[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 147 (Monday, August 3, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 48870-48874]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-15659]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[PSHSB & OET: PS Docket No. 26-189; DA 26-758; FR ID 359960]
Seeking Comment on Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of
Certain Foreign-Produced Military-Grade Uncrewed Aircraft Systems (UAS)
and UAS Critical Components for Non-U.S. Government, Including Those
With Swarming Capabilities
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this document, the Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau (PSHSB) and the Office of Engineering and Technology (OET) seek
comment on
[[Page 48871]]
proposing to prohibit the continued importation and marketing of
certain military-grade foreign-made UAS and UAS critical components
that are found on the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) Covered
List. Through this Public Notice, acting pursuant to section 2.939 of
the Federal Communications Commission's rules, PSHSB and OET propose to
apply such prohibitions given that these devices have been found to
pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States
and to the safety and security of United States persons pursuant to the
Secure and Trusted Communications Act of 2019.
DATES: Comments are due on or before September 2, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Pursuant to sections 1.415 and 1.419 of the Commission's
rules, 47 CFR 1.415, 1.419, interested parties may file comments on or
before the dates indicated on the first page of this document. You may
submit comments, identified by PS Docket No. 26-189, by any of the
following methods:
Federal Communications Commission's Website: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Electronic Filers: Comments may be filed electronically using the
internet by accessing the ECFS: https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs.
Paper Filers: Parties who choose to file by paper must
file an original and one copy of each filing.
Filings can be sent by hand or messenger delivery, by
commercial courier, or by the U.S. Postal Service. All filings must be
addressed to the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission.
Hand-delivered or messenger-delivered paper filings for
the Commission's Secretary are accepted between 8:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.
by the FCC's mailing contractor at 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701. All hand deliveries must be held together with
rubber bands or fasteners. Any envelopes and boxes must be disposed of
before entering the building.
Commercial courier deliveries (any deliveries not by the
U.S. Postal Service) must be sent to 9050 Junction Drive, Annapolis
Junction, MD 20701.
Filings sent by U.S. Postal Service First-Class Mail,
Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express must be sent to 45 L Street
NE, Washington, DC 20554.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by email: [email protected] or phone: 202-418-
0530.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Chris Smeenk, Attorney Advisor,
Operations and Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau, (202) 418-1630 or [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Public Notice
released on July 21, 2026 in PS Docket No. 26-189. The full text of
this document is available at: https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-26-758A1.docx.
In November 2022, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) adopted rules to prohibit authorization of equipment
identified on the Covered List. However, the Commission did not revoke
previously granted authorizations of covered equipment. In October
2025, the Commission adopted the EA Security Second R&O (90 FR 53227)
which, among other things, established a procedure to limit the scope
of an existing authorization of covered equipment to prohibit continued
importation or marketing of such equipment, without revoking the
underlying authorization. The Commission noted that its goal is to
mitigate potential national security risks associated with covered
equipment in the nation's supply chain that was authorized prior to a
Covered List addition under 47 U.S.C. 1601(b).
The Commission directed PSHSB and OET to ``institute proceedings to
determine whether to apply these prohibitions to some or all of the
equipment currently on the Covered List,'' and it delegated authority
to PSHSB and OET to apply such prohibitions pursuant to the framework
and process outlined in the EA Security Second R&O. The Commission gave
specific directives to PSHSB and OET regarding how to analyze and
implement the new procedures.
On December 22, 2025, PSHSB added all UAS and UAS critical
components produced in a foreign country to the Covered List. This
action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive
Branch interagency body, including several appropriate national
security agencies, determining (among other things) that UAS produced
in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security
of the United States and to the safety and security of United States
persons.
Today, we initiate another proceeding to prohibit the continued
importation and marketing of certain previously authorized equipment:
foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components on the FCC's Covered
List that qualify as ``military-grade'' as defined below.
The Commission has legal authority to review an existing
authorization for covered equipment, and to revoke such authorization
pursuant to current rules. Under section 2.939(a), the FCC may ``revoke
. . . any equipment authorization'' for various reasons, including
``conditions coming to the attention of the Commission which would
warrant it in refusing to grant an original application.'' Likewise,
under section 2.939(e), PSHSB and OET ``may place limitations on an
existing authorization for covered equipment authorizations to prohibit
continued importation or marketing'' of such equipment.
Scope. Pursuant to section 2.939(e), we propose to prohibit the
continued importation and marketing of any previously-authorized
military-grade UAS or UAS critical component that is listed on the
Covered List. We propose to limit the proposed prohibitions to
military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, which we define on the
basis of other agencies' regulations governing certain high-risk UAS,
and following discussions with our partners in other national security
agencies. Specifically, we consider military-grade UAS and UAS critical
components to be any of the following:
(1) UAS that weigh 55 pounds or more on takeoff, i.e. UAS that are
not ``small unmanned aircraft'' pursuant to Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) rules.
