[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 181 (Monday, September 21, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59904-59967]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-19260]



[[Page 59903]]

Vol. 91

Monday,

No. 181

September 21, 2026

Part III





 Securities and Exchange Commission





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17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, et al.





Rescission of Rule 14a-8's Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals 
and Amendments to Rule 14a-4; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 91 , No. 181 / Monday, September 21, 2026 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 59904]]


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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, 240, and 249

[Release No. 34-106383; File No. S7-2026-32]
RIN 3235-AN47


Rescission of Rule 14a-8's Federal Regulation of Shareholder 
Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4

AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is 
proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (``Exchange Act'') and leave determinations about the role of 
shareholder proposals to State law and company governing documents. The 
Commission also is proposing to amend Rule 14a-4 under the Exchange Act 
to expand the circumstances under which a company may exercise, with 
respect to proxies it receives, discretionary voting authority on 
proposals that will be presented at a shareholder meeting but not 
included in the company's proxy materials. At the same time, the 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 would provide shareholders with the 
means to elect to prevent the company from exercising such authority 
with respect to their individual shares.

DATES: This release was published in the Federal Register on September 
21, 2026. Comments should be received on or before November 20, 2026.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
     Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2026-32/rescission-rule-14a-8s-federal-regulation-shareholder-proposals-amendments-rule-14a-4).
     Send an email to [email protected]. Please include 
File Number S7-2026-32 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

     Send paper comments to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, 
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 
20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-2026-32. This file 
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help 
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently, 
please use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all 
submitted comments on the Commission's website (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/public-comments/s7-2026-32). Do not include 
personally identifiable information in submissions; you should submit 
only information that you wish to make available publicly. The 
Commission may redact in part or withhold entirely from publication 
submitted material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection. 
Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the 
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A 
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials 
will be made available on the Commission's website. To ensure direct 
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay 
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email. A 
summary of the proposal of not more than 100 words is posted on the 
Commission's website (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-32).

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jenny J. Choi, Special Counsel, or 
Matt McNair, Senior Adviser to the Chief Counsel, Office of Chief 
Counsel, at (202) 551-3500, David M. Plattner, Special Counsel, or 
Blake M. Grady, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers and Acquisitions, at 
(202) 551-3440, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing to rescind 17 
CFR 240.14a-8 (``Rule 14a-8'') and amend the following rules and forms:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.072

Table of Contents

I. Introduction
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    \1\ 17 CFR 229.10 through 229.1610.
    \2\ 17 CFR 229.10 through 232.501.
    \3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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II. Discussion of Proposed Amendments
    A. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
    1. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Statutory Authority
    2. Policy Reasons for Rescinding Rule 14a-8
    3. Investment Company Considerations
    B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
    1. Overview of Current Rules Related to Discretionary Voting 
Authority

[[Page 59905]]

    2. Historical Background
    3. Proposed Rule Amendments
    C. Other Proposed Amendments
    D. General Request for Comment
III. Other Matters
IV. Economic Analysis
    A. Introduction
    B. Baseline
    1. Current Regulatory Framework
    2. Affected Parties
    3. Current Practices
    C. Benefits and Costs
    1. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
    2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
    3. The Benefits and Costs for Proxy-Related Service Providers
    4. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs
    D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
    1. Efficiency
    2. Competition
    3. Capital Formation
    E. Reasonable Alternatives
    1. Alternative to Rescinding Rule 14a-8
    2. Switch the Default Choice of Check Box in Proposed Rule 14a-
4(c)(2) Amendment
    3. Require a Separate Check Box for Each Proposal
    F. Request for Comment
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
    A. Summary of the Collection of Information
    B. Estimated Paperwork Burden Effects of the Proposed Amendments
    C. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the 
Proposed Amendments
    D. Request for Comment
VI. Congressional Review Act
VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
    A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Action
    B. Legal Basis
    C. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Amendments
    D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements
    E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
    F. Significant Alternatives
    G. Request for Comment
Statutory Authority

I. Introduction

    ``Corporations are creatures of state law.'' \4\ Because 
``regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose 
very existence and attributes are a product of state law,'' ``[n]o 
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established 
than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including 
the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.'' \5\ 
Shareholder voting rights are generally exercised at shareholder 
meetings, where proposals are put before the shareholders for a 
vote.\6\ The conduct of shareholder meetings, including how proposals 
are presented, is governed by State law.\7\
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    \4\ Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Foreign issuers, as 
that term is defined in 17 CFR 240.3b-4(b), are not creatures of 
State law. Accordingly, to the extent this release refers to State 
law, the corresponding reference for foreign issuers would be to the 
applicable foreign law. Foreign private issuers, as defined in 17 
CFR 240.3b-4, are exempt from the Commission's proxy requirements 
with respect to solicitations of their own security holders, 17 CFR 
240.3a12-3(b); Regulation 14A (17 CFR 240.14a-1 through 240.14b-2). 
Foreign private issuers also are not subject to information 
statement requirements. See Regulation 14C (17 CFR 240.14c-1 through 
240.14c-101).
    \5\ CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); 
see also e.g., 8 Del. C. sections 211, 212.
    \6\ If permitted under State law, and in accordance with any 
applicable provisions in a company's governing documents, action may 
be taken by written consent without a meeting and without a vote. 
See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 228.
    \7\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 212; Model Bus. Corp. Act 
sections 7.01 through 7.08.
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    The manner in which shareholders exercise their rights to vote at 
shareholder meetings has evolved over time. Historically, shareholders 
exercised their rights by attending the shareholder meeting and voting 
in person. However, the development of large corporations with widely 
dispersed shareholders led to the rise of proxy voting, which permits 
shareholders to vote through a representative without being present at 
the shareholder meeting.\8\ Before 1934, State law governed the manner 
in which proxies to cast shareholders' votes were solicited, but 
``[t]oo often proxies [were] solicited without explanation to the 
stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to 
cast his vote [was] sought.'' \9\ In response, when it passed the 
Exchange Act in 1934, Congress included section 14 \10\ to give the 
Commission authority to regulate the proxy solicitation process.\11\ 
Section 14(a) \12\ makes it unlawful to solicit any proxy or consent or 
authorization in respect of any security ``in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.'' \13\ Relying on its authority under section 14(a), the 
Commission in 1942 adopted the predecessor of Rule 14a-8 to require a 
company to include certain shareholder proposals in its proxy statement 
and identify the proposal in its form of proxy.\14\
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    \8\ See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing 
Proxy Regulation, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1129, 1134-38 (1993) (``Fisch 
1993'') (explaining that ``proxy voting developed as a means of 
giving dispersed shareholders an opportunity to vote.'').
    \9\ S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at 12; see also 
H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (``Insiders 
have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the 
stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies are to be used 
and have used such proxies to take from the stockholders for their 
own selfish advantage valuable property rights.'').
    \10\ 15 U.S.C. 78n (``section 14'').
    \11\ See H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 
(``the proposed bill gives the Commission power to control the 
conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to 
preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free 
exercise of the voting rights of stockholders.'').
    \12\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (``section 14(a)'').
    \13\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)(1). See also, section II.A.3, discussing 
the Commission's authority under Section 20(a) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (``Investment Company Act'').
    \14\ See Release No. 34-3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) [7 FR 10655 (Dec. 
22, 1942)] (adopting Rule X-14A-7, 17 CFR 240.14a-7) (``1942 
Adopting Release''). In 1947, the Commission renumbered the rule to 
its present designation, 17 CFR 240.14a-8. See Adoption of Revised 
Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4037 (Dec. 16, 1947) [12 FR 8768 (Dec. 
24, 1947)]. A reference in this release to ``Rule 14a-8'' includes 
Rule X-14A-7 unless stated otherwise. In addition, we use the terms 
``companies,'' ``registrants,'' and ``issuers'' interchangeably in 
this release. Unless otherwise specified, these terms are intended 
to be broadly inclusive and encompass not only corporations, but 
also other types of entities, such as partnerships and other 
business organizations, that may be subject to our proxy rules and 
regulations. The use of different terms in different places is not 
meant to connote a substantive difference.
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    As explained by then-Chairman Ganson Purcell, Rule 14a-8 was 
adopted to facilitate shareholders' ability under State law \15\ to 
present certain proposals for consideration at a company's annual or 
special meeting,\16\ and to facilitate the ability of all shareholders 
to consider and vote by proxy on such proposals.\17\ Specifically, 
shortly after the rule was adopted, Chairman Purcell stated that the 
purpose of the rule was to ``assure to the stockholders . . . those 
rights that [the stockholder] has traditionally had under State law, to 
appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that proposal at 
appropriate length; and to have [the] proposal voted on.'' \18\ The 
rule originally required a company to include a shareholder proposal 
that is

[[Page 59906]]

``a proper subject for action by the security holders,'' as long as the 
shareholder proponent \19\ provided ``reasonable notice'' to the 
company.\20\ Although the rule did not specify that State law provides 
the standard for determining what was ``a proper subject for action by 
the security holders,'' the Commission subsequently issued a release 
containing a letter from the then-Director of the Division of 
Corporation Finance clarifying \21\ that State law provided the 
applicable standard. The Commission later amended the text of Rule 14a-
8 to make this point explicit by providing that a proposal could be 
excluded from a company's proxy materials if ``the proposal as 
submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper 
subject for action by security holders.'' \22\
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    \15\ We refer to State law to mean a State's legislative 
enactment and judicial interpretations of such enactment, as well as 
State common law.
    \16\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 211; Model Bus. Corp. Act 
section 7.01. Throughout this release, when discussing State 
corporate law, we frequently refer to Delaware law because of the 
large percentage of public companies incorporated under that State's 
law. The Delaware Division of Corporations reports that over 50% of 
publicly traded companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges are 
incorporated in Delaware. See Delaware Dep't of State, Facts and 
Myths, Delaware Corporate Law (n.d.), https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-and-myths/. We also frequently refer to the Model Business 
Corporation Act (``MBCA'') because the corporate statutes of many 
States adopt or closely track its provisions.
    \17\ See Securit[ies] and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules: 
Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 172 
(1943) (Statement of the Hon. Ganson Purcell, Chairman, Securities 
and Exchange Commission) (``Statement of Chairman Purcell'').
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Throughout this release, references to ``shareholder 
proponent'' and ``proponent'' generally refer to shareholders who 
submit proposals under Rule 14a-8, and references to ``shareholder 
proposal'' and ``proposal'' generally refer to proposals submitted 
under Rule 14a-8, unless the context otherwise requires, such as 
when discussing proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 in the context of 
discretionary voting authority for proposals submitted outside the 
Rule 14a-8 process.
    \20\ See 1942 Adopting Release in which the predecessor of 
current Rule 14a-8, Rule X-14A-7, provided that ``[i]n the event 
that a qualified security holder of the issuer has given the 
management reasonable notice that such security holder intends to 
present for action at a meeting of security holders of the issuer a 
proposal which is a proper subject for action by the security 
holders, the management shall set forth the proposal and provide 
means by which security holders can make a specification'' on such 
matter; see also infra section II.A.1.b.
    \21\ See Release No. 40-375, 34-3638 (Jan. 3, 1945) [Letter of 
Division of Corporation Finance Director published at 11 FR 10988, 
10995 (Sept. 27, 1946)] (``1945 Release'') (stating that Rule 14a-8 
pertains to matters that ``are proper subjects for stockholders' 
action under the laws of the state under which [the company] is 
organized''). In a subsequent release, the Commission stated that it 
had previously adopted as its own the view that ``State law is the 
standard'' for determining what is a proper subject for shareholder 
action. See also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Release No. 
34-4979 (Jan. 6, 1954) [19 FR 246 (Jan. 14, 1954)] (``1954 Adopting 
Release'') (citing 1945 Release).
    \22\ 1954 Adopting Release. The rule's current language--``If 
the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders 
under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization''--
was adopted in 1998. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder 
Proposals, Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) [63 FR 29106, 29120 
(May 28, 1998)] (``1998 Adopting Release'').
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    As discussed in greater detail in section II.A.1.b, however, the 
Commission has amended Rule 14a-8 multiple times in ways that 
incrementally have increased the Commission's role in defining and 
interpreting standards that implicate core State law corporate 
governance matters, such as shareholder voting rights. As a result, 
despite the Commission's prior statements asserting that Rule 14a-8 was 
not ``intended to supplant [S]tate law but . . . to reinforce [it] with 
a sturdy [F]ederal disclosure and proxy solicitation regime,'' \23\ 
numerous observers have expressed the view that Rule 14a-8 effectively 
has evolved to function as a Federal common law as to what constitutes 
a proper subject for shareholder action.\24\ But Congress's grant of 
authority to the Commission in the Exchange Act does not authorize such 
evolution. Section 14 does not purport to displace State law with 
respect to shareholder governance rights. As discussed below, only 
Congress can authorize the Commission to intervene in matters 
traditionally left to State law.
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    \23\ See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-56160 
(July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43466, 43467 (Aug. 3, 2007)] (``2007 Proxy 
Access Long Release'') (explaining that ``the federal proxy 
authority is not intended to supplant state law, but rather to 
reinforce state law rights with a sturdy federal disclosure and 
proxy solicitation regime,'' and noting as an example that ``Rule 
14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, explicitly provides that a 
shareholder proposal is not required to be included in a company's 
proxy materials if it `is not a proper subject for action by 
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's 
organization''' (citing 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1))).
    \24\ See, e.g., Jill Fisch et al., Stockholder Proposals--Law 
and Policy Considerations, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Dec. 
9, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/09/stockholder-proposals-law-and-policy-considerations/ (``Yet, by 
regulating proxy access, the SEC determines what matters are proper 
or improper for stockholder meetings, often restricting stockholder 
rights beyond the contours of state law.''); Fisch 1993 at 1151 
(``[B]oth in determining appropriate criteria for excluding 
shareholder proposals and in applying those criteria, the SEC does 
not replicate passively the annual meeting process by applying state 
law principles, but creates a Federal common law as to what 
constitutes a proper subject for shareholder action''); Kevin W. 
Waite, Note, The Ordinary Business Operations Exception to the 
Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return to Predictability, 64 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1253, 1259-60 (1995) (``Because little state law was developed 
discussing what was a proper subject for action by security holders, 
the SEC staff developed its own common law regarding what was a 
proper subject for shareholder action. While the SEC claimed to be 
relying on state law in determining what was a proper subject for 
shareholder action, the SEC more accurately appeared to be deciding 
what the state law was and influencing state courts in deciding the 
rare case that arose regarding what was a proper subject for 
shareholder action.'') (citations omitted).
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    Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in the sections that 
follow, we propose to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety because the 
rule exceeds the Commission's statutory authority under section 14(a) 
by improperly intruding into State law without express authorization 
from Congress.\25\ Moreover, even if the rule or aspects of it were 
within the Commission's statutory authority, there are independent 
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety and leave 
decisions regarding the appropriate role of shareholder proposals in 
the corporate governance process to the States or, if permitted by 
State law, to companies. In reaching this determination, we note that: 
(i) many of the justifications that were originally provided to support 
adoption of Rule 14a-8 either have not been substantiated in practice 
or are less compelling today; (ii) Rule 14a-8 has had, and will 
continue to have, certain unintended consequences that further 
undermine any justification for retaining the rule; and (iii) retaining 
any version of Rule 14a-8--assuming the Commission were authorized to 
do so--is unwarranted and unlikely to avoid those unintended 
consequences.\26\ Nevertheless, to better understand the potential 
impact of rescinding Rule 14a-8, we are seeking comment on the proposed 
rescission, potential reliance interests in the current rule, and 
alternative approaches within the scope of the Commission's 
authority.\27\
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    \25\ See infra section II.A.
    \26\ See infra section II.A. President Donald J. Trump issued an 
executive order titled, ``Protecting American Investors from 
Foreign-Owned and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors'' on Dec. 16, 
2025. This order, among other things, ordered the ``SEC Chairman . . 
. [to] consider revising or rescinding all rules, regulations, 
guidance, bulletins, and memoranda relating to shareholder 
proposals, including Rule 14a-8 (17 CFR 240.14a-8), that are 
inconsistent with the purposes of [such executive order].'' Exec. 
Order No. 14366, Protecting American Investors from Foreign-Owned 
and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors, 90 FR 58503 (Dec. 16, 
2025).
    \27\ The Commission has recently received several rulemaking 
petitions requesting to preserve or amend, but largely retain, Rule 
14a-8. See, e.g., Ceres et al., Petition Regarding Amendments to 
Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (July 23, 
2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-917.pdf; Shareholder Rights Group et al., Defend Shareholder 
Rights Petition (July 20, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-918.pdf; Bruce A. Burkey et al., 
Americans for Financial Reform (July 20, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-918.pdf. We will 
consider these petitions, together with any comments received in 
response to this release, when considering whether to finalize the 
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8.
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    We are also proposing amendments to 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c) (``Rule 
14a-4(c)''), which addresses when a proxy card submitted by a 
shareholder may confer discretionary voting authority on the proxy 
holder with respect to a matter that is not included on the proxy card. 
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are intended to provide 
companies with greater flexibility, and shareholders with greater 
control, regarding proposals for which a company may seek discretionary 
voting

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authority. Occasions for seeking such authority may become more 
frequent if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed. While our proposed 
amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are aligned with our proposed rescission of 
Rule 14a-8, there are independent justifications for the proposed 
amendments to Rule 14a-4 even if the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 
is not adopted.
    Finally, we are proposing certain other amendments to facilitate 
implementation of the proposed changes to the proxy rules and 
conforming amendments to our rules and forms.

II. Discussion of Proposed Amendments

A. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8

    We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 because the rule exceeds the 
Commission's statutory authority. We also believe there are independent 
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8. Under the proposed rescission, 
the Federal proxy rules would no longer require companies to include in 
their proxy materials shareholder proposals on the basis that they 
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements established under 
Federal law. Instead, State law or, if permitted by State law, a 
company's governing documents would determine whether a shareholder 
proposal would be required to be included in a company's proxy 
materials.
1. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Statutory Authority
    Although section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to regulate proxy 
solicitations, the question of whether the vote that is the subject of 
such a solicitation is permissible in the first instance--i.e., whether 
shareholders have a right to present a matter for other shareholders to 
vote on--is distinct and is determined by State law or, if permitted by 
State law, a company's governing documents. Because section 14(a) does 
not authorize the Commission to regulate the scope of matters presented 
to shareholders for a vote, the Commission lacks the power to override 
State law on this threshold question.\28\ To the contrary, it has long 
been understood that section 14(a) empowers the Commission to 
facilitate--not alter--State law rights by regulating the manner in 
which the proxy solicitation is made and the information that the 
soliciting party must disclose.\29\ As explained below, the rule has 
come to operate not as a procedural mechanism to facilitate 
shareholders' rights under State law through the proxy process, but as 
a substantive Federal overlay that improperly intrudes into matters of 
State law by dictating that companies include (or allowing them to 
exclude) certain shareholder proposals in the companies' proxy 
materials. Because Congress has not expressly authorized such an 
intrusion, Rule 14a-8 exceeds the scope of the Commission's authority. 
We therefore propose to rescind the rule in its entirety.
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    \28\ Congress requires that certain matters be presented to 
shareholders for a vote. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78n-1 (requiring 
advisory say-on-pay, say-on-frequency, and golden parachute 
arrangements to be submitted for shareholder vote) and section 
II.A.3 (discussing provisions of the Investment Company Act that 
require certain matters to be presented to shareholders for a vote). 
The fact that Congress has established Federal voting rights in 
these instances does not alter the scope of the Commission's 
authority over the solicitation of proxies under section 14. Nor 
does the discussion in this release of the Commission's authority 
under section 14 address the legal status of these other provisions.
    \29\ See infra note 58.
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a. Scope of Section 14(a) Authority
    Section 14(a) makes it unlawful ``to solicit any proxy or consent 
or authorization in respect of any security'' ``in contravention of 
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary 
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of 
investors.'' \30\ The statutory text limits the Commission's regulatory 
authority to proxy solicitation--the request for the power to vote on a 
shareholder's behalf--which encompasses the manner in which that 
solicitation is made (e.g., the timing and form of proxy) and the 
information that the soliciting party must disclose in the request. The 
Commission therefore is authorized to regulate the form of proxy 
solicitation and the means by which shareholders are asked to express 
their voting position in response to the solicitation. We construe ``in 
the public interest or for the protection of investors'' in light of 
the statutory context to authorize the Commission to prohibit false or 
misleading statements in a proxy solicitation and to promulgate 
disclosure requirements ensuring that shareholders are adequately 
informed of the proposals on which they may vote under State law and 
the voting positions for which their proxies would be used.\31\ This 
authority is consistent with other grants of authority provided to the 
Commission under the Exchange Act, which focus on ensuring that 
investors receive accurate disclosure of material information.\32\
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    \30\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)(1). We discuss section 14(a)'s references 
to ``the public interest'' and ``the protection of investors'' in 
more detail below.
    \31\ See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 
1083 (1991) (applying Rule 14a-9 to allegedly misleading disclosures 
by directors seeking shareholder approval of a merger).
    \32\ See 15 U.S.C. 78j, 78l, 78m.
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    While section 14(a) provides authority to facilitate shareholders' 
exercise of State law rights by regulating the proxy solicitation 
process, nothing in section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to regulate 
the scope of the voting or other rights shareholders may have under 
State law, such as the right to propose a matter for a shareholder 
vote.\33\ Rather, by focusing on the solicitation of a shareholder's 
vote, the text makes clear that Congress's purpose was to ensure that 
shareholders are fully informed as to the use of the proxy being 
solicited and to protect them from being denied the fair exercise of 
their State law voting rights.\34\
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    \33\ But see supra note 28.
    \34\ Cf. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (``Proxy solicitations are, after all, only communications 
with potential absentee voters. The goal of federal proxy regulation 
was to improve those communications and thereby to enable proxy 
voters to control the corporation as effectively as they might have 
by attending a shareholder meeting.'' (italics in original)).
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    Section 14(a)'s grant of authority to regulate solicitations of the 
power to vote on a shareholder's behalf presupposes that the 
shareholder already has a right to vote on particular proposals. The 
scope of those rights has traditionally been governed by State law, and 
section 14(a) does not purport to disturb that allocation.\35\ If 
Congress had intended section 14(a) to displace State law on the 
subject of shareholder voting, presumably it would have referred to 
shareholder voting in section 14(a). For example, the Public Utility 
Holding Company Act (``PUHCA''), enacted by Congress in the year after 
the Exchange Act,\36\ directed the Commission to oversee the allocation 
of voting power in public utility companies. Section 11(b)(2) of that 
law authorized the Commission ``[t]o require by order . . . that the 
corporate structure . . . does not . . . unfairly or inequitably 
distribute voting power among security holders.'' \37\ No

[[Page 59908]]

comparable language appears in section 14(a).\38\
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    \35\ See supra notes 5, 7, 23, and 28.
    \36\ Public Law 74-333 (Aug. 26, 1935), 15 U.S.C. 79 et seq., 
repealed by Public Law 109-58, title XII, section 1263, Aug. 8, 
2005, 119 Stat. 974.
    \37\ 15 U.S.C. 79k(b)(2) (2004); see also PUHCA section 7(c)(1) 
(granting the Commission authority to prohibit the sale of common 
stock unless it has ``at least equal voting rights with[ ] any 
outstanding security of the declarant'') and (e) (barring the 
exercise of voting rights if ``the Commission finds that such 
exercise of such privilege or right will result in an unfair or 
inequitable distribution of voting power among holders of the 
securities of the declarant'') [15 U.S.C. 79g(c)(1), (e) (2004)]; 
supra note 28.
    \38\ But see supra note 28.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Therefore, the Commission's authority under section 14(a) to 
regulate the proxy solicitation process does not permit the Commission 
to displace State law regarding shareholder voting rights.\39\ By 
establishing standards not found in State law for when a shareholder 
proposal must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's 
proxy materials, the Commission effectively dictates the scope of 
shareholder voting rights and, therefore, exceeds its authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \39\ Cf. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411 (stating that section 
14(a) was not intended to authorize the Commission to ``step beyond 
control of voting procedure and into the distribution of voting 
power'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent legislative history is considered, it only 
underscores the limitations on the Commission's authority that are 
inherent in the statutory text and structure. That history indicates 
that Congress's purpose in enacting this provision was to empower the 
Commission to facilitate ``fair corporate suffrage'' on the proxy by 
regulating the ``conditions under which proxies may be solicited.'' 
\40\ It also suggests an intent to authorize regulations that would 
protect ``free exercise of the voting rights'' of shareholders,\41\ 
require ``adequate disclosure'' of the matters to be decided at the 
shareholder meeting,\42\ and prevent ``irresponsible outsiders'' and 
``unscrupulous corporate officials'' from ``concealing and distorting 
facts'' in their proxy solicitations.\43\ Courts have thus interpreted 
section 14(a) as bearing ``almost exclusively on disclosure,'' with a 
``central concern'' that proxies not be obtained through ``deceptive or 
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \40\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 
see also, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 
1083, 1103 (1991).
    \41\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); see 
also, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103.
    \42\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); 
S.Rep. No. 792 at 12, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S.Rep. No. 1455 at 
75, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
    \43\ S.Rep. No. 1455 at 77.
    \44\ Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These limitations are also consistent with the Commission's 
longstanding understanding that its authority under section 14(a) is 
limited to promulgating ``federal proxy rules [that] facilitate 
shareholders' exercise of [S]tate law rights,'' \45\ such that the 
corporate proxy process ``functions, as nearly as possible, as a 
replacement for an actual, in-person gathering of security holders.'' 
\46\ As the Commission has acknowledged, section 14(a) does not grant 
it authority to ``alter those [State law] rights.'' \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \45\ 2007 Proxy Access Long Release at 43478.
    \46\ Id. at 43467 n.19 and accompanying text (citing Bus. 
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410); see also Facilitating Shareholder 
Director Nominations, Release No. 33-9046 (June 10, 2009) [74 FR 
29024 (June 18, 2009)].
    \47\ Id. at 43478.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Interpreting section 14(a)(1) more broadly would not only lack any 
basis in the statutory text and structure but would inappropriately 
interfere with matters traditionally reserved to the States. As the 
Supreme Court explained in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 
``[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant 
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that 
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established 
State policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.'' \48\ The 
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe accords with a 
substantial body of precedent establishing a clear statement rule for 
laws tilting the balance of federalism.\49\ For example, in Business 
Roundtable, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit found that section 14(a)(1) did not express an intention by 
Congress to override State law with respect to ``corporate 
governance.'' \50\ To the contrary, the court explained, those 
advocating for the Exchange Act in Congress expressly disclaimed any 
intent to confer upon the Commission authority to interfere in 
corporate management: opponents had raised concerns that the bill would 
confer ``power to interfere in the management of corporations,'' and 
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency responded that it had ``no 
such intention'' and that the bill ``furnish[ed] no justification for 
such an interpretation.'' \51\ Similarly, neither the text nor 
legislative history of section 14(a) contains any indication that the 
statute authorizes the Commission to interfere with shareholder rights 
established by State law. More generally, members of Congress have 
repeatedly proposed bills to create a ``federal corporation law,'' but 
none has been enacted.\52\ On the rare occasions when Congress has 
intended for the Commission to intervene directly in the governance of 
public companies, it has done so through clear statutory mandates.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \48\ 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); see id. (rejecting an 
interpretation of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 that ``would overlap and 
quite possibly interfere with state corporate law''); see also Bus. 
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408 (``[T]he Exchange Act cannot be 
understood to include regulation of an issue that is so far beyond 
matters of disclosure . . . and that is concededly a part of 
corporate governance traditionally left to the states.''). In 
section II.A.1.c below, we discuss how the structure and conditions 
of current Rule 14a-8, including its various eligibility criteria 
and bases for exclusion, can act to supplant State law voting 
rights.
    \49\ Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs., 
594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (``Our precedents require Congress to enact 
exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the 
balance between federal and state power . . . .'') (quoting U.S. 
Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass'n, 590 U.S. 604, 621-622 
(2020)).
    \50\ 905 F.2d at 408.
    \51\ Id. at 411 (citing S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1934)).
    \52\ Manuel Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public 
Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 119, 124 n.18 (1959) 
(``For some years after the passage of Securities Act of 1933, bills 
were introduced in the Senate proposing federal incorporation. None 
of these were enacted.''); Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall 
Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Modern Corporate Finance 205-10 (3d ed. Aspen Publ'rs 2003) 
(describing efforts by the Roosevelt administration to regulate 
corporate governance and its eventual abandonment); Symposium: 
Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 Geo. L.J. 89, 89 
n. 1 (1972) (collecting bills that would have established federal 
corporate chartering from the 1930s).
    \53\ See, e.g., Exchange Act section 10A(m) (directing the 
Commission to adopt rules requiring national securities exchanges to 
prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does not meet 
certain specified requirements related to audit committee procedures 
and independence) [15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m)]; Exchange Act section 14A 
(requiring public companies, among other things, to conduct a 
separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of 
executives, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K) [15 
U.S.C. 78n-1].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nor do the references to the ``public interest'' and ``protection 
of investors'' in section 14(a) provide a basis for the Commission to 
intrude into shareholder voting rights or corporate management. Courts 
have consistently recognized that ``public interest'' is not an open-
ended delegation of power; rather, such language ``must be limited to 
the purposes Congress had in mind when it enacted the legislation.'' 
\54\ Those statutory purposes are discerned from the text and context 
of the statute, which in turn cabin what is ``necessary or 
appropriate'' under the Commission's

[[Page 59909]]

rulemaking authority.\55\ In the context of section 14(a), this means 
that rules adopted under this provision must focus on the statute's 
core concern with regulating the proxy solicitation process and the 
disclosures within the solicitations--not on defining or reshaping the 
substantive scope of shareholder voting rights. The phrase ``protection 
of investors'' likewise cannot reasonably be construed to authorize the 
Commission to engage in such intrusions into State law.\56\ To read 
these terms otherwise would permit the Commission to use the Federal 
securities laws to supplement or override ``firmly established'' State 
law authority over shareholder rights--an approach that the Supreme 
Court has rejected absent explicit congressional authorization.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \54\ Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413 (quoting NAACP v. Fed. 
Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976)); see generally FCC v. 
Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. 656, 690 (2025) (explaining that the 
Supreme Court has ``long held that the words `public interest' in a 
regulatory statute do not encompass the general public welfare but 
rather take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory 
legislation'') (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also 
Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers 
with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, Release No. 33-11389 
(Sept. 17, 2025) [90 FR 45125 (Sept. 19, 2025)] (noting that courts 
have considered the scope of the public interest and investor 
protection standard in the context of the Federal securities laws 
and determined that, when applying this standard, it is only 
permissible to consider those matters over which the Commission has 
authority under the Federal securities laws).
    \55\ See Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 
(1989) (explaining that ``statutory language cannot be construed in 
a vacuum,'' but rather ``the words of a statute must be read in 
their context and with a view to their place in the overall 
statutory scheme'').
    \56\ See id.
    \57\ See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 
89 (1987).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Evolution of Rule 14a-8
    The earliest versions of the Commission's proxy rules enacted under 
section 14(a) focused on disclosure and providing shareholders with the 
means to specify the action to be taken pursuant to their proxies.\58\ 
In 1942, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-8's predecessor, Rule X-14A-7, 
which established a requirement that management include in the 
company's proxy materials a shareholder proposal that ``is a proper 
subject for action by the security holders.'' \59\ Although the 
Commission did not define ``proper subject'' in the rule, it issued a 
release in 1945 that contained a letter from Division of Corporation 
Finance Director Baldwin B. Bane explaining that the term referred to 
``such matters . . . as are proper subjects for stockholders' action 
under the laws of the [S]tate under which [the company] is organized.'' 
\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \58\ Release No. 34-378 (Sept. 24, 1935) 1935 WL 29270 
(requiring a ``brief description'' of the matters to be considered, 
together with the proposed action to be taken by the proxy holder, 
requiring the mailing of proxy materials to record owners at the 
requesting shareholder's expense, and prohibiting materially false 
or misleading statements under a general anti-fraud provision); 
Release No. 34-1823 (Aug. 11, 1938) [3 FR 1991 (Aug. 13, 1938)] 
(introducing the concept of the proxy statement that must be given 
to each person solicited, and requiring that each matter to be 
considered be subject to a separate yes or no vote).
    \59\ RuleX-14A-7 provided in pertinent part: ``In the event that 
a qualified security holder of the issuer has given the management 
reasonable notice that such security holder intends to present for 
action at a meeting of security holders of the issuer a proposal 
which is a proper subject for action by the security holders, the 
management shall set forth the proposal and provide means by which 
security holders can make a specification as provided in [the proxy 
rules].''17 CFR 240.14a-7 (1943). The 1942 rule also introduced the 
requirement that management, if it opposed the shareholder's 
proposal, include in its proxy materials the name and address of the 
proponent and a 100-word statement in support of the proposal, if 
requested by the proponent. Id. The maximum length of a proponent's 
supporting statement under Rule 14a-8 has been revised by the 
Commission on several occasions and is currently 500 words, 
inclusive of the proposal text.
    \60\ See 1945 Release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The letter responded to a company that sought exclusion of 
proposals relating to matters of a ``general political, social or 
economic nature'' and asked whether such proposals were a proper 
subject for shareholder action under Rule X-14A-7. Without referencing 
the laws of the State under which the company was organized, Director 
Bane stated that ``[i]t is my conclusion that the proposals which have 
been presented to you are not `proper subjects for action' by your 
company's stockholders within the meaning of that phrase as used in 
Rule X-14A-7. Consequently, it will be unnecessary for you to include 
the proposals in the management's proxy statement if you do not wish to 
do so.'' \61\ Director Bane also stated that ``[it] was not the intent 
of Rule X-14A-7 to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other 
stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political, 
social or economic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of 
such views.'' \62\ Whether intentionally or not, Director Bane's letter 
effectively positioned Rule X-14A-7 as a new Federal common law for 
shareholder voting rights, and the letter's informal understanding of 
whether a matter was ``a proper subject for action'' does not appear to 
have been based on the law of any particular State, let alone the State 
under which the company was organized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \61\ Id.
    \62\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In the years that followed, the Commission repeatedly amended what 
is now Rule 14a-8 in ways that progressively expanded the Commission's 
role in determining, interpreting, and effectively shaping matters 
traditionally governed by State law. As discussed above, the 1942 rule 
relied substantially on the concept of ``proper subject for action'' to 
determine which proposals must be included on the company's proxy. Due 
to a lack of relevant State laws to provide guidance on what was a 
``proper subject,'' as questions arose about the content of shareholder 
proposals, proponent conduct, and management objections, the Commission 
increasingly inserted Federal criteria in place of State law 
standards.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \63\ See Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 
659, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (noting that 
``the paucity of applicable state law giving content to the concept 
of `proper subject' led the Commission to seek guidance from 
precedent existing in jurisdictions which had a highly developed 
commercial and corporate law and to develop its own `common law' 
relating to proper subjects for shareholder action''); see also 
Hearings on Problems in Enforcing the Securities Laws Before a 
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 117-118 (1957) (``In the absence of a State statute 
establishing that a proposal is a proper subject for stockholder 
action, the Commission will rely on the common law if this can be 
ascertained. It will also consider other sources such as the 
corporate law of other States, particularly of the leading 
commercial States, as well as the decisions of the Federal courts, 
textbooks, law journals, and other similar material where the 
question may be discussed.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Through a series of amendments adopted in 1947 and 1948, the 
Commission required issuers to provide an explanation to the Commission 
when asserting that shareholder proposals were improper or untimely 
\64\ and introduced new bases for excluding such proposals.\65\ These 
amendments provide an early example of how the proxy rules began to 
delineate the limits of shareholder voting rights independent of State 
law. In particular, adding new exclusionary bases that went beyond 
whether a proposal was a ``proper subject for action'' under State law 
opened the door for more grounds for exclusion to be added, sometimes 
on a seemingly ad hoc basis in response to emergent issues. As a result 
of these and subsequent amendments, it became possible--as remains the 
case today--for there to be circumstances under which a shareholder's 
proposal is a ``proper subject for action'' and thereby permissible 
under State law but eligible for exclusion from the proxy materials 
under Rule 14a-8.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \64\ See Adoption of Revised Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4037 
(Dec. 16, 1947) [12 FR 8768 (Dec. 24, 1947)].
    \65\ See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-
4185 (Nov. 5, 1948) [13 FR 6678 (Nov. 12, 1948)] (``1948 Adopting 
Release'').
    \66\ See 1948 Adopting Release. For example, the 1948 amendments 
added provisions permitting exclusion on the basis of, among other 
things, a personal grievance or resubmission of a proposal. Thus, a 
proposal that may have been a proper subject for shareholder action 
under State law but that (1) could be characterized as submitted 
``primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or of 
redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its 
management'' or (2) was substantially the same proposal as was 
submitted for a vote of shareholders at the previous annual meeting 
(or any subsequent special meeting) that received less than three 
percent of votes cast could be excluded from a company's proxy 
materials. Id. at 6679. These exclusions remain, as subsequently 
revised, in the current rule. See 17 CFR 240.14a-8.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 59910]]

    Later amendments, including the 1952 exclusion for proposals 
promoting ``general economic, political, racial, religious, social or 
similar causes'' \67\ and the 1954 ``ordinary business'' exclusion,\68\ 
further entangled Federal criteria with State law requirements. The 
application of these criteria often required judgments about matters of 
boards' authority and shareholders' role in corporate decision-making. 
The 1954 amendments also restructured Rule 14a-8 such that the ``proper 
subject for action'' criterion was no longer a threshold qualification 
for the inclusion of a shareholder proposal; instead, it was re-framed 
as a basis permitting an issuer to exclude a proposal if it was not a 
proper subject for action under State law.\69\ Moreover, ``the burden 
of proof'' to make that showing was placed ``upon the management.'' 
\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \67\ See Amendment of Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4775 (Dec. 11, 
1952) [17 FR 11431 (Dec. 18, 1952)]. In 1972, the Commission revised 
the existing ``social policy'' exclusion relating to ``general 
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes'' 
to eliminate the formulation that focused on whether a proposal was 
submitted ``primarily for the purpose of'' promoting a particular 
cause. Solicitations of Proxies, Release No. 34-9784 (Sept. 22, 
1972) [37 FR 23178 (Oct. 31, 1972)]. In its place, the Commission 
adopted a broadened standard that turned on the relationship between 
the issuer and the subject matter of the proposal. Id. at 23179 
(permitting exclusion of a matter that is ``not significantly 
related to the business of the issuer or is not within the control 
of the issuer''). As the adopting release explained, the amendment 
sought ``to replace the subjective terms of the provision with 
objective standards to the extent feasible and thereby create 
greater certainty in the application of the rule.'' Id. at 23178. 
The Commission also made a corresponding revision to the personal 
grievance exclusion, removing similar language so that the two 
exclusions no longer required inquiry into a proponent's 
motivations. See id. at 23179.
    \68\ See 1954 Adopting Release.
    \69\ See id. Through this amended language, the 1954 amendments 
included in Rule 14a-8 for the first time an express reference to 
State law, which was previously referenced only in the 1945 Release.
    \70\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1976, the Commission reorganized the rule into the modern 
structure of 13 substantive exclusions.\71\ In doing so, the Commission 
made inclusion of shareholder proposals in the company's proxy 
materials dependent on, among other things, whether proposals relate 
significantly to an issuer's business or implicate areas of board and 
management discretion.\72\ Some of these exclusions were based on the 
Commission's interpretation of State law allocations of authority 
between shareholders and management, and the rest lacked any connection 
to State law.\73\ The Commission also added a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1) 
explaining that the propriety of a shareholder proposal under State law 
may depend on whether the proposal is precatory or mandatory, signaling 
broader Federal takeover in the purported application of State law 
concepts.\74\ The note, as discussed further in section II.A.1.c below, 
effectively created a presumption that precatory proposals are proper 
based on the Commission's own interpretation of State law, as opposed 
to deferring to States to resolve the question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \71\ See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by 
Security Holders, Release No. 34-12999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [41 FR 52994 
(Dec. 3, 1976)] (``1976 Adopting Release''). The 1976 amendments 
significantly changed the approach to the existing ``social policy'' 
exclusion. Specifically, the Commission removed from the exclusion 
the express references to ``economic, political, racial, religious, 
social, or similar causes.'' In the adopting release for the 
amendments, the Commission stated that those ``illustrative 
references'' to various causes were ``superfluous and unnecessary'' 
and that, in revising the provision, the ``substance'' of the 
existing exclusionary basis was retained. Id. at 52997.
    \72\ See, e.g., id. at 52998 (discussing the adoption of 
subordinate (i)(7) of Rule 14a-8--permitting exclusion of proposals 
dealing with a ``matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary 
business operations of the issuer''--and stating that matters that 
have ``significant policy, economic or other implications inherent 
in them'' were to be ``considered beyond the realm of an issuer's 
ordinary business operations'' and therefore not excludable under 
that subordinate).
    \73\ For example, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-8(i)(11) [17 
CFR 240.14a-8(i)(11)] to permit the exclusion of a proposal that 
substantially duplicates one previously submitted by another 
shareholder. The Commission explained that this rule was adopted 
``in order to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to 
consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted to 
an issuer by proponents acting independently of each other,'' 
without citing any connection to State law. See 1976 Adopting 
Release.
    \74\ See id. at 52996; 17 CFR 240.14a-8, Note to subordinate 
(c)(1) (1977).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission again modified the regulatory framework for 
shareholder proposals in 1983.\75\ The adopted amendments (including 
revisions to the relevance, resubmission, and personal grievance 
exclusions) and Commission interpretive guidance on the ordinary 
business and mootness exclusions largely preserved the central role 
that the Commission's understandings of shareholder authority and 
corporate decision-making--traditionally the province of State law--
played in the administration of the Commission's rule. Similarly, 
revisions made in 1998, while primarily structural and intended to 
improve readability by recasting the rule in a question-and-answer 
format, carried over the existing exclusionary framework.\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \75\ See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 
34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983) [48 FR 38218 (Aug. 23, 1983)]; see also 
Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-
19135 (Oct. 14, 1982) [47 FR 47420 (Oct. 26, 1982)] (``1982 
Proposing Release'') (proposing three alternative approaches to Rule 
14a-8).
    \76\ See 1998 Adopting Release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequent amendments--frequently relating to shareholder-proponent 
eligibility, resubmission thresholds, and procedural requirements--have 
continued to revise a Federal overlay that either constrains or expands 
the rights of shareholders to present a matter for a vote without any 
grounding in State law.\77\ Taken together, the evolution of Rule 14a-8 
demonstrates a consistent trend: over time, through rulemaking, the 
Commission has increasingly assumed responsibility for defining and 
interpreting standards that implicate core State law concepts of 
corporate governance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \77\ See, e.g., Procedural Requirements and Resubmission 
Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-89964 
(Sept. 23, 2020) [85 FR 70240 (Nov. 4, 2020)] (``2020 Adopting 
Release'') (amending requirements under the rule including 
resubmission thresholds and security ownership amounts for 
shareholder-proponent eligibility).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As this history illustrates, the evolution of current Rule 14a-8 
has taken the Commission from its original 1942 posture of deferring to 
State law on the scope of which matters are a proper subject for 
shareholder action to a regime in which the rule now purports to 
prescribe the ``few specific circumstances'' under which a company is 
``permitted to exclude'' a shareholder proposal, including a 
presumption that precatory proposals are ``proper unless the company 
demonstrates otherwise.'' \78\ Throughout this evolution, there has 
been little meaningful analysis of State law to justify the 
Commission's line drawing. Instead, the Commission has relied on 
generalized impressions of what State law requires or on inferences 
drawn from its own experience administering the Federal proxy rules to 
construct what is, in substance, a Federal standard governing when a 
shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder action. 
Nothing in the text or context of section 14(a) supports the 
Commission's authority to prescribe such a standard. Indeed, the plain 
and best reading of section 14(a) confirms that Congress did not grant 
the Commission such authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \78\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Authority Under Section 14(a)
    As discussed above, Rule 14a-8 dictates when a company ``must 
include'' a shareholder proposal in its proxy materials. The rule 
prescribes eligibility and procedural requirements that a shareholder 
must satisfy to have

