[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 121 (Thursday, June 25, 2026)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38340-38350]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-12794]
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
31 CFR Part 1010
RIN 1506-AB75
Definition of Huione Group, a Financial Institution Operating
Outside the United States of Primary Money Laundering Concern
AGENCY: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: FinCEN is issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
pursuant to section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act, that proposes amending
the existing definition of Huione Group to include, within the
definition of that group, H-Pay Service PLC, and adding and defining
the term ``successor entity.'' With this NPRM, FinCEN does not alter
its assessment that Huione Group is a financial institution operating
outside the United States of primary money laundering concern, and the
existing special measure codified at 31 CFR 1010.664 with respect to
Huione Group remains in effect.
DATES: Written comments on the notice of proposed rulemaking must be
submitted on
or before July 27, 2026.
ADDRESSES: Comments must be submitted in one of the following two ways
(please choose only one of the ways listed):
Federal E-rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
If you are reading this document on federalregister.gov, you may use
the green ``SUBMIT A PUBLIC COMMENT'' button beneath this rulemaking's
title to submit a comment to the regulations.gov docket.
Mail: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, P.O. Box 39,
Vienna, VA 22183. Refer to Docket Number FINCEN-2026-0166 in the
submission.
Do not include any personally identifiable information (such as
name, address, or other contact information) or confidential business
information that you do not want publicly disclosed. All comments are
public records; they are publicly displayed exactly as received, and
will not be deleted, modified, or redacted. Comments may be submitted
anonymously. Follow the search instructions on https://www.regulations.gov to view public comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: The FinCEN Resource Center at
www.fincen.gov/contact.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Statutory Provisions
Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act (section 311), codified at 31
U.S.C. 5318A, grants the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) the
authority to make a finding that ``reasonable grounds exist for
concluding'' that any of the following ``is of primary money laundering
concern'':
A jurisdiction outside of the United States;
One or more financial institutions operating outside of
the United States;
One or more classes of transactions within, or involving,
a jurisdiction outside of the United States; or
One or more types of accounts.\1\
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\1\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(1).
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Upon making such a finding, the Secretary is authorized to require
domestic financial institutions and domestic financial agencies to take
certain ``special measures.'' \2\ The five special measures set out in
section 311 are safeguards that may be employed to defend the U.S.
financial system from money laundering and terrorist financing risks.
The Secretary may impose one or more of these special measures to
protect the U.S. financial system from such threats. Through special
measures one through four, the Secretary may impose additional
recordkeeping, information collection, and reporting requirements on
covered domestic financial institutions and domestic financial
agencies--collectively, ``covered financial
[[Page 38341]]
institutions.'' \3\ Through special measure five, the Secretary may
``prohibit, or impose conditions upon, the opening or maintaining in
the United States of a correspondent account or payable-through
account'' for or on behalf of a foreign banking institution, if such
correspondent account or payable-through account involves the foreign
financial institution found to be of primary money laundering
concern.\4\
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\2\ On October 26, 2001, the President signed into law the
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Public Law
107-56 (USA PATRIOT Act). Title III of the USA PATRIOT Act amended
the anti-money laundering (AML) provisions of the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) to promote the prevention, detection, and prosecution of
international money laundering and the financing of terrorism. The
BSA, as amended, is the popular name for a collection of statutory
authorities that FinCEN administers that is codified at 12 U.S.C.
1829b, 1951-1960 and 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314, 5316-5336, and includes
other authorities reflected in notes thereto. Regulations
implementing the BSA appear at 31 CFR Chapter X.
\3\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(1)-(4). For purposes of this proposed
rule, the term ``covered financial institution'' has the same
meaning as provided at 31 CFR 1010.605(e)(1).
\4\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5).
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Before making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for
concluding that a financial institution operating outside of the United
States (or other jurisdiction, account, or class of transactions) is of
primary money laundering concern, the Secretary is required to consult
with both the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.\5\ In
addition, in the case of a decision to apply one or more of the special
measures, in making a finding that reasonable grounds exist for
concluding that a financial institution operating outside of the United
States is of primary money laundering concern, the Secretary is
required to consider such information as the Secretary determines to be
relevant, including the following potentially relevant institutional
factors:
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\5\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(1).
