[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 162 (Monday, August 24, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54713-54715]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17193]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[PSHSB & OET: PS Docket No. 26-184; DA 26-832; FR ID 362881]
Comment Sought on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Certain Covered UAS and UAS Critical Components and Equipment Listed in
Section 1709 of FY2025 NDAA
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
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SUMMARY: In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) seek
comment on proposing to prohibit the continued importation and
marketing of certain previously authorized equipment that has been
determined to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.
Through this Public Notice, PSHSB and OET propose to apply such
prohibitions to certain previously-authorized foreign-produced uncrewed
aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components, and certain
communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709
of the Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 (FY2025 NDAA), added to the
Covered List in December 2025.
DATES: Comments are due on or before September 23, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Pursuant to Sec. Sec. 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. You may
submit comments, identified by PS Docket No. 26-184, by any of the
following methods:
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically
using the internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701.
Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail,
Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street
NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Matthew Chai, Attorney Advisor,
Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1112 or [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's
document (Public Notice) in PS Docket No. 26-184, DA 26-832, released
on August 10, 2026. The full text of this document is available at:
https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-832A1.docx.
Permit-but-disclose proceeding. The proceeding this Public Notice
initiates shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in
accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must (1) list
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at
which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data
presented and arguments made during the presentation. If the
presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data
or arguments already reflected in the presenter's written comments,
memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter
[[Page 54714]]
may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior
comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page
and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in
lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum. Documents shown or given to
Commission staff during ex parte meetings are deemed to be written ex
parte presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b).
In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has
made available a method of electronic filing, written ex parte
presentations and memoranda summarizing oral ex parte presentations,
and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic
comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed
in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf).
Participants in this proceeding should familiarize themselves with the
Commission's ex parte rules.
Synopsis
In October 2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O
(90 FR 53227) which established a procedure to limit the scope of an
existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued
importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the
underlying authorization. The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to
``institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these
prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered
List'' and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such
prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the EA
Security Second R&O. Under Sec. 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET ``may place
limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment
authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing'' of such
equipment.
On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical
components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List, and all
communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in
section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA, to the Covered List. These additions
were based on a National Security Determination from an Executive
Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national
security agencies, determining (among other things) that such equipment
and services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.
On May 8, 2026, the Enforcement Bureau opened an investigation and
issued a Letter of Inquiry (LOI) to Anzu, a United States-based UAS
company, based on publicly available information that Anzu was
producing devices listed in section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. On July 9,
2026, Anzu responded to the LOI in a confidential filing. Public
sources suggest that Anzu devices are produced by an entity with a
technology sharing or licensing agreement with an entity named in
section 1709 and thus are considered covered equipment. Anzu's UAS and
UAS controllers would also be covered equipment because they are
produced in Malaysia, a foreign country.
Pursuant to Sec. 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET propose to prohibit the
continued importation and marketing of certain previously-authorized
covered equipment referenced above. We tentatively conclude that such
equipment is covered equipment. Specifically, we propose to apply these
prohibitions to the following covered equipment: communications and
video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709 produced by Anzu,
including FCC IDs 2BBYS-RAPTOR and 2BBYS-RRC01. As stated above, public
reporting indicates that this equipment is listed in section 1709 of
the FY2025 NDAA, because it is produced by an entity with a technology
licensing or sharing agreement with an entity named in section 1709 and
because the equipment is produced in a foreign country.
This proposed prohibition would not apply to any other already-
authorized covered equipment. It also would not apply to importation or
marketing for federal government use or for commercial testing and
product development, and would not affect the continued use or
operation of already-purchased equipment.
We seek comment on our tentative conclusions that the above-
referenced equipment is covered equipment. We invite commenters to
provide specific evidence in response to our tentative conclusions.
Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would
justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized
``covered'' equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the
continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized
covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts. As the Commission recognized in the EA
Security Second R&O, ``[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the
Nation.'' The Commission further stated that older models of covered
equipment, which continue to be widely sold in the United States, pose
an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed,
``not only when such equipment is new to the market.'' The Commission
agreed with commenters who observed that certain previously authorized
devices now categorized as covered equipment ``likely remain[ ]
marketable in the United States'' and ``may present continuing national
security threats.''
An Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national
security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies,
one of whom was the DoW, specifically determined that UAS and UAS
critical components produced in foreign countries and communications
and video surveillance equipment and services listed in section 1709 of
the FY2025 NDAA ``pose unacceptable risks to the national security of
the United States or the safety and security of United States
persons.'' This determination of ``unacceptable risks'' was based on an
assessment of ``threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data
exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential threats
to the homeland.'' We believe this determination included all already-
authorized covered equipment described in this Public Notice, which are
communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in
section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA. We tentatively accept this
determination and ``give [it] particular weight,'' as the Commission
directed.
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the December 21,
2025, National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that
prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously
communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in
section 1709 of the FY2025 NDAA as described above is necessary to
protect national security by mitigating risks to the United States
communications sector.
Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential
economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued
importation and marketing of the above-referenced already-authorized
covered equipment. How would this proposed action affect the financial
interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the
communications sector? As the Commission noted in the EA Security
Second R&O, it may consider ``countervailing economic concerns when
implementing the prohibitions for
[[Page 54715]]
already-authorized devices.'' What are the economic or supply chain
considerations that weigh in favor of or against taking this proposed
action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in
our analysis.
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have
substantial economic and supply chain impacts, especially given that
the devices subject to the proposed limitation appear to comprise a
very small share of the market. Anzu does not appear in major industry
market analyses or rankings. Do commenters agree that economic and
supply chain impacts are relatively minor? Could other equipment fill
any gaps that may be created by this proposed prohibition? Has the
Conditional Approval process provided an adequate source for trusted
equipment now or in the future? Would this proposal be cost-effective
for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would
providers' compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment
with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data
and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.
We seek comment on any economic benefits that may arise as a result
of these prohibitions. Following the initial update to the Covered
List, billions of dollars have been raised by domestic UAS producers,
creating thousands of United States manufacturing jobs. Billions more
have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical
components. These investments include capital from domestic investors
as well as foreign investors supporting United States manufacturing. We
tentatively conclude that if the proposed prohibitions generated
economic harm by noticeably reducing supply, such prohibition would
spur investments in domestic production that would generate a
countervailing positive economic impact. Do commenters agree? We seek
comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in United
States production that this proposed prohibition would yield.
Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting
the continued importation and marketing of the previously authorized
covered equipment subject to this Public Notice is consistent with the
public interest because it protects American communications networks
from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency
body to ``pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States or the security and safety of United States persons.'' We
also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors
that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on
import and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment.
We seek comment on this analysis. Do commenters agree that the national
security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain
factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh
in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters
to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its
balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by
the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized
covered equipment in communications networks with the impact of the
proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and
the public at large.
Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is
adopted, the continued use of previously authorized UAS and UAS
critical components that are foreign-produced, as well as
communications and video surveillance equipment listed in section 1709
of the FY2025 NDAA and addressed in this Public Notice, would remain
authorized.
Implementation timeline. We propose that Anzu must cease all
importation and marketing activities within 30 days after publication
in the Federal Register. We seek comment on the proposed timeline from
the responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers,
distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically,
we request comment on implementation considerations including the
quantity of devices already imported into the United States and
available for--or being held for--marketing or sale; new or recently
updated device models that are en route to the United States or pending
shipment; and devices subject to executed distribution, marketing, or
sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 229, 301, 302a(b), 303, 1004, 1601-
1609; Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Pub. L. 117-55, 135 Stat. 423.
Federal Communications Commission.
Zenji Nakazawa,
Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2026-17193 Filed 8-21-26; 8:45 am]
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