[[Page 59911]]

a proposal included. It then identifies the bases on which a company 
may exclude a proposal. It also sets forth certain steps that a company 
must follow if it seeks to rely on one of those bases.\79\ 
Collectively, these provisions effectively operate as a Federal 
standard governing when a matter is properly put before shareholders 
for a vote through the proxy.\80\ Because section 14(a) empowers the 
Commission to regulate the proxy solicitation process--not codify its 
own understanding of State law rights as a matter of Federal law--Rule 
14a-8 exceeds the Commission's authority under section 14(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \79\ See supra section II.A.1.b.
    \80\ See Fisch 1993 at 1149-50 (``Many of the restrictions 
imposed by the proxy rules can be attributed to a pragmatic effort 
by the SEC to limit the number of shareholder proposals and to 
restrict use of the proxy statement to issues of general importance 
to shareholders. Although such limits may be desirable, they have no 
foundation in state or common-law restrictions regarding proper 
subjects to be raised at a shareholders' meeting. The SEC's 
authority to impose these restrictions on the use of the proxy 
mechanism is therefore unclear.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In its current form, Rule 14a-8(i) contains 13 substantive bases 
for exclusion. Of these, only Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and Rule 14a-8(i)(2) 
directly refer to State law by permitting exclusion when a proposal 
``is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of 
the jurisdiction of the company's organization,'' \81\ or when a 
proposal ``would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any 
[S]tate . . . law to which it is subject.'' \82\ The remaining 
exclusion bases codify criteria developed by the Commission--often 
evolving over time--regarding what matters are appropriate for 
inclusion in a company's proxy materials, some of which derived from 
the Commission's own interpretation of State law and the rest of which 
lacked any identified connection to State law.\83\ These criteria 
include the proposal's subject matter (such as matters relating to 
ordinary business operations, the director election process, or 
dividend amount determinations) and other considerations (such as the 
motivation of the proponent, economic relevance, duplication, 
substantial implementation, or the level of past shareholder 
support).\84\ Although some of these exclusion bases may intersect with 
concepts found in State law, they are not derived from, and do not 
consistently track, State law frameworks governing shareholder rights 
to present a proposal at a meeting for a vote by their fellow 
shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \81\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1).
    \82\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(2).
    \83\ See, e.g., 1982 Proposing Release at 47428-29 (discussing 
the origin of 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(7), the ordinary business 
exclusion).
    \84\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(3) through 240.14a-8(i)(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Even where Rule 14a-8 incorporates State law considerations in Rule 
14a-8(i)(1), the rule conditions that reference with a Commission-
created presumption that non-binding, precatory proposals are proper 
subjects for shareholder action under State law.\85\ This presumption, 
grounded in prior Commission staff ``experience,'' effectively places a 
thumb on the scale in favor of inclusion. A company bears the burden to 
overcome the presumption, but meeting that burden, in practice, is 
often difficult. State law is frequently undeveloped, ambiguous, or 
fact-specific with respect to shareholder proposals, and the company is 
required to submit an opinion of counsel supporting its views on State 
law, which may be particularly difficult to obtain when State law is 
silent on the subject. In these situations, companies could lack a 
meaningful pathway to meet their burden to rebut the presumption. As a 
result, what is framed as a presumption operates in substance as a 
mandate. Rather than looking or deferring to State law, the Commission 
has, instead, substituted its own judgment for which proposals are 
proper under State law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \85\ The current Note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1) reads as follows: 
``Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered 
proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if 
approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are 
cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take 
specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will 
assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is 
proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beyond the 13 substantive bases for exclusion and the presumption 
regarding precatory proposals, the overall structure of Rule 14a-8 
underscores its function as a de facto Federal standard for shareholder 
voting rights by specifying which shareholder proposals are appropriate 
for inclusion in company proxy materials. Rule 14a-8 has, over time and 
through successive revisions, evolved into a detailed framework that 
identifies the ``few specific circumstances'' in which a company is 
``permitted to exclude'' a shareholder proposal. As an illustration of 
how Rule 14a-8 has expanded in complexity over time, the predecessor to 
Rule 14a-8 was a little over 200 words whereas the current provision is 
over 3,000 words. Companies seeking to exclude a proposal must explain 
the basis for exclusion--often by citing one or more of the 13 
substantive grounds noted above--and, where the basis relies on State 
or foreign law, provide a supporting opinion of counsel.\86\ The rule 
also imposes numerous requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to 
require inclusion of a proposal in the company's proxy materials, 
including eligibility criteria based on the amount and duration of 
share ownership; a requirement that the shareholder (or a qualified 
representative) personally attend the meeting to present the proposal; 
and limits on the number and length of proposals.\87\ None of these 
requirements is grounded in State law.\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \86\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(j)(1), (j)(2)(iii).
    \87\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iv), (c).
    \88\ While the procedural and eligibility requirements may have 
been intended to foster an orderly process for the inclusion of 
proposals, because the Commission is not authorized by section 14(a) 
to interpose Federal criteria on shareholders' or companies' State 
law rights, these requirements similarly are not supported by our 
statutory authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Despite the Commission's stated goal of ``facilitat[ing] 
shareholders' exercise of [S]tate law rights'' \89\ and making the 
proxy process ``function[ ], as nearly as possible, as a replacement 
for an actual in-person gathering of security holders,'' \90\ these 
conditions and exclusions--which constitute the vast majority of Rule 
14a-8's provisions--bear little or no connection to whether the 
proposal is proper for a shareholder vote at the shareholder meeting 
under State law. Instead, these requirements create a complex Federal 
regime governing the rights of shareholders to present proposals for 
shareholder action that functionally supplants State law.\91\ Section 
14(a) does not empower the Commission to create such a regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \89\ 2007 Proxy Access Long Release at 43478.
    \90\ Id. at 43467.
    \91\ See Fisch 1993 at 1151 (``[B]oth in determining appropriate 
criteria for excluding shareholder proposals and in applying those 
criteria, the SEC does not replicate passively the annual meeting 
process by applying state law principles, but creates a federal 
common law as to what constitutes a proper subject for shareholder 
action. The SEC has thereby thrust itself into the role of 
determining the proper balance of power between management and 
shareholders.'') (citing Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities 
Regulation 537-38 (1983) (``Inevitably the Commission (normally its 
staff), while purporting to find and apply a general[ly] nonexistent 
state law, has been building a `common law' of its own as to what 
constitutes a `proper subject' for shareholder action.'')).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It might be argued that Rule 14a-8 does not dictate the scope of 
proposals submitted by one shareholder to be voted on by other 
shareholders but rather defines the conditions under which a 
shareholder may take advantage of the opportunity provided by Federal 
law to have a proposal included in the company's proxy materials.\92\ 
But, as

[[Page 59912]]

described above, by establishing standards not found in State law for 
whether a shareholder proposal must be included in a company's proxy 
materials, the Commission effectively dictates the scope of shareholder 
voting rights and, therefore, exceeds its authority. Because voting by 
proxy has largely replaced attendance at the shareholder meeting as the 
primary means of corporate suffrage, applying the Commission's 
determinations of whether and what shareholder proposals may properly 
appear on a company's proxy materials effectively alters the corporate 
voting process.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \92\ See, e.g., Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1959) 
(stating that Rule 14a-8 ``affords a privilege [to have a proposal 
included in the company's proxy statement], which does not otherwise 
ordinarily exist in favor of stockholders. Necessarily, the 
Commission could properly impose reasonable conditions and 
limitations on the scope and manner of enjoyment of the privilege, 
in relation to the other elements of holding stockholder meetings 
and conducting corporate affairs.'').
    \93\ See Fisch 1993 at 1170 (``[T]he SEC's proxy rules are not 
passive attempts to implement shareholders' state law rights in an 
increasingly large and impersonal voting system. Instead, the rules 
change the voting process, both by determining issues upon which 
shareholder democracy is appropriate and by structuring the way in 
which such democracy can be exercised.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By way of contrast, in the context of director elections, the 
Commission has facilitated the ability of shareholders to exercise the 
voting rights they have under State law. In 2021, the Commission 
adopted rules requiring the use of a universal proxy card in non-exempt 
solicitations involving director election contests.\94\ The foundation 
for the universal proxy rules is the right of shareholders--explicit in 
State law--to vote for the election of directors.\95\ Accordingly, the 
predicate question of whether under State law the proposal (i.e., the 
election of directors) is proper for a shareholder vote at the 
shareholder meeting is clearly answered by State law.\96\ To ensure 
that shareholders voting by proxy are able to participate in the 
election of directors in the same manner they could if voting in person 
at a shareholder meeting, the rule requires that a proxy card include 
the names of all duly nominated \97\ director candidates presented for 
election,\98\ thereby allowing shareholders voting by proxy in 
contested elections to replicate the vote they could cast if they voted 
in person. Such an exercise of the Commission's rulemaking authority 
under section 14(a) works in conjunction with State law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \94\ See Universal Proxy, Release No. 34-93596 (Nov. 17, 2021) 
[86 FR 68330 (Dec. 1, 2021)] (``Universal Proxy Release''). The 
universal proxy rules do not apply to solicitations involving 
director election contests for registered investment companies and 
business development companies.
    \95\ See Universal Proxy Release at 68330 (``State statutes 
require corporations to hold an annual meeting of shareholders for 
the purpose of electing directors. A shareholder's ability to 
participate in the election of directors is a fundamental right 
under state corporate law, and the process by which directors are 
elected is a fundamental aspect of corporate governance that is 
central to maintaining the accountability of directors to 
shareholders.'') (footnotes omitted).
    \96\ See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code section 600(b); 8 Del. C. 
section 211(b); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law section 602(c).
    \97\ See Universal Proxy Release at 68331-32 (noting that 
universal proxy cards ``must include the names of all duly nominated 
director candidates presented for election by any party . . .'' and 
explaining that ``[a] duly nominated director candidate is a 
candidate whose nomination satisfies the requirements of any 
applicable [S]tate or foreign law provision and a registrant's 
governing documents as they relate to director nominations'').
    \98\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-19(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is not always clear whether a matter is a proper subject for 
shareholder action under State law. In some instances, State law 
entitlements are relatively straightforward. For example, it is widely 
recognized that State law generally confers voting rights on equity 
shareholders in director elections but does not confer voting rights on 
bondholders in those elections.\99\ In other instances, applying State 
law can present difficult interpretive questions, even within a single 
jurisdiction. For example, it remains uncertain whether the Delaware 
General Corporation Law (``DGCL'') permits precatory proposals; the 
statute does not speak to the question.\100\ These difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that States vary in how they address particular 
governance matters.\101\ But section 14(a) does not authorize the 
Commission to resolve ambiguous questions of State law or to impose a 
uniform Federal standard. Indeed, doing so has inhibited and may 
continue to inhibit the development of State law by State legislatures 
and courts interpreting the law of the relevant States of 
incorporation, as we discuss below.\102\ Absent clear congressional 
direction to the contrary, State legislatures and courts interpreting 
State law are the appropriate bodies to develop and define the scope of 
shareholder rights.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \99\ Compare 8 Del. C. section 212 (granting voting rights to 
stockholders) with 8 Del. C. section 221 (authorizing a corporation 
to grant bondholders rights similar to those held by stockholders, 
including the right to vote, because such rights do not exist by 
default under State law).
    \100\ See Mohsen Manesh, The Corporate Contract & The Private 
Ordering of Shareholder Proposals, 50 J. Corp. L. 1, 29 (2024) 
(noting that the statutory text of the DGCL is silent as to whether 
shareholders have the right to make or vote on a precatory proposal) 
(``Manesh 2024''). See also Kyle A. Pinder, The Non-Binding Bind: 
Reframing Precatory Stockholder Proposals Under Delaware Law, 15 
Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 1 (2026), available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr/vol15/iss1/2 (concluding that 
Delaware law does not provide an inherent precatory proposal right).
    \101\ See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's 
Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement 
by Proposal, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 705 (2016) (``[T]here is an 
unfortunate degree of inconsistency from state to state as to which 
actions are deemed extraordinary and which are deemed ordinary. 
States are divided, for example, as to whether such basic matters as 
filing a lawsuit or executing a guarantee of another corporation's 
debts are ordinary or extraordinary.''). While many states have 
adopted the MBCA, its adoption is not universal, and some states 
have adopted it only in part. See American Bar Ass'n, Bus. Law 
Section, Model Business Corporation Act Resource Center, available 
at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/model-business-corporation-act/ (noting that 36 jurisdictions have adopted 
the MBCA in whole or in part).
    \102\ See section II.A.2.b.ii. See also Fisch 1993 at 1192-93 
(``The interdependence of the state and federal regulatory systems 
has several consequences. First, the mere existence of the federal 
proxy rules may have restrained the development of state corporation 
law in the area of voting regulation. A state statute that 
conflicted with the proxy rules might not be valid under the 
Supremacy Clause. Additionally, the federal rules subdue state 
motivation to legislate. State legislatures have become accustomed 
to leaving the regulation of the voting process to the SEC and defer 
to that agency's expertise. State and federal courts also have grown 
accustomed to viewing shareholder proxy rights as those rights 
defined by the SEC rules. In spite of the SEC's statements that its 
rules simply enable shareholders to realize state law rights, courts 
are loathe to recognize ballot access, information, or procedural 
rights that extend beyond those explicitly guaranteed by federal 
law.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission has, at times, noted that its authority to 
promulgate Rule 14a-8 under section 14(a) was upheld in 1947 in SEC v. 
Transamerica Corp.\103\ But in Transamerica, which upheld an 
application of the 1942 version of the rule, the scope of the 
Commission's authority under section 14(a) was not squarely presented 
or addressed. To the extent the court's analysis could be read to 
endorse a more expansive view of the Commission's authority than the 
Commission's interpretation in this release, the Commission disagrees 
with such a reading for the reasons discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \103\ 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); see, e.g., Shareholder 
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Release No. 34-
56161 (July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43488, 43489 n.8 (Aug. 3, 2007)]. But 
see 1954 Adopting Release (explaining that ``state law is to be the 
standard of eligibility of a proposal under the rule'' and that 
``[t]he Commission wishes to make it clear that it considers this 
standard consistent with [Transamerica]'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

d. Rule 14a-8 Should Be Rescinded
    An administrative agency must act within its statutory 
authority.\104\ As

[[Page 59913]]

discussed, Rule 14a-8 exceeds the plain and best reading of the 
Commission's rulemaking authority under section 14(a). Accordingly, we 
propose to rescind the rule. Furthermore, as discussed below, even if 
the Commission had the authority to adopt Rule 14a-8 or aspects of the 
rule, for independent policy reasons, the Commission is proposing to 
rescind the rule in its entirety.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \104\ See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. 
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6 (1986) (holding that an administrative 
agency, in this case the Federal Reserve Board, only has the power 
``to police within the boundaries of the [relevant authorizing 
statute]'' and not ``to expand its jurisdiction beyond the 
boundaries established by Congress''); West Virginia v. EPA, 597 
U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (``Agencies have only those powers given to 
them by Congress, and `enabling legislation' is generally not an 
open book to which the agency [may] add pages and change the plot 
line.'') (citation omitted); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 
302, 327-328 (2014) (stating that to avoid ``a severe blow to the 
Constitution's separation of powers,'' an agency must act within the 
bounds established by Congress and may not rewrite statutory terms 
``to suit its own sense of how [a] statute should operate''); City 
of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (``No matter how it is 
framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's 
interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply, 
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory 
authority.'') (italics in original); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (``In determining whether a challenged 
regulation is valid, a reviewing court must first determine if the 
regulation is consistent with the language of the statute.''); Stark 
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944) (``When Congress passes an Act 
empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental 
activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the 
authority granted.''); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 
F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that a Federal agency is a 
creature of statute, has no constitutional or common law existence 
or authority, and has ``only those authorities conferred upon it by 
Congress'') (italics in original) (citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We acknowledge that Rule 14a-8 has been in existence for many years 
and that both shareholders and companies are likely to have shaped 
certain governance and engagement practices around the rule's 
provisions. However, agencies may not add to their powers by adverse 
possession; longevity is not a substitute for legal authority. Indeed, 
the passage of time has seen Rule 14a-8 stray further from section 14's 
authorization. That said, to better understand the potential impact of 
rescinding Rule 14a-8 and possible measures to mitigate such impact, we 
are seeking comment on reliance interests in the current rule and on 
alternatives to complete rescission that would fall within our 
authority.
2. Policy Reasons for Rescinding Rule 14a-8
    Independent of our lack of statutory authority, there are also 
policy reasons for rescinding Rule 14a-8 in its entirety. Specifically, 
we believe that (i) many of the justifications that were originally 
provided to support adoption of Rule 14a-8 either have not been 
substantiated in practice or are less compelling today; (ii) Rule 14a-8 
has had, and will continue to have, certain unintended consequences; 
and (iii) retaining any version of Rule 14a-8--assuming the Commission 
were authorized to do so--is unwarranted and unlikely to avoid these 
unintended consequences.
a. Many of the Original Justifications for Adopting Rule 14a-8 Either 
Have Not Been Substantiated in Practice or Are Less Compelling Today
    When the Commission first adopted Rule 14a-8, Chairman Purcell 
stated that the rule was adopted with the understanding that (i) the 
cost to companies to include shareholder proposals in their proxy 
materials was ``small;'' \105\ (ii) many proposals were either already 
supported by management or received meaningful shareholder support; 
\106\ (iii) the overall volume of proposals was low; \107\ and (iv) the 
rights of shareholders to present certain matters for a vote to their 
fellow shareholders under State law was reasonably clear, such that the 
Commission's rules could operate to facilitate those rights.\108\ As 
discussed below, many of these justifications either have not been 
substantiated in practice or have become less compelling given the 
evolution of the shareholder proposal process, and ambiguity about the 
scope of shareholder voting rights under State law. In addition to 
these considerations, other developments, including the reduced burden 
in conducting independent solicitations and availability of other 
methods of shareholder engagement due to technological advancements, 
also may have rendered Rule 14a-8's original justifications less 
compelling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \105\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell (``It is a very small 
item of expense, so far as the company's funds are concerned and one 
that can very readily and rightfully be used for the purpose, it 
seems to us.'').
    \106\ See id. at 181 (``Many [shareholder proposals] have been 
accepted by managements, and others have secured respectable 
percentages of the votes cast.''). We were unable to confirm 
shareholder support rates for these earlier proposals.
    \107\ See id. (explaining that there had been ``no flood of 
stockholders' proposals'' around the time of the rule's adoption).
    \108\ See id. (describing a situation in which a company's 
chairman ruled a shareholder's floor proposal out of order, causing 
``so much opposition among the assembled stockholders that the 
chairman rescinded his ruling and permitted full discussion of the 
matter'' and observing that ``the stockholders made it clear that in 
that corporation, whether or not they agreed with their fellow 
stockholders, they believed that every stockholder should be given 
an opportunity to present his point of view to his fellow 
stockholders and to have them express their own judgment on its 
merits. This is the right that the State law intended to give 
stockholders and it is that right our rules protect and make a 
reality.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    First, the cost to companies of addressing and including 
shareholder proposals in proxy materials is no longer small. In 
response to commenter feedback on the proposing release to the 
Commission's 2020 amendments to Rule 14a-8, the Commission estimated 
that the cost to a company ranged from $20,000 to $150,000 per 
proposal.\109\ One recent survey found that the aggregate direct costs 
over a four-year period that companies incurred to comply with Rule 
14a-8 varied widely among 35 public company respondents: 20 percent 
reported four-year aggregate direct costs of less than $100,000; 25.7 
percent reported between $100,000 and $250,000; and 17.1 percent 
reported between $251,000 and $500,000.\110\ Nearly one-quarter 
reported aggregate, four-year costs exceeding $500,000, including 14.3 
percent reporting between $501,000 and $1,000,000 and 11.4 percent 
reporting more than $1,000,000 over that period.\111\ Another survey 
found that nearly 20 percent of the 35 responding companies, including 
some companies that have small market capitalization, noted that they 
spend over $500,000 in external costs addressing shareholder proposals 
in a typical proxy season.\112\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \109\ 2020 Adopting Release at 70245 n.63.
    \110\ See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Shareholder Proposal Survey: 
Report and Analysis of Results, University of Delaware, John L. 
Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance (Jan. 2026), at 4, 
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6045474. The report states that public 
companies responding to this survey were predominantly large 
capitalization or mega capitalization firms, drawn from diverse 
industries. The estimated costs may vary for other types of 
companies, such as investment companies.
    \111\ See id.
    \112\ See Business Roundtable, The Need for Bold Proxy Process 
Reform (Apr. 2025), available at https://www.businessroundtable.org/the-need-for-bold-proxy-process-reforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Companies incur costs, including internal time, as well as external 
legal and compliance expenditures.\113\ Companies also incur indirect 
costs associated with addressing shareholder proposals, including 
internal legal and administrative resources, management time, and 
opportunity costs from diverting management's attention away from core 
business operations, which may be substantial.\114\ These costs

[[Page 59914]]

ultimately are borne by the company's shareholders,\115\ who, in 
addition to absorbing the costs incurred by the company, face their own 
costs in analyzing and voting on proposals.\116\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \113\ See id.
    \114\ See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds 
under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-87458 (Nov. 5, 2019) 
[84 FR 66458, 66496 (Dec. 4, 2019)] (``2019 Proposing Release'') 
(``Shareholder proposals also impose opportunity costs on companies 
and their shareholders because management, the board, and the voting 
shareholders could spend the time spent on processing a shareholder 
proposal and voting on the proposal to engage in other value 
enhancing activities.''); Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the 
69th Nat'l Conf. of the Soc'y of Corp. Secretaries and Governance 
Professionals: Building Meaningful Communication and Engagement with 
Shareholders (June 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/building-meaningful-communication-engagement-shareholde 
[https://perma.cc/NQ8C-NRRE] (``Briefing boards [on shareholder 
proposals], analyzing issues and determining how to communicate the 
company's views to shareholders and markets take time and resources, 
as does hiring lawyers to analyze the proper interpretation of the 
Commission's grounds for exclusion and preparing communications with 
the staff.'').
    \115\ See Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and 
Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, 
Release No. 34-95267 (July 13, 2022) [87 FR 45052, 45067 (July 27, 
2022)] (``[C]ompanies may bear both direct costs and opportunity 
costs associated with the submission of a shareholder proposal, and 
these costs may be passed on to shareholders.''); 2020 Adopting 
Release at 70267 (``[A]ll shareholders may incur passed-through 
costs associated with companies' consideration and processing of 
shareholder proposals and experience the economic impact of 
shareholder proposals that are implemented.'').
    \116\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70277 (``[T]he costs to non-
proponent shareholders of analyzing and voting on shareholder 
proposals are significant.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, most shareholder proposals today do not receive majority 
shareholder support and are not supported by management. We estimate 
that approximately seven percent of submitted proposals and 11 percent 
of proposals that were voted on received majority shareholder support 
in 2025.\117\ It is also clear that management frequently opposes 
shareholder proposals today, as reflected in the number of proposals 
companies exclude from their proxy materials each proxy season,\118\ 
the number of proposals companies seek to exclude,\119\ and the 
opposition statements companies routinely include in their proxy 
materials to rebut proposals that are included and voted on.\120\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \117\ See infra section IV.B.3.a.
    \118\ See id. (noting that 22% of proposals were omitted from 
company proxy materials in 2025).
    \119\ For example, between Oct. 1, 2024 and Sept. 30, 2025, 
companies sought to exclude approximately 370 proposals. See U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Commission, Shareholder Proposals, available 
at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/shareholder-proposals.
    \120\ See Asaf Eckstein, The Rise of Corporate Guidelines in the 
United States, 2005-2021: Theory and Evidence, 98 Indiana L.J. 921 
(2023), available at https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol98/iss3/6/ (stating that boards choose to recommend against 
shareholder proposals that are included in a company's proxy 
statement ``most of the time'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, the volume of shareholder proposals has increased 
significantly over time in comparison to the increase in the number of 
companies required to file proxy statements.\121\ In contrast to the 
relatively low number of shareholder proposals included in company 
proxy materials between 1943 and 1946, which totaled between 34 and 
66,\122\ the annual number of shareholder proposals submitted to 
companies between 2020 and 2025 is estimated to have ranged from 697 to 
932, with an estimated 437 to 599 proposals included in company proxy 
materials each year.\123\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \121\ There were 1,467 proxy statements filed by companies in 
1943, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Thirteenth Annual 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 1947, 42 (1948), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1947.pdf, and we estimate that 6,043 proxy statements 
are filed by companies today, see section V.C.
    \122\ See Securities and Exchange Commission, Thirteenth Annual 
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Fiscal Year Ended 
June 30, 1947, 42 (1948), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1947.pdf (noting that the number of shareholder 
proposals included in company proxy statements was 66 in 1943, 38 in 
1944, 34 in 1945, and 34 in 1946).
    \123\ See Matteo Tonello, 2025 Proxy Season Review: From 
Escalation to Recalibration, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance 
(Sept. 15, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/09/15/2025-proxy-season-review-from-escalation-to-recalibration/ 
(estimating the total number of shareholder proposal submissions to 
be 697 proposals in 2020, 715 in 2021, 801 in 2022, 836 in 2023, 932 
in 2024, and 781 in 2025, while estimating the total number of voted 
shareholder proposals to be 437 in 2020, 419 in 2021, 538 in 2022, 
586 in 2023, 599 in 2024, and 462 in 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, when it adopted Rule 14a-8, the Commission appears to have 
assumed that it would be clear, or at least reasonably easy to 
determine, which matters are proper to present to shareholders for a 
vote under State law. However, State law is often unclear or silent as 
to what matters may be presented to shareholders. For instance, 
Delaware law is unclear about the status of precatory proposals--the 
most common type of Rule 14a-8 proposal.\124\ While section 211 of the 
DGCL states that, in addition to the election of directors, ``[a]ny 
other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting,'' it 
does not define what can be considered as ``proper business.'' \125\ 
Consequently, there is a diversity of opinion about whether the DGCL 
permits precatory proposals. While a number of commentators have 
observed that Delaware law does not explicitly authorize or contemplate 
precatory proposals as proper subjects for shareholder action,\126\ the 
question remains unresolved. For example, one scholar of Delaware law 
has stated that section 211 of the DGCL could be interpreted to 
authorize precatory proposals as proper \127\ and another legal scholar 
has argued that the authority to present and vote on precatory 
proposals is an ``incidental power[ ]'' derived from section 121 of the 
DGCL and the broader governance framework created by statute.\128\ 
Regardless of their views, no commentator has identified any 
controlling authority from a Delaware court on this issue, and the DGCL 
(like the MBCA) does not directly address the question as to whether 
precatory proposals are proper subjects for a shareholder vote.\129\ 
Moreover, even if Delaware law were clear on this issue, other States 
may take a different position.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \124\ See supra notes 16 and 100.
    \125\ See 8 Del. C. section 211; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act 
section 7.01.
    \126\ See e.g., Manesh, supra note 100, at 29 (``For one, there 
is nothing in Delaware's statute or caselaw establishing as 
`settled' public policy the right of shareholders to make or vote on 
a proposal at a shareholder meeting. As previously noted, the 
statutory text of the [Delaware General Corporation Law] makes no 
reference to such a right. And to the extent that right is 
recognized by case law, judicial references to it are scant and 
fleeting''); Pinder, supra note 100 (``[T]he Delaware General 
Corporation Law . . . does not contemplate (and thus does not 
expressly authorize) precatory stockholder proposals.''); Unofficial 
Transcript of the Roundtable Discussion Regarding the Federal Proxy 
Rules and State Corporation Law Before the Chairman and 
Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (May 7, 
2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf (``2007 Proxy Roundtable Transcript'') 
comment of Stanley Keller (``14a-8 in and of itself I think has 
created the non-binding proposal. I think as a matter of state law 
it really didn't exist outside of 14a-8''); cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some 
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. Law. 
1079, 1088 (2008) (``Strangely, precisely because state corporation 
laws do not contemplate non-binding stockholder votes on anything, 
the SEC has permitted non-binding or `precatory' proposals on 
virtually everything, including takeover defenses and executive 
compensation.'').
    \127\ See 2007 Proxy Roundtable Transcript, comment of Frank 
Balotti (``I think precatory resolutions are authorized by [section] 
211 [of the DGCL], which says that a stockholder can bring before a 
meeting anything that is proper for a stockholder to act on. I 
believe that it is proper for stockholders to ask directors to do 
whatever, as opposed to telling directors to do whatever.'').
    \128\ See Fisch et al., supra note 24.
    \129\ Despite the recent enactment of Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. 
section 21.373, Texas law similarly does not address this question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission appears to have underestimated the challenges 
associated with discerning and applying State corporate law when it 
adopted Rule 14a-8, leading to subsequent efforts to provide clarity 
through incremental amendments to the rule (such as, for example, 
through the current codified presumption regarding precatory proposals 
\130\). However, as explained in section II.A, when State law is 
unclear or silent as to what matters can be presented to shareholders, 
it is not the Commission's role to fill those gaps or impose

[[Page 59915]]

uniformity through the Federal proxy rules.
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    \130\ See Note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition to the specific considerations discussed above, other 
developments also may have rendered Rule 14a-8's original 
justifications less compelling. For example, independent solicitation 
may have become less burdensome due to, among other factors, 
technological and regulatory advancements, including the introduction 
of the Commission's e-proxy rules (i.e., notice and access).\131\ In 
2021, we estimated that the median basic cost of soliciting 
shareholders, namely, the proxy distribution fees and postage costs for 
the first mailing, was approximately $14,000.\132\ We also estimated 
that the costs of a nominal solicitation--where dissidents minimize 
their solicitation efforts and rely on the notice-and-access 
mechanism--would fall within a range of $5,300 to $9,800, with the 
specific cost dependent on the subject company's market 
capitalization.\133\ These estimates assumed that the dissident would 
meet the minimum 67 percent solicitation requirement under 17 CFR 
240.14a-19 (``Rule 14a-19''), the Commission's universal proxy rule, 
which is not applicable if a shareholder does not solicit proxies in 
support of director nominees other than the company's nominees.\134\ 
While estimating the total costs of a specific solicitation is 
challenging due to the variability of discretionary solicitation 
expenditures, we believe that technological and regulatory advancements 
have helped to facilitate independent solicitations.
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    \131\ See Broadridge, 2025 Proxy Season Key Stats and 
Performance Ratings (2025), available at https://www.broadridge.com/campaign/2025-proxy-season-key-stats-and-performance-ratings (noting 
that 90% of the proxy communications Broadridge processed were 
digital and that issuers and funds experienced an estimated $5 
billion in cost savings on paper and postage). The Commission's e-
proxy rules require issuers and other soliciting persons to post 
their proxy materials on an internet website and furnish notice of 
the materials' availability to shareholders. The notice and access 
model was intended to promote the use of the internet as a reliable 
and cost-efficient means of making proxy materials available to 
shareholders. See Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet 
Availability of Proxy Materials, Release No. 33-9108 (Feb. 22, 2010) 
[75 FR 9074 (Feb. 26, 2010)].
    \132\ See Universal Proxy Release, at 68359 (the Commission 
calculated this estimate based on industry data provided by a proxy 
services provider for a sample of 31 proxy contests from July 1, 
2018 through June 30, 2019).
    \133\ See id. at 68359 n.273. See Table IV in section IV.B.3.b 
for estimates of proxy solicitation costs between 2022 and 2025.
    \134\ Rule 14a-19 requires the use of universal proxy cards by 
companies and by persons soliciting proxy votes for their own 
candidates in contested director elections. The universal proxy card 
must include the names of all company and dissident director 
nominees. Rule 14a-19 establishes certain notice and filing 
requirements, as well as formatting and presentation requirements 
for universal proxy cards, and requires dissidents to solicit at 
least 67% of the voting power of shares entitled to vote on the 
election of directors. Rule 14a-19 does not apply, however, in a 
``zero-slate'' campaign in which the dissident does not nominate or 
solicit proxies for its own director nominees.
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    In addition, although the original purpose of Rule 14a-8 was not to 
facilitate shareholder engagement or communication, shareholders 
frequently use the rule for these purposes, as discussed in section 
II.A.2.b.i below. To the extent shareholders use Rule 14a-8 for these 
purposes, technological advancements have given rise to a wide range of 
alternative channels--such as online platforms and social media 
forums--that facilitate communication among shareholders, enable the 
expression of shareholders' views, and allow investors to attempt to 
influence corporate behavior.\135\ These means were not available when 
Rule 14a-8 was first adopted. Modern technology allows investors--
including smaller shareholders--to communicate both with management and 
fellow shareholders, mitigating concerns that rescinding Rule 14a-8 
would limit engagement to larger shareholders or those with more access 
to management or board members.\136\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \135\ See, e.g., Donna Fuscaldo, Say Gives Retail Investors A 
Voice And Tesla Listens, Forbes (Feb. 19, 2019), available at 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/donnafuscaldo/2019/02/19/say-gives-retail-investors-a-voice-and-tesla-listens/ (describing a digital 
platform that offers retail investors the ability to engage with 
companies they invest in); Seth C. Oranburg, A Little Birdie Said: 
How Twitter Is Disrupting Shareholder Activism, 20 Fordham J. Corp. 
& Fin. L. 695, 707 (2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544363 (``Activists can now access 
virtually all shareholders and influence public opinion through 
social networks, relatively unencumbered by reporting requirements 
under SEC rules.''); Taylor Nicole Rogers, Robby Starbuck: the 
activist pushing U.S. companies to ditch their DEI vows, Fin. Times 
(Sep. 5, 2024), available at https://www.ft.com/content/0c8974ee-60bf-4edb-839c-bc24b8ecbc81 (reporting on how a shareholder uses his 
social media presence to influence corporate initiatives).
    \136\ Cf. Fisch et al., supra note 24 (suggesting that 
eliminating precatory proposals would lead to only those with large 
share holdings or personal relationships with board members having 
access to the board).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Rule 14a-8 Has Had, and Will Continue To Have, Certain Unintended 
Consequences
i. Rule 14a-8 Has Become a Mechanism for Influencing the Interactions 
Between Companies and Their Shareholders in Ways That Are Inconsistent 
With the Rule's Original Purpose
    Under Rule 14a-8, a company is required to include a shareholder 
proposal in its proxy statement and form of proxy unless it can 
identify a basis to exclude it, in which case it must file with the 
Commission its reasons for exclusion.\137\ If a company excludes or 
attempts to exclude a proposal, it may be exposed to litigation 
risk.\138\ Proponents may thus use Rule 14a-8 in an attempt to gain 
leverage in negotiations with company management or to secure private 
benefits from such negotiations.\139\ Use of Rule 14a-8 in this way 
represents a departure from the rule's original purpose and implicates 
matters more appropriately addressed by State law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \137\ See supra section II.A.1.c.
    \138\ See, e.g., DiNapoli v. BJ's Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc., 
No. 26-cv-11075, 2026WL1762143 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2026); Heritage 
Found. & Am. Conservative Values ETF v. Airbnb, Inc., 1:25-cv-00676 
(D.Del. Feb. 12, 2026).
    \139\ See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and 
the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 Yale L.J. 262, 298-299 
(2016) (stating that shareholder proponents are incentivized to 
negotiate settlements because they ``may extract private benefits 
from settlements'' and that they may ``bring a proposal solely for 
the purpose of bargaining it away, or to put pressure on management 
to accede to a different demand'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For example, proponents may submit proposals to initiate a dialogue 
with a company when they have little or no intent for their proposals 
to actually be included in company proxy materials and voted on by 
fellow shareholders. In fact, many shareholder proposals today are 
resolved without a shareholder vote, suggesting that the Rule 14a-8 
process has deviated from its original purpose.\140\ For instance, 
based on available data, proponents withdrew their proposals at rates 
ranging from 18.4 percent to 32.1 percent during the four-year period 
between 2021 and 2025, with approximately 18 percent of proposals being 
withdrawn in 2025.\141\ Companies and proponents alike may have 
incentives to settle privately, rather than proceed to a shareholder 
vote.\142\ For companies, the perceived

[[Page 59916]]

advantages of private resolution may include reducing reputational risk 
associated with proposals, mitigating litigation risk related to 
statements made in opposition or in connection with exclusion, or 
avoiding the potentially greater costs associated with either including 
a proposal in the proxy materials or seeking to exclude it under the 
Commission's rules.\143\ For proponents, reaching a settlement can 
provide a more certain path to achieving a tangible outcome since 
shareholder proposals are typically non-binding even when they receive 
majority support.\144\ The frequent withdrawal of shareholder proposals 
as part of the Rule 14a-8 process does not fully align with Congress's 
intent that section 14(a) and the Federal proxy rules promote ``fair 
corporate suffrage.'' \145\ Rather than having their proposals reach a 
shareholder vote through the proxy process, proponents often utilize 
the existence of the rule as leverage for private negotiations with 
companies, while company management may also find it advantageous when 
proposals are withdrawn.\146\
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    \140\ See id. at 293 (``[I]n virtually all cases, the private 
settlement of a proposal undercuts the basic justifications for the 
shareholder-proposal framework under Rule 14a-8.'').
    \141\ See Subodh Mishra, 2025 U.S. Governance Post-Season Review 
Evolving Priorities in a Shifting Landscape, ISS STOXX, Harv. L. 
Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Oct. 15, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/10/13/2025-u-s-governance-post-season-review-evolving-priorities-in-a-shifting-landscape/ (explaining 
that, of proposals submitted from Jan. 1 to June 30, 2025, 58% were 
voted on, 23.6% were omitted from the proxy statement, and 18.4% 
were withdrawn or not presented). Note that these numbers do not 
represent the full scope of withdrawn proposals, such as proposals 
that were withdrawn before companies filed no-action requests to 
exclude them from their proxy materials.
    \142\ Cf., e.g., Ross Kerber, This conservative activist is no 
fan of Trump's SEC, Reuters.com (Mar. 4, 2026), available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/this-conservative-activist-is-no-fan-trumps-sec-2026-03-04/ (quoting a shareholder proponent as saying, 
``[C]ompanies hate shareholder proposals. They're a nuisance to 
them. Usually somebody's bringing it because they have a criticism 
of the company and they just, they want to do everything they can 
that's possible to get the proponent to withdraw. So if they can 
work out some kind of minimally painful step to [get] us to 
withdraw, they do it.'').
    \143\ See Haan, supra note 139, at 293-297; see also Kobi 
Kastiel and Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, 94 
So. Cal. L. Rev. 569, 617 (2021).
    \144\ See Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs 
and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst. 
(Nov. 2019), available at https://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalgantchevgiannetti_2.pdf 
(``Gantchev Article'') (noting that an ``overall low implementation 
rate'' of approximately 16% of proposals ``indicates that management 
may choose not to implement proposals even when they are approved by 
a majority of the voting shareholders''); see also John G. Matsusaka 
et al., Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from 
Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action -Letter Decisions, 64 
J.L. & Econ. 107, 110 (2021), available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/710828 (``When a proposal 
is withdrawn, it often means that the company granted some 
concession to the proponent, who in exchange withdrew the 
proposal.'').
    \145\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
    \146\ See., e.g., Ross Kerber, Shareholder activist Behar says 
Trump is `disassembling capitalism,' Reuters.com (Jan. 21, 2026), 
available at https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/shareholder-activist-behar-says-trump-is-disassembling-capitalism-2026-01-21/ (quoting a shareholder 
proponent as saying ``Most companies will have a dialogue. There are 
those where you have to escalate by filing a resolution, about half 
of those then say, `OK, if you withdraw it, we'll take some action.' 
Then there are the really resistant ones, about 25% or so, that you 
have to go to a vote . . . We've had some of our biggest wins at 6% 
(support), we've had some of our biggest losses at 80%. We want to 
bring forth new ideas.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, Rule 14a-8 can serve as a mechanism for shareholder 
proponents to advance interests that in many cases may not be shared by 
a company's shareholders at large. For instance, in 2025, only 56 out 
of 786 submitted proposals (seven percent) received majority 
support.\147\ In addition, a significant proportion of shareholder 
proposals are submitted by a small number of proponents who advance 
substantially similar proposals across numerous companies.\148\ In 
2025, 10 shareholder proponents submitted an aggregate of 58 percent of 
all proposals (455 out of 786).\149\
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    \147\ The data cover proposals submitted for meetings held in 
calendar year 2025. Data is retrieved from the FactSet 
SharkRepellent Proxy Proposal dataset, which includes around 5,000 
U.S.-incorporated public companies and some foreign-incorporated 
companies. Unless otherwise specified, we exclude from our analysis 
shareholder proposals that are not subject to Rule 14a-8, such as 
proposals related to proxy contests and other proposals appearing in 
dissident shareholders' proxy soliciting material, proposals that 
were raised from the floor of the annual or special meetings and 
were not submitted to appear in the companies' proxy statements, and 
proposals submitted for a vote at meetings of foreign private 
issuers, as defined in 17 CFR 240.3b-4, which are not subject to the 
Federal proxy rules. See section IV.B.3.a.
    \148\ See Gantchev Article supra note 144 (``The press has 
widely reported that a small group of individuals, often referred to 
as corporate gadflies, submits a disproportionate number of 
proposals. These individual sponsors, such as John Chevedden and 
William Steiner, do not acquire large stakes and are not 
particularly wealthy, but submit dozens of shareholder proposals 
every year, convinced that `it is the right thing to do.' ''); see 
also Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate 
Gadflies, 94 So. Cal. L. Rev. 569, 591 (2020) (reporting that five 
individual investors accounted for almost 40% of shareholder 
proposals submitted to S&P 500 companies in 2018). See section 
IV.B.3.a.
    \149\ See supra note 147 for source of the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Such use is counter to how the Commission intended the rule to be 
used. For example, when the rule was first adopted, Chairman Purcell 
explained, ``[I]f [a shareholder proponent] were going to use the 
corporate proxy machinery for making a stump speech for some political 
party, that obviously is without the spirit of [the rule] . . . .'' 
\150\ The Commission also subsequently noted that it did not intend for 
the rule to be used as a ``publicity mechanism'' for advancing personal 
or partisan interests unrelated to the interests of a company's 
shareholders.\151\ Yet Rule 14a-8 often serves as a stump from which, 
figuratively, a small number of shareholders give speeches.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \150\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell.
    \151\ See, e.g., 1982 Proposing Release at 47422 n.8 (explaining 
that ``the rule was not designed to burden the proxy solicitation 
process by requiring the inclusion'' of proposals submitted by 
proponents ``us[ing] the rule as a publicity mechanism to further 
personal interests that are unrelated to the interests of security 
holders as security holders'').
    \152\ See, e.g., Business Roundtable, supra note 112 (``One 
repeat proponent openly stated they would not withdraw their 
proposal, not due to company-specific concerns, but because keeping 
it on the proxy statement provided a larger platform for their 
cause.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Furthermore, since Rule 14a-8 includes substantive and procedural 
bases that companies may use to exclude proposals that otherwise may be 
permitted under State law, companies may seek to use the rule to 
exclude proposals they disfavor or to limit shareholder involvement in 
corporate affairs. The various default positions, bases for exclusion, 
and eligibility criteria have made Rule 14a-8 a contested vehicle for 
influencing corporate governance practices and other corporate 
behavior. However, the allocation of power between shareholders and 
management, as well as determinations about the appropriate role of 
shareholder advocacy in corporate governance, are matters for the 
States to resolve and not the appropriate province of the 
Commission.\153\
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    \153\ See Fisch 1993 (explaining that Rule 14a-8 permits 
shareholder proposals to be excluded from company proxy materials 
for reasons that are not grounded in State law, discussing the 
rule's role in shaping corporate governance, and describing the role 
of Federal and State law in regulating proxy solicitations and 
shareholder voting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. The Existence of Rule 14a-8 Places the Commission in the Position 
of Making Judgments About the Application of State Law That Are Best 
Left to Other Actors
    In our experience, Rule 14a-8 has drawn the Commission into matters 
that should be addressed by State legislatures, courts, and, if 
permitted by relevant State law, companies.\154\ Although certain 
aspects of State law may be clear--for example, State law generally 
affords shareholders the right to elect directors \155\ and amend the 
bylaws \156\--many other areas contain

[[Page 59917]]

gaps, ambiguities, or conflicting interpretations. State legislatures 
and courts--not the Commission--are the appropriate authorities to 
resolve those gaps, ambiguities, and conflicts. Similarly, it is not 
the Commission's role to synthesize potentially conflicting State laws 
for purposes of administering the Federal proxy rules. For example, 
State corporate codes are silent as to whether precatory proposals are 
proper to present for a shareholder vote.\157\ Historically, however, 
in assessing whether a proposal is a proper subject for shareholder 
action under State law, the Commission has assumed precatory proposals 
are presumptively proper.\158\ The Commission cannot provide definitive 
answers to State law questions. Such questions are properly decided by 
courts, with the highest court in each State exercising final authority 
on questions of State law.\159\ More generally, we do not believe that 
section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to direct or influence 
substantive corporate governance matters that fall within the purview 
of State legislatures, courts, and the private ordering mechanisms 
established in a company's governing documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \154\ See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A 
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879, 910 
(1994) (citing then-Commissioner Richard Roberts who stated that 
``it is neither fair nor reasonable to expect securities experts to 
deduce the prevailing wind on public policy issues that have yet to 
be addressed by Congress in any decisive fashion.'').
    \155\ See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the 
Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev 407 (2006), available at https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1314&context=law_faculty_scholarship (noting 
that the right to elect directors is a fundamental right of 
shareholders); 8 Del. C. section 109(a) (``the power to adopt, amend 
or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.'').
    \156\ See Albert H. Choi et al., Contractarian Theory and 
Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, 104:1 Iowa L. Rev 1, 36 (2018), 
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024873 (stating that under 
both the MBCA and DGCL, the shareholders' right to amend bylaws 
cannot be restricted).
    \157\ See, e.g., supra note 100.
    \158\ See supra section II.A.1.c.
    \159\ See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177 
(1940). Decisions by courts, not the Commission, provide precedent 
that proponents and companies may appropriately rely on going 
forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The continued existence of a Federal rule governing shareholder 
proposals--even one that purports facially to defer to State law--
encourages companies and shareholders to look to the Commission to 
resolve ambiguities in the application of such rule. Moreover, because 
the Commission has authority to bring actions to enforce compliance 
with the proxy rules, including Rule 14a-8, companies inevitably turn 
to the Commission and its staff for guidance on the application of the 
Federal rule.\160\ As a result of the foregoing, State authorities who 
are the appropriate bodies to resolve corporate governance matters may 
have little incentive or occasion to provide clarity on the role of 
shareholder proposals. This dynamic is reflected in the fact that, with 
the recent exception of Texas,\161\ no State has adopted legislation 
governing shareholder proposals in more than 80 years since Rule 14a-8 
was first adopted, and we are not aware of any companies that have 
incorporated their own framework for addressing shareholder proposals 
into their governing documents.\162\ Under the proposed rescission of 
Rule 14a-8, the Commission would continue to oversee the Federal proxy 
process but would no longer determine which shareholder proposals must 
be presented to shareholders through a company's proxy materials. 
Removing the Commission from the shareholder proposal process would 
ensure that the appropriate bodies--i.e., State legislatures, courts, 
and, when permitted by relevant State law, companies--determine the 
circumstances under which proposals should be included in a company's 
proxy materials.
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    \160\ As discussed in section IV.B.3.a, during the 2022-2025 
period, companies submitted 1,073 no-action requests to the 
Commission to exclude shareholder proposals submitted under Rule 
14a-8 (corresponding to 33 percent of all proposal submissions).
    \161\ See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. section 21.373 (for eligible 
publicly traded companies that opt in, requiring a shareholder or 
group of shareholders to hold a minimum amount of a company's 
securities for a minimum amount of time, and to solicit a minimum 
percentage of shares entitled to vote on the proposal, in order to 
submit a matter for a shareholder vote).
    \162\ We are, however, aware of a small number of companies that 
have recently opted into Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. section 21.373.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. The Presence of a Federal Rule Has Inhibited the Development of 
State Law and Private Ordering
    Although States can enact laws determining the appropriate role of 
shareholder proposals and establishing whether and to what extent 
shareholders have access to company proxy materials for their 
proposals, they have largely declined to do so. As discussed above, 
Rule 14a-8 was not intended to displace State law; rather, it was 
originally designed to facilitate State law rights through a Federal 
disclosure and proxy solicitation framework.\163\ Although the rule has 
evolved over time in ways that stray from this original intent, a 
remnant of this principle remains in Rule 14a-8(i)(1), which expressly 
permits companies to exclude proposals that are ``not a proper subject 
for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the 
company's organization.'' \164\ Accordingly, where State law sets forth 
standards governing which proposals may be presented for a vote of 
shareholders, a proposal not meeting those standards is excludable 
under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) as ``not a proper subject for action by 
shareholders.'' \165\ Similarly, if permitted by State law, companies 
can adopt standards in their governing documents, such as establishing 
company-specific ownership thresholds for presenting proposals for 
shareholder action or limits on the types of proposals that may be 
presented, and a proposal not complying with those requirements could 
be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(1).\166\ For example, if State law or a 
company's governing documents (if permitted by State law) were to 
disallow precatory shareholder proposals, then a company may exclude 
such precatory proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \163\ See section II.A.1.a.
    \164\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1).
    \165\ See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of 
Directors, Release No. 34-56914 (Dec. 6, 2007) [72 FR 70450 (Dec. 
11, 2007)] (``With respect to subjects and procedures for 
shareholder votes, most state corporation laws provide that a 
corporation's charter or bylaws can specify the types of proposals 
that are permitted to be brought before the shareholders for a vote 
at an annual or special meeting. Rule 14a-8(i)(1) supports these 
determinations by providing that a proposal that is not a proper 
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the 
jurisdiction of the corporation's organization may be excluded from 
the corporation's proxy materials.''); see also Shareholder 
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Release No. 34-
56161 (July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43488, 43490 (Aug. 3, 2007)] (same).
    \166\ See supra notes 161 and 162.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although current Rule 14a-8(i)(1) accommodates the ability of 
States and their domiciled companies to tailor the shareholder proposal 
process to reflect their own views about the optimal approach to 
corporate governance and the particular circumstances of the company 
and its shareholders, States and companies have, with one notable 
exception, generally declined to exercise this authority to date.\167\ 
This reluctance may stem from concerns that adopting standards that 
deviate from those in Rule 14a-8 could bring unwanted public attention 
and criticism from investors and other parties. In this regard, State 
authorities may be disinclined to undertake politically contentious 
decisions and companies may fear that adopting such standards could 
lead to accusations of disenfranchising shareholders, trigger organized 
investor campaigns, and/or