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The extent to which such a financial institution is used
to facilitate or promote money laundering in or through a jurisdiction
outside the United States, including any money laundering activity by
organized criminal groups, international terrorists, or entities
involved in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or
missiles;
The extent to which such a financial institution is used
for legitimate business purposes in the jurisdiction; and
The extent to which such action is sufficient to ensure,
with respect to transactions involving the jurisdiction and
institutions operating in the jurisdiction, that the purposes of
section 311 continue to be fulfilled, and to guard against
international money laundering and other financial crimes.\6\
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\6\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). In addition, in the case
of a finding relating to a particular jurisdiction, section 311 sets
out certain ``jurisdictional factors'' that the Secretary may
consider, which are not relevant here. See 31 U.S.C.
5318A(c)(2)(A)(i)-(vii).
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In selecting one or more special measures, the Secretary ``shall
consult with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, any other appropriate Federal banking agency (as
defined in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act), the
Secretary of State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the National Credit Union
Administration Board, and in the sole discretion of the Secretary, such
other agencies and interested parties as the Secretary may find
appropriate.'' \7\ When imposing special measure five, the Secretary
must do so ``in consultation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney
General, and the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.'' \8\ In addition, the Secretary is required to
consider the following factors:
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\7\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(A).
\8\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(b)(5). Prior to issuing this proposed rule,
FinCEN consulted with representatives and staff of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of Comptroller
of the Currency, the Secretary of State, the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, staff of the National Credit Union
Administration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Attorney General. These consultations involved obtaining interagency
views on all aspects of this proposed rule. Those views are
reflected in FinCEN's explanation of the reasons for issuing this
proposed rule.
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Whether similar action has been or is being taken by other
nations or multilateral groups;
Whether the imposition of any particular special measure
would create a significant competitive disadvantage, including any
undue cost or burden associated with compliance, for financial
institutions organized or licensed in the United States;
The extent to which the action or the timing of the action
would have a significant adverse systemic impact on the international
payment, clearance, and settlement system, or on legitimate business
activities involving the particular jurisdiction, institution, class of
transactions, or type of account; and
The effect of the action on United States national
security and foreign policy.\9\
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\9\ 31 U.S.C. 5318A(a)(4)(B)(i)-(iv).
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The authority of the Secretary to administer the Bank Secrecy Act
(BSA) and its implementing regulations, including the authority under
section 311 to make such a finding and to impose special measures, has
been delegated to the Director of FinCEN.\10\
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\10\ Treasury Order 180-01 (Jan. 14, 2020).
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II. Prior Finding That Huione Group Is of Primary Money Laundering
Concern and Imposition of Special Measure
Huione Group \11\ is a financial services conglomerate based in
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.\12\ Huione Group is the parent company of, or
otherwise controls, several subsidiaries, affiliates, and components--
including, but not limited to: Haowang Guarantee, Huione Pay PLC, and
Huione Crypto (collectively, Components)--that coordinate to provide
services that are useful for money laundering and carrying out cyber
scams. FinCEN assesses that, as discussed below, Huione Group and its
subsidiaries, affiliates, and components, including the Components,
operate as a coordinated collective, and for that reason, FinCEN will
correspondingly refer to Huione Group and its Components as the
``Huione Group.''
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\11\ Huione Group is the parent company of several subsidiaries
and components, including Haowang Guarantee, Huione Pay PLC, and
Huione Crypto. FinCEN assesses that this grouping of exchange
services operates as a coordinative collective, and for that reason,
FinCEN will correspondingly refer to the collective as the ``Huione
Group.''
\12\ Cambodia Corporate Registry, ``Huione'' Search, https://www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh/cambodia-master/service/
create.html?targetAppCode=cambodia-
master&targetRegisterAppCode=cambodia-br-
companies&service=registerItemSearch (last accessed Oct. 7, 2025);
Huione Pay, Index, formerly available at https://www.huionepay.com.kh/index/help; Huione Group, About, formerly
available at https://huione.com/html/about.jsp (last accessed Sept.
24, 2024). Huione Crypto has numerous job announcements with a work
location in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. See Huione Crypto, Career
Opportunities, formerly available at https://www.huione.io/en-US/careerOpportunities (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025). Haowang Guarantee
also lists job announcements with a work location in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia. See Haowang Guarantee, About, formerly available at
https://www.hwdb.la/about/ (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025). This
information was available as of the issuance of the NPRM, however,
it has since been removed by Haowang Guarantee, resulting in a
``page not found'' error. FinCEN assesses that this change is more
likely than not caused by negative public attention following a
series of reports by blockchain analytic firms on money laundering
occurring at Huione Group.
