

& Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202–418–0530.

Press Access—Members of the news media are welcome to attend the meeting and will be provided reserved seating on a first-come, first-served basis. Following the meeting, the Chairman may hold a news conference in which she will take questions from credentialed members of the press in attendance. Also, senior policy and legal staff will be made available to the press in attendance for questions related to the items on the meeting agenda. Commissioners may also choose to hold press conferences. Press may also direct questions to the Office of Media Relations (OMR): MediaRelations@fcc.gov. Questions about credentialing should be directed to OMR.

Additional information concerning this meeting may be obtained from the Office of Media Relations, (202) 418–0500. Audio/Video coverage of the meeting will be broadcast live with open captioning over the internet from the FCC Live web page at www.fcc.gov/live.

Authority: This meeting is held, in accordance with the Government in the Sunshine Act (Sunshine Act), Public Law 94–409, as amended (5 U.S.C. 552b).

Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,
Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2026–15733 Filed 7–30–26; 4:15 pm]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[OMB 3060–0805; FR ID 359781]

Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, and as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on the following information collection. Comments are requested concerning: whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; the accuracy of the Commission's

burden estimate; ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and ways to further reduce the information collection burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

DATES: Written PRA comments should be submitted on or before October 2, 2026. If you anticipate that you will be submitting comments, but find it difficult to do so within the period of time allowed by this notice, you should advise the contact listed below as soon as possible.

ADDRESSES: Direct all PRA comments to Nicole Ongele, FCC, via email PRA@fcc.gov and to nicole.ongele@fcc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For additional information about the information collection, contact Nicole Ongele, (202) 418–2991.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

OMB Control Number: 3060–0805.

Title: Section 90.527, Regional Plan Requirements; and Section 90.523, Eligibility.

Form No.: N/A.

Type of Review: Revision of a currently approved collection.

Respondents: Business or other for profit; not-for-profit institutions; state, local or tribal government.

Number of Respondents and Responses: 1,066 respondents; 1,066 responses.

Estimated Time per Response: 1 hour.

Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting and one-time reporting requirements; third party disclosure.

Obligation to Respond: Required to obtain or retain benefits (47 CFR 90.523 and 90.527). Statutory authority for this information collection is contained in 4(i), 11, 303(g), 303(r), 332(c)(7), and 337(f) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 161, 303(g), 303(r), 332(c)(7), and 337(f), unless otherwise noted.

Total Annual Burden: 1,066 hours.

Total Annual Cost: No Cost.

Needs and Uses: Section 90.523 requires that nongovernmental organizations that provide services which protect the safety of life or property obtain a written statement from an authorizing state or local government entity to support the nongovernmental organization's application for assignment of 700 MHz frequencies.

Section 90.527 requires 700 MHz regional planning regions to submit an initial plan for use of the 700 MHz general use spectrum in the

consolidated narrowband segment 769–775 MHz and 799–805 MHz. Regional planning committees may modify plans by written request, which must contain the full text of the modification and certification that the modification was successfully coordinated with adjacent regions. Regional planning promotes a fair and open process in developing allocation assignments by requiring input from eligible entities in the allocation decisions and the application technical review/approval process. Entities that seek inclusion in the plan to obtain future licenses are considered third party respondents.

Commission staff use the information to assign licenses, determine regional spectrum requirements and to develop technical standards. The information is also used to determine whether prospective licensees operate in compliance with the Commission's rules. Without such information, the Commission could not accommodate regional requirements or provide for the efficient use of the available frequencies. This information collection includes rules to govern the operation and licensing of the 700 MHz band rules and regulation to ensure that licensees continue to fulfill their statutory responsibilities in accordance with the Communications Act of 1934, as amended. Such information will continue to be used to verify that applicants are legally and technically qualified to hold licenses, and to determine compliance with Commission rules.

Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,

Secretary, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2026–15685 Filed 7–31–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[PSHSB & OET: PS Docket No. 26–189; DA 26–758; FR ID 359960]

Seeking Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Certain Foreign-Produced Military-Grade Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS) and UAS Critical Components for Non-U.S. Government, Including Those With Swarming Capabilities

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) seek comment on

proposing to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain military-grade foreign-made UAS and UAS critical components that are found on the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Covered List. Through this Public Notice, acting pursuant to section 2.939 of the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET propose to apply such prohibitions given that these devices have been found to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of United States persons pursuant to the Secure and Trusted Communications Act of 2019.