[[Page 59918]]

result in voting recommendations against board nominees by proxy 
advisory firms. Indeed, simply being singled out as insufficiently 
responsive to a perceived shareholder right could impose reputational 
costs for companies.\168\ Despite the capacity of States to enact laws 
and companies to engage in private ordering under Rule 14a-8(i)(1), 
there have been only limited efforts to tailor the modern shareholder 
proposal regime.\169\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \167\ But see supra notes 161 and 162. We also note that 
companies have sought to exclude shareholder proposals based on 
limitations in their governing documents about what matters 
shareholders may vote on. See, e.g., Senior Hous. Props. Tr., SEC 
Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 530450 (Mar. 13, 2019) (agreeing 
with the company that a proposal could be omitted from the proxy 
statement under 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b), which, among other things, 
requires a proponent to hold ``securities to be entitled to vote on 
the proposal,'' because the company's governing documents limited 
the matters shareholders could vote on and the proposal dealt with a 
matter that was not within the enumerated list of matters as to 
which shareholders were entitled to vote on); RAIT Financial Trust, 
SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 373305 (Mar. 20, 2017) 
(similar); Scripps Networks Interactive, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action 
Letter, 2016 WL 390053 (Jan. 14, 2016) (agreeing with exclusion of a 
proposal where the company had multiple classes of stock and the 
proponent owned a class of common shares that were not entitled to 
vote on the proposal).
    \168\ See Manesh 2024 (``The risk of political backlash, 
resistance among investors, and other practical considerations may 
lead some, perhaps most, companies to leave shareholder proposal 
rights untouched.'').
    \169\ See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, despite prior Commission statements to the 
contrary,\170\ some uncertainty may exist as to whether States and 
companies can establish shareholder proposal standards that differ from 
those set forth in Rule 14a-8.\171\ Part of this uncertainty may stem 
from an early judicial decision--SEC v. Transamerica Corp.\172\--which 
some have interpreted as holding that Rule 14a-8 preempts State law and 
privately ordered procedures governing the submission of shareholder 
proposals.\173\ Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would eliminate any implication 
of preemption stemming from Transamerica or otherwise and thus remove 
that potential disincentive for States to develop their own laws 
governing shareholder proposals. To the extent some believe that Rule 
14a-8 currently preempts State law, we expect that if the rule were 
rescinded, States and/or companies, in compliance with State law, would 
be more inclined to adopt their own standards for when shareholder 
proposals must be included in, or may be excluded from, the company's 
proxy materials.
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    \170\ See supra note 165; but see 1982 Proposing Release. By 
proposing, in the 1982 Proposing Release, a new rule that would have 
allowed companies and their shareholders to establish customized 
requirements for submitting and including shareholder proposals in 
the company's proxy materials--subject to shareholder approval, 
periodic reapproval, and potentially certain minimum ownership and 
other requirements--the Commission may have suggested that the 
Federal rule preempts State law.
    \171\ See, e.g., Elizabeth Ising, Ronald Mueller & Julia 
Lapitskaya, Considerations for Shareholder Proposals in a Post-
Rule14a-8 World, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (June 15, 2026), 
available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/15/considerations-for-shareholder-proposals-in-a-post-rule-14a-8-world/#10 (``As Rule 14a-8 has increasingly contained provisions that are 
not reflected in state corporate laws, it has become unclear whether 
and to what extent Rule 14a-8 preempts state law.'').
    \172\ 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
    \173\ See, e.g., Jill Fisch, The Transamerica Case, The Iconic 
Cases in Corporate Law (Jonathan Macey, ed. 2008) (stating that the 
court ``concluded that any issuer-specific limitations on the 
shareholder voting power conferred by [Rule 14a-8] were improper'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, we note that, to the extent State law or a company's 
governing documents were to require inclusion of a shareholder proposal 
in a company's proxy statement, the company would be required to comply 
with the Commission's proxy rules with respect to that proposal.
c. Retaining Rule 14a-8 Is Unwarranted and Unlikely To Avoid Unintended 
Consequences
    Even if the Commission had authority to retain some version of Rule 
14a-8, doing so would require the Commission to establish certain 
baseline assumptions, such as whether shareholder proposals should, by 
default, be included in or excluded from a company's proxy materials. 
Whatever default rule the Commission were to select--inclusion or 
exclusion--would establish the starting point for how disputes are 
resolved. The rule also would have to articulate what a company or a 
shareholder must do to opt out of the default. In doing so, the rule 
necessarily would advantage one side over the other by shaping the 
burdens of persuasion and the practical likelihood of success. Such a 
structural choice, even if made with the intention of neutrality, would 
have the practical effect of shaping how companies and shareholders 
interact, negotiate, and ultimately view the costs and utility of the 
shareholder proposal process.
    Even if the Commission could attempt to amend the rule to 
completely defer to State law, in practice we do not believe such an 
alternative would address our fundamental concern about the 
Commission's entanglement in State law issues. So long as a Federal 
rule remains, experience has shown that parties will continue to look 
to that rule--and the Commission--to resolve questions about the 
inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company's proxy materials given 
the greater uniformity offered by a Federal framework and 
notwithstanding the fact that State law determines the proper scope of 
a shareholder's power to present a proposal to their fellow 
shareholders for a vote.\174\ The history of Rule 14a-8 underscores 
this dynamic as, over time, the Federal rule has become the primary 
reference for determining the scope, operation, and limits of 
shareholder proposals, effectively displacing the authority of State 
law notwithstanding the Commission's disclaimers of any intention to do 
so. Thus, even if the Commission had the authority to retain a version 
of Rule 14a-8--with the clear intention of deferring to State law--over 
time it would inevitably be drawn into matters that should be left to 
States or private ordering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \174\ See supra note 102.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we do not believe that retaining such a version of 
Rule 14a-8 would be warranted. We expect that total rescission of the 
rule would lead the States and/or (where authorized by State law) 
companies to be more inclined to adopt their own standards in this 
area. State courts are the proper venue to resolve any disputes that 
may arise directly based on State law and the terms of corporate 
governance documents, without need for a Federal rule that would itself 
necessarily incorporate State law (and risk overriding it). 
Accordingly, we believe it is prudent for the Commission to defer to 
States and companies to determine if, and under what circumstances, 
shareholder proposals must be included in company proxy materials.\175\
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    \175\ To the extent the Commission has previously suggested that 
the mere omission of a shareholder proposal from a company's proxy 
materials could render those materials materially false or 
misleading in the absence of a rule like Rule 14a-8, we disagree. 
Cf. Statement of Chairman Purcell (``The proxy statement purports to 
tell the stockholders everything that is going to be taken up at the 
meeting. The management knew [shareholder] proposals were going to 
be taken up at the meeting. It knew that it intended to oppose them. 
Any [proxy] statement which did not include those proposals and the 
position of the management was obviously misleading, because the 
soliciting material purported to tell the stockholders everything 
that is going to be taken up at a meeting that management knew 
about.''). The omission of a shareholder proposal from a company's 
proxy materials or the failure to disclose that it will be 
considered at the meeting is generally not, without more, materially 
false or misleading. Cf. Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475 (5th 
Cir. 2020) (rejecting a pure-omissions theory under Rule 14a-9); cf. 
also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239, n.17 (1988) (``Silence, 
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.''); 
Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners LP, 601 U.S. 257, 
266 (2024) (holding that pure omissions are not actionable under 
Rule 10b-5(b)). There could, however, be situations where the 
failure to disclose a shareholder proposal could be false and 
misleading under the circumstances. If, for example, management were 
to state that it was unaware of any other business to come before 
the meeting when it had in fact been advised that a shareholder 
intended to present a matter, such statement may be materially false 
and misleading in the context of soliciting discretionary voting 
authority for such matter.
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3. Investment Company Considerations
    Section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act includes substantially 
the same language as section 14(a) but relates to proxies, consents, or 
authorizations in respect of any security issued by registered 
investment companies. The Commission has used the authority under 
section 20(a) of the

[[Page 59919]]

Investment Company Act to adopt a rule that requires any proxy, 
consent, or authorization with respect to any security issued by a 
registered investment company to comply with the rules and regulations 
adopted pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.\176\ As a 
result, registered investment companies are subject to Rule 14a-8 
regardless of whether they have a class of equity securities registered 
under section 12 of the Exchange Act.
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    \176\ 17 CFR 270.20a-1.
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    We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 for all companies, including 
registered investment companies and business development companies 
\177\ (together, ``regulated funds''). We recognize that the regulatory 
framework for regulated funds is different from that of other companies 
that have a class of equity securities registered under section 12 of 
the Exchange Act (``operating companies''). In particular, the 
Investment Company Act provides regulated fund shareholders with voting 
rights that are independent of State law corporate governance 
provisions.\178\ For example, section 18(i) of the Investment Company 
Act requires that, with limited exceptions, every share of investment 
company stock must ``be a voting stock and have equal voting rights 
with every other outstanding voting stock.'' \179\ In addition, several 
provisions of the Investment Company Act require shareholder approval 
by vote on matters such as changes to an investment company's 
fundamental investment policies, approval of an investment company's 
advisory contract, or certain director elections.\180\ Moreover, any 
investment advisory agreement with a regulated fund must provide that 
it may be terminated at any time by vote of a majority of the 
outstanding voting securities.\181\
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    \177\ Business development companies are a category of closed-
end investment company that do not register under the Investment 
Company Act but rather elect to be subject to the provisions of 
sections 55 through 65 of the Investment Company Act. See section 
2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48)].
    \178\ See New Germany Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (May 8, 1998) 
(the Commission declined to provide a no-action position with 
respect to a fund's request to exclude a shareholder proposal to 
terminate the fund's advisory agreement based on the argument that 
State law vested in the board exclusive authority to terminate the 
agreement and noted that ``Section 15(a)(3) of the [Investment 
Company] Act confers independent authority on the Fund's 
shareholders to terminate the Fund's investment advisory agreement 
at any time'').
    \179\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-18(i). See also 15 U.S.C. 80a-18(a) 
(providing an exception for specific voting rights of holders of any 
senior security of a closed-end fund that is stock, e.g., preferred 
stock).
    \180\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80a-13, 80a-15, 80a-16. Business 
development companies are subject to some of these shareholder 
voting requirements to the same extent as registered investment 
companies and have some separate shareholder voting requirements 
under the Investment Company Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80a-57, 80a-
58.
    \181\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-15(a), 80a-58 (applying section 15(a) to a 
business development company to the same extent as if it were a 
registered closed-end investment company).
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    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would not affect the status 
or applicability of these statutory voting rights.\182\ The fact that 
Congress established voting rights in these instances, however, does 
not alter the scope of the Commission's authority over the solicitation 
of proxies.\183\ While section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act, 
like section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides authority to regulate 
the proxy solicitation process, section 20(a) does not empower the 
Commission to expand upon or restrict the scope of shareholder voting 
rights.\184\ By establishing standards for when a shareholder proposal 
must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's proxy 
materials that are neither grounded in State law nor authorized by 
other statutory provisions, Rule 14a-8 effectively dictates the scope 
of shareholder voting rights at regulated funds. Thus, Rule 14a-8 
exceeds the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate the proxy 
solicitation process with respect to regulated funds just as with 
respect to operating companies.
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    \182\ For example, following any rescission of Rule 14a-8, 
proponents wishing to terminate an advisory agreement would remain 
free to present a proposal to that effect at a meeting of 
shareholders or conduct an independent proxy solicitation with 
respect to such a proposal.
    \183\ Indeed, the fact that Congress mandated certain voting 
rights for shareholders of regulated funds under the Investment 
Company Act only underscores that when Congress intends to intervene 
in corporate governance matters, it does so expressly.
    \184\ For the avoidance of doubt, this release addresses the 
scope of the Commission's authority to regulate the proxy 
solicitation process under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and 
section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act. It does not relate to 
or address the scope of any other authorities available to the 
Commission under those statutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Apart from legal authority considerations, we recognize that 
regulated funds' experiences with shareholder proposals differ in some 
respects compared to operating companies. For example, regulated funds 
generally receive fewer shareholder proposals than other types of 
companies and, on average, the shareholder proposals that regulated 
funds receive gain higher levels of shareholder support.\185\ In 
addition, open-end investment companies and unlisted closed-end 
investment companies generally do not hold shareholder meetings 
annually, reducing the likelihood of shareholder proposals in proxy 
materials in any given year for these companies. While these 
considerations may mean that including shareholder proposals in proxy 
materials may be less costly for regulated funds than for other types 
of companies, we also understand that general costs associated with 
proxy solicitations may be different for regulated funds than for other 
types of companies. For example, obtaining sufficient votes on 
regulated fund proxy matters can present challenges because these funds 
often have diffuse, retail-oriented shareholder bases.\186\ Given the 
unique considerations that apply with respect to the proxy process for 
regulated funds, we are soliciting comment below on whether to take a 
different approach to shareholder proposals for these funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \185\ See infra section IV.B.3.a.
    \186\ See, e.g., Confronting Growing Burden of Fund Proxy 
Campaigns, Investment Company Institute (Mar. 2026), available at 
https://www.ici.org/system/files/2026-03/26-confronting-growing-burden-fund-proxy-campaigns.pdf.
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Request for Comment
    1. Should Rule 14a-8 be rescinded as proposed? Why or why not? Are 
there alternative approaches within the scope of the Commission's 
authority we should consider that would adequately address our policy 
concerns with respect to Rule 14a-8?
    2. Do companies and proponents have reliance interests in Rule 14a-
8 that should be considered? If so, what are those interests and how 
can we balance the need to address the Commission's authority concerns 
with the potential effects on affected parties?
    3. To what extent have the original justifications for adopting 
Rule 14a-8 been or not been substantiated in practice given the 
evolution of the shareholder proposal process?
    4. To what extent have costs to registrants associated with Rule 
14a-8 (such as the costs of addressing and including shareholder 
proposals), the volume of shareholder proposals, and the degree of 
shareholder support changed since the adoption of Rule 14a-8?
    5. As discussed above, in many cases, State law is unclear or 
silent as to whether particular types of proposals, including precatory 
proposals, are proper subjects for action by shareholders in a given 
jurisdiction. Is this an accurate assessment of the current status of 
State law as it pertains to shareholder proposals? Are there any 
additional observations or analyses regarding State law that we should 
consider?

[[Page 59920]]

    6. To what extent have recent developments, including the 
potentially lower burdens of independent solicitation campaigns and the 
emergence of alternative shareholder engagement channels, weakened the 
original justifications for a Federal shareholder proposal rule? To 
what extent have costs to proponents associated with conducting an 
independent solicitation changed since the adoption of Rule 14a-8?
    7. As discussed above, Rule 14a-8 has had certain unintended 
consequences, such as becoming a mechanism for influencing interactions 
between companies and their shareholders and potentially inhibiting the 
development of State law and private ordering. Are there alternatives 
to full rescission within the Commission's authority that would avoid 
these unintended consequences? If so, how could the Commission retain a 
Federal rule on shareholder proposals without becoming entangled in 
State law issues?
    8. If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as proposed, would States and, where 
authorized by State law, companies be more likely to set their own 
standards and requirements regarding shareholder proposals? If so, what 
would be the advantages and disadvantages? If not, what would be the 
advantages and disadvantages?
    9. If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, what are the most likely forms of 
State and private ordering that would develop? For example, would 
States adopt uniform standards applicable to all companies organized in 
their jurisdiction, or would they instead enable companies to establish 
their own standards? If the latter, would a market-wide standard likely 
develop or would companies largely adopt their own individual 
standards?
    10. What impact would rescission of Rule 14a-8 together with the 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 (described in section II.B, below) 
have on shareholders and shareholder voting rights under State law?
    11. If the Commission rescinds Rule 14a-8 as proposed, should the 
Commission provide guidance regarding any other relevant rules adopted 
pursuant to section 14? If so, which rules?
    12. Would rescinding Rule 14a-8 have different effects on regulated 
funds and their shareholders than it would on other companies and 
shareholders?
    13. Should we rescind Rule 14a-8, including for regulated funds, as 
proposed, or should we take a different approach to shareholder 
proposals for regulated funds? For example, should we adopt a new rule 
under the Investment Company Act that addresses inclusion in regulated 
funds' proxy materials of shareholder proposals relating to matters on 
which the Investment Company Act provides shareholder voting rights? If 
so, are there additional requirements or conditions that should be 
included in such a rule that would be within the scope of our authority 
to regulate the proxy solicitation process?

B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)

1. Overview of Current Rules Related to Discretionary Voting Authority
    Historically, few shareholders of companies with a class of equity 
securities registered under the Exchange Act attend shareholder 
meetings to vote in person. Instead, the most common way by which 
shareholders learn about matters to be voted on at a shareholder 
meeting and vote on such matters is through the proxy process.\187\ 
State corporate law generally authorizes the use of proxies to permit 
shareholders to vote through a representative without attending the 
shareholder meeting.\188\ Parties soliciting proxy authority to vote 
Exchange Act-registered securities on behalf of shareholders entitled 
to vote at the meeting must comply with the Federal proxy rules 
pursuant to section 14 of the Exchange Act.\189\
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    \187\ See supra note 8.
    \188\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 212(b) (``Each stockholder 
entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders . . . may authorize 
another person or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy . . . 
.''); Model Bus. Corp. Act section 7.22(a) (``A shareholder may vote 
the shareholder's shares in person or by proxy.'').
    \189\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a).
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    Currently, the Federal proxy rules provide shareholders two methods 
to present proposals for consideration by company shareholders voting 
by proxy at a shareholder meeting. First, a shareholder may seek 
inclusion of its proposal in the company's proxy materials in 
accordance with Rule 14a-8.\190\ Second, a shareholder may submit its 
proposal to the company pursuant to the company's governing documents 
\191\ and conduct its own proxy solicitation for its proposal, at the 
shareholder's expense, using its own proxy materials.
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    \190\ See supra section II.A.
    \191\ State law generally requires that, where a company has 
advance notice bylaw provisions, a proposal comply with those 
provisions. Advance notice bylaws generally provide procedural and 
informational requirements that shareholders must satisfy to submit 
valid director nominations or other proposals at a shareholder 
meeting, outside of the processes associated with Rule 14a-8 and 
proxy access bylaws. Advance notice bylaws generally require a 
shareholder who intends to nominate a director or make a proposal at 
a shareholder meeting to provide certain information to the company 
about itself, its director nominees, and its proposals within a 
specified period of time in advance of the meeting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The company has two means to vote shares represented by proxies it 
receives from shareholders on a given matter, including a shareholder 
proposal. The company may seek direct voting authority for a proposal 
included in the company's proxy statement and form of proxy (i.e., 
proxy card), in which case the company would receive direction as to 
how to vote on the proposal from the selection made (e.g., ``for'' or 
``against'' the proposal) by shareholders on their proxy cards. 
Alternatively, the company may seek discretionary voting authority (as 
further explained below) with respect to a proposal omitted from the 
company's proxy statement and proxy card in the limited circumstances 
where a company is allowed to do so under the current proxy rules, in 
which case the company would be authorized to exercise its discretion 
to determine how to vote on the proposal.
    Current Rule 14a-4 addresses when a proxy card submitted by a 
shareholder may confer discretionary voting authority on the proxy 
holder.\192\ Discretionary voting authority under Rule 14a-4(c) is the 
proxy holder's power to vote on behalf of a shareholder with respect to 
a matter that is not included on the proxy card.\193\ A company may 
omit from its proxy card a shareholder proposal presented by means 
other than Rule 14a-8 \194\ and may vote the shares represented by 
proxies the company receives against the proposal if, under Rule 14a-
4(c), the proposal is a matter on which a proxy may confer 
discretionary voting authority. Current 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1) (``Rule 
14a-4(c)(1)'') permits a company to exercise discretionary voting 
authority at an annual meeting to

[[Page 59921]]

vote the shares represented by proxies with respect to matters for 
which the company did not receive timely notice, provided a specific 
statement to that effect is made in the company's proxy statement or 
form of proxy.\195\ Current 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2) (``Rule 14a-
4(c)(2)'') permits a company to exercise discretionary voting authority 
at an annual meeting with respect to matters for which the company has 
received timely notice, provided the company includes, in its proxy 
statement, ``advice'' \196\ on the nature of the matter and how the 
company intends to exercise its discretion to vote on each matter. 
Currently, however, a company may not exercise discretionary voting 
authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(2) if the shareholder proponent does the 
following: (i) notifies the company on a timely basis in accordance 
with the rule that it intends to send its own proxy materials to 
holders of at least the percentage of the company's voting shares 
required under applicable law to carry the proposal; \197\ (ii) 
includes the same statement in its own proxy materials; \198\ and (iii) 
provides evidence to the company that it has in fact solicited the 
holders of at least the percentage of voting shares required to carry 
the proposal.\199\
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    \192\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4.
    \193\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c). This authority differs from 
broker discretionary authority, which relates to the ability of 
brokers to vote uninstructed shares held in ``street name'' (i.e., 
held in the name of the bank, broker, or other intermediary on 
behalf of the shareholder), generally regarding routine matters on 
the proxy card. See New York Stock Exchange Rule 452. Discretionary 
voting authority under Rule 14a-4(c) also differs from discretionary 
authority under 17 CFR 240.14a-4(b)(1) (``Rule 14a-4(b)(1)''), 
pursuant to which a company (or soliciting shareholder, as the case 
may be) receives the power to vote on behalf of a shareholder 
because the shareholder has submitted a signed proxy card without 
specifying a choice regarding one or more proposals listed on the 
card.
    \194\ By ``means other than Rule 14a-8,'' ``other than through 
Rule 14a-8,'' or ``outside of the Rule 14a-8 process,'' we mean, 
generally, proposals that are submitted pursuant to the advance 
notice provisions of a company's governing documents and are a 
proper subject for shareholder action under applicable State law, 
and that a shareholder intends to present for a vote at the 
shareholder meeting but does not expressly request that the company 
include in the company's proxy materials.
    \195\ Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provides that a company has not received 
timely notice if the company did not have notice of the matter at 
least 45 days before the date on which the company first sent its 
proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of shareholders 
(or the date specified by an applicable advance notice provision in 
the company's bylaws). In addition, if during the prior year the 
company did not hold an annual meeting, or if the date of the 
meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year, then 
notice is not sufficient if the company has not received it a 
``reasonable time'' before the company sends its proxy materials for 
the current year. See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1).
    \196\ ``Advice'' as currently used in the rule means that a 
company must provide brief disclosure regarding the nature of the 
proposal.
    \197\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i).
    \198\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(ii).
    \199\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(iii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3) (``Rule 14a-4(c)(3)'') through 17 CFR 
240.14a-4(c)(7) (``Rule 14a-4(c)(7)'') set forth additional matters on 
which a proxy may confer discretionary voting authority. These consist 
of:
     for solicitations by the company related to special 
meetings, or for solicitations by persons other than the company 
related to annual or special meetings, matters which the persons making 
the solicitation do not know, a ``reasonable time'' before the 
solicitation, are to be presented at the meeting, if a specific 
statement to that effect is made in the proxy statement or form of 
proxy; \200\
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    \200\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     approval of the minutes of the prior meeting if such 
approval does not amount to ratification of the action taken at that 
meeting; \201\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \201\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     the election of any person to any office for which a bona 
fide nominee is named in a proxy statement and such nominee is unable 
to serve or for good cause will not serve; \202\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \202\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     any proposal omitted from the proxy statement and form of 
proxy pursuant to Rule 14a-8 or 17 CFR 240.14a-9 (``Rule 14a-9''); 
\203\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \203\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(6). Rule 14a-9 prohibits the 
solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading 
statements or omissions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     matters incident to the conduct of the meeting.\204\
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    \204\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(7).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Historical Background
    Beginning in 1948, the Commission has sought to balance flexibility 
for companies with shareholder protection by adopting amendments to the 
rules governing discretionary voting authority, with amendments often 
related to the determination of when a company has received sufficient 
notice of a shareholder's proposal.\205\ Nonetheless, there have been 
numerous disputes between companies and shareholder proponents, often 
involving Commission staff as well, regarding the timeliness of 
proposals, particularly in the period leading up to, and into, the 
1990s.\206\ Under Rule 14a-4 as it existed at that time, a company 
could not exercise discretionary voting authority on matters known to 
the company a ``reasonable time'' before its solicitation.\207\
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    \205\ See Solicitation of Proxies, Release No. 4185 (Nov. 5, 
1948) [13 FR 6678 (Nov. 13, 1948)]; see also, e.g., Amendments to 
Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-39093 (Sept. 18, 
1997) [62 FR 50682, 50692-50693 (Sept. 26, 1997)] (``1997 Proposing 
Release'') (highlighting (i) companies' interest in avoiding 
potential delay and expense when they are notified of proposals 
after they have begun to print or even mail proxy materials to 
shareholders; (ii) shareholders' interest in having some control 
over companies' discretionary voting authority on matters for which 
the company received adequate notice, meaningful opportunity to 
review disclosures in the proxy statement, and sufficient 
information to make informed voting decisions; and (iii) companies' 
and shareholders' interest in clearer and more predictable ground 
rules).
    \206\ See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am., et al. v. Pittston 
Co., No. 89-0962, 1989 WL 201060 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (finding 
that the company did not have discretionary voting authority because 
it had received sufficient notice, under Rule 14a-4(c)(1), of a 
shareholder's proposals, where the shareholder provided the company 
the text of the proposals approximately one month before the 
company's annual meeting); see also Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769 
F. Supp. 919, 925 (D.Md. 1991) (noting that Commission staff had 
notified a company that the company could not exercise discretionary 
voting authority where the company received notice of the 
dissident's proposals 12 days before the annual meeting); Union of 
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees et al. v. May 
Department Stores Company, 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
    \207\ At the time, Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provided that ``[a] proxy 
may confer discretionary authority to vote with respect to . . . 
[m]atters which the persons making the solicitation do not know, a 
reasonable time before the solicitation, are to be presented at the 
meeting, if a specific statement to that effect is made in the proxy 
statement or form of proxy.'' See Proxy and Stockholder Information 
Rules, Release No. 34-8206 (Dec. 14, 1967) [32 FR 20960, 20963 (Dec. 
29, 1967)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    With the aim of striking an appropriate balance between the 
competing interests involved, the Commission staff, in 1996, expressed 
its view in a no-action letter to the Idaho Power Company (the ``Idaho 
Power letter'') that it would not object to the exercise of 
discretionary voting authority to vote against a timely received 
shareholder proposal not subject to Rule 14a-8, so long as the company 
advised shareholders about the matter and specified how the shares 
would be voted.\208\ The Idaho Power letter also indicated, however, 
that in the staff's view a company could not exercise discretionary 
voting authority if the proponent delivered a proxy statement and form 
of proxy to holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote on the 
matter or, if a greater percentage were required under applicable law 
to carry the proposal, holders of the minimum required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \208\ See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545 
(Mar. 13, 1996); see also Borg-Warner Security Corp., SEC No-Action 
Letter, 1996 WL 119943 (Mar. 14, 1996). The statements in staff no-
action letters and any other staff statements or guidance referenced 
in this release represent the views of Commission staff. See 17 CFR 
202.1(d). Any such staff statements are not a rule, regulation, or 
statement of the Commission. Further, the Commission has neither 
approved nor disapproved their content. These statements, like all 
staff statements, have no legal force or effect; they do not alter 
or amend applicable law, and they create no new or additional 
obligations for any person. See generally Statement of Informal 
Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect to 
Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-12599 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR 
29989 (July 20, 1976)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1997, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 to 
establish that a proposal would be considered timely if it were 
received 45 days before the date on which the company first mailed its 
proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting (or otherwise, in 
the case of an applicable advance notice bylaw provision).\209\ The 
proposed rules also would have permitted companies to exercise 
discretionary voting authority on timely received proposals, provided

[[Page 59922]]

companies included in their proxy statements a ``discussion of the 
nature'' of the proposals, as well as, on the proxy card, a cross-
reference to this discussion in the proxy statement and a check box to 
permit shareholders to prevent the proxy holder from exercising 
discretionary voting authority.\210\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \209\ See 1997 Proposing Release at 50692. The Commission noted 
that the availability of discretionary voting authority on proposals 
had ``been the subject of litigation and attendant uncertainty.''
    \210\ See id. at 50693.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In 1998, following public comment on the proposed rules, the 
Commission declined to adopt the check box concept and instead 
effectively adopted the approach set out in the Idaho Power letter, 
namely that companies could exercise discretionary voting authority 
with respect to timely received proposals, unless, among other matters, 
the proponent solicited a sufficient number of shareholders.\211\ The 
final rule did, however, retain the proposed 45-day period, or 
alternative advance notice deadline, to determine whether a proposal is 
timely received.\212\ The Rule 14a-4 framework adopted in 1998 
continues to apply today, although, as discussed further below, the 
likelihood of companies including shareholder proposals in their proxy 
materials even when not required appears to have increased following 
the Commission's adoption of the universal proxy rules in 2021.\213\
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    \211\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110. This provision was 
codified--and remains to this day--as Rule 14a-4(c)(2). See section 
II.B.3 below for a discussion of why the Commission in 1998 
abandoned the check box approach in favor of the Idaho Power 
approach, and why we are now once again proposing to adopt the check 
box approach.
    \212\ This provision was codified--and remains to this day--as 
Rule 14a-4(c)(1). We are now proposing clarifying changes to that 
rule. See section II.C. below.
    \213\ See infra notes 221 through 223 and related text.
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3. Proposed Rule Amendments
    As further described below, under the current proxy rules, 
companies may feel compelled to include on their proxy cards certain 
shareholder proposals received outside of Rule 14a-8, notwithstanding 
that the Federal proxy rules (and existing State law) do not require 
that they do so. We are proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) that are 
intended to address this issue by providing companies with greater 
flexibility to seek and obtain discretionary voting authority regarding 
such proposals. At the same time, the proposed amendments would provide 
shareholders with the means to elect to prevent the company from 
exercising such authority with respect to their individual shares.
    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are aligned with our 
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, as companies may receive shareholder 
proposals outside of Rule 14a-8 more frequently if Rule 14a-8 is 
rescinded, as proposed. As described in more detail below, there are 
also independent justifications for the proposed amendments to Rule 
14a-4, even if the proposed rescission of Rule14a-8 is not adopted.
    We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(2) to no longer prohibit a 
company from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to 
timely received shareholder proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8 
process, regardless of whether the shareholder proponent delivers its 
own proxy materials to holders of the requisite percentage of the 
company's shares necessary to carry the proposal.
    Under the proposed amendments, a company would be able to exercise 
discretionary voting authority with respect to timely received 
shareholder proposals if it includes: (i) in the proxy statement, a 
brief description \214\ of the matter (for example, ``a non-binding 
proposal from a pension fund that the company adopt a proxy access 
bylaw provision''),\215\ and how the company intends to vote through 
its exercise of discretionary authority; (ii) on the proxy card, a 
cross-reference to the location of this disclosure in the proxy 
statement; and (iii) a check box on the proxy card that, if checked by 
a shareholder, would prevent the company from exercising its 
discretion.\216\ The Commission declined to adopt a check box 
requirement in 1998 due, in part, to some commenters' concerns about 
potential shareholder confusion.\217\ However, as discussed below, we 
believe that these potential concerns are less likely to materialize 
under the proposed amendments.
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    \214\ Current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) states that registrants must 
include, in the proxy statement, ``advice on the nature of the 
matter,'' which results in disclosure of a brief description of the 
matter. We propose to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(2) to instead state that 
registrants must provide ``a brief description of the matter,'' 
solely for clarity; we do not intend for this proposed amendment to 
change the scope of the disclosure that registrants must provide 
regarding the proposal.
    \215\ Generally, we would expect that such disclosure, without 
more, would suffice. As with any disclosures in the proxy statement, 
the description would be subject to the antifraud provision in Rule 
14a-9.
    \216\ The company's description of the proposal, under the 
proposed amendments, remains at the discretion of the company. In 
addition, Rule 14a-4(c), as proposed to be amended, would not 
establish a right of proponents to comment on, or seek revision of, 
the description.
    \217\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110. Other commenters 
objected to the check box concept because of concerns that the 
availability of the box ``would in effect create a new system for 
submitting shareholder proposals without having to comply with the 
restrictions under [R]ule 14a-8.'' Id. We do not find such arguments 
compelling, given that, unlike shareholders that submit proposals 
under the current Rule 14a-8 framework, shareholders that submit 
proposals outside of Rule 14a-8 must engage in their own 
solicitations, and such proposals are not automatically included on 
companies' proxy cards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    By eliminating the circumstances under which a single shareholder 
proponent could effectively prevent a company from seeking and 
obtaining discretionary voting authority, the proposed amendments are 
intended to provide companies with greater flexibility, and 
shareholders with greater agency, regarding the use of discretionary 
voting authority for proposals that companies receive outside the Rule 
14a-8 process. Under the proposed rules, each shareholder would be able 
to prevent the company from exercising discretionary voting authority 
on such proposals solely with respect to the proxy card the shareholder 
returns to the company, while under the current rules, a single 
shareholder proponent (through its satisfaction of the solicitation 
threshold under Rule 14a-4(c)) may prevent the company from exercising 
discretionary voting authority with respect to all proxy cards that the 
company receives.
    Under the current rules, when a company is unable to exercise 
discretionary voting authority for a shareholder proposal received 
outside of the Rule 14a-8 process, the company may determine to include 
the proposal in its proxy materials even though it is not required to 
do so by our rules, so that the company can seek and exercise proxy 
voting authority from shareholders on the proposal.\218\ Otherwise, if 
the company were to omit the proposal from its proxy card, the company 
would be unable to solicit votes with respect to the proposal on the 
company's card.\219\ In those circumstances, the proponent's 
solicitation effort may obtain sufficient votes needed to pass the 
proposal using the proponent's card.\220\ The shareholder proponent, 
who may be soliciting less than all shareholders, thus may be able to 
effectively obtain

[[Page 59923]]

inclusion of its proposal on a company's proxy card that is distributed 
to all shareholders, thereby benefitting from the company's 
solicitation efforts toward all shareholders without having to incur 
the full costs associated with such solicitation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \218\ See Cydney Posner, A Few Interesting Items from the CCR 
Proxy Disclosure Conference, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Oct. 
24, 2024), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/10/24/a-few-interesting-items-from-the-ccr-proxy-disclosure-conference/.
    \219\ We note that this discussion assumes that the proponent 
has satisfied the solicitation threshold and related requirements 
set forth in Rule 14a-4(c)(2)(i)-(iii). If the proponent has not 
done so, the company may seek and exercise discretionary authority 
to vote against the proponent's proposal. See supra notes 197 
through 199 and related text.
    \220\ The possibility of the proposal passing is more likely if 
the proposal is subject to a majority-of-votes-cast standard as 
opposed to, for example, a majority-of-shares-outstanding standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed, more proponents may choose 
to conduct their own solicitations, including solicitations of the 
requisite percentage of shareholders under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) 
that would prevent a company from exercising discretionary voting 
authority on proposals omitted from the company's proxy card. Under 
those circumstances, if current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) were to remain in 
effect, more companies may feel compelled to include a proponent's 
proposals in the company's own proxy materials to obtain proxy voting 
authority from shareholders on the proposals, which would perpetuate 
the ability of proponents to effectively obtain inclusion of their 
proposals on the company's proxy card at the company's expense, even if 
Rule 14a-8 is rescinded. As discussed in section II.A, part of the 
Commission's goal in proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 is to leave 
decisions about the appropriate role of shareholder proposals in 
corporate governance to the States and companies, by reducing the 
impact of the Federal proxy rules on these matters. It would be counter 
to that goal if another Commission rule (Rule 14a-4(c)) nonetheless 
resulted in companies including shareholder proposals in company proxy 
materials even when not required under State law or the company's 
governing documents.
    In addition, the likelihood of companies including shareholder 
proposals in their proxy materials even when not required appears to 
have increased in recent years following the Commission's adoption of 
the universal proxy rules.\221\ Following those amendments, a 
proponent, when conducting a proxy solicitation for a shareholder 
proposal, can include the company's director nominees on the 
proponent's proxy card, even when the proponent does not present its 
own competing director nominees (often referred to as a ``zero slate'' 
campaign).\222\ In these circumstances, if the company does not also 
include the proponent's proposals (submitted outside Rule 14a-8) on the 
company's proxy card, shareholders may be more likely to use the 
proponent's proxy card to vote their shares instead of the company's 
proxy card, given that the proponent's card would provide shareholders 
the ability to vote on both the company's nominees and the proponent's 
proposals. The proposed amendments are intended to address the pressure 
companies may feel to include proponent proposals submitted outside 
Rule 14a-8 in the companies' own proxy materials following the adoption 
of the universal proxy rules.\223\ Under the proposed amendments, a 
proponent's proxy card could include the company's nominees, management 
proposals, and the proponent's proposals, while the company's card 
could solely include the company's nominees and management proposals. 
The company could then exercise discretionary voting authority to vote 
proxies it receives against the proponent's proposals, other than for 
proxy cards the company receives on which shareholders have checked the 
proposed box, as described below.\224\
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    \221\ See supra notes 94 through 98 and related text.
    \222\ When the Commission adopted the universal proxy rules in 
2021, 17 CFR 240.14a-4(d)(1) (``Rule 14a-4(d)(1)''), referred to as 
the ``bona fide nominee rule,'' was amended to facilitate the use of 
universal proxy cards by requiring a director nominee to consent to 
being named in any proxy statement for the meeting rather than just 
one specific party's proxy statement. See Universal Proxy Release.
    \223\ The Commission staff has observed at least three zero 
slate campaigns since the universal proxy rules went into effect in 
2022, and in each case the company included the proponent's 
proposal(s) on the company's proxy card: in 2024, one by the United 
Mine Workers of America with respect to Warrior Met Coal, Inc. (the 
company supported one of the five non-binding proposals submitted by 
the United Mine Workers of America) and another by Starboard Value 
with respect to News Corporation; and in 2026, one by Stilwell 
Activist Investments, L.P. with respect to Central Plains 
Bancshares, Inc. (the company indicated in its proxy statement that 
because Stilwell's ``proposal is advisory in nature only, [the 
company] would like to use this proposal as an opportunity for our 
stockholders to express their views on this subject.''). In 
addition, in the 2026 proxy season, at least two separate 
proponents--Trillium Asset Management (with respect to BJ's 
Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.) and Communications Workers of America 
(with respect to Nexstar Media Group, Inc.)--threatened zero slate 
campaigns in an effort to exert pressure on companies. See Meredith 
Ervine, Another Proponent Uses Rule 14a-4 for Multiple Proposals, 
The Corporate Counsel (May 1, 2026), available at https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2026/05/another-proponent-uses-rule-14a-4-for-multiple-proposals.html.
    \224\ We expect that, under the proposed amendments, the company 
would not feel compelled to include the proponent's proposals on the 
company's proxy card, because the company could seek and exercise 
discretionary voting authority to vote the proxy cards the company 
receives against the proponent's proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While we are proposing to expand the circumstances under which a 
company may seek and exercise discretionary voting authority, we are 
also proposing to require a check box on company proxy cards that would 
provide shareholders an option to prohibit the company from exercising 
discretionary voting authority on proposals omitted from the company's 
proxy card. This proposed requirement is intended to increase 
shareholders' control with respect to the company's exercise of 
discretionary voting authority by allowing shareholders, particularly 
those who are not solicited by a proponent, to vote on a company's 
proxy card without effectively obligating those shareholders to grant 
discretionary authority to the company to vote those shareholders' 
shares on matters not included on the card. Without the proposed check 
box, simply by voting on a company's card, rather than on a proponent's 
card, the shareholder would grant the company discretionary authority 
to vote on any matters not included on the company's card. Under those 
circumstances, such a shareholder would typically have two choices. One 
option would be to vote using the company's proxy card notwithstanding 
that the company may use its discretionary authority to vote the 
shareholder's shares contrary to the shareholder's wishes on a proposal 
omitted from the card. Unless the shareholder is able to attend the 
meeting or obtain a proxy card from the proponent, the shareholder's 
other option would be to not vote at all.\225\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \225\ See John C. Coffee, Jr. The Bylaw Battlefield: Can 
Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? 51 U. 
Miami L. Rev. 605, 620 (1997) (stating that if a shareholder is not 
solicited, ``the public shareholder faces Hobson's Choice: the 
shareholder can either grant a proxy to management (knowing that 
management will vote against this proposal) or refrain from 
voting''); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Proxy Rules and 
Restrictions on Shareholder Voting Rights, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 45, 
79 (2016) (stating that the ``rule allows for the involuntary 
transfer of voting rights for proposals known to management well in 
advance of the meeting. Shareholders are left with a Hobson's choice 
of either conceding the transfer or preventing discretionary 
authority by giving up the right to vote'' (internal citations 
omitted) (citing Coffee, supra, at 620)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, under the current rules, a proponent effectively has 
the ability to determine whether the company is prevented from seeking 
and exercising discretionary voting authority--on behalf of all 
shareholders--with respect to the proponent's proposals, through the 
proponent's decision whether to solicit the requisite percentage of 
shareholders. The presence of the check box, alongside the absence of a 
solicitation threshold under the proposed rules that would restrict the 
company's ability to exercise discretionary voting authority, would 
shift that agency from the proponent to each individual shareholder to 
make that determination on an individual basis.

