeping of drug and weapon evidence; and (3) improper accounting
for drug weights, including unverified and unexplained weight
differences in drug exhibits. DEA's internal inspection teams also
reported instances of missing documentation and improper recordkeeping
in their reports covering inspections done from 1996 through 1998. In
commenting on this report, DEA officials said that the problems GAO
cited do not appear to be systemic in nature and affected areas in which
redundant controls are in place to ensure the integrity of evidence at
all times. GAO disagrees with DEA and identifies several even more
severe issues plaguing all, or almost all, of the locations GAO visited
and for which redundant controls did not exist to compensate for the
deficiencies.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  AIMD-00-17
     TITLE:  Seized Drugs and Weapons: DEA Needs to Improve Certain
	     Physical Safeguards and Strengthen Accountability
      DATE:  11/30/1999
   SUBJECT:  Drugs
	     Weapons
	     Law enforcement agencies
	     Law enforcement information systems
	     Inventory control systems
	     Internal controls
	     Accountability
	     Federal records management
	     Data integrity
	     Search and seizure
IDENTIFIER:  DOJ National Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Program
	     Dallas (TX)
	     Miami (FL)
	     New York (NY)
	     San Diego (CA)
	     DEA System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
	     DEA Non-Drug Evidence System
	     DEA Laboratory Evidence Management System

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GAO/AIMD-00-17

Report to the Attorney General

November 1999

SEIZED DRUGS AND WEAPONS

DEA Needs to Improve Certain Physical Safeguards and Strengthen
Accountability
*****************

*****************

GAO/AIMD-00-17

Letter                                                                     3

Appendixes

Appendix I:Scope and Methodology

                                                                         28

Appendix II:Comments From the Drug Enforcement Administration

                                                                         31

Table 1:  Seized Drug Activity for the Year Ended September 30, 19988

AAPC    Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee

ATF     Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

DEA     Drug Enforcement Administration

DOJ     Department of Justice

FASAB   Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board

FBI     Federal Bureau of Investigation

JFMIP   Joint Financial Management Improvement Program

NEDS    Non-Drug Evidence System

OIG     Office of Inspector General

SFFAS   Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard

STRIDE  System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice 
Drug Enforcement Administration's Laboratory Operations (DOJ OIG, 95-18,
May 1995) and Retention of Drug Evidence in Drug Enforcement
Administration Laboratories (DOJ OIG, 
The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program (JFMIP) has recently
issued an exposure draft, Seized Property and Forfeited Assets Systems
Requirements (JFMIP-SR-
                                                 Accounting and Information
                                                        Management Division

B-283521

November 30, 1999

The Honorable Janet Reno
The Attorney General

Dear Madam Attorney General:

Since 1990, we have periodically reported on government operations that we
have identified as "high risk" because of their greater vulnerabilities to
waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. One of these operations is the
asset forfeiture program operated by the Department of Justice (DOJ). 
As we reported in January 1999, although some improvements have been made
to the program since we first designated it as a high-risk program in
1990, significant problems remain and continued oversight is necessary to
ensure that policies and procedures are followed and that adequate
safeguards are in place./Footnote1/

Related to asset forfeiture, DOJ operations often involve the seizure,
custody, and disposition of evidence that is used by federal prosecutors. 
A critical support function is controlling evidence to help ensure that
federal cases are not compromised or weakened by challenges made by the
defense about the existence, completeness, or handling of evidence, or its
ties to defendants. Seized property, including items such as drugs and
weapons, are subject to forfeiture and typically remain in the custody of
the seizing agency until they are approved for final disposition. In
fiscal year 1998, DOJ's Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) reported
that its agents seized over 275,000 kilograms/Footnote2/ of illegal drugs.

This report focuses on DEA's controls over seized drugs and weapons. There
is an inherent risk of theft, misuse, and loss of drugs and weapons due to
the fact that such evidence typically has a market or "street" value. In
addition, evidence can remain in DEA custody for significant amounts of
time due to long-term investigations. Another factor increasing the risk
is changes in the custody of the evidence as DEA often conducts its
operations with other law enforcement agencies, which can result in
evidence being transferred from one agency to another. 

Given this inherent risk, our audit objectives were to determine whether
DEA (1) put in place physical safeguards to control access to and use of
drug and weapon evidence and (2) maintained adequate accountability over
such evidence. To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials
from DEA headquarters and selected division offices and laboratories
concerning various aspects of the seizure, storage, and disposal of seized
drugs and weapons. We reviewed DEA's Laboratory Operations Manual and
Agents Manual for policies and procedures pertaining to the processes used
to seize, account for, safeguard, and dispose of drugs and weapons. Based
on documentation provided by DEA headquarters, we selected four division
offices and corresponding laboratories with large volumes of drug seizure
activity-Dallas, Texas (South Central Laboratory); Miami, Florida
(Southeast Laboratory); 
New York, New York (Northeast Laboratory); and San Diego, California
(Southwest Laboratory)-to perform testing of these policies and procedures. 

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected division offices
and laboratories are indicative of more systemic concerns, we (1) reviewed
reports issued by DOJ's Office of Inspector General (OIG) related to
laboratory operations/Footnote3/ and (2) requested and reviewed a copy of
the sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection reports for 20 of
DEA's 21 division offices/Footnote4/ and for the 8 laboratories that cover
procedures and internal controls related to seized drugs and weapons.
These inspections were performed from March 1996 through August 1998.
Because we received the sections of the internal inspection reports near
the end of our fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the division offices
or laboratories to determine the extent to which noted deficiencies had
been corrected. According to DEA officials, the reported deficiencies have
been addressed; however, as noted throughout this report, we identified
instances where weaknesses similar to those included in the internal
inspection reports existed at the locations we visited. 

We performed our work in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards from August 1998 through August 1999. See appendix I
for a more detailed discussion of our scope and methodology. We requested
written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney General or
her designee. The Acting DEA Administrator provided written comments which
are discussed in the "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation" section of this
report and reprinted in appendix II. DEA also provided technical
suggestions or supplemental information that we took into consideration
while finalizing our report.

Results in Brief

Physical safeguards over drug and weapon evidence, which include adequate
storage facilities and control procedures, are essential for guarding
against theft, misuse, and loss of such evidence and securing it for
federal prosecutors. Each of the four laboratories and division offices we
visited had physical safeguards in place, that, if operated effectively,
would help control access to and use of drug and weapon evidence. However,
we found instances of inadequate packaging of drug and weapon evidence and
overcrowded drug vaults that could increase the potential for theft,
misuse, and loss. Further, we found that certain requirements, such as
chemists returning drug evidence to the vault within 5 working days after
analysis and laboratories destroying drugs within 90 days of receiving
authorization to destroy, were not always met. Similar issues were
reported in the internal inspection reports provided to us by DEA that
covered DEA inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998.

Drug and weapon evidence must also be accounted for completely,
accurately, and promptly to help ensure that such evidence is not
compromised for federal prosecution purposes and is protected against the
risk of theft, misuse, or loss. Based on our visits to four selected DEA
laboratories and division offices, we found weaknesses related to DEA's
accountability over drug and weapon evidence. The weaknesses included (1)
incomplete and missing drug evidence documentation, including chain of
custody documentation, (2) inaccurate recordkeeping of drug and weapon
evidence, and (3) improper accounting for drug weights, including
unverified and unexplained weight differences in drug exhibits. For
example, DEA policy requires that chemists verify the weight of drug
evidence against the weight reported by the submitting agent upon receipt
of the evidence and obtain a witness' verification if a difference above a
certain threshold exists. For 28 of the 86 drug exhibits we reviewed that
had weight discrepancies above the threshold set forth in DEA's policy,
chemists did not obtain the appropriate verification before opening and
analyzing the evidence. 

DEA's internal inspection teams also reported instances of missing
documentation and improper recordkeeping in their reports covering
inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998. Notwithstanding
these problems, DEA officials at the four laboratories and division
offices we visited were able to locate each item selected for our testing
that was in storage in evidence vaults or warehouses, and for those items
not in storage, they provided documentation supporting the current
location or the status of the item. We are making recommendations to
address the above issues. 

