[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 181 (Monday, September 21, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 59904-59967]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-19260]
[[Page 59903]]
Vol. 91
Monday,
No. 181
September 21, 2026
Part III
Securities and Exchange Commission
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17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, et al.
Rescission of Rule 14a-8's Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals
and Amendments to Rule 14a-4; Proposed Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 91 , No. 181 / Monday, September 21, 2026 /
Proposed Rules
[[Page 59904]]
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, 240, and 249
[Release No. 34-106383; File No. S7-2026-32]
RIN 3235-AN47
Rescission of Rule 14a-8's Federal Regulation of Shareholder
Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4
AGENCY: Securities and Exchange Commission.
ACTION: Proposed rule.
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SUMMARY: The Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') is
proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (``Exchange Act'') and leave determinations about the role of
shareholder proposals to State law and company governing documents. The
Commission also is proposing to amend Rule 14a-4 under the Exchange Act
to expand the circumstances under which a company may exercise, with
respect to proxies it receives, discretionary voting authority on
proposals that will be presented at a shareholder meeting but not
included in the company's proxy materials. At the same time, the
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 would provide shareholders with the
means to elect to prevent the company from exercising such authority
with respect to their individual shares.
DATES: This release was published in the Federal Register on September
21, 2026. Comments should be received on or before November 20, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-2026-32/rescission-rule-14a-8s-federal-regulation-shareholder-proposals-amendments-rule-14a-4).
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
File Number S7-2026-32 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments to Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary,
Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC
20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to File Number S7-2026-32. This file
number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To help
the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method of submission. The Commission will post all
submitted comments on the Commission's website (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/public-comments/s7-2026-32). Do not include
personally identifiable information in submissions; you should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. The
Commission may redact in part or withhold entirely from publication
submitted material that is obscene or subject to copyright protection.
Studies, memoranda, or other substantive items may be added by the
Commission or staff to the comment file during this rulemaking. A
notification of the inclusion in the comment file of any such materials
will be made available on the Commission's website. To ensure direct
electronic receipt of such notifications, sign up through the ``Stay
Connected'' option at www.sec.gov to receive notifications by email. A
summary of the proposal of not more than 100 words is posted on the
Commission's website (https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/2026/09/s7-2026-32).
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jenny J. Choi, Special Counsel, or
Matt McNair, Senior Adviser to the Chief Counsel, Office of Chief
Counsel, at (202) 551-3500, David M. Plattner, Special Counsel, or
Blake M. Grady, Special Counsel, Office of Mergers and Acquisitions, at
(202) 551-3440, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission is proposing to rescind 17
CFR 240.14a-8 (``Rule 14a-8'') and amend the following rules and forms:
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.072
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
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\1\ 17 CFR 229.10 through 229.1610.
\2\ 17 CFR 229.10 through 232.501.
\3\ 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.
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II. Discussion of Proposed Amendments
A. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
1. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Statutory Authority
2. Policy Reasons for Rescinding Rule 14a-8
3. Investment Company Considerations
B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
1. Overview of Current Rules Related to Discretionary Voting
Authority
[[Page 59905]]
2. Historical Background
3. Proposed Rule Amendments
C. Other Proposed Amendments
D. General Request for Comment
III. Other Matters
IV. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
B. Baseline
1. Current Regulatory Framework
2. Affected Parties
3. Current Practices
C. Benefits and Costs
1. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
3. The Benefits and Costs for Proxy-Related Service Providers
4. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs
D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
1. Efficiency
2. Competition
3. Capital Formation
E. Reasonable Alternatives
1. Alternative to Rescinding Rule 14a-8
2. Switch the Default Choice of Check Box in Proposed Rule 14a-
4(c)(2) Amendment
3. Require a Separate Check Box for Each Proposal
F. Request for Comment
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
A. Summary of the Collection of Information
B. Estimated Paperwork Burden Effects of the Proposed Amendments
C. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the
Proposed Amendments
D. Request for Comment
VI. Congressional Review Act
VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Action
B. Legal Basis
C. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Amendments
D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
F. Significant Alternatives
G. Request for Comment
Statutory Authority
I. Introduction
``Corporations are creatures of state law.'' \4\ Because
``regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose
very existence and attributes are a product of state law,'' ``[n]o
principle of corporation law and practice is more firmly established
than a State's authority to regulate domestic corporations, including
the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.'' \5\
Shareholder voting rights are generally exercised at shareholder
meetings, where proposals are put before the shareholders for a
vote.\6\ The conduct of shareholder meetings, including how proposals
are presented, is governed by State law.\7\
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\4\ Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975). Foreign issuers, as
that term is defined in 17 CFR 240.3b-4(b), are not creatures of
State law. Accordingly, to the extent this release refers to State
law, the corresponding reference for foreign issuers would be to the
applicable foreign law. Foreign private issuers, as defined in 17
CFR 240.3b-4, are exempt from the Commission's proxy requirements
with respect to solicitations of their own security holders, 17 CFR
240.3a12-3(b); Regulation 14A (17 CFR 240.14a-1 through 240.14b-2).
Foreign private issuers also are not subject to information
statement requirements. See Regulation 14C (17 CFR 240.14c-1 through
240.14c-101).
\5\ CTS Corp v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987);
see also e.g., 8 Del. C. sections 211, 212.
\6\ If permitted under State law, and in accordance with any
applicable provisions in a company's governing documents, action may
be taken by written consent without a meeting and without a vote.
See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 228.
\7\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 212; Model Bus. Corp. Act
sections 7.01 through 7.08.
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The manner in which shareholders exercise their rights to vote at
shareholder meetings has evolved over time. Historically, shareholders
exercised their rights by attending the shareholder meeting and voting
in person. However, the development of large corporations with widely
dispersed shareholders led to the rise of proxy voting, which permits
shareholders to vote through a representative without being present at
the shareholder meeting.\8\ Before 1934, State law governed the manner
in which proxies to cast shareholders' votes were solicited, but
``[t]oo often proxies [were] solicited without explanation to the
stockholder of the real nature of the questions for which authority to
cast his vote [was] sought.'' \9\ In response, when it passed the
Exchange Act in 1934, Congress included section 14 \10\ to give the
Commission authority to regulate the proxy solicitation process.\11\
Section 14(a) \12\ makes it unlawful to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security ``in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.'' \13\ Relying on its authority under section 14(a), the
Commission in 1942 adopted the predecessor of Rule 14a-8 to require a
company to include certain shareholder proposals in its proxy statement
and identify the proposal in its form of proxy.\14\
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\8\ See Jill E. Fisch, From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing
Proxy Regulation, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1129, 1134-38 (1993) (``Fisch
1993'') (explaining that ``proxy voting developed as a means of
giving dispersed shareholders an opportunity to vote.'').
\9\ S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) at 12; see also
H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (``Insiders
have at times solicited proxies without fairly informing the
stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies are to be used
and have used such proxies to take from the stockholders for their
own selfish advantage valuable property rights.'').
\10\ 15 U.S.C. 78n (``section 14'').
\11\ See H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934)
(``the proposed bill gives the Commission power to control the
conditions under which proxies may be solicited with a view to
preventing the recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free
exercise of the voting rights of stockholders.'').
\12\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a) (``section 14(a)'').
\13\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)(1). See also, section II.A.3, discussing
the Commission's authority under Section 20(a) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 (``Investment Company Act'').
\14\ See Release No. 34-3347 (Dec. 18, 1942) [7 FR 10655 (Dec.
22, 1942)] (adopting Rule X-14A-7, 17 CFR 240.14a-7) (``1942
Adopting Release''). In 1947, the Commission renumbered the rule to
its present designation, 17 CFR 240.14a-8. See Adoption of Revised
Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4037 (Dec. 16, 1947) [12 FR 8768 (Dec.
24, 1947)]. A reference in this release to ``Rule 14a-8'' includes
Rule X-14A-7 unless stated otherwise. In addition, we use the terms
``companies,'' ``registrants,'' and ``issuers'' interchangeably in
this release. Unless otherwise specified, these terms are intended
to be broadly inclusive and encompass not only corporations, but
also other types of entities, such as partnerships and other
business organizations, that may be subject to our proxy rules and
regulations. The use of different terms in different places is not
meant to connote a substantive difference.
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As explained by then-Chairman Ganson Purcell, Rule 14a-8 was
adopted to facilitate shareholders' ability under State law \15\ to
present certain proposals for consideration at a company's annual or
special meeting,\16\ and to facilitate the ability of all shareholders
to consider and vote by proxy on such proposals.\17\ Specifically,
shortly after the rule was adopted, Chairman Purcell stated that the
purpose of the rule was to ``assure to the stockholders . . . those
rights that [the stockholder] has traditionally had under State law, to
appear at the meeting; to make a proposal; to speak on that proposal at
appropriate length; and to have [the] proposal voted on.'' \18\ The
rule originally required a company to include a shareholder proposal
that is
[[Page 59906]]
``a proper subject for action by the security holders,'' as long as the
shareholder proponent \19\ provided ``reasonable notice'' to the
company.\20\ Although the rule did not specify that State law provides
the standard for determining what was ``a proper subject for action by
the security holders,'' the Commission subsequently issued a release
containing a letter from the then-Director of the Division of
Corporation Finance clarifying \21\ that State law provided the
applicable standard. The Commission later amended the text of Rule 14a-
8 to make this point explicit by providing that a proposal could be
excluded from a company's proxy materials if ``the proposal as
submitted is, under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not a proper
subject for action by security holders.'' \22\
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\15\ We refer to State law to mean a State's legislative
enactment and judicial interpretations of such enactment, as well as
State common law.
\16\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 211; Model Bus. Corp. Act
section 7.01. Throughout this release, when discussing State
corporate law, we frequently refer to Delaware law because of the
large percentage of public companies incorporated under that State's
law. The Delaware Division of Corporations reports that over 50% of
publicly traded companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges are
incorporated in Delaware. See Delaware Dep't of State, Facts and
Myths, Delaware Corporate Law (n.d.), https://corplaw.delaware.gov/facts-and-myths/. We also frequently refer to the Model Business
Corporation Act (``MBCA'') because the corporate statutes of many
States adopt or closely track its provisions.
\17\ See Securit[ies] and Exchange Commission Proxy Rules:
Hearings on H.R. 1493, H.R. 1821, and H.R. 2019 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 172
(1943) (Statement of the Hon. Ganson Purcell, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) (``Statement of Chairman Purcell'').
\18\ Id.
\19\ Throughout this release, references to ``shareholder
proponent'' and ``proponent'' generally refer to shareholders who
submit proposals under Rule 14a-8, and references to ``shareholder
proposal'' and ``proposal'' generally refer to proposals submitted
under Rule 14a-8, unless the context otherwise requires, such as
when discussing proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 in the context of
discretionary voting authority for proposals submitted outside the
Rule 14a-8 process.
\20\ See 1942 Adopting Release in which the predecessor of
current Rule 14a-8, Rule X-14A-7, provided that ``[i]n the event
that a qualified security holder of the issuer has given the
management reasonable notice that such security holder intends to
present for action at a meeting of security holders of the issuer a
proposal which is a proper subject for action by the security
holders, the management shall set forth the proposal and provide
means by which security holders can make a specification'' on such
matter; see also infra section II.A.1.b.
\21\ See Release No. 40-375, 34-3638 (Jan. 3, 1945) [Letter of
Division of Corporation Finance Director published at 11 FR 10988,
10995 (Sept. 27, 1946)] (``1945 Release'') (stating that Rule 14a-8
pertains to matters that ``are proper subjects for stockholders'
action under the laws of the state under which [the company] is
organized''). In a subsequent release, the Commission stated that it
had previously adopted as its own the view that ``State law is the
standard'' for determining what is a proper subject for shareholder
action. See also Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Release No.
34-4979 (Jan. 6, 1954) [19 FR 246 (Jan. 14, 1954)] (``1954 Adopting
Release'') (citing 1945 Release).
\22\ 1954 Adopting Release. The rule's current language--``If
the proposal is not a proper subject for action by shareholders
under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's organization''--
was adopted in 1998. See Amendments to Rules on Shareholder
Proposals, Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998) [63 FR 29106, 29120
(May 28, 1998)] (``1998 Adopting Release'').
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As discussed in greater detail in section II.A.1.b, however, the
Commission has amended Rule 14a-8 multiple times in ways that
incrementally have increased the Commission's role in defining and
interpreting standards that implicate core State law corporate
governance matters, such as shareholder voting rights. As a result,
despite the Commission's prior statements asserting that Rule 14a-8 was
not ``intended to supplant [S]tate law but . . . to reinforce [it] with
a sturdy [F]ederal disclosure and proxy solicitation regime,'' \23\
numerous observers have expressed the view that Rule 14a-8 effectively
has evolved to function as a Federal common law as to what constitutes
a proper subject for shareholder action.\24\ But Congress's grant of
authority to the Commission in the Exchange Act does not authorize such
evolution. Section 14 does not purport to displace State law with
respect to shareholder governance rights. As discussed below, only
Congress can authorize the Commission to intervene in matters
traditionally left to State law.
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\23\ See, e.g., Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-56160
(July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43466, 43467 (Aug. 3, 2007)] (``2007 Proxy
Access Long Release'') (explaining that ``the federal proxy
authority is not intended to supplant state law, but rather to
reinforce state law rights with a sturdy federal disclosure and
proxy solicitation regime,'' and noting as an example that ``Rule
14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule, explicitly provides that a
shareholder proposal is not required to be included in a company's
proxy materials if it `is not a proper subject for action by
shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the company's
organization''' (citing 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1))).
\24\ See, e.g., Jill Fisch et al., Stockholder Proposals--Law
and Policy Considerations, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Dec.
9, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/09/stockholder-proposals-law-and-policy-considerations/ (``Yet, by
regulating proxy access, the SEC determines what matters are proper
or improper for stockholder meetings, often restricting stockholder
rights beyond the contours of state law.''); Fisch 1993 at 1151
(``[B]oth in determining appropriate criteria for excluding
shareholder proposals and in applying those criteria, the SEC does
not replicate passively the annual meeting process by applying state
law principles, but creates a Federal common law as to what
constitutes a proper subject for shareholder action''); Kevin W.
Waite, Note, The Ordinary Business Operations Exception to the
Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Return to Predictability, 64 Fordham L.
Rev. 1253, 1259-60 (1995) (``Because little state law was developed
discussing what was a proper subject for action by security holders,
the SEC staff developed its own common law regarding what was a
proper subject for shareholder action. While the SEC claimed to be
relying on state law in determining what was a proper subject for
shareholder action, the SEC more accurately appeared to be deciding
what the state law was and influencing state courts in deciding the
rare case that arose regarding what was a proper subject for
shareholder action.'') (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, as discussed in more detail in the sections that
follow, we propose to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety because the
rule exceeds the Commission's statutory authority under section 14(a)
by improperly intruding into State law without express authorization
from Congress.\25\ Moreover, even if the rule or aspects of it were
within the Commission's statutory authority, there are independent
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety and leave
decisions regarding the appropriate role of shareholder proposals in
the corporate governance process to the States or, if permitted by
State law, to companies. In reaching this determination, we note that:
(i) many of the justifications that were originally provided to support
adoption of Rule 14a-8 either have not been substantiated in practice
or are less compelling today; (ii) Rule 14a-8 has had, and will
continue to have, certain unintended consequences that further
undermine any justification for retaining the rule; and (iii) retaining
any version of Rule 14a-8--assuming the Commission were authorized to
do so--is unwarranted and unlikely to avoid those unintended
consequences.\26\ Nevertheless, to better understand the potential
impact of rescinding Rule 14a-8, we are seeking comment on the proposed
rescission, potential reliance interests in the current rule, and
alternative approaches within the scope of the Commission's
authority.\27\
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\25\ See infra section II.A.
\26\ See infra section II.A. President Donald J. Trump issued an
executive order titled, ``Protecting American Investors from
Foreign-Owned and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors'' on Dec. 16,
2025. This order, among other things, ordered the ``SEC Chairman . .
. [to] consider revising or rescinding all rules, regulations,
guidance, bulletins, and memoranda relating to shareholder
proposals, including Rule 14a-8 (17 CFR 240.14a-8), that are
inconsistent with the purposes of [such executive order].'' Exec.
Order No. 14366, Protecting American Investors from Foreign-Owned
and Politically-Motivated Proxy Advisors, 90 FR 58503 (Dec. 16,
2025).
\27\ The Commission has recently received several rulemaking
petitions requesting to preserve or amend, but largely retain, Rule
14a-8. See, e.g., Ceres et al., Petition Regarding Amendments to
Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (July 23,
2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-917.pdf; Shareholder Rights Group et al., Defend Shareholder
Rights Petition (July 20, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-918.pdf; Bruce A. Burkey et al.,
Americans for Financial Reform (July 20, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/rules/petitions/2026/petn4-918.pdf. We will
consider these petitions, together with any comments received in
response to this release, when considering whether to finalize the
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8.
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We are also proposing amendments to 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c) (``Rule
14a-4(c)''), which addresses when a proxy card submitted by a
shareholder may confer discretionary voting authority on the proxy
holder with respect to a matter that is not included on the proxy card.
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are intended to provide
companies with greater flexibility, and shareholders with greater
control, regarding proposals for which a company may seek discretionary
voting
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authority. Occasions for seeking such authority may become more
frequent if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed. While our proposed
amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are aligned with our proposed rescission of
Rule 14a-8, there are independent justifications for the proposed
amendments to Rule 14a-4 even if the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8
is not adopted.
Finally, we are proposing certain other amendments to facilitate
implementation of the proposed changes to the proxy rules and
conforming amendments to our rules and forms.
II. Discussion of Proposed Amendments
A. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 because the rule exceeds the
Commission's statutory authority. We also believe there are independent
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8. Under the proposed rescission,
the Federal proxy rules would no longer require companies to include in
their proxy materials shareholder proposals on the basis that they
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements established under
Federal law. Instead, State law or, if permitted by State law, a
company's governing documents would determine whether a shareholder
proposal would be required to be included in a company's proxy
materials.
1. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Statutory Authority
Although section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to regulate proxy
solicitations, the question of whether the vote that is the subject of
such a solicitation is permissible in the first instance--i.e., whether
shareholders have a right to present a matter for other shareholders to
vote on--is distinct and is determined by State law or, if permitted by
State law, a company's governing documents. Because section 14(a) does
not authorize the Commission to regulate the scope of matters presented
to shareholders for a vote, the Commission lacks the power to override
State law on this threshold question.\28\ To the contrary, it has long
been understood that section 14(a) empowers the Commission to
facilitate--not alter--State law rights by regulating the manner in
which the proxy solicitation is made and the information that the
soliciting party must disclose.\29\ As explained below, the rule has
come to operate not as a procedural mechanism to facilitate
shareholders' rights under State law through the proxy process, but as
a substantive Federal overlay that improperly intrudes into matters of
State law by dictating that companies include (or allowing them to
exclude) certain shareholder proposals in the companies' proxy
materials. Because Congress has not expressly authorized such an
intrusion, Rule 14a-8 exceeds the scope of the Commission's authority.
We therefore propose to rescind the rule in its entirety.
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\28\ Congress requires that certain matters be presented to
shareholders for a vote. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 78n-1 (requiring
advisory say-on-pay, say-on-frequency, and golden parachute
arrangements to be submitted for shareholder vote) and section
II.A.3 (discussing provisions of the Investment Company Act that
require certain matters to be presented to shareholders for a vote).
The fact that Congress has established Federal voting rights in
these instances does not alter the scope of the Commission's
authority over the solicitation of proxies under section 14. Nor
does the discussion in this release of the Commission's authority
under section 14 address the legal status of these other provisions.
\29\ See infra note 58.
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a. Scope of Section 14(a) Authority
Section 14(a) makes it unlawful ``to solicit any proxy or consent
or authorization in respect of any security'' ``in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors.'' \30\ The statutory text limits the Commission's regulatory
authority to proxy solicitation--the request for the power to vote on a
shareholder's behalf--which encompasses the manner in which that
solicitation is made (e.g., the timing and form of proxy) and the
information that the soliciting party must disclose in the request. The
Commission therefore is authorized to regulate the form of proxy
solicitation and the means by which shareholders are asked to express
their voting position in response to the solicitation. We construe ``in
the public interest or for the protection of investors'' in light of
the statutory context to authorize the Commission to prohibit false or
misleading statements in a proxy solicitation and to promulgate
disclosure requirements ensuring that shareholders are adequately
informed of the proposals on which they may vote under State law and
the voting positions for which their proxies would be used.\31\ This
authority is consistent with other grants of authority provided to the
Commission under the Exchange Act, which focus on ensuring that
investors receive accurate disclosure of material information.\32\
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\30\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a)(1). We discuss section 14(a)'s references
to ``the public interest'' and ``the protection of investors'' in
more detail below.
\31\ See, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083 (1991) (applying Rule 14a-9 to allegedly misleading disclosures
by directors seeking shareholder approval of a merger).
\32\ See 15 U.S.C. 78j, 78l, 78m.
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While section 14(a) provides authority to facilitate shareholders'
exercise of State law rights by regulating the proxy solicitation
process, nothing in section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to regulate
the scope of the voting or other rights shareholders may have under
State law, such as the right to propose a matter for a shareholder
vote.\33\ Rather, by focusing on the solicitation of a shareholder's
vote, the text makes clear that Congress's purpose was to ensure that
shareholders are fully informed as to the use of the proxy being
solicited and to protect them from being denied the fair exercise of
their State law voting rights.\34\
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\33\ But see supra note 28.
\34\ Cf. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (``Proxy solicitations are, after all, only communications
with potential absentee voters. The goal of federal proxy regulation
was to improve those communications and thereby to enable proxy
voters to control the corporation as effectively as they might have
by attending a shareholder meeting.'' (italics in original)).
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Section 14(a)'s grant of authority to regulate solicitations of the
power to vote on a shareholder's behalf presupposes that the
shareholder already has a right to vote on particular proposals. The
scope of those rights has traditionally been governed by State law, and
section 14(a) does not purport to disturb that allocation.\35\ If
Congress had intended section 14(a) to displace State law on the
subject of shareholder voting, presumably it would have referred to
shareholder voting in section 14(a). For example, the Public Utility
Holding Company Act (``PUHCA''), enacted by Congress in the year after
the Exchange Act,\36\ directed the Commission to oversee the allocation
of voting power in public utility companies. Section 11(b)(2) of that
law authorized the Commission ``[t]o require by order . . . that the
corporate structure . . . does not . . . unfairly or inequitably
distribute voting power among security holders.'' \37\ No
[[Page 59908]]
comparable language appears in section 14(a).\38\
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\35\ See supra notes 5, 7, 23, and 28.
\36\ Public Law 74-333 (Aug. 26, 1935), 15 U.S.C. 79 et seq.,
repealed by Public Law 109-58, title XII, section 1263, Aug. 8,
2005, 119 Stat. 974.
\37\ 15 U.S.C. 79k(b)(2) (2004); see also PUHCA section 7(c)(1)
(granting the Commission authority to prohibit the sale of common
stock unless it has ``at least equal voting rights with[ ] any
outstanding security of the declarant'') and (e) (barring the
exercise of voting rights if ``the Commission finds that such
exercise of such privilege or right will result in an unfair or
inequitable distribution of voting power among holders of the
securities of the declarant'') [15 U.S.C. 79g(c)(1), (e) (2004)];
supra note 28.
\38\ But see supra note 28.
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Therefore, the Commission's authority under section 14(a) to
regulate the proxy solicitation process does not permit the Commission
to displace State law regarding shareholder voting rights.\39\ By
establishing standards not found in State law for when a shareholder
proposal must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's
proxy materials, the Commission effectively dictates the scope of
shareholder voting rights and, therefore, exceeds its authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Cf. Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411 (stating that section
14(a) was not intended to authorize the Commission to ``step beyond
control of voting procedure and into the distribution of voting
power'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent legislative history is considered, it only
underscores the limitations on the Commission's authority that are
inherent in the statutory text and structure. That history indicates
that Congress's purpose in enacting this provision was to empower the
Commission to facilitate ``fair corporate suffrage'' on the proxy by
regulating the ``conditions under which proxies may be solicited.''
\40\ It also suggests an intent to authorize regulations that would
protect ``free exercise of the voting rights'' of shareholders,\41\
require ``adequate disclosure'' of the matters to be decided at the
shareholder meeting,\42\ and prevent ``irresponsible outsiders'' and
``unscrupulous corporate officials'' from ``concealing and distorting
facts'' in their proxy solicitations.\43\ Courts have thus interpreted
section 14(a) as bearing ``almost exclusively on disclosure,'' with a
``central concern'' that proxies not be obtained through ``deceptive or
inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
see also, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1103 (1991).
\41\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); see
also, e.g., Virginia Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103.
\42\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383 at 13-14, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934);
S.Rep. No. 792 at 12, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S.Rep. No. 1455 at
75, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
\43\ S.Rep. No. 1455 at 77.
\44\ Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410.
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These limitations are also consistent with the Commission's
longstanding understanding that its authority under section 14(a) is
limited to promulgating ``federal proxy rules [that] facilitate
shareholders' exercise of [S]tate law rights,'' \45\ such that the
corporate proxy process ``functions, as nearly as possible, as a
replacement for an actual, in-person gathering of security holders.''
\46\ As the Commission has acknowledged, section 14(a) does not grant
it authority to ``alter those [State law] rights.'' \47\
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\45\ 2007 Proxy Access Long Release at 43478.
\46\ Id. at 43467 n.19 and accompanying text (citing Bus.
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410); see also Facilitating Shareholder
Director Nominations, Release No. 33-9046 (June 10, 2009) [74 FR
29024 (June 18, 2009)].
\47\ Id. at 43478.
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Interpreting section 14(a)(1) more broadly would not only lack any
basis in the statutory text and structure but would inappropriately
interfere with matters traditionally reserved to the States. As the
Supreme Court explained in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,
``[a]bsent a clear indication of congressional intent, we are reluctant
to federalize the substantial portion of the law of corporations that
deals with transactions in securities, particularly where established
State policies of corporate regulation would be overridden.'' \48\ The
approach taken by the Supreme Court in Santa Fe accords with a
substantial body of precedent establishing a clear statement rule for
laws tilting the balance of federalism.\49\ For example, in Business
Roundtable, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit found that section 14(a)(1) did not express an intention by
Congress to override State law with respect to ``corporate
governance.'' \50\ To the contrary, the court explained, those
advocating for the Exchange Act in Congress expressly disclaimed any
intent to confer upon the Commission authority to interfere in
corporate management: opponents had raised concerns that the bill would
confer ``power to interfere in the management of corporations,'' and
the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency responded that it had ``no
such intention'' and that the bill ``furnish[ed] no justification for
such an interpretation.'' \51\ Similarly, neither the text nor
legislative history of section 14(a) contains any indication that the
statute authorizes the Commission to interfere with shareholder rights
established by State law. More generally, members of Congress have
repeatedly proposed bills to create a ``federal corporation law,'' but
none has been enacted.\52\ On the rare occasions when Congress has
intended for the Commission to intervene directly in the governance of
public companies, it has done so through clear statutory mandates.\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); see id. (rejecting an
interpretation of Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 that ``would overlap and
quite possibly interfere with state corporate law''); see also Bus.
Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408 (``[T]he Exchange Act cannot be
understood to include regulation of an issue that is so far beyond
matters of disclosure . . . and that is concededly a part of
corporate governance traditionally left to the states.''). In
section II.A.1.c below, we discuss how the structure and conditions
of current Rule 14a-8, including its various eligibility criteria
and bases for exclusion, can act to supplant State law voting
rights.
\49\ Ala. Ass'n of Realtors v. Dep't of Health & Hum. Servs.,
594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (``Our precedents require Congress to enact
exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the
balance between federal and state power . . . .'') (quoting U.S.
Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass'n, 590 U.S. 604, 621-622
(2020)).
\50\ 905 F.2d at 408.
\51\ Id. at 411 (citing S.Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1934)).
\52\ Manuel Cohen, Federal Legislation Affecting the Public
Offering of Securities, 28 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 119, 124 n.18 (1959)
(``For some years after the passage of Securities Act of 1933, bills
were introduced in the Senate proposing federal incorporation. None
of these were enacted.''); Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall
Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Modern Corporate Finance 205-10 (3d ed. Aspen Publ'rs 2003)
(describing efforts by the Roosevelt administration to regulate
corporate governance and its eventual abandonment); Symposium:
Federal Chartering of Corporations: A Proposal, 61 Geo. L.J. 89, 89
n. 1 (1972) (collecting bills that would have established federal
corporate chartering from the 1930s).
\53\ See, e.g., Exchange Act section 10A(m) (directing the
Commission to adopt rules requiring national securities exchanges to
prohibit the listing of any security of an issuer that does not meet
certain specified requirements related to audit committee procedures
and independence) [15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m)]; Exchange Act section 14A
(requiring public companies, among other things, to conduct a
separate shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of
executives, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K) [15
U.S.C. 78n-1].
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Nor do the references to the ``public interest'' and ``protection
of investors'' in section 14(a) provide a basis for the Commission to
intrude into shareholder voting rights or corporate management. Courts
have consistently recognized that ``public interest'' is not an open-
ended delegation of power; rather, such language ``must be limited to
the purposes Congress had in mind when it enacted the legislation.''
\54\ Those statutory purposes are discerned from the text and context
of the statute, which in turn cabin what is ``necessary or
appropriate'' under the Commission's
[[Page 59909]]
rulemaking authority.\55\ In the context of section 14(a), this means
that rules adopted under this provision must focus on the statute's
core concern with regulating the proxy solicitation process and the
disclosures within the solicitations--not on defining or reshaping the
substantive scope of shareholder voting rights. The phrase ``protection
of investors'' likewise cannot reasonably be construed to authorize the
Commission to engage in such intrusions into State law.\56\ To read
these terms otherwise would permit the Commission to use the Federal
securities laws to supplement or override ``firmly established'' State
law authority over shareholder rights--an approach that the Supreme
Court has rejected absent explicit congressional authorization.\57\
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\54\ Bus. Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413 (quoting NAACP v. Fed.
Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976)); see generally FCC v.
Consumers' Research, 606 U.S. 656, 690 (2025) (explaining that the
Supreme Court has ``long held that the words `public interest' in a
regulatory statute do not encompass the general public welfare but
rather take meaning from the purposes of the regulatory
legislation'') (quotation marks and citation omitted). See also
Acceleration of Effectiveness of Registration Statements of Issuers
with Certain Mandatory Arbitration Provisions, Release No. 33-11389
(Sept. 17, 2025) [90 FR 45125 (Sept. 19, 2025)] (noting that courts
have considered the scope of the public interest and investor
protection standard in the context of the Federal securities laws
and determined that, when applying this standard, it is only
permissible to consider those matters over which the Commission has
authority under the Federal securities laws).
\55\ See Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
(1989) (explaining that ``statutory language cannot be construed in
a vacuum,'' but rather ``the words of a statute must be read in
their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme'').
\56\ See id.
\57\ See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,
89 (1987).
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b. Evolution of Rule 14a-8
The earliest versions of the Commission's proxy rules enacted under
section 14(a) focused on disclosure and providing shareholders with the
means to specify the action to be taken pursuant to their proxies.\58\
In 1942, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-8's predecessor, Rule X-14A-7,
which established a requirement that management include in the
company's proxy materials a shareholder proposal that ``is a proper
subject for action by the security holders.'' \59\ Although the
Commission did not define ``proper subject'' in the rule, it issued a
release in 1945 that contained a letter from Division of Corporation
Finance Director Baldwin B. Bane explaining that the term referred to
``such matters . . . as are proper subjects for stockholders' action
under the laws of the [S]tate under which [the company] is organized.''
\60\
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\58\ Release No. 34-378 (Sept. 24, 1935) 1935 WL 29270
(requiring a ``brief description'' of the matters to be considered,
together with the proposed action to be taken by the proxy holder,
requiring the mailing of proxy materials to record owners at the
requesting shareholder's expense, and prohibiting materially false
or misleading statements under a general anti-fraud provision);
Release No. 34-1823 (Aug. 11, 1938) [3 FR 1991 (Aug. 13, 1938)]
(introducing the concept of the proxy statement that must be given
to each person solicited, and requiring that each matter to be
considered be subject to a separate yes or no vote).
\59\ RuleX-14A-7 provided in pertinent part: ``In the event that
a qualified security holder of the issuer has given the management
reasonable notice that such security holder intends to present for
action at a meeting of security holders of the issuer a proposal
which is a proper subject for action by the security holders, the
management shall set forth the proposal and provide means by which
security holders can make a specification as provided in [the proxy
rules].''17 CFR 240.14a-7 (1943). The 1942 rule also introduced the
requirement that management, if it opposed the shareholder's
proposal, include in its proxy materials the name and address of the
proponent and a 100-word statement in support of the proposal, if
requested by the proponent. Id. The maximum length of a proponent's
supporting statement under Rule 14a-8 has been revised by the
Commission on several occasions and is currently 500 words,
inclusive of the proposal text.
\60\ See 1945 Release.
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The letter responded to a company that sought exclusion of
proposals relating to matters of a ``general political, social or
economic nature'' and asked whether such proposals were a proper
subject for shareholder action under Rule X-14A-7. Without referencing
the laws of the State under which the company was organized, Director
Bane stated that ``[i]t is my conclusion that the proposals which have
been presented to you are not `proper subjects for action' by your
company's stockholders within the meaning of that phrase as used in
Rule X-14A-7. Consequently, it will be unnecessary for you to include
the proposals in the management's proxy statement if you do not wish to
do so.'' \61\ Director Bane also stated that ``[it] was not the intent
of Rule X-14A-7 to permit stockholders to obtain the consensus of other
stockholders with respect to matters which are of a general political,
social or economic nature. Other forums exist for the presentation of
such views.'' \62\ Whether intentionally or not, Director Bane's letter
effectively positioned Rule X-14A-7 as a new Federal common law for
shareholder voting rights, and the letter's informal understanding of
whether a matter was ``a proper subject for action'' does not appear to
have been based on the law of any particular State, let alone the State
under which the company was organized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Id.
\62\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the years that followed, the Commission repeatedly amended what
is now Rule 14a-8 in ways that progressively expanded the Commission's
role in determining, interpreting, and effectively shaping matters
traditionally governed by State law. As discussed above, the 1942 rule
relied substantially on the concept of ``proper subject for action'' to
determine which proposals must be included on the company's proxy. Due
to a lack of relevant State laws to provide guidance on what was a
``proper subject,'' as questions arose about the content of shareholder
proposals, proponent conduct, and management objections, the Commission
increasingly inserted Federal criteria in place of State law
standards.\63\
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\63\ See Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d
659, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated, 404 U.S. 403 (1972) (noting that
``the paucity of applicable state law giving content to the concept
of `proper subject' led the Commission to seek guidance from
precedent existing in jurisdictions which had a highly developed
commercial and corporate law and to develop its own `common law'
relating to proper subjects for shareholder action''); see also
Hearings on Problems in Enforcing the Securities Laws Before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th
Cong., 1st Sess. 117-118 (1957) (``In the absence of a State statute
establishing that a proposal is a proper subject for stockholder
action, the Commission will rely on the common law if this can be
ascertained. It will also consider other sources such as the
corporate law of other States, particularly of the leading
commercial States, as well as the decisions of the Federal courts,
textbooks, law journals, and other similar material where the
question may be discussed.'').
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Through a series of amendments adopted in 1947 and 1948, the
Commission required issuers to provide an explanation to the Commission
when asserting that shareholder proposals were improper or untimely
\64\ and introduced new bases for excluding such proposals.\65\ These
amendments provide an early example of how the proxy rules began to
delineate the limits of shareholder voting rights independent of State
law. In particular, adding new exclusionary bases that went beyond
whether a proposal was a ``proper subject for action'' under State law
opened the door for more grounds for exclusion to be added, sometimes
on a seemingly ad hoc basis in response to emergent issues. As a result
of these and subsequent amendments, it became possible--as remains the
case today--for there to be circumstances under which a shareholder's
proposal is a ``proper subject for action'' and thereby permissible
under State law but eligible for exclusion from the proxy materials
under Rule 14a-8.\66\
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\64\ See Adoption of Revised Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4037
(Dec. 16, 1947) [12 FR 8768 (Dec. 24, 1947)].
\65\ See Adoption of Amendments to Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-
4185 (Nov. 5, 1948) [13 FR 6678 (Nov. 12, 1948)] (``1948 Adopting
Release'').
\66\ See 1948 Adopting Release. For example, the 1948 amendments
added provisions permitting exclusion on the basis of, among other
things, a personal grievance or resubmission of a proposal. Thus, a
proposal that may have been a proper subject for shareholder action
under State law but that (1) could be characterized as submitted
``primarily for the purpose of enforcing a personal claim or of
redressing a personal grievance against the issuer or its
management'' or (2) was substantially the same proposal as was
submitted for a vote of shareholders at the previous annual meeting
(or any subsequent special meeting) that received less than three
percent of votes cast could be excluded from a company's proxy
materials. Id. at 6679. These exclusions remain, as subsequently
revised, in the current rule. See 17 CFR 240.14a-8.
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[[Page 59910]]
Later amendments, including the 1952 exclusion for proposals
promoting ``general economic, political, racial, religious, social or
similar causes'' \67\ and the 1954 ``ordinary business'' exclusion,\68\
further entangled Federal criteria with State law requirements. The
application of these criteria often required judgments about matters of
boards' authority and shareholders' role in corporate decision-making.
The 1954 amendments also restructured Rule 14a-8 such that the ``proper
subject for action'' criterion was no longer a threshold qualification
for the inclusion of a shareholder proposal; instead, it was re-framed
as a basis permitting an issuer to exclude a proposal if it was not a
proper subject for action under State law.\69\ Moreover, ``the burden
of proof'' to make that showing was placed ``upon the management.''
\70\
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\67\ See Amendment of Proxy Rules, Release No. 34-4775 (Dec. 11,
1952) [17 FR 11431 (Dec. 18, 1952)]. In 1972, the Commission revised
the existing ``social policy'' exclusion relating to ``general
economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes''
to eliminate the formulation that focused on whether a proposal was
submitted ``primarily for the purpose of'' promoting a particular
cause. Solicitations of Proxies, Release No. 34-9784 (Sept. 22,
1972) [37 FR 23178 (Oct. 31, 1972)]. In its place, the Commission
adopted a broadened standard that turned on the relationship between
the issuer and the subject matter of the proposal. Id. at 23179
(permitting exclusion of a matter that is ``not significantly
related to the business of the issuer or is not within the control
of the issuer''). As the adopting release explained, the amendment
sought ``to replace the subjective terms of the provision with
objective standards to the extent feasible and thereby create
greater certainty in the application of the rule.'' Id. at 23178.
The Commission also made a corresponding revision to the personal
grievance exclusion, removing similar language so that the two
exclusions no longer required inquiry into a proponent's
motivations. See id. at 23179.
\68\ See 1954 Adopting Release.
\69\ See id. Through this amended language, the 1954 amendments
included in Rule 14a-8 for the first time an express reference to
State law, which was previously referenced only in the 1945 Release.
\70\ See id.
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In 1976, the Commission reorganized the rule into the modern
structure of 13 substantive exclusions.\71\ In doing so, the Commission
made inclusion of shareholder proposals in the company's proxy
materials dependent on, among other things, whether proposals relate
significantly to an issuer's business or implicate areas of board and
management discretion.\72\ Some of these exclusions were based on the
Commission's interpretation of State law allocations of authority
between shareholders and management, and the rest lacked any connection
to State law.\73\ The Commission also added a note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1)
explaining that the propriety of a shareholder proposal under State law
may depend on whether the proposal is precatory or mandatory, signaling
broader Federal takeover in the purported application of State law
concepts.\74\ The note, as discussed further in section II.A.1.c below,
effectively created a presumption that precatory proposals are proper
based on the Commission's own interpretation of State law, as opposed
to deferring to States to resolve the question.
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\71\ See Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by
Security Holders, Release No. 34-12999 (Nov. 22, 1976) [41 FR 52994
(Dec. 3, 1976)] (``1976 Adopting Release''). The 1976 amendments
significantly changed the approach to the existing ``social policy''
exclusion. Specifically, the Commission removed from the exclusion
the express references to ``economic, political, racial, religious,
social, or similar causes.'' In the adopting release for the
amendments, the Commission stated that those ``illustrative
references'' to various causes were ``superfluous and unnecessary''
and that, in revising the provision, the ``substance'' of the
existing exclusionary basis was retained. Id. at 52997.
\72\ See, e.g., id. at 52998 (discussing the adoption of
subordinate (i)(7) of Rule 14a-8--permitting exclusion of proposals
dealing with a ``matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary
business operations of the issuer''--and stating that matters that
have ``significant policy, economic or other implications inherent
in them'' were to be ``considered beyond the realm of an issuer's
ordinary business operations'' and therefore not excludable under
that subordinate).
\73\ For example, the Commission adopted Rule 14a-8(i)(11) [17
CFR 240.14a-8(i)(11)] to permit the exclusion of a proposal that
substantially duplicates one previously submitted by another
shareholder. The Commission explained that this rule was adopted
``in order to eliminate the possibility of shareholders having to
consider two or more substantially identical proposals submitted to
an issuer by proponents acting independently of each other,''
without citing any connection to State law. See 1976 Adopting
Release.
\74\ See id. at 52996; 17 CFR 240.14a-8, Note to subordinate
(c)(1) (1977).
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The Commission again modified the regulatory framework for
shareholder proposals in 1983.\75\ The adopted amendments (including
revisions to the relevance, resubmission, and personal grievance
exclusions) and Commission interpretive guidance on the ordinary
business and mootness exclusions largely preserved the central role
that the Commission's understandings of shareholder authority and
corporate decision-making--traditionally the province of State law--
played in the administration of the Commission's rule. Similarly,
revisions made in 1998, while primarily structural and intended to
improve readability by recasting the rule in a question-and-answer
format, carried over the existing exclusionary framework.\76\
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\75\ See Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No.
34-20091 (Aug. 16, 1983) [48 FR 38218 (Aug. 23, 1983)]; see also
Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-8 Under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 Relating to Proposals by Security Holders, Release No. 34-
19135 (Oct. 14, 1982) [47 FR 47420 (Oct. 26, 1982)] (``1982
Proposing Release'') (proposing three alternative approaches to Rule
14a-8).
\76\ See 1998 Adopting Release.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent amendments--frequently relating to shareholder-proponent
eligibility, resubmission thresholds, and procedural requirements--have
continued to revise a Federal overlay that either constrains or expands
the rights of shareholders to present a matter for a vote without any
grounding in State law.\77\ Taken together, the evolution of Rule 14a-8
demonstrates a consistent trend: over time, through rulemaking, the
Commission has increasingly assumed responsibility for defining and
interpreting standards that implicate core State law concepts of
corporate governance.
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\77\ See, e.g., Procedural Requirements and Resubmission
Thresholds Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-89964
(Sept. 23, 2020) [85 FR 70240 (Nov. 4, 2020)] (``2020 Adopting
Release'') (amending requirements under the rule including
resubmission thresholds and security ownership amounts for
shareholder-proponent eligibility).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As this history illustrates, the evolution of current Rule 14a-8
has taken the Commission from its original 1942 posture of deferring to
State law on the scope of which matters are a proper subject for
shareholder action to a regime in which the rule now purports to
prescribe the ``few specific circumstances'' under which a company is
``permitted to exclude'' a shareholder proposal, including a
presumption that precatory proposals are ``proper unless the company
demonstrates otherwise.'' \78\ Throughout this evolution, there has
been little meaningful analysis of State law to justify the
Commission's line drawing. Instead, the Commission has relied on
generalized impressions of what State law requires or on inferences
drawn from its own experience administering the Federal proxy rules to
construct what is, in substance, a Federal standard governing when a
shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder action.
Nothing in the text or context of section 14(a) supports the
Commission's authority to prescribe such a standard. Indeed, the plain
and best reading of section 14(a) confirms that Congress did not grant
the Commission such authority.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Rule 14a-8 Exceeds the Commission's Authority Under Section 14(a)
As discussed above, Rule 14a-8 dictates when a company ``must
include'' a shareholder proposal in its proxy materials. The rule
prescribes eligibility and procedural requirements that a shareholder
must satisfy to have
[[Page 59911]]
a proposal included. It then identifies the bases on which a company
may exclude a proposal. It also sets forth certain steps that a company
must follow if it seeks to rely on one of those bases.\79\
Collectively, these provisions effectively operate as a Federal
standard governing when a matter is properly put before shareholders
for a vote through the proxy.\80\ Because section 14(a) empowers the
Commission to regulate the proxy solicitation process--not codify its
own understanding of State law rights as a matter of Federal law--Rule
14a-8 exceeds the Commission's authority under section 14(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See supra section II.A.1.b.
\80\ See Fisch 1993 at 1149-50 (``Many of the restrictions
imposed by the proxy rules can be attributed to a pragmatic effort
by the SEC to limit the number of shareholder proposals and to
restrict use of the proxy statement to issues of general importance
to shareholders. Although such limits may be desirable, they have no
foundation in state or common-law restrictions regarding proper
subjects to be raised at a shareholders' meeting. The SEC's
authority to impose these restrictions on the use of the proxy
mechanism is therefore unclear.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its current form, Rule 14a-8(i) contains 13 substantive bases
for exclusion. Of these, only Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and Rule 14a-8(i)(2)
directly refer to State law by permitting exclusion when a proposal
``is not a proper subject for action by shareholders under the laws of
the jurisdiction of the company's organization,'' \81\ or when a
proposal ``would, if implemented, cause the company to violate any
[S]tate . . . law to which it is subject.'' \82\ The remaining
exclusion bases codify criteria developed by the Commission--often
evolving over time--regarding what matters are appropriate for
inclusion in a company's proxy materials, some of which derived from
the Commission's own interpretation of State law and the rest of which
lacked any identified connection to State law.\83\ These criteria
include the proposal's subject matter (such as matters relating to
ordinary business operations, the director election process, or
dividend amount determinations) and other considerations (such as the
motivation of the proponent, economic relevance, duplication,
substantial implementation, or the level of past shareholder
support).\84\ Although some of these exclusion bases may intersect with
concepts found in State law, they are not derived from, and do not
consistently track, State law frameworks governing shareholder rights
to present a proposal at a meeting for a vote by their fellow
shareholders.