[[Page 59924]]

    In sum, we believe that the check box would appropriately balance 
the additional flexibility granted to companies under the proposed 
rules with the ability of shareholders to prevent companies from 
exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to their shares. 
Providing this option is consistent with Congress's intent that section 
14(a) and the Federal proxy rules facilitate the exercise of 
shareholders' voting rights under State law through the proxy 
process.\226\
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    \226\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell (``[t]he rights that we 
are endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights that 
he has traditionally had under State law . . .''); see also H.R. 
Rep. No. 1383 at 13, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (``Fair corporate 
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity 
security bought on a public exchange.'').
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    With respect to concerns that were raised in the past \227\ 
indicating that a check box might create confusion among shareholders, 
we believe that, given the practice of most shareholders to cast their 
votes through electronic voting platforms rather than paper proxy 
cards,\228\ as well as the resulting shareholder familiarity with 
electronic voting platforms and continued advances in the ease of use 
of electronic voting platforms, the risk of confusion has been reduced. 
In addition, both companies and shareholder proponents could further 
mitigate confusion by including clear instructions and disclosure in 
their proxy materials. Such instructions and disclosure could address, 
for example, the treatment under State law of the proxy cards of a 
shareholder voting to approve a shareholder proposal on a proponent's 
proxy card and later not marking the check box on the company's card, 
thereby allowing the company to exercise discretion to vote against the 
shareholder proposal.\229\
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    \227\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110.
    \228\ See Broadridge Financial Solutions, 2025 Proxy Season Key 
Stats and Performance Ratings, available at https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/2025proxykeystats_report.pdf (``Over 
97% of the voted shares were cast electronically via Broadridge's 
secure digital platforms.'').
    \229\ We believe that, as a matter of both current technology 
and State law, proxy service providers' electronic voting platforms 
should be able to accommodate the submission of multiple proxy cards 
by the same shareholder and to ensure that non-conflicting 
instructions are in fact honored and tabulated across such cards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) would require at least a single check 
box, regardless of the number of matters subject to discretionary 
voting authority under the rule. We are proposing that companies may 
use a single check box, as opposed to requiring a check box for each 
non-management proposal subject to discretionary voting authority, to 
address potential shareholder confusion, as a single check box would 
result in a simpler proxy card in situations involving multiple 
shareholder proposals. The proposed use of a single check box allows a 
company to avoid listing all non-management proposals subject to 
discretionary voting authority on the proxy card, which would be 
necessary under a multiple-check-box approach and potentially create a 
system for effectively providing shareholder proposals access to the 
company's proxy card.\230\ However, nothing in the proposed rules would 
prevent a company from voluntarily providing multiple check boxes for 
multiple non-management proposals subject to discretionary voting 
authority, should a company wish to provide shareholders with 
additional flexibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \230\ See supra note 217.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Request for Comment
    14. Should we adopt the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)? Why 
or why not?
    15. Do the proposed amendments, taken as a whole, strike an 
appropriate balance between, on the one hand, guarding against possible 
abuse of discretionary voting authority by companies, and, on the other 
hand, avoiding the present situation where proponents, as a practical 
matter, are often able to obtain inclusion of their proposals in 
companies' proxy materials while not fully bearing the costs of 
solicitation?
    16. If the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) and the proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 are adopted, are there reasons to expect that 
a company may continue to voluntarily include, on its own proxy card, 
shareholder proposals as to which proponents are conducting their own 
solicitation?
    17. Under the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), consistent 
with the requirements of the current rule, a company would be able to 
exercise discretionary voting authority if, among other things, it 
includes in its proxy statement a brief description of the proposal. 
Accordingly, a company would not need to disclose the full text of a 
non-Rule 14a-8 proposal to exercise discretionary voting authority. 
Should we maintain in the proposed amendments the requirement for a 
brief description of the proposal? Is the disclosure currently provided 
by companies under this requirement appropriate to inform shareholders 
about shareholder proposals submitted outside of Rule 14a-8 as to which 
the company intends to exercise discretionary voting authority? Would a 
brief description provide sufficient information for a shareholder to 
assess the company's position on the proposal and to decide whether to 
prohibit the company from exercising discretionary voting authority via 
the proposed check box or leave the box unmarked thereby permitting the 
company to exercise discretionary voting authority? In addition, are 
there reasons that we should require companies to identify the specific 
source of the proposal as part of the brief description of the 
proposal?
    18. Should we adopt the check box requirement, as proposed? Why or 
why not? Should we instead consider an amendment allowing companies to 
exercise discretionary voting authority while not providing 
shareholders with the means to elect to prevent the company from 
exercising such authority with respect to their individual shares via a 
check box? Should the requirement that companies provide the check box 
be tied to a particular solicitation threshold being met by the 
relevant proponent? Why or why not?
    19. Should we consider any modifications to the proposed check box 
requirement, or a different mechanism to give shareholders an option to 
prevent the company from exercising discretionary voting authority on 
matters not included on the proxy card? For example, should the default 
rule be that companies do not have discretionary voting authority, and 
that shareholders must check a box to elect to grant such authority?
    20. We are proposing that companies may use a single check box, as 
opposed to requiring a check box for each non-management proposal 
subject to discretionary voting authority. As an alternative approach, 
should we instead require companies to include a check box for each 
non-management proposal subject to discretionary voting authority, 
thereby allowing shareholders the option to prevent the company from 
exercising its discretion on each such matter on an individualized 
basis?
    21. Could the proposed check box be confusing to shareholders? What 
challenges may occur in implementing the proposed check box requirement 
(including shareholders' use of the check box)? How could such 
challenges be mitigated?
    22. A shareholder that submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8 to 
a company may not be aware of proposals submitted by other proponents. 
Under the current rules, a soliciting shareholder may exercise 
discretionary authority to vote the shares represented by proxies it 
receives on matters that it

[[Page 59925]]

does not know, a ``reasonable time'' before its solicitation, are to be 
presented at the meeting, so long as a specific statement to that 
effect is made in the shareholder's proxy statement or form of 
proxy.\231\ Given the uncertainty associated with ``a reasonable 
time,'' and the potential for this provision (Rule 14a-4(c)(3)) to be 
used more frequently in light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, 
should we amend Rule 14a-4(c)(3) to replace ``a reasonable time'' with 
a definite length of time, such as three or five business days before 
the date on which the shareholder proponent's proxy statement and form 
of proxy are first sent or given to shareholders? Why or why not? As 
this rule covers both companies in non-annual meeting situations and 
shareholders in all situations, would there be reasons to distinguish 
between companies and shareholders when it comes to establishing the 
appropriate timing requirement?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \231\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    23. Should companies be required to notify proponents when other 
proponents submit proposals outside of Rule 14a-8? If so, what 
deadlines and method of notification would be appropriate?
    24. It is our understanding that, generally, under State law, a 
later dated proxy card overrides an earlier dated proxy card. However, 
we also understand that, to the extent that no conflict or 
inconsistency is present as between two (or more) proxy cards (for 
example, a shareholder marks the check box on the company's proxy card 
so as not to confer discretionary voting authority to the company on a 
proposal, and separately votes either for or against a proposal on the 
proponent's card), State law generally is capable of honoring or 
otherwise resolving the voting choices made on each of the cards. Are 
there additional amendments to our rules that we should consider to 
facilitate the reconciliation of a shareholder's instructions on 
multiple proxy cards, or any other factors with respect to the proxy 
process or State law we should take into consideration, particularly 
related to the proposed check box? Please explain in detail. Would 
proxy service providers' electronic voting platforms be able to 
accommodate the submission of multiple proxy cards by the same 
shareholder and to ensure that non-conflicting instructions are in fact 
honored and tabulated across such cards?
    25. Should we amend 17 CFR 240.14a-101 (``Schedule 14A'') to 
require companies to provide a brief description of shareholder 
proposals not included on the company's proxy card and for which the 
company does not seek discretionary voting authority? Why or why not?

C. Other Proposed Amendments

    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), if adopted as proposed, would necessitate 
corresponding amendments to other provisions of the proxy rules. We are 
also proposing certain amendments to facilitate implementation of these 
proposed changes to the proxy rules.
    As discussed above in section II.B., current Rule 14a-4(c) 
addresses when a proxy card submitted by a shareholder may confer 
discretionary voting authority on the proxy holder, and current Rule 
14a-4(c)(1) sets forth deadlines for determining whether a company has 
received timely notice of a matter for purposes of exercising 
discretionary voting authority on such matter.\232\ We are proposing to 
amend Rule 14a-4(c) to clarify that discretionary voting authority 
under this provision only relates to matters that are not included on 
the proxy card.\233\ We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(1) to 
clarify that a company's advance notice provision, or an applicable 
State or foreign law provision, generally determines whether a company 
has received timely notice of a matter, and, only in the absence of 
such a provision would the default deadline under Rule 14a-4(c)(1) 
(i.e., at least 45 days before the date on which the company first sent 
its proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of 
shareholders, as is currently the case under the rule) apply. We are 
also similarly proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(1) to provide that if a 
company did not hold an annual meeting during the prior year, or if the 
date of the meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year, 
any deadline established under the company's advance notice provision, 
or an applicable State or foreign law provision, would govern instead 
of the default deadline in the current rule (i.e., a reasonable time 
before the registrant sends its proxy materials), which would, under 
the proposed amendment, only apply in the absence of such a 
provision.\234\
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    \232\ See supra section II.B.
    \233\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c).
    \234\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1).
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    We are also proposing to delete 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(6) (``Rule 14a-
4(c)(6)'').\235\ In light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), we do not see benefit in 
retaining Rule 14a-4(c)(6). Retaining the provision with only a 
reference to Rule 14a-9 may further expand the ability of companies to 
use discretionary voting authority but without providing the disclosure 
required by proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \235\ Rule 14a-4(c)(6) currently states that a proxy may confer 
discretionary authority to vote on ``[a]ny proposal omitted from the 
proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to Sec.  240.14a-8 or 
Sec.  240.14a-9 of this chapter.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e) (``Rule 14a-5(e)'') sets forth certain 
deadlines that must be disclosed in all proxy statements.\236\ We 
propose to amend 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(1) (``Rule 14a-5(e)(1)'') to 
reflect that, if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as proposed, the relevant 
deadline, if any, for submitting shareholder proposals for inclusion in 
a company's proxy statement and form of proxy would be pursuant to an 
applicable State or foreign law provision or the company's governing 
documents, which would eliminate the reference to Rule 14a-8 currently 
in the rule.\237\ Similarly, we propose to amend 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(2) 
(``Rule 14a-5(e)(2)'') to provide that the deadline required to be 
disclosed under that provision relates to shareholder proposals for 
which the shareholder is not seeking inclusion in the company's proxy 
statement and form of proxy and also to eliminate the current reference 
to Rule 14a-8.\238\ The deadline to be disclosed under Rule 14a-
5(e)(2), as proposed to be amended, would be the deadline set forth in 
Rule 14a-4(c)(1), as proposed to be amended, which would be the 
deadline established under an applicable State or foreign law provision 
or the company's governing documents, or, in the absence of such a 
provision, the default deadline under Rule 14a-4(c)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \236\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e).
    \237\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(1).
    \238\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Current 17 CFR 240.14a-5(f) (``Rule 14a-5(f)'') sets forth a 
registrant's obligations to disclose changed deadlines under Rules 14a-
5(e)(1) and (e)(2) in the event of a change in the date of the 
registrant's annual meeting. We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-5(f) to 
require that such disclosure be provided regarding paragraphs (e)(1) 
through (e)(4) of Rule 14a-5 to the extent applicable.\239\ Currently, 
the rule only requires disclosure of changed deadlines with respect to 
paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of Rule 14a-5, but the same rationale for 
requiring such disclosure--i.e., the need to inform

[[Page 59926]]

shareholders of such changes in a timely manner--applies equally to 
changed deadlines under paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4).\240\
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    \239\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(f).
    \240\ 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(3) relates to the deadline for 
submitting nominees for inclusion in the registrant's proxy 
statement and form of proxy pursuant to an applicable State or 
foreign law provision or a registrant's governing documents as they 
relate to the inclusion of shareholder director nominees in the 
registrant's proxy materials for the registrant's next annual 
meeting of shareholders. 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(4) relates to the 
deadline for providing notice of a solicitation of proxies in 
support of director nominees other than the registrant's nominees 
pursuant to 17 CFR 240.14a-19 for the registrant's next annual 
meeting unless the registrant is an investment company registered 
under the Investment Company Act or a business development company 
as defined by section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act (15 
U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We also propose to amend current 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a) (``Rule 14a-
6(a)''), which sets forth the circumstances in which companies are not 
required to file a preliminary proxy statement. Under current Rule 14a-
6(a),\241\ companies are not required to file proxy materials in 
preliminary form on account of the inclusion of a shareholder proposal 
under Rule 14a-8.\242\ There is not currently an analogous provision 
for companies that receive adequate notice of a shareholder proposal 
submitted outside of Rule 14a-8, and in fact, current Rule 14a-6(a) 
explicitly states that companies are not excluded from the preliminary 
proxy statement filing requirement if they, in their proxy materials, 
comment upon or refer to a solicitation in opposition.\243\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \241\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a).
    \242\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a)(3).
    \243\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a); Note 3 to paragraph (a) of Rule 
14a-6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We believe that a company should not be required to file a 
preliminary proxy statement and form of proxy whenever the company 
provides disclosure in accordance with Rule 14a-4(c)(2). At the same 
time, we believe that a preliminary filing by a company may be 
appropriate when that company is facing a shareholder proposal that is 
the subject of an independent, non-exempt solicitation. Therefore, we 
are proposing amendments that would provide that a company does not 
need to file its proxy statement in preliminary form solely because of 
the submission of a shareholder proposal.\244\ However, we are 
proposing that the company would need to file preliminary proxy 
materials if such a shareholder proposal, or the company's election of 
directors, involves a ``solicitation in opposition,'' which would 
include any solicitation (other than a solicitation exempt under 17 CFR 
240.14a-2 (``Rule 14a-2'')): (i) subject to Rule 14a-19; (ii) to vote 
against or withhold votes from any of the registrant's director 
nominee(s); (iii) to vote against a proposal that the registrant 
expressly supports in its proxy materials; and (iv) to vote in support 
of a proposal that the registrant does not expressly support in its 
proxy materials.\245\ In each case, the registrant's obligation to file 
in preliminary form is subject to the additional condition that the 
registrant knows, or reasonably should know, of such solicitation.\246\ 
In other words, just the inclusion of a shareholder proposal in a 
company's proxy materials (or the exclusion therefrom), without a 
corresponding non-exempt solicitation made by the shareholder 
proponent, would not require the company to file a preliminary proxy 
statement. If, however, (i) the company includes a shareholder proposal 
in (or excludes from) its proxy materials and (ii) the shareholder 
proponent prepares and distributes its own proxy materials to 
shareholders, the company would be required to file a preliminary proxy 
statement.\247\
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    \244\ Rule 14a-6(a) currently states that ``[a] registrant . . . 
shall not file with the Commission a preliminary proxy statement'' 
with respect to an annual meeting (or special meeting in lieu of the 
annual meeting) at which only the enumerated matters are to be acted 
upon. See Rule 14a-6(a). We propose to change ``shall not file'' to 
``need not file'' in order to clarify that companies are permitted 
to voluntarily file in preliminary form.
    \245\ A registrant's disclosure under proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) 
that it intends to exercise its discretion to vote against a 
proposal omitted from the proxy card would constitute the registrant 
``not expressly support[ing]'' the proposal for purposes of clause 
(iv), thereby requiring the registrant to file in preliminary form, 
so long as the proponent is conducting an independent, non-exempt 
solicitation. Our approach taken under the proposed rules is 
designed to be consistent with the approach taken under the current 
rules, in that under both the existing and proposed framework, with 
respect to a ``solicitation in opposition,'' a registrant's 
obligation to make a preliminary filing arises if and only if a 
matter is truly contested, as determined by the existence of an 
independent, non-exempt solicitation by a shareholder.
    \246\ A company would know, for example, of materials furnished 
or filed on the company's EDGAR page and of notices submitted to the 
company pursuant to a company's advance notice bylaw.
    \247\ Rule 14a-6(a) currently requires that shareholder 
proponents file proxy materials in preliminary form in all cases 
without exception. We do not propose to change that requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In addition, we propose to delete current Note 2 to paragraph (a) 
of Rule 14a-6,\248\ as companies already are aware of the importance of 
verifying the accuracy and completeness of information in their proxy 
materials, as well as the benefits associated with filing preliminary 
proxy materials at the earliest practicable date.\249\ While these 
instructions were helpful when adopted over 50 years ago, we believe 
they are no longer necessary.\250\ Relatedly, we are proposing to amend 
17 CFR 240.14c-5(a) (``Rule 14c-5(a)''), which sets forth the 
circumstances in which companies are not required to file a preliminary 
information statement,\251\ in the same manner as we propose to amend 
Rule 14a-6(a), to the extent applicable.
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    \248\ The first sentence of current Note 2 to paragraph (a) of 
Rule 14a-6 states that ``[t]he official responsible for the 
preparation of the proxy material should make every effort to verify 
the accuracy and completeness of the information required by the 
applicable rules.'' See current Note 2 to paragraph (a) of Rule 14a-
6.
    \249\ The specific filing deadline is set out in the opening 
sentence of Rule 14a-6(a), which requires that preliminary proxy 
materials be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days 
prior to the date definitive copies of such materials are first sent 
or given to security holders.
    \250\ See Proxy and Stockholder Information Rules, Release No. 
34-8206 (Dec. 14, 1967) [32 FR 20960 (Dec. 29, 1967)].
    \251\ The information statement required to be distributed to 
shareholders from whom the company is not soliciting proxies is 
intended to provide those shareholders with information equivalent 
to that which is provided to shareholders in a proxy statement. See 
Stockholder Information Statements, Release No. 34-7774 (Dec. 30, 
1965) [31 FR 262 (Jan. 7, 1966)] (noting that information statements 
delivered to shareholders pursuant to Regulation 14C are ``required 
to contain substantially the same information as that which would be 
required in a proxy statement if proxies were solicited.''). The 
information statement is required by section 14(c) of the Exchange 
Act.
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    We also propose to amend Rule 14c-101 to remove Item 4 from 
Schedule 14C and to amend Rule 14c-5(a) to remove the references to 
Item 4.\252\ Currently, if a company will distribute an information 
statement required by 17 CFR 240.14c-2 and a shareholder has submitted 
a proposal for action at the shareholder meeting a reasonable time 
before the company distributes the information statement, the company 
must ``make a statement to that effect, identify the proposal and 
indicate the disposition proposed to be made of the proposal by the 
[company] at the meeting.'' \253\ If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as 
proposed and Rule 14a-4(c)(2) is amended as proposed, the only 
circumstance in which a company would be expressly required by the 
Federal proxy rules to identify or describe a shareholder proposal in 
its proxy materials would be if the company is seeking to exercise 
discretionary voting authority with respect to a proposal not included 
on its proxy card under proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2). That circumstance 
would not arise in connection with an information statement that is 
distributed to shareholders from whom proxies are not solicited. 
Accordingly, we propose to

[[Page 59927]]

remove Item 4 of Schedule 14C, which requires the company to identify 
timely received shareholder proposals in information statements, so 
that, under the proposed amendments, shareholders receiving proxy 
statements and information statements receive equivalent information.
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    \252\ See Rule 14c-5(a)(3) and Note 3 to Rule 14c-5(a).
    \253\ Item 4 of Rule 14c-101 (Schedule 14C).
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    Finally, we are also proposing to remove references \254\ to Rule 
14a-8 throughout the Federal securities rules.\255\
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    \254\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b), 14a-5(e)(1)-(2), 17 CFR 200.30-
1(f)(4), 17 CFR 200.82, Instruction 4 to 17 CFR 229.407(f), 17 CFR 
232.101(c)(3), and Item 5.07(d) of Form 8-K.
    \255\ The Commission recently proposed and is concurrently 
proposing amendments to certain proxy rules in other Commission 
proposing releases. See Electronic Delivery of Information Under the 
Federal Securities Laws, Release No. 33-11430 (July 16, 2026) [91 FR 
45884 (July 21, 2026)] (``Reg E-Delivery Proposal''), Proxy 
Solicitation Modernization, Release No. 34-106385 (September 16, 
2026) [[] FR [] ([], 2026)] (``Proxy 
Solicitation Modernization Proposal''). The discussion in section II 
of the amendments we are proposing in this release does not reflect 
the amendments to certain proxy rules proposed in other Commission 
releases because they have not been adopted. Similarly, the text of 
proposed amendments set forth in this release does not reflect the 
amendments to certain proxy rules proposed in other Commission 
releases because they have not been adopted.
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Request for Comment
    26. Should we adopt the additional proposed amendments discussed 
above? Why or why not?
    27. We are proposing to delete Rule 14a-4(c)(6) in its entirety. 
Should we instead remove the rule's current reference to Rule 14a-8 but 
retain the reference to Rule 14a-9? Why or why not?
    28. Have we taken the appropriate approach in proposing revisions 
to Rule 14a-6(a) (regarding companies' preliminary proxy statement 
filing requirements) and Rule 14c-5(a) (regarding companies' 
preliminary information statement filing requirements)? Have we 
selected the appropriate types of ``solicitations in opposition'' for 
which a preliminary proxy statement filing by the company would be 
required under the proposal? Is our proposal underinclusive or 
overinclusive in that respect? Relatedly, should we consider any 
changes to Rule 14a-6(a)'s current requirement that shareholder 
proponents file proxy materials in preliminary form in all cases 
without exception? Are there any considerations particular to 
information statements, as compared to proxy statements, that we should 
take into account?
    29. Our proposed changes to Rule 14a-6(a) and Rule 14c-5(a) also 
would remove current rule text providing that a registrant's commenting 
on or referring to a solicitation in opposition is a trigger for a 
preliminary filing. Would it be more appropriate to retain that element 
of these rules? Are there any benefits associated with a company filing 
in preliminary form under these circumstances?
    30. We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5 to provide 
that a registrant's obligation to file in preliminary form is subject 
to the additional condition that a registrant knows, or reasonably 
should know, of a non-exempt solicitation in opposition described in 
proposed Note 2 to paragraph (a) \256\ of Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5. 
Should we instead include a different standard in proposed Note 2 to 
paragraph (a) of Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5? For example, should we 
amend the rule to provide that the registrant's obligation to file in 
preliminary form is subject to the additional condition that a 
shareholder has filed proxy materials in connection with the 
shareholder's solicitation in opposition?
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    \256\ By ``proposed Note 2 to paragraph (a),'' we are referring 
to the proposed revision to current Note 3 to paragraph (a), which 
we propose to redesignate as Note 2 given the proposed deletion of 
current Note 2, for each of Rule 14a-6(a) and Rule 14c-5(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    31. We are proposing to remove Item 4 of Schedule 14C,\257\ which 
requires a company to disclose that it has received a shareholder 
proposal and identify that proposal, if it receives such a proposal a 
``reasonable time'' before the information statement is to be 
transmitted to security holders.\258\ Should we instead retain Item 4? 
Are there any changes we should make to Item 4, if retained?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \257\ 17 CFR 240.14c-101.
    \258\ Such disclosure need only be provided if the shareholder 
provides notice to the company of the shareholder's intention to 
present the proposal for action at the meeting. See Item 4 of 17 CFR 
240.14c-101.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    32. In light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 and the other rules discussed above, 
are there other aspects of any of the Commission's proxy rules that we 
should amend or as to which market participants would benefit from 
additional guidance?

D. General Request for Comment

    We request and encourage any interested person to submit comments 
on any aspect of the proposed amendments, other matters that might have 
an impact on the proposed amendments, and any suggestions for 
additional changes. With respect to any comments, we note that they are 
of greatest assistance if accompanied by supporting data and analysis 
of the issues addressed in those comments and by alternatives to our 
proposals where appropriate.

III. Other Matters

    This proposing release is an economically significant regulatory 
action under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866 and has been 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB''), consistent 
with Executive Order 14215. This action, if finalized as proposed, is 
expected to be an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action.

IV. Economic Analysis

A. Introduction

    The Commission is mindful of the costs imposed by, and the benefits 
obtained from, its rules. Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933 
and section 3(f) of the Exchange Act require the Commission, when 
engaging in rulemaking where it is required to consider or determine 
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, 
to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the 
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation.\259\ Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act separately 
requires the Commission to consider the effects on competition of any 
rules it adopts under the Exchange Act and prohibits the Commission 
from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on competition not 
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange 
Act.\260\
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    \259\ See 15 U.S.C. 77b(b); 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
    \260\ See 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8, which requires companies to 
include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials, subject to 
certain procedural requirements and substantive bases for exclusion. We 
are also proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), which governs the 
circumstances under which a company may exercise discretionary voting 
authority with respect to matters not included on the company's proxy 
card. Although these two proposed changes to our rules are separate and 
address distinct aspects of the proxy rules, they both have 
implications for the costs and burdens associated with the proxy 
solicitation process for shareholders and companies. Accordingly, where 
appropriate, we consider how the economic effects of the two proposed 
changes might interact with one another.
    This economic analysis identifies the principal economic effects of 
the proposed amendments, the parties that would bear them, and the key 
sources

[[Page 59928]]

of uncertainty that would affect the magnitude of those effects. Many 
of the benefits and costs identified in this analysis are difficult to 
quantify with precision. Where quantification is not practicable, the 
analysis provides a qualitative assessment of the expected direction 
and relative magnitude of the relevant effects. The Commission 
encourages commenters to provide data, including relevant quantitative 
estimates, and information that would help quantify the benefits and 
costs of the proposed amendments and their potential impacts on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.

B. Baseline

    The baseline against which the costs, benefits, and the impact on 
efficiency, competition, and capital formation of the proposed 
amendments are measured consists of the current regulatory framework 
governing the shareholder proposal process as well as the current 
practices of companies and shareholders related to shareholder 
proposals.\261\
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    \261\ See, e.g., Nasdaq v. SEC, 34 F.4th 1105, 1111-14 (D.C. 
Cir. 2022). This approach also follows Commission staff guidance on 
economic analysis for rulemaking. See SEC Staff, Current Guidance on 
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Mar. 16, 2012), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf (``The economic 
consequences of proposed rules (potential costs and benefits 
including effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation) 
should be measured against a baseline, which is the best assessment 
of how the world would look in the absence of the proposed 
action.''); id. at 7 (``The baseline includes both the economic 
attributes of the relevant market and the existing regulatory 
structure.'').
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1. Current Regulatory Framework
    State laws, company charters and bylaws (and other governing 
documents), and the Federal securities laws jointly govern the 
shareholder proposal process. State law determines the substantive and 
procedural requirements for presenting a shareholder proposal for a 
vote at the annual meeting, whereas the Federal proxy rules currently 
govern (i) procedural and substantive conditions for when shareholder 
proposals must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's 
proxy materials under Rule 14a-8 and (ii) the process for soliciting 
authority to vote on such matters by proxy under Rule 14a-4.
a. Commission Rules
    Currently, the Federal proxy rules provide shareholders two methods 
to present proposals for consideration by company shareholders who 
intend to vote by proxy. First, a shareholder may seek to include its 
proposal in the company's proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Among 
other things, Rule 14a-8 specifies procedural and substantive 
requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to have a proposal 
included in the company's proxy materials. The requirements of Rule 
14a-8 are described in further detail in section II.A.1.
    Second, a shareholder may conduct its own solicitation for its 
proposal, at the shareholder's expense, using its own proxy 
statement.\262\ To do so, the shareholder must comply with the 
requirements to furnish a proxy statement,\263\ satisfy the form and 
disclosure requirements regarding the proxy card,\264\ and the 
presentation and disclosure requirements regarding the proxy 
statement,\265\ file the applicable preliminary and definitive proxy 
materials,\266\ and ensure that the solicitation does not contain any 
materially false or misleading statements.\267\ With respect to 
independent solicitations, where a company omits from its proxy card a 
proposal presented through an independent solicitation, Rule 14a-4(c) 
specifies the circumstances under which a company may exercise 
discretionary authority to vote on such proposals by proxy. The current 
regulatory framework governing a company's discretionary authority to 
vote on proposals that will be presented at a shareholder meeting but 
not included in the company's proxy materials is described in further 
detail in section II.B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \262\ See generally 17 CFR part 240, Regulation 14A.
    \263\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-3.
    \264\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4.
    \265\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-5; 17 CFR 240.14a-101.
    \266\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6.
    \267\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beyond these provisions, several other aspects of the Federal proxy 
rules bear on the shareholder proposal process. For instance, the 
Federal proxy rules currently allow proponents to include the company's 
director nominees on their own proxy card, even if they do not nominate 
alternative directors.\268\ When shareholders undertake a zero slate 
campaign, companies may choose to include shareholder proposals on 
their own proxy cards in order to exercise proxy voting authority with 
respect to those proposals.\269\ If so, this may result in those 
proponents having their proposals considered by all shareholders rather 
than only the shareholders that were solicited by the proponent.
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    \268\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(d)(1); supra note 222.
    \269\ The Commission staff has observed at least three zero 
slate campaigns since the universal proxy rules went into effect in 
2022, and in each case the company included the proponent's 
proposal(s) on the company's proxy card. See supra note 223.
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    In addition, Rule 14a-2 provides multiple exemptions for certain 
shareholder communications and solicitations, either by shareholders or 
certain third parties, from the proxy disclosure and filing 
requirements that may provide alternatives to the Rule 14a-8 submission 
process or independent non-exempt solicitations.\270\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \270\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2; see also generally 17 CFR part 240, 
Regulation 14A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, the Commission is concurrently proposing amendments to 
modernize certain rules related to proxy solicitations.\271\ If adopted 
as proposed, those amendments primarily would eliminate the requirement 
that registrants deliver an annual report to security holders, 
eliminate the delivery deadline when documents are incorporated by 
reference into a proxy statement, eliminate the requirement to file 
soliciting material regarding certain exempt solicitations, and shorten 
the minimum broker search period for proxy solicitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \271\ See Proxy Solicitation Modernization Proposal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. State Law and Corporate Charters and Bylaws on Shareholder Proposals
    State law and, if State law permits, company governing documents 
govern when and how shareholder proposals can be presented for a 
shareholder vote.\272\ Notwithstanding that such matters are 
traditionally reserved to the States, State law is often silent or 
ambiguous about what matters may be presented for a shareholder vote. 
For example, State law is unclear as to whether the presentation of 
nonbinding shareholder proposals is permitted.\273\ Because shareholder 
proposals fall under the purview of State law, States may enact 
legislation that either enables or restricts the ability of 
shareholders to submit proposals. One State recently enacted 
legislation permitting companies to impose additional eligibility 
requirements on shareholders

[[Page 59929]]

seeking to submit proposals for approval at a shareholder meeting.\274\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \272\ See e.g., Restatement of the Law, Corporate Governance 
section 1.01 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 2022) and the MBCA sections 7.01 
through 7.05 (shareholder meetings and voting), section 7.04 
(shareholder amendment of bylaws), section 10.20 (shareholder action 
by written consent) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2016); see also Thomas Lee Hazen, 
Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation section 10:27 (7th ed. 
2016). While shareholder voting rights are typically defined by 
State law, as discussed in section II.A.1.a, there are instances in 
which Federal law may establish voting rights for shareholders. This 
is especially true with respect to registered investment companies. 
See section II.A.3.
    \273\ See supra section II.A.2.a.
    \274\ See supra note 161 and related text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If permitted under State law, companies generally may establish or 
modify shareholder rights through their charter or bylaw 
provisions.\275\ For example, State corporate law may provide default 
rules that govern shareholder action, while allowing companies to 
modify such rules through their governing documents. As a result, 
companies may have the ability to adopt provisions in their governing 
documents that expand, limit, or eliminate certain procedures and 
conditions related to shareholder action.\276\
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    \275\ See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act section7.04(b) (permitting 
corporations to alter the default rule requiring unanimous written 
consent by specifying alternative consent thresholds in their 
articles of incorporation).
    \276\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section228 (permitting corporations 
to restrict shareholder action by written consent through the 
certificate of incorporation); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law section601(b) 
(authorizing bylaws to address matters relating to shareholder 
rights and powers); Model Bus. Corp. Act section7.04 (permitting 
corporations to modify the default rule requiring unanimous written 
consent).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

2. Affected Parties
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
to Rule 14a-4(c) would affect different but overlapping populations. 
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would primarily affect companies 
subject to the Federal proxy rules that receive shareholder proposals 
submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8, as well as the proponents of those 
proposals and the non-proponent shareholders of those companies. The 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would primarily affect companies 
that receive shareholder proposals presented through proponents' own 
proxy solicitations, as well as the proponents of those proposals and 
the non-proponent shareholders of those companies. In addition, the 
proposed amendments could have indirect effects on providers of 
administrative and advisory services related to proxy solicitation and 
shareholder voting.
a. Companies
    Companies that have a class of equity securities registered under 
section 12 of the Exchange Act are subject to the Federal proxy rules, 
including Rule 14a-8 and Rule 14a-4(c). In addition, registered 
investment companies and business development companies are subject to 
the Federal proxy rules.\277\ Finally, there are certain companies that 
voluntarily file proxy materials that could be affected to the extent 
that they receive shareholder proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \277\ See supra section II.A.3. Business development companies 
are a category of closed-end investment company that are not 
registered under the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We estimate that 5,357 companies, including 142 business 
development companies, had a class of securities registered under 
section 12 of the Exchange Act and filed on domestic forms during 
calendar year 2025.\278\ This estimate represents an upper bound 
estimate of the number of potentially affected companies because some 
of these companies may not file proxy materials or receive a 
shareholder proposal in a given year. Out of the 5,357 potentially 
affected companies mentioned above, 4,527 (85 percent) filed proxy 
materials with the Commission during calendar year 2025.\279\ In 
addition, there were 74 companies that voluntarily filed proxy 
materials in calendar year 2025.\280\
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    \278\ We estimate the number of companies other than issuers of 
asset-backed securities and registered investment companies with a 
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act 
by reviewing all filers, by unique Central Index Key (CIK), of Forms 
10-K and amendments thereto filed during calendar year 2025.
    \279\ The proxy materials we consider in our analysis are 
materials filed via EDGAR under submission types DEF 14A, DEF 14C, 
DEFA14A, DEFC14A, DEFM14A, DEFM14C, DEFR14A, DEFR14C, DFAN14A, PRE 
14A, PRE 14C, PREC14A, PREM14A, PREM14C, PRER14A, PRER14C, N-14, S-
4, and F-4. Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 can be a registration statement 
and/or proxy statement. For purposes of this economic analysis, we 
have reviewed all Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 filed during calendar 
year 2025 with the Commission and excluded from our estimates above 
Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 that are exclusively registration 
statements.
    \280\ We identify companies that voluntarily file proxy 
materials as companies reporting pursuant to section 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act but not registered under section 12(b) or section 12(g) 
of the Exchange Act and foreign private issuers that filed any proxy 
materials during calendar year 2025 with the Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As of December 31, 2025, there were 2,720 registered investment 
companies \281\ that were subject to the Federal proxy rules, of which 
718 (26 percent) reported to have submitted matters for their security 
holders' vote during the reporting period.\282\ The percentage of 
registered investment companies that submitted matters to shareholders 
for a vote is lower than for other types of companies because open-end 
investment companies (which are the most common form of investment 
company) and unlisted closed-end investment companies generally do not 
hold shareholder meetings annually. We estimate that 816 unique 
entities associated with registered investment companies \283\ filed 
proxy materials with the Commission during calendar year 2025 on 1,634 
unique forms.\284\
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    \281\ The number of registered investment companies was based on 
Form N-CEN data for the reporting period ending Dec. 2025 with 
filings received through Mar. 31, 2026. These 2,720 registered 
investment companies were associated with the following funds: (i) 
12,710 open-end funds, out of which 4,194 were Exchange Traded Funds 
(``ETFs'') registered as open-end funds or open-end funds that had 
an ETF share class; (ii) 707 closed-end funds; (iii) 15 variable 
annuity separate accounts registered as management investment 
companies; (iv) 414 variable annuity separate accounts registered as 
unit investment trusts; (v) 239 variable insurance contracts 
registered as unit investment trusts; (vi) 40 other unit investment 
trusts; and (vi) 2 face amount certificate companies. Open-end funds 
are series of trusts registered on Form N-1A. Closed-end funds are 
trusts registered on Form N-2. Variable annuity separate accounts 
registered as management companies are trusts registered on Form N-
3. Variable annuity separate accounts registered as unit investment 
trusts are registered on Form N-4. Variable insurance contracts 
registered as unit investment trusts are registered on Form N-6. All 
other unit investment trusts in this time frame are registered on 
Form N-8B-2. Face amount certificates were found on Form 10-K by 
manually reviewing non-BDC investment companies.
    \282\ Only management investment companies submitted matters for 
their security holders' vote during this time frame. We estimate 
this number by reviewing Item B.10 in all Forms N-CEN of management 
companies active through Dec. 2025 received by the Commission as of 
Mar. 31, 2026. These 718 management companies were associated with 
the following funds: (i) 2,811 open-end funds, out of which 740 were 
ETFs registered as open-end funds or open-end funds that had an ETF 
share class; (ii) 388 closed-end funds; and (iii) no variable 
annuity separate accounts.
    \283\ The proxy materials we consider in our analysis are 
materials filed via EDGAR under submission types DEF 14A, DEF 14C, 
DEFA14A, DEFC14A, DEFM14A, DEFM14C, DEFR14A, DEFR14C, DFAN14A, PRE 
14A, PRE 14C, PREC14A, PREM14A, PREM14C, PRER14A, PRER14C, N-14, S-
4, and F-4. Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 can be a registration statement 
and/or proxy statement. For purposes of this economic analysis, we 
have reviewed all Forms N-14, S-4. and F-4 filed during calendar 
year 2025 with the Commission and excluded from our estimates above 
Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 that are exclusively registration 
statements. Because management investment companies could comprise 
multiple funds and proxy materials could be filed with the 
Commission at the management company, fund family, a combination of 
funds or fund families, or individual fund level, the number of 
entities associated with management companies that filed proxy 
materials during calendar year 2025 exceeds that number of 
management companies that submitted matters for their security 
holders' vote.
    \284\ We estimate the number of unique proxy filings by 
reviewing the unique accession numbers of proxy materials filed by 
entities associated with registered investment companies.
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b. Shareholder Proponents
    Proponents of shareholder proposals also would be affected by the 
proposed rule amendments. We estimate that there were approximately 184 
identified proponents that submitted a shareholder proposal under Rule 
14a-8 to be included in a company's proxy materials as lead proponents 
\285\ during

[[Page 59930]]

calendar year 2025.\286\ Because proponents may not submit a 
shareholder proposal every year, this estimate, which is based solely 
on 2025 submissions, likely understates the number of proponents that 
could be affected by the proposed amendments. For example, there were 
approximately 502 unique lead proponents that submitted a shareholder 
proposal to be included in a company's proxy materials for annual and 
special meetings from 2022 through 2025.\287\
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    \285\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b)(1)(iii)(B).
    \286\ Data is retrieved from the FactSet SharkRepellent Proxy 
Proposal dataset. See infra note 293. This data allows for the 
unique identification of a sole lead proponent of each proposal, but 
not the unique identification of all co-proponents across proposals. 
As a result, our estimated number of proponents should be 
interpreted as a lower bound on the total number of unique 
shareholder proponents.
    \287\ See id.
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c. Non-Proponent Shareholders
    Non-proponent shareholders of companies also could be indirectly 
affected by the proposed rule amendments. According to a study based on 
the 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances, approximately 76 million 
households owned publicly traded stock directly or indirectly (through 
other investment instruments, such as pooled investment funds, 
retirement accounts, and other managed assets).\288\ Moreover, based on 
an academic study using U.S. retail shareholder voting data from 
Broadridge covering nearly all annual and special meetings from 2015 to 
2017, there were approximately 46 million retail accounts that directly 
held shares of U.S. public companies.\289\ Our analysis of 
institutional investor data also shows that there were 9,184 unique 
institutional investors during 2025.\290\ With respect to registered 
investment companies, there are approximately 76 million households 
owning these funds, comprising approximately 56% of U.S. 
households.\291\
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    \288\ See Aditya Aladangady et al., Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances from 2019 to 2022: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer 
Finances, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Oct. (2023), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf23.pdf (reporting that 58% of the 131.3 
million families represented owned stock in publicly-traded 
companies). Indirect holdings of publicly-traded stock are those in 
pooled investment funds, retirement accounts, and other managed 
assets. The same study estimates that approximately 28 million 
households (21%) held publicly traded stock directly in 2019. This 
is a triennial survey, and the latest data available as of this time 
is from the 2022 survey.
    \289\ See Alon Brav et al., Retail Shareholder Participation in 
the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, 144 J. Fin. 
Econ. 492, 497 (2022). The number of retail accounts is an 
approximation of the number of retail investors because each retail 
investor can hold multiple accounts and multiple retail investors 
can hold a single account. Further, this data only covers a subset 
of all retail accounts.
    \290\ Data is retrieved from the Thomson/Refinitiv Institutional 
(13F) Holdings dataset. Unique institutional investors are composed 
of filers with a unique Manager Number that filed a Form 13F at 
least for one quarter during calendar year 2025 with the Commission. 
The estimated number of institutional investors is a lower bound of 
the actual number of institutional investors because only 
institutional investment managers that exercise discretion over $100 
million or more in section 13(f) securities on the last trading day 
of any month of any calendar year must file Form 13F with the 
Commission. See 17 CFR 240.13f-1.
    \291\ See 2026 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company 
Institute, available at https://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2026-factbook.pdf.
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3. Current Practices
a. Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals
    The practices relating to shareholder proposals in more recent 
years may differ from prior years due to certain amendments to Rule 
14a-8 that have applied to proposals submitted for annual or special 
meetings held on or after January 1, 2022.\292\ As a result, the bulk 
of our analysis focuses on shareholder proposals submitted for meetings 
held from January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2025. The percentage of 
proposals submitted but not included in companies' proxy materials can 
vary considerably from one proxy season to the next, limiting our 
ability to draw conclusions regarding the current practices related to 
shareholder proposal exclusions based on data from any individual proxy 
season.
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    \292\ The 2020 amendments to Rule 14a-8, which apply to 
shareholder proposals submitted for annual and special meetings held 
on or after Jan. 1, 2022, introduced several changes, including 
revised ownership and resubmission thresholds. See 2020 Adopting 
Release.
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    Our data \293\ on shareholder proposals contains proposals that 
were (i) included in companies' proxy materials and voted on by 
shareholders; (ii) omitted from companies' proxy materials following a 
no-action letter \294\ or notice of exclusion; or (iii) submitted by 
the proponents but withdrawn prior to a vote, where the information 
about the proposal is publicly available.\295\ Throughout the analysis, 
we disaggregate statistics by company size, proponent types, and 
proposal topics to understand how the practices related to shareholder 
proposals have varied across these categories.
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    \293\ Unless stated otherwise, all data in this section is 
retrieved from the FactSet SharkRepellent Proxy Proposal dataset 
(accessed on May 10, 2026). Dataset coverage for 2025 includes 
around 5,000 U.S.-incorporated public companies and some foreign-
incorporated companies. FactSet extracts and processes proxy data 
from regulatory filings and press releases, as well as through web 
monitoring and in rare instances, direct engagement with companies 
and shareholder proponents. Unless otherwise specified, we exclude 
from our analysis shareholder proposals that are not subject to Rule 
14a-8, such as proposals related to proxy contests and other 
proposals appearing in dissident shareholders' proxy soliciting 
material, proposals that were raised from the floor of the annual or 
special meetings and were not submitted to appear in the companies' 
proxy statements, and proposals submitted for a vote at meetings of 
foreign private issuers, which are not subject to the Federal proxy 
rules.
    \294\ On Nov. 17, 2025 the Division of Corporation Finance (the 
``Division'') announced that for the 2025-2026 proxy season it would 
not respond to no-action requests for, and would instead express no 
views on, companies' intended reliance on any basis for exclusion of 
shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than no-action 
requests to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). See U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm'n, Division of Corporation Finance, Statement Regarding 
the Division of Corporation Finance's Role in the Exchange Act Rule 
14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy Season (Nov. 17, 2025), 
available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season. Accordingly, data in our 
analysis from any date on or after Nov. 17, 2025 reflects exclusions 
based on a company's notice of exclusion rather than a response to a 
no-action request. On Aug. 14, 2026, the Division announced that, 
effective immediately, it had determined to discontinue responding 
to Rule 14a-8 no-action requests entirely, including those submitted 
under subsection (i)(1). The Aug. 14 announcement also stated that 
the Division would no longer respond to notices filed under Rule 
14a-8(j) with a letter indicating that it will not object if a 
company omits a proposal from its proxy materials. Companies 
continue to be required under Rule 14a-8(j) to submit notices to the 
Commission when they intend to exclude proposals from their proxy 
materials. The Division of Investment Management will take a 
substantially similar approach to reviewing Rule 14a-8 requests 
related to investment companies. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 
Division of Corporation Finance, Updated Statement Regarding Rule 
14a-8 No-Action Requests (Aug. 14, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/corpfin-statement-rule-14a-8-process-081426.
    \295\ Our data is comprehensive with respect to shareholder 
proposals that appear in companies' proxy statements and those for 
which the company submitted a no-action request or notice of 
exclusion to Commission staff. However, proposal submission counts 
in our analysis represent a lower bound on all shareholder proposal 
submissions because this data may not include all shareholder 
proposals that were withdrawn by proponents. In particular, if a 
submitted but withdrawn proposal did not appear in a press release 
or a company's no-action request, it may not be included in the data 
we use for the analysis in this section.
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    Focusing first on shareholder proposals submitted to companies for 
annual and special meetings held in 2025, the most recent full calendar 
year for which we have data, we find that 786 shareholder proposals 
were submitted to be included in companies' proxy materials under Rule 
14a-8. Of these submissions, the majority of proposals (64 percent) 
were included in companies' proxy materials and voted on, while 22 
percent were omitted and 14 percent were withdrawn by the proponent 
prior to the applicable meeting.\296\ The majority (74 percent) of

[[Page 59931]]

proposals were submitted to S&P 500 companies. For those proposals 
where we can identify the proponent, we estimate that 53 percent of 
proposals were submitted by individual proponents while 47 percent were 
submitted by institutional proponents.\297\ The average (median) 
shareholder support for proposals that proceeded to a vote (``voted 
proposals'') during this period was 24 (14) percent of the total number 
of votes cast, with approximately seven percent of all proposals being 
approved by the voting shareholders (11 percent of voted proposals). 
Lastly, the volume and substance of shareholder proposal submissions is 
not uniform across companies. There were 449 different companies 
receiving a shareholder proposal for meetings held in 2025, five of 
which were registered investment companies. The average (median) number 
of proposals received by a company per meeting was 1.8 (one), and the 
maximum number any company received was 21.
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    \296\ See supra note 295, which discusses the potential 
underestimation of the volume of withdrawn proposals in our 
analysis. In this analysis, we classify a shareholder proposal that 
was included in a company's proxy statement but was not voted on in 
the annual or special meeting as a withdrawn proposal.
    \297\ Throughout our analysis, ``individual'' proponents are 
composed of retail investors. ``Institutional'' proponents are 
composed of asset managers, unions, pension funds, religious 
organizations, nonprofit organizations, and other organizations. The 
data is missing lead proponents' identities for 94 (11%) of 
shareholder proposals over this period which is presumably because 
companies are not required to disclose the identity of the proponent 
in proxy statements. See 17 CFR 240.14a-8(l).
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    Because the number and characteristics of shareholder proposal 
submissions can vary from one year to the next, we also repeat the 
analysis above for shareholder proposals submitted for annual and 
special meetings held in the four-year period from 2022 through 2025. A 
total of 3,205 proposals were submitted for inclusion in companies' 
proxy materials for annual and special meetings held from 2022 through 
2025, representing an average of approximately 801 proposals submitted 
each year (see Table 1 below). Of the submissions during this period, 
the majority of proposals (74 percent) were included in companies' 
proxy materials and voted on, while 14 percent were omitted following a 
no-action letter, and 12 percent were withdrawn by the proponents prior 
to the applicable meeting.\298\ Shareholder proposal activity in this 
four-year period was concentrated among the S&P 500 companies, with 77 
percent of proposals submitted to this group.\299\ Lastly, 1,429 
proposals were submitted by proponents identified as individuals,\300\ 
but these proposals were more likely to be omitted and less likely to 
be withdrawn than those submitted by proponents identified as 
institutions.\301\
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    \298\ See supra note 295.
    \299\ We note that the volume of shareholder proposal 
submissions is not uniform across companies. Over the four-year 
period, around one quarter of S&P 500 companies received no 
shareholder proposals, while 42 S&P 500 companies received four or 
more proposals on average per year. We also estimate that 
approximately 1% of all shareholder proposals were submitted to 
registered investment companies.
    \300\ See supra note 297 for a description of how we categorized 
proponent types. The data is missing lead proponents' identities for 
277 (9%) of shareholder proposals over the 2022-2025 period. Because 
proponent identity is missing for some proposals in our data, the 
percentages in the Proponent Type rows of Table 1 do not sum up to 
100%.
    \301\ Some find that the higher likelihood of withdrawal for 
proposals submitted by institutional shareholder-proponents could be 
due to these shareholders having more direct channels of 
communication and engagement and influence with companies than 
individual investors. See, e.g., Eugene Soltes et al., What Else do 
Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm 
Management (Harv. Bus. Sch. Acct. & Mgmt Unit, Working Paper, July 
14, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2771114 (retrieved 
from SSRN Elsevier database) (finding that the level of shareholder 
ownership of shares is positively associated with the probability 
that a proposal is withdrawn, which is consistent with the idea that 
large shareholders ``are more influential and are more likely to 
have dialogue with managers that would facilitate implementation of 
their proposal prior to a shareholder vote'') (``Soltes et al. 
(2017)'').
    \302\ The percentages in parentheses in each column of the table 
represent percentages of the total number of proposals in the first 
row of each column.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.073