DATES: Comments are due on or before September 2, 2026.

ADDRESSES: Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on or before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. You may submit comments, identified by PS Docket No. 26–189, by any of the following methods:

- *Federal Communications Commission's Website:* <https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs>. Follow the instructions for submitting comments. *Electronic Filers:* Comments may be filed electronically using the internet by accessing the ECFS: <https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs>.

- *Paper Filers:* Parties who choose to file by paper must file an original and one copy of each filing.

- Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.

- Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of before entering the building.

- Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis Junction, MD 20701.

- Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554.

- *People with Disabilities:* Contact the FCC to request reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202–418–0530.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Chris Smeenk, Attorney Advisor, Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418–1630 or Chris.Smeenk@fcc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Public Notice released on July 21, 2026 in PS Docket No. 26–189. The full text of this document is available at: <https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-758A1.docx>.

In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment identified on the Covered List. However, the Commission did not revoke previously granted authorizations of covered equipment. In October 2025, the Commission adopted the *EA Security Second R&O* (90 FR 53227) which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the underlying authorization. The Commission noted that its goal is to mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C. 1601(b).

The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to “institute proceedings to determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the equipment currently on the Covered List,” and it delegated authority to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework and process outlined in the *EA Security Second R&O*. The Commission gave specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and implement the new procedures.

On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List. This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and to the safety and security of United States persons.

Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment: foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components on the FCC's Covered List that qualify as “military-grade” as defined below.

The Commission has legal authority to review an existing authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization pursuant to current rules. Under section 2.939(a), the FCC may “revoke . . . any equipment authorization” for various reasons, including “conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would warrant it in refusing to grant an original application.” Likewise, under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET “may place limitations on an existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit continued importation or marketing” of such equipment.

Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of any previously-authorized military-grade UAS or UAS critical component that is listed on the Covered List. We propose to limit the proposed prohibitions to military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, which we define on the basis of other agencies' regulations governing certain high-risk UAS, and following discussions with our partners in other national security agencies. Specifically, we consider military-grade UAS and UAS critical components to be any of the following:

(1) UAS that weigh 55 pounds or more on takeoff, *i.e.* UAS that are not “small unmanned aircraft” pursuant to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rules.

- These UAS are considered “larger platforms” that offer greater payload capacity, endurance, and range, which make them suitable for military operations requiring heavy sensors, communications equipment, or specialized weapons systems (*i.e.*, deep-strike operations, persistent wide-area surveillance, electronic warfare, and cargo resupply).

- Their increased power and stability also allow them to operate effectively in more demanding environments, making them highly effective for various missions.

- UAS that weigh over 55 pounds or more operating individually or in a swarm have the capability to carry out a significant attack on the United States homeland.

(2) UAS capable of dispensing “economic poison” under FAA rules.

- These UAS can be used to deliver hazardous substances in ways that bypass traditional defense and detection systems. Their ability to fly autonomously, reach remote areas, and carry dangerous materials make them ideal for military operations.

- Aerosol dispensing platforms operating independently or in a swarm

can carry out mass chemical or biological attacks against United States persons and our food supply.

(3) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of thermal imaging (*i.e.* the capability to capture and translate the difference in temperature between objects, as well as an object's heat signature and residual heat signature).

- UAS that feature these sensors are ideal for military use because their ability to operate effectively in low visibility environments enhances night operations, covert surveillance, and targeting capabilities.

- These capabilities allow forces to bypass camouflage, navigate in total darkness, and identify concealed heat signatures that are entirely invisible to standard optical sensors and the human eye.

- These capabilities also make it more difficult to protect critical infrastructure, maintain operational security, and prevent intelligence collection in sensitive areas.

(4) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a "remote sensing technology that measures distance by illuminating a target with a laser and analyzing the reflected light."

- These UAS offer military utility by providing enhanced capability to conduct detailed three-dimensional terrain mapping, penetrate dense foliage to reveal hidden structures, assist in autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, and conduct covert reconnaissance under a range of environmental conditions.

(5) UAS docking stations, defined as multipurpose systems that enable UAS to land safely, take off, recharge and/or replace batteries, and transfer data and payload.

- UAS docking stations are infrastructure that enable persistent, 24/7 autonomous operations allowing faster, more continuous intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other mission workflows.

- Additionally, by serving as coordinated launch, recovery, and servicing nodes, docking stations facilitate the capability for large-scale drone swarms to support military operations.