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Although it was originally incorporated in Hong Kong in 2018 as
Huione Group Limited, Huione Group, the controlling entity of the
conglomerate, does not appear to be registered as a business in any
jurisdiction,\13\ and several of Huione Group's Components have been
registered outside of Cambodia. Nevertheless, Huione Group's website is
registered \14\ to an individual with a listed location of Phnom Penh,
Cambodia and Huione Group's operations are principally carried out in
Cambodia.
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\13\ Hong Kong Companies Registry, Huione Group Limited, at p.
54, https://www.cr.gov.hk/docs/wrpt/RNC063_2018.12.17-2018.12.23.pdf.
\14\ The registration is valid through June 3, 2026. See ICANN,
Huione.com, https://lookup.icann.org/en/huione.com (last accessed
Oct. 7, 2025).
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For years, Huione Group has laundered illicit proceeds from
cybercrimes--namely, cyber heists
[[Page 38342]]
carried out by the Lazarus Group,\15\ an entity sanctioned by
Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)--and Convertible
Virtual Currency (CVC) investment scams carried out by transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) based in Southeast Asia.\16\
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\15\ The Lazarus Group is an agency, instrumentality, or
controlled entity of the government of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea, that has stolen large volumes of Convertible
Virtual Currency in numerous and often widely reported cyber heists.
On September 13, 2019, the Lazarus Group was sanctioned by OFAC. See
Department of the Treasury, Press Release, Treasury Sanctions North
Korean State-Sponsored Malicious Cyber Groups (Sept. 13, 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm774.
\16\ These scams are also referred to as ``pig butchering.'' See
FinCEN, FIN-2023-Alert005, FinCEN Alert on Prevalent Virtual
Currency Investment Scam Commonly Known as ``Pig Butchering'' (Sept.
8, 2023), https://www.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FinCEN_Alert_Pig_Butchering_FINAL_508c.pdf.
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On May 5, 2025, FinCEN issued a notice of proposed rulemaking
(First NPRM) that found that reasonable grounds exist for concluding
that Huione Group is a financial institution operating outside the
United States of primary laundering concern.\17\ On October 16, 2025,
FinCEN issued a final rule (Final Rule) that prohibits covered U.S.
financial institutions from opening or maintaining a correspondent
account for, or on behalf of Huione Group, as defined in that Final
Rule.\18\ The provisions of the Final Rule are codified at 31 CFR
1010.664.
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\17\ FinCEN, Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 18934 (May 5, 2025).
\18\ FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione
Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025); see 31 CFR
1010.664.
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A. Finding That Huione Group Is of Primary Money Laundering Concern
Huione Group is a parent entity that controls the following
Components: \19\ Haowang Guarantee; Huione Pay PLC; and Huione Crypto.
FinCEN found that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Huione
Group and each of its Components engages in the business of money
transmission, and that Huione Group is therefore a financial
institution under the BSA and its implementing regulations. FinCEN also
determined that Huione Group and each of its Components, including, but
not limited to, Huione Pay PLC, are financial institutions operating
outside of the United States.
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\19\ As explained further in Section III.B, since the NPRM was
issued Huione Group has changed its business structure in an effort
to counter governmental scrutiny, including the special measure
finalized last year.
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1. Huione Group
Huione Group is a Cambodia based, Hong Kong-registered,\20\ sole
proprietorship founded in or around 2014, that appears to be owned and
controlled by an individual Cambodian national,\21\ and at times holds
itself out as the parent entity of the Components.\22\ By its own
account, Huione Group began as a fiat currency exchange service and
over the past decade, expanded its commercial interests to include
finance, insurance, real estate entities,\23\ and most recently, CVC
exchange services.\24\ The Components operate in an interconnected
fashion to provide an integrated payment service provider, illicit
online market, and CVC exchanger (a type of virtual asset service
provider or VASP).
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\20\ Hong Kong Companies Registry, Huione Group Limited, at p.
54, https://www.cr.gov.hk/docs/wrpt/RNC063_2018.12.17-2018.12.23.pdf.
\21\ See The Record, Tether freezes $29 million of
cryptocurrency connected to Cambodian marketplace accused of fueling
scams (July 15, 2024), https://therecord.media/tether-freezes-29-million-crypto-connected-to-scam-marketplace.
