[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 161 (Friday, August 21, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 54259-54264]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-17163]
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COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 1 and 38
RIN 3038-AF77
Request for Comment on the Listing of Compute Derivatives
Contracts
AGENCY: Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
ACTION: Request for comment.
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SUMMARY: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (``CFTC'' or
``Commission'') is seeking public responses to this Request for Comment
to better inform its understanding and oversight of derivatives markets
in compute.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 20, 2026.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, specifically referencing ``Request
for Comment on the Listing of Compute Derivatives Contracts'' and RIN
3038-AF77, by any of the following methods:
Regulations.gov: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and
press the ``Search'' button, then proceed as follows:
[[Page 54260]]
1. Under Refine Documents Results--check the box to ``Only show
documents open for comment'';
2. Under Agency--select ``See More'' and check the box for
``Commodity Futures Trading Commission,'' then press the Apply button;
3. Identify this proposal in the list of CFTC documents open for
comment, press the ``Comment'' button to open the submission form, and
follow the instructions on the form.
Alternatively, if you are viewing this proposal on
www.federalregister.gov, click the ``Submit A Public Comment'' button
at the top of the page to open the comment form. Follow the
instructions on the form to submit your comment to Regulations.gov.
Mail: Send to--Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary of the
Commission, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette
Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
Hand Delivery/Courier: Address to--CFTC Comment
Submission, Attn: Christopher Kirkpatrick, Secretary of the Commission,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st
Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
Please submit your comments using only one of these methods. To
avoid possible delays with mail or in-person deliveries, submissions
through Regulations.gov are encouraged.
All comments must be submitted in English or, if not, accompanied
by an English translation. Do not include in your comment text or
attachments any personal identifying information or business
information that you do not want published online. Comments (regardless
of submission method) will be published without review for, and without
removal of, any personal identifying information or information your
business may consider confidential.
If you wish to submit confidential information for the Commission's
consideration, please contact the CFTC personnel listed in this Notice
under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT before making any submission.
Please also carefully review the Commission's procedures in 17 CFR
145.9 for requesting confidential treatment under the Freedom of
Information Act (``FOIA'') of information submitted to the Commission.
The CFTC reserves the right, but shall have no obligation, to
review, pre-screen, filter, or redact all or any part of your comment
submission. The CFTC also reserves the right, without further
notification, to refuse to publish or to remove from public view all or
any part of your submission to the extent it contains content
inappropriate for publication in a comment file, such as--without
limitation--obscene language, threats of violence, solicitations for
commercial sales or illegal activity, or obvious spam. If a submission
that is refused for or withdrawn from publication because of
inappropriate content also contains comments on the merits of this
proposal, such submission will be retained in the record for the matter
and will be considered as required under the Administrative Procedure
Act and other applicable laws, and may be accessible under the FOIA.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tyler S. Badgley, General Counsel,
[email protected], 202-418-5000, Office of the General Counsel,
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st
Street NW, Washington, DC 20581; Stephen Andrews, Deputy General
Counsel for Regulation, [email protected], 202-418-5000, Office of
the General Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three
Lafayette Centre, 1155 21st Street NW, Washington, DC 20581; Aaron
Levine, [email protected], 646-746-9700, Office of the General
Counsel, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 290 Broadway, New York,
NY 10007; and, CFTC Innovation Task Force, [email protected],
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Three Lafayette Centre, 1151 21st
Street NW, Washington, DC 20581.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction and Background
a. Background
The derivatives markets that the Commission oversees pursuant to
the Commodity Exchange Act (``CEA'' or the ``Act'') are ``affected with
a national public interest'' because they facilitate risk management
and price discovery ``through trading in liquid, fair and financially
secure trading facilities.'' \1\ Under the Commission's oversight, the
Act seeks to deter disruptions to market integrity, ensure the
financial integrity of transactions, avoid systemic risk, and promote
responsible innovation and fair competition.\2\ In its oversight of the
derivatives markets subject to the Act and in order to minimize market
disruptions and protect market participants, the Commission may
prescribe by rule, regulation, or order the terms and conditions on
which a designated contract market (``DCM'') may list a contract for
trading.\3\
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\1\ CEA section 3, 7 U.S.C. 5.
