[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 164 (Wednesday, August 26, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 54966-54992]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17238]
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POSTAL SERVICE
39 CFR Part 111
Ballot Mail for Federal Elections
AGENCY: Postal Service.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The Postal Service is amending the Mailing Standards of the
United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual, regarding the
transmission of mail-in or absentee ballots for federal elections
pursuant to its rulemaking authority.
DATES: Effective August 21, 2026.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Keith Weidner, (202) 268-2950 or Drew
Mitchum, (202) 779-2766.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
On March 31, 2026, the President issued Executive Order 14399,
Ensuring Citizenship Verification and Integrity in Federal Elections,
91 FR 17125 (2026) (``Executive Order'' or ``Order''). The Executive
Order stresses the federal government's ``unavoidable duty under
Article II of the Constitution of the United States to enforce
[f]ederal law, which includes preventing violations of [f]ederal
criminal law and maintaining public confidence in election outcomes.''
Id. To these ends, the Order points out the need for additional
measures concerning the use of the mail in order to facilitate
enforcement of federal law, reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect
the integrity of federal elections. Id. Following the issuance of the
Order, the Postal Service engaged in an interagency review process
through the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB''), and subsequently
issued a proposed rule regarding the preparation of ballot mail for
federal elections to facilitate the enforcement of federal law and to
implement best practices for Postal Service operations regarding ballot
mail. Ballot Mail for Federal Elections, 91 FR 32915 (June 2, 2026).
Although exempt by 39 U.S.C. 410(a) from the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (``APA'') (5 U.S.C.
553) regarding proposed rulemaking, the Postal Service invited public
comment on the proposed revisions to Mailing Standards of the United
States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (``DMM''), incorporated by
reference in the Code of Federal Regulations, set forth in the proposed
rule. The comment period closed on July 2, 2026.
To ensure the faithful execution of federal law in connection with
federal elections, this rule has an immediate effective date. Delaying
the effective date would jeopardize implementation of this rule in time
for the 2026 general election, which will be held on November 3, 2026.
Given injunctions currently in place in State of California v. Trump,
No. 26-cv-11581 (D. Mass. June 25, 2026), and League of Women Voters of
Massachusetts v. Trump, No. 26-cv-11549 (D. Mass. Aug. 11, 2026), the
Postal Service will not take actions to implement the rule specifically
for the 2026 election unless and until the government obtains relief
from those injunctions. If the government obtains timely relief from
the injunctions, implementation immediately thereafter will provide
election officials as much time as possible before the next election to
comply with the rule's preparation standards for Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes, and to prepare to submit data to the Federal Ballot Mail
Portal (``Portal''), before the mail-in and absentee ballots subject to
this rule aremailed (which generally occurs in September or thereafter,
as determined by state law). The Portal will become active (along with
the verification process that relies on Portal data) at the time of the
publication of the system of records (``SOR'') governing the Portal.
Publication of the SOR will occur on or after August 17, 2026 (pending
the Postal Service's separate consideration of the comments on that SOR
proposal). Finally, the terms ``mail-in ballot'' and ``absentee
ballot'' are synonymous and interchangeable for the purposes of this
rule. These terms include any ballot sent through the U.S. Mail,
irrespective of state law terminology.
II. Overview of Comments
The Postal Service received more than 200,000 responses during the
comment period. These comments consisted primarily of form letters that
appeared to be drawn from templates; brief statements of general
support for or opposition to the proposed rule; and individualized
messages from concerned citizens. Additionally, organizational
commenters individually and jointly submitted over 250 letters. This
group of commenters included postal unions; federal, state, local, and
tribal officials, including state attorneys general, governors, and
members of Congress; election officials, including secretaries of state
and county election administrators; voting rights organizations; and a
range of other issue-based and political advocacy groups.
As discussed below, some opposition to the proposed rule reflected
misunderstandings about how the rule will operate in practice; to these
misunderstandings the Postal Service offers explanations in the
``Operation of the Final Rule'' section below.
A. Comments in Support of the Rule
Supportive comments emphasized several themes. Some discussed voter
fraud as a significant problem and lauded the proposed rule for helping
to restore voters' confidence in election integrity. One letter,
submitted by an Alabama-led coalition of thirteen state attorneys
general, contended that the proposed rule would facilitate efforts to
combat voter fraud while shoring up public confidence in ways that
states could not achieve on their own
[[Page 54967]]
initiative. That coalition further emphasized that states retain full
control of ballots until they are transferred to the Postal Service,
and that the proposed rule would help mitigate weaknesses in the chain
of custody of Federal Ballot Mail.
Supporting commenters also appraised the proposed rule as enhancing
election security by improving the visibility of Federal Ballot Mail in
the mailstream; approved of the ballot envelope design standards it
would normalize; emphasized the benefits of creating reconcilable data
(through the state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists
(``Lists'')) that offers a neutral administrative check which
strengthens confidence in elections; and predicted that the rule would
reduce uncertainty as to whether ballots have reached their intended
destination.
Supporting commenters further evaluated the actions that state and
local election officials may need to take to comply with the proposed
rule's standards. The Alabama-led coalition of state attorneys general,
for instance, acknowledged that the proposal would impose certain
burdens but characterized them as ``plainly justified by the security
and accountability benefits of the proposed rule,'' concluding that the
rule ``addresses real vulnerabilities inherent in mail-in voting,
responds to legitimate and widespread public concerns about federal
election integrity, and equips States with tools that strengthen their
own oversight capabilities without displacing their authority.''
Finally, many supporting commenters affirmed the Postal Service's
statutory and constitutional authority to enact the rule. Some cited
Article II, Section 3 of the U.S. Constitution (requiring the President
to ``take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed'') as legal grounds
for the rule, while also endorsing the analysis of authorities set out
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. There, the Postal Service cited
authority to regulate the mail as embodied in 39 U.S.C. 401 and 404 and
described the proposed regulations as setting forth ``mailpiece
preparation and data reporting standards that can provide information
regarding the sending of ballots through the mail that would be
available for use by law enforcement, and are consistent with title 39
of the U.S. Code.'' The Postal Service addresses the legal authority to
promulgate the final rule at greater length in the ``Legal Authority''
section below.
Finally, some commenters urged the Postal Service to adopt
additional measures, including citizenship-verification requirements,
as part of a final rule.
B. Comments in Opposition to the Rule
Comments received in opposition to the proposed rule generally
urged the Postal Service to withdraw the rule or to delay its
implementation until after the November 3, 2026, general election.
Several commenters argued that the rule should be withdrawn in light of
an injunction entered by the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts (California v. Trump, 2026 WL 1826490 (D.
Mass. June 25, 2026)) and a now-stayed injunction issued by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia, in litigation
arising out of a 2021 settlement with the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (``NAACP'') in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia (NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., 2026 WL
1893762 (D.D.C. July 1, 2026)).
Concerns raised by opposing commenters largely fell into three
broad categories, each of which is addressed in greater detail below:
The alleged legal deficiencies of the proposed rule;
Concerns regarding the purported practical implementation
challenges;
Concerns about the proposed rule's alleged broader
political and social impact.
With respect to legal objections, opposing commenters argued that
the Postal Service lacks legal authority to adopt or implement the
proposed rule. Commenters further argued that, even if the Postal
Service possesses the requisite authority, adoption of the proposed
rule would be arbitrary and capricious. These legal objections are
addressed at length in the ``Legal Authority'' and ``Impact of the
Final Rule'' sections below.
With respect to the substance of the proposed rule, opposing
commenters frequently focused on the Portal, the acceptance (or
verification) provisions, and the fact that the Postal Service would
refuse to accept certain ballots for federal elections that states
tender without satisfying the data-entry obligations that the rule
would impose. Although these provisions were uniformly opposed by
commenters not otherwise supportive of the rule, some expressed greater
openness to the envelope-design requirements, asserting that such
requirements would fall more squarely within the Postal Service's
sphere of authority. Thus, in the opinion of some commenters, the
envelope design provisions for Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail
in DMM 705.24.3 could be retained while the verification, Portal, and
optional notice provisions should be removed. In a similar vein, at
least one commenter signaled conditional support for the proposed rule
so long as all mandatory provisions were made voluntary. Comments
raising specific implementation concerns--arising from asserted costs
and burdens associated with implementation before the 2026 general
election, as well as those costs and burdens that would purportedly be
incurred on an ongoing basis; the potential risk of administrative or
data errors leading to ballot rejection; and the Postal Service's
perceived lack of readiness--are addressed at length in the sections
below.
A number of commenters urged the Postal Service to publish a system
of records notice (``SORN'') under the Privacy Act and raised questions
addressable through the SORN, including whether personally identifiable
information will be collected and stored, how long such information
will be retained, which entities and personnel will have access to it,
whether it will be shared with other federal entities or contractors,
what cybersecurity safeguards will be implemented, and what remedies
will be available in the event of improper disclosure. The Postal
Service published a SORN on July 17, 2026. 91 FR 44880. The public was
invited to submit comments relevant to the SORN and related Privacy Act
considerations in that proceeding.
C. Comments Outside the Scope of This Rulemaking
The Postal Service also received a significant number of comments
that fall outside the scope of this proceeding.
First, many commenters described voting by mail as an effective
means of exercising their franchise due to their individual
circumstances. Other commenters, by contrast, criticized mail-in voting
as a general practice and urged the Postal Service to cease delivering
ballot mail altogether. The Postal Service takes no position on
whether, or the extent to which, states should utilize the mail as part
of the administration of their elections. Indeed, the Postal Service
does not advocate for or against voting by mail. Instead, the Postal
Service collects, processes, transports, and delivers mail and
packages, and remains fully committed to transporting all types of
mail, including Federal Ballot Mail that conforms with the Postal
Service's mail preparation, data reporting, acceptance, and entry
standards. As discussed
[[Page 54968]]
further below, under the proposed rule, and as retained in the final
rule, the states retain full authority to decide whether to utilize the
U.S. Mail as part of their electoral systems, and to determine who
should be eligible to vote by mail.
Second, comments that comprehensively address state and local
election administration or the Postal Service's election mail
procedures fall outside the scope of this proceeding. By way of
example, one commenter raised concerns regarding the accuracy of voter
registration rolls, recounted their experience of observing purported
irregularities during the 2020 election cycle, and urged the Postal
Service to undertake a comprehensive review of all mail-in ballot
procedures. Comments in this vein, which concern the entire system of
election mail administration, rather than the DMM provisions set forth
in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, will not be addressed below.
Third, numerous comments raised concerns influenced by partisan
political speculation. This included conjecture about the underlying
intent of the Order and the impact it may have on voter turnout or
election outcomes. Such remarks are speculative and exceed the scope of
this proceeding. In any event, as explained further below, this rule
does not--nor is it intended to--facilitate any form of voter
suppression, affect election outcomes, or target particular
demographics, districts, or states.
Fourth, a number of comments raised issues that fall outside both
the scope of this proceeding and the Postal Service's authority
generally, extending the rule's logic beyond election mail and/or
invoking executive branch entities not involved in Postal Service
operations. Some, for example, proposed that ballots be accepted only
if they arrive by election day; demanded that mail-in voting be
discontinued; urged Congress to enact the Safeguard American Voter
Eligibility (SAVE) Act; and weighed in on sections of Executive Order
14399 that do not concern the Postal Service. Comments addressing
election deadlines, the policy of mail-in voting, other election
administration changes, pending legislation, and other entities' law
enforcement priorities are not relevant to this proceeding.
Fifth, some commenters raised broad issues of service performance
and operational decision-making. Such issues include which facilities
process particular mail classes; postmarking practices; service
performance complaints; the scope of Postal Police Officers' authority;
operational changes or service commitments for ballots mailed to and
from military and overseas voters; and collateral consequences to the
Postal Service's brand reputation or revenue if a final rule is issued.
Such comments are beyond the scope of this proceeding and will not be
addressed below.
Sixth, the Postal Service received numerous comments addressing
matters unrelated to election mail or to the matters discussed in this
proceeding. These included comments expressing personal opinions of the
President; remarks concerning nominees to the Postal Service Board of
Governors and criticisms of the Board's leadership; objections to
postage and stamp prices; requests for congressional action; appraisals
of judges who have issued decisions concerning election mail;
appraisals of the current and former Postmaster General; comments aimed
at postal management and staff; comments on postal reform and
privatization; comments on voter intimidation; comments regarding the
role of public election auditors and observers; opinions about the
impact of the Supreme Court's recent decisions dealing with the Voting
Rights Act; comments regarding the Federal Election Commission's
Clearinghouse on Election Administration; and feedback on other
administrative proceedings, including a Department of Justice (``DOJ'')
rulemaking concerning the review of state bar complaints and
allegations against DOJ attorneys and a separate Postal Service
rulemaking concerning the mailability of firearms. Such comments are
also beyond the scope of this proceeding and will not be addressed
below.
D. Conclusion
The Postal Service has carefully considered all comments received.
The summary above is intended to broadly cover the issues they raise.
Substantive legal objections, operational issues, requests for
additional study, suggested revisions to the proposed rule, and
additional topics related to the proposed rule are addressed in the
dedicated subsections that follow.
III. Legal Authority
Numerous commenters asserted, on varying grounds, that the Postal
Service lacks the legal authority to implement the proposed rule. This
section recites the specific arguments advanced by commenters, followed
in each case by a response affirming the legal basis of the DMM
changes.
A. General Remarks
Ballot mail presents unique considerations, given the role it plays
in the electoral process. This role has also grown in importance in
recent years, as many states have expanded eligibility for mail-in
voting, with some states moving to universal mail-in voting. The number
of voters using the mail to receive and cast their ballots has
commensurately increased. The Postal Service's policies regarding
election mail in general, and ballot mail in particular, have evolved
to reflect these unique considerations. From an operational standpoint,
the Postal Service deploys special practices on a nationwide basis for
the processing and delivery of ballot mail to ensure that such mail is
prioritized across the postal network and timely delivered. These
practices include the use of extraordinary measures during the period
surrounding federal general elections to accelerate the delivery of
return ballot mail beyond the Postal Service's typical operations when
its employees are able to identify a mailpiece as a ballot. In
recognition of the importance of ballot mail, the Postal Service
regularly issues nationwide guidance documents in federal election
cycles, has dedicated points of contact to coordinate with election
officials, and has created a dedicated election mail group tasked with
overseeing the Postal Service's election mail procedures nationwide.
The Postal Service also amended DMM 703.8.0 in 2022 to add its
longstanding best-practices recommendations concerning ballot mail to
facilitate efficient handling and prompt delivery and to
improvemailpiece visibility. Some jurisdictions have adopted those
recommendations.
The use of the U.S. Mail to vote also implicates federal interests
regarding whether the postal system is being used in a manner that is
consistent with federal law, including those laws governing who is
allowed to vote in federal elections. Executive Order 14399 emphasizes
the constitutional obligation of the Executive Branch to take care that
these laws are faithfully executed, and discusses the importance of
applying additional measures concerning the use of the mail to vote in
federal elections, in order to facilitate enforcement of federal law,
reduce the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal
elections--a point subsequently echoed by some comments supporting the
rule. It is fully appropriate for the Postal Service, as an
establishment of the Executive Branch, to take actions deemed necessary
to ensure the faithful
[[Page 54969]]
execution of federal law and enhance the efficiency of postal
operations. As discussed below, the Postal Service has the statutory
and constitutional authority to take such actions.
B. Election Integrity
The Postal Service received many comments expressing differing
views on the incidence of voter fraud and its impact on election
integrity. Some commenters, in voicing support for the proposed rule,
portrayed voter fraud as a significant problem, while commenters
opposing the rule argued that it is not a problem, and disputed the
Postal Service's legal authority and rationale to impose preparation
requirements for Outbound Federal Ballot Mail.
While the Postal Service acknowledges the range of disagreement on
this point, the incidence of voter fraud does not impact the proposed
rule's legal grounding. As discussed in the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking and in further detail below, the rule will afford
significantly enhanced visibility into the sending of Federal Ballot
Mail, and this will in turn facilitate law enforcement efforts by
enabling law enforcement to better detect potential issues meriting
further investigation. Such enhanced visibility will help identify
potential issues that would have otherwise gone undetected; at the very
least, it will provide increased assurance that any potential issues
are more capable of being effectively identified and investigated. Cf.
Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 196-97 (2008)
(noting the propriety of taking steps designed to detect and deter
potential electoral fraud, which also has the benefit of ``safeguarding
voter confidence'' in elections). Whether or not voter fraud is common
or uncommon, the Postal Service has the legal authority to take the
measures in this rule to facilitate enforcement of federal law, reduce
the risk of fraud, and help protect the integrity of federal elections.
C. The Constitution's Elections Clause and the 10th Amendment
Numerous commenters argued that the Postal Service, through the
proposed DMM provisions, would supplant the states' authority to
administer elections. Some of these comments characterized the proposed
rule as inconsistent with the Elections Clause of the Constitution,
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 (vesting authority over the ``manner of
elections'' with the States and Congress), and with the 10th Amendment
(reserving all non-enumerated powers to the states). According to many
of these comments, the proposed rule would allegedly recast the Postal
Service as an ``auditor of state voter rolls and an arbiter of ballot
validity,'' a ``gatekeeper of who can vote by mail,'' or a ``checkpoint
for voting.'' In a similar vein, commenters asserted that the proposed
rule contravenes the separation of powers by arrogating powers that lie
with Congress. Finally, at least one commenter argued that, by
requiring that states expend resources to comply with the standards
mandated by the Postal Service, the proposed rule would
unconstitutionally commandeer State resources.
These comments are fundamentally erroneous. The rule does not
recast the Postal Service as an election administrator, nor dictate the
manner of elections in the states. On the contrary, it sets forth
mailpiece design and data reporting standards tied to the use of the
mail. States maintain complete control over their own voter
registration rolls, deciding who within their jurisdiction is eligible
to vote by mail. States also retain complete autonomy to determine the
extent to which they utilize the postal system as an aspect of their
elections. The rule is plainly consistent with the Elections Clause,
the 10th Amendment, and the separation of powers, as well as the Postal
Service's statutory and regulatory authority.