\22\ See, e.g., Elliptic, Huione: The Company Behind the Largest
Ever Illicit Online Marketplace Has Launched a Stablecoin (Jan. 14,
2025), https://www.elliptic.co/blog/huione-largest-ever-illicit-online-marketplace-stablecoin; Elliptic, Huione Guarantee: The
multi-billion dollar marketplace used by online scammers (July 9,
2024, updated Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cyber-scam-marketplace; Chainalysis, 2024 Crypto Crime Mid-year Update
Part 2: China-based CSAM and Cybercrime Networks on the Rise, Pig
Butchering Scams Remain Lucrative (Aug. 29, 2024), https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/2024-crypto-crime-mid-year-update-part-2/;
ABC News, Cambodian online marketplace outed as one-stop shop for
scammers' money laundering and `detention equipment' needs (July 26,
2024), https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-07-27/online-marketplace-for-money-laundering-and-scammers/104131624; Huione Crypto, Terms
and Conditions, formerly available at https://www.huione.io/en-US/termsAndConditions/userAgreement (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025). The
Huione Group website is no longer accessible, which FinCEN assesses
is likely a response to negative public attention following a series
of reports by blockchain analytic firms on money laundering
occurring at Huione Group.
\23\ Huione Group, Who We Are, formerly available at https://www.huione.com/html/about.jsp (last accessed Sept. 24, 2024).
\24\ Huione Crypto, Introduce, formerly available at https://www.huione.io/en-US/introduce (last accessed Mar. 26, 2025).
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Huione Group, as an individual entity, coordinates its Components'
activities by operating the customer service and public relations
functions of the Huione Group. Huione Group has historically done this
by hosting Telegram channels \25\ to aid customers experiencing
problems with the services that the Components provide.\26\ One of
Huione Group's Telegram channels also provides public relations
commentary on behalf of the whole of the Huione Group network.\27\
Through coordination by Huione Group, Huione Group's Components all
share CVC infrastructure, making it challenging to ascertain the
specific Component involved in a particular transaction.
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\25\ Following the issuance of the NPRM, Telegram blocked Huione
Group's telegram channels, which Haowang Guarantee notified
customers of on its website. Haowang Guarantee, Announcements,
formerly available at https://www.hwbd.la/announcement (last
accessed May 15, 2025).
\26\ Telegram, Huione Group Customer Service Center, formerly
available at https://t.me/huionekf/138 (last accessed Mar. 27,
2025).
\27\ See, e.g., Telegram, Huione Group Customer Service, Huione
Statement (Mar. 9, 2025), formerly available at https://t.me/huionekf/346.
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As reflected in the Final Rule, FinCEN found that reasonable
grounds exist to conclude that Huione Group is a money transmitter. By
providing customer service and public relations services on behalf of
the Components, Huione Group is itself part of a network of people who
engage as a business in facilitating the transfer of money.
Furthermore, through Huione Group's apparent control of the Components
(each of which is itself a money transmitter and responds to Huione
Group's coordination of the Components' business activities such that
they form a self-contained ecosystem of exchange, payment, and market
services), Huione Group is engaged as a business in the transmission of
value that substitutes for currency. Accordingly, FinCEN found that
reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Huione Group is a financial
institution as defined by the BSA and as that term is used in section
311.
Furthermore, based on publicly available information, Huione Group
is operated by a Cambodian person, from Phnom Penh, Cambodia.\28\ The
Huione Group website is registered to a Cambodian address in Phnom
Penh, uses a Cambodian Top-Level Domain, and communicates predominately
in the Chinese language via a Cambodian website and one or more
Telegram channels operated from Cambodia.\29\ Accordingly, FinCEN found
that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Huione Group is operated
from and
[[Page 38343]]
located in Cambodia and thus operates outside of the United States.\30\
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\28\ The Record, Tether freezes $29 million of cryptocurrency
connected to Cambodian marketplace accused of fueling scams (July
15, 2024), https://therecord.media/tether-freezes-29-million-crypto-connected-to-scam-marketplace; see also ICANN, Huione.com, https://lookup.icann.org/en/huione.com; Elliptic, Huione Guarantee: The
multi-billion dollar marketplace used by online scammers (July 9,
2024, updated Mar. 27, 2025), https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cyber-scam-marketplace.
\29\ On May 13, 2025, Telegram shut down Huione Group's Telegram
channel, however, there is evidence that Huione Group is creating
new channels under different names to circumvent the action taken by
Telegram.
\30\ FinCEN is not aware of any physical presence by Huione
Group or the Components in the United States, or any substantial
business with customers in the United States. Accordingly, FinCEN
found that there are reasonable grounds to conclude that Huione
Group, including the Components, are foreign financial institutions
that operate outside the United States.