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\81\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1).
\82\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(2).
\83\ See, e.g., 1982 Proposing Release at 47428-29 (discussing
the origin of 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(7), the ordinary business
exclusion).
\84\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(3) through 240.14a-8(i)(13).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even where Rule 14a-8 incorporates State law considerations in Rule
14a-8(i)(1), the rule conditions that reference with a Commission-
created presumption that non-binding, precatory proposals are proper
subjects for shareholder action under State law.\85\ This presumption,
grounded in prior Commission staff ``experience,'' effectively places a
thumb on the scale in favor of inclusion. A company bears the burden to
overcome the presumption, but meeting that burden, in practice, is
often difficult. State law is frequently undeveloped, ambiguous, or
fact-specific with respect to shareholder proposals, and the company is
required to submit an opinion of counsel supporting its views on State
law, which may be particularly difficult to obtain when State law is
silent on the subject. In these situations, companies could lack a
meaningful pathway to meet their burden to rebut the presumption. As a
result, what is framed as a presumption operates in substance as a
mandate. Rather than looking or deferring to State law, the Commission
has, instead, substituted its own judgment for which proposals are
proper under State law.
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\85\ The current Note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1) reads as follows:
``Depending on the subject matter, some proposals are not considered
proper under state law if they would be binding on the company if
approved by shareholders. In our experience, most proposals that are
cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take
specified action are proper under state law. Accordingly, we will
assume that a proposal drafted as a recommendation or suggestion is
proper unless the company demonstrates otherwise.''
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Beyond the 13 substantive bases for exclusion and the presumption
regarding precatory proposals, the overall structure of Rule 14a-8
underscores its function as a de facto Federal standard for shareholder
voting rights by specifying which shareholder proposals are appropriate
for inclusion in company proxy materials. Rule 14a-8 has, over time and
through successive revisions, evolved into a detailed framework that
identifies the ``few specific circumstances'' in which a company is
``permitted to exclude'' a shareholder proposal. As an illustration of
how Rule 14a-8 has expanded in complexity over time, the predecessor to
Rule 14a-8 was a little over 200 words whereas the current provision is
over 3,000 words. Companies seeking to exclude a proposal must explain
the basis for exclusion--often by citing one or more of the 13
substantive grounds noted above--and, where the basis relies on State
or foreign law, provide a supporting opinion of counsel.\86\ The rule
also imposes numerous requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to
require inclusion of a proposal in the company's proxy materials,
including eligibility criteria based on the amount and duration of
share ownership; a requirement that the shareholder (or a qualified
representative) personally attend the meeting to present the proposal;
and limits on the number and length of proposals.\87\ None of these
requirements is grounded in State law.\88\
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\86\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(j)(1), (j)(2)(iii).
\87\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b)(1)(i), (b)(1)(iv), (c).
\88\ While the procedural and eligibility requirements may have
been intended to foster an orderly process for the inclusion of
proposals, because the Commission is not authorized by section 14(a)
to interpose Federal criteria on shareholders' or companies' State
law rights, these requirements similarly are not supported by our
statutory authority.
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Despite the Commission's stated goal of ``facilitat[ing]
shareholders' exercise of [S]tate law rights'' \89\ and making the
proxy process ``function[ ], as nearly as possible, as a replacement
for an actual in-person gathering of security holders,'' \90\ these
conditions and exclusions--which constitute the vast majority of Rule
14a-8's provisions--bear little or no connection to whether the
proposal is proper for a shareholder vote at the shareholder meeting
under State law. Instead, these requirements create a complex Federal
regime governing the rights of shareholders to present proposals for
shareholder action that functionally supplants State law.\91\ Section
14(a) does not empower the Commission to create such a regime.
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\89\ 2007 Proxy Access Long Release at 43478.
\90\ Id. at 43467.
\91\ See Fisch 1993 at 1151 (``[B]oth in determining appropriate
criteria for excluding shareholder proposals and in applying those
criteria, the SEC does not replicate passively the annual meeting
process by applying state law principles, but creates a federal
common law as to what constitutes a proper subject for shareholder
action. The SEC has thereby thrust itself into the role of
determining the proper balance of power between management and
shareholders.'') (citing Louis Loss, Fundamentals of Securities
Regulation 537-38 (1983) (``Inevitably the Commission (normally its
staff), while purporting to find and apply a general[ly] nonexistent
state law, has been building a `common law' of its own as to what
constitutes a `proper subject' for shareholder action.'')).
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It might be argued that Rule 14a-8 does not dictate the scope of
proposals submitted by one shareholder to be voted on by other
shareholders but rather defines the conditions under which a
shareholder may take advantage of the opportunity provided by Federal
law to have a proposal included in the company's proxy materials.\92\
But, as
[[Page 59912]]
described above, by establishing standards not found in State law for
whether a shareholder proposal must be included in a company's proxy
materials, the Commission effectively dictates the scope of shareholder
voting rights and, therefore, exceeds its authority. Because voting by
proxy has largely replaced attendance at the shareholder meeting as the
primary means of corporate suffrage, applying the Commission's
determinations of whether and what shareholder proposals may properly
appear on a company's proxy materials effectively alters the corporate
voting process.\93\
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\92\ See, e.g., Dyer v. SEC, 266 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1959)
(stating that Rule 14a-8 ``affords a privilege [to have a proposal
included in the company's proxy statement], which does not otherwise
ordinarily exist in favor of stockholders. Necessarily, the
Commission could properly impose reasonable conditions and
limitations on the scope and manner of enjoyment of the privilege,
in relation to the other elements of holding stockholder meetings
and conducting corporate affairs.'').
\93\ See Fisch 1993 at 1170 (``[T]he SEC's proxy rules are not
passive attempts to implement shareholders' state law rights in an
increasingly large and impersonal voting system. Instead, the rules
change the voting process, both by determining issues upon which
shareholder democracy is appropriate and by structuring the way in
which such democracy can be exercised.'').
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By way of contrast, in the context of director elections, the
Commission has facilitated the ability of shareholders to exercise the
voting rights they have under State law. In 2021, the Commission
adopted rules requiring the use of a universal proxy card in non-exempt
solicitations involving director election contests.\94\ The foundation
for the universal proxy rules is the right of shareholders--explicit in
State law--to vote for the election of directors.\95\ Accordingly, the
predicate question of whether under State law the proposal (i.e., the
election of directors) is proper for a shareholder vote at the
shareholder meeting is clearly answered by State law.\96\ To ensure
that shareholders voting by proxy are able to participate in the
election of directors in the same manner they could if voting in person
at a shareholder meeting, the rule requires that a proxy card include
the names of all duly nominated \97\ director candidates presented for
election,\98\ thereby allowing shareholders voting by proxy in
contested elections to replicate the vote they could cast if they voted
in person. Such an exercise of the Commission's rulemaking authority
under section 14(a) works in conjunction with State law.
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\94\ See Universal Proxy, Release No. 34-93596 (Nov. 17, 2021)
[86 FR 68330 (Dec. 1, 2021)] (``Universal Proxy Release''). The
universal proxy rules do not apply to solicitations involving
director election contests for registered investment companies and
business development companies.
\95\ See Universal Proxy Release at 68330 (``State statutes
require corporations to hold an annual meeting of shareholders for
the purpose of electing directors. A shareholder's ability to
participate in the election of directors is a fundamental right
under state corporate law, and the process by which directors are
elected is a fundamental aspect of corporate governance that is
central to maintaining the accountability of directors to
shareholders.'') (footnotes omitted).
\96\ See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code section 600(b); 8 Del. C.
section 211(b); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law section 602(c).
\97\ See Universal Proxy Release at 68331-32 (noting that
universal proxy cards ``must include the names of all duly nominated
director candidates presented for election by any party . . .'' and
explaining that ``[a] duly nominated director candidate is a
candidate whose nomination satisfies the requirements of any
applicable [S]tate or foreign law provision and a registrant's
governing documents as they relate to director nominations'').
\98\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-19(e).
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It is not always clear whether a matter is a proper subject for
shareholder action under State law. In some instances, State law
entitlements are relatively straightforward. For example, it is widely
recognized that State law generally confers voting rights on equity
shareholders in director elections but does not confer voting rights on
bondholders in those elections.\99\ In other instances, applying State
law can present difficult interpretive questions, even within a single
jurisdiction. For example, it remains uncertain whether the Delaware
General Corporation Law (``DGCL'') permits precatory proposals; the
statute does not speak to the question.\100\ These difficulties are
compounded by the fact that States vary in how they address particular
governance matters.\101\ But section 14(a) does not authorize the
Commission to resolve ambiguous questions of State law or to impose a
uniform Federal standard. Indeed, doing so has inhibited and may
continue to inhibit the development of State law by State legislatures
and courts interpreting the law of the relevant States of
incorporation, as we discuss below.\102\ Absent clear congressional
direction to the contrary, State legislatures and courts interpreting
State law are the appropriate bodies to develop and define the scope of
shareholder rights.
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\99\ Compare 8 Del. C. section 212 (granting voting rights to
stockholders) with 8 Del. C. section 221 (authorizing a corporation
to grant bondholders rights similar to those held by stockholders,
including the right to vote, because such rights do not exist by
default under State law).
\100\ See Mohsen Manesh, The Corporate Contract & The Private
Ordering of Shareholder Proposals, 50 J. Corp. L. 1, 29 (2024)
(noting that the statutory text of the DGCL is silent as to whether
shareholders have the right to make or vote on a precatory proposal)
(``Manesh 2024''). See also Kyle A. Pinder, The Non-Binding Bind:
Reframing Precatory Stockholder Proposals Under Delaware Law, 15
Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 1 (2026), available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mbelr/vol15/iss1/2 (concluding that
Delaware law does not provide an inherent precatory proposal right).
\101\ See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's
Ordinary Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement
by Proposal, 85 Fordham L. Rev. 705 (2016) (``[T]here is an
unfortunate degree of inconsistency from state to state as to which
actions are deemed extraordinary and which are deemed ordinary.
States are divided, for example, as to whether such basic matters as
filing a lawsuit or executing a guarantee of another corporation's
debts are ordinary or extraordinary.''). While many states have
adopted the MBCA, its adoption is not universal, and some states
have adopted it only in part. See American Bar Ass'n, Bus. Law
Section, Model Business Corporation Act Resource Center, available
at https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/resources/model-business-corporation-act/ (noting that 36 jurisdictions have adopted
the MBCA in whole or in part).
\102\ See section II.A.2.b.ii. See also Fisch 1993 at 1192-93
(``The interdependence of the state and federal regulatory systems
has several consequences. First, the mere existence of the federal
proxy rules may have restrained the development of state corporation
law in the area of voting regulation. A state statute that
conflicted with the proxy rules might not be valid under the
Supremacy Clause. Additionally, the federal rules subdue state
motivation to legislate. State legislatures have become accustomed
to leaving the regulation of the voting process to the SEC and defer
to that agency's expertise. State and federal courts also have grown
accustomed to viewing shareholder proxy rights as those rights
defined by the SEC rules. In spite of the SEC's statements that its
rules simply enable shareholders to realize state law rights, courts
are loathe to recognize ballot access, information, or procedural
rights that extend beyond those explicitly guaranteed by federal
law.'').
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The Commission has, at times, noted that its authority to
promulgate Rule 14a-8 under section 14(a) was upheld in 1947 in SEC v.
Transamerica Corp.\103\ But in Transamerica, which upheld an
application of the 1942 version of the rule, the scope of the
Commission's authority under section 14(a) was not squarely presented
or addressed. To the extent the court's analysis could be read to
endorse a more expansive view of the Commission's authority than the
Commission's interpretation in this release, the Commission disagrees
with such a reading for the reasons discussed above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\103\ 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); see, e.g., Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Release No. 34-
56161 (July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43488, 43489 n.8 (Aug. 3, 2007)]. But
see 1954 Adopting Release (explaining that ``state law is to be the
standard of eligibility of a proposal under the rule'' and that
``[t]he Commission wishes to make it clear that it considers this
standard consistent with [Transamerica]'').
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d. Rule 14a-8 Should Be Rescinded
An administrative agency must act within its statutory
authority.\104\ As
[[Page 59913]]
discussed, Rule 14a-8 exceeds the plain and best reading of the
Commission's rulemaking authority under section 14(a). Accordingly, we
propose to rescind the rule. Furthermore, as discussed below, even if
the Commission had the authority to adopt Rule 14a-8 or aspects of the
rule, for independent policy reasons, the Commission is proposing to
rescind the rule in its entirety.
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\104\ See Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys. v. Dimension Fin.
Corp., 474 U.S. 361, 373 n.6 (1986) (holding that an administrative
agency, in this case the Federal Reserve Board, only has the power
``to police within the boundaries of the [relevant authorizing
statute]'' and not ``to expand its jurisdiction beyond the
boundaries established by Congress''); West Virginia v. EPA, 597
U.S. 697, 723 (2022) (``Agencies have only those powers given to
them by Congress, and `enabling legislation' is generally not an
open book to which the agency [may] add pages and change the plot
line.'') (citation omitted); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S.
302, 327-328 (2014) (stating that to avoid ``a severe blow to the
Constitution's separation of powers,'' an agency must act within the
bounds established by Congress and may not rewrite statutory terms
``to suit its own sense of how [a] statute should operate''); City
of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (``No matter how it is
framed, the question a court faces when confronted with an agency's
interpretation of a statute it administers is always, simply,
whether the agency has stayed within the bounds of its statutory
authority.'') (italics in original); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc.,
486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988) (``In determining whether a challenged
regulation is valid, a reviewing court must first determine if the
regulation is consistent with the language of the statute.''); Stark
v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 309 (1944) (``When Congress passes an Act
empowering administrative agencies to carry on governmental
activities, the power of those agencies is circumscribed by the
authority granted.''); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372
F.3d 395, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that a Federal agency is a
creature of statute, has no constitutional or common law existence
or authority, and has ``only those authorities conferred upon it by
Congress'') (italics in original) (citation omitted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We acknowledge that Rule 14a-8 has been in existence for many years
and that both shareholders and companies are likely to have shaped
certain governance and engagement practices around the rule's
provisions. However, agencies may not add to their powers by adverse
possession; longevity is not a substitute for legal authority. Indeed,
the passage of time has seen Rule 14a-8 stray further from section 14's
authorization. That said, to better understand the potential impact of
rescinding Rule 14a-8 and possible measures to mitigate such impact, we
are seeking comment on reliance interests in the current rule and on
alternatives to complete rescission that would fall within our
authority.
2. Policy Reasons for Rescinding Rule 14a-8
Independent of our lack of statutory authority, there are also
policy reasons for rescinding Rule 14a-8 in its entirety. Specifically,
we believe that (i) many of the justifications that were originally
provided to support adoption of Rule 14a-8 either have not been
substantiated in practice or are less compelling today; (ii) Rule 14a-8
has had, and will continue to have, certain unintended consequences;
and (iii) retaining any version of Rule 14a-8--assuming the Commission
were authorized to do so--is unwarranted and unlikely to avoid these
unintended consequences.
a. Many of the Original Justifications for Adopting Rule 14a-8 Either
Have Not Been Substantiated in Practice or Are Less Compelling Today
When the Commission first adopted Rule 14a-8, Chairman Purcell
stated that the rule was adopted with the understanding that (i) the
cost to companies to include shareholder proposals in their proxy
materials was ``small;'' \105\ (ii) many proposals were either already
supported by management or received meaningful shareholder support;
\106\ (iii) the overall volume of proposals was low; \107\ and (iv) the
rights of shareholders to present certain matters for a vote to their
fellow shareholders under State law was reasonably clear, such that the
Commission's rules could operate to facilitate those rights.\108\ As
discussed below, many of these justifications either have not been
substantiated in practice or have become less compelling given the
evolution of the shareholder proposal process, and ambiguity about the
scope of shareholder voting rights under State law. In addition to
these considerations, other developments, including the reduced burden
in conducting independent solicitations and availability of other
methods of shareholder engagement due to technological advancements,
also may have rendered Rule 14a-8's original justifications less
compelling.
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\105\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell (``It is a very small
item of expense, so far as the company's funds are concerned and one
that can very readily and rightfully be used for the purpose, it
seems to us.'').
\106\ See id. at 181 (``Many [shareholder proposals] have been
accepted by managements, and others have secured respectable
percentages of the votes cast.''). We were unable to confirm
shareholder support rates for these earlier proposals.
\107\ See id. (explaining that there had been ``no flood of
stockholders' proposals'' around the time of the rule's adoption).
\108\ See id. (describing a situation in which a company's
chairman ruled a shareholder's floor proposal out of order, causing
``so much opposition among the assembled stockholders that the
chairman rescinded his ruling and permitted full discussion of the
matter'' and observing that ``the stockholders made it clear that in
that corporation, whether or not they agreed with their fellow
stockholders, they believed that every stockholder should be given
an opportunity to present his point of view to his fellow
stockholders and to have them express their own judgment on its
merits. This is the right that the State law intended to give
stockholders and it is that right our rules protect and make a
reality.'').
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First, the cost to companies of addressing and including
shareholder proposals in proxy materials is no longer small. In
response to commenter feedback on the proposing release to the
Commission's 2020 amendments to Rule 14a-8, the Commission estimated
that the cost to a company ranged from $20,000 to $150,000 per
proposal.\109\ One recent survey found that the aggregate direct costs
over a four-year period that companies incurred to comply with Rule
14a-8 varied widely among 35 public company respondents: 20 percent
reported four-year aggregate direct costs of less than $100,000; 25.7
percent reported between $100,000 and $250,000; and 17.1 percent
reported between $251,000 and $500,000.\110\ Nearly one-quarter
reported aggregate, four-year costs exceeding $500,000, including 14.3
percent reporting between $501,000 and $1,000,000 and 11.4 percent
reporting more than $1,000,000 over that period.\111\ Another survey
found that nearly 20 percent of the 35 responding companies, including
some companies that have small market capitalization, noted that they
spend over $500,000 in external costs addressing shareholder proposals
in a typical proxy season.\112\
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\109\ 2020 Adopting Release at 70245 n.63.
\110\ See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Shareholder Proposal Survey:
Report and Analysis of Results, University of Delaware, John L.
Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance (Jan. 2026), at 4,
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=6045474. The report states that public
companies responding to this survey were predominantly large
capitalization or mega capitalization firms, drawn from diverse
industries. The estimated costs may vary for other types of
companies, such as investment companies.
\111\ See id.
\112\ See Business Roundtable, The Need for Bold Proxy Process
Reform (Apr. 2025), available at https://www.businessroundtable.org/the-need-for-bold-proxy-process-reforms.
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Companies incur costs, including internal time, as well as external
legal and compliance expenditures.\113\ Companies also incur indirect
costs associated with addressing shareholder proposals, including
internal legal and administrative resources, management time, and
opportunity costs from diverting management's attention away from core
business operations, which may be substantial.\114\ These costs
[[Page 59914]]
ultimately are borne by the company's shareholders,\115\ who, in
addition to absorbing the costs incurred by the company, face their own
costs in analyzing and voting on proposals.\116\
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\113\ See id.
\114\ See Procedural Requirements and Resubmission Thresholds
under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8, Release No. 34-87458 (Nov. 5, 2019)
[84 FR 66458, 66496 (Dec. 4, 2019)] (``2019 Proposing Release'')
(``Shareholder proposals also impose opportunity costs on companies
and their shareholders because management, the board, and the voting
shareholders could spend the time spent on processing a shareholder
proposal and voting on the proposal to engage in other value
enhancing activities.''); Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Speech at the
69th Nat'l Conf. of the Soc'y of Corp. Secretaries and Governance
Professionals: Building Meaningful Communication and Engagement with
Shareholders (June 25, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/building-meaningful-communication-engagement-shareholde
[https://perma.cc/NQ8C-NRRE] (``Briefing boards [on shareholder
proposals], analyzing issues and determining how to communicate the
company's views to shareholders and markets take time and resources,
as does hiring lawyers to analyze the proper interpretation of the
Commission's grounds for exclusion and preparing communications with
the staff.'').
\115\ See Substantial Implementation, Duplication, and
Resubmission of Shareholder Proposals Under Exchange Act Rule 14a-8,
Release No. 34-95267 (July 13, 2022) [87 FR 45052, 45067 (July 27,
2022)] (``[C]ompanies may bear both direct costs and opportunity
costs associated with the submission of a shareholder proposal, and
these costs may be passed on to shareholders.''); 2020 Adopting
Release at 70267 (``[A]ll shareholders may incur passed-through
costs associated with companies' consideration and processing of
shareholder proposals and experience the economic impact of
shareholder proposals that are implemented.'').
\116\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70277 (``[T]he costs to non-
proponent shareholders of analyzing and voting on shareholder
proposals are significant.'').
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Second, most shareholder proposals today do not receive majority
shareholder support and are not supported by management. We estimate
that approximately seven percent of submitted proposals and 11 percent
of proposals that were voted on received majority shareholder support
in 2025.\117\ It is also clear that management frequently opposes
shareholder proposals today, as reflected in the number of proposals
companies exclude from their proxy materials each proxy season,\118\
the number of proposals companies seek to exclude,\119\ and the
opposition statements companies routinely include in their proxy
materials to rebut proposals that are included and voted on.\120\
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\117\ See infra section IV.B.3.a.
\118\ See id. (noting that 22% of proposals were omitted from
company proxy materials in 2025).
\119\ For example, between Oct. 1, 2024 and Sept. 30, 2025,
companies sought to exclude approximately 370 proposals. See U.S.
Securities & Exchange Commission, Shareholder Proposals, available
at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/shareholder-proposals.
\120\ See Asaf Eckstein, The Rise of Corporate Guidelines in the
United States, 2005-2021: Theory and Evidence, 98 Indiana L.J. 921
(2023), available at https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol98/iss3/6/ (stating that boards choose to recommend against
shareholder proposals that are included in a company's proxy
statement ``most of the time'').
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Third, the volume of shareholder proposals has increased
significantly over time in comparison to the increase in the number of
companies required to file proxy statements.\121\ In contrast to the
relatively low number of shareholder proposals included in company
proxy materials between 1943 and 1946, which totaled between 34 and
66,\122\ the annual number of shareholder proposals submitted to
companies between 2020 and 2025 is estimated to have ranged from 697 to
932, with an estimated 437 to 599 proposals included in company proxy
materials each year.\123\
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\121\ There were 1,467 proxy statements filed by companies in
1943, see Securities and Exchange Commission, Thirteenth Annual
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1947, 42 (1948), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1947.pdf, and we estimate that 6,043 proxy statements
are filed by companies today, see section V.C.
\122\ See Securities and Exchange Commission, Thirteenth Annual
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1947, 42 (1948), available at https://www.sec.gov/about/annual_report/1947.pdf (noting that the number of shareholder
proposals included in company proxy statements was 66 in 1943, 38 in
1944, 34 in 1945, and 34 in 1946).
\123\ See Matteo Tonello, 2025 Proxy Season Review: From
Escalation to Recalibration, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance
(Sept. 15, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/09/15/2025-proxy-season-review-from-escalation-to-recalibration/
(estimating the total number of shareholder proposal submissions to
be 697 proposals in 2020, 715 in 2021, 801 in 2022, 836 in 2023, 932
in 2024, and 781 in 2025, while estimating the total number of voted
shareholder proposals to be 437 in 2020, 419 in 2021, 538 in 2022,
586 in 2023, 599 in 2024, and 462 in 2025).
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Finally, when it adopted Rule 14a-8, the Commission appears to have
assumed that it would be clear, or at least reasonably easy to
determine, which matters are proper to present to shareholders for a
vote under State law. However, State law is often unclear or silent as
to what matters may be presented to shareholders. For instance,
Delaware law is unclear about the status of precatory proposals--the
most common type of Rule 14a-8 proposal.\124\ While section 211 of the
DGCL states that, in addition to the election of directors, ``[a]ny
other proper business may be transacted at the annual meeting,'' it
does not define what can be considered as ``proper business.'' \125\
Consequently, there is a diversity of opinion about whether the DGCL
permits precatory proposals. While a number of commentators have
observed that Delaware law does not explicitly authorize or contemplate
precatory proposals as proper subjects for shareholder action,\126\ the
question remains unresolved. For example, one scholar of Delaware law
has stated that section 211 of the DGCL could be interpreted to
authorize precatory proposals as proper \127\ and another legal scholar
has argued that the authority to present and vote on precatory
proposals is an ``incidental power[ ]'' derived from section 121 of the
DGCL and the broader governance framework created by statute.\128\
Regardless of their views, no commentator has identified any
controlling authority from a Delaware court on this issue, and the DGCL
(like the MBCA) does not directly address the question as to whether
precatory proposals are proper subjects for a shareholder vote.\129\
Moreover, even if Delaware law were clear on this issue, other States
may take a different position.
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\124\ See supra notes 16 and 100.
\125\ See 8 Del. C. section 211; see also Model Bus. Corp. Act
section 7.01.
\126\ See e.g., Manesh, supra note 100, at 29 (``For one, there
is nothing in Delaware's statute or caselaw establishing as
`settled' public policy the right of shareholders to make or vote on
a proposal at a shareholder meeting. As previously noted, the
statutory text of the [Delaware General Corporation Law] makes no
reference to such a right. And to the extent that right is
recognized by case law, judicial references to it are scant and
fleeting''); Pinder, supra note 100 (``[T]he Delaware General
Corporation Law . . . does not contemplate (and thus does not
expressly authorize) precatory stockholder proposals.''); Unofficial
Transcript of the Roundtable Discussion Regarding the Federal Proxy
Rules and State Corporation Law Before the Chairman and
Commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (May 7,
2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/proxyprocess/proxy-transcript050707.pdf (``2007 Proxy Roundtable Transcript'')
comment of Stanley Keller (``14a-8 in and of itself I think has
created the non-binding proposal. I think as a matter of state law
it really didn't exist outside of 14a-8''); cf. Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some
Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 Bus. Law.
1079, 1088 (2008) (``Strangely, precisely because state corporation
laws do not contemplate non-binding stockholder votes on anything,
the SEC has permitted non-binding or `precatory' proposals on
virtually everything, including takeover defenses and executive
compensation.'').
\127\ See 2007 Proxy Roundtable Transcript, comment of Frank
Balotti (``I think precatory resolutions are authorized by [section]
211 [of the DGCL], which says that a stockholder can bring before a
meeting anything that is proper for a stockholder to act on. I
believe that it is proper for stockholders to ask directors to do
whatever, as opposed to telling directors to do whatever.'').
\128\ See Fisch et al., supra note 24.
\129\ Despite the recent enactment of Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann.
section 21.373, Texas law similarly does not address this question.
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The Commission appears to have underestimated the challenges
associated with discerning and applying State corporate law when it
adopted Rule 14a-8, leading to subsequent efforts to provide clarity
through incremental amendments to the rule (such as, for example,
through the current codified presumption regarding precatory proposals
\130\). However, as explained in section II.A, when State law is
unclear or silent as to what matters can be presented to shareholders,
it is not the Commission's role to fill those gaps or impose
[[Page 59915]]
uniformity through the Federal proxy rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\130\ See Note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the specific considerations discussed above, other
developments also may have rendered Rule 14a-8's original
justifications less compelling. For example, independent solicitation
may have become less burdensome due to, among other factors,
technological and regulatory advancements, including the introduction
of the Commission's e-proxy rules (i.e., notice and access).\131\ In
2021, we estimated that the median basic cost of soliciting
shareholders, namely, the proxy distribution fees and postage costs for
the first mailing, was approximately $14,000.\132\ We also estimated
that the costs of a nominal solicitation--where dissidents minimize
their solicitation efforts and rely on the notice-and-access
mechanism--would fall within a range of $5,300 to $9,800, with the
specific cost dependent on the subject company's market
capitalization.\133\ These estimates assumed that the dissident would
meet the minimum 67 percent solicitation requirement under 17 CFR
240.14a-19 (``Rule 14a-19''), the Commission's universal proxy rule,
which is not applicable if a shareholder does not solicit proxies in
support of director nominees other than the company's nominees.\134\
While estimating the total costs of a specific solicitation is
challenging due to the variability of discretionary solicitation
expenditures, we believe that technological and regulatory advancements
have helped to facilitate independent solicitations.
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\131\ See Broadridge, 2025 Proxy Season Key Stats and
Performance Ratings (2025), available at https://www.broadridge.com/campaign/2025-proxy-season-key-stats-and-performance-ratings (noting
that 90% of the proxy communications Broadridge processed were
digital and that issuers and funds experienced an estimated $5
billion in cost savings on paper and postage). The Commission's e-
proxy rules require issuers and other soliciting persons to post
their proxy materials on an internet website and furnish notice of
the materials' availability to shareholders. The notice and access
model was intended to promote the use of the internet as a reliable
and cost-efficient means of making proxy materials available to
shareholders. See Amendments to Rules Requiring Internet
Availability of Proxy Materials, Release No. 33-9108 (Feb. 22, 2010)
[75 FR 9074 (Feb. 26, 2010)].
\132\ See Universal Proxy Release, at 68359 (the Commission
calculated this estimate based on industry data provided by a proxy
services provider for a sample of 31 proxy contests from July 1,
2018 through June 30, 2019).
\133\ See id. at 68359 n.273. See Table IV in section IV.B.3.b
for estimates of proxy solicitation costs between 2022 and 2025.
\134\ Rule 14a-19 requires the use of universal proxy cards by
companies and by persons soliciting proxy votes for their own
candidates in contested director elections. The universal proxy card
must include the names of all company and dissident director
nominees. Rule 14a-19 establishes certain notice and filing
requirements, as well as formatting and presentation requirements
for universal proxy cards, and requires dissidents to solicit at
least 67% of the voting power of shares entitled to vote on the
election of directors. Rule 14a-19 does not apply, however, in a
``zero-slate'' campaign in which the dissident does not nominate or
solicit proxies for its own director nominees.
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In addition, although the original purpose of Rule 14a-8 was not to
facilitate shareholder engagement or communication, shareholders
frequently use the rule for these purposes, as discussed in section
II.A.2.b.i below. To the extent shareholders use Rule 14a-8 for these
purposes, technological advancements have given rise to a wide range of
alternative channels--such as online platforms and social media
forums--that facilitate communication among shareholders, enable the
expression of shareholders' views, and allow investors to attempt to
influence corporate behavior.\135\ These means were not available when
Rule 14a-8 was first adopted. Modern technology allows investors--
including smaller shareholders--to communicate both with management and
fellow shareholders, mitigating concerns that rescinding Rule 14a-8
would limit engagement to larger shareholders or those with more access
to management or board members.\136\
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\135\ See, e.g., Donna Fuscaldo, Say Gives Retail Investors A
Voice And Tesla Listens, Forbes (Feb. 19, 2019), available at
https://www.forbes.com/sites/donnafuscaldo/2019/02/19/say-gives-retail-investors-a-voice-and-tesla-listens/ (describing a digital
platform that offers retail investors the ability to engage with
companies they invest in); Seth C. Oranburg, A Little Birdie Said:
How Twitter Is Disrupting Shareholder Activism, 20 Fordham J. Corp.
& Fin. L. 695, 707 (2015), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544363 (``Activists can now access
virtually all shareholders and influence public opinion through
social networks, relatively unencumbered by reporting requirements
under SEC rules.''); Taylor Nicole Rogers, Robby Starbuck: the
activist pushing U.S. companies to ditch their DEI vows, Fin. Times
(Sep. 5, 2024), available at https://www.ft.com/content/0c8974ee-60bf-4edb-839c-bc24b8ecbc81 (reporting on how a shareholder uses his
social media presence to influence corporate initiatives).
\136\ Cf. Fisch et al., supra note 24 (suggesting that
eliminating precatory proposals would lead to only those with large
share holdings or personal relationships with board members having
access to the board).
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b. Rule 14a-8 Has Had, and Will Continue To Have, Certain Unintended
Consequences
i. Rule 14a-8 Has Become a Mechanism for Influencing the Interactions
Between Companies and Their Shareholders in Ways That Are Inconsistent
With the Rule's Original Purpose
Under Rule 14a-8, a company is required to include a shareholder
proposal in its proxy statement and form of proxy unless it can
identify a basis to exclude it, in which case it must file with the
Commission its reasons for exclusion.\137\ If a company excludes or
attempts to exclude a proposal, it may be exposed to litigation
risk.\138\ Proponents may thus use Rule 14a-8 in an attempt to gain
leverage in negotiations with company management or to secure private
benefits from such negotiations.\139\ Use of Rule 14a-8 in this way
represents a departure from the rule's original purpose and implicates
matters more appropriately addressed by State law.
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\137\ See supra section II.A.1.c.
\138\ See, e.g., DiNapoli v. BJ's Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.,
No. 26-cv-11075, 2026WL1762143 (D. Mass. Apr. 22, 2026); Heritage
Found. & Am. Conservative Values ETF v. Airbnb, Inc., 1:25-cv-00676
(D.Del. Feb. 12, 2026).
\139\ See Sarah C. Haan, Shareholder Proposal Settlements and
the Private Ordering of Public Elections, 126 Yale L.J. 262, 298-299
(2016) (stating that shareholder proponents are incentivized to
negotiate settlements because they ``may extract private benefits
from settlements'' and that they may ``bring a proposal solely for
the purpose of bargaining it away, or to put pressure on management
to accede to a different demand'').
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For example, proponents may submit proposals to initiate a dialogue
with a company when they have little or no intent for their proposals
to actually be included in company proxy materials and voted on by
fellow shareholders. In fact, many shareholder proposals today are
resolved without a shareholder vote, suggesting that the Rule 14a-8
process has deviated from its original purpose.\140\ For instance,
based on available data, proponents withdrew their proposals at rates
ranging from 18.4 percent to 32.1 percent during the four-year period
between 2021 and 2025, with approximately 18 percent of proposals being
withdrawn in 2025.\141\ Companies and proponents alike may have
incentives to settle privately, rather than proceed to a shareholder
vote.\142\ For companies, the perceived
[[Page 59916]]
advantages of private resolution may include reducing reputational risk
associated with proposals, mitigating litigation risk related to
statements made in opposition or in connection with exclusion, or
avoiding the potentially greater costs associated with either including
a proposal in the proxy materials or seeking to exclude it under the
Commission's rules.\143\ For proponents, reaching a settlement can
provide a more certain path to achieving a tangible outcome since
shareholder proposals are typically non-binding even when they receive
majority support.\144\ The frequent withdrawal of shareholder proposals
as part of the Rule 14a-8 process does not fully align with Congress's
intent that section 14(a) and the Federal proxy rules promote ``fair
corporate suffrage.'' \145\ Rather than having their proposals reach a
shareholder vote through the proxy process, proponents often utilize
the existence of the rule as leverage for private negotiations with
companies, while company management may also find it advantageous when
proposals are withdrawn.\146\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\140\ See id. at 293 (``[I]n virtually all cases, the private
settlement of a proposal undercuts the basic justifications for the
shareholder-proposal framework under Rule 14a-8.'').
\141\ See Subodh Mishra, 2025 U.S. Governance Post-Season Review
Evolving Priorities in a Shifting Landscape, ISS STOXX, Harv. L.
Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Oct. 15, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/10/13/2025-u-s-governance-post-season-review-evolving-priorities-in-a-shifting-landscape/ (explaining
that, of proposals submitted from Jan. 1 to June 30, 2025, 58% were
voted on, 23.6% were omitted from the proxy statement, and 18.4%
were withdrawn or not presented). Note that these numbers do not
represent the full scope of withdrawn proposals, such as proposals
that were withdrawn before companies filed no-action requests to
exclude them from their proxy materials.
\142\ Cf., e.g., Ross Kerber, This conservative activist is no
fan of Trump's SEC, Reuters.com (Mar. 4, 2026), available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/this-conservative-activist-is-no-fan-trumps-sec-2026-03-04/ (quoting a shareholder proponent as saying,
``[C]ompanies hate shareholder proposals. They're a nuisance to
them. Usually somebody's bringing it because they have a criticism
of the company and they just, they want to do everything they can
that's possible to get the proponent to withdraw. So if they can
work out some kind of minimally painful step to [get] us to
withdraw, they do it.'').
\143\ See Haan, supra note 139, at 293-297; see also Kobi
Kastiel and Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, 94
So. Cal. L. Rev. 569, 617 (2021).
\144\ See Nickolay Gantchev & Mariassunta Giannetti, The Costs
and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy, Eur. Corp. Governance Inst.
(Nov. 2019), available at https://www.ecgi.global/sites/default/files/working_papers/documents/finalgantchevgiannetti_2.pdf
(``Gantchev Article'') (noting that an ``overall low implementation
rate'' of approximately 16% of proposals ``indicates that management
may choose not to implement proposals even when they are approved by
a majority of the voting shareholders''); see also John G. Matsusaka
et al., Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders? Evidence from
Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action -Letter Decisions, 64
J.L. & Econ. 107, 110 (2021), available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/710828 (``When a proposal
is withdrawn, it often means that the company granted some
concession to the proponent, who in exchange withdrew the
proposal.'').
\145\ H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1934).
\146\ See., e.g., Ross Kerber, Shareholder activist Behar says
Trump is `disassembling capitalism,' Reuters.com (Jan. 21, 2026),
available at https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/shareholder-activist-behar-says-trump-is-disassembling-capitalism-2026-01-21/ (quoting a shareholder
proponent as saying ``Most companies will have a dialogue. There are
those where you have to escalate by filing a resolution, about half
of those then say, `OK, if you withdraw it, we'll take some action.'
Then there are the really resistant ones, about 25% or so, that you
have to go to a vote . . . We've had some of our biggest wins at 6%
(support), we've had some of our biggest losses at 80%. We want to
bring forth new ideas.'').
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Furthermore, Rule 14a-8 can serve as a mechanism for shareholder
proponents to advance interests that in many cases may not be shared by
a company's shareholders at large. For instance, in 2025, only 56 out
of 786 submitted proposals (seven percent) received majority
support.\147\ In addition, a significant proportion of shareholder
proposals are submitted by a small number of proponents who advance
substantially similar proposals across numerous companies.\148\ In
2025, 10 shareholder proponents submitted an aggregate of 58 percent of
all proposals (455 out of 786).\149\
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\147\ The data cover proposals submitted for meetings held in
calendar year 2025. Data is retrieved from the FactSet
SharkRepellent Proxy Proposal dataset, which includes around 5,000
U.S.-incorporated public companies and some foreign-incorporated
companies. Unless otherwise specified, we exclude from our analysis
shareholder proposals that are not subject to Rule 14a-8, such as
proposals related to proxy contests and other proposals appearing in
dissident shareholders' proxy soliciting material, proposals that
were raised from the floor of the annual or special meetings and
were not submitted to appear in the companies' proxy statements, and
proposals submitted for a vote at meetings of foreign private
issuers, as defined in 17 CFR 240.3b-4, which are not subject to the
Federal proxy rules. See section IV.B.3.a.
\148\ See Gantchev Article supra note 144 (``The press has
widely reported that a small group of individuals, often referred to
as corporate gadflies, submits a disproportionate number of
proposals. These individual sponsors, such as John Chevedden and
William Steiner, do not acquire large stakes and are not
particularly wealthy, but submit dozens of shareholder proposals
every year, convinced that `it is the right thing to do.' ''); see
also Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili, The Giant Shadow of Corporate
Gadflies, 94 So. Cal. L. Rev. 569, 591 (2020) (reporting that five
individual investors accounted for almost 40% of shareholder
proposals submitted to S&P 500 companies in 2018). See section
IV.B.3.a.
\149\ See supra note 147 for source of the data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such use is counter to how the Commission intended the rule to be
used. For example, when the rule was first adopted, Chairman Purcell
explained, ``[I]f [a shareholder proponent] were going to use the
corporate proxy machinery for making a stump speech for some political
party, that obviously is without the spirit of [the rule] . . . .''
\150\ The Commission also subsequently noted that it did not intend for
the rule to be used as a ``publicity mechanism'' for advancing personal
or partisan interests unrelated to the interests of a company's
shareholders.\151\ Yet Rule 14a-8 often serves as a stump from which,
figuratively, a small number of shareholders give speeches.\152\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\150\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell.
\151\ See, e.g., 1982 Proposing Release at 47422 n.8 (explaining
that ``the rule was not designed to burden the proxy solicitation
process by requiring the inclusion'' of proposals submitted by
proponents ``us[ing] the rule as a publicity mechanism to further
personal interests that are unrelated to the interests of security
holders as security holders'').
\152\ See, e.g., Business Roundtable, supra note 112 (``One
repeat proponent openly stated they would not withdraw their
proposal, not due to company-specific concerns, but because keeping
it on the proxy statement provided a larger platform for their
cause.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, since Rule 14a-8 includes substantive and procedural
bases that companies may use to exclude proposals that otherwise may be
permitted under State law, companies may seek to use the rule to
exclude proposals they disfavor or to limit shareholder involvement in
corporate affairs. The various default positions, bases for exclusion,
and eligibility criteria have made Rule 14a-8 a contested vehicle for
influencing corporate governance practices and other corporate
behavior. However, the allocation of power between shareholders and
management, as well as determinations about the appropriate role of
shareholder advocacy in corporate governance, are matters for the
States to resolve and not the appropriate province of the
Commission.\153\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\153\ See Fisch 1993 (explaining that Rule 14a-8 permits
shareholder proposals to be excluded from company proxy materials
for reasons that are not grounded in State law, discussing the
rule's role in shaping corporate governance, and describing the role
of Federal and State law in regulating proxy solicitations and
shareholder voting).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. The Existence of Rule 14a-8 Places the Commission in the Position
of Making Judgments About the Application of State Law That Are Best
Left to Other Actors
In our experience, Rule 14a-8 has drawn the Commission into matters
that should be addressed by State legislatures, courts, and, if
permitted by relevant State law, companies.\154\ Although certain
aspects of State law may be clear--for example, State law generally
affords shareholders the right to elect directors \155\ and amend the
bylaws \156\--many other areas contain
[[Page 59917]]
gaps, ambiguities, or conflicting interpretations. State legislatures
and courts--not the Commission--are the appropriate authorities to
resolve those gaps, ambiguities, and conflicts. Similarly, it is not
the Commission's role to synthesize potentially conflicting State laws
for purposes of administering the Federal proxy rules. For example,
State corporate codes are silent as to whether precatory proposals are
proper to present for a shareholder vote.\157\ Historically, however,
in assessing whether a proposal is a proper subject for shareholder
action under State law, the Commission has assumed precatory proposals
are presumptively proper.\158\ The Commission cannot provide definitive
answers to State law questions. Such questions are properly decided by
courts, with the highest court in each State exercising final authority
on questions of State law.\159\ More generally, we do not believe that
section 14(a) authorizes the Commission to direct or influence
substantive corporate governance matters that fall within the purview
of State legislatures, courts, and the private ordering mechanisms
established in a company's governing documents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\154\ See Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A
Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation, 45 Ala. L. Rev. 879, 910
(1994) (citing then-Commissioner Richard Roberts who stated that
``it is neither fair nor reasonable to expect securities experts to
deduce the prevailing wind on public policy issues that have yet to
be addressed by Congress in any decisive fashion.'').
\155\ See, e.g., Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the
Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev 407 (2006), available at https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1314&context=law_faculty_scholarship (noting
that the right to elect directors is a fundamental right of
shareholders); 8 Del. C. section 109(a) (``the power to adopt, amend
or repeal bylaws shall be in the stockholders entitled to vote.'').
\156\ See Albert H. Choi et al., Contractarian Theory and
Unilateral Bylaw Amendments, 104:1 Iowa L. Rev 1, 36 (2018),
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3024873 (stating that under
both the MBCA and DGCL, the shareholders' right to amend bylaws
cannot be restricted).
\157\ See, e.g., supra note 100.
\158\ See supra section II.A.1.c.
\159\ See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 177
(1940). Decisions by courts, not the Commission, provide precedent
that proponents and companies may appropriately rely on going
forward.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The continued existence of a Federal rule governing shareholder
proposals--even one that purports facially to defer to State law--
encourages companies and shareholders to look to the Commission to
resolve ambiguities in the application of such rule. Moreover, because
the Commission has authority to bring actions to enforce compliance
with the proxy rules, including Rule 14a-8, companies inevitably turn
to the Commission and its staff for guidance on the application of the
Federal rule.\160\ As a result of the foregoing, State authorities who
are the appropriate bodies to resolve corporate governance matters may
have little incentive or occasion to provide clarity on the role of
shareholder proposals. This dynamic is reflected in the fact that, with
the recent exception of Texas,\161\ no State has adopted legislation
governing shareholder proposals in more than 80 years since Rule 14a-8
was first adopted, and we are not aware of any companies that have
incorporated their own framework for addressing shareholder proposals
into their governing documents.\162\ Under the proposed rescission of
Rule 14a-8, the Commission would continue to oversee the Federal proxy
process but would no longer determine which shareholder proposals must
be presented to shareholders through a company's proxy materials.
Removing the Commission from the shareholder proposal process would
ensure that the appropriate bodies--i.e., State legislatures, courts,
and, when permitted by relevant State law, companies--determine the
circumstances under which proposals should be included in a company's
proxy materials.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\160\ As discussed in section IV.B.3.a, during the 2022-2025
period, companies submitted 1,073 no-action requests to the
Commission to exclude shareholder proposals submitted under Rule
14a-8 (corresponding to 33 percent of all proposal submissions).
\161\ See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. section 21.373 (for eligible
publicly traded companies that opt in, requiring a shareholder or
group of shareholders to hold a minimum amount of a company's
securities for a minimum amount of time, and to solicit a minimum
percentage of shares entitled to vote on the proposal, in order to
submit a matter for a shareholder vote).