\2\ CEA section 3(b), 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
\3\ CEA section 5c(c), 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c); see also CEA section
5(d), 7 U.S.C. 7(d).
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As discussed further below, this request for comment addresses an
emerging class of derivatives contracts that reference the price of
access to computing power (``compute''),\4\ which is the processing
power primarily used by the large language models (``LLMs'') at the
center of the artificial intelligence (``AI'') economy. AI anchors a
large and growing share of the U.S. economy and public equity markets
and, accordingly, compute has become a multi-hundred-billion-dollar
enterprise \5\ and is a scarce, capital-intensive commodity.
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\4\ This request for comment uses ``compute'', ``compute
capacity'', ``compute services'' and similar terms interchangeably
depending on the context.
\5\ Federico M. Bandi, (Early) AI Compute Asset Pricing (Jul. 1,
2026) (``(Early) AI Compute Asset Pricing'') (``The economic scale
of AI compute is already macroeconomically material. Based on our
calculations, the 2025-Q4 installed compute stock already implies a
gross compute service flow of around $430 billion to $1.3 trillion
per year, or approximately 1.4% to 4.0% of U.S. GDP.'').
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The Commission is seeking comment on the factors that a DCM should
consider when addressing certain provisions of the CEA and CFTC
regulations thereunder that are relevant to the listing for trading of
derivatives with compute as the underlier (``compute derivatives'').\6\
The Commission recognizes that compute derivatives are a comparatively
new and evolving class of products, and believes responses from
industry participants may enable it to advance the standardization of
such products in a manner that promotes transparency, liquidity, and
responsible innovation. The Commission invites comment on the specific
questions set forth in Section II related to the listing for trading of
compute derivatives, as well as on all aspects of the compute markets
(including those not mentioned herein).
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\6\ While this request for comment primarily focuses on the
listing of compute derivatives by DCMs, the Commission further seeks
comment on issues that may arise in connection with a swap execution
facility (``SEF'') listing a contracts that settle to the price of
compute, or physically-settled compute swap contracts.
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b. The Regulatory Framework for Designated Contract Markets
DCMs are CFTC-regulated exchanges that provide participants in the
derivatives markets with the ability to trade derivative contracts.\7\
In order to
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obtain and maintain designation as contract markets with the CFTC, DCMs
must comply with statutory ``Core Principles'' that are set forth in
the CEA,\8\ as well as applicable CFTC rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.\9\ The statutory Core Principles for DCMs
reflect the important role that these exchanges play in promoting the
integrity of derivatives markets. DCMs are self-regulatory
organizations, and each DCM has Core Principle obligations to, among
other matters, establish and enforce rules for trading on the DCM \10\
and provide a competitive, open and efficient market for trading.\11\
Therefore, although each DCM is a commercial enterprise, the fact that
each entity has self-regulatory obligations means that each entity ``is
not simply a corporation, but a corporation charged with the public
trust.'' \12\
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\7\ See CEA section 1a(6), 7 U.S.C. 1a(6) (defining the term
``board of trade'' to mean any organized exchange or other trading
facility); CEA section 1a(51)(A), 7 U.S.C. 1a(51)(A) (defining the
term ``trading facility'' to mean a person or group of persons that
constitutes, maintains, or provides a physical or electronic
facility or system in which multiple participants have the ability
to execute or trade agreements, contracts, or transactions--(i) by
accepting bids or offers made by other participants that are open to
multiple participants in the facility or system; or (ii) through the
interaction of multiple bids or multiple offers within a system with
a pre-determined non-discretionary automated trade matching or
execution algorithm); and CEA section 5(d)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C.
7(d)(1)(A) (providing that to be designated, and maintain a
designation, as a contract market, a board of trade shall comply
with--(i) any core principle described in this subsection; and (ii)
any requirement that the Commission may impose by rule or regulation
pursuant to CEA section 8a(5)).
\8\ See, generally, CEA section 5(d), 7 U.S.C. 7(d). There are
23 statutory Core Principles for DCMs.
\9\ CEA section 5(d)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1)(A); 17 CFR part 38.