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2. Huione Pay PLC
Of note, Huione Pay PLC is a Component of the Huione Group that, as
of January 2025, was registered \31\ as a payment services institution
with the National Bank of Cambodia.\32\ Although as of July 30, 2025,
the Huione Pay PLC website was inaccessible, Huione Pay PLC offered--as
explained in the Final Rule--its customers the ability to trade CVC on
different blockchains, and to convert CVC to or from various fiat
currencies.\33\ Part of Huione Pay PLC, Huione International Payments,
acted as a merchant on Haowang Guarantee's platform, exchanging CVC to
facilitate the transfer of the proceeds of cyber scams.\34\ Huione Pay
PLC previously held the local equivalent of a money transmitting
business license issued by the Kingdom of Cambodia and engaged in the
exchange of CVC in a manner consistent with the definition of a money
transmitting business.\35\ Accordingly, as reflected in the Final Rule,
FinCEN found that reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Huione Pay
PLC is a financial institution as that term is used in the BSA and
section 311.
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\31\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Mar. 21, 2025). The
National Bank of Cambodia's List of Payment Service available on its
website only reflects the most recent reporting period. As such, the
information presented by FinCEN reflects information that was
available at the time indicated, in this example, the above-
mentioned information indicates that as of March 21, 2025, Huione
Pay PLC was registered as a payment service institution. Future
references to this list correspondingly indicate the information as
it was available on the date indicated.
\32\ Until December 2023, there was a likely related entity,
``Huione Pay,'' registered as a money services business in Canada,
which was incorporated in the country as Huione Pay Inc. Financial
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), Money
Services Business Registry, Huione Pay Inc, https://fintrac-canafe.canada.ca/msb-esm/reg-eng (last accessed Mar. 13, 2025). In
March 2025, Huione Group advertised its plans to expand Huione Pay
PLC into new markets, including in North America. Telegram, Huione
Group Customer Service, Huione Statement (Mar. 9, 2025), formerly
available at https://t.me/huionekf/346.
\33\ Huione Pay website, Index, formerly available at https://www.huionepay.com.kh/index/help (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025);
FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025); see also 31 CFR 1010.664.
\34\ FinCEN assesses that Huione International Payments is part
of Huione Pay PLC and that the entity supports Haowang Guarantee's
facilitation of transactions connected to money laundering
activities. See Elliptic, Huione Guarantee: The multi-billion dollar
marketplace used by online scammers (July 9, 2024, updated Mar. 27,
2025), https://www.elliptic.co/blog/cyber-scam-marketplace; The New
York Times, How Scammers Launder Money and Get Away With It (Mar.
23, 2025), https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/23/world/asia/cambodia-money-laundering-huione.html.
\35\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Mar. 21, 2025).
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Moreover, in the Final Rule, FinCEN found that reasonable grounds
exist to conclude that Huione Pay PLC operates outside of the United
States. Huione Pay PLC operates, or has operated, eight Cambodian
domestic branch locations, located in Battambang, Phnom Penh, Poipet,
Siem Reap, and Sihanoukville.\36\ Huione Pay PLC has advertised on
social media that it has, or had, operated a branch in Laukkaing,\37\
the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Burma and
a known center for criminal CVC investment scams, before a 2023-2024
crackdown shuttered the majority of these operations.\38\ As noted
above, Huione Pay PLC held a corporate registration in Cambodia as well
as a payment services institution license, both of which have been
revoked as of March 2025.\39\ Based on the foregoing, FinCEN found that
reasonable grounds exist to conclude that Huione Pay PLC is operated
from and located in Cambodia, and thus operates outside of the United
States.
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\36\ Telegram, Huione Branch, formerly available at https://t.me/huionestoreaddress/7 (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025).
\37\ Telegram, Huione Group Customer Service Center, formerly
available at https://t.me/huionekf/138 (last accessed Mar. 27,
2025).
\38\ Recorded Future, Myanmar rebels take control of `pig
butchering' scam city amid China pressure on junta (Jan. 8, 2024),
https://therecord.media/myanmar-rebels-control-pig-butchering-scam-hub.
\39\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Dec. 31, 2024), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Mar. 21, 2025). As of
March 31, 2025, Huione Pay PLC is no longer listed as having an
active license for ``other financial services activities.'' National
Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service Institutions (Mar. 31,
2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Oct 7, 2025). As of July 30,
2025, Huione Pay PLC has also lost its corporate registration. See
Cambodia Corporate Registry, Huione Search, https://www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh/cambodia-master/service/
create.html?targetAppCode=cambodia-
master&targetRegisterAppCode=cambodia-br-
companies&service=registerItemSearch (last accessed July 29, 2025).