Some commenters acknowledged the Postal Service's authority to
impose general standards governing the dispatch of election mail,
including ballot mail. For instance, election mail must today conform
with the DMM provisions that apply to the class of mail in which it is
entered, and users of such mail must pay the required postage. The
requirement to follow federal mail regulations if states choose to use
the federal postal system, then, cannot inherently violate the
Elections Clause, nor would it in any way ``commandeer'' state
resources. The Postal Service is not constitutionally obliged to defer
to a given state's Outbound Federal Ballot Mail design preferences or
accept a given state's decision not to use barcodes. On the contrary,
establishing a standardized set of mailpiece design requirements for
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail--requirements that, being tailored to
enable more efficient handling of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, improve
such mail's visibility in the mailstream, and Postal Service
operations--lies within the Postal Service's authority. These
requirements do not amount to election administration, nor do they
usurp state resources; rather, they regulate the use of the mail to
improve operational efficiency and support the faithful execution of
federal law. In this regard, as a general matter, states do not have to
use the U.S. mail to conduct their elections, and the Postal Service
can take steps to ensure that if states do use the mail, that use
occurs in a manner that achieves these legitimate purposes.
Similarly, the requirement to report mail piece-level data into the
Portal is not tantamount to election administration. States retain full
control over who within their jurisdictions is (or is not) eligible to
vote by mail in federal elections; they would, moreover, determine who
is enrolled in their respective Mail-In and Absentee Participation
Lists. DMM 705.24.4 only requires that states provide to the Postal
Service certain information inscribed on the Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes that they mail to voters, prior to or at
the time of the outbound mailing. This information, which necessarily
lies in the states' possession, would not be subject to revision by the
Postal Service. Eligible voters will therefore be listed by and at the
discretion of election officials, and the Postal Service will not
second-guess the states' submissions. State election officials will
thus retain full control over who is permitted to vote in federal
elections in their state by U.S. mail.
Finally, the verification process aims only to ensure that states
adhere to the mailpiece design and data reporting standards. By
checking the outbound barcode, the Postal Service will be able to
verify that the state or political subdivision thereof has satisfied
the Portal data entry requirements (e.g., certifying that Outbound and
Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes have been submitted for Mailpiece
Design Analyst (``MDA'') review and that feedback has been received,
all required data fields have been entered). Again, the Postal Service
will exercise no discretion or authority over whether an individual
should or should not be on the list a state provides.
This rule does not involve or authorize inspection of a mail-in
ballot's contents, review of individual voter's eligibility, or
auditing of state voter rolls. It instead focuses exclusively on
exterior mailpiece criteria and barcode scan data. As DMM 704.24.6
explains, ``[t]his rule relates only to the use of the U.S. Mail,''
leaving states ``fully responsible for the contents of [their] Mail-In
and Absentee Participation List.'' 91 FR 32929. Specifically, DMM
705.24.1.b limits enrollment in the Portal to users authorized by a
state's chief election official; accordingly, and as detailed in DMM
705.24.4.3, the Postal Service will compile and return to each state
only the information that
[[Page 54970]]
the state itself has submitted, thus preserving the states' control
over who is (and is not) able to vote by mail. It further bears
emphasizing that the verification process delineated in DMM 705.24.5
would not involve voter eligibility determinations in any way; it will
not entail scrutiny into, or any attempt to evaluate, individual
voters. Finally, as plainly stated in DMM 705.24.5.2, ``Postal Service
personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection.''
In short, the rule adds a layer of security and accountability while
leaving the administration of elections firmly in the hands of the
states.
D. First Amendment and Privacy Act Concerns
Some commenters raised First Amendment concerns, noting that the
Supreme Court has long recognized that voting is a protected form of
political participation and that compelled disclosure of political
participation can chill the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.
Though some commenters correctly acknowledged that the Postal Service
does not propose to disclose voting choices, numerous commenters
nevertheless alleged that the rule would compel the creation and
maintenance of records identifying citizens who engage in mail-in or
absentee voting; speculated that such records may be subject to future
disclosure, misuse, breach, or political targeting; and advised against
collecting personally identifiable election-participation information
absent a compelling need and robust safeguards.
Other commenters invoked the Privacy Act, and 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7)
in particular, as a statutory bar on the maintenance of records
``describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the
First Amendment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the
individual about whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to
and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement activity[.]''.
These First Amendment concerns are misplaced. First, the Postal
Service reiterates that it will not collect or record party affiliation
and will not inspect ballot contents. Postal Service personnel are not
authorized to open mail sealed against inspection. Instead, through the
Portal the Postal Service will maintain data of the sort that is
routinely generated for mail from the exterior of the mailpiece,
including addressing and barcode information.
The rule's enactment will not entail ``compelled disclosure of
political participation.'' Supreme Court cases on ``compelled
disclosure'' in the electoral context address compelled public
disclosure of personally identifiable election participation
information, such as a public records law making the signatures on a
referendum petition publicly available upon request. John Doe No. 1 v.
Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 192 (2010). The rule, by contrast, neither directs
nor contemplates the public disclosure of Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists or the underlying Portal data.
The Postal Service recognizes the importance of ensuring that the
Lists are protected from ``future disclosure, misuse, breach, or
political targeting.'' The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking indicated that
``steps necessary for the creation of a new SORN in accordance with the
Privacy Act'' would be initiated. 91 FR 32971. On July 17, 2026, the
SORN was published in the Federal Register. The SORN provides details
regarding retention periods, access, disclosure, notification, and
contest procedures under 39 CFR 266.5. 91 FR 44880. The notice
specifies the categories of records covered, a five-year retention
period, encryption of online data transmissions, and badge- and log-on-
controlled access limited to personnel whose duties require it. The
Postal Service can therefore confirm that no data will be collected
through the Portal until a system of record (SOR) is in effect, and
that records will be disclosed and maintained consistently with any
final SOR, which does not allow public disclosure of the Lists.
The proposed rule is also consistent with 5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7),
which applies only to records revealing ``how any individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.'' Courts have interpreted
this ``how'' to mean gathering and recording the ``content'' of
expressive activity under the First Amendment. E.g., Reuber v. United
States, 829 F.2d 133, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that a letter
reprimanding an employee for privately published essays did not depict
``how'' he had exercised First Amendment rights under the Privacy Act
because it did not discuss ``the content'' of his privately published
essays and made ``only vague allusions to the manner in which he
expressed his views'').
This section of the Privacy Act could only be invoked here if the
Postal Service were gathering and maintaining records indicating the
``content'' of an individual's exercise of their First Amendment rights
(i.e., the content of an individual's ballot, and thus the candidate
for which an individual voted). That is not the type of information
being collected under the rule. The state-specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists indicate whether a state planned to mail a blank
ballot to any given individual. This information does not describe
``the content'' of expressive activity under the First Amendment, but
simply indicates the specific means by which an individual may have
chosen to receive or return their ballot.
Furthermore, Section 552a(e)(7)'s prohibitions are operative
``unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law
enforcement activity''--and as stated above, this rule is enacted to
assist in the faithful execution and enforcement of federal law. See
Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 280 (6th Cir. 1982) (Section
552a(e)(7) ``does not bar the maintenance of records describing how a
person exercises First Amendment rights if there is a direct nexus to
an authorized criminal, civil or administrative law enforcement
activity''). The applicability of Section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement
exception to DMM 705.24.4 is further confirmed by the DOJ Office of
Legal Counsel's recent memorandum opinion, ``Authority to Obtain and
Share Statewide Voter Roll Data.'' 50 Op. OLC _(May 12, 2026), Slip.
Op. at 25-29 (explaining that Section 552a(e)(7)'s law enforcement
exception permits retention of statewide voter-registration lists when
a SORN is published).
E. Fourth Amendment Concerns
Some commenters argued that the proposed rule would violate the
Fourth Amendment by allegedly:
Allowing unreasonable search of voter information encoded
on the outside of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes;
Permitting unreasonable seizure of Federal Ballot Mail
encoded with voter information; and
Requiring voter information to be encoded on the outside
of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes and allowing suspicionless searches
(also known as ``administrative'' or ``special needs'' searches) of
that information for general law-enforcement purposes that fall outside
of the Postal Service's lawful mission of mail delivery.
The Postal Service notes that courts have long held that there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information displayed on the
exterior of a mailpiece because it is exposed to anyone's view,
including postal employees who must rely upon it in the performance of
their duties. E.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 175-77 (9th
Cir. 1978). Thus, the Postal Service's creation of ``mail covers''--
images of the outside cover of envelopes or packages in its custody--
for general
[[Page 54971]]
law enforcement purposes do not constitute a ``search'' under the
Fourth Amendment. See generally 39 CFR 233.3. Likewise, the
government's use of voter information displayed or encoded on Federal
Ballot Mail envelopes would not constitute a Fourth Amendment
``search''--administrative or otherwise--because it invades no
reasonable expectation of privacy.
F. Due Process Concerns
Some commenters argued that once a state provides for absentee
voting, the state has enabled a qualified individual to exercise their
fundamental right to vote in a way that was previously unavailable; and
that, as a result, the state must afford appropriate due process
protections, including notice and a hearing, before rejecting an
absentee ballot. Commenters analogized this principle (which applies
via the Fourteenth Amendment to the states) to the Fifth Amendment,
which, in their view, requires the federal government to provide
adequate due process before restricting voters' use of otherwise
permissible voting methods.
The Postal Service reiterates that the rule adopted herein does not
determine any individual's eligibility to vote and thus does not raise
the specter of a due process violation. The verification procedures set
forth in DMM 705.24.5 are instead designed to ensure that states
sending Federal Ballot Mail have transmitted to the Federal Ballot Mail
Portal the information required for each state-specific Mail-In and
Absentee Participation List. Such information lies with the states,
which already fully control who is, and who is not, included on the
Lists; voters themselves cannot provide all of that information (e.g.,
unique Intelligent Mail barcode (``IMb'') on the outbound and return
envelope), and the Postal Service cannot correct or amend it. While the
verification process may identify missing data or other errors between
Outbound Federal Ballot mailings and the Portal data, the states
themselves control the information that they transmit (as they do
already, even in the absence of this rule), and any procedural
protections attaching to such information must accordingly be provided
by the states. Ultimately, with or without this rule, states are
responsible for managing their own voter rolls, and deciding who is or
is not eligible to vote by mail.
G. Equal Protection Concerns
Some commenters raised concerns regarding the guarantee of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment (and subsequently
incorporated into the Fifth Amendment by Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954)). For example, at least one commenter asserted that the
exemption for ballots covered by the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting Act (``UOCAVA'') affords unequal legal protection (on
the mistaken grounds that UOCAVA covers military personnel but not
overseas civilians). Moreover, at least one commenter argued that by
creating the possibility of noncompliance, the rule's envelope-design
standards and verification process might restrict some voters' ability
to vote by mail, thus withholding equal protection under the law.
However, another commenter reasoned that uniform national
standards--far from raising equal-protection issues--resolve these
constitutional concerns. Relying on Jones v. U.S. Postal Service, 488
F. Supp. 3d 103 (S.D.N.Y. 2020), the commenter explained that Fifth
Amendment equal-protection claims were likely to succeed where there
were no standards or uniformity for handling election mail; this
inconsistency can result in intrastate and interstate disparities in
citizens' voting power. The proposed rule, the commenter argued,
eliminates such concerns by setting a single, nationwide standard for
Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service agrees with this commenter that the rule
safeguards, rather than abrogates, equal protection. The rule is
neutral on its face and uniform in application: DMM 705.24.3 applies
objective requirements to all Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail
envelopes without distinction, and the data entry and verification
processes delineated by DMM 705.24.4 and 705.24.5, respectively,
likewise apply to all states equally. Furthermore, as noted, the rule
promotes multiple rational objectives through nationwide standards and
implementation, including the enhancement of Federal Ballot Mail
visibility in the mailstream, Postal Service operations, and the
facilitation of law enforcement objectives. Cf. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 734 (1987) (holding that facial challenges to
statutes ``must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid''); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 301
(1993) (extending the Salerno standard to federal agency regulations).
The rule's exemptions also rest on a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
basis. Congress, for example, created in UOCAVA a separate federal
statutory scheme with its own requirements, including different timing
constraints and deadlines. McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394
U.S. 802, 809 (1969) (allowing exceptions within an absentee ballot
voting scheme provided ``some rational relationship to a legitimate
state end''). Furthermore, as indicated, UOCAVA coverage does in fact
extend to non-military U.S. citizens who reside outside the United
States. 52 U.S.C. 20310(5)(B)-(C).
H. Statutory Grounding in Title 39
Multiple commenters argued that, as a general matter, the Postal
Service lacks the statutory authority to implement the proposed rule.
Along similar lines, some commenters alleged specifically that, because
no provisions in title 39 explicitly contemplate mandatory standards
regarding Federal Ballot Mail, title 39 impliedly bars the Postal
Service from implementing such standards.
These statutory arguments are unavailing. As explained in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 39 U.S.C. 401(2) authorizes the Postal
Service ``to adopt, amend, and repeal such rules and regulations, not
inconsistent with this title, as may be necessary in the execution of
its functions under this title and such other functions as may be
assigned to the Postal Service under any provisions of law outside of
this title,'' and further grants the Postal Service ``all other powers
incidental, necessary, or appropriate to the carrying on of its
functions or the exercise of its specific powers.'' Id. Sec. 401(10).
Furthermore, Section 404 grants the Postal Service specific powers,
including the power ``to provide for the collection, handling,
transportation, delivery, forwarding, returning, and holding of mail,
and for the disposition of undeliverable mail.'' Id. Sec. 404(a)(1).
Setting preparation and data-reporting standards for a defined
category of mail falls squarely within that statutory authority.
Supreme Court precedent confirms the Postal Service's expansive
rulemaking authority. As noted by one commenter, in U.S. Postal Service
v. Council of Greenburgh, the Court explained that under 39 U.S.C. 401
``the Postal Service is broadly empowered to adopt rules and
regulations.'' 453 U.S. 114, 122 (1981). This commenter further argued
that the Postal Service has long managed election mail as a distinct
category under its authority. In Rider v. United States, the commenter
explained, the Claims Court recognized that the Postal Service issues
``detailed regulations and management instructions concerning the
various classes of mail and types of postal services in its Domestic
Mail Manual'' pursuant to Section 404(a), and that its Postal
Operations Manual establishes ``special operating procedures'' to
ensure that election and campaign mailings ``are processed properly,
[[Page 54972]]
delivered with equitable care and attention and that proper records are
maintained.'' 7 Cl. Ct. 770 (1985). Courts have recognized the Postal
Service's broad regulatory authority in other contexts as well. See
Grover City v. U.S. Postal Serv., 391 F. Supp. 982, 986 (C.D. Cal.1975)
(finding postal regulations setting mail receptacle standards to be
valid exercises of Sec. 404(a)(1) delivery power and Sec. 401(2)
rulemaking authority); Rockville Reminder v. U.S. Postal Serv., 480
F.2d 4, 7 (2nd Cir. 1973) (upholding postal regulations prohibiting
mailbox installations facilitating private delivery of advertising
circulars under the Postal Service's broad rulemaking authority); Egger
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 436 F. Supp. 138, 142 (W.D. Va. 1977) (upholding
the Postal Service's interpretation of its regulations governing mail
addressed to people at school).
The Postal Service has the statutory authority to set forth mail
preparation, acceptance, and entry standards that are necessary to
achieve the functions assigned to it by law--functions that include
investigation into the potential misuse of the mail and coordination
with other federal law enforcement entities. See 39 U.S.C. 401(2); cf.
18 U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing the Postal Service to investigate crimes
regarding ``the use of the mails'' and other appropriate crimes as
determined by agreement with the Attorney General); 52 U.S.C. 10307,
20511. The rule sets forth tailored requirements regarding the use of
the mail--the design of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes and the provision
of mailpiece-level data concerning such ballot mailings--to help ensure
the faithful execution of federal law; and the information yielded by
these requirements would be available for use by law enforcement.
Additionally, the rule would implement the Postal Service's
longstanding best practices for ballot mail, thereby advancing
execution of a key Postal Service function: processing and delivery of
the Nation's mail. Contrary to commenters' arguments, achieving such
purposes is within the scope of the Postal Service's authority to take
``necessary'' action to regulate the use of the mail and achieve its
assigned functions.
There is also no basis to conclude that the Postal Service's broad
statutory authority regarding the postal system encompasses all types
of mail except ballot mail, and specifically Federal Ballot Mail. On
the contrary, the Postal Service has acted pursuant to its existing
authority to take many actions regarding ballot mail, reflective of the
unique considerations raised by such mail, including by establishing
special operational procedures and issuing best practice
recommendations. While the Postal Service is now taking additional
action to make some of these recommendations mandatory, and to add a
requirement that states provide mailpiece-level detail about their
mailings, such additional steps equally fall within the Postal
Service's authority to execute on functions as assigned.
I. Grounding in Law Enforcement Statutes
Multiple commenters contested the state-specific Mail-In and
Absentee Participation Lists' grounding in law enforcement objectives,
on the theory that the Lists, and the purposes to which they will
allegedly be put, exceed the Postal Service's authority to investigate
crimes involving election fraud. In general, these comments assert that
the criminal statutes cited by the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking either
have nothing to do with voting or are related to voting but are not
enforceable by the Postal Service. Specific arguments include:
The U.S. Code does not confer on the Postal Service
authority to enforce election statutes. Commenters asserted that 52
U.S.C. 10307 and 20511 do not expressly name the Postal Service, and as
such cannot be taken to confer enforcement or investigative authority
on the Postal Service with respect to voter intimidation and fraudulent
registration or voting. Conversely, 39 U.S.C. 404(a)(6) confers on the
Postal Service the power ``to investigate postal offenses and civil
matters relating to the Postal Service,'' not election law per se.
The investigatory and enforcement powers conferred by
statute on Postal Inspectors are limited. Some commenters averred that
18 U.S.C. 3061(b) grants only limited law enforcement powers to Postal
Inspectors, which are confined to ``the enforcement of laws regarding
property in the custody of the Postal Service, property of the Postal
Service, the use of the mails, and other postal offenses,'' and to any
offenses subject to interagency agreement with the Attorney General.
This grant of authority, some asserted, does not authorize the Postal
Service to collect data on voters. Similarly, the regulations in 39 CFR
233.1(b) do not expressly grant Postal Inspectors authority to
administer elections, determine voter eligibility, maintain voter
registration databases, or conduct election fraud investigations
unrelated to postal offenses.