\10\ DCM Core Principle 2 requires, among other things, that a
DCM establish, monitor, and enforce compliance with the rules of the
DCM, including access requirements, the terms and conditions of any
contracts to be traded on the DCM, and rules prohibiting abusive
trade practices on the DCM. DCM Core Principle 2 also requires a DCM
to have the capacity to detect, investigate, and apply appropriate
sanctions to any person that violates any rule of the DCM. CEA
section 5(d)(2), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(2); see also 17 CFR 38.150-38.160.
\11\ DCM Core Principle 9 requires, among other things, that a
DCM provide a competitive, open, and efficient market and mechanism
for executing transactions that protects the price discovery process
of trading in the centralized market of the DCM. CEA section
5(d)(9), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(9); see also 17 CFR 38.500.
\12\ See ``Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations,
Designated Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding
the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest,'' Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 75 FR 63732 (Oct. 18, 2010).
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Section 3(b) of the CEA confers on the Commission the
responsibility to ensure that each DCM appropriately prioritizes its
self-regulatory obligations,\13\ which include, e.g., establishing and
enforcing rules applicable to its member futures commission merchants
(``FCMs'') and other intermediaries with respect to their financial
integrity,\14\ financial standards,\15\ segregation of customer and
proprietary funds,\16\ custody of customer funds,\17\ investment
standards for customer funds,\18\ default procedures,\19\ and related
recordkeeping.\20\ Core Principle 11 also requires a DCM ensure the
financial integrity of transactions entered into on or through its
facilities by establishing and enforcing rules concerning the clearance
and settlement thereof by a derivatives clearing organization.\21\
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\13\ CEA section 3(b), 7 U.S.C. 5(b).
\14\ CEA section 5(d)(11), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(11).
\15\ 17 CFR 38.603.
\16\ Id.
\17\ Id.
\18\ Id.
\19\ Id.
\20\ Id.
\21\ CEA section 5(d)(11), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(11).
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Each DCM also has a specific statutory obligation under DCM Core
Principle 3 to only list for trading derivative contracts that are not
readily susceptible to manipulation.\22\ A DCM may elect to list a new
derivative contract for trading either by ``self-certifying'' to the
Commission that the contract complies with the CEA and CFTC
regulations,\23\ or by seeking Commission approval to list the
contract.\24\ In either case, the DCM must submit the contract's terms
and conditions, and other prescribed information relating to the
contract, to the Commission prior to listing.\25\
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\22\ CEA section 5(d)(3), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(3); see also 17 CFR
38.200-38.201.
\23\ CEA section 5c(c)(1), 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c)(1); see also 17 CFR
40.2.
\24\ CEA section 5c(c)(4)-(5), 7 U.S.C. 7a-2(c)(4)-(5); see also
17 CFR 40.3.
\25\ See generally 17 CFR 40.2 and 40.3. Amendments to contract
terms and conditions also must be submitted to the Commission in
accordance with procedures set forth at CEA section 5c(c), 7 U.S.C.
7a-2(c), and 17 CFR part 40.
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Core Principle 4 further requires that DCMs have the capacity and
responsibility to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and
disruptions of the delivery or cash settlement process, through market
surveillance, compliance, and enforcement practices and procedures.\26\
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\26\ CEA section 5(d)(4), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(4); see also 17 CFR
38.250-38.258.
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For a number of the DCM Core Principles, the Commission has adopted
rules that establish the manner in which a DCM must comply with the
relevant Core Principle.\27\ These implementing rules are set forth in
part 38 of the Commission's regulations.\28\ The Commission has also
adopted, in appendix B to part 38,\29\ guidance and acceptable
practices for DCMs to consider with respect to certain of the Core
Principles.\30\ For example, the Appendix B Guidance provides that the
detection and prevention of market manipulation, disruptions, and
distortions should be incorporated into the design of programs a DCM
uses to monitor trading activity.\31\ Further, monitoring of intraday
trading should include the capacity to detect developing market
anomalies, including abnormal price movements and unusual trading
volumes, and position-limit violations.\32\
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\27\ Unless otherwise determined by the Commission by rule or
regulation, a DCM has reasonable discretion in establishing the
manner in which it complies with a Core Principle. CEA section
5(d)(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. 7(d)(1)(B).
\28\ 17 CFR part 38.
\29\ 17 CFR part 38, appendix B (the ``Appendix B Guidance'').