[cir] These UAS are considered ``larger platforms'' that offer
greater payload capacity, endurance, and range, which make them
suitable for military operations requiring heavy sensors,
communications equipment, or specialized weapons systems (i.e., deep-
strike operations, persistent wide-area surveillance, electronic
warfare, and cargo resupply).
[cir] Their increased power and stability also allow them to
operate effectively in more demanding environments, making them highly
effective for various missions.
[cir] UAS that weigh over 55 pounds or more operating individually
or in a swarm have the capability to carry out a significant attack on
the United States homeland.
(2) UAS capable of dispensing ``economic poison'' under FAA rules.
[cir] These UAS can be used to deliver hazardous substances in ways
that bypass traditional defense and detection systems. Their ability to
fly autonomously, reach remote areas, and carry dangerous materials
make them ideal for military operations.
[cir] Aerosol dispensing platforms operating independently or in a
swarm
[[Page 48872]]
can carry out mass chemical or biological attacks against United States
persons and our food supply.
(3) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of thermal
imaging (i.e. the capability to capture and translate the difference in
temperature between objects, as well as an object's heat signature and
residual heat signature).
[cir] UAS that feature these sensors are ideal for military use
because their ability to operate effectively in low visibility
environments enhances night operations, covert surveillance, and
targeting capabilities.
[cir] These capabilities allow forces to bypass camouflage,
navigate in total darkness, and identify concealed heat signatures that
are entirely invisible to standard optical sensors and the human eye.
[cir] These capabilities also make it more difficult to protect
critical infrastructure, maintain operational security, and prevent
intelligence collection in sensitive areas.
(4) UAS that contain or integrate sensors capable of Light
Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), a ``remote sensing technology that
measures distance by illuminating a target with a laser and analyzing
the reflected light.''
[cir] These UAS offer military utility by providing enhanced
capability to conduct detailed three-dimensional terrain mapping,
penetrate dense foliage to reveal hidden structures, assist in
autonomous navigation in GPS-denied environments, and conduct covert
reconnaissance under a range of environmental conditions.
(5) UAS docking stations, defined as multipurpose systems that
enable UAS to land safely, take off, recharge and/or replace batteries,
and transfer data and payload.
[cir] UAS docking stations are infrastructure that enable
persistent, 24/7 autonomous operations allowing faster, more continuous
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and other mission
workflows.
[cir] Additionally, by serving as coordinated launch, recovery, and
servicing nodes, docking stations facilitate the capability for large-
scale drone swarms to support military operations.
(6) UAS ``specially designed to incorporate a defense article.''
[cir] These UAS are ideal for military use because they can enable
combat commanders to conduct unparalleled precision strikes, kinetic
effect delivery, and electronic warfare capabilities at a significantly
lower cost and risk to human life than manned aircraft.
[cir] They also extend range, persistence, or precision beyond
traditional platforms.
(7) Swarming UAS, defined as:
Ground control stations purpose-built for, or UAS
integrated with flight control or vehicle management systems specially
designed for, managing drone swarms, consisting of UAS that operate
autonomously (without human intervention) to coordinate with each
other, avoid collisions, maintain formations, and dynamically respond
to changes in operational or threat environments, or if weaponized,
synchronize targeting activities across multiple drones; or
UAS purpose-built to perform flights in coordinated and
synchronized formations, including applications such as multi-UAS light
shows, where numerous illuminated UAS work together to create
synchronized aerial displays.
[cir] This capability enables large numbers of UAS to coordinate
autonomously, making them harder to detect, track, and counter.
[cir] Swarm-enabled UAS can overwhelm defenses, provide persistent
surveillance, and create complex operational challenges that strain
traditional air defense systems, which pose significant risks to public
safety and national security.
This prohibition on importation and marketing would not apply to
any non-military-grade UAS or UAS critical components, nor would it
apply to any domestically produced UAS or UAS critical components or to
any other already-authorized covered equipment. It would also only
apply to covered UAS and UAS critical components and would therefore
not apply to any UAS or UAS critical components that are exempt from
the Covered List--including UAS and UAS critical components identified
on the Defense Contract Management Agency's (DCMA's) Blue UAS Cleared
List; UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as ``domestic end
products'' under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a); and UAS
and UAS critical components granted a Conditional Approval by the
Department of War or the Department of Homeland Security. Any UAS or
UAS critical component subsequently removed from the Covered List, such
as through Conditional Approval, would also be exempt from this
prohibition. Furthermore, this prohibition would not apply to
importation or marketing for the purpose of use by the federal
government, nor for the purpose of commercial testing and product
development. Finally, while importation and marketing would be
prohibited, this prohibition would not affect the continued use or
operation of already-purchased UAS or UAS critical components.