In commenting on this report, DEA concurred that the accountability and
safeguarding of evidence is of critical importance and said it will take
the appropriate steps to reinforce its adherence to existing policies or
to implement new policies relating to 11 of our 12 recommendations.
However, DEA stated that issues identified in the report do not appear to
be systemic weaknesses and were found in areas where redundant controls
are in place to ensure the integrity of evidence is maintained at all
time. We disagree with DEA and, as discussed in this report, identified
several issues which we consider to be of a more severe nature at all, or
almost all, of the locations that we visited and for which redundant
controls did not exist to compensate for the deficiencies. In addition,
DEA officials indicated that the reported deficiencies identified by their
internal inspections performed prior to our review had been addressed.
However, as noted throughout this report, we identified weaknesses that
were the same or similar to ones identified during DEA's internal
inspections.

Further, in several comments related to the significance of certain
discrepancies, DEA stated that all exhibits of drug evidence examined by
GAO were found to be in a sealed condition. However, certain conditions
identified by us during our testing and included in this report diminish
the effectiveness of DEA's sealing of evidence procedures.

Background

DEA plays a leading role in combating the production and distribution of
illegal drugs. Under DOJ, DEA's mission is to enforce controlled substance
laws and bring individuals and organizations that violate these laws into
the justice system. To carry out its mission, DEA operates 21 domestic
division offices and 77 foreign offices in 56 different countries. DEA
also has eight laboratories located throughout the country, that conduct
drug analyses for DEA and other law enforcement agencies and maintain
thousands of exhibits from investigations. 

In fiscal year 1998, DEA reported that its agents seized over 275,000
kilograms of drugs, including marijuana, cocaine, and heroin (see table 1)
and approximately 280,000 kilograms were maintained at DEA facilities as
of September 30, 1998./Footnote5/ When drug evidence is seized, the agent
maintains custody of the drugs until sending them either via mail or hand
delivery to the laboratory for testing. Agents seal, label, and weigh the
drug evidence, as well as assign consecutive exhibit numbers to such
evidence acquired under a given case number. All drug evidence seized in
DEA-controlled investigations must be submitted to a DEA laboratory for
safekeeping and analysis. If the seizure involves over 10 kilograms of
marijuana, only a sample amount is sent to the laboratory, with the
remainder being stored in a secured area by the division offices. For
large "bulk" narcotics seizures, DEA informs the appropriate U.S.
Attorney's Office in writing within 5 days that amounts above a certain
threshold will be destroyed after 60 days from the date notice is provided
of the seizure, unless a written request not to destroy the excess is
received./Footnote6/ 

Table****Helvetica:x11****1:    Seized Drug Activity for the Year Ended
                                September 30, 1998

--------------------------------------------------------------------------
| (in kilograms)    :             :            :            :            |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Drug type         :   Beginning :  Additions :  Deletions :    Ending  |
|                   :     balance :            :            :   balance  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Marijuana         :      29,536 :    239,515 :    195,288 :    73,763  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Cocaine           :     196,722 :     31,649 :     38,704 :   189,667  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Heroin            :       1,989 :        364 :        687 :     1,666  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Methamphetamine   :       3,857 :      1,217 :        771 :     4,303  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Other             :      10,991 :      3,377 :      4,630 :     9,738  |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Total             :     243,095 :    276,122 :    240,080 :   279,137  |
--------------------------------------------------------------------------

Source: Aggregate figures for bulk and nonbulk drugs from DEA's Annual
Financial Statement Fiscal Year 1998.

Drug evidence may change hands several times from seizure to disposition,
particularly if another agency is involved or if the evidence is presented
in court. Upon receipt at the laboratory, an evidence technician takes
custody of the drugs, verifies that the seals are intact, assigns each
exhibit a laboratory identification number, and stores it in a vault for
safekeeping. The evidence technician also enters the receipt of the drug
evidence into DEA's Laboratory Evidence Management System, which produces
a bar code to be used for inventory purposes. Within 3 days of receipt,
information about the evidence is also required to be entered into DEA's
drug database, the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
(STRIDE). STRIDE is used to track evidence submitted to the laboratories
from receipt to destruction and for statistical purposes. Supervisors
assign the exhibits to specific chemists for analysis. Chemists then check
out the drugs from the vault, verify that the seals are intact, weigh and
analyze the drug evidence, and then return it to the vault. The results of
the analysis are required to be documented on a forensic chemist worksheet
(DEA 86). DEA policy states that evidence should normally be returned to
the vault within 5 working days after the analysis report is prepared.
After analysis, STRIDE is updated to reflect the test results. 

Evidence received from other agencies, such as the U.S. Customs Service
(Customs) or the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), is returned to
that agency after DEA has completed its analysis. DEA drug evidence
remains stored in the laboratory's vault until the laboratory director
receives approval from the division office for destruction. Upon receiving
approval for destruction, DEA policy requires that the drugs be disposed
of within 90 days. Drugs are disposed of periodically at a commercial
incinerator. 

Agents also seize weapons, including rifles, handguns, knives, and
ammunition and maintain them in vaults within division and field offices.
An evidence technician takes custody of the weapons from the seizing agent
and enters the receipt into DEA's Non-Drug Evidence System (NEDS), which
produces a bar code for inventory purposes. Weapons are maintained in a
vault until destroyed, forfeited, transferred to another agency, or
returned to the owner./Footnote7/

To help ensure that policies and procedures are followed and that evidence
is properly safeguarded and accounted for, the DEA Office of Inspections
and the Office of Forensic Sciences performs internal inspections at each
laboratory and division office approximately every 24 months. These
inspections include a review of field operations including those
pertaining to safeguarding and accounting for drug and weapon evidence.
After the completion of the inspection, a report detailing the findings
and recommendations is issued to division or laboratory management, which
must then submit a memorandum to the Chief Inspector within 90 days of
issuance, noting any corrective actions completed or planned. The reports
remain open until all corrective actions are completed.

DEA Needs to Improve Safeguarding of Drug and Weapon Evidence

Physical safeguards, which include adequate storage facilities and
procedures, are needed to reduce the risk of theft, misuse, or loss of
drug and weapon evidence and help ensure that evidence is not compromised
for prosecution purposes. In addition, physical safeguards can promote a
safe working environment for DEA personnel. The four laboratories and
division offices included in our review have physical safeguards in place
that if operating properly help control access to and use of drug and
weapon evidence. However, we identified some weaknesses, including storage
problems, which could affect DEA's ability to properly safeguard drug and
weapon evidence. In addition, we found that certain required procedures
involving drug evidence were not met. DEA's internal inspection reports
noted similar weaknesses in the safeguarding of drug evidence. 

Physical Safeguards
-------------------

DEA's evidence vaults and other designated secure areas used to store drug
and nondrug evidence must meet certain requirements as established by DEA,
DOJ, and the General Services Administration. The requirements include
construction specifications and standards for locks, locking devices, and
access control systems. At each of the four laboratories and division
offices, we observed the location and condition of evidence vaults and
other designated secure areas and noted that drug and nondrug evidence was
segregated in separate areas as required by DEA policy. We also observed
physical safeguards, including cameras, motion detectors, and combination
locks that are in place to control and monitor access to and use of drug
and weapon evidence. However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence,
we did not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of the
specific physical safeguards because we did not want to risk compromising
any of the evidence that may be needed for prosecution purposes. For
example, while we observed employees entering keypad access codes to
obtain entry, we did not attempt to obtain unauthorized entry into
controlled areas.

Based on our visits to the four selected locations and our review of DEA's
internal inspection reports, we noted some weaknesses with DEA's physical
safeguards. Specifically, at the South Central Laboratory in Dallas, we
were informed that two cameras inside the drug evidence vault, which
monitor vault activity, were not operational. In addition, DEA's policy
allows for short-term storage of bulk seizures in detention cells;
however, we noted that the Dallas Division Office was using a detention
cell for long-term storage for bulk marijuana. In one example, three boxes
of marijuana were stored in the detention cell from May 1996 until January
1998. Also, the internal inspection report for the Northeast Laboratory in
New York indicated that a vault alarm system had not functioned properly
for several years. An official at DEA headquarters indicated that the
inspection report did not clearly state the problem and that the alarm was
working properly but was not connected to the division office alarm system
as required. The official indicated that the alarm was subsequently fixed.
To confirm this, we asked for the more recent inspection report for this
laboratory, but as of the completion of our fieldwork, it had not been
provided to us. 