\30\ See 17 CFR part 38, appendix C. Guidance set forth in the
Appendix B Guidance states that a DCM may use the Appendix C
Guidance as guidance in meeting DCM Core Principle 3 for both new
product listings and existing listed contracts. 17 CFR part 38,
Appendix B Guidance, Core Principle 3.
\31\ Appendix B Guidance.
\32\ Id.
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Moreover, with respect to the DCM Core Principle 3 requirement that
a DCM only list for trading derivatives contracts that are not readily
susceptible to manipulation, the Commission has adopted guidance that
is set forth in appendix C to part 38--Demonstration of Compliance That
a Contract is Not Readily Susceptible to Manipulation.\33\ The Appendix
C Guidance outlines certain relevant considerations for a DCM both when
designing a derivative contract and providing supporting documentation
and data in connection with the submission of the derivative contract
listing to the Commission.\34\ The Commission takes the considerations
outlined in the Appendix C Guidance into account when determining
whether, with respect to a particular contract, the DCM is satisfying
its DCM Core Principle 3 obligation only to list derivatives contracts
that are not readily susceptible to manipulation.
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\33\ 17 CFR part 38, appendix C (the ``Appendix C Guidance'').
\34\ See Core Principles and Other Requirements for Designated
Contract Markets, 77 FR 36612, 36632 (June 19, 2012).
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Among other matters, the Appendix C Guidance outlines, for both
physically-settled and cash-settled derivatives contracts, certain
considerations in connection with the design of the contract's rules
and terms and conditions.\35\ The Commission
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preliminarily understands that the majority of compute derivatives
initially would be cash-settled because of the potential
infrastructure-related challenges associated with delivering the
underlying commodity. With respect to cash-settled derivative
contracts, the Appendix C Guidance states that an acceptable
specification of the cash settlement price would, among other things,
include rules that fully describe the essential economic
characteristics of the underlying commodity, as well as how the final
settlement price is calculated.\36\ The Appendix C Guidance further
provides that the utility of a cash-settled contract for risk
management and price discovery purposes would be significantly impaired
if the cash settlement price is not a reliable or robust indicator of
the value of the underlying commodity.\37\ Accordingly, the Appendix C
Guidance states that careful consideration should be given to the
potential for manipulation or distortion of the cash settlement price,
as well as the reliability of that price as an indicator of cash market
values.\38\
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\35\ Physically-settled derivative contracts are contracts that
may settle directly into the commodity underlying the contract. If
the holder of a position in a physically-settled derivative contract
still has an open position at the expiration of trading in the
contract, then the position holder must, in accordance with the
rules for delivery set forth in the contract, make or take delivery
(as applicable) of the underlying commodity. By contrast, cash-
settled derivative contracts are, at the expiration of trading in
the contract, settled by way of a cash payment instead of physical
delivery of the underlying commodity.
\36\ Appendix C Guidance, paragraph (c)(1).
\37\ Appendix C Guidance, paragraph (c)(2).
\38\ Id. The Appendix C Guidance requires appropriate
consideration also should be given to the commercial acceptability,
public availability, and timeliness of the price series that is used
to calculate the cash settlement price.
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c. Compute Markets
1. White House Directives
The United States is in a race to achieve global dominance in AI.
As the White House described in its July 2025 AI Action Plan (``AI
Action Plan''), ``whoever has the largest AI ecosystem will set global
AI standards and reap broad economic and military benefits. . . . [I]t
is imperative that the United States and its allies win this race.''
\39\ Indeed, one of the recommended policy actions of America's AI
Action Plan is to ensure access to large-scale compute for startups and
academics by improving the financial market for compute.\40\ President
Trump took decisive steps toward achieving American AI leadership
during his first days in office by signing Executive Order 14179,
``Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial
Intelligence.'' \41\ These actions echo the statutory purposes and
objectives of the Commission that Congress codified in the Act in 1974,
including furthering the national public interest in the commodity
derivative markets by promoting responsible innovation and fair
competition therein.
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\39\ The White House, Winning the Race: America's AI Action Plan
(July 23, 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Americas-AI-Action-Plan.pdf.
\40\ Id. at 4.
\41\ Executive Order 14179, Removing Barriers to American
Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, 90 FR 8741 (Jan. 31, 2025).