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3. Huione Group and Its Components Are of Primary Money Laundering
Concern
In the Final Rule, FinCEN further found that Huione Group (defined
to include each of the Components, including, but not limited to,
Huione Pay PLC) is of primary money laundering concern. As stated in
the Final Rule, FinCEN assessed that Huione Group is used to facilitate
and promote money laundering, particularly in support of illicit
financial activities connected to the Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (DPRK) and Southeast Asia-based TCOs.\40\ Because Huione Group
has shared infrastructure with its constituent entities, the structure
makes it challenging to ascertain the specific Component involved in
any particular transaction. Nevertheless, FinCEN based this assessment
on information available through both public and non-public reporting,
and after thorough consideration of each of the following factors: (1)
Huione Group provides services that DPRK government entities use to
launder the proceeds of cyber heists; (2) TCOs based in Southeast Asia
have used Huione Group to launder illicit proceeds of cyber scams,
including CVC investment scams; and (3) Huione Group operates an
illicit online market.\41\
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\40\ FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione
Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295, 48296 (Oct. 16, 2025).
\41\ For additional details on FinCEN's assessment with respect
to Huione Group's facilitation and promotion of money laundering,
see the discussion in the Final Rule at 90 FR at 48300-48303.
FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 48295, 48300-48303 (Oct. 16, 2025).
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With this notice of proposed rulemaking, FinCEN does not alter its
assessment that Huione Group is a financial institution operating
outside the United States of primary money laundering concern.
B. Imposition of Special Measure Prohibiting the Opening or Maintaining
of Correspondent Accounts For or On Behalf of Huione Group
Consistent with the finding that Huione Group is a foreign
financial institution of primary money laundering concern and in
consideration of additional relevant factors, FinCEN imposed, under
special measure five, a prohibition on covered financial institutions
from opening or maintaining a correspondent account for, or on behalf
of, Huione Group in order to guard against the money laundering risks
to the U.S. financial system posed by Huione Group, as
[[Page 38344]]
identified in the First NPRM, Final Rule, and this notice of proposed
rulemaking.\42\ That special measure remains in effect.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ For additional details on FinCEN's imposition of special
measure five, see the Final Rule published at 90 FR at 48305-48306.
FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025); see 31 CFR 1010.664.
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III. Proposed Rule
A. Summary
FinCEN is issuing this notice of proposed rulemaking to address
Huione Group's efforts to circumvent the previously imposed special
measure by continuing to operate as a financial institution outside the
United States under a different name. This proposed rule is necessary
to protect the U.S. financial system and the national security of the
United States. This proposed rule, issued pursuant to section 311,
would amend the definition of Huione Group \43\ to include ``H-Pay
Service PLC and any successor entity'' of Huione Group, and would
further add and define the term ``successor entity.''
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\43\ This proposed final rule does not remove any of the named
Huione Group components as established in 31 CFR 1010.664. See 31
CFR 1010.664; see also FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure
Regarding Huione Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of
Primary Money Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Huione Group's Efforts To Circumvent the Special Measure, Including
Huione Pay PLC's Name Change to H-Pay Service PLC
Based on public and non-public information, FinCEN assesses that H-
Pay Service PLC (H-Pay) is a financial institution operating outside
the United States that is not only of primary money laundering concern
as a component of Huione Group, but also that the transition within the
Huione Group of operations from Huione Pay PLC to H-Pay represents an
effort, consistent with past practice, of the Huione Group to evade
public scrutiny and circumvent the special measure imposed through the
Final Rule.
H-Pay is a newly operational component of the Huione Group that
FinCEN assesses has, following the publication of the First NPRM and
Final Rule, effectively assumed the business role of Huione Pay PLC
within the Huione Group.
As an initial matter, H-Pay was licensed in Cambodia as a ``payment
services institution'' \44\ and advertises offering services such as
worldwide payments, savings accounts, and mobile banking.\45\ FinCEN
assesses that H-Pay is engaged as a business in the transmission of
currency due to these service offerings. Accordingly, FinCEN finds
reasonable grounds exist to conclude that H-Pay is a money transmitter,
which is a type of financial institution as that term is used in the
BSA and section 311.
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\44\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (as of Sept. 30, 2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/download_files/data/khmer/KH/EN-PSIs.pdf.
\45\ H-Pay Service PLC's website, www.h-pay.com (last accessed
Mar. 19, 2026).
