

Issued on June 29, 2026.

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[FR Doc. 2026-13685 Filed 7-6-26; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T; Amendment 39-23403; AD 2026-13-52]

RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The FAA previously sent this AD as an emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. This AD was prompted by a report of several missing or broken high pressure valve (HPV) butterfly clips found in a repair shop. This AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under certain dispatch provisions corresponding to master minimum equipment list (M MEL) items for the wing anti-ice system, wing anti ice pressure sensor, fan air valve (FAV), bleed air systems, engine bleed pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV), HPV, and pack bleed air leak and overheat detection loop; and prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain crew alerting system (CAS) messages and associated info messages are displayed. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. **DATES:** This AD is effective July 7, 2026. Emergency AD 2026-13-52, issued on June 29, 2026, which contains the requirements of this amendment, was effective with actual notice.

The FAA must receive comments on this AD by August 21, 2026.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments, using the procedures found in 14 CFR 11.43 and 11.45, by any of the following methods:

- *Federal eRulemaking Portal:* Go to [regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov). Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

- *Fax:* 202-493-2251.

- *Mail:* U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.

- *Hand Delivery:* Deliver to Mail address above between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at [regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov) under Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and other information. The street address for Docket Operations is listed above.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: Michael.Bumbaugh@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

The FAA invites you to send any written data, views, or arguments about this final rule. Send your comments using a method listed under the **ADDRESSES** section. Include “Docket No. FAA-2026-7211; Project Identifier MCAI-2026-00665-T” at the beginning of your comments. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the final rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. The FAA will consider all comments received by the closing date and may amend this final rule because of those comments.

Except for Confidential Business Information (CBI) as described in the following paragraph, and other information as described in 14 CFR 11.35, the FAA will post all comments received, without change, to [regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov), including any personal information you provide. The agency will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact received about this final rule.

Confidential Business Information

CBI is commercial or financial information that is both customarily and actually treated as private by its owner. Under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. 552), CBI is exempt from public disclosure. If your comments responsive to this AD contain

commercial or financial information that is customarily treated as private, that you actually treat as private, and that is relevant or responsive to this AD, it is important that you clearly designate the submitted comments as CBI. Please mark each page of your submission containing CBI as “PROPIN.” The FAA will treat such marked submissions as confidential under the FOIA, and they will not be placed in the public docket of this AD. Submissions containing CBI should be sent to Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: Michael.Bumbaugh@faa.gov. Any commentary that the FAA receives that is not specifically designated as CBI will be placed in the public docket for this rulemaking.

Background

The FAA issued Emergency AD 2026-13-52, dated June 29, 2026 (the emergency AD), to address an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The FAA sent the emergency AD to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The emergency AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under certain dispatch provisions corresponding to M MEL items for the wing anti-ice system, wing anti ice pressure sensor; FAV, bleed air systems, engine bleed PRSOV, HPV, and pack bleed air leak and overheat detection loop; and prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain CAS messages and associated info messages are displayed.

The emergency AD was prompted by Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1, dated June 24, 2026 (Transport Canada Emergency AD CF-2026-33R1) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada, to correct an unsafe condition on all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (ACLP) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes. The MCAI states it was reported to ACLP that several missing or broken HPV butterfly clips were found in a repair shop. An ACLP assessment has determined that failure of the butterfly clip may not be readily detected during operation and could remain latent until the next scheduled inspection or until secondary effects occur (e.g., bleed leak or overheat indications). Failure of the butterfly clip may also lead to degradation of the valve sealing function. This condition, if not detected and corrected, could result in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot

air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity.

The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at [regulations.gov](https://www.regulations.gov) under Docket No. FAA–2026–7211.

Related Material

Transport Canada Emergency AD CF–2026–33R1 specifies a prohibition to dispatch an airplane under the provisions of the minimum equipment list (MEL) items corresponding to certain MMEL items and certain CAS messages and associated info messages.

FAA’s Determination

These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI described above. The FAA is issuing this AD after determining that the unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other products of the same type design.