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2. Overview of Potential Challenges in the Development in Compute
Derivatives Markets
The price of compute is one of the most material costs of AI that
affects the entire AI production stack.\42\ A compute futures market
may therefore provide a means for managing and assuming price risks,
discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information as to general
trends in AI adoption. Futures markets aggregate the disparate views of
individual market participants and are designed to reveal prices that
allows such market participants to efficiently hedge risks or speculate
(in this case, on, for example, the future scale of AI demand). In
short, compute futures contracts would allow financial markets ``to
aggregate and reveal information about the future of the AI economy.''
\43\
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\42\ NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang described the AI stack as a five-
layer cake, involving energy, chips, infrastructure, models, and
applications. ``The compute market sits at the interface between
infrastructure and model production. Its price, therefore, contains
information about both sides of the AI economy. On the supply side,
it reflects the cost of deploying and operating data centers, which
in turn depends on the cost of chips, energy and other inputs. On
the demand side, it reflects the value of training and inference
workloads, which in turn depends on the productivity of AI
applications and, ultimately, on the scale of AI adoption.'' (Early)
AI Compute Asset Pricing, at 3.
\43\ Id.
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However, there are potential challenges to the development of a
mature compute derivatives market. The Commission preliminarily
understands that compute markets are fragmented and price formation
primarily occurs in opaque bilateral transactions, hindering the
availability of current and historical price data, along with consensus
still forming concerning the appropriate underlying ``compute''
commodity. Moreover, dominant market participants may wield significant
pricing power that may lead to manipulability, preferential pricing
arrangements, and, in turn, unfair market dynamics. Further, pricing
can vary dramatically across providers, regions, and contract
structures. In other words, the Commission preliminarily believes that
compute may not yet exhibit certain of the characteristics of
commodities that typically underlie a commodity derivatives market,
including fungibility, standardization, and sufficient liquidity.\44\
These complex issues are novel in some respects, but also informed by
historical antecedents in the development of derivative markets in
similar commodities.\45\
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\44\ Dennis W. Carlton. Futures markets: Their purpose, their
history, their growth, their successes and failures, 4 J. of Futures
Mkts. 237-71 (1984); see also Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353
(1982) (``In the 19th century, the practice of trading in futures
contracts led to the development of recognized exchanges or boards
of trade. At such exchanges, standardized agreements covering
specific quantities of graded agricultural commodities to be
delivered during specified months in the future were bought and sold
pursuant to rules developed by the traders themselves. Necessarily,
the commodities subject to such contracts were fungible. For an
active market in the contracts to develop, it also was essential
that the contracts themselves be fungible. The exchanges therefore
developed standard terms describing the quantity and quality of the
commodity, the time and place of delivery, and the method of
payment; the only variable was price. The purchase or sale of a
futures contract on an exchange is therefore motivated by a single
factor--the opportunity to make a profit (or to minimize the risk of
loss) from a change in the market price.'').
\45\ See, e.g., Proposal To Exempt Certain Transactions
Involving Not-for-Profit Electric Utilities, 77 FR 164 (Aug. 23,
2012) (``Unlike many physical commodities, electric energy is not
capable of being purchased in large commercial quantities ahead of
time, delivered, and stored for later consumption or use. That is,
electric energy must be used or consumed on an as-needed basis.'').
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For example, with respect to fungibility and standardization, the
Commission preliminarily understands that the commodity underlying a
compute futures contract would typically be access to rented compute
capacity from hardware the purchaser of such capacity does not own
(e.g., the hourly rental price of compute from a B200), though the
underlier may be a different type of compute-related commodity, such as
access to a stated volume of LLM inference tokens. The Commission
preliminarily believes that the price of the compute underlying a
futures contract would likely be derived from a bundle of factors
(e.g., provider, region, contract structures). Thus, it is the
Commission's preliminary belief that the emergence of a compute
derivatives market in accordance with Commission rules and regulations
would likely require standardizing variables typically associated with
compute, both with respect to the price index used as a settlement
reference, and with respect to the standards of compute that is
required to be physically delivered.
II. Request for Comment
The Commission has a statutory obligation under the CEA to, among
other matters, foster the national public
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interest in the commodity derivatives markets by ``promot[ing]
responsible innovation'' therein. In adherence to this obligation and
the CEA's other purposes,\46\ as well as the AI Action Plan and in
light of the context set forth above, the Commission is seeking input
on the following questions.