    There were 716 unique companies receiving one or more shareholder 
proposals under Rule 14a-8 for meetings held between 2022 and 2025, 21 
of which were registered investment companies. The average (median) 
number of proposals received per company and meeting among these 716 
companies was 2.0 (one), and the maximum number any company received 
for one single meeting was 21.
    The number of omitted proposals in Table 1 above represents 
proposals

[[Page 59932]]

excluded from companies' proxy materials following receipt of a no-
action letter issued by the Commission staff on either procedural or 
substantive grounds under Rule 14a-8. With respect to all shareholder 
proposals received for meetings held in the 2022-2025 period, companies 
submitted 1,073 no-action requests (corresponding to 33 percent of all 
proposal submissions). No-action letters concurring with the company 
were issued for 462 of those proposals, which is equal to 43 percent of 
the no-action letter requests. All but four proposals for which a no-
action letter was issued were subsequently excluded by the company.
    Table 2 summarizes data on shareholder support and proponent types. 
The average (median) shareholder support for voted proposals over the 
four-year sample period was 26 (21) percent of the total number of 
votes cast, with approximately 10 percent of proposals receiving 
majority support. Shareholder support varied across proponent types. In 
particular, proposals submitted by individual proponents received 
higher shareholder support on average and were more likely to be 
supported by the majority of voting shareholders than proposals 
submitted by institutional proponents.\303\
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    \303\ Differences in the types of proposals submitted by 
individual and institutional shareholder proponents could be driving 
the differences in the voting support across these two groups. For 
example, we find that individual shareholder proponents submitted 
the majority of voted governance proposals (75%) over the four-year 
period, while institutional shareholder proponents submitted the 
majority of voted social and environmental proposals (70%).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.074

    Table 3 presents data on shareholder support for proposals 
submitted to registered investment companies for the 2022-2025 period. 
There were 33 such proposals submitted to 21 different registered 
investment companies. Of the 33 proposals, 25 were voted on and 8 were 
withdrawn. As the data in Table 3 suggests, proposals submitted to such 
companies received high support on average compared to proposals 
submitted to operating companies: an average of 45% and a median of 
53%. Most of the proponents were institutions: 24 of the 25 proposals 
were submitted by institutions, and one was submitted by an individual.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.075


[[Page 59933]]


b. Proxy Contests
    We identify 69 proxy contests containing a solicitation for one or 
more proposals that were initiated through the filing of preliminary 
proxy statements by proponents for annual or special shareholder 
meetings held in calendar years 2022-2025 across all companies subject 
to the Federal proxy rules.\304\ Out of these contests, 11 contests 
included binding proposals, 49 included nonbinding proposals, and 9 
included both binding and nonbinding proposals. Furthermore, 63 out of 
the 69 contests included one or more proponent director nominees, 
whereas six contests were solely proponent solicitations for one or 
more proposals. Out of the six proxy contests not involving board 
nominations, only two contests solely involved non-binding 
proposals.\305\
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    \304\ Based on information from FactSet's SharkRepellent 
database and staff's review of EDGAR filings. This total number of 
proxy contests includes all cases in which a proponent initiated a 
``solicitation in opposition'' to the company which included a 
proposal from the proponent to be presented and voted on, whether or 
not the proponent's proxy also included its own director nominees. 
This total does not include proxy contests that are only for 
directors' nominations.
    \305\ The two contests that solely involved non-binding 
proposals were ``zero slate'' contests involving Warrior Met Coal, 
Inc. and News Corporation, discussed earlier in the release. See 
supra note 223 and related text. The remaining four contests are not 
ones typically considered ``zero slate,'' as they involved special 
meetings in which the proponent sought to remove existing board 
members, rather than annual meetings involving the election of 
directors.
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    In terms of the characteristics of the companies targeted for the 
above proxy contests involving proposals, 14 percent (10 companies) of 
contests involved S&P 500 companies, which contrasts with the 77 
percent of S&P 500 companies that received Rule 14a-8 shareholder 
proposals.\306\ In addition, more than 43 percent of contests (30 
contests) targeted closed-end funds, which is a notable difference 
compared to the much lower proportion of funds among registrants 
receiving Rule 14a-8 proposals. In terms of the type of proponents 
initiating proxy contests involving proposals, 13 percent (9 contests) 
were initiated by individuals, and the rest by institutions (mainly 
hedge funds and other types of institutional investors).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \306\ See Table 1 in section IV.B.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Around 45 percent of the proxy contests with proposals (31 
contests) ended before the proposals were voted on at a meeting (either 
because they were withdrawn by the proponent or settled in some other 
manner prior to the meeting). Among the 38 contests that lasted through 
a shareholder meeting, there were 57 proponent proposals up for a vote, 
around 49 percent of which (28 proposals) received enough voting 
support to pass the specific voting requirements applicable to each 
proposal. Of these 57 proposals, 24 targeted investment companies, and 
67 percent of these 24 received sufficient voting support to pass.
    In proxy contests, both companies and proponents incur direct costs 
of solicitation.\307\ These costs may include, for example, fees paid 
to proxy solicitors, expenditures for attorneys and public relations 
advisors, and printing and mailing costs. We understand that for 
companies, the costs of solicitation in proxy contests generally exceed 
the solicitation costs associated with a shareholder meeting without a 
contested election. Both proponents and companies are required to 
provide estimates of the costs of solicitation in their proxy 
statements.\308\ As shown in Table 4 below, based on available data on 
estimated solicitation costs for the proxy contests involving 
proponents at meetings held in years 2022-2025, the median reported 
estimated total costs per contest were approximately $825,000 for 
companies and approximately $275,000 for proponents.
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    \307\ In some cases, proponents may seek reimbursement of their 
expenses from companies. Such potential reimbursement is governed by 
State law and is more likely in the case of a successful proxy 
contest. The Federal proxy rules require proponents to disclose 
whether reimbursement will be sought from the company, and, if so, 
whether the question of such reimbursement will be submitted to a 
vote of shareholders. See 17 CFR 240.14a-101, Item 4(b)(5).
    \308\ Companies may, but do not have to, exclude from the total 
estimated solicitation costs the amount normally expended for a 
proxy solicitation in the absence of a contest, and costs 
represented by salaries and wages of regular employees and officers, 
provided a statement to that effect is included in the proxy 
statement. It is our understanding that most companies exclude such 
costs from their estimated total costs.
    \309\ Based on data from Factset's SharkRepellent database in 
calendar years 2022-2025.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.076

    Beyond these estimated solicitation expenses, proxy contests may be 
associated with other indirect costs, such as the cost of management or 
proponent time spent in the process of conducting the contest and 
expenses associated with any discussions held between management and 
the proponent(s) or other participants who could influence the outcome 
(e.g., large investors and proxy advisor firms). We do not have data on 
these indirect costs.
    Turning to current voting mechanics in shareholder proposal proxy 
solicitations, as an alternative to the Rule 14a-8 process, a proponent 
can present a proposal to shareholders by sending its own separate 
proxy card.\310\ Such a solicitation is conducted by sending out 
electronically and/or via regular mail a proxy statement to some subset 
of shareholders. Shareholders that are solicited may then choose 
between returning the proponent's proxy card or the company's proxy 
card if they wish to vote on the proxy matters, as an alternative to 
attending the meeting. A shareholder that is not initially solicited by 
the proponent may be able to expend effort to contact the

[[Page 59934]]

proponent to request solicitation, but the success of this effort is 
not guaranteed. Those that are not solicited by the proponent are 
limited to using the company's proxy card if voting by proxy. The 
company is not required, unlike with the Rule 14a-8 process, to include 
the proponent's proposal in its proxy materials. If the company omits 
the proposal, however, and if the proponent satisfies the solicitation 
threshold and related requirements set out in current Rule 14a-
4(c)(2)(i)-(iii), the company would be unable to exercise discretionary 
voting authority with respect to the proponent's proposal under current 
Rule 14a-4(c)(2). In other words, the company would not be allowed to 
vote on the proponent's proposal on behalf of shareholders who return 
the company's proxy. With votes with respect to the proposal coming 
only from shareholders who received and returned the proponent's card 
and from shareholders who vote in person or virtually at the meeting, 
the proponent's solicitation effort may obtain sufficient votes needed 
to pass the proposal using the proponent's card.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \310\ See section IV.C.1.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A company may include proponent proposals received outside the Rule 
14a-8 process in its proxy materials, which would provide a means for 
shareholders to vote with respect to the proposal using the company's 
proxy card.\311\ To the extent shareholders who choose to return the 
company's proxy card are more inclined to vote with management than 
shareholders who choose to return the proponent's proxy card, including 
the proponent's proposal may allow the company to increase the 
proportion of votes with respect to the proposal that are favorable to 
the company. Under current rules, the company could also vote on behalf 
of shareholders who do not vote at all with respect to such proposal 
but return a signed proxy card provided the company stated on its proxy 
card how it intends to vote proxy cards that are returned signed but 
without specifying a choice regarding the proposal.\312\ If the company 
is not in favor of the proposal, for example, the shares of 
shareholders who sign and return the company's proxy card but do not 
vote with respect to the proposal would be counted as ``against'' votes 
as long as the proxy card includes such disclosure.
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    \311\ For each such proposal, the company would need to provide 
a means for shareholders to vote ``for,'' ``against,'' or to 
abstain. See Rule 14a-4(b)(1).
    \312\ See Rule 14a-4(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A company's decision on whether to include a proponent's proposal 
presented outside the Rule 14a-8 process in its proxy materials, where 
the company does not support the proposal, thus involves a tradeoff. On 
the one hand, not including the proposal potentially increases the 
likelihood that the non-Rule 14a-8 proponent's solicitation effort 
obtains the votes needed to pass the proposal if shareholders who vote 
using the proponent's proxy card are more amenable to the proposal. On 
the other hand, including the proposal incurs many of the same costs 
incurred with Rule 14a-8 proposals.
c. Other Forms of Shareholder Engagement
    Although Rule 14a-8 was not adopted to serve as a means of 
shareholder engagement, we recognize for purposes of assessing the 
baseline that some shareholders use the Rule 14a-8 process as an 
engagement tool.\313\ The baseline of the existing regulatory regime 
with respect to shareholder proposals is discussed in section IV.B.1 
above. The baseline also includes other existing forms of shareholder 
engagement that can serve as complements to or substitutes for 
shareholder proposals. These alternative engagement methods include, 
among others, voting in director elections and on management proposals, 
communicating with management informally, conducting exempt 
solicitations, calling a special meeting of shareholders, acting by 
written consent, nominating one or more directors for election to a 
company's board of directors, using proxy access provisions, making 
floor proposals or nominations, using social media platforms, and 
leveraging the threat of divestment. The availability and effectiveness 
of these mechanisms as substitutes for Rule 14a-8 proposals varies 
considerably, as discussed below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \313\ See supra section II.A.2.b.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Below we discuss available research on existing practices related 
to these forms of shareholder engagement. Where academic research on 
any particular form of engagement is limited, the lack of specific data 
and evidence makes it difficult to quantify the pros and cons of these 
particular methods. In addition, the costs and benefits of using a 
particular shareholder engagement method may vary depending on the 
investor and the company involved. In particular, as noted in various 
instances below, State law and companies' governing documents may 
dictate the form of, restrict, or have other implications for the 
feasibility and expense of undertaking, a given approach.\314\
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    \314\ See, e.g., the survey in Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty 
Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J. 
Corp. Fin. 405 (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database) (``Denes et 
al. (2017)''); Tara Bhandari et al., Governance Changes through 
Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access, 44 J. Fin. Quant. 
Anal. 405 (2017), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109020000484; James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting: 
Evidence from Charter Amendment Proposals, 1 J. Corp. Fin. 5 (1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Voting in director elections and on management proposals is, 
broadly speaking, a method of shareholder engagement.\315\ The ability 
to vote in director elections is accessible to shareholders 
irrespective of their level of share ownership and can be construed as 
a low-cost form of shareholder engagement. Although most director 
elections are uncontested and directors typically receive majority 
support,\316\ some research suggests that the level of support can 
influence governance, management changes, and corporate decisions.\317\ 
Other evidence suggests that the level of support for management-
sponsored proposals--particularly in the context of executive 
compensation--has a limited effect.\318\ Shareholders that are 
dissatisfied with

[[Page 59935]]

management performance, or have other unrelated concerns, also 
sometimes express their views by voting against a company's executive 
compensation in a ``say-on-pay'' (``SOP'') vote.\319\ Although SOP 
votes are non-binding, advisory votes, there is some evidence that they 
can affect board composition and management compensation 
practices.\320\ However, not all companies are required to conduct SOP 
votes.\321\ These mechanisms are reactive in nature, allowing 
shareholders to express dissatisfaction with existing management 
decisions but do not provide a channel for proposing specific 
governance changes, which limits their effectiveness as substitutes for 
the Rule 14a-8 submission process.
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    \315\ See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker, 
Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for Corporate Control, 
Uncontested Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review of 
the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 9 (2017) at 12, available 
at https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=olr.
    \316\ See, e.g., 2025 Proxy Season Review: From Escalation to 
Recalibration, at Figure 11 (showing that in 2024 and 2025 proxy 
seasons directors received approximately 94.5% and 94.9% votes on 
average, respectively).
    \317\ See, e.g., Fabrizio Ferri, Low-Cost' Shareholder Activism: 
A Review of the Evidence, in Research Handbook on the Economics of 
Corporate Law 192 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2012); David L. Yermack, Shareholder Voting and 
Corporate Governance, 2 ANN. REV. Fin. Econ. 103 (2010), available 
at https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104034. See 
also, e.g., Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389 
(2009) (documenting that ``shareholder votes are significantly 
related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and 
voting mechanisms'' but also noting that ``differences in votes are 
statistically significant but economically minor''); Paul E. Fischer 
et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from 
Uncontested Director Elections, 48 J. Acct. Econ. 172 (2009) 
(finding that ``firms with low vote approval are more likely to 
experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO 
compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and 
better-received divestitures in the future''). As a caveat, it is 
not always possible to rule out that low vote approval parallels 
other engagement by dissatisfied shareholders that is not fully 
accounted for in the studies but that may also contribute to the 
direction of the effect on management and corporate decisions.
    \318\ See, e.g., Christopher Armstrong et al., The Efficacy of 
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. 
Acct. Rsch. 909 (2013) (finding ``little evidence that either lower 
shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed 
equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or 
composition of future CEO incentive compensation'').
    \319\ The requirement to conduct SOP votes is in accordance with 
section 14A of the Exchange Act, as added by section 951 of the 
Dodd-Frank Act 17 U.S.C. 78n-1; Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 
(2010), sec. 951. The Commission adopted rules implementing section 
951 in 2011. See 17 CFR 240.14a-21, Shareholder Approval of 
Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Release 
No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 2011) [76 FR 6009 (Feb. 2, 2011)].
    \320\ See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Badgett et al., Director 
Reputational Penalties When Shareholders Disapprove of Executive 
Compensation, 45 J. Fin. Rsch. 759 (2022) (examining ``directors of 
firms that receive a low-support Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote'' and finding 
that ``[t]hese affected directors face a significantly greater 
likelihood of losing board seats, both at the voting firm and in the 
external labor market''); Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes 
and Proxy Advisors: Evidence From Say on Pay, 51 J. Acct. Rsch. 951 
(2013) (examining the role of proxy advisors in mandatory SOP votes 
and also finding that ``[m]ore than half of the firms respond to the 
adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by 
engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation 
plan'').
    \321\ Title I of the JOBS Act exempted Emerging Growth Companies 
from the requirement to conduct SOP votes. Public Law 112-106, 126 
Stat. 306 (2012), sec. 102(a)(1). A recent Commission proposal, if 
adopted, would also exempt the class of non-accelerated filers, as 
defined in the proposed rulemaking, from the SOP requirement. See 
Enhancement of Emerging Growth Company Accommodations and 
Simplification of Filer Status for Reporting Companies, Release No. 
34-105515 (May 19, 2026) [91 FR 30086 (May 21, 2026)].
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    Informal communication with management, a method commonly used by 
large institutional investors, is another means of shareholder 
engagement.\322\ This method is most effective when it involves 
shareholders with larger stakes or groups of shareholders. However, 
shareholders with greater than five percent beneficial ownership of a 
company's equity securities may be deterred from pursuing this channel 
as a substitute for Rule 14a-8 proposals to the extent their 
contemplated engagement could constitute ``changing or influencing 
control,'' thereby affecting their eligibility to report on Schedule 
13G rather than Schedule 13D and subjecting them to accelerated filing 
deadlines and additional disclosure requirements.\323\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \322\ See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The 
Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. Appl. 
Corp. Fin. 55 (2007). See also Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the 
Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional 
Investors, 71 J. Fin. 2905 (2016) (``McCahery et al. (2016)'') 
(finding in a 2012-2013 survey of ``143 respondents, mostly very 
large institutional investors with a long-term focus'' that ``voice, 
especially when conducted behind the scenes, is important. For 
example, 63% of respondents state that in the past five years they 
have engaged in direct discussions with management, and 45% state 
that they have had private discussions with a company's board 
outside of management's presence''). See also, e.g., a UK study 
examining engagement data provided by a single institutional 
investor. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism: 
Evidence From a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 3093 (2009).
    \323\ See Tonello, supra note 123 (noting that in 2025 
``Institutional investor engagement was affected by new SEC guidance 
issued in Feb. 2025, which introduced uncertainty around Schedule 
13G eligibility. Some investors temporarily paused or narrowed the 
scope of engagement, shaping a more cautious, issuer-led dialogue 
environment heading into the 2026 proxy season.''); See also Maia 
Gez et al.,``Under Pressure'': Walking the Fine Line of Section 
13(d) Passive Investor Status, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance 
(Mar. 29, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/03/29/under-pressure-walking-the-fine-line-of-section-13d-passive-investor-status/; Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting, 
Release No. 34-98787 (Oct. 10, 2023) [88 FR 72700 (Oct. 25, 2023)]. 
Coordination among activists undertaking a campaign also may result 
in their share ownership being consolidated for purposes of the 
application of the Schedule 13D reporting threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Shareholders with concerns who wish to express their views about 
management actions or who desire to effect change at companies also may 
conduct ``exempt solicitations,'' \324\ which include solicitations 
that are exempt from most of the Federal proxy rules other than the 
antifraud provision \325\ because the person soliciting does not 
directly or indirectly seek authority to act as proxy and does not 
furnish or request a form of revocation, abstention, consent, or 
authorization. Such a solicitation may include creating a website to 
gather and publicize views about the company's decisions, organizing 
certain forms of ``vote no'' campaigns,\326\ or undertaking certain 
other communications to shareholders.\327\ Academic research has shown 
that ``vote no'' campaigns can result in changes to CEO pay and board 
decisions sought by the shareholder.\328\ Shareholders also may request 
a special meeting between annual meetings or an action by written 
consent, if permitted by State law and a company's governing 
documents.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \324\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b). Rule 14a-6(g) requires 
shareholders that own more than $5 million of a company's securities 
and that are engaged in an exempt solicitation to file Notice of 
Exempt Solicitation (submission type PX14A6G). Data prior to Jan. 
2026 included voluntarily submitted exempt solicitation notices, 
including those by shareholders with a smaller stake. In Jan. 2026, 
Commission staff issued guidance stating it will object to the 
voluntary submission of Notices of Exempt Solicitation. See Proxy 
Rules and Schedules 14A/14C Corporation Finance Interpretation 
126.06 (Jan. 23, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/corporation-finance-interpretations/proxy-rules-schedules-14a14c. Thus, post-2025 exempt solicitation 
notice data only includes larger shareholders.
    \325\ See Rule 14a-9.
    \326\ As one source describes it, ``[i]n a vote-no campaign, an 
activist shareholder files an exempt solicitation to urge fellow 
investors to vote against certain management proposals or directors 
(or withhold votes on those directors),'' seeking to ``register 
shareholder discontent and pressure the board or management . . . 
through the weight of negative votes and public pressure, even if no 
alternate director is standing for election.'' Such campaigns may 
combine filings with other communications, such as ``press releases, 
open letters, and social media to amplify their impact.'' See Matteo 
Tonello, The Recent Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United 
States, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Dec. 24, 2025), available 
at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/24/the-recent-evolution-of-shareholder-activism-in-the-unit.
    \327\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b)(1).
    \328\ See, e.g., Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay 
Attention when Institutional Investor Activists ``Just Vote No''?, 
90 J. Fin. Econ. 84 (2008) (examining another researcher's 
hypothesis ``that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to 
take immediate action''); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A 
Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 
Stanford L. Rev. 857 (1993), available at https://doi.org/10.2307/1229199 (finding that ``a variety of supportive evidence, including 
operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief 
executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns 
induce boards to take actions in shareholders' interests.''); Yonca 
Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud. 
535 (2011) (finding that ``[f]irms with excess CEO pay targeted by 
vote-no campaigns experience a significant reduction in CEO pay'').
    \329\ See, e.g., Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Never-
Ending Quest for Shareholder Rights: Special Meetings and Written 
Consent, 99 B. U. L. Rev. 743 (2019); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate 
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. Econ. 107 (2003) (including 
limits on the ability to call a special meeting ``that either 
increase the level of shareholder support required to call a special 
meeting beyond that specified by state law or eliminate the ability 
to call one entirely'' in the paper's measure of greater management 
power (lower shareholder power) and noting that ``[s]uch provisions 
add extra time to proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the 
regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace board members or 
dismantle takeover defenses. This delay is especially potent when 
combined with limitations on actions by written consent.''). Calling 
a special shareholder meeting could be a part of the proxy fight 
(see section IV.B.3.b for more discussion of proxy contests).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Commission rules provide for certain other forms of engagement 
exempt from the proxy rules, such as solicitations limited to no more 
than 10 persons.\330\ However, data and research specific to such 
activity are lacking (in large part due to the absence of a proxy 
filing

[[Page 59936]]

obligation for shareholders undertaking this type of exempt 
solicitation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \330\ 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Proxy access'' provisions, which allow shareholders to include 
their director nominees directly on a company's proxy card (if 
permitted by the company's governing documents), is another available 
avenue of shareholder engagement.\331\ Shareholders also may engage 
with companies by making proposals or director nominations from the 
floor at a shareholders' meeting, subject to compliance with a 
company's governing documents (e.g., advance notice requirements).\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \331\ See, e.g., Denes et al. (2017), supra note 314. A proxy 
contest may still take place for the same meeting, however, if a 
separate solicitation (by a different shareholder) ends up being put 
forth (as discussed above in section IV.B.3.b).
    \332\ See, e.g., Broc Romanek, Brush Up on the Floor Proposal 
Process Before Your Annual Meeting, Mar. 31, 2025, The Governance 
Beat--Cooley, available at https://governancebeat.cooley.com/brush-up-on-the-floor-proposal-process-before-your-annual-meeting/ 
(retrieved May 21, 2016) (stating that ``[f]loor proposals allow 
shareholders to raise issues at an annual meeting if they properly 
notify the company in accordance with the company's bylaws''). The 
reach of floor proposals is also qualified to the extent companies 
make efforts to preserve discretionary voting authority over such 
proposals by including requisite language in the proxy card in 
reliance on Rule 14a-4(c)(1). Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Social media platforms represent a lower-cost alternative voice 
mechanism that may be more accessible to resource-constrained 
shareholders than independent solicitation or other formal engagement 
mechanisms. Recent research documents the use of social media by 
shareholders to mobilize support, share information, and coordinate 
governance engagement.\333\ However, social media engagement is a less 
formal and less direct mechanism for influencing specific governance 
outcomes than the Rule 14a-8 process, and the evidence on its 
effectiveness as a substitute is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \333\ See, e.g., James S. Ang et al., The Role of Social Media 
in Corporate Governance, 96 Acc. Rev. 1 (2021) (showing that ``small 
investors' negative postings are able to predict a potential 
acquirer's subsequent decision to withdraw its attempt . . .'' and 
``that message board criticisms are also able to predict governance 
outcomes beyond acquisition decisions''); J. Anthony Cookson et al., 
Can Social Media Inform Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Merger 
Withdrawals, 81 J. Fin. 91 (2026) (showing that social media 
sentiment signals can be important for corporate M&A decisions); 
Daniel Cahill, Zhangxin (Frank) Liu, & Theresa Santoso, Media and 
Social Media Sentiment and CEO Pay Cuts, 48 J. Acc. Lit. 311 (2026) 
(finding that firms facing more negative sentiment are more likely 
to engage in pay cuts).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, academic literature has also discussed the role of the 
threat of divestment as a potentially important alternative to more 
traditional methods of shareholder engagement.\334\ The effectiveness 
of this method directly depends on the credibility of the exit threat, 
the magnitude of the shareholder's stake, and the extent to which the 
shareholder is well-informed about managerial conduct.\335\ This 
strategy is likely to be more effective for larger shareholders, as 
selling a significant stake can have greater impact on the stock price, 
making the threat of divestment more significant. The threat of 
divestment also can complement other methods of shareholder 
engagement.\336\ Divestment is an exit mechanism rather than a direct 
engagement mechanism, however, and its effectiveness as a substitute 
for the proactive governance engagement that Rule 14a-8 shareholder 
proposals may enable is therefore limited, particularly for smaller 
individual shareholders for whom the exit threat may not be 
significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \334\ See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The ``Wall Street 
Walk'' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 2645 (2009) (showing in a theoretical setting that a 
large shareholder's threat of exit can reduce agency costs); Alex 
Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial 
Myopia, 64 J. Fin. 2481 (2009); Alex Edmans, Blockholders and 
Corporate Governance, 6 Annu. Rev. Fin. Econ. 23 (2014); Alex Edmans 
& Clifford G. Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and 
Evidence, in 1 The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance 
541 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., North-Holland 
2017). For an empirical analysis in the context of CEO turnover, 
see, for example, Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet: 
Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J. 
Fin. Econ. 3 (2003); Jean Helwege et al., Voting with their Feet or 
Activism? Institutional Investors' Impact on CEO Turnover, 18 J. 
Corp. Fin. 22 (2012) (examining the role of activism and exit in 
driving CEO turnover); and Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., Exit as 
Governance: An Empirical Analysis, 68 J. Fin. 2515 (2013). For 
investor survey evidence, see, for example, McCahery et al. (2016), 
supra note 322 (``document[ing] widespread behind-the-scenes 
intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. These governance 
mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention 
typically occurring prior to a potential exit.''). But see also 
Doron Levit et al., Trading and Shareholder Democracy, 79 J. Fin. 
257 (2024) (noting, in a theoretical framework, among other 
findings, that ``when shareholders can trade, shareholder voting may 
not lead to optimal outcomes. First, shareholders with extreme views 
can accumulate large positions and use their voting power to 
implement their preferred policies, which can be detrimental to 
moderate shareholders and to shareholder welfare . . .'' and that 
``trading may exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the collective 
action problems of the shareholder voting process.'').
    \335\ See Dragana Cvijanovic et al., The Wall Street Stampede: 
Exit as Governance With Interacting Blockholders, 144 J. Fin. Econ. 
433 (2022) (finding an activist hedge fund's exit can lead to 
correlated institutional exits). See also Qingyuan Li et al., The 
Information Advantage of Industry Common Owners and its Spillover 
Effect on Stock Price Crash Risk, 92 J. Corp. Fin. 102764 (2025) 
(noting shareholders who hold multiple firms in an industry may be 
better informed about the individual firms).
    \336\ See supra note 334.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

C. Benefits and Costs

    In this section, we consider the potential benefits and costs of 
the proposed amendments. Some of the benefits and costs are difficult 
to quantify or estimate with certainty.\337\ Accordingly, the 
discussion contains qualitative assessments and, where possible, we 
provide quantitative estimates of the potential benefits and costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \337\ See supra section IV.B.3 (discussing the magnitude and 
uncertainty of the effects regarding the rescission of Rule 14a-8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The potential benefits and costs of the proposed amendments will 
depend, to a certain degree, on the value of the shareholder proposals 
that may be forgone under the proposed amendments. By ``value,'' we 
mean the degree to which the proposals are associated with value-
enhancing or value-reducing corporate policy changes and thus more 
likely to be of interest to the broader shareholder base. Such changes 
are not necessarily limited to traditional corporate governance (or 
agency cost) concerns but may encompass broader considerations, such as 
corporate strategy or management dynamics.\338\ In the analysis that 
follows, we discuss how the economic effects of the proposed amendments 
may differ depending upon the value of underlying shareholder 
proposals, without characterizing any particular types of proposals as 
value-enhancing or value-reducing.\339\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \338\ Existing academic literature on the value of shareholder 
proposals is discussed in section IV.C.1.b.ii.
    \339\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70265 (``As a threshold 
matter, under state corporate law, [such] evaluations are properly 
left to the company's owners--the shareholders. In addition, our 
regulation of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 has not been 
designed to judge the economic value of any particular shareholder 
proposal, or intended to take a position on the merits of any 
shareholder proposal topic.'')
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
    As discussed in section II.A.1, the principal basis for the 
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 is the Commission's conclusion that 
the rule exceeds the Commission's authority under section 14(a) of the 
Exchange Act. Independent of that conclusion, the policy reasons 
discussed in section II.A also provide a basis for rescinding Rule 14a-
8 in its entirety. In this section, we examine economic dimensions of 
those policy reasons, focusing on two principal economic issues.
    First, Rule 14a-8 creates a cost structure that generates an 
externality. The rule requires a company to include qualifying 
shareholder proposals in its proxy materials, meaning that the

[[Page 59937]]

incremental costs of including and distributing the proposal are borne 
by the company (and its shareholders). More precisely, the marginal 
cost the proponent bears is below the total marginal cost that the 
submission process imposes on all affected parties (including the 
company and its non-proponent shareholders), thus creating a wedge that 
is the source of the externality.\340\ Because the proponent does not 
bear the full costs of submission, the decision to submit a proposal 
may be only weakly disciplined by its expected value to those who bear 
those costs.\341\ As a result, there may be a greater total volume, or 
a different mix, of proposals than would emerge if proponents bore a 
larger share of the costs resulting from their submission.\342\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \340\ Although Rule 14a-8 requires proponents to hold a minimum 
ownership stake as a condition of eligibility, the minimum 
eligibility thresholds are low relative to the total outstanding 
equity of most affected companies, and the proponent's pro-rata 
share of company processing costs through its ownership interest may 
not discipline the submission decision. See supra section IV.B.1.a.
    \341\ The same asymmetric cost structure may give proponents 
leverage in private negotiations with management. To the extent that 
proponents use the shareholder proposal process to obtain 
concessions reflecting private interests rather than those of 
shareholders more broadly, the resources devoted to pursuing and 
resisting those concessions represent economic costs not offset by 
commensurate benefits to other shareholders.
    \342\ See section IV.C.1.a for a discussion of the direct 
compliance costs associated with Rule 14a-8 proposals. See Table 2 
in section IV.B.3.a. for statistics on shareholder support of 
proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, Rule 14a-8's Federal framework has given States and 
companies little occasion or incentive to develop their own shareholder 
proposal frameworks--frameworks that States competing for 
incorporations might otherwise tailor to differences in ownership 
structure, industry, size, and other company-specific circumstances, 
and that companies might otherwise develop through charter and bylaw 
provisions to reflect their particular circumstances. With limited 
exceptions, most States have not enacted a comprehensive shareholder 
proposal framework during the more than 80 years that Rule 14a-8 has 
been in place, and the Commission is not aware of any company that has 
adopted such a framework in its own governing documents.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \343\ See supra section II.A.2.b.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rescission would address these considerations by 
leaving the allocation of proposal-related costs to State law and 
private ordering, thus providing States and companies more 
opportunities to develop frameworks suited to their circumstances.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \344\ See supra section II.A.2.b.ii (including note 161 and 
related text).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Benefits of the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
    We identify four principal categories of potential benefits of the 
proposed rescission: direct compliance cost savings for issuers, 
reallocation of managerial time and resources, potential improvements 
in the focus of corporate communications, and reductions in voting 
costs for shareholders. Each of these potential benefits is discussed 
in turn below, and the magnitude of each benefit is subject to 
uncertainty. Where State law or company governing documents require 
inclusion of shareholder proposals in circumstances similar to Rule 
14a-8, affected companies and non-proponent shareholders would not 
experience the full benefits described below.
i. Direct Cost Savings for Companies and Their Shareholders
    A direct benefit of the proposed rescission would be a reduction of 
the compliance costs that Rule 14a-8 currently imposes on issuers. 
Without the rule, companies would no longer be required by the Federal 
proxy rules to include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials. 
Some companies may decline to include such proposals absent an 
independent State law requirement, while others may adopt their own 
framework for addressing shareholder proposals in their governing 
documents, if permitted by State law. The magnitude of the resulting 
direct cost savings is uncertain and depends on various factors, 
including the extent to which companies would continue to include 
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials voluntarily or as a 
result of State law or other requirements.
    Currently, the direct costs that companies may incur under Rule 
14a-8 include, to the extent applicable, the costs to: (i) review the 
submitted proposal and respond to issues raised in the proposal 
(including time spent by internal legal, corporate governance, 
communications, and investor relations staff, law firms and other 
service providers, subject matter experts, executive management, and 
the board of directors on evaluating each proposal); \345\ (ii) engage 
in discussions and other communications with the proponent(s); \346\ 
(iii) prepare a statement of opposition to the submission, if the 
company chooses; (iv) print and distribute proxy materials,\347\ and 
monitor votes on the proposal; (v) communicate with outside consultants 
such as proxy solicitation firms and engage with non-proponent 
shareholders; and (vi) where the company intends to exclude the 
proposal, conduct a legal analysis and file a notice with the 
Commission \348\ (collectively, these activities are referred to as 
``processing'' a proposal). Opportunity costs also arise, as these 
expenditures could otherwise support more value-enhancing activities. 
The magnitude of these opportunity costs cannot be estimated but may be 
significant for companies receiving large numbers of proposals 
involving complex issues.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \345\ These costs can vary depending on the nature of the 
proposal, including whether the topic of the proposal is one with 
which the company is familiar. See, e.g., letters in response to the 
2019 Proposing Release from Council of Institutional Investors dated 
Jan. 30, 2020; Richard A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020. In addition, 
these costs can be smaller if the proposal is a resubmission rather 
than an initial submission. For example, some commenters stated that 
in the case of statements in opposition of resubmitted proposals, 
companies often repeat the arguments made in a prior year, which 
should result in a lower cost of responding to resubmissions 
relative to first-time submissions. See, e.g., letters in response 
to 2019 Proposing Release from AFL-CIO dated Feb. 3, 2020; CalPERS 
dated Feb. 3, 2020; Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan. 
30, 2020; Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility dated Jan. 
27, 2020; International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020; 
Principles for Responsible Investment dated Feb. 3, 2020; UAW 
Retiree Medical Benefits Trust dated Jan. 30, 2020. See also letter 
in response to the Proxy Process Roundtable from Shareholder Rights 
Group dated Dec. 4, 2018. In certain instances, however, 
resubmissions could be costlier than initial submissions. For 
example, companies might decide to challenge a resubmission or to 
make a concession to the proponent in exchange for the proposal 
being dropped and incur the associated costs.
    \346\ If there is engagement, the costs vary depending on the 
manner of the engagement (e.g., face-to-face meetings versus phone 
calls). See, e.g., comment letters received in response to the 2019 
Proposing Release from Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan. 
30, 2020; International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020; 
Richard A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020.
    \347\ To the extent the Reg E-Delivery Proposal is adopted as 
proposed and reduces companies' costs for printing and distributing 
proxy materials when addressing shareholder proposals under Rule14a-
8, the cost savings from printing and distribution anticipated under 
this proposal may be correspondingly diminished for those companies 
that choose to rely on Regulation E-Delivery to electronically 
deliver proxy materials. See supra note 255.
    \348\ These costs have varied in the past depending on whether 
the company submitted a no-action request and the extent to which 
the company submitted rebuttals to proponent communications 
submitted pursuant to 17 CFR 240.14a-8(k). See, e.g., comment 
letters in response to the 2019 Proposing Release from CalPERS dated 
Feb. 3, 2020; John Coates and Barbara Roper dated Jan. 30, 2020; 
Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan. 30, 2020; 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020; Richard 
A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The direct cost to companies of addressing Rule 14a-8 proposals 
cannot

[[Page 59938]]

be precisely measured. However, several sources provide estimates of 
its magnitude. In the 2020 Adopting Release, the Commission estimated 
the direct cost to companies of addressing a single shareholder 
proposal at $20,000 to $150,000, based on estimates provided by market 
participants and commenters.\349\ Adjusted for inflation, this range is 
equivalent to approximately $25,000 to $188,000 in 2026 dollars.\350\ 
In this release, we estimate that each proposal carries a burden of 107 
hours, 80.25 of which are borne internally and 26.75 of which are 
external.\351\ We monetize both the internal and external burdens at an 
hourly rate of $462 \352\ to estimate a cost savings of the proposed 
rescission of about $49,000 per proposal, which is consistent with the 
range presented in the 2020 Adopting Release.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \349\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70245 n.63.
    \350\ Inflation calculations use historical annual data on the 
GDP price index from 2020 to 2025, along with the Congressional 
Budget Office's most recent projection of the increase in the GDP 
price index from 2025 to 2026, to convert 2020 dollars to 2026 
dollars.
    \351\ See PRA Table 1, table note 1.
    \352\ See infra note 420.
    \353\ See PRA Table 1, table note 2, along with the public memo, 
section 2.4, ``Use of Occupational Hourly Rates for Monetizing 
Internal and External Burdens,'' which explains that ``Commission 
staff may determine that it is appropriate to apply the same 
occupational hourly rate to monetize burden hours'' when ``external 
labor and internal labor have equivalent knowledge, skills, and 
abilities for a task.'' The $49,000 is a rounded estimate that 
reflects the sum of internal costs (80.25 hours x $462 [ap] $37,000) 
and external costs (20.75 hours x $462 [ap] $12,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Survey data help illustrate the magnitude of direct costs. A 2025 
survey based on responses by 35 public companies found that 25.7 
percent of respondents reported cumulative four-season direct costs 
between $100,000 and $250,000 to address shareholder proposals, while 
14.3 percent reported costs between $501,000 and $1,000,000, and 11.4 
percent reported costs above $1,000,000.\354\ A separate 2025 survey 
found that nearly 20 percent of responding companies spend over 
$500,000 in external costs in a typical proxy season, including some 
small-cap firms.\355\ The wide dispersion in reported costs may reflect 
substantial heterogeneity in the compliance burden across companies, 
which results in part from the variability in the number of proposals 
received by different companies (which is itself correlated with 
company size). An interview-based study documents that the costs vary 
by the type of proposal.\356\ Because these surveys involve small 
samples of uncertain representativeness, the available data may be 
subject to response bias. For example, if companies with higher 
compliance costs are more likely to respond to surveys about compliance 
costs, then the responses would overestimate the magnitude of the 
direct costs of Rule 14a-8. However, if the responses include only 
external costs, then the survey responses would understate the direct 
costs since internal costs associated with a company's response to Rule 
14a-8 proposals would not be captured. Surveys can also be subject to 
design concerns such as whether questions might influence survey 
responses. Thus, we cannot provide a reliable aggregate estimate of 
total annual issuer compliance costs.\357\ We invite comments on data 
that would support such an estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \354\ See Cunningham (2026), supra note 110. The survey was open 
from Nov. 19 through Dec. 24, 2025. The reported cumulative four-
season expenditures span a wide range: 20.0% (n=7) reported 
cumulative costs of less than $100,000, 25.7% (n=9) report 
cumulative costs between $100,000 and $250,000, 17.1% (n=6) report a 
range between $251,000 and $500,000, 14.3% (n=5) report costs 
between $501,000 and $1,000,000, and 11.4% (n=4) report costs above 
$1,000,000. Cunningham (2026) also reports results for distribution 
of these costs (``Reliance on outside counsel accounts for a 
substantial portion of these costs. Most company respondents (57.1%, 
n=20) report that more than half of their Rule 14a-8 compliance 
costs are paid to external lawyers, including 37.1% (n=13) 
indicating that more than 75% of costs are external and 20.0% (n=7) 
reporting allocations of 51-75%. Only a small minority report 
minimal or no spending on outside counsel, including 2.9% (n=1) 
reporting zero external costs and 5.7% (n=2) reporting allocations 
of 1-10%.''). As a caveat, the sample consists of 35 very large 
companies, and thus the numbers may not be representative of all 
firms.
    \355\ See Business Roundtable, supra note 113.
    \356\ See Timothy M. Doyle & Robert G. Eccles, Rule 14a-8 in 
Practice: A Descriptive Account from Twenty Interviews, available at 
https://roberteccles.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/RBI-Rule-14a-8-in-Practice.pdf.
    \357\ The costs discussed here, which range in dollars from tens 
of thousands to one million, are small relative to the market 
capitalizations (in the billions and trillions) of S&P 500 companies 
which most Rule 14a-8 proposals target (see supra section IV.B.3.b). 
These costs would be proportionally more significant for smaller 
public companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where a company seeks to exclude a Rule 14a-8 proposal, the data in 
section IV.B.3.a suggest that complying with the notice requirement in 
Rule 14a-8(j) is an additional resource-intensive process.\358\ 
Specifically, over the 2022-2025 period, companies submitted 1,073 
notices/no-action requests, corresponding to 33 percent of all 
proposals received.\359\ Also, the costs of the notice/no-action 
process could fluctuate from year to year depending on a variety of 
factors, such as the subject matter of the proposals submitted for 
inclusion and staff application of Rule 14a-8's exclusion bases and 
procedural requirements. Additional cost uncertainty could arise from 
negotiation between companies and proponents that seek private 
resolution and proposal withdrawal. A withdrawal, with any concessions 
by the company, could be lower cost for the company than proceeding to 
proposal inclusion (or else it would not likely decide to engage in 
negotiation in the first place), as well as possibly lowering costs for 
non-proponent shareholders who would not need to review the 
proposal.\360\ Negotiation could fail, however. In that case, the 
direct costs of proceeding with proposal inclusion would still apply, 
with the added burden of the negotiation expenses.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \358\ Prior to Nov. 17, 2025, companies typically submitted 
these notices as no-action requests. Beginning that month, however, 
the Division determined to not respond to no-action requests for, 
and express no views on, companies' intended reliance on any basis 
for exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than 
no-action requests to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). 
When a company's Rule 14a-8(j) notice included an unqualified 
representation that the company had a reasonable basis to exclude 
the proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division issued a letter stating 
that, based solely on the company's or counsel's representation, it 
would not object to the company omitting the proposal from its proxy 
materials. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Division of Corporation 
Finance, Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance's 
Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy 
Season (Nov. 17, 2025), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season. 
See also supra note 294 (discussing the Division's Aug. 14, 2026 
statement announcing, among other things, the Division's 
determination to discontinue responding to Rule 14a-8 no-action 
requests altogether).
    \359\ With respect to all shareholder proposals received for 
meetings held in the 2022-2025 period, the staff received 
approximately 198 notices of intent to exclude a shareholder 
proposal.
    \360\ See infra sections IV.C.1.a.iii and iv.
    \361\ While 12% of Rule 14a-8 proposals are withdrawn (see supra 
section IV.B.3.a), we do not have visibility into the degree of 
private negotiation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cost savings from the proposed rescission would not be 
uniformly distributed across companies. Over the 2022-2025 period, 716 
companies received at least one proposal, with an average of 2.0 
proposals per company and a median of one. The gap between the mean and 
the median indicates a distribution in which a small number of 
companies receive a disproportionately large share of proposals, while 
most companies that receive at least one proposal receive only one. 
Companies receiving large numbers of proposals involving complex issues 
would experience substantially greater savings than companies receiving 
one or two proposals involving less complex issues. Companies receiving 
no proposals