AD Requirements

This AD prohibits dispatching an airplane under the dispatch provisions of the operator’s MEL items corresponding to certain dispatch provisions of MMEL items 30–11–00, Wing Anti-Ice System; 30–12–01, Wing Anti Ice Pressure Sensor; 36–11–92, Fan Air Valve (FAV); 36–12–00, Bleed Air Systems; 36–12–01, Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV); 36–12–05, HPV; and 36–21–03, Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop. This AD also prohibits dispatching an airplane if certain CAS messages and associated info messages are displayed.

Interim Action

The FAA considers that this AD is an interim action. If final action is later identified, the FAA might consider further rulemaking then.

Justification for Immediate Adoption and Determination of the Effective Date

Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 U.S.C. 551 *et seq.*) authorizes agencies to dispense with notice and comment procedures for rules when the agency, for “good cause,” finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” Under this section, an agency, upon finding good cause, may issue a final rule without

providing notice and seeking comment prior to issuance. Further, section 553(d) of the APA authorizes agencies to make rules effective in less than thirty days, upon a finding of good cause.

An unsafe condition exists that required the immediate adoption of Emergency AD 2026–13–52 issued on June 29, 2026, to all known U.S. owners and operators of these airplanes. The FAA found that the risk to the flying public justified forgoing notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because failure of the HPV butterfly clip may lead to degradation of the valve sealing function and consequent inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity. This could lead to loss of control of the airplane. These conditions still exist, therefore, notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable and contrary to the public interest pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b).

In addition, the FAA finds that good cause exists pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d) for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days, for the same reasons the FAA found good cause to forgo notice and comment.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

The requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) do not apply when an agency finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553 to adopt a rule without prior notice and comment. Because the FAA has determined that it has good cause to adopt this rule without notice and comment, RFA analysis is not required.

Costs of Compliance

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 211 airplanes of U.S. registry. The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimate for prohibiting dispatch of an airplane under the specified provisions and conditions. This cost may vary significantly among operators.

Authority for This Rulemaking

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA

with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

- (1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, and
- (2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.

The Amendment

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

- 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

- 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive:

2026–13–52 Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate Previously Held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.): Amendment 39–23403; Docket No. FAA–2026–7211; Project Identifier MCAI–2026–00665–T.

(a) Effective Date

The FAA issued Emergency Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2026–13–52 on June 29, 2026 (also referred to as the emergency AD), directly to affected owners and operators. As a result of such actual notice, the emergency AD was effective for those owners and operators on the date it was received. This AD contains the same requirements as the emergency AD and, for those who did not receive actual notice, is effective on July 7, 2026.

(b) Affected ADs None.	(e) Unsafe Condition This AD was prompted by a report of several missing or broken high pressure valve (HPV) butterfly clips found in a repair shop. The FAA is issuing this AD to address failure of an HPV butterfly clip, which may remain latent and lead to secondary effects (e.g., bleed leak or overheat conditions) and degradation of the valve sealing function. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could result in the inability to properly isolate the bleed system when required, uncontrolled hot air leakage, overheating of critical airplane structures and components, and degradation of structural integrity.	(f) Compliance Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done. (g) Dispatch Prohibitions (1) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch an airplane under the operational procedures of the operator's minimum equipment list items corresponding to the operational procedures of the Master Minimum Equipment List (MMEL) items listed in tables 1 and 2 to paragraph (g)(1) of this AD.
(c) Applicability This AD applies to all Airbus Canada Limited Partnership (Type Certificate previously held by C Series Aircraft Limited Partnership (CSALP); Bombardier, Inc.) Model BD-500-1A10 and BD-500-1A11 airplanes, certificated in any category.		
(d) Subject Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic.		

Table 1 to paragraph (g)(1) - Prohibited ice and rain protection MMEL items

30. Ice and Rain Protection

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
11-00	Wing Anti-Ice System				
1)	High Pressure Valve (HPV)	C	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations, may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, c) Flight is conducted under single bleed configuration at or below FL 310, d) Equipment bay smoke detectors are verified operative, e) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and f) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.
2)	Temperature Sensor	A	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations beyond 120 minutes, both temperature sensor elements on left or right side may be inoperative provided: a) WING ANTI-ICE is selected OFF, b) Associated wing anti-ice valve is verified closed, c) INFO message 30 WING A/ICE FAULT - L(R) WING A/ICE PRESS SNSR INOP is not displayed for the same side, d) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, e) L ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, f) R ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, and g) Repairs are made after one flight.