Storage of Drugs and Weapons 
-----------------------------

During our visits to drug and weapon evidence vaults at the laboratories
and division offices, we noted instances of improperly stored evidence.
For example, at the laboratories, we noted evidence packaging that was
deteriorating and overcrowded evidence vaults. At the division offices, we
also noted improperly sealed weapons. Weaknesses such as these have
previously been reported by the DOJ OIG and by DEA's inspection teams. 

Unsealed and damaged evidence packaging and overcrowded evidence vaults
increase the potential for theft, misuse, and loss of evidence and that
such evidence could be compromised for federal prosecution purposes. Due
to space constraints in the drug evidence vaults at two of the four
laboratories we visited, we observed boxes that had been stacked on the
floor such that the lower boxes were being crushed. As the DOJ OIG
reported in 1996, the storage of exhibits on vault floor space is not
recommended because "cluttered vault aisles can be hazardous and make
retrieving and accounting for exhibits more cumbersome and time-
consuming." In 1995, the DOJ OIG also reported that the vault storage
space was insufficient at the same two laboratories where we noted
overcrowding. 

We also observed exhibits where the packaging or the tape used to seal
boxes was deteriorating or had already deteriorated to the point that the
box was open, increasing the potential for access to the contents. For
example, at one location, we observed a punctured evidence bag containing
approximately 2 kilograms of heroin. At another location, we observed a
cocaine exhibit for which the gross weight after analysis was unknown
(i.e., not recorded on the box, in the file, or in STRIDE), being stored
in a box that was in poor condition. Officials agreed that such items
should be repackaged. At the bulk marijuana warehouse maintained by the
New York Division Office, we observed that several bags of a 9,000-pound
seizure were worn, increasing the potential for access to the contents. 

An internal inspection report for one laboratory, not included in our
review, also identified improperly stored drugs. Specifically, the
internal inspection found that the laboratory had stored drug and nondrug
evidence within the same vault, which is not in compliance with DEA
policy. Also, the inspection teams identified one resident office, a
smaller office within a division office, that did not have an overnight
drop safe to store seized drugs, as required by DEA policy. 

For safety purposes, DEA policy requires that firearms be carefully
unloaded by the agent most familiar with the weapon and sealed in an
evidence bag. While conducting our inventory testing of 78 weapons, we
observed two handguns that had not been sealed in evidence bags as
required. We also observed one seizure of knives that had not been sealed
properly. Specifically, the knives were stored within a zipper bag that
could be easily opened. Weapons that are not sealed properly can create
unsafe conditions for DEA personnel, as well as for others who may require
access to the evidence.

We noted that, while not required by DEA policy, but similar to a Bureau
of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) policy, many of the handguns we
observed had a plastic strip inserted through the chamber, further
rendering the firearm safe./Footnote8/ In addition, unlike FBI policy,
DEA's policy does not require written certification from a firearm
instructor ensuring that the firearm has been rendered safe./Footnote9/
Although DEA agents are not required to take these additional steps,
formalizing such requirements would provide further safeguards that
firearms are rendered safe. 

Timeliness of the Performance of Certain Required Actions 
----------------------------------------------------------

The DOJ OIG reported in 1995 that chemists took an average of 15 days to
return exhibits to the vault after analysis and indicated that even taking
7 days appeared to be excessive. Based on an OIG recommendation, DEA
policy was revised to require that drug evidence normally be returned to
the vault within 5 working days after analysis. During our visits to four
selected laboratories, we found that for 20 of the 216 laboratory items we
selected, where the chemists had completed their analysis and prepared the
related report, the chemists had retained evidence for an average of 10
working days. Seventeen of the 20 cases occurred at the South Central
Laboratory in Dallas, and in one instance, the chemist maintained an
exhibit for 34 working days. A laboratory official could not explain why
this exhibit was not returned promptly. Promptly returning evidence to the
vault ensures that the chemists do not maintain evidence for excessive
amounts of time in an area more accessible than the vault.

DEA policy also requires that drug evidence be destroyed within 90 days of
receiving approval to do so from the division office. We found that 1 of
16 exhibits we tested, which were being maintained by the laboratory and
had been approved for destruction, had not been destroyed within the 90
days required by DEA policy. This exhibit had been authorized for
destruction but was not destroyed until over 5 months after approval was
obtained. Timely destruction of drugs authorized to be destroyed conserves
limited vault space, allows agents to close the related case files
promptly, and eliminates the additional inherent risk of theft of these
drugs that are no longer needed as evidence. 

According to DEA policy, DEA has 5 days in which to notify the U.S.
Attorney's Office that amounts above certain thresholds for bulk seizures
will be destroyed after 60 days from the notification date unless a letter
requesting DEA to maintain the drugs is received from the U.S. Attorney's
Office. The letters notifying the U.S. Attorney's Office of DEA's intent
to destroy the amounts above certain thresholds and the response letters
from the U.S. Attorney's Office with justification for not destroying
these amounts were not provided for two of the five exhibits we tested in
which letters should have been included in the file. In another instance,
the U.S. Attorney's Office had been notified; however, the 60-day deadline
passed in February 1998 and the evidence had not yet been destroyed as of
our visit in October 1998. Ensuring that U.S. Attorney's Offices are
promptly notified and that responses are received from them for not
destroying evidence needed for prosecution purposes allows DEA to quickly
destroy unneeded evidence and conserve limited vault space. 

Internal inspection reports identified similar deficiencies at 3 of the 
8 laboratories, which include the Southeast and Northeast Laboratories,
and at 4 of the 20 division offices, which include the Dallas and New York
Division Offices. For example, one laboratory, not included in our review,
was not always destroying evidence within the required 90 days after
notification that the seized item was approved for destruction. Other
examples included chemists not returning exhibits to the vault within the 
5 working day time frame, and seized drugs being stored in a temporary
overnight storage location for over 1 year.

Accountability Over Drug and Weapon Evidence Needs Strengthening

We identified weaknesses over the accountability of drug and weapon
evidence that could increase the potential for theft, misuse, or loss of
such evidence, and that such evidence could be compromised for federal
prosecution purposes. Although the division offices and laboratories had
policies and procedures designed to ensure accountability over drug
evidence, they did not always follow them. During our visits, we noted 
(1) incomplete and missing documentation over drug evidence, including
chain of custody documentation, (2) weaknesses in recordkeeping of drug
and weapon evidence, and (3) weaknesses in accounting for drug weights,
including unverified and unexplained weight differences in drug exhibits.
Notwithstanding these problems, evidence control personnel at the four
laboratories and division offices we visited were able to locate each item
selected for our testing that was in storage in evidence vaults or other
secure areas, and for those items not in storage, they provided
documentation supporting the current location or status of the item. For
example, if the exhibit had previously been destroyed, we were provided a
copy of the DEA form authorizing the destruction and showing signatures of
the DEA personnel who witnessed the destruction. 

Maintaining Documentation
-------------------------

During our testing, we identified laboratory and evidence custodian files
that were missing documentation, including chain of custody documentation,
or contained incomplete documentation. We also identified evidence labels
that were missing witness signatures. DEA policy requires that complete
and accurate documentation, such as the Report of Drug Property Collected,
Purchased, or Seized (DEA 7), forensic chemist worksheets (DEA 86), and
forms (DEA 12) used to transfer evidence to other parties (e.g., court,
another federal agency), be maintained in the seizure files. These forms,
along with evidence accountability records (DEA 307) maintained in a
separate area within the vault, are used to document transfers of evidence
and provide a chain of custody for the evidence. For bulk seizures, the
laboratory files must also contain photographs of bulk seizures submitted
to the laboratory. Photographs provide visible proof of the evidence in
the event that drugs over certain threshold amounts are destroyed. In
addition, DEA policy requires that two agents be involved in the seizure
and sealing of evidence and that they both sign an evidence label. Having
a witness to the seizure and the sealing of critical evidence is important
to prevent any one individual from having uncontrolled access to evidence. 