\162\ We are, however, aware of a small number of companies that
have recently opted into Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. section 21.373.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii. The Presence of a Federal Rule Has Inhibited the Development of
State Law and Private Ordering
Although States can enact laws determining the appropriate role of
shareholder proposals and establishing whether and to what extent
shareholders have access to company proxy materials for their
proposals, they have largely declined to do so. As discussed above,
Rule 14a-8 was not intended to displace State law; rather, it was
originally designed to facilitate State law rights through a Federal
disclosure and proxy solicitation framework.\163\ Although the rule has
evolved over time in ways that stray from this original intent, a
remnant of this principle remains in Rule 14a-8(i)(1), which expressly
permits companies to exclude proposals that are ``not a proper subject
for action by shareholders under the laws of the jurisdiction of the
company's organization.'' \164\ Accordingly, where State law sets forth
standards governing which proposals may be presented for a vote of
shareholders, a proposal not meeting those standards is excludable
under Rule 14a-8(i)(1) as ``not a proper subject for action by
shareholders.'' \165\ Similarly, if permitted by State law, companies
can adopt standards in their governing documents, such as establishing
company-specific ownership thresholds for presenting proposals for
shareholder action or limits on the types of proposals that may be
presented, and a proposal not complying with those requirements could
be excluded under Rule 14a-8(i)(1).\166\ For example, if State law or a
company's governing documents (if permitted by State law) were to
disallow precatory shareholder proposals, then a company may exclude
such precatory proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
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\163\ See section II.A.1.a.
\164\ 17 CFR 240.14a-8(i)(1).
\165\ See Shareholder Proposals Relating to the Election of
Directors, Release No. 34-56914 (Dec. 6, 2007) [72 FR 70450 (Dec.
11, 2007)] (``With respect to subjects and procedures for
shareholder votes, most state corporation laws provide that a
corporation's charter or bylaws can specify the types of proposals
that are permitted to be brought before the shareholders for a vote
at an annual or special meeting. Rule 14a-8(i)(1) supports these
determinations by providing that a proposal that is not a proper
subject for action by shareholders under the laws of the
jurisdiction of the corporation's organization may be excluded from
the corporation's proxy materials.''); see also Shareholder
Proposals Relating to the Election of Directors, Release No. 34-
56161 (July 27, 2007) [72 FR 43488, 43490 (Aug. 3, 2007)] (same).
\166\ See supra notes 161 and 162.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although current Rule 14a-8(i)(1) accommodates the ability of
States and their domiciled companies to tailor the shareholder proposal
process to reflect their own views about the optimal approach to
corporate governance and the particular circumstances of the company
and its shareholders, States and companies have, with one notable
exception, generally declined to exercise this authority to date.\167\
This reluctance may stem from concerns that adopting standards that
deviate from those in Rule 14a-8 could bring unwanted public attention
and criticism from investors and other parties. In this regard, State
authorities may be disinclined to undertake politically contentious
decisions and companies may fear that adopting such standards could
lead to accusations of disenfranchising shareholders, trigger organized
investor campaigns, and/or
[[Page 59918]]
result in voting recommendations against board nominees by proxy
advisory firms. Indeed, simply being singled out as insufficiently
responsive to a perceived shareholder right could impose reputational
costs for companies.\168\ Despite the capacity of States to enact laws
and companies to engage in private ordering under Rule 14a-8(i)(1),
there have been only limited efforts to tailor the modern shareholder
proposal regime.\169\
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\167\ But see supra notes 161 and 162. We also note that
companies have sought to exclude shareholder proposals based on
limitations in their governing documents about what matters
shareholders may vote on. See, e.g., Senior Hous. Props. Tr., SEC
Staff No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 530450 (Mar. 13, 2019) (agreeing
with the company that a proposal could be omitted from the proxy
statement under 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b), which, among other things,
requires a proponent to hold ``securities to be entitled to vote on
the proposal,'' because the company's governing documents limited
the matters shareholders could vote on and the proposal dealt with a
matter that was not within the enumerated list of matters as to
which shareholders were entitled to vote on); RAIT Financial Trust,
SEC Staff No-Action Letter, 2017 WL 373305 (Mar. 20, 2017)
(similar); Scripps Networks Interactive, Inc., SEC Staff No-Action
Letter, 2016 WL 390053 (Jan. 14, 2016) (agreeing with exclusion of a
proposal where the company had multiple classes of stock and the
proponent owned a class of common shares that were not entitled to
vote on the proposal).
\168\ See Manesh 2024 (``The risk of political backlash,
resistance among investors, and other practical considerations may
lead some, perhaps most, companies to leave shareholder proposal
rights untouched.'').
\169\ See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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In addition, despite prior Commission statements to the
contrary,\170\ some uncertainty may exist as to whether States and
companies can establish shareholder proposal standards that differ from
those set forth in Rule 14a-8.\171\ Part of this uncertainty may stem
from an early judicial decision--SEC v. Transamerica Corp.\172\--which
some have interpreted as holding that Rule 14a-8 preempts State law and
privately ordered procedures governing the submission of shareholder
proposals.\173\ Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would eliminate any implication
of preemption stemming from Transamerica or otherwise and thus remove
that potential disincentive for States to develop their own laws
governing shareholder proposals. To the extent some believe that Rule
14a-8 currently preempts State law, we expect that if the rule were
rescinded, States and/or companies, in compliance with State law, would
be more inclined to adopt their own standards for when shareholder
proposals must be included in, or may be excluded from, the company's
proxy materials.
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\170\ See supra note 165; but see 1982 Proposing Release. By
proposing, in the 1982 Proposing Release, a new rule that would have
allowed companies and their shareholders to establish customized
requirements for submitting and including shareholder proposals in
the company's proxy materials--subject to shareholder approval,
periodic reapproval, and potentially certain minimum ownership and
other requirements--the Commission may have suggested that the
Federal rule preempts State law.
\171\ See, e.g., Elizabeth Ising, Ronald Mueller & Julia
Lapitskaya, Considerations for Shareholder Proposals in a Post-
Rule14a-8 World, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (June 15, 2026),
available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/15/considerations-for-shareholder-proposals-in-a-post-rule-14a-8-world/#10 (``As Rule 14a-8 has increasingly contained provisions that are
not reflected in state corporate laws, it has become unclear whether
and to what extent Rule 14a-8 preempts state law.'').
\172\ 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
\173\ See, e.g., Jill Fisch, The Transamerica Case, The Iconic
Cases in Corporate Law (Jonathan Macey, ed. 2008) (stating that the
court ``concluded that any issuer-specific limitations on the
shareholder voting power conferred by [Rule 14a-8] were improper'').
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Finally, we note that, to the extent State law or a company's
governing documents were to require inclusion of a shareholder proposal
in a company's proxy statement, the company would be required to comply
with the Commission's proxy rules with respect to that proposal.
c. Retaining Rule 14a-8 Is Unwarranted and Unlikely To Avoid Unintended
Consequences
Even if the Commission had authority to retain some version of Rule
14a-8, doing so would require the Commission to establish certain
baseline assumptions, such as whether shareholder proposals should, by
default, be included in or excluded from a company's proxy materials.
Whatever default rule the Commission were to select--inclusion or
exclusion--would establish the starting point for how disputes are
resolved. The rule also would have to articulate what a company or a
shareholder must do to opt out of the default. In doing so, the rule
necessarily would advantage one side over the other by shaping the
burdens of persuasion and the practical likelihood of success. Such a
structural choice, even if made with the intention of neutrality, would
have the practical effect of shaping how companies and shareholders
interact, negotiate, and ultimately view the costs and utility of the
shareholder proposal process.
Even if the Commission could attempt to amend the rule to
completely defer to State law, in practice we do not believe such an
alternative would address our fundamental concern about the
Commission's entanglement in State law issues. So long as a Federal
rule remains, experience has shown that parties will continue to look
to that rule--and the Commission--to resolve questions about the
inclusion of shareholder proposals in a company's proxy materials given
the greater uniformity offered by a Federal framework and
notwithstanding the fact that State law determines the proper scope of
a shareholder's power to present a proposal to their fellow
shareholders for a vote.\174\ The history of Rule 14a-8 underscores
this dynamic as, over time, the Federal rule has become the primary
reference for determining the scope, operation, and limits of
shareholder proposals, effectively displacing the authority of State
law notwithstanding the Commission's disclaimers of any intention to do
so. Thus, even if the Commission had the authority to retain a version
of Rule 14a-8--with the clear intention of deferring to State law--over
time it would inevitably be drawn into matters that should be left to
States or private ordering.
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\174\ See supra note 102.
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In addition, we do not believe that retaining such a version of
Rule 14a-8 would be warranted. We expect that total rescission of the
rule would lead the States and/or (where authorized by State law)
companies to be more inclined to adopt their own standards in this
area. State courts are the proper venue to resolve any disputes that
may arise directly based on State law and the terms of corporate
governance documents, without need for a Federal rule that would itself
necessarily incorporate State law (and risk overriding it).
Accordingly, we believe it is prudent for the Commission to defer to
States and companies to determine if, and under what circumstances,
shareholder proposals must be included in company proxy materials.\175\
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\175\ To the extent the Commission has previously suggested that
the mere omission of a shareholder proposal from a company's proxy
materials could render those materials materially false or
misleading in the absence of a rule like Rule 14a-8, we disagree.
Cf. Statement of Chairman Purcell (``The proxy statement purports to
tell the stockholders everything that is going to be taken up at the
meeting. The management knew [shareholder] proposals were going to
be taken up at the meeting. It knew that it intended to oppose them.
Any [proxy] statement which did not include those proposals and the
position of the management was obviously misleading, because the
soliciting material purported to tell the stockholders everything
that is going to be taken up at a meeting that management knew
about.''). The omission of a shareholder proposal from a company's
proxy materials or the failure to disclose that it will be
considered at the meeting is generally not, without more, materially
false or misleading. Cf. Heinze v. Tesco Corp., 971 F.3d 475 (5th
Cir. 2020) (rejecting a pure-omissions theory under Rule 14a-9); cf.
also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 239, n.17 (1988) (``Silence,
absent a duty to disclose, is not misleading under Rule 10b-5.'');
Macquarie Infrastructure Corp. v. Moab Partners LP, 601 U.S. 257,
266 (2024) (holding that pure omissions are not actionable under
Rule 10b-5(b)). There could, however, be situations where the
failure to disclose a shareholder proposal could be false and
misleading under the circumstances. If, for example, management were
to state that it was unaware of any other business to come before
the meeting when it had in fact been advised that a shareholder
intended to present a matter, such statement may be materially false
and misleading in the context of soliciting discretionary voting
authority for such matter.
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3. Investment Company Considerations
Section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act includes substantially
the same language as section 14(a) but relates to proxies, consents, or
authorizations in respect of any security issued by registered
investment companies. The Commission has used the authority under
section 20(a) of the
[[Page 59919]]
Investment Company Act to adopt a rule that requires any proxy,
consent, or authorization with respect to any security issued by a
registered investment company to comply with the rules and regulations
adopted pursuant to section 14(a) of the Exchange Act.\176\ As a
result, registered investment companies are subject to Rule 14a-8
regardless of whether they have a class of equity securities registered
under section 12 of the Exchange Act.
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\176\ 17 CFR 270.20a-1.
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We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 for all companies, including
registered investment companies and business development companies
\177\ (together, ``regulated funds''). We recognize that the regulatory
framework for regulated funds is different from that of other companies
that have a class of equity securities registered under section 12 of
the Exchange Act (``operating companies''). In particular, the
Investment Company Act provides regulated fund shareholders with voting
rights that are independent of State law corporate governance
provisions.\178\ For example, section 18(i) of the Investment Company
Act requires that, with limited exceptions, every share of investment
company stock must ``be a voting stock and have equal voting rights
with every other outstanding voting stock.'' \179\ In addition, several
provisions of the Investment Company Act require shareholder approval
by vote on matters such as changes to an investment company's
fundamental investment policies, approval of an investment company's
advisory contract, or certain director elections.\180\ Moreover, any
investment advisory agreement with a regulated fund must provide that
it may be terminated at any time by vote of a majority of the
outstanding voting securities.\181\
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\177\ Business development companies are a category of closed-
end investment company that do not register under the Investment
Company Act but rather elect to be subject to the provisions of
sections 55 through 65 of the Investment Company Act. See section
2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48)].
\178\ See New Germany Fund, SEC No-Action Letter (May 8, 1998)
(the Commission declined to provide a no-action position with
respect to a fund's request to exclude a shareholder proposal to
terminate the fund's advisory agreement based on the argument that
State law vested in the board exclusive authority to terminate the
agreement and noted that ``Section 15(a)(3) of the [Investment
Company] Act confers independent authority on the Fund's
shareholders to terminate the Fund's investment advisory agreement
at any time'').
\179\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-18(i). See also 15 U.S.C. 80a-18(a)
(providing an exception for specific voting rights of holders of any
senior security of a closed-end fund that is stock, e.g., preferred
stock).
\180\ See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80a-13, 80a-15, 80a-16. Business
development companies are subject to some of these shareholder
voting requirements to the same extent as registered investment
companies and have some separate shareholder voting requirements
under the Investment Company Act. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 80a-57, 80a-
58.
\181\ 15 U.S.C. 80a-15(a), 80a-58 (applying section 15(a) to a
business development company to the same extent as if it were a
registered closed-end investment company).
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The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would not affect the status
or applicability of these statutory voting rights.\182\ The fact that
Congress established voting rights in these instances, however, does
not alter the scope of the Commission's authority over the solicitation
of proxies.\183\ While section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act,
like section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, provides authority to regulate
the proxy solicitation process, section 20(a) does not empower the
Commission to expand upon or restrict the scope of shareholder voting
rights.\184\ By establishing standards for when a shareholder proposal
must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's proxy
materials that are neither grounded in State law nor authorized by
other statutory provisions, Rule 14a-8 effectively dictates the scope
of shareholder voting rights at regulated funds. Thus, Rule 14a-8
exceeds the scope of the Commission's authority to regulate the proxy
solicitation process with respect to regulated funds just as with
respect to operating companies.
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\182\ For example, following any rescission of Rule 14a-8,
proponents wishing to terminate an advisory agreement would remain
free to present a proposal to that effect at a meeting of
shareholders or conduct an independent proxy solicitation with
respect to such a proposal.
\183\ Indeed, the fact that Congress mandated certain voting
rights for shareholders of regulated funds under the Investment
Company Act only underscores that when Congress intends to intervene
in corporate governance matters, it does so expressly.
\184\ For the avoidance of doubt, this release addresses the
scope of the Commission's authority to regulate the proxy
solicitation process under section 14(a) of the Exchange Act and
section 20(a) of the Investment Company Act. It does not relate to
or address the scope of any other authorities available to the
Commission under those statutes.
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Apart from legal authority considerations, we recognize that
regulated funds' experiences with shareholder proposals differ in some
respects compared to operating companies. For example, regulated funds
generally receive fewer shareholder proposals than other types of
companies and, on average, the shareholder proposals that regulated
funds receive gain higher levels of shareholder support.\185\ In
addition, open-end investment companies and unlisted closed-end
investment companies generally do not hold shareholder meetings
annually, reducing the likelihood of shareholder proposals in proxy
materials in any given year for these companies. While these
considerations may mean that including shareholder proposals in proxy
materials may be less costly for regulated funds than for other types
of companies, we also understand that general costs associated with
proxy solicitations may be different for regulated funds than for other
types of companies. For example, obtaining sufficient votes on
regulated fund proxy matters can present challenges because these funds
often have diffuse, retail-oriented shareholder bases.\186\ Given the
unique considerations that apply with respect to the proxy process for
regulated funds, we are soliciting comment below on whether to take a
different approach to shareholder proposals for these funds.
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\185\ See infra section IV.B.3.a.
\186\ See, e.g., Confronting Growing Burden of Fund Proxy
Campaigns, Investment Company Institute (Mar. 2026), available at
https://www.ici.org/system/files/2026-03/26-confronting-growing-burden-fund-proxy-campaigns.pdf.
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Request for Comment
1. Should Rule 14a-8 be rescinded as proposed? Why or why not? Are
there alternative approaches within the scope of the Commission's
authority we should consider that would adequately address our policy
concerns with respect to Rule 14a-8?
2. Do companies and proponents have reliance interests in Rule 14a-
8 that should be considered? If so, what are those interests and how
can we balance the need to address the Commission's authority concerns
with the potential effects on affected parties?
3. To what extent have the original justifications for adopting
Rule 14a-8 been or not been substantiated in practice given the
evolution of the shareholder proposal process?
4. To what extent have costs to registrants associated with Rule
14a-8 (such as the costs of addressing and including shareholder
proposals), the volume of shareholder proposals, and the degree of
shareholder support changed since the adoption of Rule 14a-8?
5. As discussed above, in many cases, State law is unclear or
silent as to whether particular types of proposals, including precatory
proposals, are proper subjects for action by shareholders in a given
jurisdiction. Is this an accurate assessment of the current status of
State law as it pertains to shareholder proposals? Are there any
additional observations or analyses regarding State law that we should
consider?
[[Page 59920]]
6. To what extent have recent developments, including the
potentially lower burdens of independent solicitation campaigns and the
emergence of alternative shareholder engagement channels, weakened the
original justifications for a Federal shareholder proposal rule? To
what extent have costs to proponents associated with conducting an
independent solicitation changed since the adoption of Rule 14a-8?
7. As discussed above, Rule 14a-8 has had certain unintended
consequences, such as becoming a mechanism for influencing interactions
between companies and their shareholders and potentially inhibiting the
development of State law and private ordering. Are there alternatives
to full rescission within the Commission's authority that would avoid
these unintended consequences? If so, how could the Commission retain a
Federal rule on shareholder proposals without becoming entangled in
State law issues?
8. If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as proposed, would States and, where
authorized by State law, companies be more likely to set their own
standards and requirements regarding shareholder proposals? If so, what
would be the advantages and disadvantages? If not, what would be the
advantages and disadvantages?
9. If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, what are the most likely forms of
State and private ordering that would develop? For example, would
States adopt uniform standards applicable to all companies organized in
their jurisdiction, or would they instead enable companies to establish
their own standards? If the latter, would a market-wide standard likely
develop or would companies largely adopt their own individual
standards?
10. What impact would rescission of Rule 14a-8 together with the
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 (described in section II.B, below)
have on shareholders and shareholder voting rights under State law?
11. If the Commission rescinds Rule 14a-8 as proposed, should the
Commission provide guidance regarding any other relevant rules adopted
pursuant to section 14? If so, which rules?
12. Would rescinding Rule 14a-8 have different effects on regulated
funds and their shareholders than it would on other companies and
shareholders?
13. Should we rescind Rule 14a-8, including for regulated funds, as
proposed, or should we take a different approach to shareholder
proposals for regulated funds? For example, should we adopt a new rule
under the Investment Company Act that addresses inclusion in regulated
funds' proxy materials of shareholder proposals relating to matters on
which the Investment Company Act provides shareholder voting rights? If
so, are there additional requirements or conditions that should be
included in such a rule that would be within the scope of our authority
to regulate the proxy solicitation process?
B. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
1. Overview of Current Rules Related to Discretionary Voting Authority
Historically, few shareholders of companies with a class of equity
securities registered under the Exchange Act attend shareholder
meetings to vote in person. Instead, the most common way by which
shareholders learn about matters to be voted on at a shareholder
meeting and vote on such matters is through the proxy process.\187\
State corporate law generally authorizes the use of proxies to permit
shareholders to vote through a representative without attending the
shareholder meeting.\188\ Parties soliciting proxy authority to vote
Exchange Act-registered securities on behalf of shareholders entitled
to vote at the meeting must comply with the Federal proxy rules
pursuant to section 14 of the Exchange Act.\189\
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\187\ See supra note 8.
\188\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section 212(b) (``Each stockholder
entitled to vote at a meeting of stockholders . . . may authorize
another person or persons to act for such stockholder by proxy . . .
.''); Model Bus. Corp. Act section 7.22(a) (``A shareholder may vote
the shareholder's shares in person or by proxy.'').
\189\ 15 U.S.C. 78n(a).
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Currently, the Federal proxy rules provide shareholders two methods
to present proposals for consideration by company shareholders voting
by proxy at a shareholder meeting. First, a shareholder may seek
inclusion of its proposal in the company's proxy materials in
accordance with Rule 14a-8.\190\ Second, a shareholder may submit its
proposal to the company pursuant to the company's governing documents
\191\ and conduct its own proxy solicitation for its proposal, at the
shareholder's expense, using its own proxy materials.
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\190\ See supra section II.A.
\191\ State law generally requires that, where a company has
advance notice bylaw provisions, a proposal comply with those
provisions. Advance notice bylaws generally provide procedural and
informational requirements that shareholders must satisfy to submit
valid director nominations or other proposals at a shareholder
meeting, outside of the processes associated with Rule 14a-8 and
proxy access bylaws. Advance notice bylaws generally require a
shareholder who intends to nominate a director or make a proposal at
a shareholder meeting to provide certain information to the company
about itself, its director nominees, and its proposals within a
specified period of time in advance of the meeting.
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The company has two means to vote shares represented by proxies it
receives from shareholders on a given matter, including a shareholder
proposal. The company may seek direct voting authority for a proposal
included in the company's proxy statement and form of proxy (i.e.,
proxy card), in which case the company would receive direction as to
how to vote on the proposal from the selection made (e.g., ``for'' or
``against'' the proposal) by shareholders on their proxy cards.
Alternatively, the company may seek discretionary voting authority (as
further explained below) with respect to a proposal omitted from the
company's proxy statement and proxy card in the limited circumstances
where a company is allowed to do so under the current proxy rules, in
which case the company would be authorized to exercise its discretion
to determine how to vote on the proposal.
Current Rule 14a-4 addresses when a proxy card submitted by a
shareholder may confer discretionary voting authority on the proxy
holder.\192\ Discretionary voting authority under Rule 14a-4(c) is the
proxy holder's power to vote on behalf of a shareholder with respect to
a matter that is not included on the proxy card.\193\ A company may
omit from its proxy card a shareholder proposal presented by means
other than Rule 14a-8 \194\ and may vote the shares represented by
proxies the company receives against the proposal if, under Rule 14a-
4(c), the proposal is a matter on which a proxy may confer
discretionary voting authority. Current 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1) (``Rule
14a-4(c)(1)'') permits a company to exercise discretionary voting
authority at an annual meeting to
[[Page 59921]]
vote the shares represented by proxies with respect to matters for
which the company did not receive timely notice, provided a specific
statement to that effect is made in the company's proxy statement or
form of proxy.\195\ Current 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2) (``Rule 14a-
4(c)(2)'') permits a company to exercise discretionary voting authority
at an annual meeting with respect to matters for which the company has
received timely notice, provided the company includes, in its proxy
statement, ``advice'' \196\ on the nature of the matter and how the
company intends to exercise its discretion to vote on each matter.
Currently, however, a company may not exercise discretionary voting
authority under Rule 14a-4(c)(2) if the shareholder proponent does the
following: (i) notifies the company on a timely basis in accordance
with the rule that it intends to send its own proxy materials to
holders of at least the percentage of the company's voting shares
required under applicable law to carry the proposal; \197\ (ii)
includes the same statement in its own proxy materials; \198\ and (iii)
provides evidence to the company that it has in fact solicited the
holders of at least the percentage of voting shares required to carry
the proposal.\199\
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\192\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4.
\193\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c). This authority differs from
broker discretionary authority, which relates to the ability of
brokers to vote uninstructed shares held in ``street name'' (i.e.,
held in the name of the bank, broker, or other intermediary on
behalf of the shareholder), generally regarding routine matters on
the proxy card. See New York Stock Exchange Rule 452. Discretionary
voting authority under Rule 14a-4(c) also differs from discretionary
authority under 17 CFR 240.14a-4(b)(1) (``Rule 14a-4(b)(1)''),
pursuant to which a company (or soliciting shareholder, as the case
may be) receives the power to vote on behalf of a shareholder
because the shareholder has submitted a signed proxy card without
specifying a choice regarding one or more proposals listed on the
card.
\194\ By ``means other than Rule 14a-8,'' ``other than through
Rule 14a-8,'' or ``outside of the Rule 14a-8 process,'' we mean,
generally, proposals that are submitted pursuant to the advance
notice provisions of a company's governing documents and are a
proper subject for shareholder action under applicable State law,
and that a shareholder intends to present for a vote at the
shareholder meeting but does not expressly request that the company
include in the company's proxy materials.
\195\ Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provides that a company has not received
timely notice if the company did not have notice of the matter at
least 45 days before the date on which the company first sent its
proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of shareholders
(or the date specified by an applicable advance notice provision in
the company's bylaws). In addition, if during the prior year the
company did not hold an annual meeting, or if the date of the
meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year, then
notice is not sufficient if the company has not received it a
``reasonable time'' before the company sends its proxy materials for
the current year. See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1).
\196\ ``Advice'' as currently used in the rule means that a
company must provide brief disclosure regarding the nature of the
proposal.
\197\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(i).
\198\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(ii).
\199\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(2)(iii).
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17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3) (``Rule 14a-4(c)(3)'') through 17 CFR
240.14a-4(c)(7) (``Rule 14a-4(c)(7)'') set forth additional matters on
which a proxy may confer discretionary voting authority. These consist
of:
for solicitations by the company related to special
meetings, or for solicitations by persons other than the company
related to annual or special meetings, matters which the persons making
the solicitation do not know, a ``reasonable time'' before the
solicitation, are to be presented at the meeting, if a specific
statement to that effect is made in the proxy statement or form of
proxy; \200\
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\200\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3).
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approval of the minutes of the prior meeting if such
approval does not amount to ratification of the action taken at that
meeting; \201\
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\201\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(4).
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the election of any person to any office for which a bona
fide nominee is named in a proxy statement and such nominee is unable
to serve or for good cause will not serve; \202\
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\202\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(5).
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any proposal omitted from the proxy statement and form of
proxy pursuant to Rule 14a-8 or 17 CFR 240.14a-9 (``Rule 14a-9'');
\203\ and
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\203\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(6). Rule 14a-9 prohibits the
solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or misleading
statements or omissions.
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matters incident to the conduct of the meeting.\204\
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\204\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(7).
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2. Historical Background
Beginning in 1948, the Commission has sought to balance flexibility
for companies with shareholder protection by adopting amendments to the
rules governing discretionary voting authority, with amendments often
related to the determination of when a company has received sufficient
notice of a shareholder's proposal.\205\ Nonetheless, there have been
numerous disputes between companies and shareholder proponents, often
involving Commission staff as well, regarding the timeliness of
proposals, particularly in the period leading up to, and into, the
1990s.\206\ Under Rule 14a-4 as it existed at that time, a company
could not exercise discretionary voting authority on matters known to
the company a ``reasonable time'' before its solicitation.\207\
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\205\ See Solicitation of Proxies, Release No. 4185 (Nov. 5,
1948) [13 FR 6678 (Nov. 13, 1948)]; see also, e.g., Amendments to
Rules on Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-39093 (Sept. 18,
1997) [62 FR 50682, 50692-50693 (Sept. 26, 1997)] (``1997 Proposing
Release'') (highlighting (i) companies' interest in avoiding
potential delay and expense when they are notified of proposals
after they have begun to print or even mail proxy materials to
shareholders; (ii) shareholders' interest in having some control
over companies' discretionary voting authority on matters for which
the company received adequate notice, meaningful opportunity to
review disclosures in the proxy statement, and sufficient
information to make informed voting decisions; and (iii) companies'
and shareholders' interest in clearer and more predictable ground
rules).
\206\ See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am., et al. v. Pittston
Co., No. 89-0962, 1989 WL 201060 (D.D.C. Nov. 24, 1989) (finding
that the company did not have discretionary voting authority because
it had received sufficient notice, under Rule 14a-4(c)(1), of a
shareholder's proposals, where the shareholder provided the company
the text of the proposals approximately one month before the
company's annual meeting); see also Larkin v. Baltimore Bancorp, 769
F. Supp. 919, 925 (D.Md. 1991) (noting that Commission staff had
notified a company that the company could not exercise discretionary
voting authority where the company received notice of the
dissident's proposals 12 days before the annual meeting); Union of
Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees et al. v. May
Department Stores Company, 26 F. Supp. 2d 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
\207\ At the time, Rule 14a-4(c)(1) provided that ``[a] proxy
may confer discretionary authority to vote with respect to . . .
[m]atters which the persons making the solicitation do not know, a
reasonable time before the solicitation, are to be presented at the
meeting, if a specific statement to that effect is made in the proxy
statement or form of proxy.'' See Proxy and Stockholder Information
Rules, Release No. 34-8206 (Dec. 14, 1967) [32 FR 20960, 20963 (Dec.
29, 1967)].
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With the aim of striking an appropriate balance between the
competing interests involved, the Commission staff, in 1996, expressed
its view in a no-action letter to the Idaho Power Company (the ``Idaho
Power letter'') that it would not object to the exercise of
discretionary voting authority to vote against a timely received
shareholder proposal not subject to Rule 14a-8, so long as the company
advised shareholders about the matter and specified how the shares
would be voted.\208\ The Idaho Power letter also indicated, however,
that in the staff's view a company could not exercise discretionary
voting authority if the proponent delivered a proxy statement and form
of proxy to holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote on the
matter or, if a greater percentage were required under applicable law
to carry the proposal, holders of the minimum required.
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\208\ See Idaho Power Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 WL 114545
(Mar. 13, 1996); see also Borg-Warner Security Corp., SEC No-Action
Letter, 1996 WL 119943 (Mar. 14, 1996). The statements in staff no-
action letters and any other staff statements or guidance referenced
in this release represent the views of Commission staff. See 17 CFR
202.1(d). Any such staff statements are not a rule, regulation, or
statement of the Commission. Further, the Commission has neither
approved nor disapproved their content. These statements, like all
staff statements, have no legal force or effect; they do not alter
or amend applicable law, and they create no new or additional
obligations for any person. See generally Statement of Informal
Procedures for the Rendering of Staff Advice with Respect to
Shareholder Proposals, Release No. 34-12599 (July 7, 1976) [41 FR
29989 (July 20, 1976)].
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In 1997, the Commission proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 to
establish that a proposal would be considered timely if it were
received 45 days before the date on which the company first mailed its
proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting (or otherwise, in
the case of an applicable advance notice bylaw provision).\209\ The
proposed rules also would have permitted companies to exercise
discretionary voting authority on timely received proposals, provided
[[Page 59922]]
companies included in their proxy statements a ``discussion of the
nature'' of the proposals, as well as, on the proxy card, a cross-
reference to this discussion in the proxy statement and a check box to
permit shareholders to prevent the proxy holder from exercising
discretionary voting authority.\210\
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\209\ See 1997 Proposing Release at 50692. The Commission noted
that the availability of discretionary voting authority on proposals
had ``been the subject of litigation and attendant uncertainty.''
\210\ See id. at 50693.
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In 1998, following public comment on the proposed rules, the
Commission declined to adopt the check box concept and instead
effectively adopted the approach set out in the Idaho Power letter,
namely that companies could exercise discretionary voting authority
with respect to timely received proposals, unless, among other matters,
the proponent solicited a sufficient number of shareholders.\211\ The
final rule did, however, retain the proposed 45-day period, or
alternative advance notice deadline, to determine whether a proposal is
timely received.\212\ The Rule 14a-4 framework adopted in 1998
continues to apply today, although, as discussed further below, the
likelihood of companies including shareholder proposals in their proxy
materials even when not required appears to have increased following
the Commission's adoption of the universal proxy rules in 2021.\213\
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\211\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110. This provision was
codified--and remains to this day--as Rule 14a-4(c)(2). See section
II.B.3 below for a discussion of why the Commission in 1998
abandoned the check box approach in favor of the Idaho Power
approach, and why we are now once again proposing to adopt the check
box approach.
\212\ This provision was codified--and remains to this day--as
Rule 14a-4(c)(1). We are now proposing clarifying changes to that
rule. See section II.C. below.
\213\ See infra notes 221 through 223 and related text.
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3. Proposed Rule Amendments
As further described below, under the current proxy rules,
companies may feel compelled to include on their proxy cards certain
shareholder proposals received outside of Rule 14a-8, notwithstanding
that the Federal proxy rules (and existing State law) do not require
that they do so. We are proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) that are
intended to address this issue by providing companies with greater
flexibility to seek and obtain discretionary voting authority regarding
such proposals. At the same time, the proposed amendments would provide
shareholders with the means to elect to prevent the company from
exercising such authority with respect to their individual shares.
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) are aligned with our
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, as companies may receive shareholder
proposals outside of Rule 14a-8 more frequently if Rule 14a-8 is
rescinded, as proposed. As described in more detail below, there are
also independent justifications for the proposed amendments to Rule
14a-4, even if the proposed rescission of Rule14a-8 is not adopted.
We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(2) to no longer prohibit a
company from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to
timely received shareholder proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8
process, regardless of whether the shareholder proponent delivers its
own proxy materials to holders of the requisite percentage of the
company's shares necessary to carry the proposal.
Under the proposed amendments, a company would be able to exercise
discretionary voting authority with respect to timely received
shareholder proposals if it includes: (i) in the proxy statement, a
brief description \214\ of the matter (for example, ``a non-binding
proposal from a pension fund that the company adopt a proxy access
bylaw provision''),\215\ and how the company intends to vote through
its exercise of discretionary authority; (ii) on the proxy card, a
cross-reference to the location of this disclosure in the proxy
statement; and (iii) a check box on the proxy card that, if checked by
a shareholder, would prevent the company from exercising its
discretion.\216\ The Commission declined to adopt a check box
requirement in 1998 due, in part, to some commenters' concerns about
potential shareholder confusion.\217\ However, as discussed below, we
believe that these potential concerns are less likely to materialize
under the proposed amendments.
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\214\ Current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) states that registrants must
include, in the proxy statement, ``advice on the nature of the
matter,'' which results in disclosure of a brief description of the
matter. We propose to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(2) to instead state that
registrants must provide ``a brief description of the matter,''
solely for clarity; we do not intend for this proposed amendment to
change the scope of the disclosure that registrants must provide
regarding the proposal.
\215\ Generally, we would expect that such disclosure, without
more, would suffice. As with any disclosures in the proxy statement,
the description would be subject to the antifraud provision in Rule
14a-9.
\216\ The company's description of the proposal, under the
proposed amendments, remains at the discretion of the company. In
addition, Rule 14a-4(c), as proposed to be amended, would not
establish a right of proponents to comment on, or seek revision of,
the description.
\217\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110. Other commenters
objected to the check box concept because of concerns that the
availability of the box ``would in effect create a new system for
submitting shareholder proposals without having to comply with the
restrictions under [R]ule 14a-8.'' Id. We do not find such arguments
compelling, given that, unlike shareholders that submit proposals
under the current Rule 14a-8 framework, shareholders that submit
proposals outside of Rule 14a-8 must engage in their own
solicitations, and such proposals are not automatically included on
companies' proxy cards.
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By eliminating the circumstances under which a single shareholder
proponent could effectively prevent a company from seeking and
obtaining discretionary voting authority, the proposed amendments are
intended to provide companies with greater flexibility, and
shareholders with greater agency, regarding the use of discretionary
voting authority for proposals that companies receive outside the Rule
14a-8 process. Under the proposed rules, each shareholder would be able
to prevent the company from exercising discretionary voting authority
on such proposals solely with respect to the proxy card the shareholder
returns to the company, while under the current rules, a single
shareholder proponent (through its satisfaction of the solicitation
threshold under Rule 14a-4(c)) may prevent the company from exercising
discretionary voting authority with respect to all proxy cards that the
company receives.
Under the current rules, when a company is unable to exercise
discretionary voting authority for a shareholder proposal received
outside of the Rule 14a-8 process, the company may determine to include
the proposal in its proxy materials even though it is not required to
do so by our rules, so that the company can seek and exercise proxy
voting authority from shareholders on the proposal.\218\ Otherwise, if
the company were to omit the proposal from its proxy card, the company
would be unable to solicit votes with respect to the proposal on the
company's card.\219\ In those circumstances, the proponent's
solicitation effort may obtain sufficient votes needed to pass the
proposal using the proponent's card.\220\ The shareholder proponent,
who may be soliciting less than all shareholders, thus may be able to
effectively obtain
[[Page 59923]]
inclusion of its proposal on a company's proxy card that is distributed
to all shareholders, thereby benefitting from the company's
solicitation efforts toward all shareholders without having to incur
the full costs associated with such solicitation efforts.
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\218\ See Cydney Posner, A Few Interesting Items from the CCR
Proxy Disclosure Conference, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Oct.
24, 2024), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2024/10/24/a-few-interesting-items-from-the-ccr-proxy-disclosure-conference/.
\219\ We note that this discussion assumes that the proponent
has satisfied the solicitation threshold and related requirements
set forth in Rule 14a-4(c)(2)(i)-(iii). If the proponent has not
done so, the company may seek and exercise discretionary authority
to vote against the proponent's proposal. See supra notes 197
through 199 and related text.
\220\ The possibility of the proposal passing is more likely if
the proposal is subject to a majority-of-votes-cast standard as
opposed to, for example, a majority-of-shares-outstanding standard.
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If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed, more proponents may choose
to conduct their own solicitations, including solicitations of the
requisite percentage of shareholders under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2)
that would prevent a company from exercising discretionary voting
authority on proposals omitted from the company's proxy card. Under
those circumstances, if current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) were to remain in
effect, more companies may feel compelled to include a proponent's
proposals in the company's own proxy materials to obtain proxy voting
authority from shareholders on the proposals, which would perpetuate
the ability of proponents to effectively obtain inclusion of their
proposals on the company's proxy card at the company's expense, even if
Rule 14a-8 is rescinded. As discussed in section II.A, part of the
Commission's goal in proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 is to leave
decisions about the appropriate role of shareholder proposals in
corporate governance to the States and companies, by reducing the
impact of the Federal proxy rules on these matters. It would be counter
to that goal if another Commission rule (Rule 14a-4(c)) nonetheless
resulted in companies including shareholder proposals in company proxy
materials even when not required under State law or the company's
governing documents.
In addition, the likelihood of companies including shareholder
proposals in their proxy materials even when not required appears to
have increased in recent years following the Commission's adoption of
the universal proxy rules.\221\ Following those amendments, a
proponent, when conducting a proxy solicitation for a shareholder
proposal, can include the company's director nominees on the
proponent's proxy card, even when the proponent does not present its
own competing director nominees (often referred to as a ``zero slate''
campaign).\222\ In these circumstances, if the company does not also
include the proponent's proposals (submitted outside Rule 14a-8) on the
company's proxy card, shareholders may be more likely to use the
proponent's proxy card to vote their shares instead of the company's
proxy card, given that the proponent's card would provide shareholders
the ability to vote on both the company's nominees and the proponent's
proposals. The proposed amendments are intended to address the pressure
companies may feel to include proponent proposals submitted outside
Rule 14a-8 in the companies' own proxy materials following the adoption
of the universal proxy rules.\223\ Under the proposed amendments, a
proponent's proxy card could include the company's nominees, management
proposals, and the proponent's proposals, while the company's card
could solely include the company's nominees and management proposals.
The company could then exercise discretionary voting authority to vote
proxies it receives against the proponent's proposals, other than for
proxy cards the company receives on which shareholders have checked the
proposed box, as described below.\224\
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\221\ See supra notes 94 through 98 and related text.
\222\ When the Commission adopted the universal proxy rules in
2021, 17 CFR 240.14a-4(d)(1) (``Rule 14a-4(d)(1)''), referred to as
the ``bona fide nominee rule,'' was amended to facilitate the use of
universal proxy cards by requiring a director nominee to consent to
being named in any proxy statement for the meeting rather than just
one specific party's proxy statement. See Universal Proxy Release.
\223\ The Commission staff has observed at least three zero
slate campaigns since the universal proxy rules went into effect in
2022, and in each case the company included the proponent's
proposal(s) on the company's proxy card: in 2024, one by the United
Mine Workers of America with respect to Warrior Met Coal, Inc. (the
company supported one of the five non-binding proposals submitted by
the United Mine Workers of America) and another by Starboard Value
with respect to News Corporation; and in 2026, one by Stilwell
Activist Investments, L.P. with respect to Central Plains
Bancshares, Inc. (the company indicated in its proxy statement that
because Stilwell's ``proposal is advisory in nature only, [the
company] would like to use this proposal as an opportunity for our
stockholders to express their views on this subject.''). In
addition, in the 2026 proxy season, at least two separate
proponents--Trillium Asset Management (with respect to BJ's
Wholesale Club Holdings, Inc.) and Communications Workers of America
(with respect to Nexstar Media Group, Inc.)--threatened zero slate
campaigns in an effort to exert pressure on companies. See Meredith
Ervine, Another Proponent Uses Rule 14a-4 for Multiple Proposals,
The Corporate Counsel (May 1, 2026), available at https://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/2026/05/another-proponent-uses-rule-14a-4-for-multiple-proposals.html.
\224\ We expect that, under the proposed amendments, the company
would not feel compelled to include the proponent's proposals on the
company's proxy card, because the company could seek and exercise
discretionary voting authority to vote the proxy cards the company
receives against the proponent's proposals.
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While we are proposing to expand the circumstances under which a
company may seek and exercise discretionary voting authority, we are
also proposing to require a check box on company proxy cards that would
provide shareholders an option to prohibit the company from exercising
discretionary voting authority on proposals omitted from the company's
proxy card. This proposed requirement is intended to increase
shareholders' control with respect to the company's exercise of
discretionary voting authority by allowing shareholders, particularly
those who are not solicited by a proponent, to vote on a company's
proxy card without effectively obligating those shareholders to grant
discretionary authority to the company to vote those shareholders'
shares on matters not included on the card. Without the proposed check
box, simply by voting on a company's card, rather than on a proponent's
card, the shareholder would grant the company discretionary authority
to vote on any matters not included on the company's card. Under those
circumstances, such a shareholder would typically have two choices. One
option would be to vote using the company's proxy card notwithstanding
that the company may use its discretionary authority to vote the
shareholder's shares contrary to the shareholder's wishes on a proposal
omitted from the card. Unless the shareholder is able to attend the
meeting or obtain a proxy card from the proponent, the shareholder's
other option would be to not vote at all.\225\
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\225\ See John C. Coffee, Jr. The Bylaw Battlefield: Can
Institutions Change the Outcome of Corporate Control Contests? 51 U.
Miami L. Rev. 605, 620 (1997) (stating that if a shareholder is not
solicited, ``the public shareholder faces Hobson's Choice: the
shareholder can either grant a proxy to management (knowing that
management will vote against this proposal) or refrain from
voting''); see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Proxy Rules and
Restrictions on Shareholder Voting Rights, 47 Seton Hall L. Rev. 45,
79 (2016) (stating that the ``rule allows for the involuntary
transfer of voting rights for proposals known to management well in
advance of the meeting. Shareholders are left with a Hobson's choice
of either conceding the transfer or preventing discretionary
authority by giving up the right to vote'' (internal citations
omitted) (citing Coffee, supra, at 620)).
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In addition, under the current rules, a proponent effectively has
the ability to determine whether the company is prevented from seeking
and exercising discretionary voting authority--on behalf of all
shareholders--with respect to the proponent's proposals, through the
proponent's decision whether to solicit the requisite percentage of
shareholders. The presence of the check box, alongside the absence of a
solicitation threshold under the proposed rules that would restrict the
company's ability to exercise discretionary voting authority, would
shift that agency from the proponent to each individual shareholder to
make that determination on an individual basis.
[[Page 59924]]
In sum, we believe that the check box would appropriately balance
the additional flexibility granted to companies under the proposed
rules with the ability of shareholders to prevent companies from
exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to their shares.
Providing this option is consistent with Congress's intent that section
14(a) and the Federal proxy rules facilitate the exercise of
shareholders' voting rights under State law through the proxy
process.\226\
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\226\ See Statement of Chairman Purcell (``[t]he rights that we
are endeavoring to assure to the stockholders are those rights that
he has traditionally had under State law . . .''); see also H.R.
Rep. No. 1383 at 13, 73 Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) (``Fair corporate
suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity
security bought on a public exchange.'').
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With respect to concerns that were raised in the past \227\
indicating that a check box might create confusion among shareholders,
we believe that, given the practice of most shareholders to cast their
votes through electronic voting platforms rather than paper proxy
cards,\228\ as well as the resulting shareholder familiarity with
electronic voting platforms and continued advances in the ease of use
of electronic voting platforms, the risk of confusion has been reduced.
In addition, both companies and shareholder proponents could further
mitigate confusion by including clear instructions and disclosure in
their proxy materials. Such instructions and disclosure could address,
for example, the treatment under State law of the proxy cards of a
shareholder voting to approve a shareholder proposal on a proponent's
proxy card and later not marking the check box on the company's card,
thereby allowing the company to exercise discretion to vote against the
shareholder proposal.\229\
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\227\ See 1998 Adopting Release at 29110.
\228\ See Broadridge Financial Solutions, 2025 Proxy Season Key
Stats and Performance Ratings, available at https://www.broadridge.com/_assets/pdf/2025proxykeystats_report.pdf (``Over
97% of the voted shares were cast electronically via Broadridge's
secure digital platforms.'').
\229\ We believe that, as a matter of both current technology
and State law, proxy service providers' electronic voting platforms
should be able to accommodate the submission of multiple proxy cards
by the same shareholder and to ensure that non-conflicting
instructions are in fact honored and tabulated across such cards.
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Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) would require at least a single check
box, regardless of the number of matters subject to discretionary
voting authority under the rule. We are proposing that companies may
use a single check box, as opposed to requiring a check box for each
non-management proposal subject to discretionary voting authority, to
address potential shareholder confusion, as a single check box would
result in a simpler proxy card in situations involving multiple
shareholder proposals. The proposed use of a single check box allows a
company to avoid listing all non-management proposals subject to
discretionary voting authority on the proxy card, which would be
necessary under a multiple-check-box approach and potentially create a
system for effectively providing shareholder proposals access to the
company's proxy card.\230\ However, nothing in the proposed rules would
prevent a company from voluntarily providing multiple check boxes for
multiple non-management proposals subject to discretionary voting
authority, should a company wish to provide shareholders with
additional flexibility.
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\230\ See supra note 217.
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Request for Comment
14. Should we adopt the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)? Why
or why not?
15. Do the proposed amendments, taken as a whole, strike an
appropriate balance between, on the one hand, guarding against possible
abuse of discretionary voting authority by companies, and, on the other
hand, avoiding the present situation where proponents, as a practical
matter, are often able to obtain inclusion of their proposals in
companies' proxy materials while not fully bearing the costs of
solicitation?
16. If the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) and the proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 are adopted, are there reasons to expect that
a company may continue to voluntarily include, on its own proxy card,
shareholder proposals as to which proponents are conducting their own
solicitation?