30. Ice and Rain Protection

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
2)	Temperature Sensor (Cont'd)	C	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations, may be inoperative provided: a) Wing Anti Ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed Valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, c) Associated wing anti-ice valve is verified closed, d) L ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, e) R ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, f) Same side engine bleed pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV) and air conditioning pack are selected OFF, g) PRSOV is verified closed, h) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, i) Flight is conducted in single bleed and single pack configuration at or below FL 310, j) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, and k) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative). NOTE: If APU bleed air is used during takeoff or in-flight operation is conducted in accordance with AFM chapter 2, APU BLEED AIR limitations.
4)	Temperature Control Function	C	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations, may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, c) Flight is conducted in single bleed configuration at or below FL 310, d) Both air conditioning packs are operative, e) Equipment bay smoke detectors are verified operative, f) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems inoperative), and g) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.

30. Ice and Rain Protection

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
12-01	Wing Anti Ice Pressure Sensor	C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, may be inoperative provided: - Wing anti-ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, - Crossbleed valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, - Associated WAI valve is secured closed, - Both ice detection systems are operative, - Same side engine bleed pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV) and air conditioning pack are considered inoperative, and - Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions.
1)	30 WING A/ICE FAULT - L WING A/ICE PRESS SNSR INOP (INFO message)	C	-	-	(O) Except for ER operations, may be displayed provided: - Wing anti-ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, - Left wing anti ice valve (WAIV) is verified closed, - L ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, - R ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, - Left wing anti-ice temperature sensor is verified operative, - Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions.
2)	30 WING A/ICE FAULT - R WING A/ICE PRESS SNSR INOP (INFO message)	C	-	-	(O) Except for ER operations, may be displayed provided: - Wing anti-ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, - Right wing anti ice valve (WAIV) is verified closed, - L ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, - R ICE DET FAIL (Caution) is not displayed, - Right wing anti-ice temperature sensor is verified operative, - Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions.

Table 2 to paragraph (g)(1) - Prohibited pneumatic MMEL items**36. Pneumatic**

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
11-92	Fan Air Valve (FAV)				
1)		C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated FAV is secured CLOSED, b) Associated bleed system is selected OFF and not used, c) Flight is conducted in single bleed configuration at or below FL 310, d) Both air conditioning packs are operative, e) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, f) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), g) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions, and h) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative.
2)		C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated FAV is secured CLOSED, b) Associated bleed system is selected OFF and not used, c) Integrity of the associated engine bleed duct is verified, d) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, e) Both air conditioning packs are operative, f) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, g) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), h) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions, and i) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative.

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Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
11-92	Fan Air Valve (FAV) (Cont'd)				
3)		C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated FAV is secured CLOSED, b) Associated bleed system is selected OFF and not used, c) Associated air conditioning pack is selected OFF, d) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, e) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, f) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and g) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions. NOTE: If APU bleed air is used during takeoff or in-flight, operating is conducted in accordance with AFM Chapter 2, APU BLEED AIR limitations.
4)		C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated FAV is secured CLOSED, b) Associated bleed system is selected OFF and not used, c) Associated air conditioning pack is selected OFF, d) Integrity of the associated engine bleed duct is verified, e) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, f) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, g) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and h) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions. NOTE: If APU bleed air is used during takeoff or in-flight, operating is conducted in accordance with AFM Chapter 2, APU BLEED AIR limitations.