(6) UAS "specially designed to incorporate a defense article."

- These UAS are ideal for military use because they can enable combat commanders to conduct unparalleled precision strikes, kinetic effect delivery, and electronic warfare capabilities at a significantly lower cost and risk to human life than manned aircraft.

- They also extend range, persistence, or precision beyond traditional platforms.

(7) Swarming UAS, defined as:

- Ground control stations purpose-built for, or UAS integrated with flight control or vehicle management systems specially designed for, managing drone swarms, consisting of UAS that operate autonomously (without human intervention) to coordinate with each other, avoid collisions, maintain formations, and dynamically respond to changes in operational or threat environments, or if weaponized, synchronize targeting activities across multiple drones; or

- UAS purpose-built to perform flights in coordinated and synchronized formations, including applications such as multi-UAS light shows, where numerous illuminated UAS work together to create synchronized aerial displays.

- This capability enables large numbers of UAS to coordinate autonomously, making them harder to detect, track, and counter.

- Swarm-enabled UAS can overwhelm defenses, provide persistent surveillance, and create complex operational challenges that strain traditional air defense systems, which pose significant risks to public safety and national security.

This prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, nor would it apply to any domestically produced UAS or UAS critical components or to any other already-authorized covered equipment. It would also only apply to *covered* UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from the Covered List—including UAS and UAS critical components identified on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as "domestic end products" under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a); and UAS and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by the Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security. Any UAS or UAS critical component subsequently removed from the Covered List, such as through Conditional Approval, would also be exempt from this prohibition. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product development. Finally, while

importation and marketing would be prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components.

We seek comment on this list of prohibitions. Does this list adequately capture military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are listed above, but are not military-grade? Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are not listed above that are military-grade?

Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized covered equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized covered equipment serves the public interest.

National security impacts. We start with national security concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, "[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation." In the *EA Security Second R&O*, the Commission stated that older models of covered equipment, which are still widely sold in the United States, pose an unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the United States, "not only when such equipment is new to the market." The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment "likely remain[] marketable in the United States" and "may present continuing national security threats." The Commission also directed PSHSB and OET to "give particular weight to the fact that the relevant equipment was determined to pose 'an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.'"

Subject to exceptions, an Executive Branch interagency body with appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national security agencies, one of whom was the Department of War, specifically determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign countries "pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons." This determination of "unacceptable risks" was based on an assessment of "threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential

threats to the homeland.” We tentatively accept this determination and “give [it] particular weight,” as the Commission directed. This determination, which covered foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components generally, necessarily includes already-authorized foreign-produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components.

Therefore, based on the *EA Security Second R&O* and the UAS and UAS critical component National Security Determination, we tentatively conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components as described above is necessary to protect national security by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.

We also believe that military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components might pose even particularly acute national security or related risks, given their military-grade capabilities. We invite comment on whether military-grade UAS and UAS critical components, as described above, pose particularly acute national security risks of the sort described in the National Security Determination.

Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of already-authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical components. How would this proposed action affect the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, it may consider “countervailing economic concerns when implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.” What are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh either in favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to provide data that we should consider in our analysis.

We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have substantial economic and supply chain impacts. Outside of importation, marketing, and sales to the U.S. government, which are excluded from the scope of this proposed action, military-grade UAS and UAS critical components represent a minority of the remaining UAS and UAS critical component market. Recreational consumers comprise the majority of individual drone operators and are unlikely to fly military-grade UAS. While foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components dominate the recreational market, domestic

production of UAS and UAS critical components in the higher-end, military-grade subsectors is more prevalent. Moreover, several of the categories of UAS and UAS critical components are subject to U.S. export controls or other regulatory restrictions and likely comprise a small market within the United States.

Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are relatively minor and contained? Are there domestically-produced alternatives for military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Would this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining trusted equipment? Would providers’ compliance costs decrease as they replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs to this prohibition.

On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S. manufacturing jobs. Additionally, billions more have been committed for domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are expected to generate additional jobs. These investments include capital from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S. manufacturing. We tentatively conclude that the proposed prohibitions of military-grade UAS and UAS critical components would similarly generate substantial investment in domestic production, given the loss of foreign-produced supply. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the economic effects of the likely investment in United States production that this proposed prohibition would yield.

Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components is consistent with the public interest, because it protects American communications networks from devices specifically determined by an Executive Branch interagency body to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”

We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized equipment. After all, as the

Commission noted in the *EA Security Second R&O*, “[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.” We seek comment on this public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh in favor or against taking this proposed action?