Upon receipt of evidence at the laboratory, the evidence custodian is
required to sign the DEA 7, which is prepared by the submitting agent,
accepting receipt of the evidence. The evidence custodian is not required
to reweigh the evidence, but must examine the seals and check a box on the
form indicating whether the evidence seals are intact. We found
substantial compliance with the policy, but noted a few exceptions. For
example, 3 of the 236 DEA 7s we reviewed were missing the checkmark
indicating whether the seals were intact and one was missing the evidence
custodian's signature. The internal inspection report for one division
office, which was

not included in our review, stated that numerous deficiencies were noted
in documenting the chain of custody on the DEA 7 form./Footnote10/

DEA 86s are used by chemists to record all raw data, observations, and
calculations regarding their analysis of drug evidence. They are also used
to document which chemist received the evidence, whom the evidence is
physically received from, and gross weights before and after analysis,
among other items. After the form is prepared, a supervisory chemist is
required to review the form. Our review of the DEA 86s noted a few
exceptions. Specifically, the worksheets were missing from 2 of 216
analyzed exhibits in our sample and 3 of the worksheets were missing the
reviewer's initials. Four of the eight DEA laboratory internal inspection
reports, including the Southwest Laboratory, also identified instances in
which there were errors in the completion of this form. Not being able to
locate these forms or incorrectly completed forms could require a chemist
to break the original chemist's seal and reanalyze evidence--perhaps years
after the initial analysis. In addition, certain information reported only
on the form, such as the gross weights before and after analysis, would be
unknown. 

DEA 12s are required to be maintained in the laboratory case files if drug
evidence is transferred to individuals outside of the laboratory. The
individual receiving custody of the evidence is required to sign the form
and return it to DEA for inclusion in the laboratory file. According to
DEA policy, the signature of a witness must be obtained when the evidence
is transferred to a non-DEA official, such as a Customs or FBI agent. We
found that the files for 10 of the 77 exhibits in our laboratory sample
that had been transferred to an individual outside the laboratory were
missing a transfer form. In addition, the laboratories were inconsistent
in obtaining witness signatures on these forms. At the Southwest
Laboratory, officials told us that they did not require Customs agents to
provide a witness signature due to the large volume of exhibits they
analyze for Customs 
(i.e., over 300 exhibits could be picked up on a given day). Additionally,
an internal inspection report for one of the laboratories, not included in
our review, also found examples of missing DEA 12s. Having the recipient's
acknowledgement of receipt is critical for documenting the transfer of
custody and the recipient's acceptance of responsibility for the evidence. 

DEA policy also requires that photographs of bulk seizures be maintained
in laboratory files. Photographs provide visible evidence of drugs that
may be destroyed prior to the trial of a case and may be used in lieu of
transporting drugs to court. Two of the four bulk seizure laboratory files
we reviewed were missing the required photographs. The drugs for one of
these seizure cases had already been destroyed. In another example,
photographs were missing for a 50-kilogram seizure because it had been
split into five exhibits, so that no one exhibit was considered bulk. In
addition, DEA internal inspection reports for three laboratories,
including the Southeast and Southwest Laboratories and the San Diego
Division Office, indicated that 11 of 43 bulk seizure cases reviewed were
missing the required photographs. Ensuring that photographs are taken and
maintained in the file can reduce unnecessary transporting of drug
evidence to court and could allow for earlier destruction of bulk evidence. 

DEA policy requires that two agents be involved in the seizure and sealing
of evidence and that they both sign an evidence label. During our testing,
we noted instances where the required witness signature was missing from
the evidence label. Specifically, 4 of the 142 drug exhibits we weighed,
as well as 8 out of 72 weapons we selected for testing and observed, were
missing the required witness signatures on the evidence labels. Officials
were unable to explain why the required signatures were missing. Having a
witness to the seizure and the sealing of critical evidence is important
to prevent any one individual from having uncontrolled access to evidence. 

Recordkeeping 
--------------

DEA uses various information systems and logbooks to account for drug and
weapon evidence. During our testing, we noted errors and inaccuracies in
certain data in the systems used to account for both drug and weapon
evidence and the logbook used to account for bulk marijuana. DEA's
internal inspection teams reported similar weaknesses with the
recordkeeping of drug evidence. Maintaining complete and accurate records
is essential for ensuring that evidence is properly accounted for and
reported on. 

Federal financial accounting standards and related supplemental guidance
have highlighted the importance of accurately accounting for nonvalued
seized and forfeited property, including seized drugs. Specifically, the
Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standard (SFFAS) No. 3,
Accounting for Inventory and Related Property, issued in October 1993,
requires the disclosure of all material forfeited property, including
those items with no financial value. One such disclosure is an analysis of
changes in seized property that would include the amount of seized
property, including drugs (1) on hand at the beginning of the year, (2)
acquired during the year, (3) disposed of during the year, and (4) on hand
at the end of the year./Footnote11/

Recently issued supplemental guidance for SFFAS No. 3 states that amounts
for certain drugs, including cocaine and heroin, should be based on
weight./Footnote12/ For example, the standard unit of measurement for such
illegal drugs should be kilograms. In addition, according to the guidance,
material amounts of other seized drugs should be separately reported by
liquid weight, dry weight, number of tablets, or other appropriate
measures. 

The evidence system used to track nondrug evidence, including weapons,
contained inaccurate data even though annual inventories were being
performed with no outstanding exceptions being documented. DEA policy
requires annual inventories of all nondrug evidence; however, we
identified 6 of 78 sampled items at three of the four division offices we
visited where weapons were included on the inventory listing but DEA
officials were unable to locate them in the evidence vault. Only after DEA
personnel conducted research were they eventually able to explain all of
the discrepancies and provide us with supporting documentation. In some
cases the weapon had already been destroyed; in others, the weapon had
been transferred. For example, at the Miami Division Office, two of the
weapons were destroyed in July 1995, while another was transferred to the
U.S. Marshals Service in 1993. These weapons still appeared on the
office's inventory listing as of October 1998 even after the division
office officials indicated that annual inventories had been conducted. 

In another instance at the Miami Division Office, we were unable to
physically observe a firearm because the evidence custodian was unable to
locate the firearm at the time of our visit. The custodian subsequently
informed us that the firearm had been packaged for transfer to another DEA
office and provided us with photographs that DEA represented was of the
firearm. Additional documentation was provided supporting the transfer and
receipt of the firearm; however, we noted that the contents of the
package, listed as "3 guns, money, and jewelry" was recorded on a copy of
the Federal Express packaging slip, which was attached to the outside of
the package. According to DEA policy, the nature of the contents should
not have been specified on the packaging slip. 

We also noted errors in the logbooks used to account for evidence
maintained in the bulk marijuana storage facilities at two division
offices. For 3 of the 15 bulk storage items selected for testing at the
San Diego Division Office, inaccurate case numbers were recorded in the
logbook when the drugs were initially brought into the storage area and
then the proper case number was recorded when the drugs were removed. This
inconsistent recording makes it more difficult to track the amount of
drugs that should be in the facility at any given time and to link the
drugs to the case number they are associated with. The responsible
division office official could not explain why the agents were using
incorrect case numbers and stated that she would take action to address
this issue. At the Dallas Division Office, a logbook entry was taped over
and not marked through and initialed as required by DEA policy. Properly
marking through and initialing the entry allows others to determine who
made the change and whether the original entry was no longer appropriate. 

Other discrepancies were found with the data in the laboratories' STRIDE
system. This system is used to provide statistical and other program
information related to drug seizures. Data from the DEA 7, as prepared by
agents, is required to be entered into STRIDE within 3 working days of
receipt of the evidence. In most cases, the information was not entered
within 3 working days. DEA officials attributed this to staffing shortages
and other priorities. Once the analysis is completed by a chemist, STRIDE
is required to be updated to record the results of the analysis and again
when the evidence is transferred or destroyed. Out of the 236 laboratory
files we reviewed, we found 15 instances where the data in STRIDE did not
agree with the supporting documentation. In 6 of the 15 instances, STRIDE
was not updated to reflect correct weight information. Ensuring that data
are promptly and correctly entered into STRIDE provides program managers
with more accurate and useful information. 

DEA's internal inspection reports also highlighted recordkeeping problems
at 2 of the 8 laboratories, the Northeast and Southeast Laboratories, and
3 of the 20 division offices, all of which were not included in our
review. For example, the Northeast Laboratory, after conducting an
inventory of its vault, experienced "a large number of discrepancies" when
reconciling its STRIDE inventory report to the DEA 307s. The inspection
report relating to this laboratory also stated that, "[a]s a result of the
noted deficiencies, which involved numerous items of evidence not
accounted for, a PR [Office of Professional Responsibility] investigation
was initiated." Because we received the sections from the internal
inspection reports near the end of our fieldwork, we did not follow-up
with the laboratory to determine the results of this investigation. 