36. Pneumatic

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
11-92	Fan Air Valve (FAV) (Cont'd)				
5)		B	2	0	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, both may be inoperative provided: a) Both LH and RH bleed systems are selected OFF and not used, b) Both FAVs are secured CLOSED, c) Flight is conducted in an unpressurized configuration at or below 10,000 ft. MSL, d) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, e) No passengers are carried, and f) Fuel tank inerting system (FTIS) is considered inoperative.
12-00	Bleed Air System				
1)	Engine	C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Associated high pressure shutoff valve (HPV) is secured CLOSED, c) Associated pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV) is secured CLOSED, d) Integrity of the associated engine bleed duct is verified, e) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, f) Flight is conducted in single bleed configuration at or below FL 310, g) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, h) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and i) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.

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Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
12-00	Bleed Air System (Cont'd)				
1)	Engine (Cont'd)	B	2	0	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, both may be inoperative provided: a) Both LH and RH bleed systems are selected OFF and not used, b) Both LH and RH high pressure shutoff valves (HPV) are secured CLOSED, c) Both LH and RH pressure regulating shutoff valves (PRSOV) are secured CLOSED, d) Flight is conducted in an unpressurized configuration at or below 10,000 ft. MSL, e) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, f) No passengers are carried, and g) Fuel tank inerting system (FTIS) is considered inoperative.
12-00	Bleed Air System (Cont'd)				
2)	Pressure Sensor	C	2	1	One may be inoperative provided the associated side bleed system is considered inoperative.
12-00	Bleed Air System (Cont'd)				
4)	Temperature Sensor Element	C	4	2	(O) Except for ER operations, both temperature sensor elements on left or right side may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, c) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, d) Equipment bay smoke detectors are verified operative, e) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and f) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.

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Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
12-01	Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV)	C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Affected valve is secured CLOSED, b) Associated engine bleed system is selected OFF, c) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, d) Both air conditioning packs are operative, e) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, f) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and g) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.
12-01	Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) (Cont'd)	C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Affected valve is secured CLOSED, b) Associated engine bleed system is selected OFF and not used, c) Associated air conditioning pack is selected OFF, d) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, e) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, f) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and g) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions. NOTE: If APU bleed air is used during takeoff or in-flight, operation is conducted in accordance with AFM chapter 2, APU BLEED AIR limitations.
12-01	Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) (Cont'd)	C	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, c) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, d) Equipment bay smoke detectors are verified operative, e) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and f) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.

36. Pneumatic

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
12-01	Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) (Cont'd)	B	2	0	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, both may be inoperative provided: a) Both valves are secured CLOSED, b) L BLEED and R BLEED are selected OFF, c) Flight is conducted unpressurized at or below 10,000 ft. MSL, d) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, e) No passengers are carried, and f) Fuel tank inerting system (FTIS) is considered inoperative.
12-01	Engine Bleed Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) (Cont'd)	C	2	0	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, both may be inoperative provided: a) Both valves are secured CLOSED, b) APU bleed system is operated during flight, c) Both air conditioning packs are operative, d) Flight is conducted at or below 23,000 ft., per Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Chapter 2 "APU Bleed Air Limitations", e) Passenger load is limited per Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Chapter 2 "APU Bleed Air Limitations", f) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, and g) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative.
12-05	High Pressure Shutoff Valve (HPV)	C	2	1	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Associated high pressure shutoff valve (HPV) is secured CLOSED, c) Associated pressure regulating shutoff valve (PRSOV) is secured CLOSED, d) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, e) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, f) Both equipment bay smoke detectors are operative, g) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operation with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and h) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.

36. Pneumatic

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
12-05	High Pressure Shutoff Valve (HPV) (Cont'd)	C	2	1	(O) Except for ER operations, one may be inoperative provided: a) Associated bleed system is selected OFF, b) Crossbleed valve (CBV) is verified operative, c) Flight is conducted at or below FL 310, d) Equipment bay smoke detectors are verified operative, e) Operations are conducted in accordance with Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) Supplement 5 (Operations with Airplane Systems Inoperative), and f) FLAP 4 landings are prohibited in icing conditions.
12-05	High Pressure Shutoff Valve (HPV) (Cont'd)	B	2	0	(M)(O) Except for ER operations, may be inoperative provided: a) Both LH and RH bleed systems are selected OFF and not used, b) Both LH and RH high pressure shutoff valves (HPV) are secured CLOSED, c) Both LH and RH pressure regulating shutoff valves (HPV) are secured CLOSED, d) Flight is conducted in an unpressurized configuration at or below 10,000 ft. MSL, e) Airplane is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, f) No passengers are carried, and g) Fuel tank inerting system is considered inoperative.
21-03	Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop				
1)	Left Pack Zone				