The proposed rule lacks a factual predicate. To initiate
an investigation, the Postal Service requires either direct, visible
evidence of a crime or reasonable grounds to suspect that a crime is or
has been committed. Some commenters characterized voter fraud,
including through use of the mail, as rare. Commenters contended that
the proposed rule nevertheless assumes that every mail-in voter may
cast a fraudulent vote and must be placed under surveillance.
Lack of a clear statement conferring investigative or
enforcement authority. Commenters argued that if Congress had intended
to deputize the Postal Service as an adjunct of federal election law
enforcement, it would have said so clearly.
Each of the above arguments is unpersuasive. The proposed rule
establishes mailpiece preparation and data reporting standards that
will significantly enhance the visibility of Federal Ballot Mail. The
information generated by the implementation of those standards would be
available for use by appropriately authorized law enforcement entities
to help ensure the faithful execution of federal law. The determination
of whether to investigate, refer, charge, or prosecute any matter
relating to illegal voting, voter fraud or voter intimidation rests,
and will continue to rest, with the entities to which Congress has
assigned such functions. Moreover, as noted above, the rule does not
dictate the administration of elections, the determination of voter
eligibility, or the maintenance of voter registration databases--all of
which is controlled by the states-nor does the rule authorize the
Postal Service to conduct investigations unrelated to postal offenses.
Concerning the proposed rule's factual predicate (or alleged lack
thereof), claims regarding the empirical incidence of voter fraud do
not, as explained above, affect the Postal Service's authority to adopt
these regulations. The Postal Service further emphasizes that, under
the rule, it will not surveil mail-in or absentee voters. Under the
rule's plain terms, information generated at acceptance is embedded in
exterior mailpiece indicia and barcode scan data; Postal Service
personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against inspection;
and no provision in DMM 705.24 authorizes review of any ballot's
contents.
Concerning the implied clear statement rule discerned by some
commenters, the Postal Service does not purport to discover
``transformative power'' in a ``long-extant'' statute. Rather, the
envelope design, automation, barcoding and design review standards set
forth by DMM
[[Page 54973]]
705.24.3 are similar to mail preparation requirements routinely applied
across other mail categories. The rule, therefore, does not introduce
new and unsettled ``major questions''--a point explained in greater
depth below.
J. The Major Questions Doctrine
Some commenters asserted that the proposed rule would violate the
``major questions doctrine,'' which applies to agency actions
purporting to ``discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power
representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.''
West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697, 724 (2022). Such comments theorized
that as the right to vote is a fundamental political right, and as the
Postal Service has no authority to adopt rules regulating voting in
federal elections without express congressional authorization, the
proposed rule would derive from its stated sources of statutory
authority just such ``transformative'' powers.
As an initial matter, it bears repeating that this rule does not
regulate the right or eligibility to vote, voter registration, or the
manner by which states administer elections. States will retain full
autonomy to decide whether (and to what extent) they utilize the U.S.
Mail as part of their electoral systems and who can use ballot mail to
cast a vote. The rule instead imposes modest data and mail preparation
requirements on Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. The preparation
requirements have for years been issued as best-practice guidance--and
are substantively similar to the standards already employed to varying
extents by some election officials. And the data standards require that
states provide information regarding the exterior of Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes that they will already have available as part of their
ballot mailings. The verification procedures simply help to ensure
these standards have been met prior to accepting an Outbound Federal
Ballot mailing. Furthermore, the Postal Service is authorized to
regulate certain mail preparation requirements in furtherance of
federal law enforcement and to advance its ability to efficiently
handle the mail. On its face, then, the rule does not represent any
``transformative expansion'' of regulatory authority, rendering the
``major questions'' doctrine inapplicable.
By way of further explanation, major questions arise when agencies
claim to ``discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power
representing a transformative expansion in its regulatory authority.''
West Virginia, 597 U.S. at 724. Per West Virginia, ``the history and
breadth of the authority that [the agency] has asserted'' distinguishes
``extraordinary cases'' from ordinary ones. Such cases, which ``provide
a reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress meant to confer
such authority,'' typically involve an agency reaching beyond its area
of expertise. Id. at 721; see also, e.g., Alabama Ass'n of Realtors v.
HHS, 594 U.S. 758, 764 (2021) (the Centers for Disease Control
regulating landlord-tenant relations); NFIB v. OSHA, 595 U.S. 109,
(2022) (OSHA regulating a public health risk rather than workplace
hazards). By contrast, in United States v. White, 97 F.4th 532, 540
(7th Cir. 2024), the Seventh Circuit refused to apply the major
questions doctrine in a case plainly lacking ``the hallmarks of the
truly extraordinary cases,'' with no claim to ``unheralded power.'' In
Nebraska v. Su, 121 F.4th 1 (9th Cir. 2024), the Ninth Circuit likewise
held the major questions doctrine not to apply to a federal contractor
minimum wage mandate which, following a history of presidents setting
federal contractor rules, constituted neither a ``transformative'' nor
an ``unheralded'' expansion of regulatory power. Id. at 14.
Similar to the facts in White and Su, envelope preparation and data
transmission and verification requirements of the sort contemplated
here fall well short of an ``unheralded transformation'' of regulatory
authority, lack ``the hallmarks of the truly extraordinary cases,'' and
do not derive ``unheralded power'' from a ``long-extant statute.''
Indeed, the Postal Service has for years conditioned eligibility for
certain rate levels on specific requirements, including barcodes and
Mailer IDs, and has done so under the same statutory authority that
underlies this rule. For example, the Full-Service Intelligent Mail
program, described in DMM 705.23, offers automation discounts for
commercial mailers in exchange for end-to-end mail tracking, electronic
documentation, and address corrections. Participation in this program
is mandatory for automation pricing. See 78 FR 23,137 (Apr. 18, 2013)
(requiring the use of ``full-service'' Intelligent Mail ``to qualify
for automation prices for postcards (First-Class Mail[supreg] only),
letters, and flats when mailed using the following services: First-
Class Mail, Standard Mail and Periodicals; and for flats mailed at
Bound Printed Matter prices''). If the Full-Service IMb regime is
lawful under Sections 401 and 404, and it is, then the proposed rule
cannot be said to effect an ``unheralded transformation'' of the
regulatory prerogatives embedded in those statutes. Barcode, logo,
automation-compatibility, design review, and electronic documentation
conditions on defined mail categories constitute normal exercises of
Postal Service authority; they have, moreover, in large part, long been
included in the Postal Service's guidance to state Boards of Elections.
Other major-questions cases focus on the ``economic and political
significance'' of the authority at issue. Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump,
607 U.S. 229, 246 (2026); see also, e.g., Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S.
477, 502 (2023). Here, the economic significance of the rule is slight
as compared to prior major-questions cases. See Learning Resources, 607
U.S. at 246 (``could be worth $15 trillion''); Nebraska, 600 U.S. at
502 (``between $496 billion and $519 billion''). And although actual
changes to eligibility of voters to vote by mail might fairly be
described as having political significance in some sense, this rule
makes no such changes--it instead leaves voter-eligibility unchanged,
requiring only certain modest envelope-design and data reporting
standards, most of which have long been recommended by the Postal
Service (and are voluntarily complied with by some jurisdictions
already). It follows that the rule's incorporation of these practices
does not raise any ``major question'' in the relevant sense.
K. Ultra Vires Creation of ``Nonmailable Matter'' Categories
Some commenters noted that, in 39 U.S.C. 3001-3018, Congress
specified categories of nonmailable materials with robust protections
for all forms of mail not included. These commenters then argued that
the rule effectively creates a new category of ``nonmailable matter,''
and thereby exceeds title 39's statutory scheme. On this basis, they
contended that the rule and the verification process that it
establishes is ultra vires.
The rule does not create a new category of ``nonmailable matter''
into which Federal Ballot Mail as a class may generally fall. Rather,
it is designed to ensure that Federal Ballot Mail envelopes meet
certain preparation standards consistent with operational best
practices and to condition acceptance on the provision of certain
mailpiece-level data regarding those ballot envelopes--both of which
support the execution of federal law. The rule does not prohibit
federal ballots from being mailed altogether. While it is true that
outbound mail-in ballots may be rejected from the mailstream as a
consequence of noncompliance with the rule's
[[Page 54974]]
requirements, conditions on the acceptance of mailable matter are
distinct from a determination that the matter is nonmailable. Moreover,
compliance is straightforward: states need only provide information
that is inscribed on the outside of Federal Ballot Mail envelopes,
which will necessarily be in their possession. And ample resources are
available to assist states with ballot mail envelope design, should
such assistance be required. Compliance is verified by checking a
single data point (IMb) on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail prior to
acceptance. Although Outbound Federal Ballot mailings that fail the
verification process may be temporarily rejected (and thus not
permitted to enter the mailstream), any errors may be corrected and the
mailpieces will thereafter be accepted for mailing.
Rather than usurp Congress's authority to create new categories of
``nonmailable matter,'' then, the Postal Service will impose mailpiece
design and reporting standards to promote a rational and legitimate
objective. As discussed below, to support this proposal, the Postal
Service has reasonably determined that the mailpiece design
requirements will help ensure proper handling, efficient processing,
and timely delivery of such ballots to and from voters. See 90 FR at
9843 (special conditions are appropriate for ``sensitive matter'' where
such conditions ``will improve visibility and enhance handling
methods''). Moreover, requiring the submission of a consolidated list
of data concerning Federal Ballot Mail will assist law enforcement
authorities in investigating crimes, including those involving the
mails, as is consistent with the Postal Service's regulatory
authorities. See 39 U.S.C. 401(b) (noting that the Postal Service can
issue regulations to support functions assigned to it by law); 18
U.S.C. 3061(b) (authorizing Postal Service to investigate crimes
``regarding the use of the mails'' and other appropriate crimes as
determined by agreement with the Attorney General).
The Postal Service has previously relied on its authority under 39
U.S.C. 401(2) to establish standards applicable to the acceptance and
transmission of certain unique articles in furtherance of specific
Postal Service operational interests where those articles raise special
handling concerns, even where the articles are not dangerous. For
example, cremated human and animal remains must be transported through
specific types of USPS-provided boxes, and must be trackable via
barcode. See Cremated Remains Packaging Requirements, 90 FR 9843 (Feb
19, 2025) (implementing rules concerning the sending of cremated
remains in specific types of USPS-provided boxes because the Postal
Service understands such remains are ``sensitive matter and believes
this will improve visibility and enhance handling methods throughout
processing and transportation''). Similarly, replica explosives--which,
although not dangerous, also require special handling to prevent
operational disruptions--rather than being prohibited from the mail
altogether must be mailed in certain ways, including in-person
presentation to a retail counter and shipment via Registered Mail.
Restricting the Mailing of Replica or Inert Explosives, 75 FR 282 (Jan.
5, 2010) (noting that ``[t]his process will ensure that packages
containing these items remain separate and easily identifiable during
the mailing process'').
Although ballot mail does not present precisely the same
operational issues as cremated remains or replica explosives, it is
unquestionably sensitive mail that raises unique operational
considerations, as discussed above, and the Postal Service's authority
under Section 401(2) is sufficiently expansive to encompass mail-entry
conditions that further the effective execution of federal law and
advance operational best practices. 39 U.S.C. 401(2) (noting that the
Postal Service can issue regulations to support functions assigned to
it by law). And incidental to the ability to impose standards in
furtherance of such legitimate objectives is the ability to restrict
mailings that do not meet those conditions from being accepted. Cf. id.
Sec. 401(10) (Postal Service is granted ``incidental'' and
``necessary'' powers to effectuate its responsibilities).
L. Consistency With 39 U.S.C. 101(a), 403(c), 404(e), 412, and 3661
Commenters also argued that the proposed rule is inconsistent with
various title 39 provisions, i.e., 39 U.S.C. 101(a), 403(c), 404(e),
and 412. Other commenters averred that, prior to implementing these
provisions, the Postal Service must request an advisory opinion from
the Postal Regulatory Commission (``PRC'') under 39 U.S.C. 3661(b).
The Postal Service disagrees with these assessments and addresses
each of the above-cited title 39 provisions in turn.
Section 101(a) establishes the Postal Service's foundational legal
mandate to bind the nation together by providing reliable, efficient,
and regular mail services to all communities. This obligation coexists
with federal laws determining what is mailable, and the Postal Service
abides by several statutory and regulatory directives regarding items
that are not mailable, such as hazardous substances or explosives, or
(as here) mailable with conditions imposed on preparation and data
reporting. The existence of these directives does not negate the
foundational legal mandate, and neither would Federal Ballot Mail
envelope design standards and electronic documentation requirements
that align with preexisting guidance. Furthermore, the Postal Service
will continue to coordinate with state election officials and other
officials regarding the transmittal of election mail and will maintain
its longstanding election mail practices concerning the processing and
delivery of ballots that enter the mailstream, including completed
ballots mailed by voters to election officials. Indeed, consistent
implementation of longstanding best practices recommendations will
enhance, rather than hinder, these efforts.
Section 403(c) mandates that, in providing services, ``the Postal
Service shall not . . . make any undue or unreasonable discrimination
among users of the mails, nor shall it grant any undue or unreasonable
preferences to any such user.'' The PRC has noted that a violation of
section 403(c) requires that (1) a user of the mail is receiving less
favorable services than those provided to one or more other postal
customers, (2) the user is similarly situated to those postal customers
receiving more favorable service, and (3) there is no rational or
legitimate basis for denying the user the more favorable service
currently being provided to those similarly situated postal customers.
PRC Order No. 718, Advisory Opinion (AO) on Service Changes Associated
with First-Class Mail and Periodicals, July 20, 2021, Docket No. N2021-
1 at 170.
The rule adopted herein sets forth neutral, uniform, and non-
discriminatory mailpiece design and data reporting standards that apply
uniformly to all Federal Ballot Mail; thus, no ``preferential mail
service'' is granted to one class of mail-in voters over another. Nor
does the Postal Service violate Section 403(c) by requiring that
Federal Ballot Mail meet these uniform standards, since given the
unique considerations raised by such mail, Federal Ballot Mail is not
``similarly situated'' to other types of mail. Indeed, the Postal
Service already accords to election mail special operational treatment
that is unavailable for other mail matter sent as First-Class Mail or
Marketing Mail (the postal products typically used to send ballot
[[Page 54975]]
mail), and there is no basis to conclude that this special operational
treatment constitutes undue discrimination against any users of the
mail. Finally, Section 403(c) does not prohibit all distinctions among
mail users, but only preferences that are ``undue'' or
``unreasonable.'' Given the reasonable and legitimate objectives of the
new standards, they are neither ``undue'' nor ``unreasonable''--even
assuming arguendo that users of Federal Ballot Mail are ``similarly
situated'' to users of other mail classes not covered by those
standards, and even if those standards were conceded to somehow provide
``less favorable'' terms (and they do not).
The Postal Service also notes an issue flagged by several
commenters: namely, that not all states can implement the rule's
requirements with the same facility. By way of example, one comment
noted that states with universal mail-in voting can more readily
implement the new electronic documentation requirements than can states
that do not mail absentee ballots unless requested by the voter--since
the states in the former category can submit their entire list of
enrollees in one session through the ballot portal, while states in the
latter category must submit names in a more piecemeal fashion and only
for those individuals requesting to receive a ballot through the mail.
The Postal Service acknowledges the existing variations in state mail-
in voting practices, which may require different levels of process
changes in order to comply with the rule; however, as noted, the rule
itself sets forth neutral, uniform, and non-discriminatory mailpiece
design and data reporting standards that apply equally to all Federal
Ballot Mail. Compliance with these standards is straightforward and
facilitated by existing resources (in some cases, free of charge).
Furthermore, the nature and degree of states' prospective compliance
efforts reflect the states' own policies, not the uniform standards
adopted by the Postal Service. Such discrepancies, therefore, do not
implicate Section 403(c).
Section 404(e) generally prohibits the Postal Service from
providing any new ``nonpostal service.'' The term ``service'' is not
defined in title 39; the statute directed the PRC to review the
``nonpostal services'' offered by the Postal Service as of January 1,
2006, to determine whether each such service may continue. Id. Sec.
404(e)(1). In carrying out that responsibility, the PRC defined the
term ``service'' by regulation as ``any ongoing, commercial activity
offered to the public for the purpose of financial gain.'' PRC Order
154, Review of Nonpostal Services Under the Postal Accountability and
Enhancement Act, Dec. 19, 2008, Docket No. MC2008-1 at 14. Because the
creation and distribution of the Mail-in and Absentee Participation
Lists are not ``commercial'' in nature, are not offered to the public,
and are not offered ``for the purpose of financial gain,'' it would not
qualify as a ``service'' for the purposes of Section 404(e).
In any event, the creation of such lists is ``postal'' in nature,
as it would involve ``delivery of letters, printed matter, or mailable
packages, including acceptance, collection, sorting, transportation, or
other functions ancillary thereto.'' 39 U.S.C. 102(5); see also id.
Sec. 404(e)(1) (``the term `nonpostal service' means any service that
is not a postal service defined under section 102(5)''). As noted
above, these provisions set forth preparation and data standards that
are tailored to the sending of ballots, and hence to the use of the
mail.
Section 412 provides in part that ``no officer or employee of the
Postal Service shall make available to the public by any means or for
any purpose any mailing or other list of names or addresses (past or
present) of postal patrons or other persons.'' Some commenters
theorized that unless state law shields postal-provided state-specific
Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists from disclosure, furnishing
the state's chief election official with a list containing the names
and addresses of those receiving a mail-in ballot likely violates this
section. However, 39 U.S.C. 412(a) addresses lists of ``postal
patrons'' or ``other persons'' compiled from postal data, and provides
that the Postal Service shall not make such a postal list available to
the public. The information on which the Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists will be based is provided by the states themselves,
and specifically the states' records of individuals to whom they (or
their authorized election officials) plan to mail blank ballots.
Because the lists involve information furnished by the states, 39
U.S.C. 412(a) is not applicable; and in any event, the Postal Service
will not make the lists public.
Certain commenters nevertheless argued that the exception structure
created by Section 412(a) (allowing disclosure of information ``as
specifically provided by subsection (b) or other law'') in tandem with
Section 412(b) (stating that ``[t]he Postal service shall provide to
the Secretary of Commerce for use by the Bureau of the Census such
address information, address-related information, and point of postal
delivery information . . . as may be determined by the Secretary to be
appropriate for any census or survey''), impliedly excludes the
provision of Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists to state
officials. It therefore bears emphasizing that even if Section 412(a)
were applicable to Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists, it would
not bar the provision of such lists to state elections officials.