DEA's internal inspection reports also noted problems at two division
offices not included in our review involving the logbook used to account
for items in the bulk storage facility. At one location, it was reported
that the individual responsible for the drug evidence was "not maintaining
his record keeping and tracking system in compliance with DEA policies as
delineated in the DEA Agents Manual, Section 6662. Although several log
books were present, IN [Office of Inspections] determined that all drug
evidence was tracked in one bound ledger, which contained gaps in time
exceeding seven years." At another division office, the report stated that
"there were inaccurate entries in the drug logbooks. Both drug logbooks
contained inconsistent descriptions of the drug exhibits seized and
submitted, which coupled with a lack of case numbers and submitted
weights, created the appearance that drug exhibits may have been lost."
According to a DEA official, corrective actions have been taken to address
these issues. 

Accounting for Weights of Drug Exhibits
---------------------------------------

According to DEA policy, for control purposes and because of mandatory
minimum sentencing laws, all weights for drug exhibits should be
determined as precisely as possible. Properly documenting the weights at
different stages (i.e., upon receipt or after analysis) and resolving
discrepancies is critical if the exhibit is used as evidence in court and
for decreasing the potential for theft. We found weaknesses with the
recorded weights of drug exhibits, from the initial seizure by the agent
through destruction by the laboratory. Specifically, we found instances
where 
(1) agents improperly recorded weights on the DEA 7, (2) chemists did not
obtain a witness' verification for weight differences, (3) DEA did not
always require that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer
drugs for safekeeping, (4) chemists improperly recorded weights on the DEA
86 after analysis, and (5) unexplained weight differences occurred. 

DEA policy requires agents to be properly trained in the use of scales and
to weigh drug evidence after sealing and prior to submission to the
laboratory. The gross weight of the exhibit is recorded on the DEA 7 to
the nearest tenth of a gram if under 1 kilogram and to the nearest gram if
over 
1 kilogram. We found instances where agents inappropriately rounded or
recorded the number of packages seized instead of the weight. In one
example, an agent recorded that 6 "kilos" or bricks of cocaine had been
seized and submitted to the laboratory, not the actual weight (7.75
kilograms as recorded by the chemist). In another example, the agent
recorded that 25 kilograms of hashish oil was seized and submitted to the
laboratory, instead of recording the weight to the nearest gram as
required by DEA policy. Since the agent did not record the weight to the
nearest gram, a significant difference could exist and not be detected.
For example, the weight recorded to the nearest gram for this exhibit
could range from 24,500 grams to 25,499 grams. Inaccurate recording of
drug weights decreases DEA's accountability over such evidence.

During our testing we noted that drug evidence is not required to be
weighed by the laboratory upon receipt, but just prior to analysis by a
chemist. The evidence may remain in the vault for several months before it
is analyzed. Prior to breaking the seals, chemists are required by DEA
policy to verify that the weight of drug evidence agrees with the agent's
submitted weight for the drug evidence. If there is a difference of more
than 2 grams or 0.2 percent from the agent's submitted weight, whichever
is greater, the chemist is required to obtain verification of the weight
difference from a supervisor or another chemist who must then initial next
to the chemist's recorded weight designating that the verification was
performed. 

In 1995, DEA's Administrator disagreed with an OIG recommendation that
exhibits be weighed immediately upon receipt at the laboratory. The
Administrator stated that the laboratory should ensure that the evidence
is properly sealed and that "policy and procedure permit any discrepancy
in gross weight to be addressed administratively at any time prior to
breaking the seal." However, of the 216 analyzed exhibits in our sample,
the chemist did not obtain the required written verification for 28 of the
86 drug exhibits that met the criteria for verification. The differences
ranged from just over 2 grams to 1.75 kilograms (about one-fifth of the
exhibit's total weight). Obtaining independent verification when
differences exist ensures that possible arguments over such differences by
the defense or the submitting agent are mitigated. It also decreases the
potential that the difference could be subjected to theft and not be
detected. For the 28 exhibits we reviewed with differences and no witness
verification, the time frames for receipt of evidence by the laboratory to
when the chemist weighed the exhibit ranged from 1 week to over 5 months.

During our testing, we also noted instances where the weights of drug
exhibits were not recorded on the forms used to document the transfer of
drugs to a division office or to a laboratory. DEA policy requires the
gross weight of bulk marijuana to be thoroughly documented, but does not
specifically require that this information be provided to the evidence
custodian upon transfer to bulk storage facilities at the division
offices. In a bulk marijuana exhibit we selected for testing, we were only
able to verify that the quantity (12 boxes and 1 container) agreed to the
quantity recorded on the form used to transfer the evidence. There was no
weight recorded in the file maintained by the evidence custodian or in the
logbook. Also, at the laboratories we visited, we noted that weights were
not always recorded on the forms used by several non-DEA agencies when
submitting exhibits to a DEA laboratory for analysis. The agencies
included local police departments, ATF, and Customs. DEA policy does not
require non-DEA agencies to record weights on the forms used to transfer
exhibits, therefore chemists are unable to determine if there is a
difference between the submitted weight and the new weight that would
require a witness verification. Further, the policy does not require that
chemists obtain a witness' verification if the weight is not recorded on
the transfer form. Not documenting weights on the forms used to transfer
drugs for safekeeping and/or requiring that chemists obtain a witness'
verification for exhibits that do not contain a recorded weight on the
transfer form decreases DEA's accountability over such evidence. 

Once the chemist performs the analysis on the exhibit, DEA policy requires
the chemist to record the gross weight of the exhibit after it is resealed
to the nearest tenth of a gram if the weight is between 10 and 1,000
grams, and to four significant figures if greater than 1,000 grams (e.g.,
2,013 grams, 327.0 kilograms). However, the weights for 8 of the 142
exhibits we physically observed were inappropriately rounded by the
chemist (7 of the

8 occurred at the Southeast Laboratory)./Footnote13/ In one example, the
chemist recorded the gross weight after analysis as 7.1 kilograms, instead
of recording the weight to 4 significant figures. Not recording the weight
more precisely could result in undetected theft of the difference due to
rounding. There was one instance in which we could not compare our
observed weight for a particular exhibit to the recorded gross weight
after analysis because the chemist recorded the combined weight of four
exhibits together and not for each exhibit. DEA officials agreed that the
weights should have been recorded for each exhibit, particularly since one
exhibit could be destroyed before the others. As noted above, inaccurate
recording of drug weights decreases DEA's accountability over such
evidence. 

We also noted instances where DEA officials were unable to account for or
explain differences between recorded weights and our observed weights.
These differences ranged from a few grams to over 11.35 kilograms (about
25 pounds). Of the 142 items we reweighed at the laboratories, our
observed weight for 40 of the items was more than 5 grams over or under
the chemist's recorded gross weight after analysis. 

DEA officials told us that scientific research has been performed and
documented as to why certain drugs are susceptible to weight changes. 
For instance, weight gains are typically due to moisture absorption by
certain drugs, such as cocaine and heroin. They stated that losses for
certain other drugs, such as marijuana and cocaine base, are usually the
result of the drugs losing moisture as they dry. However, 7 of the 40
items with weight differences did not follow the above trends and 2 of
these items occurred on exhibits that had been authorized for destruction.
Specifically, at the Northeast Laboratory, we weighed one cocaine exhibit
that was no longer needed as evidence and was about to be destroyed, and
determined that it was about 50 grams/Footnote14/ less than the gross
weight recorded by the chemist a few weeks before our visit. At the
Southeast Laboratory, one cocaine exhibit had been analyzed 3 years prior
to our testing and the weight for this exhibit had decreased by 6 percent,
approximately 300 grams. In another example at the same laboratory, the
gross weight after analysis of a cocaine exhibit decreased by over 200
grams, even though additional materials, three plastic bottles and bubble
wrap, were added to the exhibit prior to resealing. Laboratory officials
at both sites were unable to specifically explain the lower weights for
these three exhibits, but indicated that other factors, such as humidity
or temperature changes within the vault, could result in weight
differences that did not follow the above trends.

The largest difference was noted at the bulk storage facility maintained
by the Miami Division Office, where a marijuana exhibit weighed about 
25 pounds less than (or about half) the weight recorded when the drug was
received at the site. Although both the agent and the evidence custodian
had verified and initialed the receiving weight in this case, DEA
officials agreed that the decrease in weight seemed excessive, but were
unable to provide a specific explanation for the difference. 