17. Under the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), consistent
with the requirements of the current rule, a company would be able to
exercise discretionary voting authority if, among other things, it
includes in its proxy statement a brief description of the proposal.
Accordingly, a company would not need to disclose the full text of a
non-Rule 14a-8 proposal to exercise discretionary voting authority.
Should we maintain in the proposed amendments the requirement for a
brief description of the proposal? Is the disclosure currently provided
by companies under this requirement appropriate to inform shareholders
about shareholder proposals submitted outside of Rule 14a-8 as to which
the company intends to exercise discretionary voting authority? Would a
brief description provide sufficient information for a shareholder to
assess the company's position on the proposal and to decide whether to
prohibit the company from exercising discretionary voting authority via
the proposed check box or leave the box unmarked thereby permitting the
company to exercise discretionary voting authority? In addition, are
there reasons that we should require companies to identify the specific
source of the proposal as part of the brief description of the
proposal?
18. Should we adopt the check box requirement, as proposed? Why or
why not? Should we instead consider an amendment allowing companies to
exercise discretionary voting authority while not providing
shareholders with the means to elect to prevent the company from
exercising such authority with respect to their individual shares via a
check box? Should the requirement that companies provide the check box
be tied to a particular solicitation threshold being met by the
relevant proponent? Why or why not?
19. Should we consider any modifications to the proposed check box
requirement, or a different mechanism to give shareholders an option to
prevent the company from exercising discretionary voting authority on
matters not included on the proxy card? For example, should the default
rule be that companies do not have discretionary voting authority, and
that shareholders must check a box to elect to grant such authority?
20. We are proposing that companies may use a single check box, as
opposed to requiring a check box for each non-management proposal
subject to discretionary voting authority. As an alternative approach,
should we instead require companies to include a check box for each
non-management proposal subject to discretionary voting authority,
thereby allowing shareholders the option to prevent the company from
exercising its discretion on each such matter on an individualized
basis?
21. Could the proposed check box be confusing to shareholders? What
challenges may occur in implementing the proposed check box requirement
(including shareholders' use of the check box)? How could such
challenges be mitigated?
22. A shareholder that submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8 to
a company may not be aware of proposals submitted by other proponents.
Under the current rules, a soliciting shareholder may exercise
discretionary authority to vote the shares represented by proxies it
receives on matters that it
[[Page 59925]]
does not know, a ``reasonable time'' before its solicitation, are to be
presented at the meeting, so long as a specific statement to that
effect is made in the shareholder's proxy statement or form of
proxy.\231\ Given the uncertainty associated with ``a reasonable
time,'' and the potential for this provision (Rule 14a-4(c)(3)) to be
used more frequently in light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8,
should we amend Rule 14a-4(c)(3) to replace ``a reasonable time'' with
a definite length of time, such as three or five business days before
the date on which the shareholder proponent's proxy statement and form
of proxy are first sent or given to shareholders? Why or why not? As
this rule covers both companies in non-annual meeting situations and
shareholders in all situations, would there be reasons to distinguish
between companies and shareholders when it comes to establishing the
appropriate timing requirement?
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\231\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(3).
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23. Should companies be required to notify proponents when other
proponents submit proposals outside of Rule 14a-8? If so, what
deadlines and method of notification would be appropriate?
24. It is our understanding that, generally, under State law, a
later dated proxy card overrides an earlier dated proxy card. However,
we also understand that, to the extent that no conflict or
inconsistency is present as between two (or more) proxy cards (for
example, a shareholder marks the check box on the company's proxy card
so as not to confer discretionary voting authority to the company on a
proposal, and separately votes either for or against a proposal on the
proponent's card), State law generally is capable of honoring or
otherwise resolving the voting choices made on each of the cards. Are
there additional amendments to our rules that we should consider to
facilitate the reconciliation of a shareholder's instructions on
multiple proxy cards, or any other factors with respect to the proxy
process or State law we should take into consideration, particularly
related to the proposed check box? Please explain in detail. Would
proxy service providers' electronic voting platforms be able to
accommodate the submission of multiple proxy cards by the same
shareholder and to ensure that non-conflicting instructions are in fact
honored and tabulated across such cards?
25. Should we amend 17 CFR 240.14a-101 (``Schedule 14A'') to
require companies to provide a brief description of shareholder
proposals not included on the company's proxy card and for which the
company does not seek discretionary voting authority? Why or why not?
C. Other Proposed Amendments
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), if adopted as proposed, would necessitate
corresponding amendments to other provisions of the proxy rules. We are
also proposing certain amendments to facilitate implementation of these
proposed changes to the proxy rules.
As discussed above in section II.B., current Rule 14a-4(c)
addresses when a proxy card submitted by a shareholder may confer
discretionary voting authority on the proxy holder, and current Rule
14a-4(c)(1) sets forth deadlines for determining whether a company has
received timely notice of a matter for purposes of exercising
discretionary voting authority on such matter.\232\ We are proposing to
amend Rule 14a-4(c) to clarify that discretionary voting authority
under this provision only relates to matters that are not included on
the proxy card.\233\ We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(1) to
clarify that a company's advance notice provision, or an applicable
State or foreign law provision, generally determines whether a company
has received timely notice of a matter, and, only in the absence of
such a provision would the default deadline under Rule 14a-4(c)(1)
(i.e., at least 45 days before the date on which the company first sent
its proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of
shareholders, as is currently the case under the rule) apply. We are
also similarly proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c)(1) to provide that if a
company did not hold an annual meeting during the prior year, or if the
date of the meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year,
any deadline established under the company's advance notice provision,
or an applicable State or foreign law provision, would govern instead
of the default deadline in the current rule (i.e., a reasonable time
before the registrant sends its proxy materials), which would, under
the proposed amendment, only apply in the absence of such a
provision.\234\
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\232\ See supra section II.B.
\233\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c).
\234\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(1).
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We are also proposing to delete 17 CFR 240.14a-4(c)(6) (``Rule 14a-
4(c)(6)'').\235\ In light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2), we do not see benefit in
retaining Rule 14a-4(c)(6). Retaining the provision with only a
reference to Rule 14a-9 may further expand the ability of companies to
use discretionary voting authority but without providing the disclosure
required by proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2).
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\235\ Rule 14a-4(c)(6) currently states that a proxy may confer
discretionary authority to vote on ``[a]ny proposal omitted from the
proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to Sec. 240.14a-8 or
Sec. 240.14a-9 of this chapter.''
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Current 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e) (``Rule 14a-5(e)'') sets forth certain
deadlines that must be disclosed in all proxy statements.\236\ We
propose to amend 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(1) (``Rule 14a-5(e)(1)'') to
reflect that, if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as proposed, the relevant
deadline, if any, for submitting shareholder proposals for inclusion in
a company's proxy statement and form of proxy would be pursuant to an
applicable State or foreign law provision or the company's governing
documents, which would eliminate the reference to Rule 14a-8 currently
in the rule.\237\ Similarly, we propose to amend 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(2)
(``Rule 14a-5(e)(2)'') to provide that the deadline required to be
disclosed under that provision relates to shareholder proposals for
which the shareholder is not seeking inclusion in the company's proxy
statement and form of proxy and also to eliminate the current reference
to Rule 14a-8.\238\ The deadline to be disclosed under Rule 14a-
5(e)(2), as proposed to be amended, would be the deadline set forth in
Rule 14a-4(c)(1), as proposed to be amended, which would be the
deadline established under an applicable State or foreign law provision
or the company's governing documents, or, in the absence of such a
provision, the default deadline under Rule 14a-4(c)(1).
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\236\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e).
\237\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(1).
\238\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(2).
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Current 17 CFR 240.14a-5(f) (``Rule 14a-5(f)'') sets forth a
registrant's obligations to disclose changed deadlines under Rules 14a-
5(e)(1) and (e)(2) in the event of a change in the date of the
registrant's annual meeting. We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-5(f) to
require that such disclosure be provided regarding paragraphs (e)(1)
through (e)(4) of Rule 14a-5 to the extent applicable.\239\ Currently,
the rule only requires disclosure of changed deadlines with respect to
paragraphs (e)(1) and (e)(2) of Rule 14a-5, but the same rationale for
requiring such disclosure--i.e., the need to inform
[[Page 59926]]
shareholders of such changes in a timely manner--applies equally to
changed deadlines under paragraphs (e)(3) and (e)(4).\240\
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\239\ See proposed 17 CFR 240.14a-5(f).
\240\ 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(3) relates to the deadline for
submitting nominees for inclusion in the registrant's proxy
statement and form of proxy pursuant to an applicable State or
foreign law provision or a registrant's governing documents as they
relate to the inclusion of shareholder director nominees in the
registrant's proxy materials for the registrant's next annual
meeting of shareholders. 17 CFR 240.14a-5(e)(4) relates to the
deadline for providing notice of a solicitation of proxies in
support of director nominees other than the registrant's nominees
pursuant to 17 CFR 240.14a-19 for the registrant's next annual
meeting unless the registrant is an investment company registered
under the Investment Company Act or a business development company
as defined by section 2(a)(48) of the Investment Company Act (15
U.S.C. 80a-2(a)(48)).
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We also propose to amend current 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a) (``Rule 14a-
6(a)''), which sets forth the circumstances in which companies are not
required to file a preliminary proxy statement. Under current Rule 14a-
6(a),\241\ companies are not required to file proxy materials in
preliminary form on account of the inclusion of a shareholder proposal
under Rule 14a-8.\242\ There is not currently an analogous provision
for companies that receive adequate notice of a shareholder proposal
submitted outside of Rule 14a-8, and in fact, current Rule 14a-6(a)
explicitly states that companies are not excluded from the preliminary
proxy statement filing requirement if they, in their proxy materials,
comment upon or refer to a solicitation in opposition.\243\
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\241\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a).
\242\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a)(3).
\243\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6(a); Note 3 to paragraph (a) of Rule
14a-6.
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We believe that a company should not be required to file a
preliminary proxy statement and form of proxy whenever the company
provides disclosure in accordance with Rule 14a-4(c)(2). At the same
time, we believe that a preliminary filing by a company may be
appropriate when that company is facing a shareholder proposal that is
the subject of an independent, non-exempt solicitation. Therefore, we
are proposing amendments that would provide that a company does not
need to file its proxy statement in preliminary form solely because of
the submission of a shareholder proposal.\244\ However, we are
proposing that the company would need to file preliminary proxy
materials if such a shareholder proposal, or the company's election of
directors, involves a ``solicitation in opposition,'' which would
include any solicitation (other than a solicitation exempt under 17 CFR
240.14a-2 (``Rule 14a-2'')): (i) subject to Rule 14a-19; (ii) to vote
against or withhold votes from any of the registrant's director
nominee(s); (iii) to vote against a proposal that the registrant
expressly supports in its proxy materials; and (iv) to vote in support
of a proposal that the registrant does not expressly support in its
proxy materials.\245\ In each case, the registrant's obligation to file
in preliminary form is subject to the additional condition that the
registrant knows, or reasonably should know, of such solicitation.\246\
In other words, just the inclusion of a shareholder proposal in a
company's proxy materials (or the exclusion therefrom), without a
corresponding non-exempt solicitation made by the shareholder
proponent, would not require the company to file a preliminary proxy
statement. If, however, (i) the company includes a shareholder proposal
in (or excludes from) its proxy materials and (ii) the shareholder
proponent prepares and distributes its own proxy materials to
shareholders, the company would be required to file a preliminary proxy
statement.\247\
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\244\ Rule 14a-6(a) currently states that ``[a] registrant . . .
shall not file with the Commission a preliminary proxy statement''
with respect to an annual meeting (or special meeting in lieu of the
annual meeting) at which only the enumerated matters are to be acted
upon. See Rule 14a-6(a). We propose to change ``shall not file'' to
``need not file'' in order to clarify that companies are permitted
to voluntarily file in preliminary form.
\245\ A registrant's disclosure under proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2)
that it intends to exercise its discretion to vote against a
proposal omitted from the proxy card would constitute the registrant
``not expressly support[ing]'' the proposal for purposes of clause
(iv), thereby requiring the registrant to file in preliminary form,
so long as the proponent is conducting an independent, non-exempt
solicitation. Our approach taken under the proposed rules is
designed to be consistent with the approach taken under the current
rules, in that under both the existing and proposed framework, with
respect to a ``solicitation in opposition,'' a registrant's
obligation to make a preliminary filing arises if and only if a
matter is truly contested, as determined by the existence of an
independent, non-exempt solicitation by a shareholder.
\246\ A company would know, for example, of materials furnished
or filed on the company's EDGAR page and of notices submitted to the
company pursuant to a company's advance notice bylaw.
\247\ Rule 14a-6(a) currently requires that shareholder
proponents file proxy materials in preliminary form in all cases
without exception. We do not propose to change that requirement.
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In addition, we propose to delete current Note 2 to paragraph (a)
of Rule 14a-6,\248\ as companies already are aware of the importance of
verifying the accuracy and completeness of information in their proxy
materials, as well as the benefits associated with filing preliminary
proxy materials at the earliest practicable date.\249\ While these
instructions were helpful when adopted over 50 years ago, we believe
they are no longer necessary.\250\ Relatedly, we are proposing to amend
17 CFR 240.14c-5(a) (``Rule 14c-5(a)''), which sets forth the
circumstances in which companies are not required to file a preliminary
information statement,\251\ in the same manner as we propose to amend
Rule 14a-6(a), to the extent applicable.
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\248\ The first sentence of current Note 2 to paragraph (a) of
Rule 14a-6 states that ``[t]he official responsible for the
preparation of the proxy material should make every effort to verify
the accuracy and completeness of the information required by the
applicable rules.'' See current Note 2 to paragraph (a) of Rule 14a-
6.
\249\ The specific filing deadline is set out in the opening
sentence of Rule 14a-6(a), which requires that preliminary proxy
materials be filed with the Commission at least 10 calendar days
prior to the date definitive copies of such materials are first sent
or given to security holders.
\250\ See Proxy and Stockholder Information Rules, Release No.
34-8206 (Dec. 14, 1967) [32 FR 20960 (Dec. 29, 1967)].
\251\ The information statement required to be distributed to
shareholders from whom the company is not soliciting proxies is
intended to provide those shareholders with information equivalent
to that which is provided to shareholders in a proxy statement. See
Stockholder Information Statements, Release No. 34-7774 (Dec. 30,
1965) [31 FR 262 (Jan. 7, 1966)] (noting that information statements
delivered to shareholders pursuant to Regulation 14C are ``required
to contain substantially the same information as that which would be
required in a proxy statement if proxies were solicited.''). The
information statement is required by section 14(c) of the Exchange
Act.
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We also propose to amend Rule 14c-101 to remove Item 4 from
Schedule 14C and to amend Rule 14c-5(a) to remove the references to
Item 4.\252\ Currently, if a company will distribute an information
statement required by 17 CFR 240.14c-2 and a shareholder has submitted
a proposal for action at the shareholder meeting a reasonable time
before the company distributes the information statement, the company
must ``make a statement to that effect, identify the proposal and
indicate the disposition proposed to be made of the proposal by the
[company] at the meeting.'' \253\ If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded as
proposed and Rule 14a-4(c)(2) is amended as proposed, the only
circumstance in which a company would be expressly required by the
Federal proxy rules to identify or describe a shareholder proposal in
its proxy materials would be if the company is seeking to exercise
discretionary voting authority with respect to a proposal not included
on its proxy card under proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2). That circumstance
would not arise in connection with an information statement that is
distributed to shareholders from whom proxies are not solicited.
Accordingly, we propose to
[[Page 59927]]
remove Item 4 of Schedule 14C, which requires the company to identify
timely received shareholder proposals in information statements, so
that, under the proposed amendments, shareholders receiving proxy
statements and information statements receive equivalent information.
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\252\ See Rule 14c-5(a)(3) and Note 3 to Rule 14c-5(a).
\253\ Item 4 of Rule 14c-101 (Schedule 14C).
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Finally, we are also proposing to remove references \254\ to Rule
14a-8 throughout the Federal securities rules.\255\
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\254\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b), 14a-5(e)(1)-(2), 17 CFR 200.30-
1(f)(4), 17 CFR 200.82, Instruction 4 to 17 CFR 229.407(f), 17 CFR
232.101(c)(3), and Item 5.07(d) of Form 8-K.
\255\ The Commission recently proposed and is concurrently
proposing amendments to certain proxy rules in other Commission
proposing releases. See Electronic Delivery of Information Under the
Federal Securities Laws, Release No. 33-11430 (July 16, 2026) [91 FR
45884 (July 21, 2026)] (``Reg E-Delivery Proposal''), Proxy
Solicitation Modernization, Release No. 34-106385 (September 16,
2026) [[] FR [] ([], 2026)] (``Proxy
Solicitation Modernization Proposal''). The discussion in section II
of the amendments we are proposing in this release does not reflect
the amendments to certain proxy rules proposed in other Commission
releases because they have not been adopted. Similarly, the text of
proposed amendments set forth in this release does not reflect the
amendments to certain proxy rules proposed in other Commission
releases because they have not been adopted.
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Request for Comment
26. Should we adopt the additional proposed amendments discussed
above? Why or why not?
27. We are proposing to delete Rule 14a-4(c)(6) in its entirety.
Should we instead remove the rule's current reference to Rule 14a-8 but
retain the reference to Rule 14a-9? Why or why not?
28. Have we taken the appropriate approach in proposing revisions
to Rule 14a-6(a) (regarding companies' preliminary proxy statement
filing requirements) and Rule 14c-5(a) (regarding companies'
preliminary information statement filing requirements)? Have we
selected the appropriate types of ``solicitations in opposition'' for
which a preliminary proxy statement filing by the company would be
required under the proposal? Is our proposal underinclusive or
overinclusive in that respect? Relatedly, should we consider any
changes to Rule 14a-6(a)'s current requirement that shareholder
proponents file proxy materials in preliminary form in all cases
without exception? Are there any considerations particular to
information statements, as compared to proxy statements, that we should
take into account?
29. Our proposed changes to Rule 14a-6(a) and Rule 14c-5(a) also
would remove current rule text providing that a registrant's commenting
on or referring to a solicitation in opposition is a trigger for a
preliminary filing. Would it be more appropriate to retain that element
of these rules? Are there any benefits associated with a company filing
in preliminary form under these circumstances?
30. We are proposing to amend Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5 to provide
that a registrant's obligation to file in preliminary form is subject
to the additional condition that a registrant knows, or reasonably
should know, of a non-exempt solicitation in opposition described in
proposed Note 2 to paragraph (a) \256\ of Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5.
Should we instead include a different standard in proposed Note 2 to
paragraph (a) of Rule 14a-6 and Rule 14c-5? For example, should we
amend the rule to provide that the registrant's obligation to file in
preliminary form is subject to the additional condition that a
shareholder has filed proxy materials in connection with the
shareholder's solicitation in opposition?
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\256\ By ``proposed Note 2 to paragraph (a),'' we are referring
to the proposed revision to current Note 3 to paragraph (a), which
we propose to redesignate as Note 2 given the proposed deletion of
current Note 2, for each of Rule 14a-6(a) and Rule 14c-5(a).
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31. We are proposing to remove Item 4 of Schedule 14C,\257\ which
requires a company to disclose that it has received a shareholder
proposal and identify that proposal, if it receives such a proposal a
``reasonable time'' before the information statement is to be
transmitted to security holders.\258\ Should we instead retain Item 4?
Are there any changes we should make to Item 4, if retained?
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\257\ 17 CFR 240.14c-101.
\258\ Such disclosure need only be provided if the shareholder
provides notice to the company of the shareholder's intention to
present the proposal for action at the meeting. See Item 4 of 17 CFR
240.14c-101.
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32. In light of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 and the other rules discussed above,
are there other aspects of any of the Commission's proxy rules that we
should amend or as to which market participants would benefit from
additional guidance?
D. General Request for Comment
We request and encourage any interested person to submit comments
on any aspect of the proposed amendments, other matters that might have
an impact on the proposed amendments, and any suggestions for
additional changes. With respect to any comments, we note that they are
of greatest assistance if accompanied by supporting data and analysis
of the issues addressed in those comments and by alternatives to our
proposals where appropriate.
III. Other Matters
This proposing release is an economically significant regulatory
action under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866 and has been
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB''), consistent
with Executive Order 14215. This action, if finalized as proposed, is
expected to be an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action.
IV. Economic Analysis
A. Introduction
The Commission is mindful of the costs imposed by, and the benefits
obtained from, its rules. Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
and section 3(f) of the Exchange Act require the Commission, when
engaging in rulemaking where it is required to consider or determine
whether an action is necessary or appropriate in the public interest,
to consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the
action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.\259\ Section 23(a)(2) of the Exchange Act separately
requires the Commission to consider the effects on competition of any
rules it adopts under the Exchange Act and prohibits the Commission
from adopting any rule that would impose a burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Exchange
Act.\260\
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\259\ See 15 U.S.C. 77b(b); 15 U.S.C. 78c(f).
\260\ See 15 U.S.C. 78w(a)(2).
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We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8, which requires companies to
include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials, subject to
certain procedural requirements and substantive bases for exclusion. We
are also proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), which governs the
circumstances under which a company may exercise discretionary voting
authority with respect to matters not included on the company's proxy
card. Although these two proposed changes to our rules are separate and
address distinct aspects of the proxy rules, they both have
implications for the costs and burdens associated with the proxy
solicitation process for shareholders and companies. Accordingly, where
appropriate, we consider how the economic effects of the two proposed
changes might interact with one another.
This economic analysis identifies the principal economic effects of
the proposed amendments, the parties that would bear them, and the key
sources
[[Page 59928]]
of uncertainty that would affect the magnitude of those effects. Many
of the benefits and costs identified in this analysis are difficult to
quantify with precision. Where quantification is not practicable, the
analysis provides a qualitative assessment of the expected direction
and relative magnitude of the relevant effects. The Commission
encourages commenters to provide data, including relevant quantitative
estimates, and information that would help quantify the benefits and
costs of the proposed amendments and their potential impacts on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
B. Baseline
The baseline against which the costs, benefits, and the impact on
efficiency, competition, and capital formation of the proposed
amendments are measured consists of the current regulatory framework
governing the shareholder proposal process as well as the current
practices of companies and shareholders related to shareholder
proposals.\261\
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\261\ See, e.g., Nasdaq v. SEC, 34 F.4th 1105, 1111-14 (D.C.
Cir. 2022). This approach also follows Commission staff guidance on
economic analysis for rulemaking. See SEC Staff, Current Guidance on
Economic Analysis in SEC Rulemaking (Mar. 16, 2012), available at
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/riskfin/rsfi_guidance_econ_analy_secrulemaking.pdf (``The economic
consequences of proposed rules (potential costs and benefits
including effects on efficiency, competition, and capital formation)
should be measured against a baseline, which is the best assessment
of how the world would look in the absence of the proposed
action.''); id. at 7 (``The baseline includes both the economic
attributes of the relevant market and the existing regulatory
structure.'').
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1. Current Regulatory Framework
State laws, company charters and bylaws (and other governing
documents), and the Federal securities laws jointly govern the
shareholder proposal process. State law determines the substantive and
procedural requirements for presenting a shareholder proposal for a
vote at the annual meeting, whereas the Federal proxy rules currently
govern (i) procedural and substantive conditions for when shareholder
proposals must be included in, or may be excluded from, a company's
proxy materials under Rule 14a-8 and (ii) the process for soliciting
authority to vote on such matters by proxy under Rule 14a-4.
a. Commission Rules
Currently, the Federal proxy rules provide shareholders two methods
to present proposals for consideration by company shareholders who
intend to vote by proxy. First, a shareholder may seek to include its
proposal in the company's proxy materials pursuant to Rule 14a-8. Among
other things, Rule 14a-8 specifies procedural and substantive
requirements that a shareholder must satisfy to have a proposal
included in the company's proxy materials. The requirements of Rule
14a-8 are described in further detail in section II.A.1.
Second, a shareholder may conduct its own solicitation for its
proposal, at the shareholder's expense, using its own proxy
statement.\262\ To do so, the shareholder must comply with the
requirements to furnish a proxy statement,\263\ satisfy the form and
disclosure requirements regarding the proxy card,\264\ and the
presentation and disclosure requirements regarding the proxy
statement,\265\ file the applicable preliminary and definitive proxy
materials,\266\ and ensure that the solicitation does not contain any
materially false or misleading statements.\267\ With respect to
independent solicitations, where a company omits from its proxy card a
proposal presented through an independent solicitation, Rule 14a-4(c)
specifies the circumstances under which a company may exercise
discretionary authority to vote on such proposals by proxy. The current
regulatory framework governing a company's discretionary authority to
vote on proposals that will be presented at a shareholder meeting but
not included in the company's proxy materials is described in further
detail in section II.B.1.
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\262\ See generally 17 CFR part 240, Regulation 14A.
\263\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-3.
\264\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4.
\265\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-5; 17 CFR 240.14a-101.
\266\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-6.
\267\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-9.
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Beyond these provisions, several other aspects of the Federal proxy
rules bear on the shareholder proposal process. For instance, the
Federal proxy rules currently allow proponents to include the company's
director nominees on their own proxy card, even if they do not nominate
alternative directors.\268\ When shareholders undertake a zero slate
campaign, companies may choose to include shareholder proposals on
their own proxy cards in order to exercise proxy voting authority with
respect to those proposals.\269\ If so, this may result in those
proponents having their proposals considered by all shareholders rather
than only the shareholders that were solicited by the proponent.
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\268\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-4(d)(1); supra note 222.
\269\ The Commission staff has observed at least three zero
slate campaigns since the universal proxy rules went into effect in
2022, and in each case the company included the proponent's
proposal(s) on the company's proxy card. See supra note 223.
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In addition, Rule 14a-2 provides multiple exemptions for certain
shareholder communications and solicitations, either by shareholders or
certain third parties, from the proxy disclosure and filing
requirements that may provide alternatives to the Rule 14a-8 submission
process or independent non-exempt solicitations.\270\
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\270\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2; see also generally 17 CFR part 240,
Regulation 14A.
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Finally, the Commission is concurrently proposing amendments to
modernize certain rules related to proxy solicitations.\271\ If adopted
as proposed, those amendments primarily would eliminate the requirement
that registrants deliver an annual report to security holders,
eliminate the delivery deadline when documents are incorporated by
reference into a proxy statement, eliminate the requirement to file
soliciting material regarding certain exempt solicitations, and shorten
the minimum broker search period for proxy solicitations.
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\271\ See Proxy Solicitation Modernization Proposal.
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b. State Law and Corporate Charters and Bylaws on Shareholder Proposals
State law and, if State law permits, company governing documents
govern when and how shareholder proposals can be presented for a
shareholder vote.\272\ Notwithstanding that such matters are
traditionally reserved to the States, State law is often silent or
ambiguous about what matters may be presented for a shareholder vote.
For example, State law is unclear as to whether the presentation of
nonbinding shareholder proposals is permitted.\273\ Because shareholder
proposals fall under the purview of State law, States may enact
legislation that either enables or restricts the ability of
shareholders to submit proposals. One State recently enacted
legislation permitting companies to impose additional eligibility
requirements on shareholders
[[Page 59929]]
seeking to submit proposals for approval at a shareholder meeting.\274\
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\272\ See e.g., Restatement of the Law, Corporate Governance
section 1.01 cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 2022) and the MBCA sections 7.01
through 7.05 (shareholder meetings and voting), section 7.04
(shareholder amendment of bylaws), section 10.20 (shareholder action
by written consent) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2016); see also Thomas Lee Hazen,
Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation section 10:27 (7th ed.
2016). While shareholder voting rights are typically defined by
State law, as discussed in section II.A.1.a, there are instances in
which Federal law may establish voting rights for shareholders. This
is especially true with respect to registered investment companies.
See section II.A.3.
\273\ See supra section II.A.2.a.
\274\ See supra note 161 and related text.
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If permitted under State law, companies generally may establish or
modify shareholder rights through their charter or bylaw
provisions.\275\ For example, State corporate law may provide default
rules that govern shareholder action, while allowing companies to
modify such rules through their governing documents. As a result,
companies may have the ability to adopt provisions in their governing
documents that expand, limit, or eliminate certain procedures and
conditions related to shareholder action.\276\
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\275\ See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act section7.04(b) (permitting
corporations to alter the default rule requiring unanimous written
consent by specifying alternative consent thresholds in their
articles of incorporation).
\276\ See, e.g., 8 Del. C. section228 (permitting corporations
to restrict shareholder action by written consent through the
certificate of incorporation); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law section601(b)
(authorizing bylaws to address matters relating to shareholder
rights and powers); Model Bus. Corp. Act section7.04 (permitting
corporations to modify the default rule requiring unanimous written
consent).
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2. Affected Parties
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
to Rule 14a-4(c) would affect different but overlapping populations.
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would primarily affect companies
subject to the Federal proxy rules that receive shareholder proposals
submitted pursuant to Rule 14a-8, as well as the proponents of those
proposals and the non-proponent shareholders of those companies. The
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would primarily affect companies
that receive shareholder proposals presented through proponents' own
proxy solicitations, as well as the proponents of those proposals and
the non-proponent shareholders of those companies. In addition, the
proposed amendments could have indirect effects on providers of
administrative and advisory services related to proxy solicitation and
shareholder voting.
a. Companies
Companies that have a class of equity securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act are subject to the Federal proxy rules,
including Rule 14a-8 and Rule 14a-4(c). In addition, registered
investment companies and business development companies are subject to
the Federal proxy rules.\277\ Finally, there are certain companies that
voluntarily file proxy materials that could be affected to the extent
that they receive shareholder proposals.
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\277\ See supra section II.A.3. Business development companies
are a category of closed-end investment company that are not
registered under the Investment Company Act [15 U.S.C. 80a-
2(a)(48)].
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We estimate that 5,357 companies, including 142 business
development companies, had a class of securities registered under
section 12 of the Exchange Act and filed on domestic forms during
calendar year 2025.\278\ This estimate represents an upper bound
estimate of the number of potentially affected companies because some
of these companies may not file proxy materials or receive a
shareholder proposal in a given year. Out of the 5,357 potentially
affected companies mentioned above, 4,527 (85 percent) filed proxy
materials with the Commission during calendar year 2025.\279\ In
addition, there were 74 companies that voluntarily filed proxy
materials in calendar year 2025.\280\
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\278\ We estimate the number of companies other than issuers of
asset-backed securities and registered investment companies with a
class of securities registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act
by reviewing all filers, by unique Central Index Key (CIK), of Forms
10-K and amendments thereto filed during calendar year 2025.
\279\ The proxy materials we consider in our analysis are
materials filed via EDGAR under submission types DEF 14A, DEF 14C,
DEFA14A, DEFC14A, DEFM14A, DEFM14C, DEFR14A, DEFR14C, DFAN14A, PRE
14A, PRE 14C, PREC14A, PREM14A, PREM14C, PRER14A, PRER14C, N-14, S-
4, and F-4. Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 can be a registration statement
and/or proxy statement. For purposes of this economic analysis, we
have reviewed all Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 filed during calendar
year 2025 with the Commission and excluded from our estimates above
Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 that are exclusively registration
statements.
\280\ We identify companies that voluntarily file proxy
materials as companies reporting pursuant to section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act but not registered under section 12(b) or section 12(g)
of the Exchange Act and foreign private issuers that filed any proxy
materials during calendar year 2025 with the Commission.
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As of December 31, 2025, there were 2,720 registered investment
companies \281\ that were subject to the Federal proxy rules, of which
718 (26 percent) reported to have submitted matters for their security
holders' vote during the reporting period.\282\ The percentage of
registered investment companies that submitted matters to shareholders
for a vote is lower than for other types of companies because open-end
investment companies (which are the most common form of investment
company) and unlisted closed-end investment companies generally do not
hold shareholder meetings annually. We estimate that 816 unique
entities associated with registered investment companies \283\ filed
proxy materials with the Commission during calendar year 2025 on 1,634
unique forms.\284\
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\281\ The number of registered investment companies was based on
Form N-CEN data for the reporting period ending Dec. 2025 with
filings received through Mar. 31, 2026. These 2,720 registered
investment companies were associated with the following funds: (i)
12,710 open-end funds, out of which 4,194 were Exchange Traded Funds
(``ETFs'') registered as open-end funds or open-end funds that had
an ETF share class; (ii) 707 closed-end funds; (iii) 15 variable
annuity separate accounts registered as management investment
companies; (iv) 414 variable annuity separate accounts registered as
unit investment trusts; (v) 239 variable insurance contracts
registered as unit investment trusts; (vi) 40 other unit investment
trusts; and (vi) 2 face amount certificate companies. Open-end funds
are series of trusts registered on Form N-1A. Closed-end funds are
trusts registered on Form N-2. Variable annuity separate accounts
registered as management companies are trusts registered on Form N-
3. Variable annuity separate accounts registered as unit investment
trusts are registered on Form N-4. Variable insurance contracts
registered as unit investment trusts are registered on Form N-6. All
other unit investment trusts in this time frame are registered on
Form N-8B-2. Face amount certificates were found on Form 10-K by
manually reviewing non-BDC investment companies.
\282\ Only management investment companies submitted matters for
their security holders' vote during this time frame. We estimate
this number by reviewing Item B.10 in all Forms N-CEN of management
companies active through Dec. 2025 received by the Commission as of
Mar. 31, 2026. These 718 management companies were associated with
the following funds: (i) 2,811 open-end funds, out of which 740 were
ETFs registered as open-end funds or open-end funds that had an ETF
share class; (ii) 388 closed-end funds; and (iii) no variable
annuity separate accounts.
\283\ The proxy materials we consider in our analysis are
materials filed via EDGAR under submission types DEF 14A, DEF 14C,
DEFA14A, DEFC14A, DEFM14A, DEFM14C, DEFR14A, DEFR14C, DFAN14A, PRE
14A, PRE 14C, PREC14A, PREM14A, PREM14C, PRER14A, PRER14C, N-14, S-
4, and F-4. Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 can be a registration statement
and/or proxy statement. For purposes of this economic analysis, we
have reviewed all Forms N-14, S-4. and F-4 filed during calendar
year 2025 with the Commission and excluded from our estimates above
Forms N-14, S-4, and F-4 that are exclusively registration
statements. Because management investment companies could comprise
multiple funds and proxy materials could be filed with the
Commission at the management company, fund family, a combination of
funds or fund families, or individual fund level, the number of
entities associated with management companies that filed proxy
materials during calendar year 2025 exceeds that number of
management companies that submitted matters for their security
holders' vote.
\284\ We estimate the number of unique proxy filings by
reviewing the unique accession numbers of proxy materials filed by
entities associated with registered investment companies.
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b. Shareholder Proponents
Proponents of shareholder proposals also would be affected by the
proposed rule amendments. We estimate that there were approximately 184
identified proponents that submitted a shareholder proposal under Rule
14a-8 to be included in a company's proxy materials as lead proponents
\285\ during
[[Page 59930]]
calendar year 2025.\286\ Because proponents may not submit a
shareholder proposal every year, this estimate, which is based solely
on 2025 submissions, likely understates the number of proponents that
could be affected by the proposed amendments. For example, there were
approximately 502 unique lead proponents that submitted a shareholder
proposal to be included in a company's proxy materials for annual and
special meetings from 2022 through 2025.\287\
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\285\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-8(b)(1)(iii)(B).
\286\ Data is retrieved from the FactSet SharkRepellent Proxy
Proposal dataset. See infra note 293. This data allows for the
unique identification of a sole lead proponent of each proposal, but
not the unique identification of all co-proponents across proposals.
As a result, our estimated number of proponents should be
interpreted as a lower bound on the total number of unique
shareholder proponents.
\287\ See id.
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c. Non-Proponent Shareholders
Non-proponent shareholders of companies also could be indirectly
affected by the proposed rule amendments. According to a study based on
the 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances, approximately 76 million
households owned publicly traded stock directly or indirectly (through
other investment instruments, such as pooled investment funds,
retirement accounts, and other managed assets).\288\ Moreover, based on
an academic study using U.S. retail shareholder voting data from
Broadridge covering nearly all annual and special meetings from 2015 to
2017, there were approximately 46 million retail accounts that directly
held shares of U.S. public companies.\289\ Our analysis of
institutional investor data also shows that there were 9,184 unique
institutional investors during 2025.\290\ With respect to registered
investment companies, there are approximately 76 million households
owning these funds, comprising approximately 56% of U.S.
households.\291\
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\288\ See Aditya Aladangady et al., Changes in U.S. Family
Finances from 2019 to 2022: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer
Finances, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, Oct. (2023), available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/scf23.pdf (reporting that 58% of the 131.3
million families represented owned stock in publicly-traded
companies). Indirect holdings of publicly-traded stock are those in
pooled investment funds, retirement accounts, and other managed
assets. The same study estimates that approximately 28 million
households (21%) held publicly traded stock directly in 2019. This
is a triennial survey, and the latest data available as of this time
is from the 2022 survey.
\289\ See Alon Brav et al., Retail Shareholder Participation in
the Proxy Process: Monitoring, Engagement, and Voting, 144 J. Fin.
Econ. 492, 497 (2022). The number of retail accounts is an
approximation of the number of retail investors because each retail
investor can hold multiple accounts and multiple retail investors
can hold a single account. Further, this data only covers a subset
of all retail accounts.
\290\ Data is retrieved from the Thomson/Refinitiv Institutional
(13F) Holdings dataset. Unique institutional investors are composed
of filers with a unique Manager Number that filed a Form 13F at
least for one quarter during calendar year 2025 with the Commission.
The estimated number of institutional investors is a lower bound of
the actual number of institutional investors because only
institutional investment managers that exercise discretion over $100
million or more in section 13(f) securities on the last trading day
of any month of any calendar year must file Form 13F with the
Commission. See 17 CFR 240.13f-1.
\291\ See 2026 Investment Company Fact Book, Investment Company
Institute, available at https://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2026-factbook.pdf.
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3. Current Practices
a. Rule 14a-8 Shareholder Proposals
The practices relating to shareholder proposals in more recent
years may differ from prior years due to certain amendments to Rule
14a-8 that have applied to proposals submitted for annual or special
meetings held on or after January 1, 2022.\292\ As a result, the bulk
of our analysis focuses on shareholder proposals submitted for meetings
held from January 1, 2022 through December 31, 2025. The percentage of
proposals submitted but not included in companies' proxy materials can
vary considerably from one proxy season to the next, limiting our
ability to draw conclusions regarding the current practices related to
shareholder proposal exclusions based on data from any individual proxy
season.
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\292\ The 2020 amendments to Rule 14a-8, which apply to
shareholder proposals submitted for annual and special meetings held
on or after Jan. 1, 2022, introduced several changes, including
revised ownership and resubmission thresholds. See 2020 Adopting
Release.
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Our data \293\ on shareholder proposals contains proposals that
were (i) included in companies' proxy materials and voted on by
shareholders; (ii) omitted from companies' proxy materials following a
no-action letter \294\ or notice of exclusion; or (iii) submitted by
the proponents but withdrawn prior to a vote, where the information
about the proposal is publicly available.\295\ Throughout the analysis,
we disaggregate statistics by company size, proponent types, and
proposal topics to understand how the practices related to shareholder
proposals have varied across these categories.
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\293\ Unless stated otherwise, all data in this section is
retrieved from the FactSet SharkRepellent Proxy Proposal dataset
(accessed on May 10, 2026). Dataset coverage for 2025 includes
around 5,000 U.S.-incorporated public companies and some foreign-
incorporated companies. FactSet extracts and processes proxy data
from regulatory filings and press releases, as well as through web
monitoring and in rare instances, direct engagement with companies
and shareholder proponents. Unless otherwise specified, we exclude
from our analysis shareholder proposals that are not subject to Rule
14a-8, such as proposals related to proxy contests and other
proposals appearing in dissident shareholders' proxy soliciting
material, proposals that were raised from the floor of the annual or
special meetings and were not submitted to appear in the companies'
proxy statements, and proposals submitted for a vote at meetings of
foreign private issuers, which are not subject to the Federal proxy
rules.
\294\ On Nov. 17, 2025 the Division of Corporation Finance (the
``Division'') announced that for the 2025-2026 proxy season it would
not respond to no-action requests for, and would instead express no
views on, companies' intended reliance on any basis for exclusion of
shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than no-action
requests to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1). See U.S. Sec.
& Exch. Comm'n, Division of Corporation Finance, Statement Regarding
the Division of Corporation Finance's Role in the Exchange Act Rule
14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy Season (Nov. 17, 2025),
available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season. Accordingly, data in our
analysis from any date on or after Nov. 17, 2025 reflects exclusions
based on a company's notice of exclusion rather than a response to a
no-action request. On Aug. 14, 2026, the Division announced that,
effective immediately, it had determined to discontinue responding
to Rule 14a-8 no-action requests entirely, including those submitted
under subsection (i)(1). The Aug. 14 announcement also stated that
the Division would no longer respond to notices filed under Rule
14a-8(j) with a letter indicating that it will not object if a
company omits a proposal from its proxy materials. Companies
continue to be required under Rule 14a-8(j) to submit notices to the
Commission when they intend to exclude proposals from their proxy
materials. The Division of Investment Management will take a
substantially similar approach to reviewing Rule 14a-8 requests
related to investment companies. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Division of Corporation Finance, Updated Statement Regarding Rule
14a-8 No-Action Requests (Aug. 14, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/corpfin-statement-rule-14a-8-process-081426.
\295\ Our data is comprehensive with respect to shareholder
proposals that appear in companies' proxy statements and those for
which the company submitted a no-action request or notice of
exclusion to Commission staff. However, proposal submission counts
in our analysis represent a lower bound on all shareholder proposal
submissions because this data may not include all shareholder
proposals that were withdrawn by proponents. In particular, if a
submitted but withdrawn proposal did not appear in a press release
or a company's no-action request, it may not be included in the data
we use for the analysis in this section.
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Focusing first on shareholder proposals submitted to companies for
annual and special meetings held in 2025, the most recent full calendar
year for which we have data, we find that 786 shareholder proposals
were submitted to be included in companies' proxy materials under Rule
14a-8. Of these submissions, the majority of proposals (64 percent)
were included in companies' proxy materials and voted on, while 22
percent were omitted and 14 percent were withdrawn by the proponent
prior to the applicable meeting.\296\ The majority (74 percent) of
[[Page 59931]]
proposals were submitted to S&P 500 companies. For those proposals
where we can identify the proponent, we estimate that 53 percent of
proposals were submitted by individual proponents while 47 percent were
submitted by institutional proponents.\297\ The average (median)
shareholder support for proposals that proceeded to a vote (``voted
proposals'') during this period was 24 (14) percent of the total number
of votes cast, with approximately seven percent of all proposals being
approved by the voting shareholders (11 percent of voted proposals).
Lastly, the volume and substance of shareholder proposal submissions is
not uniform across companies. There were 449 different companies
receiving a shareholder proposal for meetings held in 2025, five of
which were registered investment companies. The average (median) number
of proposals received by a company per meeting was 1.8 (one), and the
maximum number any company received was 21.
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\296\ See supra note 295, which discusses the potential
underestimation of the volume of withdrawn proposals in our
analysis. In this analysis, we classify a shareholder proposal that
was included in a company's proxy statement but was not voted on in
the annual or special meeting as a withdrawn proposal.
\297\ Throughout our analysis, ``individual'' proponents are
composed of retail investors. ``Institutional'' proponents are
composed of asset managers, unions, pension funds, religious
organizations, nonprofit organizations, and other organizations. The
data is missing lead proponents' identities for 94 (11%) of
shareholder proposals over this period which is presumably because
companies are not required to disclose the identity of the proponent
in proxy statements. See 17 CFR 240.14a-8(l).
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Because the number and characteristics of shareholder proposal
submissions can vary from one year to the next, we also repeat the
analysis above for shareholder proposals submitted for annual and
special meetings held in the four-year period from 2022 through 2025. A
total of 3,205 proposals were submitted for inclusion in companies'
proxy materials for annual and special meetings held from 2022 through
2025, representing an average of approximately 801 proposals submitted
each year (see Table 1 below). Of the submissions during this period,
the majority of proposals (74 percent) were included in companies'
proxy materials and voted on, while 14 percent were omitted following a
no-action letter, and 12 percent were withdrawn by the proponents prior
to the applicable meeting.\298\ Shareholder proposal activity in this
four-year period was concentrated among the S&P 500 companies, with 77
percent of proposals submitted to this group.\299\ Lastly, 1,429
proposals were submitted by proponents identified as individuals,\300\
but these proposals were more likely to be omitted and less likely to
be withdrawn than those submitted by proponents identified as
institutions.\301\
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\298\ See supra note 295.
\299\ We note that the volume of shareholder proposal
submissions is not uniform across companies. Over the four-year
period, around one quarter of S&P 500 companies received no
shareholder proposals, while 42 S&P 500 companies received four or
more proposals on average per year. We also estimate that
approximately 1% of all shareholder proposals were submitted to
registered investment companies.
\300\ See supra note 297 for a description of how we categorized
proponent types. The data is missing lead proponents' identities for
277 (9%) of shareholder proposals over the 2022-2025 period. Because
proponent identity is missing for some proposals in our data, the
percentages in the Proponent Type rows of Table 1 do not sum up to
100%.
\301\ Some find that the higher likelihood of withdrawal for
proposals submitted by institutional shareholder-proponents could be
due to these shareholders having more direct channels of
communication and engagement and influence with companies than
individual investors. See, e.g., Eugene Soltes et al., What Else do
Shareholders Want? Shareholder Proposals Contested by Firm
Management (Harv. Bus. Sch. Acct. & Mgmt Unit, Working Paper, July
14, 2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2771114 (retrieved
from SSRN Elsevier database) (finding that the level of shareholder
ownership of shares is positively associated with the probability
that a proposal is withdrawn, which is consistent with the idea that
large shareholders ``are more influential and are more likely to
have dialogue with managers that would facilitate implementation of
their proposal prior to a shareholder vote'') (``Soltes et al.
(2017)'').
\302\ The percentages in parentheses in each column of the table
represent percentages of the total number of proposals in the first
row of each column.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.073
There were 716 unique companies receiving one or more shareholder
proposals under Rule 14a-8 for meetings held between 2022 and 2025, 21
of which were registered investment companies. The average (median)
number of proposals received per company and meeting among these 716
companies was 2.0 (one), and the maximum number any company received
for one single meeting was 21.