First and foremost, the provisions of these lists to state election
officials does not constitute such disclosure of protected information
``to the public.'' (Emphasis added.) Indeed, at least one court has
interpreted disclosure to state law enforcement officials under 39
U.S.C. 412 as not being tantamount to an impermissible disclosure to
the public. See, e.g., People v. Pearson, 169 Cal. App. 3d 319, 323
(1985) (holding that an individual ``had no reasonable expectation of
privacy of his name and residential address given to the United States
Postal Service when applying for a post office box''; noting that ``the
information was not made available to the public'' under 39 U.S.C. 412
``but rather to a law enforcement officer conducting an official
investigation'').
Second, Section 412(a) allows disclosure of information ``as
specifically provided by subsection (b) or other law.'' (Emphasis
added.) Postal Service regulations accordingly make clear that
disclosure of information under Section 412 to the Secretary of
Commerce for census-related purposes is not exclusive, countenancing
such disclosure pursuant to certain contracts and interagency
agreements, by written request and with the prior consent of the
individuals, or as ``otherwise expressly authorized by federal law''
See 39 CFR 266.3(b)(3). As noted, the rule's Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List disclosure provisions are adopted pursuant to 39
U.S.C. 401 and 404 with the aim of supporting the faithful execution of
federal law, and disclosure would occur in accordance with an
established SOR.
Third, federal legislation serves as both a precedent and a
template for the sharing of information by the Postal Service with
state election officials, in the context of voting. Specifically, the
National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (``NVRA'') requires each state
to manage a voter list maintenance program, and to make reasonable
efforts to remove ineligible voters from voting rolls. 52 U.S.C.
20507(a)(4). The NVRA includes a safe harbor provision, whereby a state
can comply with its obligation to have a voter list maintenance program
if ``change-of-address information supplied by the Postal Service
through
[[Page 54976]]
its licensees is used to identify registrants whose addresses may have
changed.'' 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1)(A). In 2018, the Supreme Court
determined that it was ``undisputedly lawful'' for a state to utilize
the Postal Service national change-of-address data for voter list
maintenance purposes, as described in the NVRA. See Husted v. A. Philip
Randolph Inst., 584 U.S. 756, 765 (2018) (citing 52 U.S.C. 20507(c)(1)
and referring to the NVRA safe harbor as ``the Postal Service
option''). As a general matter, then, the Postal Service's sharing of
information with government officials is not exclusively limited to
providing information to the Secretary of Commerce under Section
412(b).
Section 3661(b) provides that, when the Postal Service ``determines
that there should be a change in the nature of postal services which
will generally affect service on a nationwide or substantially
nationwide basis,'' it must request an advisory opinion from the PRC
before implementing the change. Some commenters reasoned that a change
touching Federal Ballot Mail is a nationwide change in postal services
within the meaning of Section 3661--one requiring pre-filing
conferences with affected stakeholders and a formal request filed with
the PRC at least 90 days before implementation (39 CFR 3020.110-
3020.112).
As an initial matter, 39 CFR 3020.110-3020.112 are regulations
binding the PRC, not the Postal Service. It is therefore incorrect to
suggest (as some commenters did) that the Postal Service's adoption of
this proposed rule would violate its own regulations.
More importantly, the changes contemplated by the proposed rule do
not trigger any obligations under Section 3661. As noted, the
obligations attendant to Section 3661 arise in the event of ``a change
in the nature of postal services which will generally affect service on
a nationwide or substantially nationwide basis.'' Implementation of
this rule does not constitute such a nationwide change in postal
services. As the leading case on this issue explains, Section 3661 must
be read within the context of the overall statutory scheme of title 39,
which is designed to give the Postal Service ``broad authority in
postal management'' to ensure that management is not ``unjustly
hampered in its efforts to administer the Department in a businesslike
way.'' Buchanan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 508 F.2d 259, 262-63 (5th Cir.
1975). Section 3661(b) therefore comes into play only in limited
circumstances, if (1) there is a change that has a ``meaningful impact
on service,'' (2) the change is ``in the nature of postal service,''
and (3) the change affects service ``on a nationwide or substantially
nationwide basis.'' Id. ``These three factors combine to demonstrate
that Congress intended the safeguards of 3661 to apply only when
changes of significance were contemplated.'' Id. at 263.
As to the first Buchanan factor, a proposed change triggers the
Section 3661 advisory opinion requirement when that change is
``meaningful'' rather than ``minor'' from a quantitative perspective.
See Buchanan, 508 F.2d at 262. Alterations that have a minimal effect
on the general class of postal users therefore do not fall within the
scope of Section 3661. Id. Here, the rule's requirements apply only to
Federal Ballot Mail--a subset of election mail--and only in connection
with federal general, special, or runoff elections (and not state
elections or primary elections). To put this in context, in 2020 the
Postal Service delivered roughly 400 million pieces of mail per day,
and election mail in the 2020 general election accounted for only a
small fraction of a percentage (roughly 0.1%) of that total mail
volume. The standards being imposed on this exceedingly small subset of
overall mail volume do not constitute a change of sufficient scale and
scope to implicate Section 3661, but will instead have only a de
minimis effect on the nature of postal services available to ordinary
Postal Service users.
Moreover, whether a proposed action constitutes a change in the
``nature of postal services'' within the meaning of Section 3661(b)
``involves a qualitative examination of the manner in which postal
services available to the users will be altered.'' Buchanan, 508 F.2d
at 263. In that regard, the PRC has held that ``in determining whether
an initiative involves a change in the nature of postal services `[i]t
is the experience of the individual postal consumer, the recipient of
the complex of services provided by the Postal Service and the intended
beneficiary of the policies incorporated by Sec. 3661, that must be
assayed.' '' Pennsylvania v. DeJoy, 490 F. Supp. 3d 833, 885 (E.D. Pa.
2020). Here, the changes contemplated by this rule do not directly
affect the provision of postal services; rather, they encompass
preparation and documentation requirements that are within the control
of the states and, if adhered to, will not disturb the acceptance,
processing, transmission or delivery of Federal Ballot Mail. The rule
contemplates no changes to how the Postal Service processes and
delivers election mail. In other words, as long as the rule's
conditions are met, Outbound Federal Ballot Mail will enter the
mailstream as usual, will transit as usual to its intended destination,
and will in the usual manner be delivered: no discernible difference in
the nature of postal services will arise. Indeed, as explained more
fully below, the Postal Service will work closely with Boards of
Elections to facilitate that very outcome. And, once the Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail reaches a voter, the voter will experience no
change. Voters may complete and return their ballot as they do now. It
further bears noting that even if a state declined to submit the
information required by the rule, the resulting acceptance refusal
would not implicate Section 3661 any more than would a large-
scalemailer's decision to opt out of the mail system: the nationwide
availability of postal services would remain unchanged.
Finally, some commenters argued that it was unlawful for the
President to issue an Executive Order directing action by the
Postmaster General. To be sure, Executive Order 14399 was relevant to
the Postal Service's consideration of this subject and began the
deliberative process that is now resulting in this rule. While the
Executive Order did not mandate a final rule, the Postal Service has
determined that, to help achieve the goals articulated by the Order as
necessary to faithfully execute federal law and also to advance the
Postal Service's operational interests, it is appropriate to exercise
its statutory authority to promulgate these provisions. Considerations
of Postal Service independence are not relevant to this rulemaking.
M. 2021 Settlement With the NAACP
In a 2021 settlement with the NAACP, the Postal Service agreed to
take certain actions regarding mail-in voting in future federal
elections, including prioritizing monitoring and timely delivery of
election mail through 2028. Some commenters argued that the enactment
of new mail preparation and electronic documentation requirements,
particularly immediately, would deprioritize the timely delivery of
election mail and, thus, violate that settlement agreement. In doing
so, some commenters pointed to a recent judgment by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia granting NAACP's motion to enforce
the settlement agreement, and enjoining the proposed rule's
implementation. See NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 1:20-cv-2295
(D.D.C.).
On July 17, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
stayed the
[[Page 54977]]
district court's injunction, concluding that ``even if adopted, that
proposed rule likely would not violate . . . the parties' settlement
agreement.'' NAACP v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. 26-5257 (D.C. Cir. July
17, 2026). As the government has explained in that litigation,
implementation of this proposed rule is not inconsistent with the terms
of the settlement agreement: nothing in the rule adopted herein
deprioritizes the timely delivery of election mail. To the contrary,
implementation of these standards will, in fact, facilitate the Postal
Service's efforts to deliver Federal Ballot Mail in a timely manner.
Furthermore, the Postal Service will continue to work closely with
stakeholders, and will deploy an array of special operational
procedures (including so-called ``extraordinary measures'') to ensure
the timely delivery of election mail, as it has done in prior election
cycles.
N. NVRA, the Help America Vote Act and the Voting Rights Act
Some commenters argued that NVRA (intended primarily to facilitate
the registration of voters) and the Help America Vote Act (``HAVA'')
(establishing a funding program to support state administration of
elections) neither grant the President authority to identify the
additional measures outlined in Executive Order 14399, nor authorize
the Postal Service to adopt the rule as proposed. Commenters further
argued that implementation of the proposed rule, and in particular the
refusal to accept Outbound Federal Ballot Mail mailings that do not
comply with the acceptance standards embodied in DMM 705.24, would
violate the Voting Rights Act. As background, Congress enacted the
Voting Rights Act to protect citizens' constitutional right to vote and
to move freely across state lines, providing that no U.S. citizen shall
``be denied the right to vote'' in federal elections ``because of the
failure of such citizen to be physically present in such State or
political subdivision at the time of such election,'' so long as the
citizen has ``complied with the requirements prescribed by the law of
such State or political subdivision'' concerning absentee ballots. 52
U.S.C. 10502. The enforcement provisions of the Voting Rights Act, id.
Sec. 10307(a), further establish that ``[n]o person acting under color
of law shall fail or refuse to permit any person to vote who is
entitled to vote under any provision of chapters 103 to 107 of this
title or is otherwise qualified to vote[.]'' In these commenters' view,
the rule as proposed would violate these statutes by adding a new
enrollment requirement as a necessary precondition to the delivery of
absentee ballots. Other commenters argued that the Election Assistance
Commission (``EAC''), not the Postal Service, is the federal entity
tasked to act as a national clearinghouse and resource for the
compilation of information with respect to administration of Federal
elections; if the EAC cannot impose any requirement on any state or
local unit of government, the Postal Service cannot do so through its
proposed rule either.
As discussed above, under the rule, states retain full control over
how to utilize the mail in their electoral systems, including by
determining who is registered to vote and who is eligible to receive
and send a mail-in ballot. The rule requires only that Federal Ballot
Mail envelopes meet certain mail preparation requirements and that
states provide mailpiece-level data regarding their Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot mailings. As such, this rule simply regulates the use of
the mail, and does not interfere with or supplant the schemes
established under NVRA, HAVA, or the Voting Rights Act. The Postal
Service's rule complements, rather than replaces, these statutory
responsibilities by supporting the accurate distribution of ballots
after states have determined who is eligible to receive them.
Similarly, the Postal Service is not usurping the authority vested in
the EAC. This rule concerns the mail, not election administration;
voting systems and other election administration tasks remain squarely
within EAC's scope. The Postal Service will continue (as before) to
provide change of address information to state and local officials; and
state and local officials will continue (as before) to maintain their
official voter registration lists. Mail-In and Absentee Participation
Lists will be based entirely on data in the possession of, and provided
by, the states, and the Postal Service will not change the content of
those lists. In this regard, it bears repeating that the Portal is not
in any way a federal voting database; instead, it establishes a
mechanism whereby states can provide data, which is fully within their
possession and control, regarding Federal Ballot mailings.
O. The Paperwork Reduction Act
Some commenters faulted the proposed rule for its alleged failure
to address the obligations under the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C.
3501 et seq., which requires that federal agencies obtain approval from
OMB before imposing a new information collection requirement on
persons, including state governments.
The Postal Service notes that it is outside the Paperwork Reduction
Act's scope. See Kuzma v. U.S. Postal Serv., 798 F.2d 29, 32 (2d Cir.
1986); Shane v. Buck, 658 F. Supp. 908, 915 (D. Utah 1985), aff'd, 817
F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1987).
P. Administrative Procedure Act Requirements
Some commenters took issue with the length of the notice and
comment period, with some alleging that the time allotted for comments
was insufficient under the APA, and others remarking that for a rule of
such scope and consequence, a 60-day comment period would be more
fitting and appropriate.
Although the Postal Service is part of the executive branch, it is
not subject to many of the laws and guidance that govern the rulemaking
processes used by other executive branch entities--including the APA
(except in proceedings concerning mailability, which as explained above
and in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the instant proceeding is
not). 39 U.S.C. 410(a), 3001(m). The Postal Service also notes that the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking prompted more than 200,000 comments
covering a wide range of topics and opinions. There is thus no
indication that the public had inadequate time to share its views, or
that 30 additional days would have resulted in material additional
comments. The Postal Service has considered and taken seriously all
significant comments.
IV. Operation of the Final Rule
The proposed rule, and the final rule on which it is based, was
designed to be flexible enough to accommodate the variation in state
election laws and election administration practices. However, some
commenters interpreted this flexibility as vague, expressing
frustration about the lack of concrete compliance steps or confusion
over the responsibilities of Authorized Ballot Mailers and Federal
Ballot Mail Portal Users. Commenters also misconstrued the proposed
rule's provisions as covering the most expansive scope of ballot mail
possible while also operating in the most restrictive manner possible.
This led to a substantial volume of comments that were premised on
inaccurate factual assumptions, with the underlying basis for the
expressed opposition being based, either in full or in part, on these
inaccurate assumptions. These inaccuracies led to many exaggerated
claims about the
[[Page 54978]]
impact of the proposed rule as well as the Postal Service's role under
the rule.
The Postal Service does not expressly recount each inaccuracy here,
in an effort to avoid further confusion. Instead, to respond to the
multitude of factual misunderstandings represented in the comments, and
in an effort to supply additional details, the Postal Service offers
the following explanation of how the final rule is intended to be
implemented.
A. Overview
To begin, the Postal Service is continuing to accept and deliver
ballot mail, including Federal Ballot Mail, from election officials and
voters. The proposed rule does not end or prevent mail-in or absentee
voting, contrary to the mistaken claims raised in comments. As
explained above, the Postal Service is continuing to carry out its core
statutory mission in a uniform, neutral, and nondiscriminatory manner.
Nothing in this rule need prevent that outcome, as states will retain
full control over who is (or is not) permitted to vote by mail in their
jurisdiction.
The rule introduces new mailpiece preparation requirements and data
reporting standards for Federal Ballot Mail that must be satisfied
prior to presenting Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for acceptance into
the mailstream. Thus, the final rule regulates Federal Ballot Mail,
consistent with the Postal Service's core statutory function, not the
franchise. Eligibility for mail-in and absentee voting will continue to
be governed by state law; state and local election officials will still
determine which individuals are eligible under these laws; and state
and local election officials will determine whether completed ballots
are eligible to be counted. To repeat, the Postal Service will not play
any role in determining voter eligibility, maintaining voter rolls, or
counting ballots. The Postal Service will not open ballot mail,
including Federal Ballot Mail; will not know the contents of a ballot;
will not know how an individual voted; and will not know an
individual's political party affiliation.
However, as many commenters acknowledged, and consistent with the
stated authority above, the Postal Service will generally not accept
Outbound Federal Ballot mailings unless compliance with the rule's new
standards has been verified, as further detailed below and in the final
rule.
B. Optional 90-Day Pre-Mailing Notice
Section 705.24.2 of the rule creates an optional process through
which a state's chief election official (including those representing
DC and U.S. territories) may alert the Postal Service of the state's
intent to allow mail-in or absentee ballots to be transmitted by the
Postal Service. This notice may be given 90 days prior to a federal
election. This provision does not require a response from the state
official, and also does not require preparation of a list of
individuals to whom a ballot will be mailed or coordination with local
officials (although the state official may choose to do so).
Some commenters misunderstood the purpose of this optional notice.
For instance, one comment from a former election official stated that
the Postal Service is already well aware of whether a state intends to
use its services. The purpose of this provision, however, is to
facilitate pre-election planning, as some commenters accurately
recognized. When the Postal Service knows that a state plans to send
ballots for a federal election using the mail, it can conduct outreach
on mail preparation, provide resources related to IMbs, and offer
guidance on how to access and use the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. While
the process to enroll in the Portal is straightforward, beginning this
process sooner--as the 90-day notice would allow--will be logistically
beneficial.
Alternatively, the chief state election official can provide no
notice at all. This does not preclude the state from using the Postal
Service to transmit mail-in and absentee ballots for federal elections.
Ballots for federal elections may still be sent through the mail so
long as the chief state election official, and any other Federal Ballot
Mail Portal User, creates a Portal account, satisfies the rule's mail
preparation requirements, enters the required information into the
Portal, and successfully completes verification prior to their Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail being accepting for mailing.
The chief state election official may also provide notice that they
do not intend to transmit ballots using the mail or that they do not
intend to use the Portal. This also provides the Postal Service with
valuable information to plan its resources and may inform internal
training.
It should also be emphasized that these notices are not binding.
For example, if the chief state election official initially informs the
Postal Service that they do not intend to use the Portal, they may
later change their mind and send ballots using the mail by following
the steps outlined above.
C. Envelope Design
The rule makes several of the Postal Service's longstanding
mailpiece design preparation recommendations required elements for
Federal Ballot Mail. As many commenters recognized, these elements--the
Official Election Mail logo, automation-compatible envelope design,
uniquely serialized IMbs on outbound and return envelopes, and
mailpiece design review--are not novel. Each of these design elements
is already recommended in the Postal Service's Official Election Mail
Guide (``Kit 600'') and included as a best practice in DMM 703.8.0.
Some jurisdictions have, on their own initiative, already opted to
implement these recommendations to varying degrees. However, nothing in
the rule prevents or discourages election officials from including
envelope design elements required by state law, such as printed
affidavits. Nor does anything in the rule prevent states from complying
with accessibility laws or including unique envelope design elements
intended to accommodate voters covered by these laws. The rule will not
create a single, uniform ballot envelope design across all states;
variation will remain. Rather, as one commenter explained, what the
rule adds is uniformity: it makes these proven measures a consistent
baseline for every jurisdiction that mails federal ballots, closing the
patchwork that today inhibits mailpiece visibility and can make it more
difficult to process and deliver ballot mail.