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Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
a)	Inoperative not annunciated by 36 LEAK DET FAULT - LOOP REDUND LOSS (INFO message)	C	2	0	(M)(O) May be inoperative provided: a) Except for engine start, APU bleed is selected OFF, b) Left Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) is considered inoperative, c) Left pack is considered inoperative, d) Except for engine start, Crossbleed Valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, e) Fuel tank inerting system is considered inoperative, f) Wing Anti-Ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, g) Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, and h) Verify no additional loops have faulted before each flight.
21-03	Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop (Cont'd)				
1)	Left Pack Zone (Cont'd)				
b)	Inoperative annunciated by 36 LEAK DET FAULT - LOOP REDUND LOSS (INFO message)	C	2	0	(M)(O) May be inoperative provided: a) Except for engine start, APU bleed is selected OFF, b) Left Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) is considered inoperative, c) Left pack is considered inoperative, d) Except for engine start, Crossbleed Valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, e) Fuel tank inerting system is considered inoperative, f) Wing Anti-Ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, g) Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, h) Integrity of the left pack bleed air ducting and structure adjacent to and surrounding the inoperative sensing element(s) is verified, and i) Verify no additional loops have faulted before each flight.

36. Pneumatic

Sequence No.	Item	1	2	3	4
21-03	Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop (Cont'd)				
2)	Right Pack Zone				
a)	Inoperative not annunciated by 36 LEAK DET FAULT - LOOP REDUND LOSS (INFO message)	C	2	0	(M)(O) May be inoperative provided: a) Right Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) is considered inoperative, b) Right pack is considered inoperative, c) Except for engine start, Crossbleed Valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, d) Wing Anti-Ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, e) Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, and f) Verify no additional loops have faulted before each flight.
21-03	Pack Bleed Air Leak and Overheat Detection Loop (Cont'd)				
2)	Right Pack Zone				
b)	Inoperative annunciated by 36 LEAK DET FAULT - LOOP REDUND LOSS (INFO message)	C	2	0	(M)(O) May be inoperative provided: a) Right Pressure Regulating Shutoff Valve (PRSOV) is considered inoperative, b) Right pack is considered inoperative, c) Except for engine start, Crossbleed Valve (CBV) is selected MAN CLSD, d) Wing Anti-Ice (WAI) system is selected OFF, e) Aircraft is not operated in known or forecast icing conditions, f) Integrity of the right pack bleed air ducting and structure adjacent to and surrounding the inoperative sensing element(s) is verified, and g) Verify no additional loops have faulted before each flight.

(2) As of the effective date of this AD, no person may dispatch an airplane if any crew alerting system (CAS) message and associated info message identified in paragraph (g)(2)(i) through (xviii) of this AD is displayed.

(i) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT—CTRL TEMP INOP (Info).

(ii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT—L HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).

(iii) L WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE LO HEAT—L WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(iv) L WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 L WING A/ICE OVHT—L WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(v) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT—CTRL TEMP INOP (Info).

(vi) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT—R HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).

(vii) R WING A/ICE LO HEAT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE LO HEAT—R WING A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(viii) R WING A/ICE OVHT (Caution): 30 R WING A/ICE OVHT—R WING—A/ICE TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(ix) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT—L WING A/ICE VLV LEAK (Info).

(x) WING A/ICE FAULT (Advisory): 30 WING A/ICE FAULT—R WING A/ICE VLV LEAK (Info).

(xi) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT—L BLEED MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info).

(xii) AIR SYSTEM FAULT (Advisory): 36 AIR SYSTEM FAULT—R BLEED MON PRESS SNSR INOP (Info).

(xiii) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL—L BLEED TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(xiv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL—L HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).

(xv) L BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 L BLEED FAIL—L PRESS REG SOV INOP (Info).

(xvi) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL—R BLEED TEMP SNSR INOP (Info).

(xvii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL—R HPV FAIL CLSD (Info).