We seek comment on this list of prohibitions. Does this list
adequately capture military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Are
there UAS and UAS critical components that are listed above, but are
not military-grade? Are there UAS and UAS critical components that are
not listed above that are military-grade?
Below, we provide a brief analysis of the relevant factors that
would justify limitation on the authorization of previously authorized
covered equipment and tentatively conclude that prohibiting the
continued importation and marketing of this previously authorized
covered equipment serves the public interest.
National security impacts. We start with national security
concerns, because, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second
R&O, ``[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is
more compelling than the security of the Nation.'' In the EA Security
Second R&O, the Commission stated that older models of covered
equipment, which are still widely sold in the United States, pose an
unacceptable risk to national security when imported or marketed in the
United States, ``not only when such equipment is new to the market.''
The Commission agreed with commenters who pointed out that certain
previously authorized devices that are now considered covered equipment
``likely remain[ ] marketable in the United States'' and ``may present
continuing national security threats.'' The Commission also directed
PSHSB and OET to ``give particular weight to the fact that the relevant
equipment was determined to pose `an unacceptable risk to the national
security of the United States or the safety and security of United
States persons.' ''
Subject to exceptions, an Executive Branch interagency body with
appropriate national security expertise, including appropriate national
security agencies, one of whom was the Department of War, specifically
determined that UAS and UAS critical components produced in foreign
countries ``pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the
United States or the safety and security of United States persons.''
This determination of ``unacceptable risks'' was based on an assessment
of ``threats from unauthorized surveillance, sensitive data
exfiltration, supply chain vulnerabilities, and other potential
[[Page 48873]]
threats to the homeland.'' We tentatively accept this determination and
``give [it] particular weight,'' as the Commission directed. This
determination, which covered foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical
components generally, necessarily includes already-authorized foreign-
produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components.
Therefore, based on the EA Security Second R&O and the UAS and UAS
critical component National Security Determination, we tentatively
conclude that prohibiting the continued importation and marketing of
previously authorized covered military-grade UAS and UAS critical
components as described above is necessary to protect national security
by mitigating risks to the U.S. communications sector.
We also believe that military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS
critical components might pose even particularly acute national
security or related risks, given their military-grade capabilities. We
invite comment on whether military-grade UAS and UAS critical
components, as described above, pose particularly acute national
security risks of the sort described in the National Security
Determination.
Economic and supply chain impacts. We seek comment on the potential
economic and supply chain impacts of prohibiting the continued
importation and marketing of already-authorized covered military-grade
UAS and UAS critical components. How would this proposed action affect
the financial interests of consumers, providers, and manufacturers in
the communications sector? As the Commission noted in the EA Security
Second R&O, it may consider ``countervailing economic concerns when
implementing the prohibitions for already-authorized devices.'' What
are the economic or supply chain considerations that weigh either in
favor or against taking this proposed action? We invite commenters to
provide data that we should consider in our analysis.
We tentatively conclude that our proposed action would not have
substantial economic and supply chain impacts. Outside of importation,
marketing, and sales to the U.S. government, which are excluded from
the scope of this proposed action, military-grade UAS and UAS critical
components represent a minority of the remaining UAS and UAS critical
component market. Recreational consumers comprise the majority of
individual drone operators and are unlikely to fly military-grade UAS.
While foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components dominate the
recreational market, domestic production of UAS and UAS critical
components in the higher-end, military-grade subsectors is more
prevalent. Moreover, several of the categories of UAS and UAS critical
components are subject to U.S. export controls or other regulatory
restrictions and likely comprise a small market within the United
States.
Do commenters agree that economic and supply chain impacts are
relatively minor and contained? Are there domestically-produced
alternatives for military-grade UAS and UAS critical components? Would
this proposal be cost-effective for the public in terms of obtaining
trusted equipment? Would providers' compliance costs decrease as they
replace covered equipment with trusted equipment? We strongly encourage
commenters to supply data and other specific evidence of economic costs
to this prohibition.
On the other hand, we seek comment on any economic benefits that
might arise as a result of these prohibitions. We note that after the
initial update to the Covered List, billions of dollars have already
been raised by domestic UAS producers, creating thousands of U.S.
manufacturing jobs. Additionally, billions more have been committed for
domestic production of UAS and UAS critical components, which are
expected to generate additional jobs. These investments include capital
from domestic investors as well as foreign investors supporting U.S.
manufacturing. We tentatively conclude that the proposed prohibitions
of military-grade UAS and UAS critical components would similarly
generate substantial investment in domestic production, given the loss
of foreign-produced supply. Do commenters agree? We seek comment on the
economic effects of the likely investment in United States production
that this proposed prohibition would yield.