The rule's design requirements help to ensure timely processing and
delivery of Federal Ballot Mail. As explained in the proposed rule and
as echoed by many commenters, envelopes built for automation move
through processing with less manual intervention and fewer chances for
error. A consistent, recognizable election mail logo helps postal
employees distinguish ballot mail from other mailpieces and facilitates
proper handling, in accordance with existing Postal Service policy. And
unique IMb data helps facilitate the tracking of individual pieces of
Federal Ballot Mail to and from individual voters as the barcodes are
scanned on the Postal Service's mail processing equipment.
Some commenters, including election officials and election-related
organizations, appeared confused about how to generate IMbs. Unique
IMbs can be generated for any type of address, including P.O. Boxes and
nontraditional addresses. Generating and printing unique IMbs does not
require specialized equipment or expensive software. It can be done by
election officials of any level of technical sophistication, including
those jurisdictions that manually print and stuff their own ballot
envelopes, using
[[Page 54979]]
free tools and common office equipment.
The Postal Service offers a number of tools and resources to make
generating unique IMbs simple, quick, and cost-effective. For example,
the Postal Service's Intelligent Mail for Small Business Tool (``IMsb
Tool'') is a free (voluntary) online tool specifically designed for
small-volume mailers that do not use Business Reply Mail, allowing such
mailers to generate unique IMbs for printing on address labels or
envelopes. The IMsb Tool is a web-based program that does not require
any software or downloads. It allows small mailers to create mailings
and documentation without making the investment of engaging software
providers. Customers can upload their mailing list into the Tool to
create and print address labels, envelopes, inserts or card stock and
also generate the associated postage statements. The printing can be
done from a regular printer. Some in the election community have
printed the IMbs themselves using this tool for several years. More
information about getting started in the IMsb Tool is available on
PostalPro: https://postalpro.usps.com/node/2266.
The Postal Service also anticipates making modifications to the
IMsb Tool to further enhance its functionality for Federal Ballot Mail.
For instance, the Tool will be able to create lists for Portal
submissions that contain a file with the name, address, and unique
outbound and return IMb of individuals on the election official's
mailing list. This file can be uploaded directly to the Portal by
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users. Another change for Federal Ballot
Mail in the IMsb Tool will allow election officials to generate a
unique IMb even where the address cannot be verified using Delivery
Point Verification (``DPV''). Although DPV helps to identify issues
that may hinder delivery, this modification will reduce the chance of
an administrative or technical issue that could prevent an election
official from generating a unique IMb.
Alternatively, if an election official prefers to work with a
vendor, as many do, the Postal Service provides a list of certified
vendors and Mail Service Providers (``MSPs'') at https://postalpro.usps.com/certifiedmsps/. It is a basic function of MSPs to
print mailings with unique IMbs. To the extent they arise, printing
issues, including jams, are surmountable and do not prevent proper
implementation of the rule.
The Postal Service's Managers of Customer Relations (``MCRs'') are
also available to provide guidance and support on mailpiece design as
election officials work to comply with the rule. MCRs serve as
dedicated points of contact for each election jurisdiction, including
territories. They regularly educate election officials on the benefits
of using unique IMbs and can direct election officials to available
postal resources to help them get started. Election officials can
contact their local MCR directly or by following this link: https://electionmail.usps.com/s/contact-local-mcr. Election Officials can also
contact the Mailing & Shipping Solutions Center (``MSSC'') for support
regarding IMbs by email at [email protected] or by phone at 1-877-672-0007
(Monday-Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. CT).
D. Mailpiece Design Analyst Review
Once election officials or their vendors have designed the Outbound
and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope to include the required
elements, as set forth in DMM 705.24.3, the mailpiece must be submitted
to the Postal Service for review by one of its MDAs. The envelope
design must be reviewed each election cycle. If a state uses a single
design, each political subdivision thereof does not need to separately
submit the envelope for review. Mailpieces do not need to be reviewed
prior to each separate mailing.
The mailpiece design review referenced in 705.24.3 is the existing
MDA review process that many in the election community already utilize.
MDAs are specially trained postal employees who can answer questions
about mailpiece design, including IMbs and automation compatibility.
Consulting with Postal Service MDAs will help ensure election officials
have a well-designed Federal Ballot Mail envelope that is compatible
with Postal Service guidelines and regulations, including the
provisions of this rule. Although MDAs are already trained to assess
the design elements included in this rule, the Postal Service will
provide supplemental training to MDAs on Federal Ballot Mail and will
offer additional resources as necessary to ensure customers receive
consistent, accurate advice.
The rule does not change the process for submitting a mailpiece for
review, receiving feedback, or contesting an MDA's advice. Customers
can receive assistance from an MDA by submitting a design review
request to [email protected], through the Postal Service's Election Mail
website at https://electionmail.usps.com/s/election-mail-review, or by
calling 877-672-0007 (select option 3 for mailpiece design) (Monday-
Friday, 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. CT).
MDA review is generally a quick process. MDAs typically aim to
provide feedback to mailers within 2 business days after receiving the
mailer's request and necessary information and samples.
More information about the MDA review process is available in Kit
600 or at https://postalpro.usps.com/node/773.
E. Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Under 705.24.4, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users, including state
and local election officials and other authorized users, such as MSPs,
must submit certain data into the Federal Ballot Mail Portal prior to
presenting an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing for acceptance. Chief
state election officials are not required to enter this data themselves
or to consolidate data for all political subdivisions within their
state before data can be entered into the Portal. The chief state
election official of each state does, however, authorize access for
other Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users within their state. The rule
also allows other individuals to enter information into the Portal if
authorized, such as staff members, MSPs, or other vendors, thereby
minimizing any potential administrative burden on election officials.
The Postal Service recognizes that many states have decentralized
election administration. It is important that the state, through the
chief state election official, maintain ultimate control over access to
the Portal because they will have more visibility into their own
election structures than will the Postal Service.
Voters themselves will not enroll with the Postal Service, and are
not responsible for verifying Portal information or correcting
information provided by Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users. In part, this
is because voters do not design ballot mail envelopes and,
consequently, do not have the relevant data elements for the Portal.
Instead, that responsibility lies exclusively with election officials
and their authorized MSPs.
Once Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users have set up a Portal account,
they will be prompted to certify that their Outbound and Return Federal
Ballot Mail envelopes have been submitted for MDA review and that they
have received feedback. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will not be
able to upload any data into the Portal until the certification is
complete. This will ensure compliance with DMM 705.24.3.1 and
705.24.3.2 and reduces the information that is verified prior to
acceptance of an Outbound Federal
[[Page 54980]]
Ballot mailing. Business Mail Entry Unit (``BMEU'') technicians and
Retail clerks will not perform a separate review of this information.
After completing the certification, Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users must provide: the name and address of the voter as found on
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope; the issuing state; and the IMbs
on the Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. This
information must be uploaded to the Portal prior to presenting Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail for acceptance. These data help to ensure that the
rule's preparation standards have been satisfied, can provide valuable
insight to election officials and law enforcement, and facilitate the
verification process. This type of information is regularly collected
by the Postal Service, including on mailing manifests. No other voter
information, such as birthdate, social security number, or other voter
registration details, will be uploaded to the Portal. As described
further below, the Postal Service is developing this Portal with
appropriate cybersecurity and privacy safeguards to protect Portal
data, consistent with applicable law.
The required information can be uploaded into the Portal using an
Excel template specifically formatted for Portal submission. Uploading
and generating the necessary information is similar to submitting a
manifest for bulk mailings, which larger election offices and their
MSPs routinely complete. For smaller jurisdictions, the (free and
optional) IMsb Tool can be used to generate a file that can be uploaded
directly into the Portal. This will help minimize any data entry
burden. The Postal Service does not anticipate that providing Portal
data should require any change to statewide systems or databases.
States must necessarily already maintain lists or databases with the
relevant name and address information, otherwise it would never have
been possible to mail those ballots in the first place. These systems
are intended to remain separate, and do not need to be interconnected
with the Portal. One commenter mentioned that states may wish to update
their databases to include IMb data. States are free to undertake such
actions, but it is not required by the rule.
Under the proposed rule, there is a flexible timeline for uploading
data into the Portal. Initial mailing lists should be entered into the
Portal at least 30 days before the election, if possible, or by the
date on which ballots must begin being mailed under state law. This 30-
day timeline, retained without modification in the final rule, is not a
rigid deadline for completing Portal data entry. Although Executive
Order 14399 contemplated a proposal in which states would submit such
lists ``no fewer than 60 days before the election,'' the flexible 30-
day timeline accommodates variations in state law.
The Postal Service does not expect these initial lists to be
complete or final. States may continue to add, amend, or remove data
from the Portal to account for new voters, new mail-in or absentee
ballot requests, replacement ballots, addressing administrative errors,
and other changes consistent with their state's law. These changes can
be made as a new separate entry or by updating prior entries. This
flexibility is intended to facilitate--not constrain--voters' ability
to access mail-in or absentee voting as permitted by their own state's
voting law, none of which are altered by this rule.
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users can update the information
submitted through the Portal as frequently as needed, consistent with
state law. This process is designed to be flexible to account for
variation in state law. For example, as one commenter explained,
California Elections Code Section 3000.5(a) dictates when county
election officials are to mail ballots to registered voters. Section
3005.5(a) provides, in part: ``for each election, the elections
official shall, no later than 29 days before the day of the election,
begin mailing the materials specified in Section 3010 to every
registered voter. The elections official shall have five days to mail a
ballot to each person who is registered to vote on the 29th day before
the day of the election and five days to mail a ballot to each person
who is subsequently registered to vote.'' Under California law, a voter
may also register as late as 15 days before an election and will
subsequently be sent a ballot via mail. Even after the 15th day before
an election, voters may request a replacement mail ballot upon request
to their county election official. This state statutory scheme is
consistent with the rule. California election officials could submit
initial mailing lists into the Portal 30 days (or sooner) before the
election and present Outbound Federal Mailings for acceptance ``no
later than 29 days before the day of the election,'' consistent with
state law. California election officials may continue to add Portal
entries for Outbound Federal Ballot Mail destined for voters who
register after that time and until the 15th day before the election,
and even after the 15th day before the election may continue to make
supplemental entries for any replacement requests.
The ability to add and amend lists also allows Authorized Ballot
Mailers to enter Outbound Federal Ballot Mail in batches, consistent
with the current practice for many in the election community. Federal
Ballot Mail Portal Users may continue to supplement the Portal data as
permitted by state law, potentially up until Election Day. The only
constraint imposed by the rule in this regard is that the information
for a particular mailing must be uploaded into the Portal prior to the
Outbound Federal Ballot mailing being presented to the Postal Service
for acceptance. Thus, the Portal and verification process accommodate
election officials who (for example) may do one large mailing and
multiple smaller mailings. It also accommodates election officials who
prepare many ballots for mailing at once but enter them into the
mailstream in multiple installments.
Portal data will be updated as soon as it is submitted by the
Federal Ballot Mail Portal User, and there should be minimal to no
delay between Portal upload and a mailer's ability to present the
mailing for acceptance. Portal data will also be available for
verification purposes on a nationwide basis. If an Outbound Federal
Ballot mailing is presented for acceptance outside of the issuing
state, Postal Service employees would still have access to the
necessary Portal data to perform verification under DMM 705.24.5.
Within the Portal, the Postal Service plans to confirm that the
required data fields are completed (i.e., they may not be left blank)
prior to Outbound Federal Ballot mailings being presented for
acceptance. This includes verifying the unique IMb on Return Federal
Ballot Mail has been uploaded into the Portal. Aside from confirming
that the required data has been uploaded, however, the Postal Service
will not otherwise verify, correct, or amend any data entered into the
Portal. It will not determine whether an individual's name is accurate;
so, for example, married women changing their names or potential
mismatches for misspellings will not prevent a ballot from reaching a
voter under the rule. Likewise, the Postal Service will not assess the
accuracy of the address entered, such as to determine whether there is
a Change of Address or whether the address is otherwise invalid.
Moreover, the address uploaded into the Portal should be the address
used on the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Nontraditional
addresses, such as tribal addresses, college dormitories, and long-term
care facilities, can and should be entered into the Portal if that is
the address on the Outbound Federal Ballot envelope. Voters who may
move often,
[[Page 54981]]
like students, the homeless, the elderly, renters, or people whose
mailing addresses do not match identically with government records,
should not experience delivery issues under the rule so long as their
state or local election official has their current mailing address.
The Postal Service will not be comparing any data entered into the
Portal against state voter rolls as part of the verification process or
otherwise. This means that state election officials will maintain full
control over managing their own voter rolls and determining voter
eligibility without any interference or involvement from the Postal
Service.
All data or changes submitted by Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users
will be accepted. The possibility that the Portal may, therefore, be
overinclusive does not undermine the purposes of the rule as the State
Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, which compiles all Portal data
for a state and is not intended to serve as a replacement for official
voter rolls.
Finally, shortly after the effective date of the final rule, the
Postal Service will make additional guidance documents available,
including a User Guide for the Portal and Technical Specifications for
the Portal. These resources will explain how to create a Portal
account, how to assign and approve Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users,
the file format for Portal uploads, and how to resolve errors and make
new submissions; these documents will be available in accessible
formats. The Postal Service has an established process for
communicating new or updated technical requirements that it will deploy
to inform election officials, MSPs, and others in the mailing community
about the Portal and these resources. This process includes familiar
communications channels, including Industry Alerts and Mailers
Technical Advisory Committee User Group notifications, which help to
ensure that the information reaches the appropriate audience. MCRs are
also available to assist individual customers by email and phone. The
Postal Service will also directly engage with election officials, MSPs,
and other stakeholders to answer questions and provide guidance related
to implementation of the rule.
F. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Entry
When preparing Outbound Federal Ballot mailings, Authorized Ballot
Mailers must segregate Outbound Federal Ballot Mail from other types of
ballot mail, such as primary ballots, UOCAVA ballots, or ballots for
state or local elections only. Comingling non-federal ballot mail with
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail may impact the verification process and
could prevent or delay proper acceptance of mailings. For ballots that
have both federal and state issues on the ballot, the mailing will be
treated as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail and will be subject to the
rule. At entry, mailers should inform the BMEU technician or Retail
clerk if a ballot mailing contains non-federal ballots. Timing
differences (between primaries and general elections or between federal
and state elections) and external indicia may also help alert postal
employees to the presence of non-Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service is also working on establishing Federal Election
Mail and Non-Federal Election Mail Service Type Identifiers
(``STIDs''). Specifically, the Postal Service is planning to convert
the current Election Mail STIDs to Federal Election Mail STIDs. New
STIDs will be developed for non-Federal elections. This approach will
assist jurisdictions that may have already finalized the printing
process for their 2026 general election envelopes relying on the
existing STID table, and will support their ability to comply with the
final rule. Having unique STIDs for Federal and non-Federal elections
will help to further distinguish Federal Ballot Mail from other ballot
mail. Prior to finalizing and releasing the new STIDs, the Postal
Service will publish a notice in the Federal Register.
As stated in the proposed rule, Outbound Federal Ballot mailings
must be entered at a Post Office retail counter, including manual post
offices, or a BMEU. A locator tool for Postal Service locations is
available here: https://tools.usps.com/locations/. These mailings may
not be entered into blue collection boxes, collection boxes in retail
lobbies, or through other means. While the rule makes this restriction
mandatory, it is also consistent with the Postal Service's general
guidance for outbound ballot mailings. Commercial mailings must meet
applicable DMM requirements. Mailings paid at single-piece First Class
Mail rates are not required to meet commercial mailing standards.
Verification under 705.24.5 will be performed at a BMEU or Post
Office retail counter when an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is
presented for acceptance. Conducting verification prior to acceptance
is intended to obviate confusion and provide a clear, immediate
identification of potential issues. Either a BMEU technician, if the
mailing is presented at a BMEU, or Retail clerk, if the mailing is
presented at a Post Office or other Postal Service retail location,
will perform the verification. Both BMEU technicians and Retail clerks
will receive training on this process.
The verification process is straightforward. The Outbound Federal
Ballot mailings will be verified using the IMb on the outside of the
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Relying on existing scanning
technology and devices, the Postal Service will confirm the presence of
scanned barcodes in the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. Portal data will be
available for verification purposes on a nationwide basis. Therefore,
if a state uses an MSP located in a state different than the issuing
state of the ballot, the Postal Service will still be able to conduct
verification.
This process can be completed promptly. Scanning a barcode
generally takes less than a minute per mailpiece. Depending on how many
barcodes are scanned, the verification process should take no more than
a few hours for larger mailings, and potentially only a few minutes for
smaller mailings. Authorized Ballot Mailers should remain at the BMEU
or postal retail location during the verification process.
If the Outbound Federal Ballot mailing meets the verification
standards, it will be accepted by the Postal Service. No further action
is needed by election officials or voters under the rule.
Authorized Ballot Mailers will be informed of the escalation
procedures should they decide to challenge a rejection; relevant Postal
Service employees will also receive training about these procedures.
The ability to cure rests not with the voter, as the franchise itself
is not impacted, but with the officials responsible for preparing the
envelope and entering Portal data. This approach is consistent with how
election mail works now, where election officials and mailers are
responsible for preparing the ballot mail, addressing the mailpieces
properly, ensuring that they are going to the proper individual, and
correcting any error that may occur or prevent delivery to the intended
recipient. Thus, the Postal Service will continue to resolve issues
consistent with our current approach, rather than creating a new
``appeal'' process for voters, as many commenters urged, that would
impose a direct burden on voters and increase the risk of confusion and
concern.
Once Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is accepted by the Postal
Service, it will enter and move through the mailstream as it has in
prior elections. It will not be intercepted, returned, or delayed due
to the rule.
[[Page 54982]]
The verification process does not entail scrutiny into, or any
attempt to evaluate, individual voters. The Postal Service is not
verifying addresses, names, voter eligibility, or citizenship status as
part of this verification process. As noted above, Portal data will be
regularly refreshed to minimize the risk that the verification process
incorrectly flags, delays, or disrupts lawful federal ballot materials.