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\46\ See CEA section 3(b), 7 U.S.C. 5(b), providing that ``it is
further the purpose of this chapter to deter and prevent price
manipulation or any other disruptions to market integrity; to ensure
the financial integrity of all transactions subject to this chapter
and the avoidance of systemic risk; to protect all market
participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales practices and
misuses of customer assets.''
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1. Compute Cash Markets: Size, Liquidity, and Other Considerations
a. How does observed price behavior in compute markets compare to
price behavior in cash markets underlying derivatives that the
Commission has customarily regulated? In responding, please distinguish
between on-demand, spot, reserved, committed purchase modes, and state
for each the volume transacted, the number of distinct counterparties
transacting, and whether any transaction price is published. Are there
particular commodity markets that the Commission should consider as
being especially relevant or similar to the compute cash market?
b. What data sources, analyses, calculations, variables, or other
factors should be used to determine the market size, liquidity,
transaction volume, types of participants, and supplier concentration
of compute markets? Please distinguish between publicly available data
sources and the data derived from non-public, bilateral agreements. How
should the Commission consider the fact that, in the Commission's
preliminary understanding, non-public, bilateral agreements carry the
majority of economic value but tend to be undisclosed and negotiated
privately?
c. What proportion of compute transactions occur at publicly
disclosed prices, and what proportion does not? What data applicable to
this question is available by voluntary disclosure, as opposed to
obligations under statutory, regulatory, or contractual obligations?
Would it be appropriate to permit trading in a derivative contract
settling to a price computed from data that the Commission may not be
able to observe, verify, or surveil, in whole or in part?
d. Have any audits, studies, or independent verifications of the
transaction data referenced in question 1(c) above been conducted, and
if so, what did they conclude?
e. How do the characteristics of the compute cash markets differ
from those of the cash markets underlying derivatives customarily
regulated by the Commission? Please address the following
characteristics: (i) whether the underlying commodity is storable; (ii)
whether a publicly observable transaction record exists, and what
proportion of the total transaction volume it captures; (iii) the
number of producers of the commodity and the share of commodity
production attributable to the largest producers; (iv) the extent to
which units of the commodity are fungible across producers without
adjustment, and if not, what quality or grade adjustments are necessary
to foster fungibility; and (v) whether any price reporting agency or
enforced standardized methodology exists.
f. Please describe any potential effects on the cash market for
compute that may arise in connection with the listing or trading of
compute derivatives. In particular, would the existence of a listed
futures contract settling to a published compute index change provider
incentives with respect to the publication of posted rates, the pricing
or structuring of bilateral reservations, the disclosure of utilization
and committed capacity data, or the allocation of capacity amongst
purchasers? How should the Commission consider whether the parties best
positioned to influence the reference price are the same parties that
supply capacity or contribute transactions or posted rates from which
price is computed? Is this different from other derivative contracts
and their commodity underliers?
g. Regarding DCM Core Principle 5, what would be an appropriate
deliverable supply estimate methodology to evaluate the necessity and
appropriateness of position limits or position accountability levels?
2. Market Oversight and Susceptibility to Manipulation
a. Core Principle 3 requires a DCM to list only contracts not
readily susceptible to manipulation. What features would a compute
derivatives contract that cash settles to an index calculated over
predominantly bilateral and privately priced cash market transactions
be required to demonstrate to satisfy that standard, consistent with
the Appendix C Guidance?
b. Certain published compute price series are constructed in whole
or in part from posted or listed rates that the compute capacity
providers themselves administer, with the remainder of transactions
executed on venues that a small number of participants operate or
dominate. Are there protections or requirements that would prevent a
compute capacity provider from manipulating a cash settlement index by
adjusting a posted rate, directing capacity onto or away from a venue
whose transactions the index calculation methodology treats as input
data, or by executing or declining to execute transactions during the
observation window? Please describe any such protections or
requirements which the Commission should consider.
c. What volume, transaction-frequency, and contributor
concentration data typically characterize the population from which a
compute reference price may be calculated? What thresholds would be
appropriate for a compute settlement reference price given the
idiosyncrasies of the cash markets for compute?
d. Core Principle 4 requires a DCM to have the capacity and
responsibility to prevent manipulation, price distortion, and
disruption of the delivery or cash-settlement process. What
surveillance capabilities would be necessary to satisfy Core Principle
4 for compute derivatives, and are those capabilities presently
feasible from a technological, operational, and legal perspective?