The number of omitted proposals in Table 1 above represents
proposals
[[Page 59932]]
excluded from companies' proxy materials following receipt of a no-
action letter issued by the Commission staff on either procedural or
substantive grounds under Rule 14a-8. With respect to all shareholder
proposals received for meetings held in the 2022-2025 period, companies
submitted 1,073 no-action requests (corresponding to 33 percent of all
proposal submissions). No-action letters concurring with the company
were issued for 462 of those proposals, which is equal to 43 percent of
the no-action letter requests. All but four proposals for which a no-
action letter was issued were subsequently excluded by the company.
Table 2 summarizes data on shareholder support and proponent types.
The average (median) shareholder support for voted proposals over the
four-year sample period was 26 (21) percent of the total number of
votes cast, with approximately 10 percent of proposals receiving
majority support. Shareholder support varied across proponent types. In
particular, proposals submitted by individual proponents received
higher shareholder support on average and were more likely to be
supported by the majority of voting shareholders than proposals
submitted by institutional proponents.\303\
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\303\ Differences in the types of proposals submitted by
individual and institutional shareholder proponents could be driving
the differences in the voting support across these two groups. For
example, we find that individual shareholder proponents submitted
the majority of voted governance proposals (75%) over the four-year
period, while institutional shareholder proponents submitted the
majority of voted social and environmental proposals (70%).
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.074
Table 3 presents data on shareholder support for proposals
submitted to registered investment companies for the 2022-2025 period.
There were 33 such proposals submitted to 21 different registered
investment companies. Of the 33 proposals, 25 were voted on and 8 were
withdrawn. As the data in Table 3 suggests, proposals submitted to such
companies received high support on average compared to proposals
submitted to operating companies: an average of 45% and a median of
53%. Most of the proponents were institutions: 24 of the 25 proposals
were submitted by institutions, and one was submitted by an individual.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.075
[[Page 59933]]
b. Proxy Contests
We identify 69 proxy contests containing a solicitation for one or
more proposals that were initiated through the filing of preliminary
proxy statements by proponents for annual or special shareholder
meetings held in calendar years 2022-2025 across all companies subject
to the Federal proxy rules.\304\ Out of these contests, 11 contests
included binding proposals, 49 included nonbinding proposals, and 9
included both binding and nonbinding proposals. Furthermore, 63 out of
the 69 contests included one or more proponent director nominees,
whereas six contests were solely proponent solicitations for one or
more proposals. Out of the six proxy contests not involving board
nominations, only two contests solely involved non-binding
proposals.\305\
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\304\ Based on information from FactSet's SharkRepellent
database and staff's review of EDGAR filings. This total number of
proxy contests includes all cases in which a proponent initiated a
``solicitation in opposition'' to the company which included a
proposal from the proponent to be presented and voted on, whether or
not the proponent's proxy also included its own director nominees.
This total does not include proxy contests that are only for
directors' nominations.
\305\ The two contests that solely involved non-binding
proposals were ``zero slate'' contests involving Warrior Met Coal,
Inc. and News Corporation, discussed earlier in the release. See
supra note 223 and related text. The remaining four contests are not
ones typically considered ``zero slate,'' as they involved special
meetings in which the proponent sought to remove existing board
members, rather than annual meetings involving the election of
directors.
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In terms of the characteristics of the companies targeted for the
above proxy contests involving proposals, 14 percent (10 companies) of
contests involved S&P 500 companies, which contrasts with the 77
percent of S&P 500 companies that received Rule 14a-8 shareholder
proposals.\306\ In addition, more than 43 percent of contests (30
contests) targeted closed-end funds, which is a notable difference
compared to the much lower proportion of funds among registrants
receiving Rule 14a-8 proposals. In terms of the type of proponents
initiating proxy contests involving proposals, 13 percent (9 contests)
were initiated by individuals, and the rest by institutions (mainly
hedge funds and other types of institutional investors).
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\306\ See Table 1 in section IV.B.3.a.
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Around 45 percent of the proxy contests with proposals (31
contests) ended before the proposals were voted on at a meeting (either
because they were withdrawn by the proponent or settled in some other
manner prior to the meeting). Among the 38 contests that lasted through
a shareholder meeting, there were 57 proponent proposals up for a vote,
around 49 percent of which (28 proposals) received enough voting
support to pass the specific voting requirements applicable to each
proposal. Of these 57 proposals, 24 targeted investment companies, and
67 percent of these 24 received sufficient voting support to pass.
In proxy contests, both companies and proponents incur direct costs
of solicitation.\307\ These costs may include, for example, fees paid
to proxy solicitors, expenditures for attorneys and public relations
advisors, and printing and mailing costs. We understand that for
companies, the costs of solicitation in proxy contests generally exceed
the solicitation costs associated with a shareholder meeting without a
contested election. Both proponents and companies are required to
provide estimates of the costs of solicitation in their proxy
statements.\308\ As shown in Table 4 below, based on available data on
estimated solicitation costs for the proxy contests involving
proponents at meetings held in years 2022-2025, the median reported
estimated total costs per contest were approximately $825,000 for
companies and approximately $275,000 for proponents.
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\307\ In some cases, proponents may seek reimbursement of their
expenses from companies. Such potential reimbursement is governed by
State law and is more likely in the case of a successful proxy
contest. The Federal proxy rules require proponents to disclose
whether reimbursement will be sought from the company, and, if so,
whether the question of such reimbursement will be submitted to a
vote of shareholders. See 17 CFR 240.14a-101, Item 4(b)(5).
\308\ Companies may, but do not have to, exclude from the total
estimated solicitation costs the amount normally expended for a
proxy solicitation in the absence of a contest, and costs
represented by salaries and wages of regular employees and officers,
provided a statement to that effect is included in the proxy
statement. It is our understanding that most companies exclude such
costs from their estimated total costs.
\309\ Based on data from Factset's SharkRepellent database in
calendar years 2022-2025.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.076
Beyond these estimated solicitation expenses, proxy contests may be
associated with other indirect costs, such as the cost of management or
proponent time spent in the process of conducting the contest and
expenses associated with any discussions held between management and
the proponent(s) or other participants who could influence the outcome
(e.g., large investors and proxy advisor firms). We do not have data on
these indirect costs.
Turning to current voting mechanics in shareholder proposal proxy
solicitations, as an alternative to the Rule 14a-8 process, a proponent
can present a proposal to shareholders by sending its own separate
proxy card.\310\ Such a solicitation is conducted by sending out
electronically and/or via regular mail a proxy statement to some subset
of shareholders. Shareholders that are solicited may then choose
between returning the proponent's proxy card or the company's proxy
card if they wish to vote on the proxy matters, as an alternative to
attending the meeting. A shareholder that is not initially solicited by
the proponent may be able to expend effort to contact the
[[Page 59934]]
proponent to request solicitation, but the success of this effort is
not guaranteed. Those that are not solicited by the proponent are
limited to using the company's proxy card if voting by proxy. The
company is not required, unlike with the Rule 14a-8 process, to include
the proponent's proposal in its proxy materials. If the company omits
the proposal, however, and if the proponent satisfies the solicitation
threshold and related requirements set out in current Rule 14a-
4(c)(2)(i)-(iii), the company would be unable to exercise discretionary
voting authority with respect to the proponent's proposal under current
Rule 14a-4(c)(2). In other words, the company would not be allowed to
vote on the proponent's proposal on behalf of shareholders who return
the company's proxy. With votes with respect to the proposal coming
only from shareholders who received and returned the proponent's card
and from shareholders who vote in person or virtually at the meeting,
the proponent's solicitation effort may obtain sufficient votes needed
to pass the proposal using the proponent's card.
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\310\ See section IV.C.1.a.
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A company may include proponent proposals received outside the Rule
14a-8 process in its proxy materials, which would provide a means for
shareholders to vote with respect to the proposal using the company's
proxy card.\311\ To the extent shareholders who choose to return the
company's proxy card are more inclined to vote with management than
shareholders who choose to return the proponent's proxy card, including
the proponent's proposal may allow the company to increase the
proportion of votes with respect to the proposal that are favorable to
the company. Under current rules, the company could also vote on behalf
of shareholders who do not vote at all with respect to such proposal
but return a signed proxy card provided the company stated on its proxy
card how it intends to vote proxy cards that are returned signed but
without specifying a choice regarding the proposal.\312\ If the company
is not in favor of the proposal, for example, the shares of
shareholders who sign and return the company's proxy card but do not
vote with respect to the proposal would be counted as ``against'' votes
as long as the proxy card includes such disclosure.
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\311\ For each such proposal, the company would need to provide
a means for shareholders to vote ``for,'' ``against,'' or to
abstain. See Rule 14a-4(b)(1).
\312\ See Rule 14a-4(b)(1).
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A company's decision on whether to include a proponent's proposal
presented outside the Rule 14a-8 process in its proxy materials, where
the company does not support the proposal, thus involves a tradeoff. On
the one hand, not including the proposal potentially increases the
likelihood that the non-Rule 14a-8 proponent's solicitation effort
obtains the votes needed to pass the proposal if shareholders who vote
using the proponent's proxy card are more amenable to the proposal. On
the other hand, including the proposal incurs many of the same costs
incurred with Rule 14a-8 proposals.
c. Other Forms of Shareholder Engagement
Although Rule 14a-8 was not adopted to serve as a means of
shareholder engagement, we recognize for purposes of assessing the
baseline that some shareholders use the Rule 14a-8 process as an
engagement tool.\313\ The baseline of the existing regulatory regime
with respect to shareholder proposals is discussed in section IV.B.1
above. The baseline also includes other existing forms of shareholder
engagement that can serve as complements to or substitutes for
shareholder proposals. These alternative engagement methods include,
among others, voting in director elections and on management proposals,
communicating with management informally, conducting exempt
solicitations, calling a special meeting of shareholders, acting by
written consent, nominating one or more directors for election to a
company's board of directors, using proxy access provisions, making
floor proposals or nominations, using social media platforms, and
leveraging the threat of divestment. The availability and effectiveness
of these mechanisms as substitutes for Rule 14a-8 proposals varies
considerably, as discussed below.
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\313\ See supra section II.A.2.b.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below we discuss available research on existing practices related
to these forms of shareholder engagement. Where academic research on
any particular form of engagement is limited, the lack of specific data
and evidence makes it difficult to quantify the pros and cons of these
particular methods. In addition, the costs and benefits of using a
particular shareholder engagement method may vary depending on the
investor and the company involved. In particular, as noted in various
instances below, State law and companies' governing documents may
dictate the form of, restrict, or have other implications for the
feasibility and expense of undertaking, a given approach.\314\
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\314\ See, e.g., the survey in Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty
Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical Research, 44 J.
Corp. Fin. 405 (2017), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608085 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database) (``Denes et
al. (2017)''); Tara Bhandari et al., Governance Changes through
Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access, 44 J. Fin. Quant.
Anal. 405 (2017), available at https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109020000484; James A. Brickley et al., Corporate Voting:
Evidence from Charter Amendment Proposals, 1 J. Corp. Fin. 5 (1994).
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Voting in director elections and on management proposals is,
broadly speaking, a method of shareholder engagement.\315\ The ability
to vote in director elections is accessible to shareholders
irrespective of their level of share ownership and can be construed as
a low-cost form of shareholder engagement. Although most director
elections are uncontested and directors typically receive majority
support,\316\ some research suggests that the level of support can
influence governance, management changes, and corporate decisions.\317\
Other evidence suggests that the level of support for management-
sponsored proposals--particularly in the context of executive
compensation--has a limited effect.\318\ Shareholders that are
dissatisfied with
[[Page 59935]]
management performance, or have other unrelated concerns, also
sometimes express their views by voting against a company's executive
compensation in a ``say-on-pay'' (``SOP'') vote.\319\ Although SOP
votes are non-binding, advisory votes, there is some evidence that they
can affect board composition and management compensation
practices.\320\ However, not all companies are required to conduct SOP
votes.\321\ These mechanisms are reactive in nature, allowing
shareholders to express dissatisfaction with existing management
decisions but do not provide a channel for proposing specific
governance changes, which limits their effectiveness as substitutes for
the Rule 14a-8 submission process.
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\315\ See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Patrick C. Tricker,
Shareholder Voting in Proxy Contests for Corporate Control,
Uncontested Director Elections and Management Proposals: A Review of
the Empirical Literature, 70 OKLA. L. REV. 9 (2017) at 12, available
at https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1311&context=olr.
\316\ See, e.g., 2025 Proxy Season Review: From Escalation to
Recalibration, at Figure 11 (showing that in 2024 and 2025 proxy
seasons directors received approximately 94.5% and 94.9% votes on
average, respectively).
\317\ See, e.g., Fabrizio Ferri, Low-Cost' Shareholder Activism:
A Review of the Evidence, in Research Handbook on the Economics of
Corporate Law 192 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., Edward
Elgar Publishing, 2012); David L. Yermack, Shareholder Voting and
Corporate Governance, 2 ANN. REV. Fin. Econ. 103 (2010), available
at https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-073009-104034. See
also, e.g., Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. Fin. 2389
(2009) (documenting that ``shareholder votes are significantly
related to firm performance, governance, director performance, and
voting mechanisms'' but also noting that ``differences in votes are
statistically significant but economically minor''); Paul E. Fischer
et al., Investor Perceptions of Board Performance: Evidence from
Uncontested Director Elections, 48 J. Acct. Econ. 172 (2009)
(finding that ``firms with low vote approval are more likely to
experience CEO turnover, greater board turnover, lower CEO
compensation, fewer and better-received acquisitions, and more and
better-received divestitures in the future''). As a caveat, it is
not always possible to rule out that low vote approval parallels
other engagement by dissatisfied shareholders that is not fully
accounted for in the studies but that may also contribute to the
direction of the effect on management and corporate decisions.
\318\ See, e.g., Christopher Armstrong et al., The Efficacy of
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J.
Acct. Rsch. 909 (2013) (finding ``little evidence that either lower
shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed
equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or
composition of future CEO incentive compensation'').
\319\ The requirement to conduct SOP votes is in accordance with
section 14A of the Exchange Act, as added by section 951 of the
Dodd-Frank Act 17 U.S.C. 78n-1; Public Law 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010), sec. 951. The Commission adopted rules implementing section
951 in 2011. See 17 CFR 240.14a-21, Shareholder Approval of
Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Release
No. 33-9178 (Jan. 25, 2011) [76 FR 6009 (Feb. 2, 2011)].
\320\ See, e.g., Mary Elizabeth Badgett et al., Director
Reputational Penalties When Shareholders Disapprove of Executive
Compensation, 45 J. Fin. Rsch. 759 (2022) (examining ``directors of
firms that receive a low-support Say-on-Pay (SOP) vote'' and finding
that ``[t]hese affected directors face a significantly greater
likelihood of losing board seats, both at the voting firm and in the
external labor market''); Yonca Ertimur et al., Shareholder Votes
and Proxy Advisors: Evidence From Say on Pay, 51 J. Acct. Rsch. 951
(2013) (examining the role of proxy advisors in mandatory SOP votes
and also finding that ``[m]ore than half of the firms respond to the
adverse shareholder vote triggered by a negative recommendation by
engaging with investors and making changes to their compensation
plan'').
\321\ Title I of the JOBS Act exempted Emerging Growth Companies
from the requirement to conduct SOP votes. Public Law 112-106, 126
Stat. 306 (2012), sec. 102(a)(1). A recent Commission proposal, if
adopted, would also exempt the class of non-accelerated filers, as
defined in the proposed rulemaking, from the SOP requirement. See
Enhancement of Emerging Growth Company Accommodations and
Simplification of Filer Status for Reporting Companies, Release No.
34-105515 (May 19, 2026) [91 FR 30086 (May 21, 2026)].
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Informal communication with management, a method commonly used by
large institutional investors, is another means of shareholder
engagement.\322\ This method is most effective when it involves
shareholders with larger stakes or groups of shareholders. However,
shareholders with greater than five percent beneficial ownership of a
company's equity securities may be deterred from pursuing this channel
as a substitute for Rule 14a-8 proposals to the extent their
contemplated engagement could constitute ``changing or influencing
control,'' thereby affecting their eligibility to report on Schedule
13G rather than Schedule 13D and subjecting them to accelerated filing
deadlines and additional disclosure requirements.\323\
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\322\ See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The
Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United States, 19 J. Appl.
Corp. Fin. 55 (2007). See also Joseph A. McCahery et al., Behind the
Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional
Investors, 71 J. Fin. 2905 (2016) (``McCahery et al. (2016)'')
(finding in a 2012-2013 survey of ``143 respondents, mostly very
large institutional investors with a long-term focus'' that ``voice,
especially when conducted behind the scenes, is important. For
example, 63% of respondents state that in the past five years they
have engaged in direct discussions with management, and 45% state
that they have had private discussions with a company's board
outside of management's presence''). See also, e.g., a UK study
examining engagement data provided by a single institutional
investor. Marco Becht et al., Returns to Shareholder Activism:
Evidence From a Clinical Study of the Hermes UK Focus Fund, 22 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 3093 (2009).
\323\ See Tonello, supra note 123 (noting that in 2025
``Institutional investor engagement was affected by new SEC guidance
issued in Feb. 2025, which introduced uncertainty around Schedule
13G eligibility. Some investors temporarily paused or narrowed the
scope of engagement, shaping a more cautious, issuer-led dialogue
environment heading into the 2026 proxy season.''); See also Maia
Gez et al.,``Under Pressure'': Walking the Fine Line of Section
13(d) Passive Investor Status, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance
(Mar. 29, 2025), available at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/03/29/under-pressure-walking-the-fine-line-of-section-13d-passive-investor-status/; Modernization of Beneficial Ownership Reporting,
Release No. 34-98787 (Oct. 10, 2023) [88 FR 72700 (Oct. 25, 2023)].
Coordination among activists undertaking a campaign also may result
in their share ownership being consolidated for purposes of the
application of the Schedule 13D reporting threshold.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shareholders with concerns who wish to express their views about
management actions or who desire to effect change at companies also may
conduct ``exempt solicitations,'' \324\ which include solicitations
that are exempt from most of the Federal proxy rules other than the
antifraud provision \325\ because the person soliciting does not
directly or indirectly seek authority to act as proxy and does not
furnish or request a form of revocation, abstention, consent, or
authorization. Such a solicitation may include creating a website to
gather and publicize views about the company's decisions, organizing
certain forms of ``vote no'' campaigns,\326\ or undertaking certain
other communications to shareholders.\327\ Academic research has shown
that ``vote no'' campaigns can result in changes to CEO pay and board
decisions sought by the shareholder.\328\ Shareholders also may request
a special meeting between annual meetings or an action by written
consent, if permitted by State law and a company's governing
documents.\329\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\324\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b). Rule 14a-6(g) requires
shareholders that own more than $5 million of a company's securities
and that are engaged in an exempt solicitation to file Notice of
Exempt Solicitation (submission type PX14A6G). Data prior to Jan.
2026 included voluntarily submitted exempt solicitation notices,
including those by shareholders with a smaller stake. In Jan. 2026,
Commission staff issued guidance stating it will object to the
voluntary submission of Notices of Exempt Solicitation. See Proxy
Rules and Schedules 14A/14C Corporation Finance Interpretation
126.06 (Jan. 23, 2026), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/corporation-finance-interpretations/proxy-rules-schedules-14a14c. Thus, post-2025 exempt solicitation
notice data only includes larger shareholders.
\325\ See Rule 14a-9.
\326\ As one source describes it, ``[i]n a vote-no campaign, an
activist shareholder files an exempt solicitation to urge fellow
investors to vote against certain management proposals or directors
(or withhold votes on those directors),'' seeking to ``register
shareholder discontent and pressure the board or management . . .
through the weight of negative votes and public pressure, even if no
alternate director is standing for election.'' Such campaigns may
combine filings with other communications, such as ``press releases,
open letters, and social media to amplify their impact.'' See Matteo
Tonello, The Recent Evolution of Shareholder Activism in the United
States, Harv. L. Sch. F. Corp. Governance (Dec. 24, 2025), available
at https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/12/24/the-recent-evolution-of-shareholder-activism-in-the-unit.
\327\ See 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b)(1).
\328\ See, e.g., Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay
Attention when Institutional Investor Activists ``Just Vote No''?,
90 J. Fin. Econ. 84 (2008) (examining another researcher's
hypothesis ``that a substantial withheld vote motivates directors to
take immediate action''); Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A
Minimalist Strategy for Dealing With Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45
Stanford L. Rev. 857 (1993), available at https://doi.org/10.2307/1229199 (finding that ``a variety of supportive evidence, including
operating performance improvements and abnormal disciplinary chief
executive officer (CEO) turnover, indicating that such campaigns
induce boards to take actions in shareholders' interests.''); Yonca
Ertimur et al., Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 Rev. Fin. Stud.
535 (2011) (finding that ``[f]irms with excess CEO pay targeted by
vote-no campaigns experience a significant reduction in CEO pay'').
\329\ See, e.g., Emiliano M. Catan & Marcel Kahan, The Never-
Ending Quest for Shareholder Rights: Special Meetings and Written
Consent, 99 B. U. L. Rev. 743 (2019); Paul Gompers et al., Corporate
Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. Econ. 107 (2003) (including
limits on the ability to call a special meeting ``that either
increase the level of shareholder support required to call a special
meeting beyond that specified by state law or eliminate the ability
to call one entirely'' in the paper's measure of greater management
power (lower shareholder power) and noting that ``[s]uch provisions
add extra time to proxy fights, since bidders must wait until the
regularly scheduled annual meeting to replace board members or
dismantle takeover defenses. This delay is especially potent when
combined with limitations on actions by written consent.''). Calling
a special shareholder meeting could be a part of the proxy fight
(see section IV.B.3.b for more discussion of proxy contests).
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Commission rules provide for certain other forms of engagement
exempt from the proxy rules, such as solicitations limited to no more
than 10 persons.\330\ However, data and research specific to such
activity are lacking (in large part due to the absence of a proxy
filing
[[Page 59936]]
obligation for shareholders undertaking this type of exempt
solicitation).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\330\ 17 CFR 240.14a-2(b)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Proxy access'' provisions, which allow shareholders to include
their director nominees directly on a company's proxy card (if
permitted by the company's governing documents), is another available
avenue of shareholder engagement.\331\ Shareholders also may engage
with companies by making proposals or director nominations from the
floor at a shareholders' meeting, subject to compliance with a
company's governing documents (e.g., advance notice requirements).\332\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\331\ See, e.g., Denes et al. (2017), supra note 314. A proxy
contest may still take place for the same meeting, however, if a
separate solicitation (by a different shareholder) ends up being put
forth (as discussed above in section IV.B.3.b).
\332\ See, e.g., Broc Romanek, Brush Up on the Floor Proposal
Process Before Your Annual Meeting, Mar. 31, 2025, The Governance
Beat--Cooley, available at https://governancebeat.cooley.com/brush-up-on-the-floor-proposal-process-before-your-annual-meeting/
(retrieved May 21, 2016) (stating that ``[f]loor proposals allow
shareholders to raise issues at an annual meeting if they properly
notify the company in accordance with the company's bylaws''). The
reach of floor proposals is also qualified to the extent companies
make efforts to preserve discretionary voting authority over such
proposals by including requisite language in the proxy card in
reliance on Rule 14a-4(c)(1). Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Social media platforms represent a lower-cost alternative voice
mechanism that may be more accessible to resource-constrained
shareholders than independent solicitation or other formal engagement
mechanisms. Recent research documents the use of social media by
shareholders to mobilize support, share information, and coordinate
governance engagement.\333\ However, social media engagement is a less
formal and less direct mechanism for influencing specific governance
outcomes than the Rule 14a-8 process, and the evidence on its
effectiveness as a substitute is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\333\ See, e.g., James S. Ang et al., The Role of Social Media
in Corporate Governance, 96 Acc. Rev. 1 (2021) (showing that ``small
investors' negative postings are able to predict a potential
acquirer's subsequent decision to withdraw its attempt . . .'' and
``that message board criticisms are also able to predict governance
outcomes beyond acquisition decisions''); J. Anthony Cookson et al.,
Can Social Media Inform Corporate Decisions? Evidence from Merger
Withdrawals, 81 J. Fin. 91 (2026) (showing that social media
sentiment signals can be important for corporate M&A decisions);
Daniel Cahill, Zhangxin (Frank) Liu, & Theresa Santoso, Media and
Social Media Sentiment and CEO Pay Cuts, 48 J. Acc. Lit. 311 (2026)
(finding that firms facing more negative sentiment are more likely
to engage in pay cuts).
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Finally, academic literature has also discussed the role of the
threat of divestment as a potentially important alternative to more
traditional methods of shareholder engagement.\334\ The effectiveness
of this method directly depends on the credibility of the exit threat,
the magnitude of the shareholder's stake, and the extent to which the
shareholder is well-informed about managerial conduct.\335\ This
strategy is likely to be more effective for larger shareholders, as
selling a significant stake can have greater impact on the stock price,
making the threat of divestment more significant. The threat of
divestment also can complement other methods of shareholder
engagement.\336\ Divestment is an exit mechanism rather than a direct
engagement mechanism, however, and its effectiveness as a substitute
for the proactive governance engagement that Rule 14a-8 shareholder
proposals may enable is therefore limited, particularly for smaller
individual shareholders for whom the exit threat may not be
significant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\334\ See Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The ``Wall Street
Walk'' and Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 2645 (2009) (showing in a theoretical setting that a
large shareholder's threat of exit can reduce agency costs); Alex
Edmans, Blockholder Trading, Market Efficiency, and Managerial
Myopia, 64 J. Fin. 2481 (2009); Alex Edmans, Blockholders and
Corporate Governance, 6 Annu. Rev. Fin. Econ. 23 (2014); Alex Edmans
& Clifford G. Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, in 1 The Handbook of the Economics of Corporate Governance
541 (Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach eds., North-Holland
2017). For an empirical analysis in the context of CEO turnover,
see, for example, Robert Parrino et al., Voting with Their Feet:
Institutional Ownership Changes Around Forced CEO Turnover, 68 J.
Fin. Econ. 3 (2003); Jean Helwege et al., Voting with their Feet or
Activism? Institutional Investors' Impact on CEO Turnover, 18 J.
Corp. Fin. 22 (2012) (examining the role of activism and exit in
driving CEO turnover); and Sreedhar T. Bharath et al., Exit as
Governance: An Empirical Analysis, 68 J. Fin. 2515 (2013). For
investor survey evidence, see, for example, McCahery et al. (2016),
supra note 322 (``document[ing] widespread behind-the-scenes
intervention as well as governance-motivated exit. These governance
mechanisms are viewed as complementary devices, with intervention
typically occurring prior to a potential exit.''). But see also
Doron Levit et al., Trading and Shareholder Democracy, 79 J. Fin.
257 (2024) (noting, in a theoretical framework, among other
findings, that ``when shareholders can trade, shareholder voting may
not lead to optimal outcomes. First, shareholders with extreme views
can accumulate large positions and use their voting power to
implement their preferred policies, which can be detrimental to
moderate shareholders and to shareholder welfare . . .'' and that
``trading may exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the collective
action problems of the shareholder voting process.'').
\335\ See Dragana Cvijanovic et al., The Wall Street Stampede:
Exit as Governance With Interacting Blockholders, 144 J. Fin. Econ.
433 (2022) (finding an activist hedge fund's exit can lead to
correlated institutional exits). See also Qingyuan Li et al., The
Information Advantage of Industry Common Owners and its Spillover
Effect on Stock Price Crash Risk, 92 J. Corp. Fin. 102764 (2025)
(noting shareholders who hold multiple firms in an industry may be
better informed about the individual firms).
\336\ See supra note 334.
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C. Benefits and Costs
In this section, we consider the potential benefits and costs of
the proposed amendments. Some of the benefits and costs are difficult
to quantify or estimate with certainty.\337\ Accordingly, the
discussion contains qualitative assessments and, where possible, we
provide quantitative estimates of the potential benefits and costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\337\ See supra section IV.B.3 (discussing the magnitude and
uncertainty of the effects regarding the rescission of Rule 14a-8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential benefits and costs of the proposed amendments will
depend, to a certain degree, on the value of the shareholder proposals
that may be forgone under the proposed amendments. By ``value,'' we
mean the degree to which the proposals are associated with value-
enhancing or value-reducing corporate policy changes and thus more
likely to be of interest to the broader shareholder base. Such changes
are not necessarily limited to traditional corporate governance (or
agency cost) concerns but may encompass broader considerations, such as
corporate strategy or management dynamics.\338\ In the analysis that
follows, we discuss how the economic effects of the proposed amendments
may differ depending upon the value of underlying shareholder
proposals, without characterizing any particular types of proposals as
value-enhancing or value-reducing.\339\
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\338\ Existing academic literature on the value of shareholder
proposals is discussed in section IV.C.1.b.ii.
\339\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70265 (``As a threshold
matter, under state corporate law, [such] evaluations are properly
left to the company's owners--the shareholders. In addition, our
regulation of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 has not been
designed to judge the economic value of any particular shareholder
proposal, or intended to take a position on the merits of any
shareholder proposal topic.'')
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1. Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
As discussed in section II.A.1, the principal basis for the
proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 is the Commission's conclusion that
the rule exceeds the Commission's authority under section 14(a) of the
Exchange Act. Independent of that conclusion, the policy reasons
discussed in section II.A also provide a basis for rescinding Rule 14a-
8 in its entirety. In this section, we examine economic dimensions of
those policy reasons, focusing on two principal economic issues.
First, Rule 14a-8 creates a cost structure that generates an
externality. The rule requires a company to include qualifying
shareholder proposals in its proxy materials, meaning that the
[[Page 59937]]
incremental costs of including and distributing the proposal are borne
by the company (and its shareholders). More precisely, the marginal
cost the proponent bears is below the total marginal cost that the
submission process imposes on all affected parties (including the
company and its non-proponent shareholders), thus creating a wedge that
is the source of the externality.\340\ Because the proponent does not
bear the full costs of submission, the decision to submit a proposal
may be only weakly disciplined by its expected value to those who bear
those costs.\341\ As a result, there may be a greater total volume, or
a different mix, of proposals than would emerge if proponents bore a
larger share of the costs resulting from their submission.\342\
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\340\ Although Rule 14a-8 requires proponents to hold a minimum
ownership stake as a condition of eligibility, the minimum
eligibility thresholds are low relative to the total outstanding
equity of most affected companies, and the proponent's pro-rata
share of company processing costs through its ownership interest may
not discipline the submission decision. See supra section IV.B.1.a.
\341\ The same asymmetric cost structure may give proponents
leverage in private negotiations with management. To the extent that
proponents use the shareholder proposal process to obtain
concessions reflecting private interests rather than those of
shareholders more broadly, the resources devoted to pursuing and
resisting those concessions represent economic costs not offset by
commensurate benefits to other shareholders.
\342\ See section IV.C.1.a for a discussion of the direct
compliance costs associated with Rule 14a-8 proposals. See Table 2
in section IV.B.3.a. for statistics on shareholder support of
proposals.
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Second, Rule 14a-8's Federal framework has given States and
companies little occasion or incentive to develop their own shareholder
proposal frameworks--frameworks that States competing for
incorporations might otherwise tailor to differences in ownership
structure, industry, size, and other company-specific circumstances,
and that companies might otherwise develop through charter and bylaw
provisions to reflect their particular circumstances. With limited
exceptions, most States have not enacted a comprehensive shareholder
proposal framework during the more than 80 years that Rule 14a-8 has
been in place, and the Commission is not aware of any company that has
adopted such a framework in its own governing documents.\343\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\343\ See supra section II.A.2.b.iii.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rescission would address these considerations by
leaving the allocation of proposal-related costs to State law and
private ordering, thus providing States and companies more
opportunities to develop frameworks suited to their circumstances.\344\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\344\ See supra section II.A.2.b.ii (including note 161 and
related text).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Benefits of the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
We identify four principal categories of potential benefits of the
proposed rescission: direct compliance cost savings for issuers,
reallocation of managerial time and resources, potential improvements
in the focus of corporate communications, and reductions in voting
costs for shareholders. Each of these potential benefits is discussed
in turn below, and the magnitude of each benefit is subject to
uncertainty. Where State law or company governing documents require
inclusion of shareholder proposals in circumstances similar to Rule
14a-8, affected companies and non-proponent shareholders would not
experience the full benefits described below.
i. Direct Cost Savings for Companies and Their Shareholders
A direct benefit of the proposed rescission would be a reduction of
the compliance costs that Rule 14a-8 currently imposes on issuers.
Without the rule, companies would no longer be required by the Federal
proxy rules to include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials.
Some companies may decline to include such proposals absent an
independent State law requirement, while others may adopt their own
framework for addressing shareholder proposals in their governing
documents, if permitted by State law. The magnitude of the resulting
direct cost savings is uncertain and depends on various factors,
including the extent to which companies would continue to include
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials voluntarily or as a
result of State law or other requirements.
Currently, the direct costs that companies may incur under Rule
14a-8 include, to the extent applicable, the costs to: (i) review the
submitted proposal and respond to issues raised in the proposal
(including time spent by internal legal, corporate governance,
communications, and investor relations staff, law firms and other
service providers, subject matter experts, executive management, and
the board of directors on evaluating each proposal); \345\ (ii) engage
in discussions and other communications with the proponent(s); \346\
(iii) prepare a statement of opposition to the submission, if the
company chooses; (iv) print and distribute proxy materials,\347\ and
monitor votes on the proposal; (v) communicate with outside consultants
such as proxy solicitation firms and engage with non-proponent
shareholders; and (vi) where the company intends to exclude the
proposal, conduct a legal analysis and file a notice with the
Commission \348\ (collectively, these activities are referred to as
``processing'' a proposal). Opportunity costs also arise, as these
expenditures could otherwise support more value-enhancing activities.
The magnitude of these opportunity costs cannot be estimated but may be
significant for companies receiving large numbers of proposals
involving complex issues.
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\345\ These costs can vary depending on the nature of the
proposal, including whether the topic of the proposal is one with
which the company is familiar. See, e.g., letters in response to the
2019 Proposing Release from Council of Institutional Investors dated
Jan. 30, 2020; Richard A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020. In addition,
these costs can be smaller if the proposal is a resubmission rather
than an initial submission. For example, some commenters stated that
in the case of statements in opposition of resubmitted proposals,
companies often repeat the arguments made in a prior year, which
should result in a lower cost of responding to resubmissions
relative to first-time submissions. See, e.g., letters in response
to 2019 Proposing Release from AFL-CIO dated Feb. 3, 2020; CalPERS
dated Feb. 3, 2020; Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan.
30, 2020; Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility dated Jan.
27, 2020; International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020;
Principles for Responsible Investment dated Feb. 3, 2020; UAW
Retiree Medical Benefits Trust dated Jan. 30, 2020. See also letter
in response to the Proxy Process Roundtable from Shareholder Rights
Group dated Dec. 4, 2018. In certain instances, however,
resubmissions could be costlier than initial submissions. For
example, companies might decide to challenge a resubmission or to
make a concession to the proponent in exchange for the proposal
being dropped and incur the associated costs.
\346\ If there is engagement, the costs vary depending on the
manner of the engagement (e.g., face-to-face meetings versus phone
calls). See, e.g., comment letters received in response to the 2019
Proposing Release from Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan.
30, 2020; International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020;
Richard A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020.
\347\ To the extent the Reg E-Delivery Proposal is adopted as
proposed and reduces companies' costs for printing and distributing
proxy materials when addressing shareholder proposals under Rule14a-
8, the cost savings from printing and distribution anticipated under
this proposal may be correspondingly diminished for those companies
that choose to rely on Regulation E-Delivery to electronically
deliver proxy materials. See supra note 255.
\348\ These costs have varied in the past depending on whether
the company submitted a no-action request and the extent to which
the company submitted rebuttals to proponent communications
submitted pursuant to 17 CFR 240.14a-8(k). See, e.g., comment
letters in response to the 2019 Proposing Release from CalPERS dated
Feb. 3, 2020; John Coates and Barbara Roper dated Jan. 30, 2020;
Council of Institutional Investors dated Jan. 30, 2020;
International Brotherhood of Teamsters dated Feb. 3, 2020; Richard
A. Liroff dated Jan. 28, 2020.
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The direct cost to companies of addressing Rule 14a-8 proposals
cannot
[[Page 59938]]
be precisely measured. However, several sources provide estimates of
its magnitude. In the 2020 Adopting Release, the Commission estimated
the direct cost to companies of addressing a single shareholder
proposal at $20,000 to $150,000, based on estimates provided by market
participants and commenters.\349\ Adjusted for inflation, this range is
equivalent to approximately $25,000 to $188,000 in 2026 dollars.\350\
In this release, we estimate that each proposal carries a burden of 107
hours, 80.25 of which are borne internally and 26.75 of which are
external.\351\ We monetize both the internal and external burdens at an
hourly rate of $462 \352\ to estimate a cost savings of the proposed
rescission of about $49,000 per proposal, which is consistent with the
range presented in the 2020 Adopting Release.\353\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\349\ See 2020 Adopting Release at 70245 n.63.
\350\ Inflation calculations use historical annual data on the
GDP price index from 2020 to 2025, along with the Congressional
Budget Office's most recent projection of the increase in the GDP
price index from 2025 to 2026, to convert 2020 dollars to 2026
dollars.
\351\ See PRA Table 1, table note 1.
\352\ See infra note 420.
\353\ See PRA Table 1, table note 2, along with the public memo,
section 2.4, ``Use of Occupational Hourly Rates for Monetizing
Internal and External Burdens,'' which explains that ``Commission
staff may determine that it is appropriate to apply the same
occupational hourly rate to monetize burden hours'' when ``external
labor and internal labor have equivalent knowledge, skills, and
abilities for a task.'' The $49,000 is a rounded estimate that
reflects the sum of internal costs (80.25 hours x $462 [ap] $37,000)
and external costs (20.75 hours x $462 [ap] $12,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Survey data help illustrate the magnitude of direct costs. A 2025
survey based on responses by 35 public companies found that 25.7
percent of respondents reported cumulative four-season direct costs
between $100,000 and $250,000 to address shareholder proposals, while
14.3 percent reported costs between $501,000 and $1,000,000, and 11.4
percent reported costs above $1,000,000.\354\ A separate 2025 survey
found that nearly 20 percent of responding companies spend over
$500,000 in external costs in a typical proxy season, including some
small-cap firms.\355\ The wide dispersion in reported costs may reflect
substantial heterogeneity in the compliance burden across companies,
which results in part from the variability in the number of proposals
received by different companies (which is itself correlated with
company size). An interview-based study documents that the costs vary
by the type of proposal.\356\ Because these surveys involve small
samples of uncertain representativeness, the available data may be
subject to response bias. For example, if companies with higher
compliance costs are more likely to respond to surveys about compliance
costs, then the responses would overestimate the magnitude of the
direct costs of Rule 14a-8. However, if the responses include only
external costs, then the survey responses would understate the direct
costs since internal costs associated with a company's response to Rule
14a-8 proposals would not be captured. Surveys can also be subject to
design concerns such as whether questions might influence survey
responses. Thus, we cannot provide a reliable aggregate estimate of
total annual issuer compliance costs.\357\ We invite comments on data
that would support such an estimate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\354\ See Cunningham (2026), supra note 110. The survey was open
from Nov. 19 through Dec. 24, 2025. The reported cumulative four-
season expenditures span a wide range: 20.0% (n=7) reported
cumulative costs of less than $100,000, 25.7% (n=9) report
cumulative costs between $100,000 and $250,000, 17.1% (n=6) report a
range between $251,000 and $500,000, 14.3% (n=5) report costs
between $501,000 and $1,000,000, and 11.4% (n=4) report costs above
$1,000,000. Cunningham (2026) also reports results for distribution
of these costs (``Reliance on outside counsel accounts for a
substantial portion of these costs. Most company respondents (57.1%,
n=20) report that more than half of their Rule 14a-8 compliance
costs are paid to external lawyers, including 37.1% (n=13)
indicating that more than 75% of costs are external and 20.0% (n=7)
reporting allocations of 51-75%. Only a small minority report
minimal or no spending on outside counsel, including 2.9% (n=1)
reporting zero external costs and 5.7% (n=2) reporting allocations
of 1-10%.''). As a caveat, the sample consists of 35 very large
companies, and thus the numbers may not be representative of all
firms.
\355\ See Business Roundtable, supra note 113.
\356\ See Timothy M. Doyle & Robert G. Eccles, Rule 14a-8 in
Practice: A Descriptive Account from Twenty Interviews, available at
https://roberteccles.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/RBI-Rule-14a-8-in-Practice.pdf.
\357\ The costs discussed here, which range in dollars from tens
of thousands to one million, are small relative to the market
capitalizations (in the billions and trillions) of S&P 500 companies
which most Rule 14a-8 proposals target (see supra section IV.B.3.b).
These costs would be proportionally more significant for smaller
public companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Where a company seeks to exclude a Rule 14a-8 proposal, the data in
section IV.B.3.a suggest that complying with the notice requirement in
Rule 14a-8(j) is an additional resource-intensive process.\358\
Specifically, over the 2022-2025 period, companies submitted 1,073
notices/no-action requests, corresponding to 33 percent of all
proposals received.\359\ Also, the costs of the notice/no-action
process could fluctuate from year to year depending on a variety of
factors, such as the subject matter of the proposals submitted for
inclusion and staff application of Rule 14a-8's exclusion bases and
procedural requirements. Additional cost uncertainty could arise from
negotiation between companies and proponents that seek private
resolution and proposal withdrawal. A withdrawal, with any concessions
by the company, could be lower cost for the company than proceeding to
proposal inclusion (or else it would not likely decide to engage in
negotiation in the first place), as well as possibly lowering costs for
non-proponent shareholders who would not need to review the
proposal.\360\ Negotiation could fail, however. In that case, the
direct costs of proceeding with proposal inclusion would still apply,
with the added burden of the negotiation expenses.\361\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\358\ Prior to Nov. 17, 2025, companies typically submitted
these notices as no-action requests. Beginning that month, however,
the Division determined to not respond to no-action requests for,
and express no views on, companies' intended reliance on any basis
for exclusion of shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8, other than
no-action requests to exclude a proposal under Rule 14a-8(i)(1).
When a company's Rule 14a-8(j) notice included an unqualified
representation that the company had a reasonable basis to exclude
the proposal under Rule 14a-8, the Division issued a letter stating
that, based solely on the company's or counsel's representation, it
would not object to the company omitting the proposal from its proxy
materials. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Division of Corporation
Finance, Statement Regarding the Division of Corporation Finance's
Role in the Exchange Act Rule 14a-8 Process for the Current Proxy
Season (Nov. 17, 2025), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-regarding-division-corporation-finances-role-exchange-act-rule-14a-8-process-current-proxy-season.
See also supra note 294 (discussing the Division's Aug. 14, 2026
statement announcing, among other things, the Division's
determination to discontinue responding to Rule 14a-8 no-action
requests altogether).
\359\ With respect to all shareholder proposals received for
meetings held in the 2022-2025 period, the staff received
approximately 198 notices of intent to exclude a shareholder
proposal.
\360\ See infra sections IV.C.1.a.iii and iv.
\361\ While 12% of Rule 14a-8 proposals are withdrawn (see supra
section IV.B.3.a), we do not have visibility into the degree of
private negotiation.
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The cost savings from the proposed rescission would not be
uniformly distributed across companies. Over the 2022-2025 period, 716
companies received at least one proposal, with an average of 2.0
proposals per company and a median of one. The gap between the mean and
the median indicates a distribution in which a small number of
companies receive a disproportionately large share of proposals, while
most companies that receive at least one proposal receive only one.
Companies receiving large numbers of proposals involving complex issues
would experience substantially greater savings than companies receiving
one or two proposals involving less complex issues. Companies receiving
no proposals
[[Page 59939]]
would experience minimal direct cost savings.
Several factors would partially offset these savings. First, the
rescission may result in the loss of value-increasing proposals, and
this would represent a cost to companies and their shareholders.
Although theoretical arguments support a valuable role for nonbinding
shareholder proposals as a communication and engagement mechanism, the
empirical evidence on their economic impact is mixed. Some empirical
research suggests that Rule 14a-8 proposals can improve company
performance by motivating value-enhancing policy changes, limiting
insider entrenchment, and providing management with useful information
about shareholder views.\362\ The counterview is that shareholder
proposals can result in costs for companies and for those shareholders
who do not support a given proposal, as they require company resources
to address (including the cost of diverting attention of management and
the board from their primary responsibilities).\363\ The fact that many
proposals often receive less than majority support \364\ suggests that
they may address issues of interest primarily to a minority of
shareholders rather than shareholders more broadly and therefore can
result in costs without commensurate benefit,\365\ although minority
support alone does not mean a proposal is not important or of no value
to the company.
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\362\ See, e.g., Vicente Cu[ntilde]at et al., The Vote Is Cast:
The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. Fin.
1943 (2012); Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of
Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167
(2011); John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas & Irene Yi, Opportunistic
Proposals by Union Shareholders, 32 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3215 (2019)
(``Matsusaka et al. (2019)'').
\363\ See, e.g., Gantchev Article, supra note 144; Maxime
Couvert, What Are the Firm Value Implications of SEC-Challenged
Shareholder Proposals?, 71 Mgmt. Sci. 4533 (2025) available at
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.
\364\ See section IV.B.3.a for data.