Verification under DMM 705.24.5 is done only for Outbound Federal
Ballot mailings. If a voter chooses to return their completed ballot by
mail, they should use the Federal Return Ballot Mail envelope provided
by their state; and they may continue to mail from a residential
mailbox, a blue collection box, or any retail counter. Once the Federal
Return Ballot Mail enters the mailstream, it will be processed and
delivered consistently with current operational practices. This
includes generating scan data from the unique IMb on the outer return
envelope when the mailpiece is processed on the Postal Service's
automated equipment subject to certain limitations, including
extraordinary measures that may remove ballots from normal operational
processes to expedite delivery.
The Postal Service also wishes to clarify two provisions of the
proposed rule, which are adopted without change in the final rule.
First, the Postal Service would like to clarify the meaning of Section
705.24.5.2, which provides in part that ``[t]he Postal Service's
acceptance of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail does not constitute verified
compliance.'' This provision was included in recognition of the fact
that, despite the Postal Service's best efforts, some Outbound Federal
Mail may enter the mailstream that does not meet the preparation or
data standards set forth in the rule. For that reason, DMM 705.24.5.2
is intended to acknowledge that acceptance (and ultimately delivery) of
an outbound federal ballot does not, in and of itself, evidence
compliance with the rule's provisions.
Second, commenters expressed concern over 705.24.5.3.d, which
states that ``[t]he Postal Service assumes no responsibility for any
outbound ballot mailing presented until it is accepted into the mail.
The Postal Service is not responsible for service delays when the
Ballot Portal User or Authorized Ballot Mailer does not meet the
applicable preparation or entry standards.'' The Postal Service notes
that comparable statements appear throughout the DMM, and that the
provision reflects the longstanding principle that the Postal Service
is not responsible for a mailing until the mailing is in its custody--
that is, until it has been accepted. For example, DMM 608.11.3
(Postmarks and Postal Possession) describes the point at which the
``Postal Service accept[s] custody of a mailpiece,'' and the Plant-
Verified Drop Shipment provisions of DMM 705 provide that such
shipments ``are freight until deposited and accepted as mail at the
destination facility.'' The specific language in 705.24.5.3.d is
similar to a provision discussing the effects on service for Metered
Mail Drop Shipments, which also must satisfy specific preparation
conditions to be accepted for mailing. DMM 705.19.1. That provision
states: ``The USPS assumes no responsibility for the material presented
until it is accepted into the mail. The USPS is not responsible for
service delays when the mailer does not meet the applicable preparation
or entry requirements.'' This language is included in the rule to
ensure that mailers know that they must remain in control of an
Outbound Federal Ballot mailing until it has been accepted by the
Postal Service.
G. State-Specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation List
On or about Election Day, the Postal Service will generate a state-
specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation List, which compiles all
Federal Ballot Mail Portal entries submitted for the originating state.
This list will be securely transmitted to the chief election official
of each state. The Postal Service will not disclose the Lists to the
public. The List is in effect a manifest, and is primarily intended to
assist election officials and law enforcement to understand who may
have been mailed a ballot, in order to identify potentially anomalous
incidents that may merit further investigation. Providing the list on
or after Election Day is consistent with this purpose.
To be clear, the state-specific Lists are not intended to
substitute for or supplant state voter rolls. It simply offers another
data point at the chief state election official's disposal based on
their own Portal data. The chief state election official is free to
choose whether and how to use the state-specific list. Those decisions
are not dictated by the Postal Service or this rule. States have sole
responsibility for ensuring the accuracy of their voter rolls and
counting ballots as permitted under state law.
The Portal data is the sole data source used to generate the Lists.
These data are provided directly by election officials (and other
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users) based on the mailings they actually
made or planned to make. The List will not be based on external sources
of information, such as federal databases made available by the
Department of Homeland Security or the Social Security Administration.
Nor will the Postal Service compare Portal data to any other internal
or external source (e.g., National Change of Address data, federal data
lists), filter the information, or otherwise alter the Portal data on
its own when compiling the state-specific List. The Lists will also not
contain any scan data. As one commenter correctly stated, the rule
``require[s] USPS to provide the state with the List that contained the
same information that the state provided to USPS.''
In light of the above, some commenters questioned the purpose of
the Lists. Other commenters recognized that the value of the List lies
in the creation of reconcilable data that offer a neutral
administrative check that strengthens confidence in elections. These
commenters argued that credible post-election audits can rise or fall
on the quality of the underlying data. The state-specific List would
meaningfully sharpen that data by providing significantly enhanced
visibility regarding the sending of mail-in ballots, as it will provide
federal law enforcement with a list of individuals to whom states
planned to mail a ballot (and who may potentially use the mail to
vote), along with the associated barcode data, which the Postal Service
understands will help to facilitate enforcement of federal law.
Currently, law enforcement lacks such information regarding the use of
the mail. The List is not intended to substitute for official election
records or state mandated reconciliation procedures. In assessing the
List for areas of potential further investigation, it should also be
noted that some variation may exist between the List and the (separate)
scan data for a variety of reasons, for example not all voters who
receive a mail-in ballot will return it by mail, and as noted above the
Portal data may be over-inclusive. The benefits of the rule are still
achieved notwithstanding these variations.
V. Impact of the Final Rule
Consistent with the operation of the rule set forth above, the
Postal Service also clarifies the impact of the rule on voters and
election officials, particularly as weighed against the rule's purpose
and benefits. As provided by the comments, this section discusses
commenters' claims regarding the benefits and burdens of the rule, and
how the Postal Service is striking an appropriate balance in the final
rule.
[[Page 54983]]
A. Benefits of the Rule
Those commenters who supported the rule believed that the benefits
to the rule are aligned with the rule's intended purpose and that the
rule's policy goals are properly weighed against the potential burdens,
harms, and costs. They urged the Postal Service to swiftly adopt the
proposed rule, so that all federal elections could benefit from its
stated improvements, including mailpiece visibility and the enforcement
of federal law.
As an initial matter, these comments acknowledged that mail ballots
play an important role for many voters, but also had concerns related
to voter fraud. These commenters noted that even the possibility that
elections are taking place in an unsecure manner due to lack of
necessary visibility can undermine public confidence in the electoral
process, even if no fraud is ultimately discovered. These commenters
asserted that given the prevalence of mail-in voting, it would be both
appropriate and beneficial for the government entity tasked with
delivering ballots to and from the voter and the election office to put
safeguards in place. Many of these commenters argued that by making the
mailstream more reliable and more transparent on a nationwide basis,
the rule would provide states with a means to combat potential voter
fraud in ways they could not do acting alone. Commenters note that this
would strengthen public confidence in the election system without
altering any state election laws, voter registration, or eligibility
requirements; or changing how ballots are issued, collected, or
counted. As one comment explained: public confidence in elections is
best sustained by procedures that can be verified, documented, and
consistently applied.
Moreover, these commenters recognized that the rule offers
efficiency and security benefits for voters and election officials, and
promotes secure elections that the public can be confident in.
Commenters note that a set of minimum envelope-design standards would
help election officials, the Postal Service, and the public better
account for Federal Ballot Mail moving through the mailstream. As
several commenters explained, a ballot that can be tracked is far
harder to misplace, stall, or counterfeit. Improved tracking may also
help identify discrepancies between ballots mailed and ballots
received, some commenters added, making it easier to detect and deter
potential fraud or irregularities while protecting the integrity of
mail-in voting. Even parties opposing the rule recognized that unique
IMbs can provide unmatched visibility into the mailpiece's progress in
the mailstream. Commenters also reiterated the importance of the
Official Election Mail logo as a means for voters to recognize election
mail as important and distinct from other mailings and to help Postal
Service employees identify official election mail among the millions of
mailpieces processed daily. Commenters further explained that advance
review of ballot envelope designs would reduce operational errors,
delays, and delivery issues that have sometimes affected voters and
delayed delivery of their ballots. As examples, commenters pointed out
that non-automation compatible ballot mail is more likely to encounter
avoidable processing complications or delays, and other mailpiece
design defects could prevent barcodes from being read or increase the
need for manual handling. Commenters concluded that requiring design
review before ballot envelopes are printed and mailed is a low-cost,
high-value step that can prevent serious problems during the compressed
period before an election.
Furthermore, these commenters state that the rule's other
preparation and data entry requirements, particularly those involving
the Portal, would support stronger coordination between state election
officials and the Postal Service. For example, the rule would improve
pre-election planning by allowing states to notify the Postal Service
before using the postal system for ballot delivery. States would still
retain full control over who receives a ballot, and the Postal Service
would have better information to plan resources. Many election
officials who submitted comments, including those who opposed the rule,
expressed appreciation for the Postal Service's ongoing efforts to
support election officials. The rule, some commenters noted, provides
another avenue to strengthen those relationships. Many commenters
concluded that by improving coordination between election officials and
the Postal Service, the proposed rule has the potential to reduce
undeliverable election mail, strengthen ballot accountability, and
reinforce public confidence that election mail is being sent to the
correct recipients.
These commenters further contend that applying reasonable
verification procedures to federal election ballots is consistent with
the Postal Service's longstanding mission of delivering mail
accurately, securely, and reliably. Commenters noted that verification,
as contemplated in the rule, does not alter the states' authority to
determine voter eligibility or administer elections. Rather, it
provides an additional administrative safeguard to help ensure that
ballots approved by election officials are delivered accurately to the
intended recipient. Commenters opposing and supporting the rule noted
the extensive efforts election officials undertake to maintain accurate
voter rolls. Those in favor of the proposed rule argue that rather than
duplicating, undermining, or usurping these efforts, the rule
strengthens ballot distribution procedures as a logical complement to
states' election administration responsibilities.
Ultimately, these commenters reasoned that while the rule would
place some administrative burdens on states, as they take advantage of
the new Portal registration, barcode generation, and list submission
provisions, these burdens are plainly justified by the rule's security
and accountability benefits. Overall, in their view, the rule's
standards would improve accountability without displacing the role of
states in deciding who is eligible to vote or how elections are
administered. The operational improvements that the rule mandates would
benefit voters of every political affiliation because they promote
accuracy, efficiency, and transparency in the administration of federal
elections. These commenters explained that public confidence in
elections is strengthened when every stage of ballot distribution is
transparent. They also opined that the rule would help facilitate the
appropriate direction of resources to law enforcement efforts.
B. Burdens and Costs of the Rule
Separate from arguments, discussed above, about the legal authority
for the rule, numerous commenters opposing the rule also criticized it
for purportedly failing to account for the potential burdens and other
alleged harms it would impose on voters and election officials, not
addressing associated reliance interests, and not adequately
demonstrating a connection between the proposed rule's provisions and
its stated goal. These commenters asserted that a rule of this nature
should be based on detailed study, should be gradually rolled out, and
should move forward only after election officials and the Postal
Service are fully prepared for implementation. In particular, these
commenters argued that a rule of this nature should not be issued
roughly three months before an election. These commenters contended
that the Postal Service should not finalize this rule without a
reasoned explanation, a full implementation analysis, and an
[[Page 54984]]
assessment of foreseeable civil rights impacts. Commenters strongly
urged the Postal Service not to finalize it.
Voters
Those opposed to the rule expressed concern about the possibility
of disenfranchisement. They contended that voters may be omitted from
the Portal with no recourse, that an administrative or technical error
may result in an otherwise lawful ballot being rejected by the Postal
Service, or that voters may not receive a ballot at all if their state
government chooses not to provide data in the Portal. Any of these
scenarios, commenters argued, could result in voters having their mail-
in or absentee ballots withheld or delayed, without any recourse or
viable alternative to cast a ballot. Commenters asserted that some
voters may be especially impacted should their ability to vote by mail
be altered in any way, including those who are disabled, are elderly,
have limited English proficiency, live in rural-dwelling, or are
financially distressed. According to commenters, voters would bear the
practical consequence of any delivery delay, even if the delay was
caused by an administrative process outside the voter's control.
Commenters asserted that the rule would discourage individuals from
voting by mail. Other commenters argued that any policy that could
result in the delay, rejection, segregation, or differential treatment
of mail ballots raises concerns regarding voter access, election
administration, and public confidence in the democratic process.
Commenters also discussed the risks of confusion that the rule
would purportedly create, particularly because voters may not know if
their state has complied with or will be able to comply with the rule.
These commenters claimed that the potential for voter confusion due to
the rule is a harm in and of itself.
Others expressed concerns for their privacy and did not want voter
information included in a Portal run by the federal government or their
identity linked to uniquely serialized IMbs on Outbound and Return
Federal Ballot Mail envelopes.
Election Officials
Among the most frequently raised concerns from commenters opposing
the rule was the purported burden imposed on election officials,
specifically if the rule were implemented immediately. Commenters,
particularly election officials, secretaries of state, governmental
officials, and voting organizations, stated that it would be difficult
if not impossible to implement the rule in time for the 2026 general
election. Election officials asserted that their preparations for the
2026 election are already underway and that they lack the time,
funding, and staff to implement the proposed rule. Some commenters
asserted that they have already purchased envelopes for the 2026
election cycle, and that generating unique barcodes for both outbound
and return ballot mailings in some cases would require significant
changes to their ballot envelope design, as well as procurement of
those redesigned envelopes on an expedited timeline, which they assert
would not be possible. Other commenters explained that in some cases,
legislative action, Attorney General guidance, or state board approval
are needed before such changes could be made. Some commenters posited
that smaller and more rural counties with limited technology would be
disproportionately affected, while others thought complying with the
rule would be more onerous for election officials in states that have
universal mail-in voting compared to states that do not mail absentee
ballots unless requested by the voter.
Commenters also argued that the rule would impose new and recurring
costs and administrative burdens for future elections cycles that do
not currently exist. In this regard, commenters note that election
systems are designed around state law, existing technology systems,
vendor contracts, staffing structures, election calendars, and
operational procedures that have been developed over time, and
introducing new reporting, certification, and verification processes
for Federal Ballot Mail would, in their view, require significant
modifications to existing workflows and systems. Having previously
relied on current procedures in structuring their budgets, staffing,
and election timelines, commenters note that states would have to
absorb any new costs, which those plans never contemplated.
Complying with the mail preparation and data-reporting standards,
commenters asserted, would require them to divert resources away from
processing voter registration applications and mail-in or absentee
ballot applications, and in some instances the staffing necessary to
implement the proposed rule may not be available at all. Election
officials also asserted that there will be additional costs for direct
voter contact, and other voter education efforts required to explain
the rule to voters and to respond to related inquiries, including an
increase in support calls.
Reliance Interests
Other commenters argued that, when a federal entity issues new
standards, it must assess whether there were reliance interests,
determine whether these interests were significant, and weigh any such
interests against competing policy concerns, and alleged that the
Postal Service has failed to do so. Commenters argued that the rule
would create a ``one size fits all'' federal policy that would displace
established state and local practices driven by the needs of different
localities and grounded in reliance on the Postal Service's dependable
transmission of mail-in and absentee ballots. As noted above,
commenters further focused on reliance interests related to
preparations for the 2026 election cycle.
Relationship of the Rule to Its Intended Purpose
Commenters argued that the proposed rule was not sufficiently tied
to its stated purpose--namely to help ensure election integrity, fraud
prevention, and facilitation of federal law enforcement. In their view,
the proposed rule provides no empirical evidence or other explanation
to articulate why existing election mail procedures are deficient, what
operational problem would be solved by the Portal, or how IMb data
would help mitigate or investigate election crimes. Numerous commenters
also argued that, the proposed rule would not provide any material new
information to law enforcement.
Some commenters who opposed 705.24.4 and 705.24.5 were supportive
of the mailpiece envelope design provisions of 705.24.3. However, those
commenters noted that many of the envelope design best practices the
rule would mandate are already available and used voluntarily.
Commenters argued that converting these recommendations into federal
requirements adds cost and operational risk for election officials
without counterbalancing benefits.
Evaluating Less Restrictive Alternatives
Several commenters also argued that the Postal Service should
evaluate less restrictive alternatives. For example commenters
suggested: voluntary pilot programs, phased implementation after the
2026 election cycle or a capacity-adjusted implementation timeline,
aggregate or post-mailing reconciliation, data minimization, hashed or
non-voter-identifying records, safe harbors for minor or correctable
defects, mandatory acceptance during Portal outages,
[[Page 54985]]
making the data entry standards optional, and emergency escalation
procedures for replacement ballots, late-added voters, court-ordered
ballots, and small-volume local mailings. Other commenters argued that
rejection of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail for failure to satisfy
preparation and data entry standards is a disproportionate consequence
compared to the monetary penalties imposed elsewhere in the DMM for
failing to meet other preparation or eligibility standards after an
administrative review. See DMM 607.
C. Balancing Interests
After careful consideration of these various viewpoints, and the
comments discussing these issues, the Postal Service is moving to
finalize the proposed rule, subject to certain modifications explained
in ``Revisions Adopted in the Final Rule.''
The Postal Service has thoroughly explained the rationale for
imposing mail preparation and data reporting requirements as set forth
in the proposed rule, which are necessary to help promote the faithful
execution of federal law and advance the Postal Service's ability to
efficiently handle Federal Ballot Mail. While the Postal Service's
existing processes are designed to support the timely delivery and
smooth processing of ballot mail, it has long recognized that across-
the-board compliance with its longstanding recommendations would
further improve efficient handling, processing, and delivery. This
would benefit the Postal Service, election officials, and voters alike.
Moreover, while the Postal Service currently does obtain scan data for
some ballot mail that could be useful for law-enforcement purposes,
mandating compliance with the data reporting and mail-preparation
requirements for all Federal Ballot Mail would significantly improve
the quality of that data. This visibility will, in turn, put law
enforcement in a better position to identify any potential issues
regarding compliance with federal law that may merit further
investigation.
Weighing these benefits and the operational needs of the Postal
Service, the rule is intended to minimize the burden and impact on
voters and election officials, while still achieving the rule's
purposes. Under this rule, states will retain complete autonomy to
determine voter eligibility to use the mail to vote, as they do today.
If their state complies with the rule's relatively modest mail
preparation and data entry standards, voters should not experience any
difference from the status quo. The Postal Service anticipates that all
states will make a good faith effort to comply with the rule,
consistent with the belief expressed by some commenters, thereby
enabling eligible voters to continue to use the mail to vote. Overall,
the rule imposes requirements that are rationally and carefully
tailored to the underlying purposes of the rule. The Postal Service
would also reiterate that the rule does not mandate that states
administer elections in a ``one size fits all'' manner; on the
contrary, state election laws and practices will continue to vary in
accordance with state law, as states will retain control over the
manner of their elections, unaltered by the rule. The rule requires
merely that states that choose to use the U.S. mail as part of their
elections adhere to certain standard mailpiece design and data
reporting standards when sending Federal Ballot Mail.
