

Register notice of the approved Tribal-State compacts for the purpose of engaging in class III gaming activities on Indian lands. *See* 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(D). As required by 25 CFR 293.4, all compacts and amendments are subject to review and approval by the Secretary. The Compact authorizes class III gaming on the Tribe's Indian lands in the State of Kansas, including sports wagering and a hub-and-spoke betting model that deems sports wagers placed anywhere in the State occur on the Tribe's Indian lands where the servers are located, provided the wager is not placed on another Tribe's Indian lands. The Secretary took no action on the Compact within the 45-day statutory review period. Therefore, the Compact is considered to have been approved, but only to the extent it is consistent with IGRA. *See* 25 U.S.C. 2710(d)(8)(C).

William Henry Kirkland III,
Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs.

[FR Doc. 2026–14130 Filed 7–13–26; 8:45 am]

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INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION

[Investigation No. 731–TA–1070A (Fourth Review)]

Crepe Paper From China; Determination

On the basis of the record¹ developed in the subject five-year review, the United States International Trade Commission (“Commission”) determines, pursuant to the Tariff Act of 1930 (“the Act”), that revocation of the antidumping duty order on crepe paper from China would be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of material injury to an industry in the United States within a reasonably foreseeable time.

Background

The Commission instituted this review on February 2, 2026 (91 FR 4611) and determined on May 8, 2026 that it would conduct an expedited review (91 FR 34648, June 8, 2026).

The Commission made this determination pursuant to section 751(c) of the Act (19 U.S.C. 1675(c)). It completed and filed its determination in this review on July 10, 2026. The views of the Commission are contained in USITC Publication 5763 (July 2026), entitled *Crepe Paper from China: Investigation No. 731–TA–1070A (Fourth Review)*.

¹ The record is defined in § 207.2(f) of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure (19 CFR 207.2(f)).

By order of the Commission.

Issued: July 10, 2026.

Sharon Bellamy,
Supervisory Hearings and Information Officer.

[FR Doc. 2026–14149 Filed 7–13–26; 8:45 am]

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

Barlow St-Clair Lynch, M.D.; Decision and Order

On December 23, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Barlow St-Clair Lynch, M.D., of Brunswick, ME (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. FL4408995, alleging that Registrant's registration should be revoked because Registrant is “currently without authority to prescribe, administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the State of Maine, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.” *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).

The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. *Id.* (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing, and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 2–3.¹ “A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant's/

¹ Based on the Government's submissions in its RFAA dated March 3, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate. The RFAA's included Declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on January 8, 2026, the DI emailed the OSC to Registrant's registered email address. RFAAX 2, at 1; *see also id.*, Attachment A. Further, on January 12, 2026, the DI mailed a copy of the OSC to the mailing address that Registrant provided to DEA. *Id.* at 1–2; *see also id.*, Attachment B. On January 15, 2026, the DI, along with other DEA personnel, traveled to Registrant's registered address to personally serve Registrant with the OSC, where they were informed that Registrant was not on the employee roster of the business associated with the address. *Id.* at 2. Here, the Agency finds that Registrant was successfully served the OSC by email and that the DI's efforts to serve Registrant by other means were “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of the pendency of the action.” *Jones v. Flowers*, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); *see also Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D.*, 82 FR 34552, 34552 (2017) (finding that service by email satisfies due process where the email is not returned as undeliverable and other methods have been unsuccessful).

applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

Further, “[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.” *Id.* at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), 1301.46. RFAA, at 1; *see also* 21 CFR 1316.67.

Findings of Fact

The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the OSC, Registrant's Maine medical license expired by its own terms on June 30, 2025. RFAAX 1, at 2. According to Maine online records, of which the Agency takes official notice,² Registrant's state medical license is expired (Status: “Failed to Renew”). State of Maine Regulatory Licensing & Permitting License Search, Search License Information, <https://www.pfr.maine.gov/ALMSOnline/ALMSQuery/Welcome.aspx> (last visited date of signature of this Order). Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to practice medicine in Maine, the state in which he is registered with DEA.³

Discussion

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 “upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by

² Under the Administrative Procedure Act, an agency “may take official notice of facts at any stage in a proceeding—even in the final decision.” United States Department of Justice, Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure Act 80 (1947) (Wm. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., Reprint 1979).

³ Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 556(e), “[w]hen an agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence in the record, a party is entitled, on timely request, to an opportunity to show the contrary.” The material fact here is that Registrant, as of the date of this Order, is not licensed to practice medicine in Maine. Accordingly, Registrant may dispute the Agency's finding by filing a properly supported motion for reconsideration of findings of fact within fifteen calendar days of the date of this Order. Any such motion and response shall be filed and served by email to the other party and to the Office of the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, at dea.addo.attorneys@dea.gov.

State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.”