(xviii) R BLEED FAIL (Caution): 36 R BLEED FAIL—R PRESS REG SOV INOP (Info).

(h) Additional AD Provisions

The following provisions also apply to this AD:

(1) *Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)*: The Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in paragraph (i) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.

(2) *Contacting the Manufacturer*: For any requirement in this AD to obtain instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method approved by the Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or Transport Canada; or Airbus Canada Limited Partnership's Transport Canada Design Approval Organization (DAO). If approved by the DAO, the approval must include the DAO-authorized signature.

(i) Additional Information

For more information about this AD, contact Michael Bumbaugh, Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-231-3522; email: Michael.Bumbaugh@faa.gov.

(j) Material Incorporated by Reference

None.

Issued on July 1, 2026.

Brian Knaup,

Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division, Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 2026-13655 Filed 7-2-26; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Office of the Secretary

14 CFR Parts 260 and 399

[Docket No. DOT-OST-2022-0089, DOT-OST-2025-2285]

RIN 2105-AF04, 2105-AF36

Airline Refunds and Other Consumer Protections

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST), U.S. Department of Transportation.

ACTION: Notification of enforcement discretion.

SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Transportation (Department or DOT) is extending its current enforcement discretion, announced on December 5, 2025, regarding specific refund regulations. Under current regulations, a flight assigned a different flight number than was active at the time of ticket purchase is considered a “cancelled flight,” making the consumer eligible for a prompt refund and related notifications. The Department is extending its discretion to not enforce these requirements for renumbered flights, provided that the passenger is rebooked on a flight with a new number and the flight operates without any “significant change or delay” as defined in its regulations. This extension provides the Department with the necessary time to complete the pending rulemaking addressing the definition of a flight cancellation.

DATES: As of July 7, 2026, the Department is extending the pause on the enforcement of airline refunds requirements regarding cancelled flights under 14 CFR parts 260 and 399 for flights that are merely renumbered. This enforcement discretion is extended for 1-year from the date of this publication, expiring on July 7, 2027.

ADDRESSES: This notification of enforcement discretion may be viewed online at www.regulations.gov using the docket numbers listed above. Electronic retrieval help and guidelines are available on the website. It is available 24 hours each day, 365 days each year.

An electronic copy of this document may also be downloaded from the Office of the Federal Register's website at www.federalregister.gov and the Government Publishing Office's website at www.GovInfo.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Clereece Kroha or Blane Workie, Office of Aviation Consumer Protection, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590, 202-366-9342 (phone), 202-366-7152 (fax), clereece.kroha@dot.gov, or blane.workie@dot.gov (email).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On April 26, 2024, DOT published a final rule titled “Refunds and Other Consumer Protections” (Refund I) (89 FR 32760). Under that rule, a “cancelled flight” was defined in a way that classified a flight operated under a different flight number as a new flight, meaning the original flight was considered cancelled and subject to refund requirements. The rule also requires carriers to provide notifications to affected consumers that they are entitled to a refund when a flight cancellation or significant delay or change occurs. Following the implementation of Refund I, multiple airlines submitted requests highlighting the necessity of flight renumbering for logistical reasons (such as switching between mainline and regional service) and the general lack of material impact on passengers. Upon review, DOT determined that consumers face no inherent harm from routine flight renumbering, and, on December 5, 2025, published a notification of enforcement discretion (90 FR 55999) announcing no enforcement of these specific ticket refund and notification requirements until June 30, 2026.

The Department is engaged in a rulemaking titled “Airline Refunds and Other Consumer Protections III” (Refund III), identified by RIN 2105-AF36. Among other things, this proposed rule aims to reduce unnecessary regulatory burdens by modifying the definition of a flight cancellation that would entitle consumers to ticket refunds. Because the Refund III rulemaking remains pending, the Department is extending the enforcement pause for an additional 1-year period from the date of this publication. Taking this interim step avoids imposing counterproductive operational and technical difficulties on airlines while the rulemaking process is ongoing.

This enforcement discretion remains temporary and strictly limited. It applies solely to situations where a flight is given a different flight number but the passenger is successfully rebooked on