The Postal Service also notes that some commenters narrowly focused
their concerns on the purportedly substantial costs and practical
challenges that election officials would presently face in attempting
to comply with the rule for the November 2026 general election. The
Postal Service recognizes that the rule would require states to adjust
their processes and adapt to the changes imposed by the rule,
potentially incurring new costs. While the Postal Service has weighed
these considerations, including the possibility that some jurisdictions
would need to order new ballot envelopes and devote resources to
complying with the new envelope-design standards and reporting
requirements, those considerations have to be balanced against the
benefits of the rule, and in particular the fact that these standards
are necessary to ensure the faithful execution of federal law. Given
that mail-in ballots subject to this rule are generally mailed in
September or thereafter, an immediate effective date ensures the
maximum possible time for election officials to adjust their ballot
mail envelopes to meet the new preparation standards if necessary, and
to prepare to submit data to the Portal once it becomes active. This
promotes states' and political subdivisions' ability to successfully
implement the rule prior to the 2026 general election with good faith
efforts and the available postal resources, notwithstanding the
comments that described this task as ``impossible.'' And despite any
logistical or financial difficulties states may face complying with the
rule, including some claims that immediate implementation would prove
impossible, the visibility and law-enforcement benefits of the rule,
including for this election cycle, are such that there is no compelling
reason for any delay. In recognition of the potential burdens on
election officials and the timeline involved, the Postal Service will
make available considerable educational and other support resources
discussed above to assist election officials with implementation and
help facilitate timely compliance with the rule.
The Postal Service has also considered alternatives to the proposed
rule, including both more and less restrictive options. The Postal
Service received comments proposing a number of alternatives including:
using registered mail to transmit ballots; performing verification of
additional forms of data (including name, address, or Return Federal
Ballot Mail envelope IMb); expanding the rule to cover primaries or all
voters; making all of the rule's provisions optional; eliminating
verification and rejection procedures; and not requiring a unique IMb
on return ballot envelopes.
As explained above, the Postal Service believes the proposed rule,
as modified in the final rule, is appropriate in scale and scope. A
more restrictive approach is unnecessary to achieve the goals of the
rule and realize the related benefits. At the same time, the
sensitivity of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, the importance of voter
confidence and election security, and the ability to support law
enforcement purposes that are necessary to ensure the faithful
execution of federal law require the inclusion of the verification and
rejection procedures as set forth in 704.24.5 in order to fulfill the
purposes of the rule. A less restrictive approach would not achieve all
of the rule's benefits. For example, scans from unique IMbs provide a
level of visibility into individual mailpieces that is not possible
using non-serialized IMbs. The Postal Service agrees with commenters
that this visibility is dependent on the mailpieces being scanned, and
believes that the potential for improved visibility made possible by
the use of unique IMbs on both Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail
better serves the intended goals of the rule than if a unique IMb were
only on Outbound Federal Ballot Mail. Moreover, if the rule were not
applied in a consistent, nationwide fashion (e.g., if its provisions
only applied to some ballot mail, were optional, or if there were a
phased roll-out), it may prevent the full benefits of the rule from
being realized, prove unadministrable, and could potentially cause
confusion and delays.
The final rule creates an appropriate balance of the purported
burdens
[[Page 54986]]
imposed by the rule against its intended benefits. As one commenter
explained, election integrity and voter access are complementary goals.
Any regulatory changes should strengthen public confidence while
avoiding unnecessary obstacles to the timely and reliable delivery of
election mail. This rule properly balances those considerations.
VI. Other Considerations
A. Postal Service Readiness
Numerous commenters expressed concern over the Postal Service's
ability to successfully implement this rule. They expressed concern
over whether the Postal Service had the necessary financial resources
and staffing capacity and conjectured that proposed rule would saddle
the Postal Service with election administration functions; require
additional clerks, mailpiece design personnel, information technology
support staff, and other human resources; and impose new obligations on
retail offices and field operations.
Other commenters sought clarification about the training that
postal employees would need to perform the new processes set forth in
the rule. Other commenters, including some postal employees, questioned
whether postal employees could satisfy their obligations under the
Hatch Act and to the public under the rule.
The Postal Service is prepared to implement the rule, consistent
with its legal obligations and available resources. The Postal Service
already possesses the necessary staffing capacity at BMEUs and retail
locations as well as mail acceptance infrastructure necessary to
administer the rule: wholly new institutional capacity does not need to
be built from scratch. The Postal Service currently operates nationwide
digital systems through the Business Customer Gateway and PostalOne!,
and business mailers must already submit mailing documentation
electronically. The Postal Service also maintains centralized support
channels, including the MDA help desk. Furthermore, as stated in the
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Postal Service has available or will
soon publish resources to assist election officials with compliance,
including technical instructions on barcode creation, service type
identifiers, acceptance processes, file preparation, documentation
submission, and entry of data into the proposed portal. The addition of
a new compliance review for a small subset of overall mail volume is
not expected to require additional staff or be a significant burden on
employees. Since the rule builds on processes already in place for
election mail, its implementation should not prove inordinately costly.
The Postal Service is able to balance the cost of implementing the
rule, including developing the Portal, with the costs required to
fulfill its other core operational responsibilities.
As explained above, there are only a few categories of employees
who will be directly responsible for verifying compliance with the rule
under 705.24.5, namely BMEU technicians, Retail clerks, and discrete
support functions like employees in the PCSC. For employees in direct
operational roles, the new pre-acceptance verification measures are
similar to, and are no more onerous than, other mailing manifest
reviews. With respect to other provisions in the rule, the Postal
Service also recognizes that MDAs will see an increase in mailpiece
design review requests under the rule. The Postal Service is committed
to ensuring this process is completed in a timely manner, consistent
with current customer expectations.
The Postal Service agrees that proper training to ensure nationwide
consistency is important. The Postal Service is developing specific
training for employees who will be directly responsible for conducting
verification under the rule. Retail clerks and BMEU technicians will be
trained on how to identify Federal Outbound Ballot Mail and what the
scanning verification process requires. The training will be rolled out
and conducted consistently with the Postal Service's usual processes.
Additionally, MDAs will receive training on the rule's design
requirements and recordkeeping requirements.
It is important to remember that the vast majority of employees
will not experience a change in their responsibilities as a result of
the rule. For example, letter carriers and employees in delivery and
processing functions will not have any new responsibilities. These
employees will continue to process and deliver ballot mail, including
Federal Ballot Mail, and all other election mail, consistent with
existing Postal Service processes, procedures, and guidance. Letter
carriers and employees in processing and delivery functions will not
validate, withhold, delay, or remove ballots in the mailstream.
The rule's requirements should not impact how the Postal Service
processes and delivers Federal Ballot Mail. Longstanding processing and
delivery practices for completed ballots that enter the mainstream will
remain unchanged. As noted, designing automation compatible mailpieces,
inclusion of the Official Election Mail logo, serialized IMbs on both
the outbound and return ballots, and MDA mailpiece review have long
been key components of the Postal Service's best practices guidance for
ballot mail. Ensuring compliance with these longstanding
recommendations, together with verification processes for IMbs on
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail, lie within the Postal Service's zone of
competence, and can therefore be incorporated into the Postal Service's
normal course of operations.
The Postal Service would also note that the rule does not implicate
the Hatch Act, as it neither directs nor authorizes any partisan
political activity as defined by that Act by Postal Service employees.
B. Portal Security
The Postal Service received a number of comments concerned that
creating a centralized data repository with voter information would
make elections less secure. These comments argued that creating a
centralized Portal establishes a high-value target for state-sponsored
cyberattacks, other data breaches, and election disruption, and that
the recent rise of AI-enhanced hacking technology increases these
risks. For these commenters, the value of the Portal is minimal because
it is, they argue, largely duplicative of existing state systems, and,
in their view, does not justify the risk. Commenters contend that
decentralized election systems improve election security.
Some commenters were concerned about the Postal Service's ability
to maintain and protect data in complex, public-facing systems, with a
few commenters suggesting technology, services, and other resources
that the Postal Service could use to create the Portal. Commenters
noted that system outages, technical malfunction or cyberattacks
impacting the Portal could impact, or potentially halt, Outbound
Federal Ballot mailings across multiple states simultaneously. Others
emphasized that neither the Portal nor any related technical
specifications are currently available; as a result, these commenters
questioned whether election offices (especially those in small or
under-resourced jurisdictions) would have the time and technical
capacity to build the required data files immediately.
The Postal Service has extensive experience in developing,
maintaining, and safeguarding public-facing data systems. The Postal
Service faces ongoing cyberthreats and challenges
[[Page 54987]]
that could directly impact customers, partners, and employees, and it
is well prepared to defend against these threats. The Postal Service's
Corporate Information Security Office (CISO) protects its critical
stakeholders by safeguarding the postal network, monitoring threats,
and responding to incidents. As with comparable organizations in the
government and private-sector, cybersecurity is a top priority for the
Postal Service.
Against this backdrop, the Postal Service maintains a vast
commercial public-facing website and has a number of existing systems
for mailers to enter data to satisfy other mail preparation standards.
It also has experience in quickly developing and deploying public-
facing websites, like the website created to facilitate ordering and
distribution of COVID-19 test kits. These are high-volume systems that
maintain sensitive data. The Postal Service has specific guidelines and
protocols in place for protecting and handling the sensitive and
critical data contained within these systems. In short, contrary to
commenters' claims and concerns, the Postal Service has meaningful
experience developing and operating a system like the Portal.
The Portal will contain multi-layered security controls, including
encrypted data transmission and storage, strict access management with
multi-factor authentication, and role-based permissions. The system
will be protected by enterprise-grade network defenses, real-time
monitoring, and comprehensive audit logging, ensuring that sensitive
data is accessible only to authorized officials and is retained
securely.
As discussed above in ``Operation of the Final Rule,'' there are
free, optional tools available that can assist election officials and
Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users in generating the data files necessary
to satisfy the rule's data reporting requirements and ensure that the
necessary information for Outbound Federal Ballot mailings is available
to satisfy verification and be accepted into the mailstream.
Jurisdictions using a vendor may already have such data files prepared
as part of other mailing documentation. In either case, the burdens are
modest and can be timely satisfied.
C. Other State Law Concerns
Commenters, including election officials, raised concerns about the
ability of election officials to satisfy the requirements of the rule
while also complying with various state laws. For example, some
comments argued that the obligation to provide Portal data for
inclusion on a state-specific List could require election officials to
choose between complying with state privacy laws or the rule. Other
commenters questioned election officials' ability to satisfy the rule's
requirements while also complying with state statutory timing
requirements for requesting, processing, and issuing ballots. And
others argued that the rule would impact state and local elections
where consolidated ballots are used.
The decision of how to arrange ballots is a matter for the states.
Ballots that contain both federal and state or local elections are
covered by the rule. States can easily avoid any effects on their state
elections by either complying with the rule's requirements or by
separating their federal ballots to exclude any non-federal elections.
Either is permissible under the rule and would eliminate any impact on
exclusively state or local elections.
The rule is also not facially incompatible with the various timing
provisions in state election law. The envelope design review, data
entry, and verification processes set forth in the rule should be
relatively quick to complete and should not significantly alter the
timeline for election officials. The rule's requirements will permit an
election official to prepare and send Outbound Federal Ballot Mail near
election day, as they do now. And, once Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is
accepted into the postal network, the Postal Service has a strong track
record of promptly delivering ballots to and from voters.
The rule also does not require that sensitive voter information be
made public, like birthdates or social security numbers that may be
protected from disclosure by state law. For one thing, the Portal and
the Lists will not contain this kind of sensitive information; they
include information that appears on the outside of the ballot mail
envelopes. For another, the Lists and the underlying Portal data will
not be made publicly available. There are existing statutory and
regulatory protections against the disclosure of customer addresses and
other sensitive information. For example, while 39 U.S.C. 410 provides
that the Postal Service is subject to the Freedom of Information Act
and the Privacy Act, it limits the scope of access to certain kinds of
postal records. In particular, Section 410(c)(1) provides that neither
law requires the Postal Service to release ``the name or address, past
or present, of any postal patron.'' Similarly, postal regulations
provide that disclosures of address information may be made to state
and local governments and law enforcement agencies, but generally
prohibit disclosure of an individual person's mailing address to a non-
government individual except in limited, enumerated circumstances. 39
CFR 265.14(d)(2)-(5), (9). Furthermore, as discussed above and
reiterated below, many of these privacy concerns may be resolved by the
information contained in the SOR for the Portal, which was published in
the Federal Register on July 17, 2026.
D. Tribal Issues
The Postal Service received a small number of comments arguing that
the proposed rule did not meaningfully address how the rule's
requirements would affect tribal communities. Commenters were concerned
about the ability of election officials to generate unique IMbs for
nontraditional mailing addresses used by many Native American
households, and about the impact of the rule more broadly given the
unique mail delivery challenges that can impact these communities.
Other commenters advocated for tribal consultation prior issuance of a
final rule. In particular, one commenter argued that the rule should
not be finalized until the Postal Service conducted formal consultation
with federally recognized tribes pursuant to Executive Order 13175.
As the Postal Service has explained, the rule does not require any
change to existing addressing practices. It only requires that the
address uploaded into the Portal be the address used on the Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail envelope. Election officials may continue to
address ballots to nontraditional addresses and may generate unique
IMbs for these addresses to comply with the rule. As discussed above,
election officials may be able to use the free IMsb tool to generate a
unique IMb even if these addresses cannot be validated through DPV.
With respect to consultation, the Postal Service will continue to
work with tribal stakeholders as part of its broader outreach,
education, and implementation efforts. However, Executive Order 13175
does not require the Postal Service to engage in such consultations.
Only agencies covered by the Paperwork Reduction Act are subject to
that Executive Order and, as noted above, the Postal Service is outside
the Paperwork Reduction Act's scope. Shane, 658 F. Supp. at 915; accord
Kuzma, 798 F.2d at 32. Therefore, consultation under Executive Order
13175 is not required prior to finalizing the rule.
[[Page 54988]]
E. Requests for More Information
The Postal Service received several comments requesting detailed
analysis about the potential impact of the proposed rule and
recommending that the results of any such analysis be published before
issuing a final rule. For example, requests were made for a state-by-
state analysis of the rule's impact; impact assessments for Tribal
communities and UOCAVA voters (despite the express exclusion of UOCAVA
ballots from the rule's scope); detailed information about the
development of this rule and the Portal; an evaluation of any
differential administrative burdens based on the size or resources of
election jurisdictions; an assessment of the anticipated ballot-
rejection rate under DMM 705.24.5; and a formal disability
accessibility impact assessment before finalizing any changes to ballot
mail procedures.
The Postal Service declines to conduct, publish, or otherwise
disclose any additional analysis or information concerning the rule or
Portal. The Postal Service has received sufficient information through
public comments to assess the impact of the proposed rule and issue
this final rule. Each state and political subdivision thereof may
choose different means to satisfy the rule's mail preparation and data
entry requirements based on their own capabilities and resources. As a
result, the impact on states may vary but these decisions are not
dictated by the Postal Service. Similarly, the Postal Service
anticipates that the rejection rate of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail
will be low, as states need only comply with the final rule's
relatively modest mail preparation and data entry standards.
F. System of Records Notice
The Postal Service received numerous comments urging it to publish
a new SORN for the Federal Ballot Mail Portal in accordance with the
Privacy Act. Commenters sought information about retention periods for
Portal data, access to that data, and limits on disclosure, among other
things. While these comments are outside the scope of this rulemaking,
the Postal Service separately took steps necessary for the creation of
a SORN, as stated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. On July 17,
2026, the SORN was published in the Federal Register. 91 FR 44880. As
explained in the SORN, a SOR will need to be in place to implement this
final rule, because no data will be collected through the Portal or
disclosed until a SOR is in place. The SORN provides details regarding
retention periods, access, disclosure, and the other matters raised by
commenters. Comments will be accepted on the SORN for 30 days.
Interested parties were invited to submit comments.
VII. Suggested Revisions to the Proposed Rule
A. UOCAVA
In the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Postal Service
specifically invited comments on the exemption in the proposed rule for
UOCAVA voters. Many commenters supported this exemption. Other
commenters, while supporting the exemption, believed that the rule's
express exclusion of UOCAVA ballots was insufficient to exclude or
protect UOCAVA voters. These commenters asked for more assurances and
safeguards to ensure UOCAVA ballots would not be impacted by the rule,
as errors could occur that would accidentally apply the rule's
standards to UOCAVA ballots.
Some commenters opposed the exemption for UOCAVA ballots. These
commenters argued that ``[a]pplying the E.O. 14399 framework''--such as
enhanced tracking and participation lists--to UOCAVA ballots would
strengthen integrity without undermining access, while aligning with
existing Postal Service special handling for election mail to and from
military and overseas voters. Excluding them, in the opinion of some
commenters, leaves a significant portion of ballot mail for federal
elections outside the new security measures, and including UOCAVA
ballots would create a more comprehensive, uniform system that better
serves all eligible voters while deterring unlawful use of the mail.
The Postal Service finds that the proposed rule provides sufficient
safeguards for UOCAVA voters as drafted and declines to make additional
changes. Further safeguards and assurances are unnecessary because
these voters will experience no change as a result of proper
implementation of the rule given its exemption of UOCAVA ballots. At
the same time, the exemption does not create an anomaly or otherwise
undermine the stated purpose of the rule. Rather, it reflects the
unique logistical circumstances that overseas and military voters and
their family members face, consistent with the statutory scheme enacted
by Congress.
Separately, other comments sought clarification on how the Postal
Service would distinguish between ballots sent pursuant to UOCAVA and
other mail-in or absentee ballots. Existing postal regulations require
that ballots sent to and from UOCAVA voters include unique identifiers
on the exterior of the envelope that are not present on the ballot
envelopes for non-UOCAVA voters. Specifically, DMM 703.8.8.5 requires
that envelopes for mailing and receiving absentee ballots under UOCAVA
must contain the following words: ``No Postage Necessary in the U.S.