With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner’s registration. *Gonzales v. Oregon*, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006) (“The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense controlled substances ‘if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.’ . . . The very definition of a ‘practitioner’ eligible to prescribe includes physicians ‘licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices’ to dispense controlled substances. 802(21).”). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., *Lawrence Rudolph, D.M.D.*, 89 FR 79310 (2024); *Henry-Norbert O. Ndekwe, M.D.*, 90 FR 15990 (2025); *Benson Sergiles, P.A.*, 90 FR 32016 (2025).⁴

According to Maine statute, “a ‘prescription drug order’ means ‘a lawful written or oral order of a practitioner for a drug or device. Written orders may be issued on a prescription form or by electronic transmission.’” Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 32 § 13702–A(31) (2025). Further, “‘practitioner’ means ‘an individual who is licensed, registered or otherwise authorized in the appropriate jurisdiction to prescribe and administer drugs in the course of professional practice.’” *Id.* § 13702–A(29). Additionally, a “‘prescriber’ means ‘a licensed health care professional or veterinarian with prescriptive authority, including a licensed health care professional or veterinarian who uses telehealth in providing health care to

⁴ This rule derives from the text of two provisions of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). First, Congress defined the term “practitioner” to mean “a physician . . . or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by . . . the jurisdiction in which he practices . . . , to distribute, dispense, . . . [or] administer . . . a controlled substance in the course of professional practice.” 21 U.S.C. 802(21). Second, in setting the requirements for obtaining a practitioner’s registration, Congress directed that “[t]he Attorney General shall register practitioners . . . if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.” 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1). Because Congress has clearly mandated that a practitioner possess state authority in order to be deemed a practitioner under the CSA, DEA has held repeatedly that revocation of a practitioner’s registration is the appropriate sanction whenever he is no longer authorized to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which he practices. See, e.g., *Elias Garcia Garcia, P.A.*, 90 FR 31242 (2025); *Jason Weakley, R.N., A.P.R.N.*, 90 FR 10085 (2025); *Khurshed Haider, M.D.*, 90 FR 21950 (2025).

prescribe controlled substances to patients located in th[e] State.” Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22 § 7246(5). “Dispense” means “the preparation and delivery of a prescription drug in a suitable container appropriately labeled for subsequent administration to or use by a patient or other individual entitled to receive the prescription drug pursuant to a lawful order of a practitioner.” Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 32, § 13702–A(9).

Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant lacks authority to practice medicine in Maine because his Maine medical license expired. As discussed above, an individual must be a licensed practitioner to dispense or prescribe a controlled substance in Maine. Thus, because Registrant currently lacks authority to practice medicine in Maine and, therefore, is not currently authorized to handle controlled substances in Maine, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant’s DEA registration be revoked.

Order

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. FL4408995 issued to Barlow St-Clair Lynch, M.D. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Barlow St-Clair Lynch, M.D., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Barlow St-Clair Lynch, M.D., for additional registration in Maine. This Order is effective August 13, 2026.

Signing Authority

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on July 7, 2026, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the **Federal Register**.

Leslie Mayer,

Federal Register Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.

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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Drug Enforcement Administration

David Enright, M.D.; Decision and Order

On December 22, 2025, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to David Enright, M.D., of Brunswick, ME (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 3. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant’s Certificate of Registration No. BE1352157, alleging that Registrant’s registration should be revoked because Registrant is “currently without authority to prescribe, administer, dispense, or otherwise handle controlled substances in the State of Maine, the state in which [he is] registered with DEA.” *Id.* at 1–2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)).

The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. *Id.* at 2 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing, and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 2–3.¹ “A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant’s/ applicant’s right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

Further, “[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may

¹ Based on the Government’s submissions in its RFAA dated February 17, 2026, the Agency finds that service of the OSC on Registrant was adequate. The RFAA’s included Declaration from a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) indicates that on December 30, 2025, the DI emailed the OSC to Registrant’s registered email address and mailed a copy of the OSC to the mailing address that Registrant provided to DEA. RFAAX 2, at 1–2; see also *id.*, Attachments A–B. Further, on January 2, 2026, the DI, along with other DEA personnel, traveled to Registrant’s registered address to personally serve Registrant with the OSC, where they were informed that Registrant was no longer employed by the business associated with the address and had retired in July 2025. *Id.* at 2. Here, the Agency finds that Registrant was successfully served the OSC by email and that the DI’s efforts to serve Registrant by other means were “‘reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [Registrant] of the pendency of the action.’” *Jones v. Flowers*, 547 U.S. 220, 226 (2006) (quoting *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)); see also *Mohammed S. Aljanaby, M.D.*, 82 FR 34552, 34552 (2017) (finding that service by email satisfies due process where the email is not returned as undeliverable and other methods have been unsuccessful).