Conclusion

DEA has established numerous policies and procedures to control and
safeguard drug and weapon evidence in its custody. However, based on our
work at four division offices and laboratories and the results of DEA's
internal inspections performed from March 1996 through August 1998,
specific actions are needed to strengthen accountability over and
safeguarding of drug and weapon evidence. Such actions will help reduce
the potential for theft, misuse, or loss of drug and weapon evidence and
the risk of evidence being compromised for federal prosecution purposes
while in DEA custody. 

Recommendations

We recommend that the Attorney General require that the DEA Administrator
take the appropriate steps to reinforce DEA's adherence to existing DEA
policies regarding 

o properly storing bulk marijuana evidence in designated approved areas
  and sealing weapons in evidence bags;

o destroying drugs promptly to alleviate overcrowded drug evidence vaults
  and reduce the additional risk of theft since these drugs are no longer
  needed as evidence; 

o chemists returning drug evidence to the evidence vault promptly after
  analysis so that the evidence is not maintained for excessive amounts
  of time in a more accessible area than that of the vault;

o requiring that two signatures be recorded on evidence labels prior to
  acceptance by laboratory and division office evidence custodians;

o maintaining complete and properly reviewed documentation in the
  laboratory seizure files and promptly entering accurate information
  into STRIDE; 

o identifying any discrepancies-between evidence maintained in the vault
  and the location of evidence per the Non-Drug Evidence System-during
  annual inventories and promptly researching the discrepancies and
  updating the appropriate records;

o not specifying the contents on packaging slips when using commercial
  carriers;

o maintaining complete and accurate information in bulk marijuana
  logbooks; and

o chemists and agents recording weights in accordance with DEA policy and
  chemists obtaining an independent written verification if weight
  differences, over the DEA established threshold, exist between the
  weight of drug evidence reported by the agent and that weighed by the
  chemist.

Further, we recommend that the Attorney General require that the DEA
Administrator modify existing DEA policy to include guidance for 

o agents to obtain a written certification from an independent party
  experienced in handling firearms that firearms and other weapons being
  submitted for storage in the vault are rendered safe prior to being
  stored; 

o requiring that if a DEA 12 is used to transfer bulk marijuana (1) the
  weight be recorded on the DEA 12 or (2) a copy of the DEA 7 be provided
  to the evidence custodian; and 

o requiring that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer non-
  DEA exhibits to a laboratory prior to acceptance by the evidence
  custodian and/or requiring that chemists obtain a witness verification
  if no weight is recorded on the transfer form.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In commenting on a draft of this report, DEA concurred that the
accountability and safeguarding of evidence is of critical importance and
that we are right to point out the inherent risk involved in monitoring
the integrity and accountability of evidence. DEA indicated that it will
take the appropriate steps to reinforce its adherence to existing policies
or to implement new policies relating to 11 of our 12 recommendations. DEA
disagreed with our recommendation to modify existing DEA policy to require
that weights be recorded on the forms used to transfer bulk marijuana
exhibits prior to acceptance by the evidence custodian because they
believe that this policy already exists. While we recognize that a DEA
policy exists that requires that weights be documented on the DEA 7,
several of our sample items involved transfers of bulk marijuana to an
evidence custodian using a DEA 12 and the weights were not recorded on the
DEA 12. Although a description of the evidence is required to be recorded
on the DEA 12, recording the weight on the form is not specifically
required. We therefore clarified our recommendation to state that DEA
modify their existing policy to require that if a DEA 12 is used to
transfer evidence (1) the weight be recorded on the DEA 12 or (2) a copy
of the DEA 7 be provided to the evidence custodian. 

In addition to responding to our recommendations, DEA provided us with
additional comments on our draft report and requested that we consider
them before finalizing the report for publication. DEA stated that issues
identified in the report do not appear to be systemic weaknesses and, for
the most part, were found in areas where redundant controls are in place
to ensure that the integrity of the evidence is maintained at all times.
We disagree. Several of the issues discussed in this report, which we
consider to be of a more severe nature, involved discrepancies at all, or
almost all, of the locations that we visited and redundant controls did
not exist to compensate for the deficiencies. In addition, while DEA
officials indicated that the reported deficiencies in their inspection
reports had been addressed, as noted throughout this report, we identified
weaknesses that were the same or similar to ones identified during
internal inspections performed prior to our review including some at the
locations we visited. 

For example, DEA policy requires that if drug evidence is transferred to
an individual outside of the laboratory, the individual receiving custody
must sign the DEA 12 (transfer form) and return it to DEA. We found 10 of
77 drug exhibits that had been transferred to an individual outside the
laboratory that were missing the DEA 12. Having the recipient's
acknowledgment of receipt is critical for documenting the transfer of
custody and the recipient's acceptance of responsibility for the evidence.
The controls mentioned by DEA (i.e., recording the transfer on a DEA 307,
DEA 12, and in a database) may be redundant in documenting the transfer of
custody, but these do not in any way annotate or document the recipient's
actual acceptance of responsibility for the transferred evidence. We
identified this problem at each of the four laboratories we visited. 

In another example, for 28 of the 86 drug exhibits we reviewed that had
weight discrepancies above the threshold set forth in DEA's policy,
chemists did not obtain the appropriate verification required by DEA
policy before opening and analyzing the evidence. Obtaining independent
verification when differences exist ensures that possible arguments over
such differences by the defense or the submitting agent are mitigated and
decreases the potential that the difference could be subjected to theft
and not detected. Three of the 4 laboratories that we visited contributed
to the 28 discrepancies in this area, and we did not identify a
compensating control that would specifically reduce the risk of this type
of deficiency. According to a DEA official, the inspection teams did not
test for this verification, but will do so in future inspections. 

In several comments related to the significance of certain discrepancies,
DEA stated that all exhibits of drug evidence examined by GAO were found
to be in a sealed condition. We agree that adequately established and
implemented sealing of evidence procedures can reduce the risk of theft,
misuse, or loss of drug evidence. However, certain conditions identified
by us during our testing and included in this report diminish the
effectiveness of DEA's sealing of evidence procedures. For example, a
witness signature was not present on the evidence label used to seal
evidence by the seizing agent for 4 of 142 drug exhibits we reweighed.
Having a witness signature at the time of sealing the evidence is
important to prevent any one individual from having uncontrolled access to
evidence. In addition, we observed exhibits for which the packaging or the
tape used to seal boxes was deteriorating, or had already deteriorated to
the point that the box was open, increasing the potential for access to
the contents. At one location, we observed a punctured evidence bag
containing approximately 
2 kilograms of heroin. Further, at a bulk marijuana warehouse, we observed
that several bags of a 9,000 pound seizure were worn, increasing the
potential for access to the contents. 

This report contains recommendations to you. The head of a federal agency
is required by 31 U.S.C. 720 to submit a written statement on actions
taken on these recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and the House Committee on Government Reform within 60 days of the
date of this report. You must also send a written statement to the House
and Senate Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request
for appropriations made over 60 days after the date of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Fred Thompson, Senator
Joseph Lieberman, Representative Dan Burton, Representative Henry A.
Waxman, Representative Stephen Horn, and Representative Jim Turner in
their capacities as Chair or Ranking Minority Member of Senate or House
Committees and Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to
Donnie R. Marshall, the Administrator of DEA; Robert L. Ashbaugh, Acting
Inspector General, Department of Justice; and the Honorable 
Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will be
made available to others upon request.

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-3406. Key contributors to this assignment were Larry Malenich,
Casey Keplinger, and Jeffrey Knott. 