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Further, based on public and non-public information, FinCEN
assesses that H-Pay is a component of the Huione Group--closely linked
to Huione Pay PLC--and operating outside the United States. Although
FinCEN assesses that Huione Pay PLC remains a financial institution of
primary money laundering concern,\46\ Huione Pay PLC's ability to
freely operate has been increasingly constrained. In particular, a
March 6, 2025 media report indicated that Huione Pay PLC's banking
license was revoked by the Cambodian government.\47\ According to a
July 31, 2025 update, the National Bank of Cambodia rescinded this
license by updating its list of ``Payment Service Institutions.'' \48\
Further, as of March 2025, Huione Pay PLC was registered with the
Cambodian Ministry of Commerce for ``other financial service
activities;'' however, as of July 29, 2025, it no longer appears in the
Ministry of Commerce's business registration database, indicating that
Huione Pay PLC lacks an active corporate registration or payment
service license.\49\
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\46\ Shortly after publication of the NPRM in May 2025, Huione
Pay began removing signage from its headquarters and other branches.
When contacted by a journalist about this change, a Huione Pay
employee claimed that Huione Pay was ``operating as usual,'' despite
Huione Pay's license being revoked in March 2025. Cambodian
Journalists Alliance Association, Huione Pay Removes Sign After U.S.
Blacklist Move (May 7, 2025), www.cambojanews.com/huione-pay-removes-sign-after-u-s-blacklist-move/. At present, FinCEN has no
information confirming that Huione Pay PLC has wholly ceased
operations.
\47\ See Radio Free Asia, Exclusive: World's Largest online
black market' Loses banking license (Mar. 6, 2025), https://www.rfa.org/english/cambodia/2025/03/06/huione-cambodia-cyberscam-cryptocurrency/. Huione Group responded to the allegations, refuting
them by noting that Huione Pay PLC does not require a banking
license for its operations. Telegram, Huione Group Customer Service,
Huione Statement (Mar. 9, 2025), formerly available at https://t.me/huionekf/346. As of March 31, 2025, Huione Pay PLC is no longer
listed as having an active license for ``other financial services
activities.'' National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed May 14, 2025).
\48\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (July 31, 2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Oct. 7, 2025).
\49\ Cambodia Corporate Registry, Huione Search, https://www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh/cambodia-master/service/
create.html?targetAppCode=cambodia-
master&targetRegisterAppCode=cambodia-br-
companies&service=registerItemSearch (last accessed Mar. 27, 2025;
July 29, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Huione Pay PLC's operations have become restricted, FinCEN
assesses that H-Pay has assumed its place. Despite incorporating in
2024,\50\ H-Pay was not listed as a licensed payment service
institution by the National Bank of Cambodia until June 2025, after the
National Bank of Cambodia revoked Huione Pay PLC's license, the
Ministry of Commerce apparently delisted Huione Pay PLC, and FinCEN
issued the First NPRM.\51\ H-Pay originally utilized an address \52\ in
the same building as the flagship location of Panda Commercial Bank
PLC, a financial institution in Cambodia that has reportedly been
linked to Huione Pay PLC and the Huione Group and that has had its
license revoked (and been forced into liquidation) by the National Bank
of Cambodia.\53\ After that point, FinCEN assesses that H-Pay assumed
Huione Pay PLC's physical and operational footprint. Shortly after
publication of the First NPRM in May 2025, Huione Pay PLC began
removing signage from its headquarters and other branches,\54\ and by
November 2025, signs for H-Pay replaced Huione Pay PLC signs at both
their headquarters location and at
[[Page 38345]]
multiple other branches.\55\ At the same time, a still-active Huione
Pay hotline even referred a journalist to use H-Pay's app to continue
accessing Huione Pay's services.\56\ And, as of December 2025--
following a ``bank run'' on H-Pay \57\--H-Pay customers were advised--
through a Chinese-language note on the door of the H-Pay headquarters--
of a ``Huione Deferred Payment Plan'' for their deposits in H-Pay,\58\
providing evidence of continued Huione Group--and specifically, Huione
Pay--operations through H-Pay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ Kingdom of Cambodia, Business Registration, H-PAY SERVICE
PLC. (00074959) General Details, https://www.businessregistration.moc.gov (last accessed Dec. 11, 2025).
\51\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions, https://www.nbc.gov.kh/download_files/data/khmer/KH/EN-PSIs.pdf (as of June 30, 2025).
\52\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Oct 7, 2025); Kingdom
of Cambodia Ministry of Commerce Business Registration, H-PAY
SERVICE PLC. (00074959) Addresses,
www.businessregistration.moc.gov.kh (last accessed Dec. 30, 2025).