Public interest analysis. We tentatively conclude that prohibiting
the importation and marketing of previously authorized covered
military-grade foreign-produced UAS and UAS critical components is
consistent with the public interest, because it protects American
communications networks from devices specifically determined by an
Executive Branch interagency body to ``pose an unacceptable risk to the
national security of the United States or the security and safety of
United States persons.''
We also tentatively conclude that there are no public interest
factors that outweigh our tentative conclusion regarding the proposed
ban on import and marketing of this previously authorized equipment.
After all, as the Commission noted in the EA Security Second R&O,
``[i]t is obvious and unarguable that no governmental interest is more
compelling than the security of the Nation.'' We seek comment on this
public interest analysis. Do commenters agree that the national
security benefits outweigh any negative economic or supply chain
factors? Are there any other public interest considerations that weigh
in favor or against taking this proposed action?
We invite commenters to provide any information that would assist
the Commission in its balancing of the need to address the national
security risks posed by the continued importation and marketing of
previously-authorized covered equipment that are military-grade UAS and
UAS critical components in communications networks with the impact of
the proposed prohibitions on government partners, consumers, industry,
and the public at large.
Existing authorizations. We clarify that, if this prohibition is
adopted, the continued use or operation of previously-authorized
military-grade UAS and UAS critical components that are already in the
hands of users would remain authorized. This is consistent with the
approach that the Commission adopted in the EA Security Second R&O. The
limitation on existing authorizations would not result in the
revocation of an existing authorization of covered equipment and,
therefore, would not affect the continued use or operation of devices
that consumers already possess.
Implementation timeline. We propose that all parties must cease all
importation and marketing activities regarding such previously-
authorized military-grade UAS and UAS critical components 180 days
after publication in the Federal Register. We believe that this
timeline is reasonable and strikes the appropriate balance between
addressing the national security concerns and minimizing any potential
adverse economic or supply chain impacts. Although the Commission's
prohibition with respect to covered equipment added to the Covered List
in 2024 or earlier took effect within 10 days of publication in the
Federal Register, given the expected large scope of equipment at issue
in this proposed prohibition, as well as the shorter time that such
foreign produced military-grade UAS and UAS critical components have
been listed on the Covered List, we believe that a more extended time
period to permit an orderly transition is appropriate.
[[Page 48874]]
We seek comment on the proposed timeline and invite input from
responsible parties and relevant manufacturers, importers,
distributors, retailers, and other interested entities. Specifically,
we request that commenters address implementation considerations
including the quantity of devices that have already been imported into
the United States and are available for or being held for marketing or
sale, new or recently updated device models that are en route to the
United States or pending shipment, and devices that are subject to
executed distribution, marketing, or sales agreements, but have not yet
entered the supply chain.
Permit-but-disclose proceeding. The proceeding this Public Notice
initiates shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose'' proceeding in
accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons making ex
parte presentations must file a copy of any written presentation or a
memorandum summarizing any oral presentation within two business days
after the presentation (unless a different deadline applicable to the
Sunshine period applies). Persons making oral ex parte presentations
are reminded that memoranda summarizing the presentation must: (1) list
all persons attending or otherwise participating in the meeting at
which the ex parte presentation was made, and (2) summarize all data
presented and arguments made during the presentation.
If the presentation consisted in whole or in part of the
presentation of data or arguments already reflected in the presenter's
written comments, memoranda or other filings in the proceeding, the
presenter may provide citations to such data or arguments in his or her
prior comments, memoranda, or other filings (specifying the relevant
page and/or paragraph numbers where such data or arguments can be
found) in lieu of summarizing them in the memorandum.
Documents shown or given to Commission staff during ex parte
meetings are deemed to be written ex parte presentations and must be
filed consistent with rule 1.1206(b). In proceedings governed by rule
1.49(f) or for which the Commission has made available a method of
electronic filing, written ex parte presentations and memoranda
summarizing oral ex parte presentations, and all attachments thereto,
must be filed through the electronic comment filing system available
for that proceeding, and must be filed in their native format (e.g.,
.doc, .xml, .ppt, searchable .pdf). Participants in this proceeding
should familiarize themselves with the Commission's ex parte rules.
Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 229, 301, 302a(b), 303, 1004, 1601-
1609; Pub. L. 117-55, 135 Stat. 423-24.
Federal Communications Commission.
Zenji Nakazawa,
Chief, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau.
[FR Doc. 2026-15659 Filed 7-31-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712-01-P