Sincerely yours,

*****************

*****************

Gary T. Engel
Associate Director
Governmentwide Accounting and
  Financial Management Issues

--------------------------------------
/Footnote1/-^(GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1999).
/Footnote2/-^One kilogram equals 1,000 grams and is the equivalent of
  approximately 2.2 pounds. About 453.6 grams is the equivalent of 1 pound.
/Footnote3/-^I-96-02, February 1996). 
/Footnote4/-^The El Paso Division Office was established after the
  completion of our fieldwork.
/Footnote5/-^DEA employees are drug tested before they are hired and are
  subject to additional random drug testing during employment at DEA. 
/Footnote6/-^Drug seizures over certain threshold amounts are considered
  "bulk" seizures. Bulk seizure thresholds vary depending on the type of
  drug. For example, the threshold amount for heroin is 2 kilograms, while
  the threshold for cocaine is 10 kilograms. The U.S. Attorney's Office
  may request keeping amounts in excess of the threshold if it believes
  possession of the drugs may affect the legal proceedings.
/Footnote7/-^Return of a firearm to the owner can take place only if the
  party receiving the firearm may legally own a firearm and ownership of
  such type of firearm is not prohibited by law. 
/Footnote8/-^ATF requires plastic tie wraps to be inserted through the
  chamber prior to storage of all firearms, including handguns and rifles. 
/Footnote9/-^FBI policy requires that a firearm instructor certify in
  writing that seized firearms are rendered safe prior to transferring
  custody to an evidence custodian. 
/Footnote10/-^No additional explanation of these chain of custody issues
  was given in the document we were provided.
/Footnote11/-^99-7, June 1999), that covers systems requirements for
  seized property and forfeited assets. According to the exposure draft, a
  system component that covers the custody of seized and forfeited
  property must have the capability to provide information to allow the
  independent verification that each item of seized property is in the
  physical or constructive custody of the government and that the recorded
  quantity is accurate.
/Footnote12/-^Reporting on Non-Valued Seized and Forfeited Property,
  Federal Financial Accounting and Auditing Technical Release Number 4,
  July 31, 1999, issued by the Accounting and Auditing Policy Committee
  (AAPC), which is a permanent committee sponsored by the Federal
  Accounting Standards Advisory Board (FASAB).
/Footnote13/-^According to DEA officials, having chemists record the gross
  weight after analysis on the DEA 86 has always been a recommended
  procedure that became a requirement in January 1998. We were unable to
  compare our observed weight for 16 exhibits that were analyzed prior to
  when the requirement to record the gross weights after analysis became
  effective.
/Footnote14/-^Fifty grams of cocaine have an approximate "street" value of
  up to $5,000 based on DEA estimates as of February 1998.
At one division office, we used a manually prepared listing provided by
the evidence custodian. At another division office, we were only able to
identify and select six weapons from the vault since this division office
seizes a limited number of weapons and does not maintain a separate area
just for weapons. We selected and observed an additional two items from
the listing. Therefore, the total number of weapons selected at the 4
offices 
Drug Enforcement Administration's Laboratory Operations (DOJ OIG, 95-18,
May 1995) and Retention of Drug Evidence in Drug Enforcement
Administration Laboratories (DOJ OIG, 

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=====================

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed officials from DEA
headquarters and selected division offices and laboratories concerning
various aspects of the seizure, storage, and disposal of seized drugs and
weapons. We reviewed DEA's Laboratory Operations Manual and Agents Manual
for policies and procedures pertaining to the processes used to seize,
account for, safeguard, and dispose of drugs and weapons. Based on
documentation provided by DEA headquarters, we selected four division
offices and corresponding laboratories with a large volume of drug seizure
activity-Dallas, Texas (South Central Laboratory); Miami, Florida
(Southeast Laboratory); New York, New York (Northeast Laboratory); and San
Diego, California (Southwest Laboratory)-to perform our testing. 

From DEA headquarters, we obtained a STRIDE listing for drug exhibits
submitted to the laboratories from October 1997 through August 1998. 
A random sample of 59 drug exhibits from the listing was statistically
selected for each of the four laboratories. These exhibits included DEA
cases, as well as cases from other agencies, such as FBI and Customs. For
each item selected, we requested the laboratory seizure file and other
related documentation to test certain controls, mostly related to ensuring
that proper chain of custody documentation existed. We judgmentally
selected and weighed 10 of the 59 items at each selected site to verify
the recorded weight in the file against our observed weight./Footnote1/ At
each of the selected laboratories, we also obtained current inventory
listings of cocaine seizures over 3 kilograms and heroin seizures over 500
grams, and selected 10 seizures from the listings, observed their
existence, and weighed the item./Footnote2/ From the evidence maintained
in the vault at each of the four selected laboratories, we judgmentally
selected 15 items, weighed each item, and traced each one to a current
inventory listing provided by the laboratory. Items were selected based on
length of time the exhibit had been in storage, condition of packaging,
type of drug, and/or whether the exhibit had been authorized for
destruction. In total, we weighed 142 items. 

At each selected division office, we reviewed the logbooks maintained by
the facility to track bulk marijuana and physically inspected the bulk
storage facilities. We judgmentally selected a total of 20 exhibits from
the logbooks and 18 exhibits from those maintained in the storage
facilities. We reviewed the related files maintained by the evidence
custodian and weighed 14 of the exhibits. The specific number of cases
selected for review and weighed varied at each location due to a limited
number of bulk drug exhibits being maintained or because we were unable to
reasonably reweigh the exhibit. For those cases not reweighed, we verified
the quantity. At each selected division office, we also obtained current
inventory listings from NEDS to randomly select 10 weapons to verify their
existence in the vault. In addition, from weapons maintained in the vault,
we judgmentally selected 10 items based on length of time each weapon had
been in storage, type of weapon, or condition of packaging. Each selected
item was traced to the current inventory listing./Footnote3/ We observed 
72 of the total 78 items selected. Six of the items selected from the
listing were no longer being stored in the division office's evidence
vaults. For these six cases, we reviewed the related disposition
documents.  

At each of the four laboratories and division offices, we observed the
location and condition of storage facilities and other physical safeguards
including cameras, motion detectors, and combination locks that are in
place to control access to and use of drug and weapon evidence. We also
made inquiries of DEA's personnel about the operation of the physical
safeguards. However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence, we did
not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the operation of the
specific physical safeguards because we did not want to risk compromising
any of the evidence that may be needed for prosecution purposes. 

To determine if issues we identified at the four selected division offices
and laboratories are indicative of more systemic concerns, we (1) reviewed
reports/Footnote4/ issued by DOJ's Office of Inspector General (OIG)
related to laboratory operations and (2) requested and reviewed a copy of
the sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection reports for 20 of
DEA's 21 division offices/Footnote5/ and for the 8 laboratories that cover
procedures and internal controls related to seized drugs and weapons.
These inspections were performed between March 1996 and August 1998.
Because we received the sections of the internal inspection reports near
the end of our fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the division offices
or laboratories to determine the extent to which noted deficiencies had
been corrected. We performed our work in accordance with generally
accepted government auditing standards from August 1998 through August 1999.

We requested written comments on a draft of this report from the Attorney
General or her designee. The Acting DEA Administrator provided written
comments, which are discussed in the "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation"
section and are reprinted in appendix II. DEA also provided five
enclosures with technical suggestions or supplemental information that we
took into consideration while finalizing our report.

--------------------------------------
/Footnote1/-^At two of the laboratories, we were unable to select 10 items
  to reweigh because many of the exhibits in our sample of 59 had been
  transferred to another agency, destroyed, or were of insignificant
  amounts. In these instances, replacement items were selected.
/Footnote2/-^At two of the laboratories, we selected seven items from the
  listings and 3 items from alternative sources. At one laboratory, 3 of
  the 10 items had been authorized for destruction. At another laboratory,
  3 of the 10 items selected were exhibits received by the laboratory, but
  not yet analyzed.
/Footnote3/-^was 78. 
/Footnote4/-^I-96-02, February 1996). 
/Footnote5/-^The El Paso Division Office was established after the
  completion of our fieldwork.

COMMENTS FROM THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
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The following are GAO's comments on the Drug Enforcement Administration's
letter dated October 21, 1999.

GAO Comments

   1.    This review occurred in June 1999 with accreditation being
         granted in September 1999, subsequent to our review. The review
         covered DEA's 8 laboratories, but none of the division offices. 

   2.    See "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation" section.

   3.    We did note in our report that we requested and reviewed a copy
         of the sections of the most recent DEA internal inspection
         reports for the division offices and laboratories in existence at
         the time of our fieldwork that cover procedures and internal
         controls related to seized drugs and weapons. In addition, in
         several places in this report, we noted the period of time
         covered by these inspections. As we reported, because we received
         the sections of the internal inspection reports near the end of
         our fieldwork, we did not follow-up with the division offices or
         laboratories to determine the extent to which noted deficiencies
         had been corrected. 

   4.    In order to provide balance to the report, we also reported
         instances where we only found a few discrepancies. For the cases
         cited here by DEA where we noted three or fewer discrepancies, we
         used language such as, we "found substantial compliance with the
         policy, but noted a few exceptions." As noted throughout the
         report, we identified numerous discrepancies in other key areas.

   5.    The report was clarified to include that chemists also document
         that they have verified that the seals are intact by checking the
         appropriate box on the DEA 86. 