\365\ See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate
Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of
Institutional Investors, 57 J. Fin. Econ. 275 (2000) (``Gillan &
Starks (2000)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, State law or company governing documents that require
inclusion of shareholder proposals in circumstances similar to Rule
14a-8 would reduce the full savings described above. To the extent that
a State adopts statutory criteria governing the inclusion of
shareholder proposals, or, if State law permits, a company incorporates
such criteria into its charter or bylaws, companies subject to those
requirements would continue to bear many of the same processing costs
they currently incur under Rule 14a-8, regardless of whether the
Federal rule is rescinded.\366\ The degree to which this factor offsets
the direct cost savings from the proposed rescission would depend on
how States and companies respond to the proposed rescission, which is
uncertain at this time and would likely vary across jurisdictions and
companies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\366\ Since a company's decision to adopt provisions in its
governing documents regarding the inclusion of shareholder proposals
(absent a State law requirement) would be within its control, it
seems reasonable to assume that the company would elect to adopt
such a provision, and accept its attendant costs, only if it
determines that doing so is beneficial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, savings would be partially offset if proponents were to
decide, should Rule 14a-8 be rescinded, to conduct independent
solicitations and management were to choose to engage with them. Under
current rules, companies facing independent solicitations may choose to
include proponent proposals in their own proxy materials to obtain
discretionary voting authority,\367\ incurring many of the same costs
as they would when facing a shareholder proposal submitted under Rule
14a-8. Additionally, savings from the proposed rescission could be
partially offset if proponents switch to alternative engagement
mechanisms such as calling a special meeting, acting by written
consent, utilizing proxy access provisions (where available), and
submitting floor proposals, as issuers would have to expend resources.
The overall magnitude of such offsetting effects is difficult to
quantify because it is difficult to ascertain how proponents,
companies, and States may respond to the proposed rescission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\367\ See supra section II.B.1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, the proposed rescission is being considered alongside
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)(2). As discussed in section
IV.B.2, those amendments may reduce the probability that a proposal
submitted through independent solicitation would receive majority
support, all else equal. This may reduce proponents' incentives to
conduct their own solicitations as a substitute for the Rule 14a-8
process. The volume of independent solicitations, and therefore the
degree to which the benefits of the proposed rescission would be offset
by substitution activity, likely would be smaller under the combined
set of proposed amendments than under the proposed rescission of Rule
14a-8 alone.
ii. Reallocation of Managerial Resources and Reduction in Agency Costs
Beyond the direct costs described above, addressing shareholder
proposals generates indirect opportunity costs: the time and attention
that management and the board devote to shareholder proposals could
otherwise support core business functions, strategic planning, and
other value-enhancing activities. To the extent the proposed rescission
reduces the total volume of proposals, rather than simply redirecting
them to alternative channels, it would free those resources for value-
enhancing activities. The magnitude of this benefit therefore depends
on the degree to which proposals are actually forgone following
rescission rather than substituted through alternative mechanisms, and
the extent to which freed up managerial resources are used for value-
enhancing activities, which is uncertain and is discussed further in
the context of the offsetting factors above.
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could affect agency costs in
two opposing ways. On the one hand, where management or the board has
private incentives to resist proposals that would benefit shareholders,
they may devote more resources to opposition than shareholder value
maximization requires. To the extent rescission eliminates such
proposals, it would reduce this wasteful expenditure. On the other
hand, if rescission eliminates value-enhancing proposals, then it would
increase rather than reduce agency costs. The net effect on agency
costs therefore depends on the distribution of proposals between those
that are value-enhancing and those that are not. The two effects cannot
be bifurcated with available data, and we accordingly treat the net
agency cost effect of rescission as uncertain.
A related benefit of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would be
the reduction in management's perceived pressure to implement value-
reducing proposals. Because Rule 14a-8 proposals are generally
nonbinding, implementation is often discretionary. Academic evidence
suggests that management sometimes implements value-reducing proposals
due to reputational concerns about disregarding proposals that receive
widespread shareholder support.\368\ The costs of implementing value-
reducing proposals are distinct from processing costs; the proposed
rescission could reduce both. The magnitude of this effect is uncertain
as the frequency of such implementations and the
[[Page 59940]]
associated reduction in value are not directly observable from
available data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\368\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144.
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iii. Potential Improvements in the Focus of Corporate Communications
A related potential benefit of the proposed rescission is a
reduction in the burden that low-value proposals impose on the broader
shareholder base. Where proposals reflect concerns not broadly shared
by the shareholder base, the inclusion of proposal text, supporting
statements by proponents, and any voluntary opposition statements by
the company in its proxy materials may consume shareholder attention
without commensurate benefit, potentially distracting from
communications of greater relevance. Under the current rule, this cost
falls not just on companies but also on all shareholders who review and
process the resulting proxy materials. To the extent the proposed
rescission reduces the frequency of such proposals, it could allow the
proxy materials to serve more effectively as a channel for
communications relevant to the broader shareholder base. The magnitude
of this benefit depends on the proportion of forgone proposals that
would not have provided meaningful informational value to the broader
shareholder base, an issue that the available data do not allow us to
assess with confidence. In addition, although not commonly used today,
any potential reduction in shareholder communications might be offset
by an increase in use of electronic shareholder forums permitted by
Rule 14a-17 as an alternative option for communication.
iv. Reductions in Voting Costs for Shareholders and Their Fiduciaries
Voting shareholders (including institutional investors acting on
behalf of beneficiaries) currently incur costs to analyze proposals,
cast votes, and report on voting decisions to their own stakeholders
(if any). These costs scale with the volume and complexity of proposals
each proxy season. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would reduce
these costs to the extent it reduces the number of proposals presented
for a vote.
The baseline data show that over the 2022 to 2025 period, the
average voted proposal received support from 26 percent of votes cast,
with a median of 21 percent, and approximately 90 percent of voted
proposals failed to pass.\369\ These figures are consistent with the
view that a large portion of proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 do
not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns. To the extent that
such proposals do not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns, a
reduction in their number would allow shareholders and their
fiduciaries to redirect time and resources to more productive uses.
Voting support is, however, a noisy signal of proposal quality:
shareholder apathy, management solicitation against proposals, proxy
advisor recommendations, and institutional voting policies may all
affect the measured support independently of the underlying proposal
value. Accordingly, these figures are not able to speak to whether the
proposals most likely to be forgone following the proposed rescission
necessarily would be those of low value for companies and shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\369\ See supra Table 2 in section IV.B.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For institutional investors acting as fiduciaries, the voting costs
described above carry legal significance beyond their administrative
dimension. Depending on the scope of voting authority assumed in the
relationship, investment advisers, pension fund managers subject to the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, and other
institutional investors subject to analogous fiduciary frameworks can
be responsible for making voting determinations for their clients or
beneficiaries. Under these circumstances, the voting determinations
must be consistent with the relevant fiduciary duties of the party, and
in many cases votes are documented and reported.
These obligations can result in costs that scale directly with the
number of proposals presented for a vote: each additional proposal can
involve incremental analysis, documentation, and reporting regardless
of the ultimate voting outcome. This cost may be partially, but not
fully, mitigated to the extent that institutional fiduciaries retain
proxy advisory firms to provide voting recommendations or voting
execution services.\370\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\370\ For example, the Commission has stated that investment
advisers retaining proxy advisory firms should consider taking steps
to evaluate whether the proxy advisory firm's voting recommendations
are consistent with its voting policies and procedures and in the
client's best interest before the votes are cast, which could
include a higher degree of analysis for certain votes. See
Commission Guidance Regarding Proxy Voting Responsibilities of
Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 5325 (Aug.
21, 2019) [84 FR 47420 (Sept. 20, 2019)].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To the extent that a meaningful share of current Rule 14a-8
proposals do not reflect broadly shared shareholder concerns,
institutional fiduciaries currently can incur voting-related costs on
proposals that may generate limited value for their clients.\371\ The
proposed rescission would reduce these fiduciary voting-related costs
to the extent it reduces the number of proposals presented for a vote.
However, the magnitude of this benefit cannot be quantified with
available data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\371\ A client and its investment adviser may agree that the
adviser would not exercise voting authority on certain types of
matters where the cost of voting would be high, or the benefit to
the client would be low. See id. at discussion accompanying n.35. As
a result, the extent to which advisers incur voting-related costs on
shareholder proposals depends, in part, on the agreement between the
adviser and its client on the scope of the adviser's authority and
responsibilities to vote proxies on behalf of the client.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Costs of the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8
We identify two principal categories of costs: costs to shareholder
proponents, and costs to non-proponent shareholders and the broader
shareholder base. As with the expected benefits, these costs would be
reduced to the extent that State law or company governing documents
require inclusion of shareholder proposals in certain circumstances.
i. Costs to Proponents
Direct costs due to rescission. Submission of shareholder proposals
pursuant to Rule 14a-8 is generally the only mechanism currently
available to shareholders for communicating their views or concerns
directly to the full shareholder base through the company's own proxy
materials. Rescission would remove this mechanism, leaving an
independent proxy solicitation as the most direct substitute available
to proponents.\372\ Although technological and regulatory developments
have reduced the cost of independent proxy solicitation, the cost
differential between independent solicitation and the Rule 14a-8
submission process is likely to be meaningful for many proponents; the
magnitude of that differential, however, is uncertain. Theoretical work
on shareholder engagement suggests that shareholders will use more
costly forms of engagement only when expected benefits exceed expected
costs.\373\ Accordingly, we anticipate that the proposals most likely
to be pursued through independent solicitation
[[Page 59941]]
following the proposed rescission would be those with the greatest
value-enhancement potential for the broader shareholder base or those
that benefit the proponent's private interests (and not those of the
broader shareholder base), while proposals with lower value-enhancement
potential would more likely be forgone or pursued through other
channels.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\372\ Shareholder proponents may also be able to use social
media campaigns, shareholder forums, and exempt solicitations as a
means of communicating with management and fellow shareholders,
although as discussed below, these alternative mechanisms are
unlikely to be as effective as conducting an independent
solicitation.
\373\ See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders
and Corporate Control, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 461 (1986), available at
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1833044 (``Shleifer & Vishny (1986)'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The substitution effect from Rule 14a-8 proposals to independent
solicitations would depend on the cost structure of independent
solicitation and the distribution of value-enhancing proposals in the
current baseline. Proxy solicitation costs are generally lower with
respect to smaller companies, as they tend to have less dispersed
ownership, making it easier for proponents to reach a large fraction of
a company's shareholders. The baseline data indicate that 23 percent of
proposals submitted between 2022 and 2025 were directed to non-S&P 500
companies. This distribution could shift towards smaller companies
following the proposed rescission. At the same time, smaller companies
tend to have more concentrated insider ownership, which could reduce
the probability that an independent solicitation will succeed and
thereby partially offset the cost advantage of targeting smaller
companies.
The proposed rescission could disproportionately affect less well-
resourced proponents--including individual retail investors and smaller
advocacy groups--for whom independent solicitation could be cost-
prohibitive. Individual proponents accounted for approximately 45
percent of proposals submitted between 2022 and 2025, a share that rose
to 53 percent in 2025. Whether this increase reflects a trend or year-
to-year variation is uncertain, but it suggests that a group of
proponents potentially most affected by the proposed rescission may be
a group that has accounted for a growing share of proposal activity
under the baseline.
Proposals submitted by individual proponents received higher voting
support (average: 32 percent; median: 31 percent) and a higher majority
support rate (14 percent of voted proposals) than those submitted by
institutional proponents (average: 20 percent; median: 15 percent;
majority support rate: 6 percent of voted proposals).\374\ Subject to
the caveat about the noisiness of voting support as a signal of
proposal value,\375\ these figures indicate that individual proponents
are more likely to submit proposals reflecting broadly shared
shareholder concerns. The loss of Rule 14a-8 as an engagement mechanism
for this group therefore could result in governance costs, the
magnitude of which depends on the degree to which individual proponent
proposals generate value for the broader shareholder base and on the
degree to which State law or the company's governing documents allow
similar access for shareholder proponents in a world without Rule 14a-
8.\376\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\374\ See supra Table 2 in section IV.B.3.a.
\375\ Shareholder apathy, management solicitation against
proposals, proxy advisor recommendations, and institutional voting
policies may all affect support independently of proposal value. See
supra section IV.C.1.a.iv.
\376\ According to researchers, Rule 14a-8 can serve as a
valuable advisory role by providing a cost-effective method of
communicating shareholder views to management, whose decisions
benefit from managerial learning when there is large heterogeneity
in beliefs about such decisions. This is especially important for
shareholders who are not able to engage with management directly.
See Ali Kakhbod et al., Advising the Management: A Theory of
Shareholder Engagement, 36 Rev. Fin. Stud. 1319 (2023), available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3231365 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier
database) (``Kakhbod et al., 2023'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Costs associated with switching to alternative engagement
mechanisms. The costs to proponents could be mitigated by utilizing
alternative engagement mechanisms. Several alternatives to Rule 14a-8
may be available where permitted by State law and a company's governing
documents. First, as discussed above, subject to State law and a
company's governing documents, proponents may be able to nominate
directors (proxy access), call special meetings, or act by written
consent. These mechanisms can provide engagement channels for
shareholders. Their availability is not uniform, however, and companies
with more restrictive governing documents would offer shareholders
fewer substitutes, increasing the engagement costs for proponents.
Also, engagement based on the Rule 14a-8 process provides companies
with a lower friction, lower reputation cost mechanism to come to an
agreement and learn about shareholder preferences. Switching to these
alternative engagement mechanisms, even if available, might increase
costs for both proponents and companies.
Second, exempt solicitations--including public advocacy campaigns,
vote-no campaigns, and other communications intended to influence
voting without involving a shareholder proposal--are available as an
alternative to the Rule 14a-8 proposal submission process.
Third, voting in director elections, participating in say-on-pay
votes, and divesting are all available alternative engagement
mechanisms to shareholders but are not perfect substitutes for the type
of proactive shareholder engagement that Rule 14a-8 proposals enable.
For example, divestment is an exit mechanism rather than a direct
engagement mechanism, and its effectiveness as a substitute for
engagement under Rule 14a-8 depends on the size of the shareholder's
stake and the significance of the exit threat. These are conditions
that are least likely to be met by the smaller individual shareholders
that may be most affected by the proposed rescission.
Fourth, social media platforms could serve as a lower-cost
alternative engagement mechanism for some proponents compared to
independent solicitation.\377\ However, as noted in section IV.B.3,
social media engagement is a less formal and direct mechanism for
influencing specific corporate governance issues and outcomes than the
Rule 14a-8 submission process, and the evidence on its effectiveness as
a substitute is limited. The net effect of rescission on social media
engagement is uncertain--the proposed rescission may prompt some
proponents to shift their engagement to social media, while others may
disengage entirely in the absence of a formal proposal mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\377\ See supra section IV.B.3.c and note 333.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lastly, proponents may engage in informal communications with
management. For smaller proponents, such communications are less likely
to compel management attention. Some small or resource-constrained
proponents may find that better-resourced shareholders with aligned
interests are willing to sponsor solicitations on their behalf,
particularly for proposals with greater expected benefits. The extent
to which this substitution would occur is uncertain. Multiple
proponents targeting the same company may also have incentives to
conduct joint solicitations, sharing the fixed cost component. As
mentioned in section IV.B.3, however, shareholders with five percent or
greater beneficial ownership may be deterred from pursuing this channel
to the extent their contemplated engagement could affect their
eligibility to use Schedule 13G rather than Schedule 13D.
Taken together, these alternative mechanisms of engagement may not
provide a uniform or complete substitute for the Rule 14a-8 process.
Their availability and effectiveness vary systematically with
shareholder size, company governing documents, and State law in ways
that may disadvantage smaller proponents and shareholders of
[[Page 59942]]
companies with governing documents that have more restrictive
requirements related to shareholder proposals. The costs of the
rescission would be higher for proponents of companies whose governing
documents and State laws provide fewer (or no) alternative mechanisms,
and lower with respect to companies whose governing documents and State
laws provide more mechanisms. The revealed preferences of current
proponents are consistent with the view that they regard the Rule 14a-8
process as preferable to the available alternatives, though this
preference may reflect factors other than the relative cost and
effectiveness of the mechanisms, such as familiarity and the formal
structure of the process.
Costs associated with loss of shareholder leverage in negotiations
with management. Although not the intended use of Rule 14a-8,
proponents may also lose a means for exercising leverage in private
negotiations with management. Between 2022 and 2025, approximately 12
percent of proposals submitted under Rule 14a-8 (382 in total) were
withdrawn prior to the applicable meeting, suggesting that negotiated
withdrawals following communication between management and proponents
occurred in some or many of these cases.\378\ The frequency of such
negotiated outcomes reflects the bargaining structure that Rule 14a-8
creates: a proponent can credibly threaten to place a proposal on the
company's proxy at near-zero marginal cost to the proponent but at a
cost to the company. This asymmetric cost structure incentivizes
company management to negotiate. Private negotiations are effective
precisely because the threat is credible and cheap to execute for
proponents. To the extent that these proposals were value-enhancing to
the company, their withdrawals may represent improvements achieved
without an actual vote. Withdrawal practices vary across proponent
types: institutional proponents accounted for 60 percent of withdrawals
despite submitting 47 percent of proposals, while individual proponents
accounted for only 30 percent of withdrawals despite submitting 45
percent of proposals. As evidenced by this data, the negotiated
withdrawal mechanism operates more prevalently with respect to
institutional proponents. The potential unavailability of this
mechanism as a result of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8
therefore would be expected to have a greater impact on those
proponents than individual proponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\378\ See supra Table 1 in section IV.B.3.a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The potential value of Rule 14a-8 proposals as leverage in private
negotiations with management could be gauged by the frequency of
submissions and withdrawals of various shareholder proposals under Rule
14a-8. For example, environmental and social proposals accounted for 61
percent of withdrawals despite representing 53 percent of submissions,
while governance proposals accounted for only 36 percent of withdrawals
despite representing 45 percent of submissions. This higher withdrawal
rate for environmental and social proposals suggests that proponents
bringing proposals in this category may be more likely to negotiate
with management and withdraw following engagement.\379\ The proposed
rescission would eliminate this negotiation-and-withdrawal channel
along with the Rule 14a-8 submission process. This analysis assumes
that, absent Rule 14a-8, companies would not engage with shareholder
proponents; however, that assumption may not be accurate, as some
companies may still choose to negotiate privately with proponents even
without the possibility of being compelled to include a shareholder
proposal in their proxy materials if alternative engagement mechanisms
are employed.\380\ Accordingly, the extent to which the proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would reduce such engagement is uncertain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\379\ See Reena Aggarwal et al., Public Sentiment Decomposition
and Shareholder Actions (Fisher Coll. Bus, Working Paper No. 2024-
26, Dec. 2, 2024), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=5040715
(retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database).
\380\ See discussion in section IV.C.1.b.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Costs to Non-Proponent Shareholders
The costs of the rescission could extend beyond proponents to the
broader non-proponent shareholder base through several channels.
Loss of valuable shareholder engagement mechanism. The proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 could generate costs for non-proponent
shareholders through the loss of value-enhancing shareholder proposals
that Rule 14a-8 currently facilitates, although academic evidence on
the value of Rule 14a-8 proposals is mixed. This cost may be mitigated
to the extent that proponents use available mechanisms under State law
and company governing documents to bring about the same result as they
currently do under Rule 14a-8. As discussed in section IV.C.1, theory
holds that shareholders engage only when expected benefits exceed
expected costs, and the value of engagement to shareholders varies
along a continuum depending on its form.\381\ As generally nonbinding
instruments, Rule 14a-8 proposals occupy a comparatively low position
on the value-enhancement continuum. Their value depends on shareholder
participation in voting, management's willingness to implement
proposals that pass or receive broad support, and any informational
benefits due to management learning about shareholder preferences. A
recent meta-analysis of the academic literature on shareholder activism
finds that shareholder proposals have the smallest wealth effects of
any form of shareholder engagement (close to zero on average) and notes
that selective-reporting bias in the literature may lead to an
overstatement of positive effects.\382\ This evidence is consistent
with the view that the average value of proposals forgone under the
proposed rescission may be limited, though the cross-sectional
variation in proposal value effects identified in the literature
suggests that the forgone benefits due to rescission may be more
significant for a subset of proposals than the average evidence
implies.\383\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\381\ See Shleifer & Vishny (1986), supra note 373. The study
notes that informal communications with management are less costly
but also less likely to generate large value increases than more
intensive forms of engagement (e.g., takeovers).
\382\ See Josef Bajzik et al., Does Shareholder Activism Create
Value? A Meta-Analysis, 33 Corp. Governance: An Int'l. Rev. 1039
(2025).
\383\ We note that it is difficult to isolate the effect of a
single proposal on a company's stock price from the effects of other
items voted on at the same meeting, or from concurrent direct
engagement between shareholders and management. Also, observed stock
price changes may reflect several effects simultaneously--including
signaling effects from the proposal submission, market expectations
about the voting outcome, and market expectations about the
probability of implementation--making it difficult to attribute
price movements to the proposal's governance content alone. These
limitations do not invalidate the evidence discussed above, but they
counsel caution in drawing strong causal inferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The literature does, however, identify meaningful cross-sectional
variation in proposal value effects. Studies find more positive short-
run market reactions for proposals related to eliminating poison pills,
adopting cumulative voting, and reducing antitakeover protections.\384\
Some evidence suggests that environmental and social proposals passing
by a small margin elicit a positive stock market reaction.\385\ Market
reactions are also
[[Page 59943]]
higher for firms that have had poorer recent stock returns.\386\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\384\ See Gillan & Starks (2000), supra note 365. This study
examines a sample of proposals submitted between 1987 and 1994.
Hence, the generalizability of some of the findings of this study to
present time could be limited.
\385\ See Caroline Flammer, Does Corporate Social Responsibility
Lead to Superior Financial Performance? A Regression Discontinuity
Approach, 61 Mgmt. Sci. 2549 (2015), available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/24551545. Nevertheless, the study also notes
that ``although [the] results imply that adopting close call
[environmental and social] proposals is beneficial to companies,
they do not necessarily imply that [environmental and social]
proposals are beneficial in general.'' In particular, the study
finds that shareholder proposals on social and environmental issues
receive low shareholder support, on average, and only a small and
unrepresentative sample of shareholder proposals on social and
environmental issues is associated with positive stock market
reactions. See also Henk Berkman et al., The Value Impact of Climate
and Non-climate Environmental Shareholder Proposals, 89 J. Corp.
Fin. 102653 (2024), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4748646
(retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database).
\386\ See Luc Renneboog & Peter G. Szilagyi, The Role of
Shareholder Proposals in Corporate Governance, 17 J. Corp. Fin. 167
(2011). They also find potential poorer governance indicators such
as the use of anti-takeover devices are related to higher stock
price reactions to proposal announcements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The evidence on whether individual or institutional proponent
proposals generate larger market reactions is also conflicting. One
study finds higher market reactions for proposals sponsored by
individuals than those sponsored by institutions; \387\ however,
another study finds the opposite.\388\ One study finds that passing
proposals submitted by the most active individual proponents result in
negative abnormal returns and trigger sales by mutual funds that voted
against them.\389\ Another study finds a negative market reaction to
proposals submitted by labor unions in years when a new labor contract
is being negotiated.\390\ This conflicting evidence indicates that the
academic literature does not consistently identify proposals from any
particular proponent category (or proposal subject matter) as uniformly
value-enhancing or value-reducing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\387\ See Gillan & Starks (2000), supra note 365.
\388\ See Vicente Cu[ntilde]at et al., The Vote is Cast: The
Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value, 67 J. Fin. 1943
(2012) (``Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012'') The different findings of the
cited papers may be attributable to different samples and
methodologies used.
\389\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144.
\390\ See Matsusaka et al. (2019), supra note 362. For similar
evidence of stock market reaction to union-sponsored proposals, see
Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders' Say on Pay: Does it
Create Value?, 46 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 299 (2011),
available at https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/23018411.pdf; Andrew
K. Prevost et al., Labor Unions as Shareholder Activists: Champions
or Detractors?, 47 Fin. Rev. 327 (2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond short-run stock price evidence, the academic literature
documents long-run value effects and corporate changes following
proposal passage. One study finds that firms where proposals pass by a
narrow margin subsequently improve on multiple operating dimensions,
with the adoption of these proposals estimated to raise long-run
shareholder value by roughly 2.8 percent.\391\ Subject to the caveat
that long-run returns may reflect other concurrent changes, this
evidence suggests that some benefits of the proposals are not fully
captured in short-run stock price reactions, and that the forgone
benefits of the proposed rescission may exceed what the short-run
evidence alone implies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\391\ See Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012, supra note 362. The study
uses a regression discontinuity design around closely contested
votes and finds that passage of a shareholder-sponsored corporate
governance provision generates a 1.3% abnormal return on the day of
the vote, an implied market value per provision of 2.8%, and
evidence of changes in investment behavior and long-term performance
improvements. The study uses Tobin's Q--the market value of a
company's assets divided by the book value of its assets--as a
measure of long-term performance, but this measure can be imprecise.
In addition, the study's research design around closely contested
votes may mean its findings are less applicable to less contested
votes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss of a preference expression mechanism. Most shareholders do not
initiate proposals but instead use voting on others' proposals to
express their preferences. Between 2022 and 2025, 2,363 proposals were
voted on across 716 companies, providing shareholders at those
companies with a channel for expressing their preferences on certain
topics at a generally lower cost than other channels of engagement. To
the extent that fewer proposals would be presented following
rescission, these shareholders may have fewer opportunities to use this
mechanism. One study has shown that advisory votes can aggregate
dispersed shareholder beliefs and convey that information to the board,
enabling more informed governance decisions.\392\ This aggregation is
most valuable when shareholders hold value-relevant but dispersed
beliefs.\393\ It is less effective when shareholder inputs are noisy or
driven by motivations unrelated to company outcomes. The extent to
which the loss of this mechanism represents a significant cost
therefore depends on the composition of proposals that would be
forgone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\392\ See Kakhbod et al., 2023, supra note 376.
\393\ Value-relevant but dispersed beliefs means that
shareholders have private information about the value of the
company, with each shareholder possessing a piece of information
that is different from what other shareholders possess. Thus,
shareholder engagement can be beneficial because shareholders learn
about those private pieces of information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss of informational signals from proposal activity and voting
outcomes. The submission of proposals under Rule 14a-8 and the outcome
of proxy voting provide informational signals to management about the
distribution of shareholder support for specific corporate policies and
positions. These signals may be difficult to replicate through other
channels, as the formal proposal and voting process provides a direct
and quantified measure of shareholder sentiment on specific governance
issues. To the extent that these signals provide benefits to companies
(such as by enabling more informed corporate decisions, revealing
shareholder dissatisfaction before it escalates to more disruptive
forms of engagement, or prompting value-enhancing corporate policy
changes), their loss represents a cost of rescission.\394\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\394\ For example, an academic study finds that higher voting
support for environmental and social proposals can predict future
firm risk, which in turn affects firm value--suggesting that voting
outcomes contain forward-looking information not captured through
other channels (see Yazhou Ellen Heet al., ES Risks and Shareholder
Voice, 36 Rev. Fin. Stud 4824 (2023)). In a similar vein, other
studies show that the number of shareholder proposals predicts
subsequent forced CEO turnover and director turnover, indicating
that proposal activity is informative about shareholder
dissatisfaction with real governance consequences (see supra note
389). The empirical literature also documents concrete governance
changes and long-run value effects following proposal activity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The magnitude of this cost is uncertain and depends on the degree
to which current proposals reflect value-enhancing shareholder beliefs
rather than special interests. To the extent that proponents use
available mechanisms under State law and company governing documents to
bring about the same or similar result as they currently do under Rule
14a-8, this cost could be mitigated. Also, the effectiveness of
informational signals from proposal voting is not uniform: signals are
most valuable when management and shareholders differ in their beliefs
about potential outcomes rather than in their underlying incentives,
and less valuable when shareholder inputs are noisy or driven by
motivations unrelated to firm outcomes. The available empirical
evidence suggests that the informational value of proposal activity is
heterogeneous rather than uniformly high or low--a meaningful subset of
proposals appears to generate governance benefits that are not fully
captured in contemporaneous voting outcomes, while a substantial
proportion of proposals receive limited voting support and may have
limited informational value for the broader shareholder base and for
management.\395\ The forgone informational benefits of rescission may
therefore be meaningful for a subset of proposals, even if the value of
forgone proposals cannot be quantified with the
[[Page 59944]]
available data and the average value of forgone proposals is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\395\ See Gantchev Article, supra note 144; Kakhbod et al.,
2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Loss of informational signals from management responses. Non-
proponent shareholders also benefit from the information conveyed
through management's responses to proposals--including opposition
statements, pre-vote adjustments,\396\ and negotiated withdrawals--
which may reveal the management's views and priorities on various
issues and how the board responds to shareholder concerns. The proposed
rescission would remove this signaling mechanism, potentially reducing
the ability of shareholders to learn of management's governance
priorities. The magnitude of this cost depends on how management has
responded under the current framework, which may vary across companies
and proposals, and on the degree to which that information is not
available through other channels. To the extent that management's
responses are perfunctory or that the information they convey is
available through other disclosure mechanisms, the loss of this
signaling channel would represent a smaller cost to non-proponent
shareholders.
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\396\ Pre-vote adjustments refer to the processes used by
financial institutions, broker-dealers, and institutional investors
to accurately determine which investors are entitled to vote and
precisely reconcile the number of shares that can be voted before
the proxy materials are sent and the votes are submitted.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Informational spillovers to the broader market. Shareholder
activity and voting results currently generate informational spillovers
beyond the shareholders of individual companies. Voting outcomes on
proposals at one company may provide signals that other companies and
their shareholders can use to assess corporate policies and shareholder
sentiment more broadly. The proposed rescission could reduce these
spillovers, representing a cost to the broader market and to companies.
The magnitude of this cost depends on two conditions: the degree to
which voting outcomes at one company provide information not already
available through other channels, and the degree to which the proposals
most likely to be forgone following the proposed rescission are those
that generate the most valuable spillovers. To the extent that the
proposals most likely to be forgone are those with limited
informational value for the broader market, as suggested by the low
average voting support documented in the baseline data, the reduction
in informational spillovers may be modest. Conversely, to the extent
that a meaningful subset of forgone proposals would have generated
valuable spillovers (e.g., proposals addressing governance issues that
are common across companies or industries), the cost to the broader
investment community could be more significant.
Transition costs. The proposed rescission could also impose
transition costs on companies, proponents, and non-proponent
shareholders in the period after the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8,
during which State law and private ordering and alternative engagement
practices generally may develop. Rule 14a-8 has governed the
shareholder proposal process for more than 80 years, and both companies
and proponents have developed governance and engagement practices
around its provisions. Many companies have established internal
processes and governance approaches premised on the existence of a
Federal rule; many proponents have organized their engagement
strategies around the rule's requirements, including those regarding
eligibility, submission deadlines, and substantive standards. The
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would require both groups to develop new
frameworks and practices during a period of legal uncertainty, before
State legislatures and courts have taken any steps to address
unresolved questions left by the rescission of the Federal rule. The
transition period may also be associated with elevated litigation
costs, to the extent that the frequency of disputes about whether a
proposal is a proper subject for shareholder action under State law
increases following the proposed rescission. These litigation costs may
include court fees, legal representation and the time and resources
required to resolve disputes through court proceedings.
The magnitude of the impacts and duration of this transition period
are uncertain and would depend on the degree to which State law and
private ordering develop frameworks that address shareholder proposal
activity in the absence of Rule 14a-8 and the pace at which State
legislatures act, State courts resolve relevant legal questions, and
companies and their shareholders agree upon new frameworks and
practices. It is possible that this transition period could extend for
several years. These transition costs would be temporary in nature and
would diminish if and to the extent State law develops and private
ordering is implemented, but they may be significant in the near term.
Non-proponent shareholders could also be affected during the
transition period to the extent that legal uncertainty about the
standards applicable to shareholder proposals affects the governance of
companies in which they hold shares. The degree to which non-proponent
shareholders are affected similarly would depend on the pace of the
transition and the degree to which State law and private ordering
develop frameworks that address shareholder proposal activity in the
absence of Rule 14a-8.
2. Proposed Amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) address an externality
that is related to that arising in the context of Rule 14-8 but is also
distinct: under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2), a proponent's decision to
conduct an independent solicitation can lead to costs for a company
that the proponent does not bear and therefore does not internalize.
Specifically, a company is restricted from exercising discretionary
voting authority with respect to an omitted proposal if the proponent
distributes its own proxy materials to holders of at least the
percentage of the company's voting shares required under applicable law
to carry the proposal and satisfies related procedural
requirements.\397\ Once the proponent satisfies that threshold, the
company faces a binary choice: include the proposal in its proxy
materials and bear the associated inclusion and solicitation costs, or
omit it and forgo the ability to collect and cast votes on the proposal
through its proxy card.\398\ Neither option is costless, and the
company cannot recover the costs imposed by either choice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\397\ See section II.B.1 for a description of the current
regulatory framework governing a company's discretionary voting
authority.
\398\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendments to the proxy rules to facilitate the universal proxy
rules adopted in 2021 increased the significance of this choice.\399\ A
proponent soliciting votes for its proposals may include the company's
director nominees on its own proxy card even when it does not nominate
competing directors.\400\ This ``zero slate'' structure allows
shareholders to vote on the company's nominees and on the proponent's
proposals using the proponent's proxy card. If the company omits the
proponent's proposals, shareholders may shift to the proponent's card
in order to be able to vote on both the company's nominees and the
proponent's proposals. A company may conclude that it has little
practical choice but to include the proponent's proposals in its own
proxy
[[Page 59945]]
materials and bear the associated costs if it wants shareholders to use
its proxy card, even though neither State law nor the Federal proxy
rules require their inclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\399\ See section II.B.3 for a description of Rule 14a-4(d)(1)
and its interaction with current Rule 14a-4(c)(2).
\400\ See supra section II.B.3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would address both the
general and zero-slate cases by replacing the solicitation threshold
with an individual shareholder opt-out check box. A company that omits
a proposal would remain able to collect and cast votes on it through
discretionary voting authority, except for shares represented by proxy
cards on which shareholders opt out. In a zero-slate campaign, the
company would likewise no longer need to include the proponent's
proposals on its proxy card to exercise proxy voting authority with
respect to those proposals. The following economic analysis examines
the potential benefits and costs of the proposed amendments to Rule
14a-4(c), including the potential effects on proposal volume, proposal
composition, and shareholder voting. The proposed amendments could
increase the number of proposals that companies omit from their proxy
cards and reduce the number of proposals submitted by proponents, with
consequences for shareholder voting and governance examined below. We
also examine the interaction of the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) with the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8.
To illustrate the effects of the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) on shareholder voting, consider a scenario in which: (i) a
proponent submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8 and delivers its own
proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the company's shares
necessary to carry the proposal; and (ii) the proposal is timely
received by the company. Under the current rule, the company faces a
binary choice: include the proposal in its proxy materials in order to
exercise proxy voting authority with respect to that proposal (because
it cannot exercise discretionary voting authority with respect to the
proposal) or omit the proposal from its proxy materials and forgo the
ability to exercise proxy voting authority with respect to that
proposal. Assume additionally within the scenario that: (iii) the
company omits the proponent's proposal from its proxy card while
providing the disclosure required under Rule 14a-4(c)(2); and (iv) a
shareholder signs the company's proxy card. Under the baseline, this
shareholder's proxy is counted as a non-vote on the proponent's
proposal (i.e., a vote not cast) because the company lacks any proxy
voting authority on the proposal. Under the proposed amendments, the
company would be allowed to exercise discretionary voting authority on
the proposal with respect to the shares of any shareholder who signs
the company's proxy card and does not check the proposed opt-out check
box, allowing the company to vote the shareholder's proxy in accordance
with the company's disclosed intention.
The proposed amendments would therefore enable a company to
exercise discretionary voting authority on the proposal without
including the proposal in its proxy materials, reducing certain costs
of inclusion where a company chooses to omit a proposal from its proxy
card. The proposed amendments would also provide an additional option
to a shareholder who uses the company's proxy card where the company
omits the proposal: such a shareholder would be able to preserve the
baseline of a non-vote outcome by checking the proposed opt-out box in
lieu of having its vote cast through the company's discretionary
authority by leaving the box unchecked.
a. Direct Cost Savings to Issuers
When a proponent submits a proposal outside of Rule 14a-8, delivers
its own proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the company's
shares necessary to carry the proposal, and ensures the proposal is
timely received by the company, the company currently faces a binary
choice between inclusion and omission--where omission means forgoing
any ability to receive and exercise proxy voting authority from
shareholders through its own proxy card with respect to the proposal.
The proposed amendments do not change this binary choice, but they do
change the consequence of choosing omission. Under the proposed
amendments, a company that omits a proposal from its proxy card can
receive and exercise discretionary voting authority, subject to the
proposed opt-out check box. Where companies that currently would have
otherwise included the proposal but choose to omit a proposal under the
proposed amendments, they would no longer face certain direct costs
associated with inclusion.
Under the baseline, few practical differences exist between a
company's activities and costs in connection with inclusion and
omission: a company would generally conduct legal review, management
and board review, and communications with outside consultants in both
cases. The costs that vary between inclusion and omission consist
primarily of the incremental costs of including the proposal and the
board's recommendation to shareholders regarding the proposal in the
proxy materials and conducting active solicitation campaigns that some
companies undertake when including a proponent's proposal on their
proxy card.
Active solicitation efforts may involve proxy solicitation firms,
investor outreach, and substantial management time, which can
collectively be a significant cost driver.\401\ To the extent the
proposed amendments enable companies to omit a proposal from their
proxy card while still collecting and casting votes through
discretionary voting authority, they may reduce the costs associated
with active solicitation campaigns. The magnitude of this cost saving
depends in part on the degree to which shareholders actively use the
proposed opt-out check box, as discussed in section IV.B.2.f below. To
the extent shareholders do not check the box, management may be able to
exercise discretionary authority over a substantial proportion of
votes, reducing the need for active solicitation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\401\ See supra section IV.B.3.b, at Table 4. For companies,
mean (median) reported estimates of solicitation expenses in
election contests with proposals at shareholder meetings held in
2022-2025 were $5,460,302 ($825,000).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The cost savings identified above are also related to the costs
that the proposed amendment may impose on certain shareholders. Under
the baseline, companies that ultimately include proposals may respond
by conducting active solicitation campaigns. The proposed amendments
give these companies the option to switch to omission while retaining
the ability to exercise discretionary voting authority, generating the
largest cost savings for companies that currently bear the highest
costs of inclusion and active solicitation. At these same companies,
however, shareholders who wish to vote in a manner that is opposite to
management's intended vote currently have a direct path to doing so
through the company's proxy card because the proposal is included on
the company's card, which is a path that would be removed if the
company switches to omission. The cost savings to the company and the
loss of voting options for shareholders who wish to vote opposite to
management's intended vote on the company's card are therefore two
consequences of the same decision by the same set of companies. This
analysis is subject to the qualification that not all companies will
switch to omission: some may continue to include proposals for
strategic or reputational reasons, in which case neither effect would
materialize.
[[Page 59946]]
b. Potential Compliance Costs Incurred by Issuers
Issuers who take advantage of the additional flexibility with
respect to discretionary voting authority would face compliance costs
of doing so. These compliance costs are estimated to be approximately
$1,100 annually in aggregate across all affected issuers, reflecting
$625 per hour for 0.1 hours per proposal.\402\ However, the costs are
not distributed evenly across issuers. Issuers would not incur these
costs if they chose not to take advantage of the additional flexibility
with respect to discretionary voting authority or if they are not faced
with independent solicitations. These compliance costs also assume the
proposal would not affect the volume of proposals and that issuers
would exercise this discretionary voting authority on all independent
solicitations. The costs could be higher or lower depending on how the
proposed rule affects the volume of proposals. The costs would be lower
if issuers would not always exercise the additional discretionary
voting authority.
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\402\ See Table 6 in section IV.C.4 and PRA Table 1 note 3. The
PRA estimates 0.1 hours per proposal. Multiplying 0.1 hours per
proposal by $625 for the blended hourly labor rate and 17 for the
average number of proxy contests per year generates $1,062.5, or
approximately $1,100. The rate of $625 per hour is a blended hourly
rate of our current estimate of the hourly rate for each of four
occupations: lawyers ($774), accountants and auditors ($330),
financial managers ($730), and general and operations managers
($656). This blended hourly rate assumes that lawyers will account
for 50 percent of the time spent on compliance activities;
accountants and auditors, 30 percent; financial managers, 10
percent; and general operations managers, 10 percent. We expect that
the types of individuals, the rates for those individuals, and the
proportion of each individual's contributions would vary among
registrants and could differ depending on which specific information
collection a registrant is completing. Nonetheless, for purposes of
this economic analysis, we believe the $625 per hour rate is a
reasonable estimate of the hourly cost of completing the required
information collection. To calculate the occupational hourly rates
used in this release, the Commission uses the May 2025 occupational
mean hourly wage data from the Occupational Employment and Wage
Statistics (OEWS) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
for ``Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Other Financial
Investments and Related Activities'' (NAICS 523). See Occupational
Employment and Wage Statistics, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/; see also Standard
Occupational Classification, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
available at https://www.bls.gov/soc/ (describing occupational
classification system used by BLS); Exec. Off. of the President,
Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, North American Industry Classification
System (2022), available at https://www.census.gov/naics/reference_files_tools/2022_NAICS_Manual.pdf (describing the industry
classification system used by BLS and other agencies). The mean
hourly wage for each occupation is multiplied by an employment cost
index (ECI) factor of 1.0227, calculated as one plus the percentage
change in the seasonally adjusted ECI for wages and salaries of
private industry workers from the second quarter of 2025
(ECI=173.563), which contains the May 2025 OEWS reference period, to
the first quarter of 2026 (ECI=177.498), which is the date of the
most recently available ECI observations when the occupational
hourly rates used in this release were calculated. See Employment
Cost Index, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Seasonal Data 2001-
Present, available at https://www.bls.gov/eci/tables.htm. The
adjusted mean hourly wage is then multiplied by a nonwage cost
adjustment factor of 5.734, which accounts for nonwage costs borne
by employers, such as bonuses, benefits, and overhead. This factor
is calculated as the average over 2016-2025 of the ratio of the
Bureau of Economic Analysis's gross output for the NAICS 523 to
total wages across all occupations for the NAICS 523 in the OEWS
data. See Gross Output by Industry, U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, available at https://www.bea.gov/data/industries/gross-output-by-industry; Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics,
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at https://www.bls.gov/oes/. For example, the $774 occupational hourly rate for lawyers is
calculated as $131.91 x 1.0227 x 5.734, or approximately $774 (where
$131.91 is the May 2025 mean hourly wage for lawyers in NAICS 523).
The final product is the occupational hourly rate. See generally
Updated Methodology for Calculating Occupational Hourly Rates (Dec.
19, 2025), available at https://www.sec.gov/files/method-occupational-hourly-rates.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Effects on Proposal Volume
The proposed amendments may reduce the total volume of proposals
submitted through independent solicitation. By enabling companies to
exercise discretionary voting authority, even where the proponent has
delivered its own proxy materials to holders of the percentage of the
company's shares necessary to carry the proposal, the proposed
amendments would allow companies to cast votes against a proposal on
behalf of shareholders who use the company's proxy card and do not
check the proposed opt-out check box. Such votes would have been
counted as non-votes under the current framework. This reduces the
proponent's expected probability of success, which may affect the
proponent's incentives to conduct an independent solicitation.\403\
Whether the volume of proposals submitted through independent
solicitation would decline would depend on the degree to which the
reduced probability of success affects the proponent's assessment of
whether expected benefits justify those costs. Proponents with strong
motivations and sufficient resources may conclude that the expected
benefits justify the costs despite the reduced probability of success,
while proponents with less to gain or fewer resources may be deterred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\403\ The reduction in the expected probability of a successful
outcome is partially mitigated by the ability of shareholders who
wish to vote in favor of the proposal to vote the proponent's proxy
card rather than the company's card. This mitigation is incomplete,
however, as voting the proponent's card involves frictions (for
example, awareness of the proponent's card, the ability to obtain
it, and the willingness to use it in place of the company's card)
that are likely to be more pronounced for certain shareholders than
for others. To the extent these frictions limit the rate at which
shareholders switch to the proponent's card, the reduction in the
expected probability of a successful outcome identified above would
be larger. The effects of these frictions on shareholder voting
options are discussed further in section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) should also be considered
in conjunction with the Commission's concurrent proposal to rescind
Rule 14a-8. Under the baseline, non-Rule 14a-8 proposals are
uncommon,\404\ as Rule 14a-8 provides shareholders with a lower-cost
mechanism for submitting proposals. The proposed rescission of Rule
14a-8 could redirect a portion of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals
into the independent solicitation channel, potentially increasing the
volume of independent solicitations. The magnitude of this effect is
uncertain. If a substantial proportion of shareholders who would have
submitted a proposal under Rule 14a-8 cease submitting proposals
entirely due to the higher costs of independent solicitations, the
volume increase of independent solicitations would be small.
Additionally, the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) may attenuate
this volume increase, as some former Rule 14a-8 proponents may be
deterred by the reduction in the expected probability of success
discussed above. The aggregate effect of these two concurrent proposed
changes on the total volume of non-Rule 14a-8 proposals may be impacted
by the relative sizes of these two proposal populations. From 2022 to
2025, there were 3,205 Rule 14a-8 proposals submitted but only 69 proxy
contests containing an independent solicitation for one or more
proposals (and thus the number of proposals in these 69 contests is
likely slightly higher than 69). Although it is uncertain how many of
the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals would be redirected into the
independent solicitation channel, a switch by a very small percentage
of current Rule 14a-8 proposals would likely more than offset any
reduction in non-14a-8 proposals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\404\ There were 69 total proxy contests that contained a
solicitation for one or more proposals that were initiated through
the filing of preliminary proxy statements in calendar years 2022-
2025. See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed amendments could also compound the effect on less
well-resourced proponents. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 would
disproportionately affect less well-resourced proponents, including
individual retail investors and smaller
[[Page 59947]]
advocacy groups, for whom independent solicitation could be cost-
prohibitive. Less well-resourced proponents who nonetheless shift to
independent solicitation as an alternative channel would face not only
higher direct costs of solicitation relative to the Rule 14a-8 process,
but also a reduced probability that their proposals would receive
majority support. The combination of higher costs and lower probability
of success could further reduce the participation of less well-
resourced proponents relative to large institutional investors and
activist hedge funds, which have greater resources and established
solicitation infrastructure. To the extent the two proposed changes
together produce a greater reduction in less well-resourced proponent
participation than either change alone, the combined effect on
proponent participation would exceed what either the rescission of Rule
14a-8 or the amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would produce individually.
d. Effects on Proposal Composition
The proposed amendments may affect the characteristics of proposals
submitted through independent solicitation in two ways. First, by
reducing the expected probability of a successful outcome for proposals
submitted through independent solicitation, the amendments may affect
which proponents find it worthwhile to conduct independent
solicitations and for which proposals, potentially changing the
composition of submitted proposals. Second, the concurrent rescission
of Rule 14a-8 would raise the cost threshold for presenting proposals,
potentially changing the composition of the broader proposal population
by filtering out some of the proponents (and therefore their proposals)
who otherwise would have relied on Rule 14a-8's lower-cost mechanism.