Mail--DMM 703.8.0.'' Additionally, balloting envelopes for UOCAVA
voters contain the statement: ``U.S. Postage Paid 39 U.S.C. 3406.''
These indicia enable the Postal Service to distinguish between UOCAVA
ballots and ballots that fall within the scope of the rule. As
explained above, UOCAVA ballots should be segregated from Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail when presented for mailing. This will help ensure
that both UOCAVA ballots and Outbound Federal Ballot Mail covered by
the rule are properly accepted under applicable rules. Therefore,
revisions to the proposed rule are unnecessary to ensure that UOCAVA
ballots are distinguishable from Federal Ballot Mail.
B. Primaries
The Postal Service received several comments about primary
elections specifically. Describing primaries as gateways to federal
general elections, and further noting that in noncompetitive districts,
primaries may effectively determine the outcomes of federal races,
commenters argued that the rule's exclusion of primary elections
creates inconsistencies in tracking, verification, and security
standards. Commenters contended that the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
inadequately explained why fraud prevention and law enforcement
rationales for ballots for general, special, and runoff federal
elections would not apply equally to primaries. These commenters opined
that voters and election officials would benefit from uniform Postal
Service requirements throughout the election cycle.
The Postal Service reaffirms that, consistent with the framework
for the proposed rule set forth in Executive Order 14399, the rule will
not apply to primaries. Primary elections involve the selection of
political party nominees through procedures chosen by the parties
themselves, not the election of federal officials; as such, they fall
outside the rule's scope and reach.
[[Page 54989]]
C. Address Confidentiality Protection and Other Voter Confidentiality
Programs
As some commenters pointed out, survivors of domestic and sexual
violence and/or stalking may experience significant privacy concerns
related to the voter registration process. The fear of being located
may deter such victims from voting in person, and even from registering
to vote. Furthermore, as commenters noted, survivors of domestic
violence, sexual violence, and/or stalking often relocate multiple
times and/or postpone updating public records until adequate safety
measures are in place. For these reasons, commenters concluded, many
survivors rely crucially on the ability to vote by mail.
According to commenters, to assist such survivors, forty-seven
states have instituted Address Confidentiality Protection programs
(``ACPs'')--confidential mail forwarding services available to
survivors of domestic violence, stalking, sexual violence, child
abduction and/or human trafficking who have recently relocated to a
location unknown to their abuser or stalker. To ensure participant
safety, commenters explained, ACPs typically shield participants from
appearing in public voter files, usually by substituting alternative
addresses or keeping records entirely offline. Often, ACP registration
is entered manually in a locked file and not entered into the state's
typical voter registration system. The ballot is then mailed to the
state's substitute address, which, by design, differs from the voter's
confidential actual address. In some instances, even an individual's
name is protected under ACPs. Some commenters also noted that other
states have additional privacy protections in place for participants.
Some commenters voiced concern that including information about
these voters in the Portal and the contemplated exchange of this
information through the state-specific Mail-In and Absentee
Participation Lists would compromise ACP and other confidentiality
programs and may call into question compliance with certain state
requirements. One commenter noted a lack of guidance as to whether
states would be required to upload survivors' actual physical addresses
to the Portal, or whether the Postal Service (or other entities within
the federal government) would question mailing ballots to a potentially
large number of voters registered to a single alternative mailing
address. Other commenters criticized the proposed rule for allegedly
increasing risks to survivor safety. One commenter cited recent large-
scale privacy breaches affecting government agencies and suggested that
Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists in the Postal Service's
custody (including, presumably, the private information of voters
protected under ACPs) could fall prey to such a breach.
The Postal Service clarifies that the rule requires that the name
and address used on the outside of a ballot envelope be submitted to
the Portal; it would not require that confidential information known
only to the state be provided. The information in the Portal would also
not be publicly disclosed, and the Postal Service has taken appropriate
cybersecurity measures with respect to the Portal cybersecurity as
discussed above. For these reasons, the proposed rule is compatible
with state ACP programs.
D. Alternative Operational Approaches
A small number of commenters recommended that the rule be
accompanied by ambitious operational changes, including a dedicated
postal-run ``state ballot box'' into which only ballots would be
placed, the establishment of a separate processing and delivery system
for ballots, and fundamental Mailer ID redesign (a key component of
IMbs).
The Postal Service declines to adopt these proposals. Such large-
scale (and costly) operational changes are not necessary to accomplish
the rule's objectives.
VIII. Revisions Adopted in the Final Rule
Very few comments included recommended changes to the rule itself.
The Postal Service received several suggestions that would result in a
more expansive final rule ; however, these suggestions fall outside the
scope of this rulemaking and the Postal Service's authority. For
instance, a few commenters encouraged the Postal Service to add
provisions into the rule to verify a voter's citizenship status as a
condition of mail acceptance. Other commenters advocated for
exclusively in-person voting, and still others proposed only accepting
ballots that are received by Election Day. The Postal Service also
received comments recommending a narrower final rule that would retain
the proposed rule's provisions concerning ballot envelope design for
Federal Ballot Mail, in 705.24.3, and eliminate the rule's other
substantive provisions, namely 705.24.4 and 705.24.5. Within the scope
of this rulemaking, the Postal Service is making several changes in
response to the concerns discussed above.
First, the Postal Service makes clear that the verification process
set forth in 705.24.5 (i.e., mail sent by authorized ballot mailers)
does not apply to Return Federal Ballot Mail. Many comments
demonstrated a factual misunderstanding about the inapplicability of
these verification procedures to return ballots. Given the widespread
confusion, the Postal Service believes that clarifying the final rule
will reduce voter confusion and help ensure consistent implementation
of the rule. However, as noted above, for individuals transmitting
Return Federal Ballot mail to be in compliance with this rule, Return
Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that meets the
requirements of 705.24.3.2. As under existing law, voters may use their
residential mailbox, any retail counter, or other authorized means to
transmit their compliant Return Federal Ballot Mail.
In the event a voter loses or misplaces the Return Federal Ballot
Mail envelope provided by the Authorized Ballot Mailer, or if the
Authorized Ballot Mailer fails to provide the voter with a compliant
Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope, the voter should request a
replacement envelope from the Authorized Ballot Mailer that conforms to
705.24.3.2. The Postal Service may also provide such other means as
reasonably determined by the Postal Service for transmitting Return
Federal Ballot Mail consistent with the requirements of this rule. This
will provide visibility and scan data for these ballot envelopes when
processed on the Postal Service's automated equipment.
Second, there was confusion over how the MDA review requirements
would be verified and enforced, and the circumstances under which the
MDA review requirements could lead to an Outbound Federal Ballot
mailing being rejected. As set forth above, certification of MDA review
will not be verified when an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing is
presented for acceptance. Instead, prior to uploading data into the
Portal, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be prompted to certify
that their ballot envelope design has been submitted for review by an
MDA and that the MDA has provided feedback. If they do not provide such
certification, Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will be unable to
upload data into the Portal. To reduce confusion and clarify the
responsibilities of Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users, the Postal
Service is amending the language in 705.24.3.1, 705.24.3.2, and
705.24.4.2.f, and striking 705.24.5.3.b from the final rule.
[[Page 54990]]
Third, the Postal Service is amending the language in 705.24.3.1.c
and 705.23.3.2.c to make clear that Authorized Ballot Mailers are
responsible for creating IMbs. The Postal Service is also amending the
language in 705.24.4.2.b.3 and 705.24.4.2.b.4 to clarify that the
unique IMb submitted into the Portal is the IMb printed on the Outbound
and Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes. These clarifications are
intended to reduce confusion and provide clarity for Federal Ballot
Mail Portal users; they do not substantively change the rule's data
reporting requirements.
Fourth, the Postal Service is amending the language in 705.24.5.2
to clarify that only commercial mailings are subject to commercial
mailing standards and regulations. There was confusion over whether
non-commercial mailings must be entered at BMEUs or otherwise meet
commercial mailing standards. The Postal Service has simplified the
language in 705.24.5.2 to help avoid confusion.
Finally, the Postal Service is changing the term ``Ballot Portal
User'' to ``Federal Ballot Mail Portal User'' to clarify the
relationship between Federal Ballot Mail, the rule's data standards,
and the Federal Ballot Mail Portal. The Postal Service's hope is that
this reduces confusion about the application of rule's data-entry
requirements to other ballot mail as well as confusion about data entry
that needs to be performed at the state-level.
IX. Explanation of Final Rule
After evaluating the comments, the Postal Service is adopting the
new DMM Section 705.24. The final text of DMM Section 705.24
incorporates the revisions noted above. Accordingly, the Postal Service
adopts the described changes to Mailing Standards of the United States
Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated by reference
in the Code of Federal Regulations. We will publish an appropriate
amendment to 39 CFR part 111 to reflect these changes.
List of Subjects in 39 CFR Part 111
Administrative practice and procedure, Postal Service.
Accordingly, the Postal Service amends Mailing Standards of the
United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail Manual (DMM), incorporated
by reference in the Code of Federal Regulations as follows (see 39 CFR
111.1):
PART 111--[AMENDED]
0
1. The authority citation for 39 CFR Part 111 continues to read as
follows:
Authority: 5 U.S.C. 552(a); 13 U.S.C. 301-307; 18 U.S.C. 1692-
1737; 39 U.S.C. 101, 401-404, 414, 416, 3001-3018, 3201-3220, 3401-
3406, 3621, 3622, 3626, 3629, 3631-3633, 3641, 3681-3685, and 5001.
0
2. Revise Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service,
Domestic Mail Manual (DMM) as follows:
Mailing Standards of the United States Postal Service, Domestic Mail
Manual (DMM)
* * * * *
700 Special Standards
* * * * *
705 Advanced Preparation and Special Postage Payment Systems
* * * * *
[Insert after 705.23 the following:]
24.0 Ballot Mail for Federal Elections
24.1 Definitions
For the purposes of Section 705.24, the following definitions
apply:
a. Authorized ballot mailer means an election official of a state
or a political subdivision thereof who is responsible for sending mail-
in or absentee ballots to eligible voters of that state or political
subdivision; or an individual or entity, such as a mail service
provider, that an election official has authorized to send mail-in or
absentee ballots by mail on the election official's behalf.
b. Federal Ballot Mail Portal User means the chief election
official of each state and any individual or entity, such as a mail
service provider or an election official of that state or a political
subdivision thereof, authorized by the chief election official to
provide information through the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail
Portal as described in 24.4.2.b.
c. Mail-in or absentee ballot means a physical ballot, other than a
ballot provided at a designated polling place, that may be used to cast
a vote in a federal election. For the purposes of Section 705.24, a
mail-in or absentee ballot does not include a ballot mailed under
703.8.8 or 703.8.9.
d. Outbound Federal Ballot Mail means any mailpiece containing a
mail-in or absentee ballot for a federal election sent from an
authorized ballot mailer to an individual voter.
e. Return Federal Ballot Mail means any mailpiece containing a
mail-in or absentee ballot for a federal election sent from an
individual voter to an election office, or an authorized recipient of
ballot mail, of a state or a political subdivision thereof.
f. Federal election means any general, special, or runoff election
for the office of President or Vice President; or of Senator or
Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commissioner to, the
Congress. This definition does not include primary elections.
g. State includes all 50 states, as well as the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and
the Northern Mariana Islands.
h. Intelligent Mail barcode (IMb) has the meaning provided in
204.1.2.1.
i. Official Election Mail logo is a unique registered trademark
designed exclusively for inclusion in the design of Official Election
Mail. The conditions of use are provided in Publication 631, Official
Election Mail--Graphic Guidelines and Logos.
24.2 Optional 90-Day Pre-Mailing Notice
A state's chief election official may notify the Postal Service, no
fewer than 90 days prior to a federal election, of its intent to allow
for mail-in or absentee ballots in the federal election to be
transmitted by the Postal Service. This notification should indicate
whether the state intends to submit to the Postal Service the
information described in 24.4.2.b to the Postal Service Federal Ballot
Mail Portal as set forth in 24.4.2.d.
A state's failure to provide the optional 90-day notice to the
Postal Service under 24.2 will not prevent enrollment under 24.4.
24.3 Federal Ballot Mail
24.3.1 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Envelope Standards
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that:
a. Includes the official Election Mail logo;
b. Is automation compatible; and
c. Bears the voter's unique IMb, as created by the Authorized
Ballot Mailer, with the Delivery Point ZIP Code embedded and a Federal
Ballot Mail Service Type Identifier (STID).
Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelopes must be submitted to the
Postal Service for mailpiece design review and feedback.
24.3.2 Return Federal Ballot Mail Envelope Standards
Return Federal Ballot Mail must be mailed in an envelope that:
a. Includes the official Election Mail logo;
b. Is automation compatible; and
[[Page 54991]]
c. Bears the voter's unique IMb, as created by the Authorized
Ballot Mailer, with the Delivery Point ZIP Code embedded and a Federal
Ballot Mail STID.
Return Federal Ballot Mail envelopes must be submitted to the
Postal Service for mailpiece design review and feedback.
24.3.3 Authorized Ballot Mailer Responsibility
Authorized ballot mailers are responsible for barcode creation
under 24.3.1 and 24.3.2 as well as envelope design and printing for all
ballot mail.
24.3.4 Additional Recommendations
For additional information on the Postal Service's recommendations
for all ballot mail, see DMM 703.8.4.
24.4 State-Specific Mail-In and Absentee Participation Lists
24.4.1 Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal User Registration
To access the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail Portal, each
Federal Ballot Mail Portal User must have a registered account.
Registration must be completed no later than two business days before
an Outbound Federal Ballot mailing. The chief election official of each
state is responsible for authorizing the Federal Ballot Mail Portal
Users for their state including political subdivisions thereof.
24.4.2 Enrollment
a. Any state that intends to receive mail-in or absentee ballots
from individual voters through the Postal Service must ensure that such
individuals have been enrolled with the Postal Service for inclusion on
the state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List.
b. In order for an individual to be enrolled with the Postal
Service for inclusion on a state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation
List, a Federal Ballot Mail Portal User in that state must provide the
following information through the Postal Service Federal Ballot Mail
Portal:
1. Name of individual receiving a mail-in or absentee ballot;
2. Address of individual receiving a mail-in or absentee ballot;
3. Unique IMb applied on the Outbound Federal Ballot Mail envelope
pursuant to 24.3.1;
4. Unique IMb applied on the Return Federal Ballot Mail envelope
pursuant to 24.3.2; and
5. Originating election office state.
c. An individual will be deemed enrolled with the Postal Service
for inclusion on a state's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List as
of the date that the information in 24.4.2.b is provided.
d. Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users must provide the information in
24.4.2.b at least 30 days before the date of the federal election, to
the extent practicable, or by the date on which mail-in or absentee
ballots may begin to be mailed under state law. Federal Ballot Mail
Portal Users may make supplemental submissions to enroll additional
individuals or modify prior submissions until the last day that ballots
may be mailed out to individuals under state law. A separate submission
is required in connection with each Outbound Federal Ballot mailing,
regardless of the number of mailpieces in the mailing.
e. The information provided in 24.4.2.b must meet the Postal
Service's technical specifications for the Federal Ballot Mail Portal.
f. Before providing the information in 24.4.2.b, Federal Ballot
Mail Portal Users must certify in the Federal Ballot Mail Portal that
any mail-in or absentee ballots their state's authorized ballot mailers
provide to the Postal Service for mailing have been submitted for
review and that they have received feedback consistent with 24.3.1 and
24.3.2 Federal Ballot Mail Portal Users will not be able to enter the
information in 24.4.2.b into the Federal Ballot Mail Portal if the
certification is incomplete.
24.4.3 Provision of State-Specific Lists
On or about the date of the federal election, the Postal Service
will provide a state-specific Mail-In and Absentee Participant List to
each state's chief election official that contains the name and address
of each individual in that state who was enrolled through the process
set forth in 24.4.2, along with the unique IMb associated with the
Outbound and Return Federal Ballot Mail sent to each such individual.
24.5 Outbound Federal Ballot Mail Verification
24.5.1 Procedure
Using the information provided in 24.4.2, the Postal Service will
review mailings identified as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail prior to
acceptance to evaluate whether the mailing meets the standards in
24.3.1 and is being sent to individuals who have been enrolled with the
Postal Service for inclusion on the state's Mail-In and Absentee
Participation List, consistent with the technical specifications for
the Federal Ballot Mail Portal.
24.5.2 Authorized Verification
Mailings identified as Outbound Federal Ballot Mail are verified by
Postal Service employees when presented for acceptance. Outbound
Federal Ballot Mail must be entered at a facility that performs
business mail acceptance functions or at a Postal Service retail
counter. Commercial mailings must comply with applicable requirements.
Postal Service personnel are not authorized to open mail sealed against
inspection, except under circumstances described in ASM 274. The Postal
Service's acceptance of Outbound Federal Ballot Mail does not
constitute verified compliance.
24.5.3 Noncompliance
a. Mailings that do not comply with 24.5.1 and 24.5.2 will not be
accepted and will be returned to the authorized ballot mailer. The
authorized ballot mailer or Federal Ballot Mail Portal User must
address the error(s) before resubmitting the mailing.
b. An authorized ballot mailer may request further review by the
Postal Service if Outbound Federal Ballot Mail is not accepted.
c. The Postal Service assumes no responsibility for any outbound
ballot mailing presented until it is accepted into the mail. The Postal
Service is not responsible for service delays when the Federal Ballot
Mail Portal User or authorized ballot mailer does not meet the
applicable preparation or entry standards.
d. Authorized ballot mailers must comply with all applicable postal
laws and regulations governing mailability and preparation for mailing,
as well as nonpostal laws and regulations on the possession, treatment,
transmission, or transfer of particular matter.
24.5.4 Return Federal Ballot Mail
705.24.5 does not apply to Return Federal Ballot Mail.
24.6 Non-Interference With State or Federal Election Laws
This rule relates only to the use of the U.S. Mail. The Postal
Service does not purport to alter the eligibility of any individual to
vote under state or federal law. The Postal Service does not have any
legal responsibility for management of state voter rolls or
administration of federal elections within each state. States are fully
responsible for the
[[Page 54992]]
contents of each State's Mail-In and Absentee Participation List.
* * * * *
Colleen Hibbert-Kapler,
Attorney, Ethics and Legal Compliance.
[FR Doc. 2026-17238 Filed 8-21-26; 9:00 pm]
BILLING CODE 7710-12-P