   6.    As noted in our report, at the South Central Laboratory, we were
         informed that there were cameras that monitor vault activity that
         were not operational. In addition, at our exit conference with
         DEA, agency officials provided documentation indicating that
         after our visit the two cameras in question had subsequently been
         fixed. 

   7.    We reported that an official indicated that the vault alarm
         system at the Northeast Laboratory in New York had been fixed. We
         also noted that to confirm this, we had asked for the more recent
         inspection report for this laboratory, but as of the completion
         of our fieldwork, it had not been provided to us. After our exit
         conference with DEA, we were provided further documentation
         relating to this issue. However, the documentation did not
         clearly demonstrate that the alarm had been fixed. In addition,
         along with the comments on our draft report, DEA provided a Self-
         Inspection Status Report (instead of the requested internal
         inspection report). However, this report did not specifically
         indicate that the work was performed and whether the problem was
         resolved. 

   8.    We reported that we observed physical safeguards that are in
         place to control and monitor access to and use of drug and weapon
         evidence. However, due to the sensitive nature of the evidence,
         we did not perform any comprehensive tests to verify the
         operation of the specific physical safeguards because we did not
         want to risk compromising any of the evidence that may be needed
         for prosecution purposes. The specific physical safeguard issues
         listed in this report are weaknesses we identified through
         observation or inquiry of officials, or were reported in DEA's
         internal inspection reports. Since we were not previously
         informed of the physical security surveys or formal courtesy
         visits referred to in DEA's comments and have not been provided
         any documentation showing the scope of such reviews, we cannot
         determine whether the reviews addressed the control areas we
         reported on. 

   9.    We reported that due to space constraints in the drug evidence
         vaults at two of the four laboratories we visited, we observed
         boxes that had been stacked on the floor such that the lower
         boxes were being crushed, increasing the potential for access to
         the contents and therefore increasing the potential for theft,
         misuse, or loss. DEA stated that it recognizes that the evidence
         vaults at some locations are overcrowded and need to be enlarged
         and has plans to construct several new laboratory facilities with
         larger evidence vaults to address this issue. 

   10.    Our report does describe the process by which DEA handles bulk
          evidence, including the recognition that other parties influence
          how bulk evidence is handled and when it is destroyed. We did
          not take issue to there being circumstances for which bulk
          evidence may need to be held for extended periods of time, but
          requested that documentation supporting the extension be
          provided. Specifically, for bulk exhibits tested, we requested
          that DEA provide either a (1) DEA 48, authorizing the
          destruction or 
          (2) Letter of Intent to Destroy, which is sent to the U.S.
          Attorney's Office, along with the U.S. Attorney's response
          authorizing DEA to retain bulk amounts. For two of the five bulk
          exhibits tested, the letters authorizing DEA to maintain amounts
          above certain thresholds or the forms authorizing the
          destruction were not provided. In addition, 1 of 16 exhibits
          that had been authorized for destruction had not been destroyed
          within the 90 days as required by DEA policy. This exhibit had
          been authorized for destruction but was not destroyed until over
          5 months after approval was obtained. 

   11.    We recognize that situations beyond management's control can
          occasionally preclude chemists from adhering to the requirement
          that drug evidence normally be returned to the vault within 5
          working days after the chemist's analysis. However, returning
          evidence to the vault promptly ensures that chemists do not
          maintain evidence for excessive amounts of time in a more
          accessible area than that of the vault. In addition, 17 of the
          20 reported instances occurred at the South Central Laboratory,
          indicating a more significant problem at this particular
          laboratory. DEA acknowledged that it would continue to reinforce
          the 5 working day policy and that specific procedures have been
          instituted to correct the problem at the South Central Laboratory.

   12.    The timeliness issues addressed in this report primarily affect
          the controls over the safeguarding of evidence. Destroying
          evidence within 90 days of receiving approval as required by DEA
          policy conserves limited vault space and eliminates the
          additional inherent risk of theft of drugs that are no longer
          needed as evidence. DEA indicated that it will continue to
          devote resources to ensure the timely destruction of evidence. 

   13.    During our testing at each DEA location visited, we met with
          agency officials and discussed our findings and provided them
          opportunities to respond to our findings and to provide
          documentation that could resolve the discrepancies. We
          requested, but were not provided, DEA 12s for 10 of the 77
          exhibits selected for our review that had been transferred to an
          individual outside the laboratory. In addition, we were not
          provided with any other documentation acknowledging receipt of
          the transferred items by the recipient. 

   14.    At our exit conference with DEA, agency officials indicated that
          the issue in the internal inspection reports had been corrected,
          but did not indicate that the DEA 12s in question related to
          special program exhibits and were being filed in one central
          file, not in the individual corresponding case files. DEA states
          that this issue has since been corrected and copies of the DEA
          12s for special program exhibits are being placed in their
          respective case files. 

   15.    As noted in comment 13, during our testing at each DEA location
          visited, we met with agency officials and discussed our findings
          and provided them opportunities to respond to such findings and
          to provide documentation that could resolve the discrepancies.
          We requested, but were not provided the required photographs for
          two of the four bulk seizure files we reviewed, both of which
          exceeded the 10 kilogram threshold. 

   16.     Ensuring that data are promptly and correctly entered into
          STRIDE provides program managers with more accurate and useful
          information. However, as we reported, we found 15 instances
          where the data in STRIDE did not agree with supporting
          documentation and therefore diminished DEA's accountability over
          the related evidence. 

   17.    The two reported examples relate to exhibits that were submitted
          to the laboratory in person and not mailed. Regardless of the
          method of delivery, it is important that the chemist, as
          required by DEA policy, obtain a witness' verification when
          differences above the established threshold exist to ensure that
          possible arguments over such differences by the defense or
          submitting agent are mitigated.

   18.    We recognize that certain uncontrollable environmental factors
          may cause weight differences that do not follow trends. However,
          DEA could not specifically explain the weight decreases for
          several differences we identified, including differences
          relating to two exhibits that had been authorized for
          destruction and were therefore no longer needed as evidence. For
          example, the weight for one cocaine exhibit that had been
          analyzed 3 years prior to our testing had decreased by 6 percent
          or approximately 300 grams. According to DEA officials, cocaine
          typically absorbs moisture and gains weight. In another example,
          a marijuana exhibit weighed about 25 pounds less than (or about
          half) the weight recorded when the drug was received at the
          division office. DEA officials agreed that the decrease in
          weight seemed excessive, but were unable to provide a specific
          explanation for the difference. Further, as noted in our agency
          comments and evaluation section of this report, we identified
          certain conditions that diminish the effectiveness of DEA's
          sealing of evidence procedures. 

   19.    DEA concurred with our recommendation to reinforce its policy
          that requires two signatures be recorded on evidence labels
          prior to acceptance by laboratory or division office evidence
          custodians. DEA stated that it will reinforce the policy, but it
          is reluctant to return evidence that is mailed to the laboratory
          with only one signature due to the added risk and delay of
          mailing evidence back. We agree that mailing evidence back to
          obtain a second signature may not be appropriate, however, the
          occurrence of this situation should decrease if stronger
          adherence to the policy is achieved. 

   20.    A Miami Division Office official provided us with a copy of a
          packaging slip showing that one of the firearms in our sample
          had been transferred from Miami to another DEA office. We
          reported that the contents of the package, listed as "3 guns,
          money, and jewelry," was recorded on the packaging slip which
          was attached to the outside of the package. We recommended that
          DEA adhere to a previously existing policy in its Agents Manual,
          Section 6663.43, which states that the procedures set forth for
          the domestic delivery of drug evidence shall also apply to
          nondrug property. The procedures for mailing drug evidence
          specifically state that the outer wrapping should bear no
          indication as to the nature of the contents. 

   21.    Our primary objective in testing the controls over the
          safeguarding of weapons was to determine whether control
          procedures existed and were being followed. As we reported, we
          found two handguns that had not been sealed in evidence bags as
          required by DEA policy and knives that were stored in a zipper
          bag that could be easily opened. The scope of our testing did
          not include determining if the weapons themselves were rendered
          safe.

   22.    The scope of our review was designed to determine whether
          weaknesses in controls existed that increase the risk that
          evidence could be compromised for federal prosecution purposes.
          It was not our intent to specifically determine whether the
          evidence had in fact been compromised. 

(901799)

Table 1:  Seized Drug Activity for the Year Ended September 30, 19988

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