Data on shareholder voting outcomes indicate that, over the 2022 to
2025 period, the average shareholder support for voted Rule 14a-8
proposals was approximately 26 percent of votes cast, with only
approximately 10 percent of proposals receiving majority support. These
figures are consistent with the finding that most currently submitted
Rule 14a-8 proposals lack broad shareholder support. To the extent that
proposals lacking majority support reflect the preferences of a
minority of shareholders rather than the shareholder base as a whole, a
reduction in such proposals may reduce the costs that the majority of
shareholders incur in reviewing and voting on them and may allow
shareholder attention to be directed toward proposals with broader
support. This benefit is contingent, however, on the proposals that
would no longer be submitted being those with lower shareholder
support. Data on proposals submitted through independent solicitations
and voted on show that a higher fraction, 49 percent, of such proposals
(and 67 percent of those targeting regulated funds) pass.\405\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\405\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We draw limited inferences from the voting data for two reasons.
First, support levels are a noisy signal of a proposal's value to the
company and shareholders: shareholder apathy, management solicitation
against proposals, and institutional standing voting policies may all
affect shareholders' votes on a proposal, independently of underlying
proposal value. Second, the voting data cover only proposals that
proceeded to a vote, which may differ systematically from those that
would no longer be submitted under the proposed amendment.
The higher cost threshold, all else equal, under a post-rescission
regime may operate as a filter in two distinct ways. First, it may
filter out proposals less likely to receive broad shareholder support,
which would be beneficial to companies and shareholders to the extent
it reduces the burden of reviewing and voting on proposals that do not
reflect broadly shared concerns. This filtering benefit assumes,
however, that proponents of low-support proposals are primarily
motivated by the prospect of a successful voting outcome and will
therefore be deterred by the reduced probability of success. To the
extent that some proponents submit proposals primarily to make a
statement, generate publicity, or put a governance concern on the
record, rather than to garner majority support, the reduced probability
of success may have little effect on their submission behavior. These
proponents may therefore be among the least filtered out by a higher
cost threshold, which would attenuate the filtering benefit identified
above.
Second, it may filter out proponents with fewer resources,
regardless of the value of their proposals, which is not necessarily
beneficial as such proponents may have proposals that would have
benefited shareholders and the company. The direction and magnitude of
these filtering effects depend on which proposals are most likely to be
affected by the higher cost threshold, and the available evidence
suggests that opposing forces bear on the question, as discussed below.
On the one hand, the filtering benefit assumes that the proposals
most sensitive to the cost increase are those submitted by proponents
whose proposals lack broad shareholder support. However, individual
proponents constituted approximately 49 percent of the identified Rule
14a-8 population (during the 2022-2025 period), and their proposals
received higher average shareholder support (approximately 32 percent)
than those submitted by institutional proponents (approximately 20
percent) in the historical voting data.\406\ Because individual
proponents are less likely on average than institutional proponents to
have the resources necessary to sustain an independent solicitation,
they may be most sensitive to the cost increase and therefore most
likely to cease pursuing proposals. If this is correct, the filtering
effect may operate in the opposite direction from that assumed by the
benefit case: the cost increase would disproportionately affect a class
of proposals that received relatively higher shareholder support in the
historical data, while leaving largely unaffected the institutional
proposals that received lower average support. However, considering
independent solicitations for proposals, where nearly half receive
enough voting support to pass, only 13 percent were initiated by
individuals. Thus, most of these independent solicitations would not
likely be deterred solely by a cost increase.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\406\ See supra section IV.B.3.a. The 49% is derived from 1,429
identified individual proponents and 1,499 identified institutional
proponents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the other hand, several considerations qualify the inference
that the filtering effect would operate against the benefit case.
First, the subset of individual proponents who would transition to
independent solicitation may be more sophisticated and better resourced
than the broader Rule 14a-8 individual proponent population, as the
higher costs of independent solicitation would themselves function as a
filter on proponent sophistication and resources. If this is correct,
the proposals submitted by individual proponents under the new regime
may not be as sensitive to the cost increase as the prior argument
assumes. Second, this inference depends on the Rule 14a-8 proponent
population being representative of the population likely to submit
proposals under the new regime--an assumption that may not hold if
proponents who have committed to independent solicitation differ
systematically in sophistication and resources from the historical Rule
14a-8 population. Indeed, we find evidence this is the case, as
proposals submitted through independent solicitation are
[[Page 59948]]
more likely to be submitted by institutions.\407\ Third, average
support figures mask heterogeneity within both the individual and
institutional proponent categories, and the proposals most likely to be
affected may not be representative of their category averages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\407\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These opposing forces introduce uncertainty about the magnitude as
well as the direction of the filtering effect, as the available data do
not support a firm inference that the proposals most likely to no
longer be presented under the proposed amendment are those with the
weakest underlying shareholder support. We therefore treat the
filtering effect as uncertain in both direction and magnitude.
The economic significance of these composition effects depends on
the direction of the filtering effect. If the proposals most likely to
exit the system are those with the weakest underlying shareholder
support, companies and shareholders would benefit from a reduction in
the burden of reviewing and voting on proposals that do not reflect
broadly shared concerns. If, however, the proposals that would most
likely not be presented are those with stronger underlying shareholder
support--as the individual proponent data suggest is possible--the
composition effect would represent a cost rather than a benefit, as the
set of proposals that might include value-enhancing proposals would no
longer be submitted. Further, independent solicitations have
historically received significant shareholder support (close to half of
them passed during the 2022-2025 period).\408\ Thus, to the extent the
proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) reduce these submissions, this
could represent a cost. Given the uncertainty about the direction of
the filtering effect identified above, we cannot assess with confidence
whether the composition effect represents a net benefit or a net cost
for companies and shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\408\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The voting data also do not capture outcomes produced through the
negotiation and withdrawal of proposals. A significant proportion of
shareholder proposals are withdrawn before a vote, often following
negotiation with management, which may thus produce governance outcomes
that do not appear in voting data. Management may be more committed to
implementing a negotiated outcome than the outcome of a majority vote
on a shareholder proposal, suggesting that the value effect of the
negotiation and withdrawal of proposals channel may exceed what the
voting data alone capture. The likelihood of proceeding to a vote is
the primary source of proponent leverage in these negotiations. To the
extent that the proposed amendments alter the credible threat of a
successful outside solicitation, they may affect proponent leverage in
pre-vote negotiations, the negotiating dynamic between companies and
proponents, and the rate of negotiated withdrawals and the outcomes
associated with them. The direction of this effect depends on the
degree to which the proposed amendments change proponent leverage and
negotiating incentives. The voting data therefore do not provide
insight into all the activity that the proposed amendments may affect.
Uncertainty about the change in value from changes in proposal
composition is consistent with broader mixed results when attempting to
value shareholder proposals. Empirical research on stock price
reactions to shareholder proposals suggests that the average wealth
effects of non-binding proposals are close to zero, though with
significant cross-sectional variation.\409\ Studies using the no-action
letter process as a natural experiment find that markets react
positively, on average, when a no-action letter concurring with the
company is issued, with larger effects for proposals sponsored by
individuals and those classified (by the studies' authors) as pursuing
special interests.\410\ This literature provides the closest available
quasi-experimental evidence on the value effects of proposal exclusion,
but its applicability to the proposed amendments is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\409\ See Josef Bajzik et al., Does Shareholder Activism Create
Value? A Meta-Analysis, 33 Corp. Governance: An Int'l. Rev. 1039
(2025).
\410\ See John G. Matsusaka et al., Can Shareholder Proposals
Hurt Shareholders? Evidence From Securities and Exchange Commission
No-Action-Letter Decisions, 64 J.L. & Econ. 107, 110 (2021),
available at https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/epdf/10.1086/710828.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. Agency Conflicts and Governance Effects
The proposed amendments would increase management's expected
probability of success when faced with independent solicitations. The
extent to which this is a benefit or cost of the proposed amendments
depends in part on the degree of managerial agency conflict in
companies targeted by independent solicitations. An agency conflict
occurs when the managers of a company have different incentives or
objectives than the owners (shareholders) of the company. For example,
managers might reduce board independence, weaken compensation
oversight, or entrench anti-takeover provisions such as poison pills
(also known as shareholder rights plans) to increase their
compensation, improve executive job security, or insulate themselves
from accountability.
If managers are aligned with shareholder interests and possess
superior information as insiders, then providing them with additional
discretionary authority over independent proposal solicitations would
likely increase the likelihood of higher-value vote outcomes. However,
if the proposal exacerbates managerial agency conflicts, it could
increase the likelihood of lower-value vote outcomes. The balance
between these potential outcomes depends on which companies would
likely be targeted by independent solicitations under the proposed
amendments, how these companies chose to exercise their discretionary
voting, and the potential severity of the agency conflicts. Ultimately,
the magnitudes of these effects are uncertain.
i. Characteristics of Companies and Proposals Most Likely Affected
The population of companies that attract independent solicitations
is unlikely to be representative of the broader universe of public
companies, and independent solicitations may skew toward target
companies with agency conflicts. Independent solicitations are costly,
and proponents may pursue them only after exhausting lower-cost
engagement channels or determining that these other engagement channels
have proven insufficient. Agency conflicts would frustrate these other
engagement channels. Accordingly, companies that attract independent
solicitation may disproportionately be those with agency conflicts that
are, in the view of proponents, significant enough to warrant the
expense of independent solicitations.
This inference faces several limitations. First, companies may
attract independent solicitations, despite their cost, for reasons
other than concerns about company value, including their size and
public profile, the industries in which they operate, or ownership
structures that make them attractive targets for particular types of
proponents. Second, declining solicitation costs (e.g., due to
technological changes) could weaken the attrition bias, making the
affected population more representative of all public companies. Third,
proponents themselves may have agency conflicts, pursuing interests of
stakeholders that differ from the interests of non-
[[Page 59949]]
proponent shareholders.\411\ The proposed amendments could benefit
(non-proponent) shareholders in these cases by more easily allowing
companies to vote against such proposals. Finally, the proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 may alter which companies attract independent
solicitations, introducing further uncertainty.\412\ It is also unclear
to what extent proposals redirected into independent solicitation would
address agency conflicts. Currently, Rule 14a-8 proposals receive less
shareholder support on average than independent solicitations, though
ones that would switch to independent solicitation under the proposed
rescission may be more value-enhancing for the company than the average
Rule 14a-8 proposal to the extent they are more similar to current
independent solicitations, which receive higher shareholder support.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\411\ See supra note 223 (discussing, e.g., union involvement in
a proposal at Warrior Met Coal).
\412\ See section IV.B.2.c for a discussion of changes to the
composition of companies targeted by independent solicitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii. Exercise of Discretionary Voting Power
Any conclusion that the proposals are costly because of agency
conflicts would depend on management using their additional voting
discretion to defeat value-enhancing proposals, but the available
evidence does not establish that management would necessarily do so.
Nearly half (49 percent) of proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8
process from 2022 to 2025 that went to a vote received enough support
to pass.\413\ Shareholder approval of these proposals may signal that
they are value-enhancing for the company. Management could use the
proposed amendments to seek and obtain discretionary voting authority
and vote against such value-enhancing proposals. Available data and
current literature do not allow us to characterize with confidence the
prevalence of agency conflicts across the population of companies
targeted by independent solicitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\413\ See supra section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Academic research suggests that corporate governance structures
develop endogenously to the existing agency conflicts within a firm,
and that management incentives and objectives can shape governance
arrangements and corporate outcomes over time.\414\ Given this
endogeneity, the literature supports two distinct interpretations of
the governance profile of companies that are likely to attract
independent solicitations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\414\ For references on endogenous governance structures, and
the role of executive character and style in shaping corporate
outcomes, see, e.g., Aiyesha Dey, Corporate Governance and Agency
Conflicts, 46 J. Acct. Rsch. 1143 (2008); Benjamin E. Hermalin and
Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and the
Monitoring of the CEO, 88 Am. Econ. Rev. 96 (1998); Benjamin E.
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: a Survey of the Economic
Literature (Apr. 2003), Econ. Pol'y Rev. available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=794804 (retrieved from SSRN Elsevier database);
Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, Managing With Style: The
Effect of Managers on Firm Policies, 118 Q. J. Econ. 1169 (2003);
and Robert Davidson et al., Executives' ``Off-The-Job'' Behavior,
Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 5
(2015).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the first interpretation, management has shaped governance to
extract private benefits at shareholders' expense, reducing board
independence, weakening compensation oversight, or entrenching anti-
takeover provisions to insulate itself from accountability. Under this
interpretation, the governance concerns motivating independent
solicitations are well-founded, management opposition reflects agency
conflict, and the proposed amendments' effect in reducing the
probability of success of independent solicitations may be adverse to
shareholder interests.
Under the second interpretation, management has shaped governance
to be less restrictive, not to extract private benefits but to preserve
operational flexibility in the service of shareholder value. Governance
structures that appear suboptimal by reference to general best-practice
standards may reflect rational adaptation to firm-specific
circumstances, such as industry, strategy, or competitive environment.
Proposals identifying these arrangements as concerns may therefore
mischaracterize legitimate managerial discretion as an agency problem,
and management opposition may reflect a valid assessment of shareholder
interests rather than entrenchment. The same governance profile could
be consistent with both interpretations.
iii. Additional Uncertainties
Two additional factors create uncertainties in the potential
magnitude of the agency conflict concern. First, the argument that the
proposed amendments would have a negative effect in the presence of
agency conflicts assumes that management at these companies would be
aware of the amendments (if adopted) and then act on them to seek
discretionary voting authority. If the additional authority under the
proposed amendments is not used, then the agency conflict risk would be
smaller than the argument implies. Second, the agency conflict concern
may be most relevant for companies with moderate rather than the most
severe governance concerns: companies with very significant governance
problems may have already been subjected to other forms of shareholder
intervention (such as shareholder campaigns or board reconstitution)
that reduce the marginal role of independent solicitations under the
proposed amendments.
f. Effects on Shareholder Voting
The proposed amendments would affect shareholders who use the
company's proxy card differently depending on whether they wish to vote
with or opposite to management's voting recommendation on a proposal.
A shareholder who wishes to vote with management's recommended vote
in the case where the company omits the proposal from its proxy card
would be better off under the proposed amendments. Under the baseline,
the only possible result of such a shareholder's proxy is a non-vote,
whereas under the proposed amendments the shareholder would be able to
leave the proposed opt-out check box blank and have its vote cast in
accordance with management's recommendation. This benefit is
conditional on the company having omitted the proposal under the
baseline. To the extent companies would have included proposals in
their proxy materials under the baseline, allowing shareholders to vote
directly according to their preference, these shareholders would
benefit less from the proposed amendments, as they could already vote
in accordance with management's voting recommendation on the company's
proxy card.
A shareholder who wishes to vote opposite management's intended
vote could be worse off under the proposed amendments. First, consider
the case where the company omits the proposal under both the baseline
and the proposed amendments. Under the baseline, such a shareholder
using the company's proxy card is counted as a non-vote. Under the
proposed amendments, the same shareholder would have to affirmatively
check the proposed opt-out check box to be counted as a non-vote;
failing to do so would result in the company exercising its
discretionary authority to cast the vote in accordance with its
disclosed intention, contrary to the shareholder's preference. Second,
consider the case where the proposed amendments would make the company
more likely to switch from inclusion to omission. Under the
[[Page 59950]]
baseline, the shareholder can vote opposite to management's
recommendation directly through the company's proxy card. Under the
proposed amendments, the same shareholder's best available option using
the company's proxy card would be a non-vote, achieved by checking the
proposed opt-out check box--and if the shareholder fails to check the
box, the company would be able to exercise its discretionary authority
to cast the vote contrary to the shareholder's preference.\415\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\415\ Under both the baseline and proposed amendments, a
shareholder who wishes to vote opposite management's recommendation
when the company omits the proposal can do so by returning, instead,
the proponent's proxy card or attending the meeting in person or
virtually and voting at the meeting. For such shareholders not
solicited by the proponent, however, additional cost would be
required to attempt to take this action, and it is not guaranteed
that these shareholders would ultimately be solicited. See supra
section IV.B.3.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Companies' switch from inclusion of a proposal to omission would
also have informational consequences for shareholders. Under inclusion,
shareholders receive the proposal and the board's recommendation
regarding the proposal with reasons for their support or lack of
support. Under omission (absent the proposed amendments) and under the
proposed amendments, shareholders would receive a brief description of
the proposal in the proxy statement, as required under current Rule
14a-4(c)(2), as well as how the company intends to vote through its
exercise of discretionary authority (although reasons would not be
required). The proxy card would include a cross-reference to the
location of this information in the proxy statement and the proposed
opt-out check box. The net informational effect of the proposed
amendments therefore depends on the proportion of companies that would
have chosen inclusion rather than omission under the baseline. For
companies that would have chosen inclusion absent the proposed
amendments, the proposed amendments would represent an informational
reduction; for companies that would have chosen omission, the
informational effect is neutral.\416\ This informational reduction may
be partially offset for shareholders who value more concise disclosure,
particularly where there are multiple shareholder proposals and
shareholder attention is limited, as noted above. Shorter disclosure
may lead to more overall information absorption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\416\ Under the baseline, a company that would have chosen
omission for proposals received outside of Rule 14a-8 could attempt
to seek discretionary authority (nevertheless preventable by the
proponent under current Rule 14a-4(c)(2)) by including, in its proxy
statement, ``advice'' (brief disclosure) on the nature of each
matter and how the company intends to exercise its discretion to
vote. Thus, the amount of information available to investors if the
company chooses to omit such proposals under the baseline would
likely be similar to the information available under the proposed
amendments. It is possible under the baseline that a company that
plans to omit, knowing a proponent may prevent discretionary
authority regardless of the company's actions, would choose to not
even include the brief disclosure. In this case, the proposed
amendments could result in marginally more information being made
available to shareholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A shareholder who wishes to abstain faces a situation similar to
that of a shareholder who wishes to vote opposite to management's
recommendation in the case where the company omits the proposal under
both the baseline and the proposed amendments. Under the baseline, such
a shareholder is automatically counted as a non-vote, whereas under the
proposed amendments the shareholder would be counted as a non-vote if
he or she affirmatively checks the proposed opt-out check box. In the
case where the proposed amendments would make the company more likely
to switch from inclusion to omission, the extent to which a non-vote
and an abstention (available if the proposal were included) are
practically equivalent depends on the applicable voting standard: under
a percent-of-outstanding-shares standard the two are equivalent, while
under a percent-of-votes-cast standard a non-vote reduces the
denominator and may affect the outcome differently than a formal
abstention. To the extent the proposed amendments would increase
omission rates and more shareholders would not have their votes cast on
the proposal, the effect on proposal outcomes would therefore depend on
the applicable voting standard.
g. Default Effects
The analysis above (section IV.C.2.f) assumes that shareholders are
fully aware of the proposed opt-out check box mechanism and do in fact
choose the action that best aligns with their preferences. However, a
substantial body of empirical research on default effects demonstrates
that defaults exert a considerable and consistent influence on
decisions across a wide range of contexts, and that the option
presented as the default is chosen at higher rates than preferences
alone would predict.\417\ Because the proposed opt-out check box must
be affirmatively checked to prevent management from exercising
discretionary voting authority, shareholders who do not act (including
those who fail to act for reasons such as inertia, limited attention,
or an interpretation of the default as an implied recommendation) will
have their votes cast by management regardless of their actual
preferences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\417\ See Jon M. Jachimowicz et al., When and Why Defaults
Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Default Effects, 3 Behav.
Pub. Pol'y 159 M(2019) for a survey of the literature. See also
Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion:
Inertia in 401(k) Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ
1149 (2001). See also Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More
Tomorrow \TM\: Using Behavioral Economics to Increase Employee
Saving, 112 J. Pol. Econ.S164 (2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The default effect is likely to vary across the shareholder
population. Institutional investors with dedicated proxy voting teams
are unlikely to be materially affected by inertia or limited attention,
given their established processes for reviewing proxy materials and
making voting decisions. The impact of the default effect would
therefore likely be more concentrated among retail shareholders, who
hold a meaningful minority share of most public companies' outstanding
equity. The proposed mandatory disclosure of management's voting
recommendation would provide information to shareholders who read the
proxy materials carefully but may not address the inertia and limited
attention components of the default effect for shareholders who engage
less thoroughly with proxy materials--precisely the shareholders for
whom the default effect is most likely to be significant.
The proposed opt-out check box mechanism has practical limitations
that would bear on its effectiveness in mitigating the default effect.
First, mitigating the default effect through the proposed check box
mechanism would require shareholders to be informed about the
importance of checking the opt-out box through channels independent of
the company's proxy materials. Proponents may or may not undertake this
effort, and some proponents may face resource constraints to do so, as
noted above. Second, the check box mechanism faces a structural
limitation independent of the communication problem. A shareholder who
wishes to vote opposite to management's recommendation and checks the
proposed opt-out check box achieves only a non-vote, not an affirmative
vote opposite to management's recommended vote. The proposed check box
would therefore address one dimension of the default effect: it
prevents management from casting a vote in accordance with its
disclosed
[[Page 59951]]
intention on behalf of shareholders who have not actively chosen that
outcome. It does not, however, provide a mechanism on the company's
card for shareholders who wish to vote opposite management's
recommendation to do so affirmatively.\418\ If management discloses its
intention to vote in favor of a proposal in accordance with the
proposed amendments, however, a shareholder who leaves the opt-out box
unchecked can effectively delegate the vote to the company's
discretionary authority, resulting in a vote consistent with the
shareholder's preference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\418\ See supra note 415.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The default effect may result in votes being cast in accordance
with management's recommended vote regardless of shareholders' actual
preferences. In addition, shareholders who check the proposed opt-out
box under the mistaken belief that doing so constitutes a vote opposite
to management's recommended vote will have their preferences only
partially realized. The net distributional effect depends on the
composition of shareholder preferences relative to management's
recommended votes across the affected population of companies and
proposals; this composition varies considerably and cannot be assessed
in the aggregate.
h. Effects on Zero Slate Campaigns
The proposed amendments address a distortion created by the
interaction between current Rule 14a-4(c)(2) and Rule 14a-4(d)(1) (the
``bona fide nominee'' rule), which was amended in connection with the
adoption of the universal proxy rules. This distortion differs from the
general cost of inclusion problem.
Under the current proxy rules, a proponent soliciting votes for a
shareholder proposal may place the company's director nominees on the
proponent's own proxy card, even when offering no competing nominees.
This ``zero slate'' approach allows the proponent's card to offer
shareholders both the company's director nominees and the proponent's
proposals on a single card, making it generally more appealing to
shareholders than the company's card when that card contains only the
company's nominees and management proposals. As a result, shareholders
who want to support the company's nominees but also vote on the
proponent's proposals have strong incentives to use the proponent's
proxy card rather than the company's card in this instance.
This dynamic can result in companies feeling compelled to include a
proponent's proposals on their own proxy card, even though the Federal
proxy rules (and existing State laws) do not require that they do so.
If the company omits the proposals, then it will not have proxy voting
authority with respect to the proponent's proposals. To avoid that loss
of proxy voting authority, a company may decide to include the
proponent's proposals, thereby assuming the full costs of inclusion and
solicitation while the proponent only incurs the costs of its own
solicitation.
This is a form of cost externalization because the proponent
benefits from the company's proxy distribution infrastructure and
solicitation efforts without bearing the associated expense of
soliciting all shareholders. The company, in turn, incurs costs it
would not otherwise face, not because the Federal proxy rules require
inclusion, but because the interaction between Rules 14a-4(c)(2) and
14a-4(d)(1) creates structural pressure to include the proposals
voluntarily. As a result, a single proponent, through a zero slate
campaign, may be able to compel the company to place its proposals on
the company's proxy card at the company's expense.
By allowing companies to exercise discretionary voting authority
even when the proponent has distributed proxy materials to the
requisite percentage of shareholders, the amendments remove the binary
choice that makes omission costly today. A company that omits a
proposal from its proxy card would still be able to exercise
discretionary authority, subject to the proposed opt-out check box. As
a result, the company would no longer need to include the proponent's
proposals on its own card to exercise proxy voting authority.
The benefit of the proposed amendments in this context is the
removal of the coercive dynamic currently created by zero slate
campaigns. Companies that currently feel compelled to include a
proponent's proposals to exercise proxy voting authority would be able
to omit those proposals while still exercising discretionary voting
authority. This benefit differs from the general cost savings described
above, which concern companies that include proposals because of the
solicitation-threshold mechanism in current Rule 14a-4(c)(2). The zero
slate benefit is narrower and more targeted: it applies to companies
whose pressure to include proposals stems not from the threshold
itself, but from its interaction with the bona fide nominee rule.
The benefit of the proposed amendments in the zero slate context is
subject to qualifications. First, the benefit arises only for companies
that would have faced zero slate campaigns in the absence of the
proposed amendments and would depend on how frequently proponents
choose to use zero slate campaigns following the rescission of Rule
14a-8. Second, the benefit assumes that the amendments do not result in
other changes that may lead to costs for companies. For example, if
proponents instead increase their use of exempt solicitations, public
campaigns, or informal engagement, the benefit of eliminating the zero
slate dynamic may be reduced. Third, the benefit depends on companies
choosing to omit proposals under the amended framework rather than
continuing to include them voluntarily for strategic or reputational
reasons. Companies that would have included the proposals regardless of
the zero slate coercive dynamic would not experience this benefit.
3. The Benefits and Costs for Proxy-Related Service Providers
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
in Rule 14a-4(c) may generate benefits and costs for providers of
administrative and advisory services related to proxy solicitation and
shareholder voting (``proxy-related service providers''). If the
proposed rescission results in fewer shareholder proposals, such
providers may incur costs in the form of forgone revenue as a result of
reduction in business. Such an effect could be mitigated to the extent
that States adopt statutory criteria governing the inclusion of
shareholder proposals, or, if State law permits, companies incorporate
such criteria into their charter or bylaws; but only to the extent that
those frameworks result in shareholders submitting proposals at levels
comparable to the current Rule 14a-8 process. State or bylaw frameworks
that are more restrictive than Rule 14a-8, or that companies or
shareholders do not actively use, would provide limited mitigation.
These costs could also be mitigated if the proposed rescission of Rule
14a-8 redirects a portion of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals into the
independent solicitation channel, potentially increasing the demand for
solicitation-related services.
Additionally, proxy-related service providers could incur
transition costs due to the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8. If the
proposed rescission leads States to adopt statutory criteria governing
the inclusion of shareholder
[[Page 59952]]
proposals or if companies incorporate such criteria into their
governing documents, when permitted by State law, proxy-related service
providers would need to devote time and resources to become familiar
with such criteria and their impact on the proxy solicitation process.
4. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs
Throughout this economic analysis, we have estimated monetized
benefits and costs per proposal. In this section, we present estimates
of aggregate monetized benefits and costs. These totals include only
benefits and costs that are monetized in the economic analysis and thus
do not encompass all of the proposed rule's benefits and costs. For
example, we were not able to quantify the cost savings to issuers
resulting from the amendments to Rule 14a-4(c).\419\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\419\ See supra section IV.C.1.a.i.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
a. Aggregate Monetized Benefits and Costs Across Affected Entities
We did not monetize any one-time initial costs or benefits of the
proposed rule. As shown in Table 5, we estimate that the proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 would result in aggregate annual monetized
cost savings (i.e., benefits) for covered entities of approximately
$29.7 million attributable to a reduction in internal burden hours
\420\ and an additional $9.9 million attributable to a reduction in
external costs, for a total of about $39.6 million. In addition, as
shown in Table 6, we estimate that the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) would result in aggregate annual costs for companies of
approximately $1,063, attributable to an increase in internal burden
hours.\421\ These figures are based on Paperwork Reduction Act
estimates.\422\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\420\ See supra note 353 and accompanying text; see also PRA
Table 1, footnotes 1 and 2, which characterize the external cost
savings as a share of the total reduction in burden hours and
monetize these hours at a rate of $462 per hour. The rate of $462
per hour is a blended hourly rate of our current estimate of the
hourly rate for each of four occupations: lawyers ($774), paralegals
and legal assistants ($281), general and operations managers ($656),
and general office clerks ($142). This blended hourly rate assumes
that lawyers will account for 30 percent of the time spent on
compliance activities; paralegals and legal assistants, 20 percent;
general and operations managers, 20 percent; and general office
clerks, 30 percent. We expect that the types of individuals, the
rates for those individuals, and the proportion of each individual's
contributions would vary among respondents and could differ
depending on which specific information collection a respondent is
completing. Nonetheless, for purposes of this economic analysis, we
believe the $462 per hour rate is a reasonable estimate of the
hourly cost of completing the required information collection. For
additional information on the methodology used to calculate this
rate, please see the explanation in note 402.
\421\ See supra section IV.C.2.b.
\422\ See supra sections IV.C.1.a.i and IV.C.2.b.
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BILLING CODE 6351-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.078
[[Page 59953]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.079
BILLING CODE 6351-01-C
b. Present Values and Annualized Values of Aggregate Monetized Benefits
and Costs
Consistent with the requirements of Executive Order 12866, the
Commission reports estimated total monetized benefits and costs for all
affected entities in two additional ways specified in OMB Circular A-
4.\424\ These two presentations address the fact that the benefits and
costs of the proposed rule accrue at different points in time, and that
benefits and costs realized sooner are generally more valuable than
those realized later.\425\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\424\ See E.O. No. 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993), 58 FR 51735, 51741
(Oct. 4, 1993) (requiring agencies to provide an analysis of
benefits, costs, and regulatory alternatives to OIRA for significant
regulatory actions); OMB, Circular A-4, at 31-34, 45 (Sept. 17,
2003) (providing guidance to agencies regarding compliance with E.O.
12866); see also E.O. No. 14215 (Feb. 18, 2025), 90 FR 10447, 10448
(Feb. 24, 2025) (requiring all Federal agencies, including the
Securities and Exchange Commission, to comply with E.O. No. 12866).
In addition, E.O. 14192 requires agencies to provide their best
approximation of the total costs or savings associated with each new
regulation or repealed regulation consistent with the analyses
required by E.O. 12866. See E.O. No. 14192 (Jan. 31, 2025), 90 FR
9065, 9066 (Feb. 6, 2025).
\425\ See Circular A-4, at 32.
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We report (1) the present values of expected benefits and costs
that are monetized in our economic analysis, aggregated across all
affected entities over a 10-year time horizon starting in 2026, and (2)
the annualized values over the same time horizon, derived from the
present values. This time horizon represents the period over which the
principal benefits and costs that are monetized in the Economic
Analysis are expected to accrue.\426\ The present values and annualized
values account for the timing of benefits and costs through
discounting, which is a procedure that accounts for the time value of
money.\427\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\426\ See id. at 31 (stating that ``[t]he ending point should be
far enough in the future to encompass all the significant benefits
and costs likely to result from the rule''). For the purposes of
this analysis, we assume the effective date of the proposal, as well
as the start year for the analysis's time horizon, is the present
year.
\427\ See id. at 32 (``The Rationale for Discounting'') and 45
(``Treatment of Benefits and Costs over Time''); see also OIRA,
Regulatory Impact Analysis: A Primer, at 11 (Aug. 15, 2011),
available at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf (``To provide an
accurate assessment of benefits and costs that occur at different
points in time or over different time horizons, an agency should use
discounting. Agencies should provide benefit and cost estimates
using both 3 percent and 7 percent annual discount rates expressed
as a present value as well as annualized.''); Harvey S. Rosen & Ted
Gayer, Public Finance 151 (8th ed. 2008) (defining present value as
``the value today of a given amount of money to be paid or received
in the future'').
\428\ This approach is consistent with the recommended treatment
of benefits and costs over time in Circular A-4. See id. at 45
(``You should present annualized benefits and costs using real
discount rates of 3 and 7 percent.'').
\429\ For each discount rate, the annualized monetized benefits
(costs, respectively) in Table 9 represent the constant annual
stream of benefits (costs, respectively) whose present value over
the time horizon equates the corresponding present value in Table 8.
See Table 9, note a, for additional calculation details.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.080
Table 9 reports annualized aggregate monetized benefits and costs
using real discount rates of 3 percent and 7 percent over a 10-year
horizon.\428\ The lump sum present values of aggregate monetized
benefits and costs reported in Table 8 are converted in Table 9 into a
constant stream of annualized benefits and costs over a 10-year time
horizon, starting in 2026.\429\ Annualized benefits and costs may
differ from the sum of recurring monetized annual benefits and costs
discussed earlier in this Economic Analysis because they incorporate
the timing of benefits and costs through discounting, and combine one-
time and
[[Page 59954]]
recurring benefits and costs.\430\ We estimate that annualized total
monetized benefits are about $39.6 million using a three percent
discount rate and about $39.6 million using a seven percent discount
rate. In addition, we estimate that annualized total monetized costs
are about $1,063 per year using a three percent discount rate and about
$1,063 per year using a seven percent discount rate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\430\ The annualized benefits and costs present these values
over the 10-year time horizon, starting in the present year.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.081
D. Effects on Efficiency, Competition, and Capital Formation
This section addresses the potential effects of the proposed
rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
on efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
1. Efficiency
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could affect efficiency
through several channels. The proposed rescission could improve
allocative efficiency by allowing governance arrangements to better
reflect the circumstances of individual companies and industries. Rule
14a-8 establishes a uniform Federal framework governing which
shareholder proposals companies must include in their proxy materials.
Through its eligibility requirements, procedural requirements, and
substantive exclusion grounds, the rule has influenced which matters
are presented for shareholder consideration. As discussed in section
II.A.2.c, Rule 14a-8's uniform Federal framework may have given States
and companies little occasion or incentive to develop their own
shareholder proposal frameworks, including frameworks tailored to
differences in ownership structure, industry, size, and other company-
specific circumstances. The proposed rescission would instead leave
these determinations to State law and, where State law permits, to
private ordering through a company's choice of jurisdiction and the
terms of its charter and bylaws. To the extent that the resulting
arrangements better serve companies and their shareholders than the
uniform Federal framework, the proposed rescission would improve
allocative efficiency.
To the extent that the proposed rescission reduces the number of
shareholder proposals, companies would incur fewer legal and
administrative costs associated with evaluating proponent eligibility,
preparing responses, and managing the proxy process. As discussed in
section IV.B.3, these costs can be large, particularly in contested
solicitations and sustained shareholder campaigns, and can divert
resources from productive uses. If the proposals that are eliminated do
not generate benefits commensurate with their costs, reducing these
expenses would improve productive efficiency. If companies redirect the
resulting savings, management attention, and other resources toward
higher-value activities, the proposed rescission could also improve
allocative efficiency. Both effects depend on whether the proposed
rescission reduces the number of proposals companies process, which
would turn on how State law and company governing documents develop.
Beyond the administrative costs of processing proposals in general,
Rule 14a-8 may also facilitate a distinct category of resource
consumption, specifically a form of rent-seeking to obtain private
benefits through the proposal process. On the proponent side, some
proponents may use the credible threat of a proposal to obtain
concessions from management that benefit the proponents. If those
concessions merely transfer value from the company or its other
shareholders to the proponent rather than creating value, they
represent a private benefit rather than a governance improvement. On
the company side, management may devote legal fees, executive time, and
other resources to such proposals.\431\ To the extent that both sets of
expenditures (by the proponent pursuing concessions and by the company
resisting them) are directed at determining who captures existing value
rather than creating new value, the resources consumed on both sides
are consumed without creating value, regardless of which party
prevails. Reducing those expenditures would improve productive
efficiency. However, the magnitude of any such gain is uncertain. As
discussed in section IV.B.1.b, the same negotiating process may in some
cases produce governance changes that benefit shareholders more
broadly, and some proposals may be withdrawn following changes
companies adopt in response to proponent pressure. The available
evidence does not allow us to assess what proportion of negotiated
outcomes represents rent extraction as opposed to genuine governance
improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\431\ See Matsusaka et al. (2019), supra note 390 (finding that
labor unions increase their rate of shareholder proposal submissions
in years when a collective bargaining agreement expires, that a
substantial proportion of such proposals is withdrawn before a vote,
and that withdrawn proposals are associated with more favorable wage
outcomes for union members, consistent with proposals being used as
leverage to obtain concessions from management).
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[[Page 59955]]
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect informational
efficiency through a different channel. Under the amendments, a company
would not have to include a non-Rule 14a-8 proposal in its proxy
materials to exercise proxy voting authority over the proposal.
Research has documented that investors have limited attention and may
not fully process all available information in complex or lengthy
disclosures, which can affect the quality of financial decision-
making.\432\ To the extent that these limitations apply to proxy cards,
the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could improve the
informational efficiency of the proxy process to some degree with
respect to those items. Any such benefit would depend on the number of
non-Rule 14a-8 proposals a company receives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\432\ See Tim Loughran & Bill McDonald, Measuring Readability in
Financial Disclosures 69 J. Fin. 1643 (2014) (showing that longer
financial disclosures are associated with worse investor
comprehension and processing), and David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong
Teoh, Limited Attention, Information Disclosure, and Financial
Reporting, 36 J. Acct. & Econ. 337 (2003) (developing a model of
limited investor attention showing that disclosure format and
complexity affect information processing).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed opt-out structure in Rule 14a-4(c) can also be
analyzed as a form of delegated decision-making. If a shareholder
returns the company's proxy card without checking the opt-out box, the
company would have discretionary authority to vote the shareholder's
shares on non-Rule 14a-8 proposals in accordance with its disclosed
intention. When management is better informed than individual
shareholders about the merits of a particular proposal (e.g., because
it has greater familiarity with the company's operations, strategy, or
governance), delegating voting authority to management could result in
votes that better serve shareholders broadly, which can improve the
allocative efficiency of the voting process. This mechanism is
consistent with the broader literature on delegated decision-making,
which suggests that delegation can improve outcomes when the delegate
has an informational advantage and the parties' interests are
sufficiently aligned.\433\ Any such benefit would depend on the
alignment of managerial and shareholder interests, which may vary
across companies and proposals, and on whether a shareholder's failure
to check the box reflects a decision to delegate rather than
inattention, as discussed in section IV.C.2.g.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\433\ See Wouter Dessein, Authority and Communication in
Organizations, 69 Rev. Econ. Stud. 811 (2002) (developing a model in
which a principal prefers to delegate control to a better-informed
agent when the incentive conflict is not too large relative to the
principal's uncertainty). But see Milton Harris & Artur Raviv,
Control of Corporate Decisions: Shareholders vs. Management, 23 Rev.
Fin. Stud. 4115 (2010) (developing a model in which shareholders'
informational disadvantages do not, by themselves, justify
managerial control, but concluding that shareholders nevertheless
should not control all major corporate decisions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could reduce efficiency
through several channels. Under the baseline, shareholder proposals may
provide useful information even when they do not receive majority
support. They can reveal shareholder preferences, bring attention to
issues that management might not otherwise consider, and generate
public discussion that informs corporate decision-making. To the extent
that the proposed rescission reduces the number of proposals presented,
companies and shareholders could lose these informational benefits.
Moreover, if proposals that are no longer presented would have prompted
value-enhancing changes in corporate policy, rescission could prevent
resources from being directed toward higher-valued uses, reducing
allocative efficiency.
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also reduce allocative
efficiency by weakening managerial discipline. Rule 14a-8 gives
shareholders a relatively low-cost means of seeking changes to
governance arrangements, including board structure, takeover defenses,
and compensation practices. If the prospect that shareholders may
submit such proposals and attract support currently discourages
entrenchment or capital misallocation, the proposed rescission could
weaken that disciplining effect.\434\ This channel operates through the
availability and credibility of the Rule 14a-8 submission process
rather than solely through proposals actually submitted. Its magnitude
would therefore depend less on the number of proposals presented than
on whether State law and company governing documents preserve a
comparable channel. To the extent that no comparable channel remains
(at this time), managerial agency costs could increase and corporate
resources could be directed toward lower-valued uses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\434\ See Cu[ntilde]at et al., 2012, supra note 391. For
discussions of agency costs, see generally, Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976)
(developing a theory of agency costs arising from conflicts between
managers and shareholders).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also reduce allocative
efficiency by narrowing the range of perspectives that reach the board
of directors (or similar governing body). Rule 14a-8's low-cost access
mechanism enables proponents, including less well-resourced proponents,
retail investors, and smaller institutional investors, to present
proposals to the broader shareholder base at minimal incremental cost,
with the cost of inclusion and distribution borne by the company.
Without that mechanism, and to the extent State law and company
governing documents do not provide a comparable one, participation in
the governance process would require resources sufficient to conduct an
independent solicitation. As discussed in section IV.C.2.c, when
combined with the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), this cost
differential could systematically reduce the participation of less
well-resourced proponents. To the extent that those proponents
currently surface governance concerns that are not otherwise raised,
and to the extent that the resulting diversity of perspectives improves
the quality of corporate decision-making, their reduced participation
could diminish the information available in the governance process and
reduce allocative efficiency.
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could reduce informational
efficiency, with consequences for allocative efficiency. Because a
company would not need to disclose the full text of a non-Rule 14a-8
proposal in its proxy materials to exercise discretionary voting
authority over the proposal, shareholders who do not affirmatively opt
out may effectively delegate their voting authority without full
information about the matter. A brief description may not provide
enough information for a shareholder to assess the company's position
or to evaluate the proposal on its merits. To the extent this results
in the rejection of value-enhancing proposals or the approval of value-
reducing ones, the amendments would reduce allocative efficiency. The
informational effect would fall principally on shareholders whom the
proponent does not solicit, because shareholders who receive the
proponent's proxy materials would have access to the full text of the
proposal.
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could also reduce
allocative efficiency by weakening shareholder oversight through two
related but distinct mechanisms. First, by eliminating the solicitation
threshold that currently limits a company's discretionary voting
authority, the proposed amendments would expand the circumstances under
which companies can vote on behalf of shareholders on omitted
proposals, shifting the exercise of discretionary voting authority
toward management. Second, as discussed in section IV.B.2.f,
[[Page 59956]]
the proposed opt-out default structure would mean that shareholders who
do not understand or affirmatively act on the check box mechanism would
have their shares voted in accordance with the company's disclosed
intention, even when that outcome differs from their preferences. To
the extent voting outcomes differ from those shareholders would choose
if they affirmatively expressed their preferences, the amendments could
reduce allocative efficiency. This effect could be greater at companies
with dispersed ownership, where individual shareholders have weaker
incentives to monitor management or coordinate with other
shareholders.\435\ Its magnitude would also depend on the extent to
which managerial and shareholder interests are aligned and on the
availability of other governance mechanisms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\435\ See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of
Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 (1997) (discussing collective-
action and free-rider problems that weaken the incentives of
dispersed shareholders to monitor management).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The transition following the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8
could itself reduce efficiency, apart from the direct costs of adapting
to a new framework. The proposed rescission would likely eliminate the
Federal standard before it is clear whether (and to what extent) State
law and private-ordering alternatives may develop. In many
jurisdictions, State law is silent or unclear as to which proposals are
proper subjects for shareholder action, and these questions may be
resolved over time by State legislators and courts. In the interim,
companies would need to make decisions about whether to include or
exclude a proposal, and shareholders would need to decide whether to
pursue proposals or other forms of engagement, without clear and
settled requirements. Companies might base inclusion decisions
primarily on litigation exposure rather than on a fuller assessment of
the expected costs and benefits of inclusion or exclusion, and they
might defer changes to their governing documents or State of
incorporation while awaiting greater clarity. Legal advice and
litigation devoted to resolving these questions would consume
resources, reducing productive efficiency. Decisions made or delayed
because of uncertainty could also direct resources away from higher-
valued uses, reducing allocative efficiency. The transition could
therefore create uncertainty, delay, and litigation costs that would
not necessarily arise under either the current Federal framework or the
arrangements that may ultimately emerge.
Finally, shareholders may respond to the proposed rescission by
shifting to alternative forms of engagement, including direct outreach
to management, exempt solicitations, and independent proxy
solicitations. The costs of these alternatives would vary. For
proponents, independent proxy solicitations require bearing the full
cost of soliciting shareholders directly, which are costs that are
largely borne by the company under Rule 14a-8. For companies, response
costs may persist regardless of the channel used by the proponent, and
companies facing independent solicitations may still choose to include
the proposals in their own proxy materials to exercise proxy voting
authority (absent the concurrent proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)),
thereby incurring many of the same costs as under Rule 14a-8. To the
extent that total resources consumed across proponents and companies
combined are greater under independent solicitation than under the Rule
14a-8 process, substitution would offset some of the processing-cost
savings described above and reduce productive efficiency.
2. Competition
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect competition along several dimensions.
Because Rules 14a-8 and 14a-4(c) apply only to companies subject to the
Federal proxy rules, the associated costs may currently place those
companies at a competitive disadvantage relative to companies in the
same product markets that are not subject to those rules, including
private companies and foreign private issuers. These costs may also be
difficult to predict because they depend on the number and nature of
the proposals a company receives. As discussed in section IV.B.3,
however, these costs are concentrated: most companies subject to the
proxy rules receive no shareholder proposals in a given year, and most
of those that do receive only one. The asymmetry therefore falls
unevenly across public companies, and its competitive significance
would depend on the number and cost of proposals a particular company
expects to receive. To the extent the proposed changes reduce these
costs, they could narrow the cost differential between public and
private companies competing in the same product markets.\436\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\436\ See Xiaohui Gao et al., Where Have All the IPOs Gone?, 48
J. Fin. Quant. Anal. 1663 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Among public companies, the competitive effects of the proposed
changes could vary by company size. As discussed in section IV.B.3.a,
using S&P 500 membership as a proxy for larger company size, Rule 14a-8
proposals are concentrated among larger companies, which therefore bear
a disproportionate share of proposal-related processing costs.\437\ To
the extent the proposed rescission reduces those costs, the savings
would accrue disproportionately to larger companies. Smaller companies
could also benefit from the proposed rescission, however, to the extent
compliance with Rule 14a-8 entails fixed or recurring legal,
governance, and administrative costs that represent a larger share of
their resources. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could have a
different distributional effect. As discussed in section IV.B.3.b,
approximately 86 percent of the proxy contests involving proposals
identified in our sample (contests identified through preliminary proxy
statement filings for meetings held from 2022 through 2025) targeted
companies outside the S&P 500. To the extent the amendments reduce the
costs associated with such contests, the benefits may therefore accrue
more often to smaller companies.\438\ Any resulting effect on
competition between larger and smaller public companies would depend on
the incidence and magnitude of the costs avoided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\437\ See section IV.B.3.a (noting that 74% of Rule 14a-8
proposals in the sample targeted S&P 500 companies, which we use
here as a proxy for larger company size).