[[Page 59939]]

would experience minimal direct cost savings.
    Several factors would partially offset these savings. First, the 
rescission may result in the loss of value-increasing proposals, and 
this would represent a cost to companies and their shareholders. 
Although theoretical arguments support a valuable role for nonbinding 
shareholder proposals as a communication and engagement mechanism, the 
empirical evidence on their economic impact is mixed. Some empirical 
research suggests that Rule 14a-8 proposals can improve company 
performance by motivating value-enhancing policy changes, limiting 
insider entrenchment, and providing management with useful information 
about shareholder views.\362\ The counterview is that shareholder 
proposals can result in costs for companies and for those shareholders 
who do not support a given proposal, as they require company resources 
to address (including the cost of diverting attention of management and 
the board from their primary responsibilities).\363\ The fact that many 
proposals often receive less than majority support \364\ suggests that 
they may address issues of interest primarily to a minority of 
shareholders rather than shareholders more broadly and therefore can 
result in costs without commensurate benefit,\365\ although minority 
support alone does not mean a proposal is not important or of no value 
to the company.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \362\ See, e.g., Vicente Cu[ntilde]at et al., The Vote Is Cast: 
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. Fin. 
1943 (2012); Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of 
Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167 
(2011); John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic 
Proposals by Union Shareholders, 32 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3215 (2019) 
(``Matsusaka et al. (2019)'').
    \363\ See, e.g., Gantchev Article, supra note 144; Maxime 
Couvert, What Are the Firm Value Implications of SEC-Challenged 
Shareholder Proposals?, 71 Mgmt. Sci. 4533 (2025) available at 
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.
    \364\ See section IV.B.3.a for data.
    \365\ See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate 
Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of 
Institutional Investors, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 275 (2000) (``Gillan & 
Starks (2000)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, State law or company governing documents that require 
inclusion of shareholder proposals in circumstances similar to Rule 
14a-8 would reduce the full savings described above. To the extent that 
a State adopts statutory criteria governing the inclusion of 
shareholder proposals, or, if State law permits, a company incorporates 
such criteria into its charter or bylaws, companies subject to those 
requirements would continue to bear many of the same processing costs 
they currently incur under Rule 14a-8, regardless of whether the 
Federal rule is rescinded.\366\ The degree to which this factor offsets 
the direct cost savings from the proposed rescission would depend on 
how States and companies respond to the proposed rescission, which is 
uncertain at this time and would likely vary across jurisdictions and 
companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \366\ Since a company's decision to adopt provisions in its 
governing documents regarding the inclusion of shareholder proposals 
(absent a State law requirement) would be within its control, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the company would elect to adopt 
such a provision, and accept its attendant costs, only if it 
determines that doing so is beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Third, savings would be partially offset if proponents were to 
decide, should Rule 14a-8 be rescinded, to conduct independent 
solicitations and management were to choose to engage with them. Under 
current rules, companies facing independent solicitations may choose to 
include proponent proposals in their own proxy materials to obtain 
discretionary voting authority,\367\ incurring many of the same costs 
as they would when facing a shareholder proposal submitted under Rule 
14a-8. Additionally, savings from the proposed rescission could be 
partially offset if proponents switch to alternative engagement 
mechanisms such as calling a special meeting, acting by written 
consent, utilizing proxy access provisions (where available), and 
submitting floor proposals, as issuers would have to expend resources. 
The overall magnitude of such offsetting effects is difficult to 
quantify because it is difficult to ascertain how proponents, 
companies, and States may respond to the proposed rescission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \367\ See supra section II.B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, the proposed rescission is being considered alongside 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2). As discussed in section 
IV.B.2, those amendments may reduce the probability that a proposal 
submitted through independent solicitation would receive majority 
support, all else equal. This may reduce proponents' incentives to 
conduct their own solicitations as a substitute for the Rule 14a-8 
process. The volume of independent solicitations, and therefore the 
degree to which the benefits of the proposed rescission would be offset 
by substitution activity, likely would be smaller under the combined 
set of proposed amendments than under the proposed rescission of Rule 
14a-8 alone.
ii. Reallocation of Managerial Resources and Reduction in Agency Costs
    Beyond the direct costs described above, addressing shareholder 
proposals generates indirect opportunity costs: the time and attention 
that management and the board devote to shareholder proposals could 
otherwise support core business functions, strategic planning, and 
other value-enhancing activities. To the extent the proposed rescission 
reduces the total volume of proposals, rather than simply redirecting 
them to alternative channels, it would free those resources for value-
enhancing activities. The magnitude of this benefit therefore depends 
on the degree to which proposals are actually forgone following 
rescission rather than substituted through alternative mechanisms, and 
the extent to which freed up managerial resources are used for value-
enhancing activities, which is uncertain and is discussed further in 
the context of the offsetting factors above.
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could affect agency costs in 
two opposing ways. On the one hand, where management or the board has 
private incentives to resist proposals that would benefit shareholders, 
they may devote more resources to opposition than shareholder value 
maximization requires. To the extent rescission eliminates such 
proposals, it would reduce this wasteful expenditure. On the other 
hand, if rescission eliminates value-enhancing proposals, then it would 
increase rather than reduce agency costs. The net effect on agency 
costs therefore depends on the distribution of proposals between those 
that are value-enhancing and those that are not. The two effects cannot 
be bifurcated with available data, and we accordingly treat the net 
agency cost effect of rescission as uncertain.
    A related benefit of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would be 
the reduction in management's perceived pressure to implement value-
reducing proposals. Because Rule 14a-8 proposals are generally 
nonbinding, implementation is often discretionary. Academic evidence 
suggests that management sometimes implements value-reducing proposals 
due to reputational concerns about disregarding proposals that receive 
widespread shareholder support.\368\ The costs of implementing value-
reducing proposals are distinct from processing costs; the proposed 
rescission could reduce both. The magnitude of this effect is uncertain 
as the frequency of such implementations and the

[[Page 59940]]

associated reduction in value are not directly observable from 
available data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \368\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

iii. Potential Improvements in the Focus of Corporate Communications
    A related potential benefit of the proposed rescission is a 
reduction in the burden that low-value proposals impose on the broader 
shareholder base. Where proposals reflect concerns not broadly shared 
by the shareholder base, the inclusion of proposal text, supporting 
statements by proponents, and any voluntary opposition statements by 
the company in its proxy materials may consume shareholder attention 
without commensurate benefit, potentially distracting from 
communications of greater relevance. Under the current rule, this cost 
falls not just on companies but also on all shareholders who review and 
process the resulting proxy materials. To the extent the proposed 
rescission reduces the frequency of such proposals, it could allow the 
proxy materials to serve more effectively as a channel for 
communications relevant to the broader shareholder base. The magnitude 
of this benefit depends on the proportion of forgone proposals that 
would not have provided meaningful informational value to the broader 
shareholder base, an issue that the available data do not allow us to 
assess with confidence. In addition, although not commonly used today, 
any potential reduction in shareholder communications might be offset 
by an increase in use of electronic shareholder forums permitted by 
Rule 14a-17 as an alternative option for communication.
iv. Reductions in Voting Costs for Shareholders and Their Fiduciaries
    Voting shareholders (including institutional investors acting on 
behalf of beneficiaries) currently incur costs to analyze proposals, 
cast votes, and report on voting decisions to their own stakeholders 
(if any). These costs scale with the volume and complexity of proposals 
each proxy season. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would reduce 
these costs to the extent it reduces the number of proposals presented 
for a vote.
    The baseline data show that over the 2022 to 2025 period, the 
average voted proposal received support from 26 percent of votes cast, 
with a median of 21 percent, and approximately 90 percent of voted 
proposals failed to pass.\369\ These figures are consistent with the 
view that a large portion of proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 do 
not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns. To the extent that 
such proposals do not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns, a 
reduction in their number would allow shareholders and their 
fiduciaries to redirect time and resources to more productive uses. 
Voting support is, however, a noisy signal of proposal quality: 
shareholder apathy, management solicitation against proposals, proxy 
advisor recommendations, and institutional voting policies may all 
affect the measured support independently of the underlying proposal 
value. Accordingly, these figures are not able to speak to whether the 
proposals most likely to be forgone following the proposed rescission 
necessarily would be those of low value for companies and shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \369\ See supra Table 2 in section IV.B.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    For institutional investors acting as fiduciaries, the voting costs 
described above carry legal significance beyond their administrative 
dimension. Depending on the scope of voting authority assumed in the 
relationship, investment advisers, pension fund managers subject to the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and other 
institutional investors subject to analogous fiduciary frameworks can 
be responsible for making voting determinations for their clients or 
beneficiaries. Under these circumstances, the voting determinations 
must be consistent with the relevant fiduciary duties of the party, and 
in many cases votes are documented and reported.
    These obligations can result in costs that scale directly with the 
number of proposals presented for a vote: each additional proposal can 
involve incremental analysis, documentation, and reporting regardless 
of the ultimate voting outcome. This cost may be partially, but not 
fully, mitigated to the extent that institutional fiduciaries retain 
proxy advisory firms to provide voting recommendations or voting 
execution services.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \370\ For example, the Commission has stated that investment 
advisers retaining proxy advisory firms should consider taking steps 
to evaluate whether the proxy advisory firm's voting recommendations 
are consistent with its voting policies and procedures and in the 
client's best interest before the votes are cast, which could 
include a higher degree of analysis for certain votes. See 
Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of 
Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5325 (Aug. 
21, 2019) [84 FR 47420 (Sept. 20, 2019)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To the extent that a meaningful share of current Rule 14a-8 
proposals do not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns, 
institutional fiduciaries currently can incur voting-related costs on 
proposals that may generate limited value for their clients.\371\ The 
proposed rescission would reduce these fiduciary voting-related costs 
to the extent it reduces the number of proposals presented for a vote. 
However, the magnitude of this benefit cannot be quantified with 
available data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \371\ A client and its investment adviser may agree that the 
adviser would not exercise voting authority on certain types of 
matters where the cost of voting would be high, or the benefit to 
the client would be low. See id. at discussion accompanying n.35. As 
a result, the extent to which advisers incur voting-related costs on 
shareholder proposals depends, in part, on the agreement between the 
adviser and its client on the scope of the adviser's authority and 
responsibilities to vote proxies on behalf of the client.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

b. Costs of the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
    We identify two principal categories of costs: costs to shareholder 
proponents, and costs to non-proponent shareholders and the broader 
shareholder base. As with the expected benefits, these costs would be 
reduced to the extent that State law or company governing documents 
require inclusion of shareholder proposals in certain circumstances.
i. Costs to Proponents
    Direct costs due to rescission. Submission of shareholder proposals 
pursuant to Rule 14a-8 is generally the only mechanism currently 
available to shareholders for communicating their views or concerns 
directly to the full shareholder base through the company's own proxy 
materials. Rescission would remove this mechanism, leaving an 
independent proxy solicitation as the most direct substitute available 
to proponents.\372\ Although technological and regulatory developments 
have reduced the cost of independent proxy solicitation, the cost 
differential between independent solicitation and the Rule 14a-8 
submission process is likely to be meaningful for many proponents; the 
magnitude of that differential, however, is uncertain. Theoretical work 
on shareholder engagement suggests that shareholders will use more 
costly forms of engagement only when expected benefits exceed expected 
costs.\373\ Accordingly, we anticipate that the proposals most likely 
to be pursued through independent solicitation

[[Page 59941]]

following the proposed rescission would be those with the greatest 
value-enhancement potential for the broader shareholder base or those 
that benefit the proponent's private interests (and not those of the 
broader shareholder base), while proposals with lower value-enhancement 
potential would more likely be forgone or pursued through other 
channels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \372\ Shareholder proponents may also be able to use social 
media campaigns, shareholder forums, and exempt solicitations as a 
means of communicating with management and fellow shareholders, 
although as discussed below, these alternative mechanisms are 
unlikely to be as effective as conducting an independent 
solicitation.
    \373\ See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders 
and Corporate Control, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 461 (1986), available at 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1833044 (``Shleifer & Vishny (1986)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The substitution effect from Rule 14a-8 proposals to independent 
solicitations would depend on the cost structure of independent 
solicitation and the distribution of value-enhancing proposals in the 
current baseline. Proxy solicitation costs are generally lower with 
respect to smaller companies, as they tend to have less dispersed 
ownership, making it easier for proponents to reach a large fraction of 
a company's shareholders. The baseline data indicate that 23 percent of 
proposals submitted between 2022 and 2025 were directed to non-S&P 500 
companies. This distribution could shift towards smaller companies 
following the proposed rescission. At the same time, smaller companies 
tend to have more concentrated insider ownership, which could reduce 
the probability that an independent solicitation will succeed and 
thereby partially offset the cost advantage of targeting smaller 
companies.
    The proposed rescission could disproportionately affect less well-
resourced proponents--including individual retail investors and smaller 
advocacy groups--for whom independent solicitation could be cost-
prohibitive. Individual proponents accounted for approximately 45 
percent of proposals submitted between 2022 and 2025, a share that rose 
to 53 percent in 2025. Whether this increase reflects a trend or year-
to-year variation is uncertain, but it suggests that a group of 
proponents potentially most affected by the proposed rescission may be 
a group that has accounted for a growing share of proposal activity 
under the baseline.
    Proposals submitted by individual proponents received higher voting 
support (average: 32 percent; median: 31 percent) and a higher majority 
support rate (14 percent of voted proposals) than those submitted by 
institutional proponents (average: 20 percent; median: 15 percent; 
majority support rate: 6 percent of voted proposals).\374\ Subject to 
the caveat about the noisiness of voting support as a signal of 
proposal value,\375\ these figures indicate that individual proponents 
are more likely to submit proposals reflecting broadly shared 
shareholder concerns. The loss of Rule 14a-8 as an engagement mechanism 
for this group therefore could result in governance costs, the 
magnitude of which depends on the degree to which individual proponent 
proposals generate value for the broader shareholder base and on the 
degree to which State law or the company's governing documents allow 
similar access for shareholder proponents in a world without Rule 14a-
8.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \374\ See supra Table 2 in section IV.B.3.a.
    \375\ Shareholder apathy, management solicitation against 
proposals, proxy advisor recommendations, and institutional voting 
policies may all affect support independently of proposal value. See 
supra section IV.C.1.a.iv.
    \376\ According to researchers, Rule 14a-8 can serve as a 
valuable advisory role by providing a cost-effective method of 
communicating shareholder views to management, whose decisions 
benefit from managerial learning when there is large heterogeneity 
in beliefs about such decisions. This is especially important for 
shareholders who are not able to engage with management directly. 
See Ali Kakhbod et al., Advising the Management: A Theory of 
Shareholder Engagement, 36 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1319 (2023), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3231365 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier 
database) (``Kakhbod et al., 2023'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Costs associated with switching to alternative engagement 
mechanisms. The costs to proponents could be mitigated by utilizing 
alternative engagement mechanisms. Several alternatives to Rule 14a-8 
may be available where permitted by State law and a company's governing 
documents. First, as discussed above, subject to State law and a 
company's governing documents, proponents may be able to nominate 
directors (proxy access), call special meetings, or act by written 
consent. These mechanisms can provide engagement channels for 
shareholders. Their availability is not uniform, however, and companies 
with more restrictive governing documents would offer shareholders 
fewer substitutes, increasing the engagement costs for proponents. 
Also, engagement based on the Rule 14a-8 process provides companies 
with a lower friction, lower reputation cost mechanism to come to an 
agreement and learn about shareholder preferences. Switching to these 
alternative engagement mechanisms, even if available, might increase 
costs for both proponents and companies.
    Second, exempt solicitations--including public advocacy campaigns, 
vote-no campaigns, and other communications intended to influence 
voting without involving a shareholder proposal--are available as an 
alternative to the Rule 14a-8 proposal submission process.
    Third, voting in director elections, participating in say-on-pay 
votes, and divesting are all available alternative engagement 
mechanisms to shareholders but are not perfect substitutes for the type 
of proactive shareholder engagement that Rule 14a-8 proposals enable. 
For example, divestment is an exit mechanism rather than a direct 
engagement mechanism, and its effectiveness as a substitute for 
engagement under Rule 14a-8 depends on the size of the shareholder's 
stake and the significance of the exit threat. These are conditions 
that are least likely to be met by the smaller individual shareholders 
that may be most affected by the proposed rescission.
    Fourth, social media platforms could serve as a lower-cost 
alternative engagement mechanism for some proponents compared to 
independent solicitation.\377\ However, as noted in section IV.B.3, 
social media engagement is a less formal and direct mechanism for 
influencing specific corporate governance issues and outcomes than the 
Rule 14a-8 submission process, and the evidence on its effectiveness as 
a substitute is limited. The net effect of rescission on social media 
engagement is uncertain--the proposed rescission may prompt some 
proponents to shift their engagement to social media, while others may 
disengage entirely in the absence of a formal proposal mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \377\ See supra section IV.B.3.c and note 333.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Lastly, proponents may engage in informal communications with 
management. For smaller proponents, such communications are less likely 
to compel management attention. Some small or resource-constrained 
proponents may find that better-resourced shareholders with aligned 
interests are willing to sponsor solicitations on their behalf, 
particularly for proposals with greater expected benefits. The extent 
to which this substitution would occur is uncertain. Multiple 
proponents targeting the same company may also have incentives to 
conduct joint solicitations, sharing the fixed cost component. As 
mentioned in section IV.B.3, however, shareholders with five percent or 
greater beneficial ownership may be deterred from pursuing this channel 
to the extent their contemplated engagement could affect their 
eligibility to use Schedule 13G rather than Schedule 13D.
    Taken together, these alternative mechanisms of engagement may not 
provide a uniform or complete substitute for the Rule 14a-8 process. 
Their availability and effectiveness vary systematically with 
shareholder size, company governing documents, and State law in ways 
that may disadvantage smaller proponents and shareholders of

[[Page 59942]]

companies with governing documents that have more restrictive 
requirements related to shareholder proposals. The costs of the 
rescission would be higher for proponents of companies whose governing 
documents and State laws provide fewer (or no) alternative mechanisms, 
and lower with respect to companies whose governing documents and State 
laws provide more mechanisms. The revealed preferences of current 
proponents are consistent with the view that they regard the Rule 14a-8 
process as preferable to the available alternatives, though this 
preference may reflect factors other than the relative cost and 
effectiveness of the mechanisms, such as familiarity and the formal 
structure of the process.
    Costs associated with loss of shareholder leverage in negotiations 
with management. Although not the intended use of Rule 14a-8, 
proponents may also lose a means for exercising leverage in private 
negotiations with management. Between 2022 and 2025, approximately 12 
percent of proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 (382 in total) were 
withdrawn prior to the applicable meeting, suggesting that negotiated 
withdrawals following communication between management and proponents 
occurred in some or many of these cases.\378\ The frequency of such 
negotiated outcomes reflects the bargaining structure that Rule 14a-8 
creates: a proponent can credibly threaten to place a proposal on the 
company's proxy at near-zero marginal cost to the proponent but at a 
cost to the company. This asymmetric cost structure incentivizes 
company management to negotiate. Private negotiations are effective 
precisely because the threat is credible and cheap to execute for 
proponents. To the extent that these proposals were value-enhancing to 
the company, their withdrawals may represent improvements achieved 
without an actual vote. Withdrawal practices vary across proponent 
types: institutional proponents accounted for 60 percent of withdrawals 
despite submitting 47 percent of proposals, while individual proponents 
accounted for only 30 percent of withdrawals despite submitting 45 
percent of proposals. As evidenced by this data, the negotiated 
withdrawal mechanism operates more prevalently with respect to 
institutional proponents. The potential unavailability of this 
mechanism as a result of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 
therefore would be expected to have a greater impact on those 
proponents than individual proponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \378\ See supra Table 1 in section IV.B.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The potential value of Rule 14a-8 proposals as leverage in private 
negotiations with management could be gauged by the frequency of 
submissions and withdrawals of various shareholder proposals under Rule 
14a-8. For example, environmental and social proposals accounted for 61 
percent of withdrawals despite representing 53 percent of submissions, 
while governance proposals accounted for only 36 percent of withdrawals 
despite representing 45 percent of submissions. This higher withdrawal 
rate for environmental and social proposals suggests that proponents 
bringing proposals in this category may be more likely to negotiate 
with management and withdraw following engagement.\379\ The proposed 
rescission would eliminate this negotiation-and-withdrawal channel 
along with the Rule 14a-8 submission process. This analysis assumes 
that, absent Rule 14a-8, companies would not engage with shareholder 
proponents; however, that assumption may not be accurate, as some 
companies may still choose to negotiate privately with proponents even 
without the possibility of being compelled to include a shareholder 
proposal in their proxy materials if alternative engagement mechanisms 
are employed.\380\ Accordingly, the extent to which the proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would reduce such engagement is uncertain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \379\ See Reena Aggarwal et al., Public Sentiment Decomposition 
and Shareholder Actions (Fisher Coll. Bus, Working Paper No. 2024-
26, Dec. 2, 2024), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=5040715 
(retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database).
    \380\ See discussion in section IV.C.1.b.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Costs to Non-Proponent Shareholders
    The costs of the rescission could extend beyond proponents to the 
broader non-proponent shareholder base through several channels.
    Loss of valuable shareholder engagement mechanism. The proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 could generate costs for non-proponent 
shareholders through the loss of value-enhancing shareholder proposals 
that Rule 14a-8 currently facilitates, although academic evidence on 
the value of Rule 14a-8 proposals is mixed. This cost may be mitigated 
to the extent that proponents use available mechanisms under State law 
and company governing documents to bring about the same result as they 
currently do under Rule 14a-8. As discussed in section IV.C.1, theory 
holds that shareholders engage only when expected benefits exceed 
expected costs, and the value of engagement to shareholders varies 
along a continuum depending on its form.\381\ As generally nonbinding 
instruments, Rule 14a-8 proposals occupy a comparatively low position 
on the value-enhancement continuum. Their value depends on shareholder 
participation in voting, management's willingness to implement 
proposals that pass or receive broad support, and any informational 
benefits due to management learning about shareholder preferences. A 
recent meta-analysis of the academic literature on shareholder activism 
finds that shareholder proposals have the smallest wealth effects of 
any form of shareholder engagement (close to zero on average) and notes 
that selective-reporting bias in the literature may lead to an 
overstatement of positive effects.\382\ This evidence is consistent 
with the view that the average value of proposals forgone under the 
proposed rescission may be limited, though the cross-sectional 
variation in proposal value effects identified in the literature 
suggests that the forgone benefits due to rescission may be more 
significant for a subset of proposals than the average evidence 
implies.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \381\ See Shleifer & Vishny (1986), supra note 373. The study 
notes that informal communications with management are less costly 
but also less likely to generate large value increases than more 
intensive forms of engagement (e.g., takeovers).
    \382\ See Josef Bajzik et al., Does Shareholder Activism Create 
Value? A Meta-Analysis, 33 Corp. Governance: An Int'l. Rev. 1039 
(2025).
    \383\ We note that it is difficult to isolate the effect of a 
single proposal on a company's stock price from the effects of other 
items voted on at the same meeting, or from concurrent direct 
engagement between shareholders and management. Also, observed stock 
price changes may reflect several effects simultaneously--including 
signaling effects from the proposal submission, market expectations 
about the voting outcome, and market expectations about the 
probability of implementation--making it difficult to attribute 
price movements to the proposal's governance content alone. These 
limitations do not invalidate the evidence discussed above, but they 
counsel caution in drawing strong causal inferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The literature does, however, identify meaningful cross-sectional 
variation in proposal value effects. Studies find more positive short-
run market reactions for proposals related to eliminating poison pills, 
adopting cumulative voting, and reducing antitakeover protections.\384\ 
Some evidence suggests that environmental and social proposals passing 
by a small margin elicit a positive stock market reaction.\385\ Market 
reactions are also

[[Page 59943]]

higher for firms that have had poorer recent stock returns.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \384\ See Gillan & Starks (2000), supra note 365. This study 
examines a sample of proposals submitted between 1987 and 1994. 
Hence, the generalizability of some of the findings of this study to 
present time could be limited.
    \385\ See Caroline Flammer, Does Corporate Social Responsibility 
Lead to Superior Financial Performance? A Regression Discontinuity 
Approach, 61 Mgmt. Sci. 2549 (2015), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/24551545. Nevertheless, the study also notes 
that ``although [the] results imply that adopting close call 
[environmental and social] proposals is beneficial to companies, 
they do not necessarily imply that [environmental and social] 
proposals are beneficial in general.'' In particular, the study 
finds that shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues 
receive low shareholder support, on average, and only a small and 
unrepresentative sample of shareholder proposals on social and 
environmental issues is associated with positive stock market 
reactions. See also Henk Berkman et al., The Value Impact of Climate 
and Non-climate Environmental Shareholder Proposals, 89 J. Corp. 
Fin. 102653 (2024), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4748646 
(retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database).
    \386\ See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of 
Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167 
(2011). They also find potential poorer governance indicators such 
as the use of anti-takeover devices are related to higher stock 
price reactions to proposal announcements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The evidence on whether individual or institutional proponent 
proposals generate larger market reactions is also conflicting. One 
study finds higher market reactions for proposals sponsored by 
individuals than those sponsored by institutions; \387\ however, 
another study finds the opposite.\388\ One study finds that passing 
proposals submitted by the most active individual proponents result in 
negative abnormal returns and trigger sales by mutual funds that voted 
against them.\389\ Another study finds a negative market reaction to 
proposals submitted by labor unions in years when a new labor contract 
is being negotiated.\390\ This conflicting evidence indicates that the 
academic literature does not consistently identify proposals from any 
particular proponent category (or proposal subject matter) as uniformly 
value-enhancing or value-reducing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \387\ See Gillan & Starks (2000), supra note 365.
    \388\ See Vicente Cu[ntilde]at et al., The Vote is Cast: The 
Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. Fin. 1943 
(2012) (``Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012'') The different findings of the 
cited papers may be attributable to different samples and 
methodologies used.
    \389\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144.
    \390\ See Matsusaka et al. (2019), supra note 362. For similar 
evidence of stock market reaction to union-sponsored proposals, see 
Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does it 
Create Value?, 46 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 299 (2011), 
available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23018411.pdf; Andrew 
K. Prevost et al., Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions 
or Detractors?, 47 Fin. Rev. 327 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Beyond short-run stock price evidence, the academic literature 
documents long-run value effects and corporate changes following 
proposal passage. One study finds that firms where proposals pass by a 
narrow margin subsequently improve on multiple operating dimensions, 
with the adoption of these proposals estimated to raise long-run 
shareholder value by roughly 2.8 percent.\391\ Subject to the caveat 
that long-run returns may reflect other concurrent changes, this 
evidence suggests that some benefits of the proposals are not fully 
captured in short-run stock price reactions, and that the forgone 
benefits of the proposed rescission may exceed what the short-run 
evidence alone implies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \391\ See Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012, supra note 362. The study 
uses a regression discontinuity design around closely contested 
votes and finds that passage of a shareholder-sponsored corporate 
governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of 
the vote, an implied market value per provision of 2.8%, and 
evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance 
improvements. The study uses Tobin's Q--the market value of a 
company's assets divided by the book value of its assets--as a 
measure of long-term performance, but this measure can be imprecise. 
In addition, the study's research design around closely contested 
votes may mean its findings are less applicable to less contested 
votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Loss of a preference expression mechanism. Most shareholders do not 
initiate proposals but instead use voting on others' proposals to 
express their preferences. Between 2022 and 2025, 2,363 proposals were 
voted on across 716 companies, providing shareholders at those 
companies with a channel for expressing their preferences on certain 
topics at a generally lower cost than other channels of engagement. To 
the extent that fewer proposals would be presented following 
rescission, these shareholders may have fewer opportunities to use this 
mechanism. One study has shown that advisory votes can aggregate 
dispersed shareholder beliefs and convey that information to the board, 
enabling more informed governance decisions.\392\ This aggregation is 
most valuable when shareholders hold value-relevant but dispersed 
beliefs.\393\ It is less effective when shareholder inputs are noisy or 
driven by motivations unrelated to company outcomes. The extent to 
which the loss of this mechanism represents a significant cost 
therefore depends on the composition of proposals that would be 
forgone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \392\ See Kakhbod et al., 2023, supra note 376.
    \393\ Value-relevant but dispersed beliefs means that 
shareholders have private information about the value of the 
company, with each shareholder possessing a piece of information 
that is different from what other shareholders possess. Thus, 
shareholder engagement can be beneficial because shareholders learn 
about those private pieces of information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Loss of informational signals from proposal activity and voting 
outcomes. The submission of proposals under Rule 14a-8 and the outcome 
of proxy voting provide informational signals to management about the 
distribution of shareholder support for specific corporate policies and 
positions. These signals may be difficult to replicate through other 
channels, as the formal proposal and voting process provides a direct 
and quantified measure of shareholder sentiment on specific governance 
issues. To the extent that these signals provide benefits to companies 
(such as by enabling more informed corporate decisions, revealing 
shareholder dissatisfaction before it escalates to more disruptive 
forms of engagement, or prompting value-enhancing corporate policy 
changes), their loss represents a cost of rescission.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \394\ For example, an academic study finds that higher voting 
support for environmental and social proposals can predict future 
firm risk, which in turn affects firm value--suggesting that voting 
outcomes contain forward-looking information not captured through 
other channels (see Yazhou Ellen Heet al., ES Risks and Shareholder 
Voice, 36 Rev. Fin. Stud 4824 (2023)). In a similar vein, other 
studies show that the number of shareholder proposals predicts 
subsequent forced CEO turnover and director turnover, indicating 
that proposal activity is informative about shareholder 
dissatisfaction with real governance consequences (see supra note 
389). The empirical literature also documents concrete governance 
changes and long-run value effects following proposal activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The magnitude of this cost is uncertain and depends on the degree 
to which current proposals reflect value-enhancing shareholder beliefs 
rather than special interests. To the extent that proponents use 
available mechanisms under State law and company governing documents to 
bring about the same or similar result as they currently do under Rule 
14a-8, this cost could be mitigated. Also, the effectiveness of 
informational signals from proposal voting is not uniform: signals are 
most valuable when management and shareholders differ in their beliefs 
about potential outcomes rather than in their underlying incentives, 
and less valuable when shareholder inputs are noisy or driven by 
motivations unrelated to firm outcomes. The available empirical 
evidence suggests that the informational value of proposal activity is 
heterogeneous rather than uniformly high or low--a meaningful subset of 
proposals appears to generate governance benefits that are not fully 
captured in contemporaneous voting outcomes, while a substantial 
proportion of proposals receive limited voting support and may have 
limited informational value for the broader shareholder base and for 
management.\395\ The forgone informational benefits of rescission may 
therefore be meaningful for a subset of proposals, even if the value of 
forgone proposals cannot be quantified with the

[[Page 59944]]

available data and the average value of forgone proposals is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \395\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144; Kakhbod et al., 
2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Loss of informational signals from management responses. Non-
proponent shareholders also benefit from the information conveyed 
through management's responses to proposals--including opposition 
statements, pre-vote adjustments,\396\ and negotiated withdrawals--
which may reveal the management's views and priorities on various 
issues and how the board responds to shareholder concerns. The proposed 
rescission would remove this signaling mechanism, potentially reducing 
the ability of shareholders to learn of management's governance 
priorities. The magnitude of this cost depends on how management has 
responded under the current framework, which may vary across companies 
and proposals, and on the degree to which that information is not 
available through other channels. To the extent that management's 
responses are perfunctory or that the information they convey is 
available through other disclosure mechanisms, the loss of this 
signaling channel would represent a smaller cost to non-proponent 
shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \396\ Pre-vote adjustments refer to the processes used by 
financial institutions, broker-dealers, and institutional investors 
to accurately determine which investors are entitled to vote and 
precisely reconcile the number of shares that can be voted before 
the proxy materials are sent and the votes are submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Informational spillovers to the broader market. Shareholder 
activity and voting results currently generate informational spillovers 
beyond the shareholders of individual companies. Voting outcomes on 
proposals at one company may provide signals that other companies and 
their shareholders can use to assess corporate policies and shareholder 
sentiment more broadly. The proposed rescission could reduce these 
spillovers, representing a cost to the broader market and to companies. 
The magnitude of this cost depends on two conditions: the degree to 
which voting outcomes at one company provide information not already 
available through other channels, and the degree to which the proposals 
most likely to be forgone following the proposed rescission are those 
that generate the most valuable spillovers. To the extent that the 
proposals most likely to be forgone are those with limited 
informational value for the broader market, as suggested by the low 
average voting support documented in the baseline data, the reduction 
in informational spillovers may be modest. Conversely, to the extent 
that a meaningful subset of forgone proposals would have generated 
valuable spillovers (e.g., proposals addressing governance issues that 
are common across companies or industries), the cost to the broader 
investment community could be more significant.
    Transition costs. The proposed rescission could also impose 
transition costs on companies, proponents, and non-proponent 
shareholders in the period after the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, 
during which State law and private ordering and alternative engagement 
practices generally may develop. Rule 14a-8 has governed the 
shareholder proposal process for more than 80 years, and both companies 
and proponents have developed governance and engagement practices 
around its provisions. Many companies have established internal 
processes and governance approaches premised on the existence of a 
Federal rule; many proponents have organized their engagement 
strategies around the rule's requirements, including those regarding 
eligibility, submission deadlines, and substantive standards. The 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would require both groups to develop new 
frameworks and practices during a period of legal uncertainty, before 
State legislatures and courts have taken any steps to address 
unresolved questions left by the rescission of the Federal rule. The 
transition period may also be associated with elevated litigation 
costs, to the extent that the frequency of disputes about whether a 
proposal is a proper subject for shareholder action under State law 
increases following the proposed rescission. These litigation costs may 
include court fees, legal representation and the time and resources 
required to resolve disputes through court proceedings.
    The magnitude of the impacts and duration of this transition period 
are uncertain and would depend on the degree to which State law and 
private ordering develop frameworks that address shareholder proposal 
activity in the absence of Rule 14a-8 and the pace at which State 
legislatures act, State courts resolve relevant legal questions, and 
companies and their shareholders agree upon new frameworks and 
practices. It is possible that this transition period could extend for 
several years. These transition costs would be temporary in nature and 
would diminish if and to the extent State law develops and private 
ordering is implemented, but they may be significant in the near term.
    Non-proponent shareholders could also be affected during the 
transition period to the extent that legal uncertainty about the 
standards applicable to shareholder proposals affects the governance of 
companies in which they hold shares. The degree to which non-proponent 
shareholders are affected similarly would depend on the pace of the 
transition and the degree to which State law and private ordering 
develop frameworks that address shareholder proposal activity in the 
absence of Rule 14a-8.
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) address an externality 
that is related to that arising in the context of Rule 14-8 but is also 
distinct: under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2), a proponent's decision to 
conduct an independent solicitation can lead to costs for a company 
that the proponent does not bear and therefore does not internalize. 
Specifically, a company is restricted from exercising discretionary 
voting authority with respect to an omitted proposal if the proponent 
distributes its own proxy materials to holders of at least the 
percentage of the company's voting shares required under applicable law 
to carry the proposal and satisfies related procedural 
requirements.\397\ Once the proponent satisfies that threshold, the 
company faces a binary choice: include the proposal in its proxy 
materials and bear the associated inclusion and solicitation costs, or 
omit it and forgo the ability to collect and cast votes on the proposal 
through its proxy card.\398\ Neither option is costless, and the 
company cannot recover the costs imposed by either choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \397\ See section II.B.1 for a description of the current 
regulatory framework governing a company's discretionary voting 
authority.
    \398\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Amendments to the proxy rules to facilitate the universal proxy 
rules adopted in 2021 increased the significance of this choice.\399\ A 
proponent soliciting votes for its proposals may include the company's 
director nominees on its own proxy card even when it does not nominate 
competing directors.\400\ This ``zero slate'' structure allows 
shareholders to vote on the company's nominees and on the proponent's 
proposals using the proponent's proxy card. If the company omits the 
proponent's proposals, shareholders may shift to the proponent's card 
in order to be able to vote on both the company's nominees and the 
proponent's proposals. A company may conclude that it has little 
practical choice but to include the proponent's proposals in its own 
proxy

[[Page 59945]]

materials and bear the associated costs if it wants shareholders to use 
its proxy card, even though neither State law nor the Federal proxy 
rules require their inclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \399\ See section II.B.3 for a description of Rule 14a-4(d)(1) 
and its interaction with current Rule 14a-4(c)(2).
    \400\ See supra section II.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would address both the 
general and zero-slate cases by replacing the solicitation threshold 
with an individual shareholder opt-out check box. A company that omits 
a proposal would remain able to collect and cast votes on it through 
discretionary voting authority, except for shares represented by proxy 
cards on which shareholders opt out. In a zero-slate campaign, the 
company would likewise no longer need to include the proponent's 
proposals on its proxy card to exercise proxy voting authority with 
respect to those proposals. The following economic analysis examines 
the potential benefits and costs of the proposed amendments to Rule 
14a-4(c), including the potential effects on proposal volume, proposal 
composition, and shareholder voting. The proposed amendments could 
increase the number of proposals that companies omit from their proxy 
cards and reduce the number of proposals submitted by proponents, with 
consequences for shareholder voting and governance examined below. We 
also examine the interaction of the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) with the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8.
    To illustrate the effects of the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) on shareholder voting, consider a scenario in which: (i) a 
proponent submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8 and delivers its own 
proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the company's shares 
necessary to carry the proposal; and (ii) the proposal is timely 
received by the company. Under the current rule, the company faces a 
binary choice: include the proposal in its proxy materials in order to 
exercise proxy voting authority with respect to that proposal (because 
it cannot exercise discretionary voting authority with respect to the 
proposal) or omit the proposal from its proxy materials and forgo the 
ability to exercise proxy voting authority with respect to that 
proposal. Assume additionally within the scenario that: (iii) the 
company omits the proponent's proposal from its proxy card while 
providing the disclosure required under Rule 14a-4(c)(2); and (iv) a 
shareholder signs the company's proxy card. Under the baseline, this 
shareholder's proxy is counted as a non-vote on the proponent's 
proposal (i.e., a vote not cast) because the company lacks any proxy 
voting authority on the proposal. Under the proposed amendments, the 
company would be allowed to exercise discretionary voting authority on 
the proposal with respect to the shares of any shareholder who signs 
the company's proxy card and does not check the proposed opt-out check 
box, allowing the company to vote the shareholder's proxy in accordance 
with the company's disclosed intention.
    The proposed amendments would therefore enable a company to 
exercise discretionary voting authority on the proposal without 
including the proposal in its proxy materials, reducing certain costs 
of inclusion where a company chooses to omit a proposal from its proxy 
card. The proposed amendments would also provide an additional option 
to a shareholder who uses the company's proxy card where the company 
omits the proposal: such a shareholder would be able to preserve the 
baseline of a non-vote outcome by checking the proposed opt-out box in 
lieu of having its vote cast through the company's discretionary 
authority by leaving the box unchecked.
a. Direct Cost Savings to Issuers
    When a proponent submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8, delivers 
its own proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the company's 
shares necessary to carry the proposal, and ensures the proposal is 
timely received by the company, the company currently faces a binary 
choice between inclusion and omission--where omission means forgoing 
any ability to receive and exercise proxy voting authority from 
shareholders through its own proxy card with respect to the proposal. 
The proposed amendments do not change this binary choice, but they do 
change the consequence of choosing omission. Under the proposed 
amendments, a company that omits a proposal from its proxy card can 
receive and exercise discretionary voting authority, subject to the 
proposed opt-out check box. Where companies that currently would have 
otherwise included the proposal but choose to omit a proposal under the 
proposed amendments, they would no longer face certain direct costs 
associated with inclusion.
    Under the baseline, few practical differences exist between a 
company's activities and costs in connection with inclusion and 
omission: a company would generally conduct legal review, management 
and board review, and communications with outside consultants in both 
cases. The costs that vary between inclusion and omission consist 
primarily of the incremental costs of including the proposal and the 
board's recommendation to shareholders regarding the proposal in the 
proxy materials and conducting active solicitation campaigns that some 
companies undertake when including a proponent's proposal on their 
proxy card.
    Active solicitation efforts may involve proxy solicitation firms, 
investor outreach, and substantial management time, which can 
collectively be a significant cost driver.\401\ To the extent the 
proposed amendments enable companies to omit a proposal from their 
proxy card while still collecting and casting votes through 
discretionary voting authority, they may reduce the costs associated 
with active solicitation campaigns. The magnitude of this cost saving 
depends in part on the degree to which shareholders actively use the 
proposed opt-out check box, as discussed in section IV.B.2.f below. To 
the extent shareholders do not check the box, management may be able to 
exercise discretionary authority over a substantial proportion of 
votes, reducing the need for active solicitation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \401\ See supra section IV.B.3.b, at Table 4. For companies, 
mean (median) reported estimates of solicitation expenses in 
election contests with proposals at shareholder meetings held in 
2022-2025 were $5,460,302 ($825,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The cost savings identified above are also related to the costs 
that the proposed amendment may impose on certain shareholders. Under 
the baseline, companies that ultimately include proposals may respond 
by conducting active solicitation campaigns. The proposed amendments 
give these companies the option to switch to omission while retaining 
the ability to exercise discretionary voting authority, generating the 
largest cost savings for companies that currently bear the highest 
costs of inclusion and active solicitation. At these same companies, 
however, shareholders who wish to vote in a manner that is opposite to 
management's intended vote currently have a direct path to doing so 
through the company's proxy card because the proposal is included on 
the company's card, which is a path that would be removed if the 
company switches to omission. The cost savings to the company and the 
loss of voting options for shareholders who wish to vote opposite to 
management's intended vote on the company's card are therefore two 
consequences of the same decision by the same set of companies. This 
analysis is subject to the qualification that not all companies will 
switch to omission: some may continue to include proposals for 
strategic or reputational reasons, in which case neither effect would 
materialize.

[[Page 59946]]

b. Potential Compliance Costs Incurred by Issuers
    Issuers who take advantage of the additional flexibility with 
respect to discretionary voting authority would face compliance costs 
of doing so. These compliance costs are estimated to be approximately 
$1,100 annually in aggregate across all affected issuers, reflecting 
$625 per hour for 0.1 hours per proposal.\402\ However, the costs are 
not distributed evenly across issuers. Issuers would not incur these 
costs if they chose not to take advantage of the additional flexibility 
with respect to discretionary voting authority or if they are not faced 
with independent solicitations. These compliance costs also assume the 
proposal would not affect the volume of proposals and that issuers 
would exercise this discretionary voting authority on all independent 
solicitations. The costs could be higher or lower depending on how the 
proposed rule affects the volume of proposals. The costs would be lower 
if issuers would not always exercise the additional discretionary 
voting authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \402\ See Table 6 in section IV.C.4 and PRA Table 1 note 3. The 
PRA estimates 0.1 hours per proposal. Multiplying 0.1 hours per 
proposal by $625 for the blended hourly labor rate and 17 for the 
average number of proxy contests per year generates $1,062.5, or 
approximately $1,100. The rate of $625 per hour is a blended hourly 
rate of our current estimate of the hourly rate for each of four 
occupations: lawyers ($774), accountants and auditors ($330), 
financial managers ($730), and general and operations managers 
($656). This blended hourly rate assumes that lawyers will account 
for 50 percent of the time spent on compliance activities; 
accountants and auditors, 30 percent; financial managers, 10 
percent; and general operations managers, 10 percent. We expect that 
the types of individuals, the rates for those individuals, and the 
proportion of each individual's contributions would vary among 
registrants and could differ depending on which specific information 
collection a registrant is completing. Nonetheless, for purposes of 
this economic analysis, we believe the $625 per hour rate is a 
reasonable estimate of the hourly cost of completing the required 
information collection. To calculate the occupational hourly rates 
used in this release, the Commission uses the May 2025 occupational 
mean hourly wage data from the Occupational Employment and Wage 
Statistics (OEWS) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) 
for ``Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial 
Investments and Related Activities'' (NAICS 523). See Occupational 
Employment and Wage Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/; see also Standard 
Occupational Classification, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
available at https://www.bls.gov/soc/ (describing occupational 
classification system used by BLS); Exec. Off. of the President, 
Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, North American Industry Classification 
System (2022), available at https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf (describing the industry 
classification system used by BLS and other agencies). The mean 
hourly wage for each occupation is multiplied by an employment cost 
index (ECI) factor of 1.0227, calculated as one plus the percentage 
change in the seasonally adjusted ECI for wages and salaries of 
private industry workers from the second quarter of 2025 
(ECI=173.563), which contains the May 2025 OEWS reference period, to 
the first quarter of 2026 (ECI=177.498), which is the date of the 
most recently available ECI observations when the occupational 
hourly rates used in this release were calculated. See Employment 
Cost Index, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonal Data 2001-
Present, available at https://www.bls.gov/eci/tables.htm. The 
adjusted mean hourly wage is then multiplied by a nonwage cost 
adjustment factor of 5.734, which accounts for nonwage costs borne 
by employers, such as bonuses, benefits, and overhead. This factor 
is calculated as the average over 2016-2025 of the ratio of the 
Bureau of Economic Analysis's gross output for the NAICS 523 to 
total wages across all occupations for the NAICS 523 in the OEWS 
data. See Gross Output by Industry, U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, available at https://www.bea.gov/data/industries/gross-output-by-industry; Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics, 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/. For example, the $774 occupational hourly rate for lawyers is 
calculated as $131.91 x 1.0227 x 5.734, or approximately $774 (where 
$131.91 is the May 2025 mean hourly wage for lawyers in NAICS 523). 
The final product is the occupational hourly rate. See generally 
Updated Methodology for Calculating Occupational Hourly Rates (Dec. 
19, 2025), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/method-occupational-hourly-rates.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

c. Effects on Proposal Volume
    The proposed amendments may reduce the total volume of proposals 
submitted through independent solicitation. By enabling companies to 
exercise discretionary voting authority, even where the proponent has 
delivered its own proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the 
company's shares necessary to carry the proposal, the proposed 
amendments would allow companies to cast votes against a proposal on 
behalf of shareholders who use the company's proxy card and do not 
check the proposed opt-out check box. Such votes would have been 
counted as non-votes under the current framework. This reduces the 
proponent's expected probability of success, which may affect the 
proponent's incentives to conduct an independent solicitation.\403\ 
Whether the volume of proposals submitted through independent 
solicitation would decline would depend on the degree to which the 
reduced probability of success affects the proponent's assessment of 
whether expected benefits justify those costs. Proponents with strong 
motivations and sufficient resources may conclude that the expected 
benefits justify the costs despite the reduced probability of success, 
while proponents with less to gain or fewer resources may be deterred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \403\ The reduction in the expected probability of a successful 
outcome is partially mitigated by the ability of shareholders who 
wish to vote in favor of the proposal to vote the proponent's proxy 
card rather than the company's card. This mitigation is incomplete, 
however, as voting the proponent's card involves frictions (for 
example, awareness of the proponent's card, the ability to obtain 
it, and the willingness to use it in place of the company's card) 
that are likely to be more pronounced for certain shareholders than 
for others. To the extent these frictions limit the rate at which 
shareholders switch to the proponent's card, the reduction in the 
expected probability of a successful outcome identified above would 
be larger. The effects of these frictions on shareholder voting 
options are discussed further in section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) should also be considered 
in conjunction with the Commission's concurrent proposal to rescind 
Rule 14a-8. Under the baseline, non-Rule 14a-8 proposals are 
uncommon,\404\ as Rule 14a-8 provides shareholders with a lower-cost 
mechanism for submitting proposals. The proposed rescission of Rule 
14a-8 could redirect a portion of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals 
into the independent solicitation channel, potentially increasing the 
volume of independent solicitations. The magnitude of this effect is 
uncertain. If a substantial proportion of shareholders who would have 
submitted a proposal under Rule 14a-8 cease submitting proposals 
entirely due to the higher costs of independent solicitations, the 
volume increase of independent solicitations would be small. 
Additionally, the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) may attenuate 
this volume increase, as some former Rule 14a-8 proponents may be 
deterred by the reduction in the expected probability of success 
discussed above. The aggregate effect of these two concurrent proposed 
changes on the total volume of non-Rule 14a-8 proposals may be impacted 
by the relative sizes of these two proposal populations. From 2022 to 
2025, there were 3,205 Rule 14a-8 proposals submitted but only 69 proxy 
contests containing an independent solicitation for one or more 
proposals (and thus the number of proposals in these 69 contests is 
likely slightly higher than 69). Although it is uncertain how many of 
the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals would be redirected into the 
independent solicitation channel, a switch by a very small percentage 
of current Rule 14a-8 proposals would likely more than offset any 
reduction in non-14a-8 proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \404\ There were 69 total proxy contests that contained a 
solicitation for one or more proposals that were initiated through 
the filing of preliminary proxy statements in calendar years 2022-
2025. See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments could also compound the effect on less 
well-resourced proponents. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would 
disproportionately affect less well-resourced proponents, including 
individual retail investors and smaller