We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of previously-authorized covered equipment that are military-grade UAS and UAS critical components in communications networks with the impact of the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry, and the public at large.

Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components that are already in the hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the approach that the Commission adopted in the *EA Security Second R&O*. The limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and, therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices that consumers already possess.

Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all importation and marketing activities regarding such previously-authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components 180 days after publication in the **Federal Register**. We believe that this timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential adverse economic or supply chain impacts. Although the Commission’s prohibition with respect to covered equipment added to the Covered List in 2024 or earlier took effect within 10 days of publication in the **Federal Register**, given the expected large scope of equipment at issue in this proposed prohibition, as well as the shorter time that such foreign produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components have been listed on the Covered List, we believe that a more extended time period to permit an orderly transition is appropriate.

We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically, we request that commenters address implementation considerations including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into the United States and are available for or being held for marketing or sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the United States or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet entered the supply chain.

Permit-but-disclose proceeding. The proceeding this Public Notice initiates shall be treated as a “permit-but-disclose” proceeding in accordance with the Commission’s *ex parte* rules. Persons making *ex parte* presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must: (1) list all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at which the *ex parte* presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data presented and arguments made during the presentation.

If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter’s written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.

Documents shown or given to Commission staff during *ex parte* meetings are deemed to be written *ex parte* presentations and must be filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule 1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of electronic filing, written *ex parte* presentations and memoranda summarizing oral *ex parte* presentations, and all attachments thereto, must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g., .doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding should familiarize

themselves with the Commission’s *ex parte* rules.

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 229, 301, 302a(b), 303, 1004, 1601–1609; Pub. L. 117–55, 135 Stat. 423–24.

Federal Communications Commission.

Zenji Nakazawa,

Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.

[FR Doc. 2026–15659 Filed 7–31–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[OMB 3060–0848; FR ID 360191]

Information Collection Being Reviewed by the Federal Communications Commission

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Notice; request for comments.

SUMMARY: As part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork burdens, and as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA) of 1995, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission) invites the general public and other Federal agencies to take this opportunity to comment on the following information collection. Comments are requested concerning: whether the proposed collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical utility; the accuracy of the Commission’s burden estimate; ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information collected; ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on the respondents, including the use of automated collection techniques or other forms of information technology; and ways to further reduce the information collection burden on small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.

DATES: Written PRA comments should be submitted on or before October 2, 2026. If you anticipate that you will be submitting comments, but find it difficult to do so within the period of time allowed by this notice, you should advise the contact listed below as soon as possible.

ADDRESSES: Direct all PRA comments to Nicole Ongele, FCC, via email PRA@fcc.gov and to nicole.ongele@fcc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For additional information about the information collection, contact Nicole Ongele, (202) 418–2991.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

OMB Control Number: 3060–0848.

Title: Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, CC Docket No. 98–147.

Form Number: N/A.

Type of Review: Extension of a currently approved collection.

Respondents: Business or other for-profit.

Number of Respondents and Responses: 584 respondents; 7,278 responses.

Estimated Time per Response: 0.5–26 hours.

Frequency of Response: On occasion reporting requirement, recordkeeping requirement and third-party disclosure requirement.

Obligation to Respond: Required to obtain or retain benefits. Statutory authority for this information collection is contained in 47 U.S.C. 201 and 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended.

Total Annual Burden: 25,873 hours.

Total Annual Cost: No cost.

Needs and Uses: The information collection requirements implement sections 201 and 251 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to provide for physical collocation on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory, and to promote deployment of advanced telecommunications services without significantly degrading the performance of other services.

All of the requirements will be used by the Commission and competitive local exchange carriers (LECs) to facilitate the deployment of telecommunications services, including advanced telecommunications services.

Federal Communications Commission.

Marlene Dortch,

Secretary, Office of the Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2026–15678 Filed 7–31–26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6712–01–P

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

Formations of, Acquisitions by, and Mergers of Bank Holding Companies

The companies listed in this notice have applied to the Board for approval, pursuant to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (12 U.S.C. 1841 *et seq.*) (BHC Act), Regulation Y (12 CFR part 225), and all other applicable statutes and regulations to become a bank holding company and/or to acquire the assets or the ownership of, control of, or the power to vote shares of a bank or bank holding company and all of the