\438\ See section IV.B.3.b (noting that only 14% of proxy
contests involving one or more proposals and initiated through the
filing of preliminary proxy statements targeted S&P 500 companies).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes could also affect competition in the market
for corporate control. Shareholder proposals provide one channel
through which shareholders may seek changes to takeover defenses and
related governance arrangements. To the extent the proposed rescission
reduces the availability or use of that channel, and State law and
company governing documents do not provide a comparable one, such
arrangements may become more difficult to challenge or remove. This
could reduce the contestability of control at affected companies and
weaken competitive pressure from potential acquisitions. A proponent
could still pursue such changes through an independent solicitation,
although the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would permit the
company to exercise discretionary voting authority over the proposal as
described above, potentially making it harder for the
[[Page 59957]]
proponent to obtain the shareholder support needed to succeed, as
discussed in section IV.C.2.c. The magnitude of this effect would
depend on how effectively other mechanisms substitute for the
shareholder proposal process, including shareholders' State-law rights
to nominate and elect directors and, where applicable, amend companies'
governing documents.
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could also affect competition
among States to attract companies for incorporation within their
jurisdictions. States currently have authority to determine the role of
shareholder proposals in corporate governance but, with one exception,
have not adopted legislation governing shareholder proposals in more
than 80 years since Rule 14a-8 was first adopted. The proposed
rescission could encourage more States to legislate in this area, and
companies' ability to choose their State of incorporation would give
States an incentive to adopt frameworks that attract and retain
incorporations.\439\ Differences in State approaches to shareholder
proposals could therefore affect competition for incorporations and the
distribution of incorporations among States. The magnitude of this
effect would depend on whether States develop materially different
frameworks and whether companies consider those differences when
choosing where to incorporate. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)
could moderate this effect to the extent they reduce the practical
significance of proposals permitted under State law, making differences
among State proposal regimes less important to companies and investors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\439\ See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces
of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 225 (1985)
(analyzing competition among States in the production of corporate
law and companies' choices of where to incorporate); Lucian A.
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L.
& Econ. 383 (2003) (finding that differences in State corporate law,
including anti-takeover protections, affect companies' incorporation
decisions).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Capital Formation
The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
to Rule 14a-4(c) could affect capital formation through their influence
on the costs and attractiveness of public markets, the cost of capital,
and the incentives of companies and investors to participate in public
equity markets.
To the extent the proposed changes reduce the costs associated with
being a public company, they could make public markets more attractive
relative to private alternatives. Whether the proposed changes affect a
particular company's decision to go or remain public would depend in
part on the proposal-related costs it expects to incur, which may be
difficult to predict. Proposal-related costs are one of several factors
companies may consider in deciding whether to go or remain public,\440\
and we are unable to assess the weight companies would place on
them.\441\ The magnitude of any effect would also depend on whether
State law and company governing documents preserve comparable
requirements and on the extent to which the proposed amendments to Rule
14a-4(c) reduce the costs associated with non-Rule 14a-8 proposals. To
the extent the proposed changes affect these decisions, they could
influence the availability of investment opportunities for investors
who cannot access private markets as well as companies' access to
public equity capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\440\ Craig G. Doidge et al., The U.S. Listing Gap, 123 J. Fin.
Econ. 464 (2017). Michael Dambra et al., The JOBS Act and IPO
Volume: Evidence That Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision, 116
J. Fin. Econ. 121 (2015).
\441\ Although relatively few Rule 14a-8 proposals are received
by new public companies, companies may consider the unpredictability
of these costs, as well as the medium/long-term effects associated
with the shareholder proposal process in making decisions about
whether to go and remain public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed changes could also affect the cost of capital if
investors regard them as reducing practical access to shareholder-
governance mechanisms. Evidence on how investors value particular
governance mechanisms is mixed.\442\ The proposed changes would not
alter shareholders' voting rights under State law, and the extent to
which investors would view the proposed changes as increasing
governance risk is uncertain. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8
would affect the inclusion of shareholder proposals in company proxy
materials, while the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) would affect
a company's exercise of discretionary voting authority over proposals
presented outside those materials when shareholders return the
company's proxy card without opting out. To the extent investors view
the proposed changes as limiting their practical ability to raise
governance concerns or influence voting outcomes, they may require
incrementally higher expected returns, increasing the cost of equity
capital for affected companies. The magnitude of any effect would
depend on whether State law, company governing documents, and other
governance mechanisms provide comparable means of shareholder
participation, and on the extent to which shareholders understand and
use the opt-out mechanism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\442\ Event studies of the Commission's 2010 proxy-access rule
found that companies most exposed to proxy access lost value when
implementation was delayed and when the rule was vacated. See Bo
Becker et al., Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value?
Evidence from the Business Roundtable's Challenge, 56 J.L. & Econ.
127 (2013); Jonathan B. Cohn et al., On Enhancing Shareholder
Control: A (Dodd-)Frank Assessment of Proxy Access, 71 J. Fin. 1623
(2016) (finding positive valuation effects from increases in
perceived shareholder control, particularly at poorly performing
companies, but more limited benefits where shareholders may pursue
objectives other than shareholder-value maximization). Other
research finds that markets reacted positively, on average, when
Commission staff issue a no-action letter concurring with the
company's decision to exclude a shareholder proposal. See John G.
Matsusaka et al., Can Shareholder Proposals Hurt Shareholders?
Evidence from Securities and Exchange Commission No-Action-Letter
Decisions, 64 J.L. & Econ. 107 (2021). Neither line of research
estimates the effect of removing the Rule 14a-8 process as a whole
or directly measures companies' cost of capital. Moreover, the no-
action letter evidence reflects proposals that companies challenged
under particular Rule 14a-8 exclusion grounds and may not generalize
to the broader set of proposals affected by the proposed rescission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) could have distinct
effects on capital formation by closed-end funds. As discussed in
section IV.B.3, proxy contests involving shareholder proposals are more
frequent among closed-end funds, so these funds may be affected by the
proposed amendments. Shareholder proposals at closed-end funds may seek
tender offers, conversion to an open-end structure, liquidation, or
other actions intended to address the difference between a fund's
market price and its net asset value. Because closed-end funds
generally may not issue common shares below net asset value, a
persistent discount can limit their ability to raise additional
equity.\443\ Research on shareholder campaigns at closed-end funds
finds that attempts to convert to an open-end structure substantially
reduce discounts, that discounts narrow in anticipation of future
campaigns, and that campaign activity responds to the costs of
communication among shareholders.\444\ The proposed amendments could
therefore affect fund discounts through changes in the expected
likelihood that a shareholder campaign succeeds, not only through
campaigns actually
[[Page 59958]]
conducted. The direction of the resulting effect on capital formation
is uncertain. If reduced shareholder pressure allows discounts to
persist, it could constrain additional equity issuance; if it reduces
the likelihood of tender offers, conversion, or liquidation, it could
reduce the contraction or elimination of existing closed-end funds. The
magnitude of any effect would depend on the proposals presented, how
funds exercise discretionary voting authority, and how investors
respond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\443\ See section 23(b) of the Investment Company Act (generally
prohibiting a registered closed-end investment company from selling
common stock below its current net asset value, subject to specified
exceptions).
\444\ See Michael Bradley et al., Activist Arbitrage: A Study of
Open-Ending Attempts of Closed-End Funds, 95 J. Fin. Econ. 1 (2010)
(finding that attempts to convert closed-end funds to open-end funds
reduced fund discounts, on average, to approximately half their
prior level; that discounts narrowed in anticipation of future
activist campaigns; and that campaign activity increased after the
1992 proxy rule amendments reduced the costs of shareholder
communication and was more frequent where communication costs were
lower).
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E. Reasonable Alternatives
1. Alternative To Rescinding Rule 14a-8
We considered whether a reasonable alternative to full rescission
of Rule 14a-8 would be to substantially revise the rule and leave in
place a version of Rule 14a-8 that defers entirely to State law as to
whether a shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder
action and therefore must be included in a company's proxy materials.
Under such an alternative, companies would be required to include
shareholder proposals in their proxy materials if they are proper
subjects for shareholder action under State law, without additional
criteria or conditions established by our rules.
Even assuming we had authority to adopt such a rule, this approach
would offer companies fewer potential benefits than fully rescinding
the rule and would result in increased costs to companies when compared
to the baseline. This is because, in jurisdictions that do not impose
limits on what is a proper subject for shareholder action, that require
companies to include shareholder proposals in their proxy materials, or
where companies are unable to adopt their own limits on such
submissions, the number of proposals required to be included in company
proxy materials could increase compared to the baseline, perhaps
significantly, thereby expanding preparation, review, and disclosure
burdens. Moreover, as discussed in section II.A.2.c, retaining a
Federal rule (even a limited one) that requires inclusion of
shareholder proposals that are proper subjects for shareholder action
under State law could create a perception of Federal preemption,
discouraging States and companies from developing their own standards
with respect to the inclusion of proposals in company proxy materials.
This could leave a situation similar to the current baseline, under
which very few States and companies have developed their own standards.
While this alternative could potentially reduce certain costs for
proponents by increasing their ability to have proposals included in
company proxy materials, it would increase costs for companies by
requiring them to include more proposals, to prepare longer and more
complex proxy materials, and to impose greater review and decision-
making burdens on non-proponent shareholders.
We recognize that the costs and benefits of this alternative could
vary depending on how States, companies, and proponents choose to
respond to such a rule. We invite comments on possible reasonable
alternatives that would achieve the goals identified in this release
while imposing fewer costs.
Similarly, we considered an alternative of leaving in place a
version of Rule 14a-8, or proposing a similar rule under the Investment
Company Act, that refers to the Investment Company Act and State law as
to whether a shareholder proposal is a proper subject for shareholder
action and therefore must be included in a regulated fund's proxy
materials. While referring to the Investment Company Act would
establish some limits on the matters that would be appropriate for
shareholder action and that would be required to be included in a
regulated fund's proxy materials, referring to State law would raise
many of the same issues as discussed above. Moreover, under this
approach, proponents may be incentivized to attempt to frame matters as
being related to Investment Company Act voting matters even where such
connection is tenuous, which could lead to a potentially resource-
intensive process for the regulated funds to determine whether such
proposals can be excluded from their proxy materials.
2. Switch the Default Choice of Check Box in Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2)
Amendment
As an alternative approach to the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c), we could have chosen to retain the baseline rule prohibiting a
company from exercising discretionary voting authority with respect to
timely received shareholder proposals submitted outside the Rule 14a-8
process if the shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials
to holders of the requisite percentage of the company's shares
necessary to carry the proposal. Under this alternative, we could then
require the inclusion of a check box that, if checked by the
shareholder, would grant the company discretionary voting authority.
This would theoretically be no different than the proposed amendment
structure, if not for the behavioral default check box effects
discussed in section IV.C.2.g. Because shareholders who do not act for
reasons that may include inertia, limited attention, or an
interpretation of the default as an implied recommendation would
produce the default outcome, this alternative would likely result in
discretionary voting authority being exercised less often by management
than under the proposed rules. Whereas the default structure as
proposed could result in some (likely retail) shareholders granting
authority when that might not be their actual preference, this
alternative could result in some shareholders submitting a non-vote
when that might not be their actual preference.
3. Require a Separate Check Box for Each Proposal
For non-management proposals subject to discretionary voting
authority, we could have required companies to include a separate
discretionary authority check box on the proxy card for each such
proposal, as opposed to a single check box that would apply to all
proposals, as under the proposed amendments. Allowing shareholders the
flexibility to make individualized choices would be beneficial if
shareholders using the company's card wished to vote with management on
some proposals (leaving these boxes unchecked) while not wishing to
grant discretionary authority on others (by checking these boxes).
Companies could also benefit by receiving more granular information as
to shareholders' preferences. However, under the proposed rules, for
omitted proposals, the proxy card need only include a cross-reference
to the location in the proxy statement of disclosures regarding
proposals' descriptions and the company's recommended votes. A separate
check box for each proposal would necessitate a separate, identifying
description on the proxy card for each proposal. This could lengthen
the contents of the proxy card and distract shareholders from
communications of greater relevance as they review and process the
resulting proxy materials.
F. Request for Comment
We request comments on all aspects of our economic analysis,
including the potential costs and benefits of the proposed amendments
and alternatives, and whether the proposed amendments, if adopted,
would promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data, estimation
methodologies, and other factual support for their views, in
particular, on
[[Page 59959]]
any estimates of costs and benefits of the proposed amendments.
Specifically, we seek comment with respect to the following questions:
33. Have we correctly characterized the baseline of shareholder
proposals and independent solicitations? Have we correctly
characterized the affected entities? Are there other important elements
of the baseline? Please provide supportive data to the extent
available.
34. Have we correctly characterized the benefits and costs of the
proposed amendments to affected parties? Are there other effects that
should be considered? Please provide supportive data to the extent
available.
35. Have we correctly characterized the effects on efficiency,
competition, and capital formation from the proposed amendments? Are
there any other effects that should be considered? Please provide
supportive data to the extent available.
36. To what extent would proponents who would have submitted
proposals under Rule 14a-8 switch to alternative forms of engagement if
the rule were rescinded? Which alternative methods would likely be
used, and how would their effectiveness in achieving the proponent's
goals compare to submitting proposals under Rule 14a-8? Are certain
types of proponents more likely to adopt specific alternative
engagement methods?
37. What are the costs of the alternative engagement mechanisms
that proponents may use if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, compared to the
cost of the current Rule 14a-8 process? Please provide estimates to the
extent possible.
38. What is the cost of an independent proxy solicitation per
proponent? Does it vary by type of proposal, type of proponent (e.g.,
institutional investor vs. retail investor), or type of subject
registrant (e.g., large vs. small, operating company vs. registered
investment company)? Please provide estimates where possible.
39. What effect would the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) have
on the likelihood of potential proponents conducting independent
solicitations? What alternative engagement methods might they use
instead, and how effective would these alternatives be?
40. Would the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) influence
companies' decisions regarding whether to include or exclude proposals
that are the subject of independent solicitations in their proxy
materials?
41. For proposals that are the subject of independent
solicitations, what is the difference in the current cost to companies
between including the proposal in their proxy materials and omitting
the proposal? Would this difference in cost change under the proposed
amendments which would require, if omitting: (i) in the proxy
statement, a brief description of the matter and how the company
intends to vote through its exercise of discretionary authority; and
(ii) on the proxy card, a cross-reference to the location of this
disclosure in the proxy statement and a check box? What are the primary
cost drivers that currently contribute to the cost difference between
including and omitting?
42. The proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could redirect a portion
of the existing Rule 14a-8 proposals into the independent solicitation
channel. However, the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) may reduce
the number of independent solicitations. What would be the aggregate
effect of the concurrent proposed changes to Rules 14a-8 and 14a-4(c)
on the total volume of non-Rule 14a-8 proposals?
43. To what extent would shareholders' ability to express their
views on proposals introduced through independent proxy solicitations
be affected by the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4(c)?
44. Would the rescission of Rule 14a-8 and the proposed amendments
to Rule 14a-4(c) impact companies' decisions to go public or stay
public?
45. To what extent would the proposed amendments result in
management being less aware of shareholder views and concerns? Would
this impact cost of capital and capital formation?
46. What State laws or company governing document provisions
(private ordering) with respect to shareholder proposals are likely to
emerge upon any rescission of Rule 14a-8, and how might these compare
to current laws and practices under the baseline?
47. How significant would the transition costs be during the period
in which State law and private ordering may develop in response to the
proposed amendments?
48. Are there any other reasonable alternatives to the proposed
rescission of the entirety of Rule 14a-8 that we should consider?
49. Are there any other reasonable alternatives to the proposed
amendments to Rule 14a-4(c) that we should consider?
V. Paperwork Reduction Act
A. Summary of the Collection of Information
Certain provisions of our rules and schedules that would be
affected by the proposed amendments contain ``collection of
information'' requirements within the meaning of the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (``PRA'').\445\ We are submitting the proposed
amendments to OMB for review in accordance with the PRA.\446\ The hours
and costs associated with preparing, filing, and sending the schedules,
including preparing documentation required by the shareholder proposal
process under Rule 14a-8, constitute paperwork burdens imposed by the
collection of information. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a
person is not required to comply with, a collection of information
requirement unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
The title for the affected collection of information is:
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\445\ 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.
\446\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) and 5 CFR 1320.11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Regulation 14A (Commission Rules 14a-1 through 14a-21 and
Schedule 14A)'' (OMB Control No. 3235-0059).
The regulations and schedule listed above were adopted pursuant to
the Exchange Act. The regulations and schedule set forth the disclosure
and other requirements for proxy statements filed by issuers and other
soliciting parties. Responses to this collection of information are
mandatory. Responses to this information collection are not kept
confidential, and there is no mandatory retention period for the
information disclosed.
A detailed description of the proposed amendments can be found in
section II above, and a discussion of the expected economic effects of
the proposed amendments can be found in section IV above.
B. Estimated Paperwork Burden Effects of the Proposed Amendments
As discussed in section II.A above, we are proposing to rescind
Rule 14a-8. The proposed rescission, therefore, would eliminate any
information collection requirements associated with Rule 14a-8. We are
also proposing to amend Rule 14a-4(c) to require that companies seeking
discretionary voting authority on proposals that will be presented at a
shareholder meeting but not included in the company's proxy materials
to include a check box on the proxy card that, if checked by a
shareholder, would prevent the company from exercising voting authority
on such matters. The following PRA Table 1 summarizes the estimated
effects of the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 and addition of the
check box on the paperwork
[[Page 59960]]
burdens associated with the affected collection of information.
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.082
[[Page 59961]]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
C. Incremental and Aggregate Burden and Cost Estimates for the Proposed
Amendments
We estimate below the incremental and aggregate change in paperwork
burden as a result of the proposed amendments. These estimates
represent the average burden for all issuers, both large and small. In
deriving our estimates, we recognize that the burdens will likely vary
among individual respondents based on numerous factors, including the
size and complexity of their business. These estimates include the time
and the cost of preparing and reviewing disclosure, filing documents,
coordinating and engaging with proponents, and retaining records. We
believe that some issuers would experience costs in excess of this
average cost and some issuers would experience less than such average
cost. Our methodologies for deriving these estimates are discussed in
section IV.C above.
For purposes of this PRA analysis, the burden is generally
allocated between burden hours and costs. The cost burden generally
reflects the portion of the burden carried by outside professionals,
while the burden hours generally reflect the portion of the burden
carried by the issuer internally. The following PRA Table 2 summarizes
the estimated total annual number of responses, the average burden
hours per response, and the average cost burden per response for each
information collection affected by the proposed amendments and, using
those amounts, calculates the estimated total annual burden hours and
total annual cost burden associated with each affected collection of
information under the proposed amendments. The total annual burden
hours and cost burdens are rounded to the nearest whole number, and the
burden hours per response and cost burden per response are rounded to
the second decimal point.
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P
[[Page 59962]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP21SE26.083
[[Page 59963]]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-C
D. Request for Comment
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(B), we request comment in order
to:
Evaluate whether the proposed changes to the collection of
information are necessary for the proper performance of the functions
of the Commission, including whether the information will have
practical utility;
Evaluate the accuracy and assumptions and estimates of the
burden of the proposed collection of information;
Determine whether there are ways to enhance the quality,
utility, and clarity of the information to be collected;
Evaluate whether there are ways to minimize the burden of
the collection of information on those who respond, including through
the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of
information technology; and
Evaluate whether the proposed amendments would have any
effects on any other collection of information not previously
identified in this section.
Any member of the public may direct to us any comments concerning
the accuracy of these burden estimates and any suggestions for reducing
these burdens. Persons submitting comments on the collection of
information requirements should direct their comments to the OMB Desk
Officer for the Securities and Exchange Commission,
[email protected], and should send a copy to
Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission,
using any of the methods in the ADDRESSES section, with reference to
File No. S7-2026-32. Requests for materials submitted to OMB by the
Commission with regard to the collection of information should be in
writing, refer to File No. S7-2026-32 and be submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of FOIA Services, 100 F
Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-2736. OMB is required to make a
decision concerning the collection of information between 30 and 60
days after publication of this proposed rule. Consequently, a comment
to OMB is best assured of having its full effect if the OMB receives it
within 30 days of publication.
VI. Congressional Review Act
For purposes of Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (also known as the Congressional
Review Act),\447\ the Commission must seek OMB's determination as to
whether a final regulation constitutes a ``major rule.'' Under the
Congressional Review Act, a rule is considered ``major'' where, if
adopted, it results in or is likely to result in:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\447\ See 5 U.S.C. chapter 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more;
A major increase in costs or prices for consumers or
individual industries; or
Significant adverse effects on competition, investment, or
innovation.\448\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\448\ See 5 U.S.C. 804(2) (defining ``major rule'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To help inform OMB's determination as to whether any final rule
that results from the proposal would be a ``major rule,'' we solicit
comment and data on:
The potential effect on the U.S. economy on an annual
basis;
Any potential increase in costs or prices for consumers or
individual industries; and
Any potential effect on competition, investment, or
innovation.
Commenters are requested to provide empirical data and other
factual support for their views to the extent possible, to inform OMB's
determination regarding whether any final rule following this proposal
is likely to be a ``major rule'' for the purposes of the Congressional
Review Act.
VII. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (``RFA'') \449\ requires an agency,
when issuing a rulemaking proposal, to prepare and make available for
public comment an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (``IRFA'')
that describes the impact of the proposed rule on small entities.\450\
This IRFA has been prepared in accordance with the RFA and relates to
the proposed amendments described in section II above.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\449\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\450\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Reasons for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Action
We are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 because the rule exceeds the
Commission's statutory authority. We also believe there are independent
policy reasons to rescind Rule 14a-8. Under the proposed rescission,
the Federal proxy rules would no longer require companies to include in
their proxy materials shareholder proposals on the basis that they
satisfy procedural and substantive requirements established under
Federal law. Instead, State law or, if State law permits, a company's
governing documents would determine whether a shareholder proposal
would be required to be included in a company's proxy materials.
We are also proposing amendments to Rule 14a-4(c), which addresses
when a proxy card submitted by a shareholder may confer discretionary
voting authority on the proxy holder with respect to a matter that is
not included on the proxy card. The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-
4(c) are intended to provide companies with greater flexibility, and
shareholders with greater control, regarding proposals for which a
company may seek discretionary voting authority, which may become more
frequent if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, as proposed.
Finally, we are proposing certain other amendments to facilitate
implementation of the proposed changes to the proxy rules and
conforming amendments to our rules and forms.
The reasons for, and objectives of, the proposed rescission and
amendments are discussed in more detail in section II above.
B. Legal Basis
The amendments contained in this release are proposed under the
authority set forth in sections 3(b), 14, and 23(a) of the Exchange
Act, as amended, and sections 20(a) and 38 of the Investment Company
Act, as amended.
C. Small Entities Subject to the Proposed Amendments
The proposed amendments would apply to: (i) shareholder proponents
that submit Rule 14a-8 proposals and those that present proposals
through their own proxy solicitations, and (ii) registrants (including
issuers and investment companies) subject to the Federal proxy rules
that receive Rule 14a-8 proposals and/or proposals presented through
proponents' own proxy solicitations. The RFA defines ``small entity''
to mean ``small business,'' ``small organization,'' or ``small
governmental jurisdiction.'' \451\ The definition of ``small entity''
does not include individuals. For purposes of the RFA, under our rules,
an issuer of securities or a person, other than an investment company,
is a ``small business'' or ``small organization'' if it had total
assets of $5 million or less on the last day of its most recent fiscal
year.\452\ We estimate that there are
[[Page 59964]]
approximately 506 issuers that are subject to the Federal proxy rules,
other than investment companies, that may be considered small
entities.\453\ An investment company, including a business development
company, is considered to be a ``small business'' if it, together with
other investment companies in the same group of related investment
companies, has net assets of $50 million or less as of the end of its
most recent fiscal year.\454\ There are approximately five business
development companies and 62 registered investment companies subject to
the Federal proxy rules that may be considered small entities.\455\ We
are unable to estimate the number of potential shareholder proponents
that may be considered small entities; \456\ therefore, we request
comment on the number of these small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\451\ 5 U.S.C. 601(6).
\452\ 17 CFR 240.0-10(a). The Commission has proposed amendments
to the definitions of ``small business'' and ``small organization''
in 17 CFR 230.157 and 17 CFR 240.0-10(a). See Enhancement of
Emerging Growth Company Accommodations and Simplification of Filer
Status for Reporting Companies, Release No. 33-11419 (May 19, 2026)
[91 FR 30086, 30124 (May 21, 2026)]. We encourage commenters to
review that proposal to determine whether it might affect their
comments on this IRFA.
\453\ We estimate the number of small entity companies other
than asset-backed securities, registered investment companies, and
BDCs with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the
Exchange Act by reviewing all filers with total assets less than or
equal to $5 million, by unique Central Index Key (CIK), of Forms 10-
K and amendments thereto filed during calendar year 2025.
\454\ 17 CFR 270.0-10. The Commission has a pending proposal
addressing the definition under the Investment Company Act of small
organization and small business for purposes of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act. The Commission encourages commenters to review the
proposal to determine whether it might affect their comments on this
IRFA. See Amendments to the ``Small Business'' and ``Small
Organization'' Definitions for Investment Companies and Investment
Advisers for Purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, Investment
Company Act Release No. 35864 (Jan. 7, 2026) [91 FR 1107 (Jan. 12,
2026)].
\455\ Based on Commission staff estimates that as of Dec. 2025,
approximately 27 open-end funds (including 7 exchange-traded funds),
34 closed-end funds, 1 unit investment trust, and 5 business
development companies are small entities.
\456\ For the purposes of our Economic Analysis, we have
estimated that there were approximately 184 proponents that
submitted a shareholder proposal to be included in a company's proxy
statement as a lead proponent during calendar year 2025. See supra
section IV.B.2.b. Out of these 184 proponents, 44 were individuals,
81 were institutions, and 59 were missing description of type. Thus,
at most, 140 (184-44) of these unique proponents could be considered
small entities. This data allows for the identification of a sole
lead proponent of each proposal, but not all of a proposal's
proponents, and, as a result, it should be interpreted as a lower
bound on the total number of unique proponents.
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D. Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements
If adopted, the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8, the proposed
amendment to Rule 14a-4, and the related amendments to the proxy rules
would apply to small entities to the same extent as other entities,
irrespective of size. As discussed in section IV above, the nature of
any benefits and costs associated with the proposed rescission and
amendments may vary for large and small entities. However, as a general
matter, we are unable to isolate the costs and benefits associated with
the proposed amendments for small entities alone, because we lack
information necessary to make reasonable estimates.
If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded, States and companies may or may not
adopt frameworks that address shareholder proposals in ways that may
impact large and small entities, including companies and shareholder
proponents, differently. In addition, the proposed amendments to Rule
14a-4, if adopted, would allow companies of all sizes to exercise
discretionary voting authority with regard to timely received
shareholder proposals presented other than through Rule 14a-8 even if
the shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials to holders
of the requisite percentage of the company's shares necessary to carry
the proposal. We refer to the discussion of the economic impact of the
proposed amendments, including the estimated costs and benefits, on all
affected parties, including small entities, in section IV above.
Consistent with that discussion, we anticipate that the economic
benefits and costs likely could vary among small entities (including
both proponents and companies) based on a number of factors, such as
the amount of resources a particular shareholder proponent has, or the
number of shareholder proposals received by a particular company. With
respect to shareholder proponents in particular, as discussed in
section IV above, the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 could
disproportionately affect less well-resourced proponents, for whom
independent solicitation could be cost-prohibitive, while smaller
companies could also benefit from the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8
to the extent compliance with Rule 14a-8 entails fixed or recurring
legal, governance, and administrative costs that represent a larger
share of their resources.
While the proposed amendments would not impose any compliance or
reporting requirements under a Federal rule (other than the burden of
including a check box and cross-reference on the proxy card), we
request comment on how the proposed amendments would affect small
entities, including available empirical data. We discuss the economic
impact of, and potential alternatives to, the proposed amendments in
section IV, and the estimated compliance costs and burdens of the
proposed amendments for purposes of the PRA in section V, above.
E. Duplicative, Overlapping, or Conflicting Federal Rules
We do not expect the proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 or
amendments to Rule 14a-4 and other proxy rules, if adopted, to
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with other Federal rules.
F. Significant Alternatives
The RFA directs us to consider significant alternatives that would
accomplish our stated objectives, while minimizing any significant
adverse impact on small entities. In connection with the proposed rule,
we considered the following alternatives:
Establishing different compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into account the resources
available to small entities;
Clarifying, consolidating, or simplifying compliance and
reporting requirements under the rules for small entities;
Using performance rather than design standards; and
Exempting small entities from all or part of the
requirements.
The Commission is proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 and to defer to
States and companies to determine if, and under what circumstances,
shareholder proposals must be included in a company's proxy materials.
Imposing different standards or requirements regarding the
inclusion of shareholder proposals in company proxy materials based on
the size of companies or shareholder proponents would not accomplish
our stated objective of ending the Commission's entanglement in State
law corporate governance matters. Indeed, imposing different standards
and requirements is likely to exacerbate the adverse effects of such
entanglement, as described in section II.A.2 above. Furthermore, as we
are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety, we do not believe
there are any alternatives that would further minimize the compliance
and reporting requirements of small entities subject to Rule 14a-8. As
we are proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 in its entirety, it is also not
necessary to exempt any small entities from the rule or provide them
with alternative compliance timetables.
The proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 would allow companies of all
sizes to exercise discretionary voting authority with regard to timely
received shareholder proposals presented other than through Rule 14a-8,
subject to certain requirements, even if the
[[Page 59965]]
shareholder proponent delivers its own proxy materials to holders of
the requisite percentage of the company's shares necessary to carry the
proposal. The other proposed amendments to the proxy rules would also
apply equally to companies of all sizes.
We do not believe that imposing different standards or requirements
based on the size of the company or shareholder proponent for these
amendments is necessary. In fact, different standards may result in
additional costs associated with ascertaining whether a particular
company or shareholder proponent may avail itself of such different
standards. For these reasons, we are not proposing differing compliance
or reporting requirements or timetables, or an exception, for companies
and shareholder proponents that are small entities.
Similarly, as the proposed amendments to Rule 14a-4 and the other
proxy rules would not impose new compliance or reporting burdens on any
entities (other than the burden of including a check box and cross-
reference on the proxy card), we find that clarifying, consolidating or
simplifying compliance and reporting requirements for small entities,
or utilizing performance rather than design standards is not necessary,
although we solicit comment on how the proposed amendments could be
revised to reduce existing burdens on small entities, including with
respect to shareholder proponents that are small entities.
G. Request for Comment
We encourage the submission of comments with respect to any aspect
of this IRFA. In particular, we request comments regarding:
The number of small entities that may be affected by the
proposed amendments;
The existence or nature of the potential impact of the
proposed amendments on small entities discussed in this analysis;
Whether there are any alternative approaches to the
proposed amendments that can achieve the objective of this proposal
with a lower burden on small entities (including shareholder
proponents);
How the proposed amendments could further lower the burden
on small entities;
How to quantify the impact of the proposed amendments; and
Whether there are any Federal rules that duplicate,
overlap, or conflict with the proposed amendments.
Commenters are asked to describe the nature of any impact and
provide empirical data supporting the extent of the impact. Comments
will be considered in the preparation of the Final Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, if the proposed amendments are adopted, and will
be placed in the same public file as comments on the proposed
amendments themselves.
Statutory Authority
The rule amendments contained in this release are being proposed
under the authority set forth in sections 3(b), 14, and 23(a) of the
Exchange Act, as amended, and sections 20(a) and 38 of the Investment
Company Act, as amended.
List of Subjects in 17 CFR Parts 200, 229, 232, 240, and 249
Reporting and recordkeeping requirements; Securities; Investment
companies; Electronic filing.
Text of Proposed Amendments
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, the Commission proposes
to amend Title 17, Chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations as
follows:
PART 200--ORGANIZATION; CONDUCT AND ETHICS, AND INFORMATION AND
REQUESTS
Subpart A--Organization and Program Management
0
1. The authority citation for part 200, subpart A, continues to read in
part as follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552, 552a, 552b, and 557; 11 U.S.C. 901 and
1109(a); 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77o, 77q, 77s, 77u,
77z-3, 77ggg(a), 77hhh, 77sss, 77uuu, 78b, 78c(b), 78d, 78d-1, 78d-
2, 78e, 78f, 78g, 78h, 78i, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o, 78o-4,
78q, 78q-1, 78t-1, 78u, 78w, 78ll(d), 78mm, 78eee, 80a-8, 80a-20,
80a-24, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80a-41, 80a-44(a), 80a-44(b), 80b-3, 80b-4,
80b-5, 80b-9, 80b-10(a), 80b-11, 7202, and 7211 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.
794; 44 U.S.C. 3506 and 3507; Reorganization Plan No. 10 of 1950 (15
U.S.C. 78d); sec. 8G, Pub. L. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (5 U.S.C. App.);
sec. 913, Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1827; sec. 3(a), Pub. L.
114-185, 130 Stat. 538; E.O. 11222, 30 FR 6469, 3 CFR, 1964-1965
Comp., p. 36; E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166;
E.O. 12600, 52 FR 23781, 3 CFR, 1987 Comp., p. 235; Information
Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, 47 FR 27836; and 5 CFR
735.104 and 5 CFR parts 2634 and 2635, unless otherwise noted.
0
2. Amend Sec. 200.30-1 by, in paragraph (f)(4), removing the words
``and 240.14a-8(j)(1)''.
0
3. Remove and reserve Sec. 200.82.
PART 229--STANDARD INSTRUCTIONS FOR FILING FORMS UNDER SECURITIES
ACT OF 1933, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND ENERGY POLICY AND
CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975--REGULATION S-K
0
4. The authority citation for part 229 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77e, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77k, 77s, 77z-2,
77z-3, 77aa(25), 77aa(26), 77ddd, 77eee, 77ggg, 77hhh, 77iii, 77jjj,
77nnn, 77sss, 78c, 78i, 78j, 78j-3, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o, 78u-
5, 78w, 78ll, 78mm, 80a-8, 80a-9, 80a-20, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-31(c),
80a-37, 80a-38(a), 80a-39, 80b-11 and 7201 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350;
sec. 953(b), Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1904 (2010); and sec.
102(c), Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 310 (2012).
0
5. Amend Sec. 229.407 by removing Instruction 4 to paragraph (f) of
the Instructions to Item 407(f).
PART 232--REGULATION S-T--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
ELECTRONIC FILINGS
0
6. The general authority citation for part 232 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77f, 77g, 77h, 77j, 77s(a), 77z-3,
77sss(a), 78c(b), 78l, 78m, 78n, 78o(d), 78w(a), 78ll, 80a-6(c),
80a-8, 80a-29, 80a-30, 80a-37, 80b-4, 80b-6a, 80b-10, 80b-11, 7201
et seq.; and 18 U.S.C. 1350, unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
7. Amend Sec. 232.101 by removing and reserving paragraph (c)(3).
PART 240--GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
1934
0
8. The general authority citation for part 240 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 77c, 77d, 77g, 77j, 77s, 77z-2, 77z-3,
77eee, 77ggg, 77nnn, 77sss, 77ttt, 78c, 78c-3, 78c-5, 78d, 78e, 78f,
78g, 78i, 78j, 78j-1, 78j-4, 78k, 78k-1, 78l, 78m, 78n, 78n-1, 78o,
78o-4, 78o-10, 78p, 78q, 78q-1, 78s, 78u-5, 78w, 78x, 78dd, 78ll,
78mm, 80a-20, 80a-23, 80a-29, 80a-37, 80b-3, 80b-4, 80b-11,
1681w(a)(1), 6801-6809, 6825, 7201 et seq., and 8302; 7 U.S.C.
2(c)(2)(E); 12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(3); 18 U.S.C. 1350; Pub. L. 111-203,
939A, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); and Pub. L. 112-106, sec. 503 and 602,
126 Stat. 326 (2012), unless otherwise noted.
* * * * *
0
9. Amend Sec. 240.14a-2 by revising the introductory text of paragraph
(b) to read as follows:
Sec. 240.14a-2 Solicitations to which Sec. 240.14a-3 to Sec.
240.14a-15 apply.
* * * * *
(a) * * *
(b) Sections 240.14a-3 through 240.14a-6 (other than Sec. 240.14a-
6(g)
[[Page 59966]]
and (p)), 240.14a-10, 240.14a-12 through 240.14a-15, and 240.14a-19 do
not apply to the following:
* * * * *
0
10. Amend Sec. 240.14a-4 by:
0
a. Revising the introductory text to paragraph (c);
0
b. Revising paragraph (c)(1);
0
c. Revising paragraph (c)(2);
0
d. Removing paragraph (c)(6); and
0
e. Redesignating paragraph (c)(7) as (c)(6).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 240.14a-4 Requirements as to proxy.
* * * * *
(c) A proxy may confer discretionary authority to vote on any of
the following matters not included on the form of proxy:
(1) For an annual meeting of shareholders, if the registrant did
not have notice of the matter by the deadline established pursuant to
an applicable state or foreign law provision or the registrant's
governing documents (or, in the absence of such a deadline, at least 45
days before the anniversary of the date on which the registrant first
sent its proxy materials for the prior year's annual meeting of
shareholders), and a specific statement to that effect is made in the
proxy statement or form of proxy. If during the prior year the
registrant did not hold an annual meeting, or if the date of the
meeting has changed more than 30 days from the prior year, then notice
must not have been received a reasonable time before the registrant
sends its proxy materials for the current year (unless a provision of
applicable state or foreign law or the registrant's governing documents
establishes an applicable deadline for such notice, in which case such
deadline applies).
(2) In the case in which the registrant has received timely notice
in connection with an annual meeting of shareholders (as determined
under paragraph (c)(1) of this section), if the registrant includes:
(i) In the proxy statement, a brief description of the matter or
matters and how the registrant intends to exercise its discretion to
vote on each matter, and
(ii) On the form of proxy, a cross-reference to such description in
the proxy statement and a box by which a security holder may elect not
to confer discretionary voting authority on the same matter(s).
(3) * * *
(4) * * *
(5) * * *
(6) Matters incident to the conduct of the meeting.
* * * * *
0
11. Amend Sec. 240.14a-5 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (e)(1);
0
b. Revising paragraph (e)(2); and
0
c. Revising paragraph (f).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 240.14a-5 Presentation of information in proxy statement.
* * * * *
(e) * * *
(1) The deadline for submitting shareholder proposals for inclusion
in the registrant's proxy statement and form of proxy pursuant to an
applicable state or foreign law provision or a registrant's governing
documents as they relate to the inclusion of shareholder proposals in
the registrant's proxy materials for the registrant's next annual
meeting;
(2) The deadline for providing notice of shareholder proposals that
are not for inclusion in the registrant's proxy statement and form of
proxy, after which the notice would be considered untimely under Sec.
240.14a-4(c)(1);
(3) * * *
(4) * * *
(f) If the date of the next annual meeting is subsequently advanced
or delayed by more than 30 calendar days from the date of the annual
meeting to which the proxy statement relates, the registrant must, in a
timely manner, inform shareholders of such change, and the new dates
referred to in paragraphs (e)(1) through (e)(4) of this section (to the
extent applicable), by including a notice, under Item 5, in its
earliest possible quarterly report on Form 10-Q (Sec. 249.308a of this
chapter), or, in the case of investment companies, in a shareholder
report under Sec. 270.30d-1 of this chapter under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, or, if impracticable, any means reasonably
calculated to inform shareholders.
0
12. Amend Sec. 240.14a-6 by:
0
a. Revising paragraph (a);
0
b. Revising paragraph (a)(3);
0
c. Revising paragraph (a)(4);
0
d. Removing the undesignated paragraph immediately following (a)(8);
0
e. Removing Note 2 to paragraph (a);
0
f. Redesignating Note 3 to paragraph (a) as Note 2 to paragraph (a);
0
g. Revising newly redesignated Note 2 to paragraph (a); and
0
h. Removing Note 4 to paragraph (a).
The revisions read as follows:
Sec. 240.14a-6 Filing requirements.
(a) Preliminary proxy statement. Five preliminary copies of the
proxy statement and form of proxy must be filed with the Commission at
least 10 calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such
material are first sent or given to security holders, or such shorter
period prior to that date as the Commission may authorize upon a
showing of good cause thereunder. A registrant, however, need not file
with the Commission a preliminary proxy statement, form of proxy or
other soliciting material to be furnished to security holders
concurrently therewith if the solicitation relates to an annual (or
special meeting in lieu of the annual) meeting, or for an investment
company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C.
80a-1 et seq.) or a business development company, if the solicitation
relates to any meeting of security holders, at which the only matters
to be acted upon are:
(1) * * *
(2) * * *
(3) One or more security holder proposals;
(4) One or more shareholder nominees for director included pursuant
to an applicable state or foreign law provision or a registrant's
governing documents as they relate to the inclusion of shareholder
director nominees in the registrant's proxy materials;
(5) * * *
(6) * * *
(7) * * *
(8) A vote to approve the compensation of executives as required
pursuant to section 14A(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(1)) and Sec. 240.14a-21(a) of this chapter, or
pursuant to section 111(e)(1) of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008 (12 U.S.C. 5221(e)(1)) and Sec. 240.14a-20 of this
chapter, a vote to determine the frequency of shareholder votes to
approve the compensation of executives as required pursuant to Section
14A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78n-
1(a)(2)) and Sec. 240.14a-21(b) of this chapter, or any other
shareholder advisory vote on executive compensation.
Note 1 to paragraph (a): * * *
Note 2 to paragraph (a): The exclusion from filing preliminary
proxy material does not apply if any of the matters to be acted upon
is subject to a solicitation in opposition. Each of the following
constitutes a ``solicitation in opposition'' (other than any
solicitation exempt under Sec. 240.14a-2, which does not constitute
a solicitation in opposition): (i) a solicitation subject to Sec.
240.14a-19; (ii) a solicitation of votes against or withhold votes
from any of the registrant's nominee(s); (iii) a solicitation of
votes against a proposal that the registrant expressly supports in
its proxy materials; and (iv) a solicitation of votes in support of
a proposal that the registrant does not expressly support in its
proxy materials, in
[[Page 59967]]
each case, if the registrant knows, or reasonably should know, of
such solicitation.
* * * * *
0
13. Remove and reserve Sec. 240.14a-8.
0
14. Amend Sec. 240.14c-5 by revising paragraph (a) and its
accompanying Note 2, and removing Notes 3 and 4. The revisions to read
as follows:
Sec. 240.14c-5 Filing requirements.
(a) Preliminary information statement. Five preliminary copies of
the information statement must be filed with the Commission at least 10
calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such statement are
first sent or given to security holders, or such shorter period prior
to that date as the Commission may authorize upon a showing of good
cause therefor. In computing the 10-day period, the filing date of the
preliminary copies is to be counted as the first day and the 11th day
is the date on which definitive copies of the information statement may
be sent to security holders. A registrant, however, need not file with
the Commission a preliminary information statement if it relates to an
annual (or special meeting in lieu of the annual) meeting, of security
holders at which the only matters to be acted upon are:
(1) * * *
(2) * * *
(3) One or more security holder proposals; and/or
(4) The approval or ratification of a plan as defined in paragraph
(a)(6)(ii) of Item 402 of Regulation S-K (Sec. 229.402(a)(6)(ii) of
this chapter) or amendments to such a plan.
Note 1: * * *
Note 2: The exclusion from filing a preliminary information
statement does not apply if any of the matters to be acted upon is
subject to a solicitation in opposition. Each of the following
constitutes a ``solicitation in opposition'' (other than any
solicitation exempt under Sec. 240.14a-2, which does not constitute
a solicitation in opposition): (i) a solicitation of votes against a
proposal that the registrant expressly supports in its information
statement; and (ii) a solicitation of votes in support of a proposal
that the registrant does not expressly support in its information
statement, in each case, if the registrant knows, or reasonably
should know, of such solicitation.
* * * * *
0
15. Amend Sec. 240.14c-101 by:
0
a. In the Note to Cover Page, removing the words ``Where any item,
other than Item 4,'' and adding, in their place, ``Where any item'';
0
b. Removing Item 4 and the instructions to Item 4; and
0
c. Redesignating Item 5 as Item 4.
PART 249--FORMS, SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934
0
16. The authority citation for part 249 continues to read, in part, as
follows:
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq. and 7201 et seq.; 12 U.S.C.
5461 et seq.; 18 U.S.C. 1350; Sec. 953(b) Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat.
1904; Sec. 102(a)(3) Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 309 (2012), Sec. 107
Pub. L. 112-106, 126 Stat. 313 (2012), Sec. 72001 Pub. L. 114-94,
129 Stat. 1312 (2015), and secs. 2 and 3 Pub. L. 116-222, 134 Stat.
1063 (2020), unless otherwise noted.
0
17. Amend Form 8-K (referenced in Sec. 249.308) by, in Item 5.07,
paragraph (d), removing the words ``but in no event later than sixty
calendar days prior to the deadline for submission of shareholder
proposals under Sec. 240.14a-8, as disclosed in the registrant's most
recent proxy statement for an annual or other meeting of shareholders
relating to the election of directors at which shareholders voted on
the frequency of shareholder votes on the compensation of executives as
required by section 14A(a)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(15 U.S.C. 78n-1(a)(2)),''.
Dated: September 16, 2026.
By the Commission.
Vanessa A. Countryman,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-19260 Filed 9-18-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P