[[Page 59947]]

advocacy groups, for whom independent solicitation could be cost-
prohibitive. Less well-resourced proponents who nonetheless shift to 
independent solicitation as an alternative channel would face not only 
higher direct costs of solicitation relative to the Rule 14a-8 process, 
but also a reduced probability that their proposals would receive 
majority support. The combination of higher costs and lower probability 
of success could further reduce the participation of less well-
resourced proponents relative to large institutional investors and 
activist hedge funds, which have greater resources and established 
solicitation infrastructure. To the extent the two proposed changes 
together produce a greater reduction in less well-resourced proponent 
participation than either change alone, the combined effect on 
proponent participation would exceed what either the rescission of Rule 
14a-8 or the amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would produce individually.
d. Effects on Proposal Composition
    The proposed amendments may affect the characteristics of proposals 
submitted through independent solicitation in two ways. First, by 
reducing the expected probability of a successful outcome for proposals 
submitted through independent solicitation, the amendments may affect 
which proponents find it worthwhile to conduct independent 
solicitations and for which proposals, potentially changing the 
composition of submitted proposals. Second, the concurrent rescission 
of Rule 14a-8 would raise the cost threshold for presenting proposals, 
potentially changing the composition of the broader proposal population 
by filtering out some of the proponents (and therefore their proposals) 
who otherwise would have relied on Rule 14a-8's lower-cost mechanism.
    Data on shareholder voting outcomes indicate that, over the 2022 to 
2025 period, the average shareholder support for voted Rule 14a-8 
proposals was approximately 26 percent of votes cast, with only 
approximately 10 percent of proposals receiving majority support. These 
figures are consistent with the finding that most currently submitted 
Rule 14a-8 proposals lack broad shareholder support. To the extent that 
proposals lacking majority support reflect the preferences of a 
minority of shareholders rather than the shareholder base as a whole, a 
reduction in such proposals may reduce the costs that the majority of 
shareholders incur in reviewing and voting on them and may allow 
shareholder attention to be directed toward proposals with broader 
support. This benefit is contingent, however, on the proposals that 
would no longer be submitted being those with lower shareholder 
support. Data on proposals submitted through independent solicitations 
and voted on show that a higher fraction, 49 percent, of such proposals 
(and 67 percent of those targeting regulated funds) pass.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \405\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    We draw limited inferences from the voting data for two reasons. 
First, support levels are a noisy signal of a proposal's value to the 
company and shareholders: shareholder apathy, management solicitation 
against proposals, and institutional standing voting policies may all 
affect shareholders' votes on a proposal, independently of underlying 
proposal value. Second, the voting data cover only proposals that 
proceeded to a vote, which may differ systematically from those that 
would no longer be submitted under the proposed amendment.
    The higher cost threshold, all else equal, under a post-rescission 
regime may operate as a filter in two distinct ways. First, it may 
filter out proposals less likely to receive broad shareholder support, 
which would be beneficial to companies and shareholders to the extent 
it reduces the burden of reviewing and voting on proposals that do not 
reflect broadly shared concerns. This filtering benefit assumes, 
however, that proponents of low-support proposals are primarily 
motivated by the prospect of a successful voting outcome and will 
therefore be deterred by the reduced probability of success. To the 
extent that some proponents submit proposals primarily to make a 
statement, generate publicity, or put a governance concern on the 
record, rather than to garner majority support, the reduced probability 
of success may have little effect on their submission behavior. These 
proponents may therefore be among the least filtered out by a higher 
cost threshold, which would attenuate the filtering benefit identified 
above.
    Second, it may filter out proponents with fewer resources, 
regardless of the value of their proposals, which is not necessarily 
beneficial as such proponents may have proposals that would have 
benefited shareholders and the company. The direction and magnitude of 
these filtering effects depend on which proposals are most likely to be 
affected by the higher cost threshold, and the available evidence 
suggests that opposing forces bear on the question, as discussed below.
    On the one hand, the filtering benefit assumes that the proposals 
most sensitive to the cost increase are those submitted by proponents 
whose proposals lack broad shareholder support. However, individual 
proponents constituted approximately 49 percent of the identified Rule 
14a-8 population (during the 2022-2025 period), and their proposals 
received higher average shareholder support (approximately 32 percent) 
than those submitted by institutional proponents (approximately 20 
percent) in the historical voting data.\406\ Because individual 
proponents are less likely on average than institutional proponents to 
have the resources necessary to sustain an independent solicitation, 
they may be most sensitive to the cost increase and therefore most 
likely to cease pursuing proposals. If this is correct, the filtering 
effect may operate in the opposite direction from that assumed by the 
benefit case: the cost increase would disproportionately affect a class 
of proposals that received relatively higher shareholder support in the 
historical data, while leaving largely unaffected the institutional 
proposals that received lower average support. However, considering 
independent solicitations for proposals, where nearly half receive 
enough voting support to pass, only 13 percent were initiated by 
individuals. Thus, most of these independent solicitations would not 
likely be deterred solely by a cost increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \406\ See supra section IV.B.3.a. The 49% is derived from 1,429 
identified individual proponents and 1,499 identified institutional 
proponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, several considerations qualify the inference 
that the filtering effect would operate against the benefit case. 
First, the subset of individual proponents who would transition to 
independent solicitation may be more sophisticated and better resourced 
than the broader Rule 14a-8 individual proponent population, as the 
higher costs of independent solicitation would themselves function as a 
filter on proponent sophistication and resources. If this is correct, 
the proposals submitted by individual proponents under the new regime 
may not be as sensitive to the cost increase as the prior argument 
assumes. Second, this inference depends on the Rule 14a-8 proponent 
population being representative of the population likely to submit 
proposals under the new regime--an assumption that may not hold if 
proponents who have committed to independent solicitation differ 
systematically in sophistication and resources from the historical Rule 
14a-8 population. Indeed, we find evidence this is the case, as 
proposals submitted through independent solicitation are

[[Page 59948]]

more likely to be submitted by institutions.\407\ Third, average 
support figures mask heterogeneity within both the individual and 
institutional proponent categories, and the proposals most likely to be 
affected may not be representative of their category averages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \407\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    These opposing forces introduce uncertainty about the magnitude as 
well as the direction of the filtering effect, as the available data do 
not support a firm inference that the proposals most likely to no 
longer be presented under the proposed amendment are those with the 
weakest underlying shareholder support. We therefore treat the 
filtering effect as uncertain in both direction and magnitude.
    The economic significance of these composition effects depends on 
the direction of the filtering effect. If the proposals most likely to 
exit the system are those with the weakest underlying shareholder 
support, companies and shareholders would benefit from a reduction in 
the burden of reviewing and voting on proposals that do not reflect 
broadly shared concerns. If, however, the proposals that would most 
likely not be presented are those with stronger underlying shareholder 
support--as the individual proponent data suggest is possible--the 
composition effect would represent a cost rather than a benefit, as the 
set of proposals that might include value-enhancing proposals would no 
longer be submitted. Further, independent solicitations have 
historically received significant shareholder support (close to half of 
them passed during the 2022-2025 period).\408\ Thus, to the extent the 
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) reduce these submissions, this 
could represent a cost. Given the uncertainty about the direction of 
the filtering effect identified above, we cannot assess with confidence 
whether the composition effect represents a net benefit or a net cost 
for companies and shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \408\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The voting data also do not capture outcomes produced through the 
negotiation and withdrawal of proposals. A significant proportion of 
shareholder proposals are withdrawn before a vote, often following 
negotiation with management, which may thus produce governance outcomes 
that do not appear in voting data. Management may be more committed to 
implementing a negotiated outcome than the outcome of a majority vote 
on a shareholder proposal, suggesting that the value effect of the 
negotiation and withdrawal of proposals channel may exceed what the 
voting data alone capture. The likelihood of proceeding to a vote is 
the primary source of proponent leverage in these negotiations. To the 
extent that the proposed amendments alter the credible threat of a 
successful outside solicitation, they may affect proponent leverage in 
pre-vote negotiations, the negotiating dynamic between companies and 
proponents, and the rate of negotiated withdrawals and the outcomes 
associated with them. The direction of this effect depends on the 
degree to which the proposed amendments change proponent leverage and 
negotiating incentives. The voting data therefore do not provide 
insight into all the activity that the proposed amendments may affect.
    Uncertainty about the change in value from changes in proposal 
composition is consistent with broader mixed results when attempting to 
value shareholder proposals. Empirical research on stock price 
reactions to shareholder proposals suggests that the average wealth 
effects of non-binding proposals are close to zero, though with 
significant cross-sectional variation.\409\ Studies using the no-action 
letter process as a natural experiment find that markets react 
positively, on average, when a no-action letter concurring with the 
company is issued, with larger effects for proposals sponsored by 
individuals and those classified (by the studies' authors) as pursuing 
special interests.\410\ This literature provides the closest available 
quasi-experimental evidence on the value effects of proposal exclusion, 
but its applicability to the proposed amendments is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \409\ See Josef Bajzik et al., Does Shareholder Activism Create 
Value? A Meta-Analysis, 33 Corp. Governance: An Int'l. Rev. 1039 
(2025).
    \410\ See John G. Matsusaka et al., Can Shareholder Proposals 
Hurt Shareholders? Evidence From Securities and Exchange Commission 
No-Action-Letter Decisions, 64 J.L. & Econ. 107, 110 (2021), 
available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/710828.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

e. Agency Conflicts and Governance Effects
    The proposed amendments would increase management's expected 
probability of success when faced with independent solicitations. The 
extent to which this is a benefit or cost of the proposed amendments 
depends in part on the degree of managerial agency conflict in 
companies targeted by independent solicitations. An agency conflict 
occurs when the managers of a company have different incentives or 
objectives than the owners (shareholders) of the company. For example, 
managers might reduce board independence, weaken compensation 
oversight, or entrench anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills 
(also known as shareholder rights plans) to increase their 
compensation, improve executive job security, or insulate themselves 
from accountability.
    If managers are aligned with shareholder interests and possess 
superior information as insiders, then providing them with additional 
discretionary authority over independent proposal solicitations would 
likely increase the likelihood of higher-value vote outcomes. However, 
if the proposal exacerbates managerial agency conflicts, it could 
increase the likelihood of lower-value vote outcomes. The balance 
between these potential outcomes depends on which companies would 
likely be targeted by independent solicitations under the proposed 
amendments, how these companies chose to exercise their discretionary 
voting, and the potential severity of the agency conflicts. Ultimately, 
the magnitudes of these effects are uncertain.
i. Characteristics of Companies and Proposals Most Likely Affected
    The population of companies that attract independent solicitations 
is unlikely to be representative of the broader universe of public 
companies, and independent solicitations may skew toward target 
companies with agency conflicts. Independent solicitations are costly, 
and proponents may pursue them only after exhausting lower-cost 
engagement channels or determining that these other engagement channels 
have proven insufficient. Agency conflicts would frustrate these other 
engagement channels. Accordingly, companies that attract independent 
solicitation may disproportionately be those with agency conflicts that 
are, in the view of proponents, significant enough to warrant the 
expense of independent solicitations.
    This inference faces several limitations. First, companies may 
attract independent solicitations, despite their cost, for reasons 
other than concerns about company value, including their size and 
public profile, the industries in which they operate, or ownership 
structures that make them attractive targets for particular types of 
proponents. Second, declining solicitation costs (e.g., due to 
technological changes) could weaken the attrition bias, making the 
affected population more representative of all public companies. Third, 
proponents themselves may have agency conflicts, pursuing interests of 
stakeholders that differ from the interests of non-

[[Page 59949]]

proponent shareholders.\411\ The proposed amendments could benefit 
(non-proponent) shareholders in these cases by more easily allowing 
companies to vote against such proposals. Finally, the proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 may alter which companies attract independent 
solicitations, introducing further uncertainty.\412\ It is also unclear 
to what extent proposals redirected into independent solicitation would 
address agency conflicts. Currently, Rule 14a-8 proposals receive less 
shareholder support on average than independent solicitations, though 
ones that would switch to independent solicitation under the proposed 
rescission may be more value-enhancing for the company than the average 
Rule 14a-8 proposal to the extent they are more similar to current 
independent solicitations, which receive higher shareholder support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \411\ See supra note 223 (discussing, e.g., union involvement in 
a proposal at Warrior Met Coal).
    \412\ See section IV.B.2.c for a discussion of changes to the 
composition of companies targeted by independent solicitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

ii. Exercise of Discretionary Voting Power
    Any conclusion that the proposals are costly because of agency 
conflicts would depend on management using their additional voting 
discretion to defeat value-enhancing proposals, but the available 
evidence does not establish that management would necessarily do so. 
Nearly half (49 percent) of proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8 
process from 2022 to 2025 that went to a vote received enough support 
to pass.\413\ Shareholder approval of these proposals may signal that 
they are value-enhancing for the company. Management could use the 
proposed amendments to seek and obtain discretionary voting authority 
and vote against such value-enhancing proposals. Available data and 
current literature do not allow us to characterize with confidence the 
prevalence of agency conflicts across the population of companies 
targeted by independent solicitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \413\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Academic research suggests that corporate governance structures 
develop endogenously to the existing agency conflicts within a firm, 
and that management incentives and objectives can shape governance 
arrangements and corporate outcomes over time.\414\ Given this 
endogeneity, the literature supports two distinct interpretations of 
the governance profile of companies that are likely to attract 
independent solicitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \414\ For references on endogenous governance structures, and 
the role of executive character and style in shaping corporate 
outcomes, see, e.g., Aiyesha Dey, Corporate Governance and Agency 
Conflicts, 46 J. Acct. Rsch. 1143 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin and 
Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and the 
Monitoring of the CEO, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 96 (1998); Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an 
Endogenously Determined Institution: a Survey of the Economic 
Literature (Apr. 2003), Econ. Pol'y Rev. available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=794804 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database); 
Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing With Style: The 
Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q. J. Econ. 1169 (2003); 
and Robert Davidson et al., Executives' ``Off-The-Job'' Behavior, 
Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 5 
(2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the first interpretation, management has shaped governance to 
extract private benefits at shareholders' expense, reducing board 
independence, weakening compensation oversight, or entrenching anti-
takeover provisions to insulate itself from accountability. Under this 
interpretation, the governance concerns motivating independent 
solicitations are well-founded, management opposition reflects agency 
conflict, and the proposed amendments' effect in reducing the 
probability of success of independent solicitations may be adverse to 
shareholder interests.
    Under the second interpretation, management has shaped governance 
to be less restrictive, not to extract private benefits but to preserve 
operational flexibility in the service of shareholder value. Governance 
structures that appear suboptimal by reference to general best-practice 
standards may reflect rational adaptation to firm-specific 
circumstances, such as industry, strategy, or competitive environment. 
Proposals identifying these arrangements as concerns may therefore 
mischaracterize legitimate managerial discretion as an agency problem, 
and management opposition may reflect a valid assessment of shareholder 
interests rather than entrenchment. The same governance profile could 
be consistent with both interpretations.
iii. Additional Uncertainties
    Two additional factors create uncertainties in the potential 
magnitude of the agency conflict concern. First, the argument that the 
proposed amendments would have a negative effect in the presence of 
agency conflicts assumes that management at these companies would be 
aware of the amendments (if adopted) and then act on them to seek 
discretionary voting authority. If the additional authority under the 
proposed amendments is not used, then the agency conflict risk would be 
smaller than the argument implies. Second, the agency conflict concern 
may be most relevant for companies with moderate rather than the most 
severe governance concerns: companies with very significant governance 
problems may have already been subjected to other forms of shareholder 
intervention (such as shareholder campaigns or board reconstitution) 
that reduce the marginal role of independent solicitations under the 
proposed amendments.
f. Effects on Shareholder Voting
    The proposed amendments would affect shareholders who use the 
company's proxy card differently depending on whether they wish to vote 
with or opposite to management's voting recommendation on a proposal.
    A shareholder who wishes to vote with management's recommended vote 
in the case where the company omits the proposal from its proxy card 
would be better off under the proposed amendments. Under the baseline, 
the only possible result of such a shareholder's proxy is a non-vote, 
whereas under the proposed amendments the shareholder would be able to 
leave the proposed opt-out check box blank and have its vote cast in 
accordance with management's recommendation. This benefit is 
conditional on the company having omitted the proposal under the 
baseline. To the extent companies would have included proposals in 
their proxy materials under the baseline, allowing shareholders to vote 
directly according to their preference, these shareholders would 
benefit less from the proposed amendments, as they could already vote 
in accordance with management's voting recommendation on the company's 
proxy card.
    A shareholder who wishes to vote opposite management's intended 
vote could be worse off under the proposed amendments. First, consider 
the case where the company omits the proposal under both the baseline 
and the proposed amendments. Under the baseline, such a shareholder 
using the company's proxy card is counted as a non-vote. Under the 
proposed amendments, the same shareholder would have to affirmatively 
check the proposed opt-out check box to be counted as a non-vote; 
failing to do so would result in the company exercising its 
discretionary authority to cast the vote in accordance with its 
disclosed intention, contrary to the shareholder's preference. Second, 
consider the case where the proposed amendments would make the company 
more likely to switch from inclusion to omission. Under the

[[Page 59950]]

baseline, the shareholder can vote opposite to management's 
recommendation directly through the company's proxy card. Under the 
proposed amendments, the same shareholder's best available option using 
the company's proxy card would be a non-vote, achieved by checking the 
proposed opt-out check box--and if the shareholder fails to check the 
box, the company would be able to exercise its discretionary authority 
to cast the vote contrary to the shareholder's preference.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \415\ Under both the baseline and proposed amendments, a 
shareholder who wishes to vote opposite management's recommendation 
when the company omits the proposal can do so by returning, instead, 
the proponent's proxy card or attending the meeting in person or 
virtually and voting at the meeting. For such shareholders not 
solicited by the proponent, however, additional cost would be 
required to attempt to take this action, and it is not guaranteed 
that these shareholders would ultimately be solicited. See supra 
section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Companies' switch from inclusion of a proposal to omission would 
also have informational consequences for shareholders. Under inclusion, 
shareholders receive the proposal and the board's recommendation 
regarding the proposal with reasons for their support or lack of 
support. Under omission (absent the proposed amendments) and under the 
proposed amendments, shareholders would receive a brief description of 
the proposal in the proxy statement, as required under current Rule 
14a-4(c)(2), as well as how the company intends to vote through its 
exercise of discretionary authority (although reasons would not be 
required). The proxy card would include a cross-reference to the 
location of this information in the proxy statement and the proposed 
opt-out check box. The net informational effect of the proposed 
amendments therefore depends on the proportion of companies that would 
have chosen inclusion rather than omission under the baseline. For 
companies that would have chosen inclusion absent the proposed 
amendments, the proposed amendments would represent an informational 
reduction; for companies that would have chosen omission, the 
informational effect is neutral.\416\ This informational reduction may 
be partially offset for shareholders who value more concise disclosure, 
particularly where there are multiple shareholder proposals and 
shareholder attention is limited, as noted above. Shorter disclosure 
may lead to more overall information absorption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \416\ Under the baseline, a company that would have chosen 
omission for proposals received outside of Rule 14a-8 could attempt 
to seek discretionary authority (nevertheless preventable by the 
proponent under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2)) by including, in its proxy 
statement, ``advice'' (brief disclosure) on the nature of each 
matter and how the company intends to exercise its discretion to 
vote. Thus, the amount of information available to investors if the 
company chooses to omit such proposals under the baseline would 
likely be similar to the information available under the proposed 
amendments. It is possible under the baseline that a company that 
plans to omit, knowing a proponent may prevent discretionary 
authority regardless of the company's actions, would choose to not 
even include the brief disclosure. In this case, the proposed 
amendments could result in marginally more information being made 
available to shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A shareholder who wishes to abstain faces a situation similar to 
that of a shareholder who wishes to vote opposite to management's 
recommendation in the case where the company omits the proposal under 
both the baseline and the proposed amendments. Under the baseline, such 
a shareholder is automatically counted as a non-vote, whereas under the 
proposed amendments the shareholder would be counted as a non-vote if 
he or she affirmatively checks the proposed opt-out check box. In the 
case where the proposed amendments would make the company more likely 
to switch from inclusion to omission, the extent to which a non-vote 
and an abstention (available if the proposal were included) are 
practically equivalent depends on the applicable voting standard: under 
a percent-of-outstanding-shares standard the two are equivalent, while 
under a percent-of-votes-cast standard a non-vote reduces the 
denominator and may affect the outcome differently than a formal 
abstention. To the extent the proposed amendments would increase 
omission rates and more shareholders would not have their votes cast on 
the proposal, the effect on proposal outcomes would therefore depend on 
the applicable voting standard.
g. Default Effects
    The analysis above (section IV.C.2.f) assumes that shareholders are 
fully aware of the proposed opt-out check box mechanism and do in fact 
choose the action that best aligns with their preferences. However, a 
substantial body of empirical research on default effects demonstrates 
that defaults exert a considerable and consistent influence on 
decisions across a wide range of contexts, and that the option 
presented as the default is chosen at higher rates than preferences 
alone would predict.\417\ Because the proposed opt-out check box must 
be affirmatively checked to prevent management from exercising 
discretionary voting authority, shareholders who do not act (including 
those who fail to act for reasons such as inertia, limited attention, 
or an interpretation of the default as an implied recommendation) will 
have their votes cast by management regardless of their actual 
preferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \417\ See Jon M. Jachimowicz et al., When and Why Defaults 
Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Default Effects, 3 Behav. 
Pub. Pol'y 159 M(2019) for a survey of the literature. See also 
Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: 
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ 
1149 (2001). See also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More 
Tomorrow \TM\: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee 
Saving, 112 J. Pol. Econ.S164 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The default effect is likely to vary across the shareholder 
population. Institutional investors with dedicated proxy voting teams 
are unlikely to be materially affected by inertia or limited attention, 
given their established processes for reviewing proxy materials and 
making voting decisions. The impact of the default effect would 
therefore likely be more concentrated among retail shareholders, who 
hold a meaningful minority share of most public companies' outstanding 
equity. The proposed mandatory disclosure of management's voting 
recommendation would provide information to shareholders who read the 
proxy materials carefully but may not address the inertia and limited 
attention components of the default effect for shareholders who engage 
less thoroughly with proxy materials--precisely the shareholders for 
whom the default effect is most likely to be significant.
    The proposed opt-out check box mechanism has practical limitations 
that would bear on its effectiveness in mitigating the default effect. 
First, mitigating the default effect through the proposed check box 
mechanism would require shareholders to be informed about the 
importance of checking the opt-out box through channels independent of 
the company's proxy materials. Proponents may or may not undertake this 
effort, and some proponents may face resource constraints to do so, as 
noted above. Second, the check box mechanism faces a structural 
limitation independent of the communication problem. A shareholder who 
wishes to vote opposite to management's recommendation and checks the 
proposed opt-out check box achieves only a non-vote, not an affirmative 
vote opposite to management's recommended vote. The proposed check box 
would therefore address one dimension of the default effect: it 
prevents management from casting a vote in accordance with its 
disclosed

[[Page 59951]]

intention on behalf of shareholders who have not actively chosen that 
outcome. It does not, however, provide a mechanism on the company's 
card for shareholders who wish to vote opposite management's 
recommendation to do so affirmatively.\418\ If management discloses its 
intention to vote in favor of a proposal in accordance with the 
proposed amendments, however, a shareholder who leaves the opt-out box 
unchecked can effectively delegate the vote to the company's 
discretionary authority, resulting in a vote consistent with the 
shareholder's preference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \418\ See supra note 415.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The default effect may result in votes being cast in accordance 
with management's recommended vote regardless of shareholders' actual 
preferences. In addition, shareholders who check the proposed opt-out 
box under the mistaken belief that doing so constitutes a vote opposite 
to management's recommended vote will have their preferences only 
partially realized. The net distributional effect depends on the 
composition of shareholder preferences relative to management's 
recommended votes across the affected population of companies and 
proposals; this composition varies considerably and cannot be assessed 
in the aggregate.
h. Effects on Zero Slate Campaigns
    The proposed amendments address a distortion created by the 
interaction between current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) and Rule 14a-4(d)(1) (the 
``bona fide nominee'' rule), which was amended in connection with the 
adoption of the universal proxy rules. This distortion differs from the 
general cost of inclusion problem.
    Under the current proxy rules, a proponent soliciting votes for a 
shareholder proposal may place the company's director nominees on the 
proponent's own proxy card, even when offering no competing nominees. 
This ``zero slate'' approach allows the proponent's card to offer 
shareholders both the company's director nominees and the proponent's 
proposals on a single card, making it generally more appealing to 
shareholders than the company's card when that card contains only the 
company's nominees and management proposals. As a result, shareholders 
who want to support the company's nominees but also vote on the 
proponent's proposals have strong incentives to use the proponent's 
proxy card rather than the company's card in this instance.
    This dynamic can result in companies feeling compelled to include a 
proponent's proposals on their own proxy card, even though the Federal 
proxy rules (and existing State laws) do not require that they do so. 
If the company omits the proposals, then it will not have proxy voting 
authority with respect to the proponent's proposals. To avoid that loss 
of proxy voting authority, a company may decide to include the 
proponent's proposals, thereby assuming the full costs of inclusion and 
solicitation while the proponent only incurs the costs of its own 
solicitation.
    This is a form of cost externalization because the proponent 
benefits from the company's proxy distribution infrastructure and 
solicitation efforts without bearing the associated expense of 
soliciting all shareholders. The company, in turn, incurs costs it 
would not otherwise face, not because the Federal proxy rules require 
inclusion, but because the interaction between Rules 14a-4(c)(2) and 
14a-4(d)(1) creates structural pressure to include the proposals 
voluntarily. As a result, a single proponent, through a zero slate 
campaign, may be able to compel the company to place its proposals on 
the company's proxy card at the company's expense.
    By allowing companies to exercise discretionary voting authority 
even when the proponent has distributed proxy materials to the 
requisite percentage of shareholders, the amendments remove the binary 
choice that makes omission costly today. A company that omits a 
proposal from its proxy card would still be able to exercise 
discretionary authority, subject to the proposed opt-out check box. As 
a result, the company would no longer need to include the proponent's 
proposals on its own card to exercise proxy voting authority.
    The benefit of the proposed amendments in this context is the 
removal of the coercive dynamic currently created by zero slate 
campaigns. Companies that currently feel compelled to include a 
proponent's proposals to exercise proxy voting authority would be able 
to omit those proposals while still exercising discretionary voting 
authority. This benefit differs from the general cost savings described 
above, which concern companies that include proposals because of the 
solicitation-threshold mechanism in current Rule 14a-4(c)(2). The zero 
slate benefit is narrower and more targeted: it applies to companies 
whose pressure to include proposals stems not from the threshold 
itself, but from its interaction with the bona fide nominee rule.
    The benefit of the proposed amendments in the zero slate context is 
subject to qualifications. First, the benefit arises only for companies 
that would have faced zero slate campaigns in the absence of the 
proposed amendments and would depend on how frequently proponents 
choose to use zero slate campaigns following the rescission of Rule 
14a-8. Second, the benefit assumes that the amendments do not result in 
other changes that may lead to costs for companies. For example, if 
proponents instead increase their use of exempt solicitations, public 
campaigns, or informal engagement, the benefit of eliminating the zero 
slate dynamic may be reduced. Third, the benefit depends on companies 
choosing to omit proposals under the amended framework rather than 
continuing to include them voluntarily for strategic or reputational 
reasons. Companies that would have included the proposals regardless of 
the zero slate coercive dynamic would not experience this benefit.
3. The Benefits and Costs for Proxy-Related Service Providers
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
in Rule 14a-4(c) may generate benefits and costs for providers of 
administrative and advisory services related to proxy solicitation and 
shareholder voting (``proxy-related service providers''). If the 
proposed rescission results in fewer shareholder proposals, such 
providers may incur costs in the form of forgone revenue as a result of 
reduction in business. Such an effect could be mitigated to the extent 
that States adopt statutory criteria governing the inclusion of 
shareholder proposals, or, if State law permits, companies incorporate 
such criteria into their charter or bylaws; but only to the extent that 
those frameworks result in shareholders submitting proposals at levels 
comparable to the current Rule 14a-8 process. State or bylaw frameworks 
that are more restrictive than Rule 14a-8, or that companies or 
shareholders do not actively use, would provide limited mitigation. 
These costs could also be mitigated if the proposed rescission of Rule 
14a-8 redirects a portion of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals into the 
independent solicitation channel, potentially increasing the demand for 
solicitation-related services.
    Additionally, proxy-related service providers could incur 
transition costs due to the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8. If the 
proposed rescission leads States to adopt statutory criteria governing 
the inclusion of shareholder

[[Page 59952]]

proposals or if companies incorporate such criteria into their 
governing documents, when permitted by State law, proxy-related service 
providers would need to devote time and resources to become familiar 
with such criteria and their impact on the proxy solicitation process.
4. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs
    Throughout this economic analysis, we have estimated monetized 
benefits and costs per proposal. In this section, we present estimates 
of aggregate monetized benefits and costs. These totals include only 
benefits and costs that are monetized in the economic analysis and thus 
do not encompass all of the proposed rule's benefits and costs. For 
example, we were not able to quantify the cost savings to issuers 
resulting from the amendments to Rule 14a-4(c).\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \419\ See supra section IV.C.1.a.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

a. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs Across Affected Entities
    We did not monetize any one-time initial costs or benefits of the 
proposed rule. As shown in Table 5, we estimate that the proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would result in aggregate annual monetized 
cost savings (i.e., benefits) for covered entities of approximately 
$29.7 million attributable to a reduction in internal burden hours 
\420\ and an additional $9.9 million attributable to a reduction in 
external costs, for a total of about $39.6 million. In addition, as 
shown in Table 6, we estimate that the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) would result in aggregate annual costs for companies of 
approximately $1,063, attributable to an increase in internal burden 
hours.\421\ These figures are based on Paperwork Reduction Act 
estimates.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \420\ See supra note 353 and accompanying text; see also PRA 
Table 1, footnotes 1 and 2, which characterize the external cost 
savings as a share of the total reduction in burden hours and 
monetize these hours at a rate of $462 per hour. The rate of $462 
per hour is a blended hourly rate of our current estimate of the 
hourly rate for each of four occupations: lawyers ($774), paralegals 
and legal assistants ($281), general and operations managers ($656), 
and general office clerks ($142). This blended hourly rate assumes 
that lawyers will account for 30 percent of the time spent on 
compliance activities; paralegals and legal assistants, 20 percent; 
general and operations managers, 20 percent; and general office 
clerks, 30 percent. We expect that the types of individuals, the 
rates for those individuals, and the proportion of each individual's 
contributions would vary among respondents and could differ 
depending on which specific information collection a respondent is 
completing. Nonetheless, for purposes of this economic analysis, we 
believe the $462 per hour rate is a reasonable estimate of the 
hourly cost of completing the required information collection. For 
additional information on the methodology used to calculate this 
rate, please see the explanation in note 402.
    \421\ See supra section IV.C.2.b.
    \422\ See supra sections IV.C.1.a.i and IV.C.2.b.
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
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[[Page 59953]]


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BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
b. Present Values and Annualized Values of Aggregate Monetized Benefits 
and Costs
    Consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 12866, the 
Commission reports estimated total monetized benefits and costs for all 
affected entities in two additional ways specified in OMB Circular A-
4.\424\ These two presentations address the fact that the benefits and 
costs of the proposed rule accrue at different points in time, and that 
benefits and costs realized sooner are generally more valuable than 
those realized later.\425\
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    \424\ See E.O. No. 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993), 58 FR 51735, 51741 
(Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring agencies to provide an analysis of 
benefits, costs, and regulatory alternatives to OIRA for significant 
regulatory actions); OMB, Circular A-4, at 31-34, 45 (Sept. 17, 
2003) (providing guidance to agencies regarding compliance with E.O. 
12866); see also E.O. No. 14215 (Feb. 18, 2025), 90 FR 10447, 10448 
(Feb. 24, 2025) (requiring all Federal agencies, including the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, to comply with E.O. No. 12866). 
In addition, E.O. 14192 requires agencies to provide their best 
approximation of the total costs or savings associated with each new 
regulation or repealed regulation consistent with the analyses 
required by E.O. 12866. See E.O. No. 14192 (Jan. 31, 2025), 90 FR 
9065, 9066 (Feb. 6, 2025).
    \425\ See Circular A-4, at 32.
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    We report (1) the present values of expected benefits and costs 
that are monetized in our economic analysis, aggregated across all 
affected entities over a 10-year time horizon starting in 2026, and (2) 
the annualized values over the same time horizon, derived from the 
present values. This time horizon represents the period over which the 
principal benefits and costs that are monetized in the Economic 
Analysis are expected to accrue.\426\ The present values and annualized 
values account for the timing of benefits and costs through 
discounting, which is a procedure that accounts for the time value of 
money.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \426\ See id. at 31 (stating that ``[t]he ending point should be 
far enough in the future to encompass all the significant benefits 
and costs likely to result from the rule''). For the purposes of 
this analysis, we assume the effective date of the proposal, as well 
as the start year for the analysis's time horizon, is the present 
year.
    \427\ See id. at 32 (``The Rationale for Discounting'') and 45 
(``Treatment of Benefits and Costs over Time''); see also OIRA, 
Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, at 11 (Aug. 15, 2011), 
available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf (``To provide an 
accurate assessment of benefits and costs that occur at different 
points in time or over different time horizons, an agency should use 
discounting. Agencies should provide benefit and cost estimates 
using both 3 percent and 7 percent annual discount rates expressed 
as a present value as well as annualized.''); Harvey S. Rosen & Ted 
Gayer, Public Finance 151 (8th ed. 2008) (defining present value as 
``the value today of a given amount of money to be paid or received 
in the future'').
    \428\ This approach is consistent with the recommended treatment 
of benefits and costs over time in Circular A-4. See id. at 45 
(``You should present annualized benefits and costs using real 
discount rates of 3 and 7 percent.'').
    \429\ For each discount rate, the annualized monetized benefits 
(costs, respectively) in Table 9 represent the constant annual 
stream of benefits (costs, respectively) whose present value over 
the time horizon equates the corresponding present value in Table 8. 
See Table 9, note a, for additional calculation details.
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    Table 9 reports annualized aggregate monetized benefits and costs 
using real discount rates of 3 percent and 7 percent over a 10-year 
horizon.\428\ The lump sum present values of aggregate monetized 
benefits and costs reported in Table 8 are converted in Table 9 into a 
constant stream of annualized benefits and costs over a 10-year time 
horizon, starting in 2026.\429\ Annualized benefits and costs may 
differ from the sum of recurring monetized annual benefits and costs 
discussed earlier in this Economic Analysis because they incorporate 
the timing of benefits and costs through discounting, and combine one-
time and

[[Page 59954]]

recurring benefits and costs.\430\ We estimate that annualized total 
monetized benefits are about $39.6 million using a three percent 
discount rate and about $39.6 million using a seven percent discount 
rate. In addition, we estimate that annualized total monetized costs 
are about $1,063 per year using a three percent discount rate and about 
$1,063 per year using a seven percent discount rate.
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    \430\ The annualized benefits and costs present these values 
over the 10-year time horizon, starting in the present year.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.081

D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation

    This section addresses the potential effects of the proposed 
rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) 
on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
1. Efficiency
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could affect efficiency 
through several channels. The proposed rescission could improve 
allocative efficiency by allowing governance arrangements to better 
reflect the circumstances of individual companies and industries. Rule 
14a-8 establishes a uniform Federal framework governing which 
shareholder proposals companies must include in their proxy materials. 
Through its eligibility requirements, procedural requirements, and 
substantive exclusion grounds, the rule has influenced which matters 
are presented for shareholder consideration. As discussed in section 
II.A.2.c, Rule 14a-8's uniform Federal framework may have given States 
and companies little occasion or incentive to develop their own 
shareholder proposal frameworks, including frameworks tailored to 
differences in ownership structure, industry, size, and other company-
specific circumstances. The proposed rescission would instead leave 
these determinations to State law and, where State law permits, to 
private ordering through a company's choice of jurisdiction and the 
terms of its charter and bylaws. To the extent that the resulting 
arrangements better serve companies and their shareholders than the 
uniform Federal framework, the proposed rescission would improve 
allocative efficiency.
    To the extent that the proposed rescission reduces the number of 
shareholder proposals, companies would incur fewer legal and 
administrative costs associated with evaluating proponent eligibility, 
preparing responses, and managing the proxy process. As discussed in 
section IV.B.3, these costs can be large, particularly in contested 
solicitations and sustained shareholder campaigns, and can divert 
resources from productive uses. If the proposals that are eliminated do 
not generate benefits commensurate with their costs, reducing these 
expenses would improve productive efficiency. If companies redirect the 
resulting savings, management attention, and other resources toward 
higher-value activities, the proposed rescission could also improve 
allocative efficiency. Both effects depend on whether the proposed 
rescission reduces the number of proposals companies process, which 
would turn on how State law and company governing documents develop.
    Beyond the administrative costs of processing proposals in general, 
Rule 14a-8 may also facilitate a distinct category of resource 
consumption, specifically a form of rent-seeking to obtain private 
benefits through the proposal process. On the proponent side, some 
proponents may use the credible threat of a proposal to obtain 
concessions from management that benefit the proponents. If those 
concessions merely transfer value from the company or its other 
shareholders to the proponent rather than creating value, they 
represent a private benefit rather than a governance improvement. On 
the company side, management may devote legal fees, executive time, and 
other resources to such proposals.\431\ To the extent that both sets of 
expenditures (by the proponent pursuing concessions and by the company 
resisting them) are directed at determining who captures existing value 
rather than creating new value, the resources consumed on both sides 
are consumed without creating value, regardless of which party 
prevails. Reducing those expenditures would improve productive 
efficiency. However, the magnitude of any such gain is uncertain. As 
discussed in section IV.B.1.b, the same negotiating process may in some 
cases produce governance changes that benefit shareholders more 
broadly, and some proposals may be withdrawn following changes 
companies adopt in response to proponent pressure. The available 
evidence does not allow us to assess what proportion of negotiated 
outcomes represents rent extraction as opposed to genuine governance 
improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \431\ See Matsusaka et al. (2019), supra note 390 (finding that 
labor unions increase their rate of shareholder proposal submissions 
in years when a collective bargaining agreement expires, that a 
substantial proportion of such proposals is withdrawn before a vote, 
and that withdrawn proposals are associated with more favorable wage 
outcomes for union members, consistent with proposals being used as 
leverage to obtain concessions from management).

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[[Page 59955]]

    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect informational 
efficiency through a different channel. Under the amendments, a company 
would not have to include a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal in its proxy 
materials to exercise proxy voting authority over the proposal. 
Research has documented that investors have limited attention and may 
not fully process all available information in complex or lengthy 
disclosures, which can affect the quality of financial decision-
making.\432\ To the extent that these limitations apply to proxy cards, 
the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could improve the 
informational efficiency of the proxy process to some degree with 
respect to those items. Any such benefit would depend on the number of 
non-Rule 14a-8 proposals a company receives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \432\ See Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Measuring Readability in 
Financial Disclosures 69 J. Fin. 1643 (2014) (showing that longer 
financial disclosures are associated with worse investor 
comprehension and processing), and David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong 
Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial 
Reporting, 36 J. Acct. & Econ. 337 (2003) (developing a model of 
limited investor attention showing that disclosure format and 
complexity affect information processing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed opt-out structure in Rule 14a-4(c) can also be 
analyzed as a form of delegated decision-making. If a shareholder 
returns the company's proxy card without checking the opt-out box, the 
company would have discretionary authority to vote the shareholder's 
shares on non-Rule 14a-8 proposals in accordance with its disclosed 
intention. When management is better informed than individual 
shareholders about the merits of a particular proposal (e.g., because 
it has greater familiarity with the company's operations, strategy, or 
governance), delegating voting authority to management could result in 
votes that better serve shareholders broadly, which can improve the 
allocative efficiency of the voting process. This mechanism is 
consistent with the broader literature on delegated decision-making, 
which suggests that delegation can improve outcomes when the delegate 
has an informational advantage and the parties' interests are 
sufficiently aligned.\433\ Any such benefit would depend on the 
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests, which may vary 
across companies and proposals, and on whether a shareholder's failure 
to check the box reflects a decision to delegate rather than 
inattention, as discussed in section IV.C.2.g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \433\ See Wouter Dessein, Authority and Communication in 
Organizations, 69 Rev. Econ. Stud. 811 (2002) (developing a model in 
which a principal prefers to delegate control to a better-informed 
agent when the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the 
principal's uncertainty). But see Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, 
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management, 23 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 4115 (2010) (developing a model in which shareholders' 
informational disadvantages do not, by themselves, justify 
managerial control, but concluding that shareholders nevertheless 
should not control all major corporate decisions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could reduce efficiency 
through several channels. Under the baseline, shareholder proposals may 
provide useful information even when they do not receive majority 
support. They can reveal shareholder preferences, bring attention to 
issues that management might not otherwise consider, and generate 
public discussion that informs corporate decision-making. To the extent 
that the proposed rescission reduces the number of proposals presented, 
companies and shareholders could lose these informational benefits. 
Moreover, if proposals that are no longer presented would have prompted 
value-enhancing changes in corporate policy, rescission could prevent 
resources from being directed toward higher-valued uses, reducing 
allocative efficiency.
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also reduce allocative 
efficiency by weakening managerial discipline. Rule 14a-8 gives 
shareholders a relatively low-cost means of seeking changes to 
governance arrangements, including board structure, takeover defenses, 
and compensation practices. If the prospect that shareholders may 
submit such proposals and attract support currently discourages 
entrenchment or capital misallocation, the proposed rescission could 
weaken that disciplining effect.\434\ This channel operates through the 
availability and credibility of the Rule 14a-8 submission process 
rather than solely through proposals actually submitted. Its magnitude 
would therefore depend less on the number of proposals presented than 
on whether State law and company governing documents preserve a 
comparable channel. To the extent that no comparable channel remains 
(at this time), managerial agency costs could increase and corporate 
resources could be directed toward lower-valued uses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \434\ See Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012, supra note 391. For 
discussions of agency costs, see generally, Michael C. Jensen & 
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976) 
(developing a theory of agency costs arising from conflicts between 
managers and shareholders).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also reduce allocative 
efficiency by narrowing the range of perspectives that reach the board 
of directors (or similar governing body). Rule 14a-8's low-cost access 
mechanism enables proponents, including less well-resourced proponents, 
retail investors, and smaller institutional investors, to present 
proposals to the broader shareholder base at minimal incremental cost, 
with the cost of inclusion and distribution borne by the company. 
Without that mechanism, and to the extent State law and company 
governing documents do not provide a comparable one, participation in 
the governance process would require resources sufficient to conduct an 
independent solicitation. As discussed in section IV.C.2.c, when 
combined with the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), this cost 
differential could systematically reduce the participation of less 
well-resourced proponents. To the extent that those proponents 
currently surface governance concerns that are not otherwise raised, 
and to the extent that the resulting diversity of perspectives improves 
the quality of corporate decision-making, their reduced participation 
could diminish the information available in the governance process and 
reduce allocative efficiency.
    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could reduce informational 
efficiency, with consequences for allocative efficiency. Because a 
company would not need to disclose the full text of a non-Rule 14a-8 
proposal in its proxy materials to exercise discretionary voting 
authority over the proposal, shareholders who do not affirmatively opt 
out may effectively delegate their voting authority without full 
information about the matter. A brief description may not provide 
enough information for a shareholder to assess the company's position 
or to evaluate the proposal on its merits. To the extent this results 
in the rejection of value-enhancing proposals or the approval of value-
reducing ones, the amendments would reduce allocative efficiency. The 
informational effect would fall principally on shareholders whom the 
proponent does not solicit, because shareholders who receive the 
proponent's proxy materials would have access to the full text of the 
proposal.
    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could also reduce 
allocative efficiency by weakening shareholder oversight through two 
related but distinct mechanisms. First, by eliminating the solicitation 
threshold that currently limits a company's discretionary voting 
authority, the proposed amendments would expand the circumstances under 
which companies can vote on behalf of shareholders on omitted 
proposals, shifting the exercise of discretionary voting authority 
toward management. Second, as discussed in section IV.B.2.f,