Should a DCM be expected or required to maintain an information-sharing
arrangement with each compute venue and each compute capacity provider
whose transactions or posted rates enter a settlement reference price
against which a compute derivative settles on the DCM?
e. What, if any, recalibration of market safeguards, risk controls,
and liquidity protections should a DCM implement for compute
derivatives to ensure price formation remains representative of genuine
supply and demand, and to prevent thin liquidity conditions from
resulting in disproportionate or runaway price movements that could
influence benchmark markets?
f. Are there any types or patterns of trader or intermediary
conduct that has occurred in the compute cash markets that raise market
risks or challenges and should be monitored closely by trading venues
or regulators? How do these risks and challenges compare to cash
markets underlying more mature futures products?
g. Appendix C to part 38 provides that a cash-settled derivative
contract is readily susceptible to manipulation if the settlement price
is not reliable, acceptable, publicly available, and timely, and is
computed from a cash market that is sufficiently liquid and not itself
readily susceptible to manipulation. Is there a cash price series for
compute cash markets that could serve as a reference price that
[[Page 54264]]
satisfies those criteria? Please describe the series, its computation
methodology and governance, and the venues and transaction volumes from
which it is derived. What steps should the Commission take, if any, if
no such cash price series is available?
h. The Appendix C Guidance addresses the adequacy of deliverable
supply and susceptibility to squeezes and corners. What is the
estimated deliverable supply for compute at the relevant pricing point
or points and how are they measured? Please provide associated data.
i. Are there any other considerations the Commission should take
into account with respect to evaluating a DCM's compliance with the
Core Principles in connection with the listing and trading of compute
derivatives?
3. Customer Protection of Market Participants
a. What heightened anti-money laundering and know your customers
concerns, if any, are present in the compute markets, as compared to
more mature commodities markets? What challenges may introducing
brokers, FCMs, and other intermediaries face in implementing a BSA/AML
program for compute futures?
b. What customer-protection considerations, such as disclosure
requirements arise from offering a compute derivatives contract
settling against a geopolitically sensitive commodity, including to
retail participants? How do these considerations differ, if at all,
from derivatives that settle against other commodities, such as oil?
c. Should the terms and conditions of a compute futures contract be
required to include any specific information related to idiosyncratic
risks? If so, what are those idiosyncratic risks?
d. What, if any, unique protections and prophylactic measures are
appropriate or necessary for the protection of retail users of compute
derivatives and markets, including as compared to other derivatives
markets?
e. Are there any types of trader or intermediary conduct that are
particular to compute cash markets and contemplated compute derivative
markets, including any such conduct that may require additional action
by the Commission?
4. Perpetual Compute Futures
a. Would perpetual compute futures have advantages for market
participants over ``traditional'' or ``fixed date'' futures contracts?
Would perpetual compute derivatives provide commercial risk management
features that cannot be met with existing products?
b. Would perpetual compute derivatives pose any unique risks for
market participants or the broader markets? Are there additional
protections or safeguards that the Commission or exchanges should adopt
to mitigate risks associated with these products?
III. General Request for Comment and Data
The Commission is requesting comment from the public on all aspects
of these questions and encourages the public to provide any information
that may provide value to the Commission as it considers compute
derivatives markets. The Commission particularly encourages commenters
to provide empirical and data-driven input.
IV. Regulatory Planning and Review
This request for comment is a significant regulatory action under
section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, and has been reviewed by the
Office of Management and Budget.
Issued in Washington, DC, on August 19, 2026, by the Commission.
Christopher Kirkpatrick,
Secretary of the Commission.
Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of
Federal Regulations.
Appendix To Request for Comment on the Listing of Compute Derivatives
Contracts--Commission Voting Summary
On this matter, Chairman Selig voted in the affirmative. No
Commissioner voted in the negative.
[FR Doc. 2026-17163 Filed 8-20-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6351-01-P