[[Page 59956]]

the proposed opt-out default structure would mean that shareholders who 
do not understand or affirmatively act on the check box mechanism would 
have their shares voted in accordance with the company's disclosed 
intention, even when that outcome differs from their preferences. To 
the extent voting outcomes differ from those shareholders would choose 
if they affirmatively expressed their preferences, the amendments could 
reduce allocative efficiency. This effect could be greater at companies 
with dispersed ownership, where individual shareholders have weaker 
incentives to monitor management or coordinate with other 
shareholders.\435\ Its magnitude would also depend on the extent to 
which managerial and shareholder interests are aligned and on the 
availability of other governance mechanisms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \435\ See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 (1997) (discussing collective-
action and free-rider problems that weaken the incentives of 
dispersed shareholders to monitor management).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The transition following the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 
could itself reduce efficiency, apart from the direct costs of adapting 
to a new framework. The proposed rescission would likely eliminate the 
Federal standard before it is clear whether (and to what extent) State 
law and private-ordering alternatives may develop. In many 
jurisdictions, State law is silent or unclear as to which proposals are 
proper subjects for shareholder action, and these questions may be 
resolved over time by State legislators and courts. In the interim, 
companies would need to make decisions about whether to include or 
exclude a proposal, and shareholders would need to decide whether to 
pursue proposals or other forms of engagement, without clear and 
settled requirements. Companies might base inclusion decisions 
primarily on litigation exposure rather than on a fuller assessment of 
the expected costs and benefits of inclusion or exclusion, and they 
might defer changes to their governing documents or State of 
incorporation while awaiting greater clarity. Legal advice and 
litigation devoted to resolving these questions would consume 
resources, reducing productive efficiency. Decisions made or delayed 
because of uncertainty could also direct resources away from higher-
valued uses, reducing allocative efficiency. The transition could 
therefore create uncertainty, delay, and litigation costs that would 
not necessarily arise under either the current Federal framework or the 
arrangements that may ultimately emerge.
    Finally, shareholders may respond to the proposed rescission by 
shifting to alternative forms of engagement, including direct outreach 
to management, exempt solicitations, and independent proxy 
solicitations. The costs of these alternatives would vary. For 
proponents, independent proxy solicitations require bearing the full 
cost of soliciting shareholders directly, which are costs that are 
largely borne by the company under Rule 14a-8. For companies, response 
costs may persist regardless of the channel used by the proponent, and 
companies facing independent solicitations may still choose to include 
the proposals in their own proxy materials to exercise proxy voting 
authority (absent the concurrent proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)), 
thereby incurring many of the same costs as under Rule 14a-8. To the 
extent that total resources consumed across proponents and companies 
combined are greater under independent solicitation than under the Rule 
14a-8 process, substitution would offset some of the processing-cost 
savings described above and reduce productive efficiency.
2. Competition
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect competition along several dimensions. 
Because Rules 14a-8 and 14a-4(c) apply only to companies subject to the 
Federal proxy rules, the associated costs may currently place those 
companies at a competitive disadvantage relative to companies in the 
same product markets that are not subject to those rules, including 
private companies and foreign private issuers. These costs may also be 
difficult to predict because they depend on the number and nature of 
the proposals a company receives. As discussed in section IV.B.3, 
however, these costs are concentrated: most companies subject to the 
proxy rules receive no shareholder proposals in a given year, and most 
of those that do receive only one. The asymmetry therefore falls 
unevenly across public companies, and its competitive significance 
would depend on the number and cost of proposals a particular company 
expects to receive. To the extent the proposed changes reduce these 
costs, they could narrow the cost differential between public and 
private companies competing in the same product markets.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \436\ See Xiaohui Gao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48 
J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 1663 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Among public companies, the competitive effects of the proposed 
changes could vary by company size. As discussed in section IV.B.3.a, 
using S&P 500 membership as a proxy for larger company size, Rule 14a-8 
proposals are concentrated among larger companies, which therefore bear 
a disproportionate share of proposal-related processing costs.\437\ To 
the extent the proposed rescission reduces those costs, the savings 
would accrue disproportionately to larger companies. Smaller companies 
could also benefit from the proposed rescission, however, to the extent 
compliance with Rule 14a-8 entails fixed or recurring legal, 
governance, and administrative costs that represent a larger share of 
their resources. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could have a 
different distributional effect. As discussed in section IV.B.3.b, 
approximately 86 percent of the proxy contests involving proposals 
identified in our sample (contests identified through preliminary proxy 
statement filings for meetings held from 2022 through 2025) targeted 
companies outside the S&P 500. To the extent the amendments reduce the 
costs associated with such contests, the benefits may therefore accrue 
more often to smaller companies.\438\ Any resulting effect on 
competition between larger and smaller public companies would depend on 
the incidence and magnitude of the costs avoided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \437\ See section IV.B.3.a (noting that 74% of Rule 14a-8 
proposals in the sample targeted S&P 500 companies, which we use 
here as a proxy for larger company size).
    \438\ See section IV.B.3.b (noting that only 14% of proxy 
contests involving one or more proposals and initiated through the 
filing of preliminary proxy statements targeted S&P 500 companies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed changes could also affect competition in the market 
for corporate control. Shareholder proposals provide one channel 
through which shareholders may seek changes to takeover defenses and 
related governance arrangements. To the extent the proposed rescission 
reduces the availability or use of that channel, and State law and 
company governing documents do not provide a comparable one, such 
arrangements may become more difficult to challenge or remove. This 
could reduce the contestability of control at affected companies and 
weaken competitive pressure from potential acquisitions. A proponent 
could still pursue such changes through an independent solicitation, 
although the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would permit the 
company to exercise discretionary voting authority over the proposal as 
described above, potentially making it harder for the

[[Page 59957]]

proponent to obtain the shareholder support needed to succeed, as 
discussed in section IV.C.2.c. The magnitude of this effect would 
depend on how effectively other mechanisms substitute for the 
shareholder proposal process, including shareholders' State-law rights 
to nominate and elect directors and, where applicable, amend companies' 
governing documents.
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also affect competition 
among States to attract companies for incorporation within their 
jurisdictions. States currently have authority to determine the role of 
shareholder proposals in corporate governance but, with one exception, 
have not adopted legislation governing shareholder proposals in more 
than 80 years since Rule 14a-8 was first adopted. The proposed 
rescission could encourage more States to legislate in this area, and 
companies' ability to choose their State of incorporation would give 
States an incentive to adopt frameworks that attract and retain 
incorporations.\439\ Differences in State approaches to shareholder 
proposals could therefore affect competition for incorporations and the 
distribution of incorporations among States. The magnitude of this 
effect would depend on whether States develop materially different 
frameworks and whether companies consider those differences when 
choosing where to incorporate. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) 
could moderate this effect to the extent they reduce the practical 
significance of proposals permitted under State law, making differences 
among State proposal regimes less important to companies and investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \439\ See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces 
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225 (1985) 
(analyzing competition among States in the production of corporate 
law and companies' choices of where to incorporate); Lucian A. 
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. 
& Econ. 383 (2003) (finding that differences in State corporate law, 
including anti-takeover protections, affect companies' incorporation 
decisions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

3. Capital Formation
    The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect capital formation through their influence 
on the costs and attractiveness of public markets, the cost of capital, 
and the incentives of companies and investors to participate in public 
equity markets.
    To the extent the proposed changes reduce the costs associated with 
being a public company, they could make public markets more attractive 
relative to private alternatives. Whether the proposed changes affect a 
particular company's decision to go or remain public would depend in 
part on the proposal-related costs it expects to incur, which may be 
difficult to predict. Proposal-related costs are one of several factors 
companies may consider in deciding whether to go or remain public,\440\ 
and we are unable to assess the weight companies would place on 
them.\441\ The magnitude of any effect would also depend on whether 
State law and company governing documents preserve comparable 
requirements and on the extent to which the proposed amendments to Rule 
14a-4(c) reduce the costs associated with non-Rule 14a-8 proposals. To 
the extent the proposed changes affect these decisions, they could 
influence the availability of investment opportunities for investors 
who cannot access private markets as well as companies' access to 
public equity capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \440\ Craig G. Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. Fin. 
Econ. 464 (2017). Michael Dambra et al., The JOBS Act and IPO 
Volume: Evidence That Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision, 116 
J. Fin. Econ. 121 (2015).
    \441\ Although relatively few Rule 14a-8 proposals are received 
by new public companies, companies may consider the unpredictability 
of these costs, as well as the medium/long-term effects associated 
with the shareholder proposal process in making decisions about 
whether to go and remain public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed changes could also affect the cost of capital if 
investors regard them as reducing practical access to shareholder-
governance mechanisms. Evidence on how investors value particular 
governance mechanisms is mixed.\442\ The proposed changes would not 
alter shareholders' voting rights under State law, and the extent to 
which investors would view the proposed changes as increasing 
governance risk is uncertain. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 
would affect the inclusion of shareholder proposals in company proxy 
materials, while the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would affect 
a company's exercise of discretionary voting authority over proposals 
presented outside those materials when shareholders return the 
company's proxy card without opting out. To the extent investors view 
the proposed changes as limiting their practical ability to raise 
governance concerns or influence voting outcomes, they may require 
incrementally higher expected returns, increasing the cost of equity 
capital for affected companies. The magnitude of any effect would 
depend on whether State law, company governing documents, and other 
governance mechanisms provide comparable means of shareholder 
participation, and on the extent to which shareholders understand and 
use the opt-out mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \442\ Event studies of the Commission's 2010 proxy-access rule 
found that companies most exposed to proxy access lost value when 
implementation was delayed and when the rule was vacated. See Bo 
Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? 
Evidence from the Business Roundtable's Challenge, 56 J.L. & Econ. 
127 (2013); Jonathan B. Cohn et al., On Enhancing Shareholder 
Control: A (Dodd-)Frank Assessment of Proxy Access, 71 J. Fin. 1623 
(2016) (finding positive valuation effects from increases in 
perceived shareholder control, particularly at poorly performing 
companies, but more limited benefits where shareholders may pursue 
objectives other than shareholder-value maximization). Other 
research finds that markets reacted positively, on average, when 
Commission staff issue a no-action letter concurring with the 
company's decision to exclude a shareholder proposal. See John G. 
Matsusaka et al., Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? 
Evidence from Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action-Letter 
Decisions, 64 J.L. & Econ. 107 (2021). Neither line of research 
estimates the effect of removing the Rule 14a-8 process as a whole 
or directly measures companies' cost of capital. Moreover, the no-
action letter evidence reflects proposals that companies challenged 
under particular Rule 14a-8 exclusion grounds and may not generalize 
to the broader set of proposals affected by the proposed rescission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could have distinct 
effects on capital formation by closed-end funds. As discussed in 
section IV.B.3, proxy contests involving shareholder proposals are more 
frequent among closed-end funds, so these funds may be affected by the 
proposed amendments. Shareholder proposals at closed-end funds may seek 
tender offers, conversion to an open-end structure, liquidation, or 
other actions intended to address the difference between a fund's 
market price and its net asset value. Because closed-end funds 
generally may not issue common shares below net asset value, a 
persistent discount can limit their ability to raise additional 
equity.\443\ Research on shareholder campaigns at closed-end funds 
finds that attempts to convert to an open-end structure substantially 
reduce discounts, that discounts narrow in anticipation of future 
campaigns, and that campaign activity responds to the costs of 
communication among shareholders.\444\ The proposed amendments could 
therefore affect fund discounts through changes in the expected 
likelihood that a shareholder campaign succeeds, not only through 
campaigns actually

[[Page 59958]]

conducted. The direction of the resulting effect on capital formation 
is uncertain. If reduced shareholder pressure allows discounts to 
persist, it could constrain additional equity issuance; if it reduces 
the likelihood of tender offers, conversion, or liquidation, it could 
reduce the contraction or elimination of existing closed-end funds. The 
magnitude of any effect would depend on the proposals presented, how 
funds exercise discretionary voting authority, and how investors 
respond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \443\ See section 23(b) of the Investment Company Act (generally 
prohibiting a registered closed-end investment company from selling 
common stock below its current net asset value, subject to specified 
exceptions).
    \444\ See Michael Bradley et al., Activist Arbitrage: A Study of 
Open-Ending Attempts of Closed-End Funds, 95 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2010) 
(finding that attempts to convert closed-end funds to open-end funds 
reduced fund discounts, on average, to approximately half their 
prior level; that discounts narrowed in anticipation of future 
activist campaigns; and that campaign activity increased after the 
1992 proxy rule amendments reduced the costs of shareholder 
communication and was more frequent where communication costs were 
lower).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Reasonable Alternatives

1. Alternative To Rescinding Rule 14a-8
    We considered whether a reasonable alternative to full rescission 
of Rule 14a-8 would be to substantially revise the rule and leave in 
place a version of Rule 14a-8 that defers entirely to State law as to 
whether a shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder 
action and therefore must be included in a company's proxy materials. 
Under such an alternative, companies would be required to include 
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials if they are proper 
subjects for shareholder action under State law, without additional 
criteria or conditions established by our rules.
    Even assuming we had authority to adopt such a rule, this approach 
would offer companies fewer potential benefits than fully rescinding 
the rule and would result in increased costs to companies when compared 
to the baseline. This is because, in jurisdictions that do not impose 
limits on what is a proper subject for shareholder action, that require 
companies to include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials, or 
where companies are unable to adopt their own limits on such 
submissions, the number of proposals required to be included in company 
proxy materials could increase compared to the baseline, perhaps 
significantly, thereby expanding preparation, review, and disclosure 
burdens. Moreover, as discussed in section II.A.2.c, retaining a 
Federal rule (even a limited one) that requires inclusion of 
shareholder proposals that are proper subjects for shareholder action 
under State law could create a perception of Federal preemption, 
discouraging States and companies from developing their own standards 
with respect to the inclusion of proposals in company proxy materials. 
This could leave a situation similar to the current baseline, under 
which very few States and companies have developed their own standards. 
While this alternative could potentially reduce certain costs for 
proponents by increasing their ability to have proposals included in 
company proxy materials, it would increase costs for companies by 
requiring them to include more proposals, to prepare longer and more 
complex proxy materials, and to impose greater review and decision-
making burdens on non-proponent shareholders.
    We recognize that the costs and benefits of this alternative could 
vary depending on how States, companies, and proponents choose to 
respond to such a rule. We invite comments on possible reasonable 
alternatives that would achieve the goals identified in this release 
while imposing fewer costs.
    Similarly, we considered an alternative of leaving in place a 
version of Rule 14a-8, or proposing a similar rule under the Investment 
Company Act, that refers to the Investment Company Act and State law as 
to whether a shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder 
action and therefore must be included in a regulated fund's proxy 
materials. While referring to the Investment Company Act would 
establish some limits on the matters that would be appropriate for 
shareholder action and that would be required to be included in a 
regulated fund's proxy materials, referring to State law would raise 
many of the same issues as discussed above. Moreover, under this 
approach, proponents may be incentivized to attempt to frame matters as 
being related to Investment Company Act voting matters even where such 
connection is tenuous, which could lead to a potentially resource-
intensive process for the regulated funds to determine whether such 
proposals can be excluded from their proxy materials.
2. Switch the Default Choice of Check Box in Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) 
Amendment
    As an alternative approach to the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c), we could have chosen to retain the baseline rule prohibiting a 
company from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to 
timely received shareholder proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8 
process if the shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials 
to holders of the requisite percentage of the company's shares 
necessary to carry the proposal. Under this alternative, we could then 
require the inclusion of a check box that, if checked by the 
shareholder, would grant the company discretionary voting authority. 
This would theoretically be no different than the proposed amendment 
structure, if not for the behavioral default check box effects 
discussed in section IV.C.2.g. Because shareholders who do not act for 
reasons that may include inertia, limited attention, or an 
interpretation of the default as an implied recommendation would 
produce the default outcome, this alternative would likely result in 
discretionary voting authority being exercised less often by management 
than under the proposed rules. Whereas the default structure as 
proposed could result in some (likely retail) shareholders granting 
authority when that might not be their actual preference, this 
alternative could result in some shareholders submitting a non-vote 
when that might not be their actual preference.
3. Require a Separate Check Box for Each Proposal
    For non-management proposals subject to discretionary voting 
authority, we could have required companies to include a separate 
discretionary authority check box on the proxy card for each such 
proposal, as opposed to a single check box that would apply to all 
proposals, as under the proposed amendments. Allowing shareholders the 
flexibility to make individualized choices would be beneficial if 
shareholders using the company's card wished to vote with management on 
some proposals (leaving these boxes unchecked) while not wishing to 
grant discretionary authority on others (by checking these boxes). 
Companies could also benefit by receiving more granular information as 
to shareholders' preferences. However, under the proposed rules, for 
omitted proposals, the proxy card need only include a cross-reference 
to the location in the proxy statement of disclosures regarding 
proposals' descriptions and the company's recommended votes. A separate 
check box for each proposal would necessitate a separate, identifying 
description on the proxy card for each proposal. This could lengthen 
the contents of the proxy card and distract shareholders from 
communications of greater relevance as they review and process the 
resulting proxy materials.

F. Request for Comment

    We request comments on all aspects of our economic analysis, 
including the potential costs and benefits of the proposed amendments 
and alternatives, and whether the proposed amendments, if adopted, 
would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation. 
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data, estimation 
methodologies, and other factual support for their views, in 
particular, on

[[Page 59959]]

any estimates of costs and benefits of the proposed amendments. 
Specifically, we seek comment with respect to the following questions:
    33. Have we correctly characterized the baseline of shareholder 
proposals and independent solicitations? Have we correctly 
characterized the affected entities? Are there other important elements 
of the baseline? Please provide supportive data to the extent 
available.
    34. Have we correctly characterized the benefits and costs of the 
proposed amendments to affected parties? Are there other effects that 
should be considered? Please provide supportive data to the extent 
available.
    35. Have we correctly characterized the effects on efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation from the proposed amendments? Are 
there any other effects that should be considered? Please provide 
supportive data to the extent available.
    36. To what extent would proponents who would have submitted 
proposals under Rule 14a-8 switch to alternative forms of engagement if 
the rule were rescinded? Which alternative methods would likely be 
used, and how would their effectiveness in achieving the proponent's 
goals compare to submitting proposals under Rule 14a-8? Are certain 
types of proponents more likely to adopt specific alternative 
engagement methods?
    37. What are the costs of the alternative engagement mechanisms 
that proponents may use if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, compared to the 
cost of the current Rule 14a-8 process? Please provide estimates to the 
extent possible.
    38. What is the cost of an independent proxy solicitation per 
proponent? Does it vary by type of proposal, type of proponent (e.g., 
institutional investor vs. retail investor), or type of subject 
registrant (e.g., large vs. small, operating company vs. registered 
investment company)? Please provide estimates where possible.
    39. What effect would the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) have 
on the likelihood of potential proponents conducting independent 
solicitations? What alternative engagement methods might they use 
instead, and how effective would these alternatives be?
    40. Would the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) influence 
companies' decisions regarding whether to include or exclude proposals 
that are the subject of independent solicitations in their proxy 
materials?
    41. For proposals that are the subject of independent 
solicitations, what is the difference in the current cost to companies 
between including the proposal in their proxy materials and omitting 
the proposal? Would this difference in cost change under the proposed 
amendments which would require, if omitting: (i) in the proxy 
statement, a brief description of the matter and how the company 
intends to vote through its exercise of discretionary authority; and 
(ii) on the proxy card, a cross-reference to the location of this 
disclosure in the proxy statement and a check box? What are the primary 
cost drivers that currently contribute to the cost difference between 
including and omitting?
    42. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could redirect a portion 
of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals into the independent solicitation 
channel. However, the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) may reduce 
the number of independent solicitations. What would be the aggregate 
effect of the concurrent proposed changes to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-4(c) 
on the total volume of non-Rule 14a-8 proposals?
    43. To what extent would shareholders' ability to express their 
views on proposals introduced through independent proxy solicitations 
be affected by the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)?
    44. Would the rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments 
to Rule 14a-4(c) impact companies' decisions to go public or stay 
public?
    45. To what extent would the proposed amendments result in 
management being less aware of shareholder views and concerns? Would 
this impact cost of capital and capital formation?
    46. What State laws or company governing document provisions 
(private ordering) with respect to shareholder proposals are likely to 
emerge upon any rescission of Rule 14a-8, and how might these compare 
to current laws and practices under the baseline?
    47. How significant would the transition costs be during the period 
in which State law and private ordering may develop in response to the 
proposed amendments?
    48. Are there any other reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
rescission of the entirety of Rule 14a-8 that we should consider?
    49. Are there any other reasonable alternatives to the proposed 
amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) that we should consider?

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

A. Summary of the Collection of Information

    Certain provisions of our rules and schedules that would be 
affected by the proposed amendments contain ``collection of 
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\445\ We are submitting the proposed 
amendments to OMB for review in accordance with the PRA.\446\ The hours 
and costs associated with preparing, filing, and sending the schedules, 
including preparing documentation required by the shareholder proposal 
process under Rule 14a-8, constitute paperwork burdens imposed by the 
collection of information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a 
person is not required to comply with, a collection of information 
requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number. 
The title for the affected collection of information is:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \445\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
    \446\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ``Regulation 14A (Commission Rules 14a-1 through 14a-21 and 
Schedule 14A)'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0059).
    The regulations and schedule listed above were adopted pursuant to 
the Exchange Act. The regulations and schedule set forth the disclosure 
and other requirements for proxy statements filed by issuers and other 
soliciting parties. Responses to this collection of information are 
mandatory. Responses to this information collection are not kept 
confidential, and there is no mandatory retention period for the 
information disclosed.
    A detailed description of the proposed amendments can be found in 
section II above, and a discussion of the expected economic effects of 
the proposed amendments can be found in section IV above.

B. Estimated Paperwork Burden Effects of the Proposed Amendments

    As discussed in section II.A above, we are proposing to rescind 
Rule 14a-8. The proposed rescission, therefore, would eliminate any 
information collection requirements associated with Rule 14a-8. We are 
also proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c) to require that companies seeking 
discretionary voting authority on proposals that will be presented at a 
shareholder meeting but not included in the company's proxy materials 
to include a check box on the proxy card that, if checked by a 
shareholder, would prevent the company from exercising voting authority 
on such matters. The following PRA Table 1 summarizes the estimated 
effects of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and addition of the 
check box on the paperwork

[[Page 59960]]

burdens associated with the affected collection of information.
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.082


[[Page 59961]]


BILLING CODE 8011-01-C

C. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the Proposed 
Amendments

    We estimate below the incremental and aggregate change in paperwork 
burden as a result of the proposed amendments. These estimates 
represent the average burden for all issuers, both large and small. In 
deriving our estimates, we recognize that the burdens will likely vary 
among individual respondents based on numerous factors, including the 
size and complexity of their business. These estimates include the time 
and the cost of preparing and reviewing disclosure, filing documents, 
coordinating and engaging with proponents, and retaining records. We 
believe that some issuers would experience costs in excess of this 
average cost and some issuers would experience less than such average 
cost. Our methodologies for deriving these estimates are discussed in 
section IV.C above.
    For purposes of this PRA analysis, the burden is generally 
allocated between burden hours and costs. The cost burden generally 
reflects the portion of the burden carried by outside professionals, 
while the burden hours generally reflect the portion of the burden 
carried by the issuer internally. The following PRA Table 2 summarizes 
the estimated total annual number of responses, the average burden 
hours per response, and the average cost burden per response for each 
information collection affected by the proposed amendments and, using 
those amounts, calculates the estimated total annual burden hours and 
total annual cost burden associated with each affected collection of 
information under the proposed amendments. The total annual burden 
hours and cost burdens are rounded to the nearest whole number, and the 
burden hours per response and cost burden per response are rounded to 
the second decimal point.
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P

[[Page 59962]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.083


[[Page 59963]]


BILLING CODE 8011-01-C

D. Request for Comment

    Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), we request comment in order 
to:
     Evaluate whether the proposed changes to the collection of 
information are necessary for the proper performance of the functions 
of the Commission, including whether the information will have 
practical utility;
     Evaluate the accuracy and assumptions and estimates of the 
burden of the proposed collection of information;
     Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality, 
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
     Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of 
the collection of information on those who respond, including through 
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of 
information technology; and
     Evaluate whether the proposed amendments would have any 
effects on any other collection of information not previously 
identified in this section.
    Any member of the public may direct to us any comments concerning 
the accuracy of these burden estimates and any suggestions for reducing 
these burdens. Persons submitting comments on the collection of 
information requirements should direct their comments to the OMB Desk 
Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 
[email protected], and should send a copy to 
Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 
using any of the methods in the ADDRESSES section, with reference to 
File No. S7-2026-32. Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the 
Commission with regard to the collection of information should be in 
writing, refer to File No. S7-2026-32 and be submitted to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of FOIA Services, 100 F 
Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-2736. OMB is required to make a 
decision concerning the collection of information between 30 and 60 
days after publication of this proposed rule. Consequently, a comment 
to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if the OMB receives it 
within 30 days of publication.

VI. Congressional Review Act

    For purposes of Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory 
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (also known as the Congressional 
Review Act),\447\ the Commission must seek OMB's determination as to 
whether a final regulation constitutes a ``major rule.'' Under the 
Congressional Review Act, a rule is considered ``major'' where, if 
adopted, it results in or is likely to result in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \447\ See 5 U.S.C. chapter 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
     A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; or
     Significant adverse effects on competition, investment, or 
innovation.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \448\ See 5 U.S.C. 804(2) (defining ``major rule'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To help inform OMB's determination as to whether any final rule 
that results from the proposal would be a ``major rule,'' we solicit 
comment and data on:
     The potential effect on the U.S. economy on an annual 
basis;
     Any potential increase in costs or prices for consumers or 
individual industries; and
     Any potential effect on competition, investment, or 
innovation.
    Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other 
factual support for their views to the extent possible, to inform OMB's 
determination regarding whether any final rule following this proposal 
is likely to be a ``major rule'' for the purposes of the Congressional 
Review Act.

VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \449\ requires an agency, 
when issuing a rulemaking proposal, to prepare and make available for 
public comment an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'') 
that describes the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.\450\ 
This IRFA has been prepared in accordance with the RFA and relates to 
the proposed amendments described in section II above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \449\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
    \450\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Action

    We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 because the rule exceeds the 
Commission's statutory authority. We also believe there are independent 
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8. Under the proposed rescission, 
the Federal proxy rules would no longer require companies to include in 
their proxy materials shareholder proposals on the basis that they 
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements established under 
Federal law. Instead, State law or, if State law permits, a company's 
governing documents would determine whether a shareholder proposal 
would be required to be included in a company's proxy materials.
    We are also proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), which addresses 
when a proxy card submitted by a shareholder may confer discretionary 
voting authority on the proxy holder with respect to a matter that is 
not included on the proxy card. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) are intended to provide companies with greater flexibility, and 
shareholders with greater control, regarding proposals for which a 
company may seek discretionary voting authority, which may become more 
frequent if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed.
    Finally, we are proposing certain other amendments to facilitate 
implementation of the proposed changes to the proxy rules and 
conforming amendments to our rules and forms.
    The reasons for, and objectives of, the proposed rescission and 
amendments are discussed in more detail in section II above.

B. Legal Basis

    The amendments contained in this release are proposed under the 
authority set forth in sections 3(b), 14, and 23(a) of the Exchange 
Act, as amended, and sections 20(a) and 38 of the Investment Company 
Act, as amended.

C. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Amendments

    The proposed amendments would apply to: (i) shareholder proponents 
that submit Rule 14a-8 proposals and those that present proposals 
through their own proxy solicitations, and (ii) registrants (including 
issuers and investment companies) subject to the Federal proxy rules 
that receive Rule 14a-8 proposals and/or proposals presented through 
proponents' own proxy solicitations. The RFA defines ``small entity'' 
to mean ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' or ``small 
governmental jurisdiction.'' \451\ The definition of ``small entity'' 
does not include individuals. For purposes of the RFA, under our rules, 
an issuer of securities or a person, other than an investment company, 
is a ``small business'' or ``small organization'' if it had total 
assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent fiscal 
year.\452\ We estimate that there are

[[Page 59964]]

approximately 506 issuers that are subject to the Federal proxy rules, 
other than investment companies, that may be considered small 
entities.\453\ An investment company, including a business development 
company, is considered to be a ``small business'' if it, together with 
other investment companies in the same group of related investment 
companies, has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its 
most recent fiscal year.\454\ There are approximately five business 
development companies and 62 registered investment companies subject to 
the Federal proxy rules that may be considered small entities.\455\ We 
are unable to estimate the number of potential shareholder proponents 
that may be considered small entities; \456\ therefore, we request 
comment on the number of these small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \451\ 5 U.S.C. 601(6).
    \452\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(a). The Commission has proposed amendments 
to the definitions of ``small business'' and ``small organization'' 
in 17 CFR 230.157 and 17 CFR 240.0-10(a). See Enhancement of 
Emerging Growth Company Accommodations and Simplification of Filer 
Status for Reporting Companies, Release No. 33-11419 (May 19, 2026) 
[91 FR 30086, 30124 (May 21, 2026)]. We encourage commenters to 
review that proposal to determine whether it might affect their 
comments on this IRFA.
    \453\ We estimate the number of small entity companies other 
than asset-backed securities, registered investment companies, and 
BDCs with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the 
Exchange Act by reviewing all filers with total assets less than or 
equal to $5 million, by unique Central Index Key (CIK), of Forms 10-
K and amendments thereto filed during calendar year 2025.
    \454\ 17 CFR 270.0-10. The Commission has a pending proposal 
addressing the definition under the Investment Company Act of small 
organization and small business for purposes of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act. The Commission encourages commenters to review the 
proposal to determine whether it might affect their comments on this 
IRFA. See Amendments to the ``Small Business'' and ``Small 
Organization'' Definitions for Investment Companies and Investment 
Advisers for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 35864 (Jan. 7, 2026) [91 FR 1107 (Jan. 12, 
2026)].
    \455\ Based on Commission staff estimates that as of Dec. 2025, 
approximately 27 open-end funds (including 7 exchange-traded funds), 
34 closed-end funds, 1 unit investment trust, and 5 business 
development companies are small entities.
    \456\ For the purposes of our Economic Analysis, we have 
estimated that there were approximately 184 proponents that 
submitted a shareholder proposal to be included in a company's proxy 
statement as a lead proponent during calendar year 2025. See supra 
section IV.B.2.b. Out of these 184 proponents, 44 were individuals, 
81 were institutions, and 59 were missing description of type. Thus, 
at most, 140 (184-44) of these unique proponents could be considered 
small entities. This data allows for the identification of a sole 
lead proponent of each proposal, but not all of a proposal's 
proponents, and, as a result, it should be interpreted as a lower 
bound on the total number of unique proponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance 
Requirements

    If adopted, the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, the proposed 
amendment to Rule 14a-4, and the related amendments to the proxy rules 
would apply to small entities to the same extent as other entities, 
irrespective of size. As discussed in section IV above, the nature of 
any benefits and costs associated with the proposed rescission and 
amendments may vary for large and small entities. However, as a general 
matter, we are unable to isolate the costs and benefits associated with 
the proposed amendments for small entities alone, because we lack 
information necessary to make reasonable estimates.
    If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, States and companies may or may not 
adopt frameworks that address shareholder proposals in ways that may 
impact large and small entities, including companies and shareholder 
proponents, differently. In addition, the proposed amendments to Rule 
14a-4, if adopted, would allow companies of all sizes to exercise 
discretionary voting authority with regard to timely received 
shareholder proposals presented other than through Rule 14a-8 even if 
the shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials to holders 
of the requisite percentage of the company's shares necessary to carry 
the proposal. We refer to the discussion of the economic impact of the 
proposed amendments, including the estimated costs and benefits, on all 
affected parties, including small entities, in section IV above. 
Consistent with that discussion, we anticipate that the economic 
benefits and costs likely could vary among small entities (including 
both proponents and companies) based on a number of factors, such as 
the amount of resources a particular shareholder proponent has, or the 
number of shareholder proposals received by a particular company. With 
respect to shareholder proponents in particular, as discussed in 
section IV above, the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could 
disproportionately affect less well-resourced proponents, for whom 
independent solicitation could be cost-prohibitive, while smaller 
companies could also benefit from the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 
to the extent compliance with Rule 14a-8 entails fixed or recurring 
legal, governance, and administrative costs that represent a larger 
share of their resources.
    While the proposed amendments would not impose any compliance or 
reporting requirements under a Federal rule (other than the burden of 
including a check box and cross-reference on the proxy card), we 
request comment on how the proposed amendments would affect small 
entities, including available empirical data. We discuss the economic 
impact of, and potential alternatives to, the proposed amendments in 
section IV, and the estimated compliance costs and burdens of the 
proposed amendments for purposes of the PRA in section V, above.

E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules

    We do not expect the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 or 
amendments to Rule 14a-4 and other proxy rules, if adopted, to 
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with other Federal rules.

F. Significant Alternatives

    The RFA directs us to consider significant alternatives that would 
accomplish our stated objectives, while minimizing any significant 
adverse impact on small entities. In connection with the proposed rule, 
we considered the following alternatives:
     Establishing different compliance or reporting 
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources 
available to small entities;
     Clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and 
reporting requirements under the rules for small entities;
     Using performance rather than design standards; and
     Exempting small entities from all or part of the 
requirements.
    The Commission is proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 and to defer to 
States and companies to determine if, and under what circumstances, 
shareholder proposals must be included in a company's proxy materials.
    Imposing different standards or requirements regarding the 
inclusion of shareholder proposals in company proxy materials based on 
the size of companies or shareholder proponents would not accomplish 
our stated objective of ending the Commission's entanglement in State 
law corporate governance matters. Indeed, imposing different standards 
and requirements is likely to exacerbate the adverse effects of such 
entanglement, as described in section II.A.2 above. Furthermore, as we 
are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety, we do not believe 
there are any alternatives that would further minimize the compliance 
and reporting requirements of small entities subject to Rule 14a-8. As 
we are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety, it is also not 
necessary to exempt any small entities from the rule or provide them 
with alternative compliance timetables.
    The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 would allow companies of all 
sizes to exercise discretionary voting authority with regard to timely 
received shareholder proposals presented other than through Rule 14a-8, 
subject to certain requirements, even if the

[[Page 59965]]

shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials to holders of 
the requisite percentage of the company's shares necessary to carry the 
proposal. The other proposed amendments to the proxy rules would also 
apply equally to companies of all sizes.
    We do not believe that imposing different standards or requirements 
based on the size of the company or shareholder proponent for these 
amendments is necessary. In fact, different standards may result in 
additional costs associated with ascertaining whether a particular 
company or shareholder proponent may avail itself of such different 
standards. For these reasons, we are not proposing differing compliance 
or reporting requirements or timetables, or an exception, for companies 
and shareholder proponents that are small entities.
    Similarly, as the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 and the other 
proxy rules would not impose new compliance or reporting burdens on any 
entities (other than the burden of including a check box and cross-
reference on the proxy card), we find that clarifying, consolidating or 
simplifying compliance and reporting requirements for small entities, 
or utilizing performance rather than design standards is not necessary, 
although we solicit comment on how the proposed amendments could be 
revised to reduce existing burdens on small entities, including with 
respect to shareholder proponents that are small entities.

G. Request for Comment

    We encourage the submission of comments with respect to any aspect 
of this IRFA. In particular, we request comments regarding:
     The number of small entities that may be affected by the 
proposed amendments;
     The existence or nature of the potential impact of the 
proposed amendments on small entities discussed in this analysis;
     Whether there are any alternative approaches to the 
proposed amendments that can achieve the objective of this proposal 
with a lower burden on small entities (including shareholder 
proponents);
     How the proposed amendments could further lower the burden 
on small entities;
     How to quantify the impact of the proposed amendments; and
     Whether there are any Federal rules that duplicate, 
overlap, or conflict with the proposed amendments.
    Commenters are asked to describe the nature of any impact and 
provide empirical data supporting the extent of the impact. Comments 
will be considered in the preparation of the Final Regulatory 
Flexibility Analysis, if the proposed amendments are adopted, and will 
be placed in the same public file as comments on the proposed 
amendments themselves.

Statutory Authority

    The rule amendments contained in this release are being proposed 
under the authority set forth in sections 3(b), 14, and 23(a) of the 
Exchange Act, as amended, and sections 20(a) and 38 of the Investment 
Company Act, as amended.

List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, 240, and 249

    Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; Securities; Investment 
companies; Electronic filing.

Text of Proposed Amendments

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Commission proposes 
to amend Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
follows:

PART 200--ORGANIZATION; CONDUCT AND ETHICS, AND INFORMATION AND 
REQUESTS

Subpart A--Organization and Program Management

0
1. The authority citation for part 200, subpart A, continues to read in 
part as follows:

    Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552, 552a, 552b, and 557; 11 U.S.C. 901 and 
1109(a); 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77o, 77q, 77s, 77u, 
77z-3, 77ggg(a), 77hhh, 77sss, 77uuu, 78b, 78c(b), 78d, 78d-1, 78d-
2, 78e, 78f, 78g, 78h, 78i, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78o-4, 
78q, 78q-1, 78t-1, 78u, 78w, 78ll(d), 78mm, 78eee, 80a-8, 80a-20, 
80a-24, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80a-41, 80a-44(a), 80a-44(b), 80b-3, 80b-4, 
80b-5, 80b-9, 80b-10(a), 80b-11, 7202, and 7211 et seq.; 29 U.S.C. 
794; 44 U.S.C. 3506 and 3507; Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 (15 
U.S.C. 78d); sec. 8G, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (5 U.S.C. App.); 
sec. 913, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1827; sec. 3(a), Pub. L. 
114-185, 130 Stat. 538; E.O. 11222, 30 FR 6469, 3 CFR, 1964-1965 
Comp., p. 36; E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166; 
E.O. 12600, 52 FR 23781, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 235; Information 
Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, 47 FR 27836; and 5 CFR 
735.104 and 5 CFR parts 2634 and 2635, unless otherwise noted.

0
2. Amend Sec.  200.30-1 by, in paragraph (f)(4), removing the words 
``and 240.14a-8(j)(1)''.
0
3. Remove and reserve Sec.  200.82.

PART 229--STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING FORMS UNDER SECURITIES 
ACT OF 1933, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND ENERGY POLICY AND 
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975--REGULATION S-K

0
4. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77k, 77s, 77z-2, 
77z-3, 77aa(25), 77aa(26), 77ddd, 77eee, 77ggg, 77hhh, 77iii, 77jjj, 
77nnn, 77sss, 78c, 78i, 78j, 78j-3, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78u-
5, 78w, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-20, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-31(c), 
80a-37, 80a-38(a), 80a-39, 80b-11 and 7201 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; 
sec. 953(b), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1904 (2010); and sec. 
102(c), Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 310 (2012).

0
5. Amend Sec.  229.407 by removing Instruction 4 to paragraph (f) of 
the Instructions to Item 407(f).

PART 232--REGULATION S-T--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR 
ELECTRONIC FILINGS

0
6. The general authority citation for part 232 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority:  15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z-3, 
77sss(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78ll, 80a-6(c), 
80a-8, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, 80b-4, 80b-6a, 80b-10, 80b-11, 7201 
et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
7. Amend Sec.  232.101 by removing and reserving paragraph (c)(3).

PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 
1934

0
8. The general authority citation for part 240 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3, 
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f, 
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78j-4, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll, 
78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11, 
1681w(a)(1), 6801-6809, 6825, 7201 et seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C. 
2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; Pub. L. 111-203, 
939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-106, sec. 503 and 602, 
126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
9. Amend Sec.  240.14a-2 by revising the introductory text of paragraph 
(b) to read as follows:


Sec.  240.14a-2  Solicitations to which Sec.  240.14a-3 to Sec.  
240.14a-15 apply.

* * * * *
    (a) * * *
    (b) Sections 240.14a-3 through 240.14a-6 (other than Sec.  240.14a-
6(g)

[[Page 59966]]

and (p)), 240.14a-10, 240.14a-12 through 240.14a-15, and 240.14a-19 do 
not apply to the following:
* * * * *
0
10. Amend Sec.  240.14a-4 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text to paragraph (c);
0
b. Revising paragraph (c)(1);
0
c. Revising paragraph (c)(2);
0
d. Removing paragraph (c)(6); and
0
e. Redesignating paragraph (c)(7) as (c)(6).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  240.14a-4  Requirements as to proxy.

* * * * *
    (c) A proxy may confer discretionary authority to vote on any of 
the following matters not included on the form of proxy:
    (1) For an annual meeting of shareholders, if the registrant did 
not have notice of the matter by the deadline established pursuant to 
an applicable state or foreign law provision or the registrant's 
governing documents (or, in the absence of such a deadline, at least 45 
days before the anniversary of the date on which the registrant first 
sent its proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of 
shareholders), and a specific statement to that effect is made in the 
proxy statement or form of proxy. If during the prior year the 
registrant did not hold an annual meeting, or if the date of the 
meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year, then notice 
must not have been received a reasonable time before the registrant 
sends its proxy materials for the current year (unless a provision of 
applicable state or foreign law or the registrant's governing documents 
establishes an applicable deadline for such notice, in which case such 
deadline applies).
    (2) In the case in which the registrant has received timely notice 
in connection with an annual meeting of shareholders (as determined 
under paragraph (c)(1) of this section), if the registrant includes:
    (i) In the proxy statement, a brief description of the matter or 
matters and how the registrant intends to exercise its discretion to 
vote on each matter, and
    (ii) On the form of proxy, a cross-reference to such description in 
the proxy statement and a box by which a security holder may elect not 
to confer discretionary voting authority on the same matter(s).
    (3) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (5) * * *
    (6) Matters incident to the conduct of the meeting.
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec.  240.14a-5 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (e)(1);
0
b. Revising paragraph (e)(2); and
0
c. Revising paragraph (f).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  240.14a-5  Presentation of information in proxy statement.

* * * * *
    (e) * * *
    (1) The deadline for submitting shareholder proposals for inclusion 
in the registrant's proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to an 
applicable state or foreign law provision or a registrant's governing 
documents as they relate to the inclusion of shareholder proposals in 
the registrant's proxy materials for the registrant's next annual 
meeting;
    (2) The deadline for providing notice of shareholder proposals that 
are not for inclusion in the registrant's proxy statement and form of 
proxy, after which the notice would be considered untimely under Sec.  
240.14a-4(c)(1);
    (3) * * *
    (4) * * *
    (f) If the date of the next annual meeting is subsequently advanced 
or delayed by more than 30 calendar days from the date of the annual 
meeting to which the proxy statement relates, the registrant must, in a 
timely manner, inform shareholders of such change, and the new dates 
referred to in paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) of this section (to the 
extent applicable), by including a notice, under Item 5, in its 
earliest possible quarterly report on Form 10-Q (Sec.  249.308a of this 
chapter), or, in the case of investment companies, in a shareholder 
report under Sec.  270.30d-1 of this chapter under the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, or, if impracticable, any means reasonably 
calculated to inform shareholders.
0
12. Amend Sec.  240.14a-6 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising paragraph (a)(3);
0
c. Revising paragraph (a)(4);
0
d. Removing the undesignated paragraph immediately following (a)(8);
0
e. Removing Note 2 to paragraph (a);
0
f. Redesignating Note 3 to paragraph (a) as Note 2 to paragraph (a);
0
g. Revising newly redesignated Note 2 to paragraph (a); and
0
h. Removing Note 4 to paragraph (a).
    The revisions read as follows:


Sec.  240.14a-6  Filing requirements.

    (a) Preliminary proxy statement. Five preliminary copies of the 
proxy statement and form of proxy must be filed with the Commission at 
least 10 calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such 
material are first sent or given to security holders, or such shorter 
period prior to that date as the Commission may authorize upon a 
showing of good cause thereunder. A registrant, however, need not file 
with the Commission a preliminary proxy statement, form of proxy or 
other soliciting material to be furnished to security holders 
concurrently therewith if the solicitation relates to an annual (or 
special meeting in lieu of the annual) meeting, or for an investment 
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. 
80a-1 et seq.) or a business development company, if the solicitation 
relates to any meeting of security holders, at which the only matters 
to be acted upon are:
    (1) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (3) One or more security holder proposals;
    (4) One or more shareholder nominees for director included pursuant 
to an applicable state or foreign law provision or a registrant's 
governing documents as they relate to the inclusion of shareholder 
director nominees in the registrant's proxy materials;
    (5) * * *
    (6) * * *
    (7) * * *
    (8) A vote to approve the compensation of executives as required 
pursuant to section 14A(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(1)) and Sec.  240.14a-21(a) of this chapter, or 
pursuant to section 111(e)(1) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization 
Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(1)) and Sec.  240.14a-20 of this 
chapter, a vote to determine the frequency of shareholder votes to 
approve the compensation of executives as required pursuant to Section 
14A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n-
1(a)(2)) and Sec.  240.14a-21(b) of this chapter, or any other 
shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation.

    Note 1 to paragraph (a):  * * *


    Note 2 to paragraph (a):  The exclusion from filing preliminary 
proxy material does not apply if any of the matters to be acted upon 
is subject to a solicitation in opposition. Each of the following 
constitutes a ``solicitation in opposition'' (other than any 
solicitation exempt under Sec.  240.14a-2, which does not constitute 
a solicitation in opposition): (i) a solicitation subject to Sec.  
240.14a-19; (ii) a solicitation of votes against or withhold votes 
from any of the registrant's nominee(s); (iii) a solicitation of 
votes against a proposal that the registrant expressly supports in 
its proxy materials; and (iv) a solicitation of votes in support of 
a proposal that the registrant does not expressly support in its 
proxy materials, in

[[Page 59967]]

each case, if the registrant knows, or reasonably should know, of 
such solicitation.

* * * * *
0
13. Remove and reserve Sec.  240.14a-8.
0
14. Amend Sec.  240.14c-5 by revising paragraph (a) and its 
accompanying Note 2, and removing Notes 3 and 4. The revisions to read 
as follows:


Sec.  240.14c-5  Filing requirements.

    (a) Preliminary information statement. Five preliminary copies of 
the information statement must be filed with the Commission at least 10 
calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such statement are 
first sent or given to security holders, or such shorter period prior 
to that date as the Commission may authorize upon a showing of good 
cause therefor. In computing the 10-day period, the filing date of the 
preliminary copies is to be counted as the first day and the 11th day 
is the date on which definitive copies of the information statement may 
be sent to security holders. A registrant, however, need not file with 
the Commission a preliminary information statement if it relates to an 
annual (or special meeting in lieu of the annual) meeting, of security 
holders at which the only matters to be acted upon are:
    (1) * * *
    (2) * * *
    (3) One or more security holder proposals; and/or
    (4) The approval or ratification of a plan as defined in paragraph 
(a)(6)(ii) of Item 402 of Regulation S-K (Sec.  229.402(a)(6)(ii) of 
this chapter) or amendments to such a plan.

     Note 1:  * * *


    Note 2:  The exclusion from filing a preliminary information 
statement does not apply if any of the matters to be acted upon is 
subject to a solicitation in opposition. Each of the following 
constitutes a ``solicitation in opposition'' (other than any 
solicitation exempt under Sec.  240.14a-2, which does not constitute 
a solicitation in opposition): (i) a solicitation of votes against a 
proposal that the registrant expressly supports in its information 
statement; and (ii) a solicitation of votes in support of a proposal 
that the registrant does not expressly support in its information 
statement, in each case, if the registrant knows, or reasonably 
should know, of such solicitation.

* * * * *
0
15. Amend Sec.  240.14c-101 by:
0
a. In the Note to Cover Page, removing the words ``Where any item, 
other than Item 4,'' and adding, in their place, ``Where any item'';
0
b. Removing Item 4 and the instructions to Item 4; and
0
c. Redesignating Item 5 as Item 4.

PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934

0
16. The authority citation for part 249 continues to read, in part, as 
follows:

    Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; 12 U.S.C. 
5461 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; Sec. 953(b) Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 
1904; Sec. 102(a)(3) Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 309 (2012), Sec. 107 
Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012), Sec. 72001 Pub. L. 114-94, 
129 Stat. 1312 (2015), and secs. 2 and 3 Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat. 
1063 (2020), unless otherwise noted.

0
17. Amend Form 8-K (referenced in Sec.  249.308) by, in Item 5.07, 
paragraph (d), removing the words ``but in no event later than sixty 
calendar days prior to the deadline for submission of shareholder 
proposals under Sec.  240.14a-8, as disclosed in the registrant's most 
recent proxy statement for an annual or other meeting of shareholders 
relating to the election of directors at which shareholders voted on 
the frequency of shareholder votes on the compensation of executives as 
required by section 14A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
(15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(2)),''.

    Dated: September 16, 2026.

    By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-19260 Filed 9-18-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P