\53\ Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, National Bank
Revokes Panda Bank License, Orders Liquidation (Feb. 24, 2026),
www.cambojanews.com/national-bank-revokes-panda-bank-license-orders-liquidation/. Huione Group has a history of claiming to be
affiliated with Panda Bank. For example, a post from @hwdbgs, a now-
deleted Huione Guarantee-affiliated Telegram channel, claimed that
Panda Bank was a subsidiary of Huione Group. Additionally, now-
deactivated website for Huione Group's insurance arm advertised on
its website, as recently as 2024, that its shareholders also owned
Huione Pay and Panda Bank. Telegram, @hwdb Channel (Apr. 5, 2022),
archived at tgstat.com/channel/@hwdbgs.
\54\ Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, Huione Pay
Removes Sign After U.S. Blacklist Move (May 7, 2025),
www.cambojanews.com/huione-pay-removes-sign-after-u-s-blacklist-move/.
\55\ Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, H-Pay Emerges
From Sanctioned Huione Pay, Panda Bank Links Noted (Nov. 27, 2025),
www.cambojanews.com/h-pay-emerges-from-sanctioned-huione-pay-panda-bank-links-noted/.
\56\ Id.
\57\ Cambodian Journalists Alliance Association, Huione Pay
Pulls Rebrand Sign, Freezes Accounts After CamboJA Report (Dec. 3,
2025), www.cambojanews.com/huione-pay-pulls-rebrand-sign-freezes-accounts-after-camboja-report/.
\58\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More evidence of H-Pay's links to Huione Pay can be found in H-
Pay's early branding. A logo visible on H-Pay's website in August 2025
bears a strong resemblance to Huione Pay's logos advertised on its
websites, some of which remain active, featuring a red emblem with two
curved laurel wreaths which form an almost complete circle.\59\ By
December 2025, H-Pay's logo on its website was altered to remove the
two curved laurel wreaths,\60\ which FinCEN assesses is an attempt to
obfuscate its connection to Huione Pay.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ H-Pay's website, formerly available at www.h-pay.com (last
accessed Aug. 18, 2025); Huione Pay's website, www.dev.huione.com
(last accessed Aug. 18, 2025).
\60\ H-Pay's website, formerly available at www.h-pay.com (last
accessed Dec. 9, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, a scam compound called ``#8 Park'' \61\ that hosted a
physical Huione Pay store and also bore signage for a company allegedly
linked to the OFAC-sanctioned ``Prince Group'' TCO,\62\ was reportedly
also known as ``Huione Park.'' \63\ Following the disruption of Huione
Pay's business, its branch in the compound was replaced with a new
company, ``H-Pay,'' \64\ which has been publicly characterized as a
``rebrand'' of Huione Pay.\65\ This H-Pay location was so vital to the
compound that the #8 Park administrators had declared H-Pay to be the
mandatory payment platform inside the complex.\66\ As described in the
Final Rule, Huione Pay lost its license to operate as a payment service
institution, as of March 31, 2025.\67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ On March 26, 2026, the United Kingdom's Foreign,
Commonwealth, and Development Office sanctioned a number of scam
compound associated entities, including Legend Innovation Company,
the operator of #8 Park. FCDO, UK Crackdown on Vile Scam Centres
Steps Up with Sanctions on Illicit Crypto Network (Mar. 26, 2026)
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-crackdown-on-vile-scam-centres-steps-up-with-sanctions-on-illicit-crypto-network.
\62\ On October 14, 2025, OFAC sanctioned 146 targets within the
Cambodia-based Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization
(Prince Group). Treasury, Press Release, U.S. and U.K. Take Largest
Action Ever Targeting Cybercriminal Networks in Southeast Asia (Oct.
14, 2025), https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sb0278.
\63\ Elliptic, #8 Park: Prince and Huione's role in a scam
compound still operating amid crackdowns (Feb. 4, 2026), https://www.elliptic.co/blog/8-park-prince-and-huiones-role-in-a-scam-compound-still-operating-amid-crackdowns.
\64\ Id.
\65\ KiriPost, Rebranded H-Pay Freezes Withdrawals Amid Cash
Crunch Following International Sanctions (Dec. 1, 2025), https://kiripost.com/stories/rebranded-h-pay-freezes-withdrawals-amid-cash-crunch-following-international-sanctions.
\66\ See supra note 63.
\67\ National Bank of Cambodia, List of Payment Service
Institutions (Mar. 31, 2025), https://www.nbc.gov.kh/english/supervision/payment_service.php (last accessed Oct 7, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importantly, Huione Group's efforts to replace Huione Pay PLC with
H-Pay follows the pattern of conduct that Huione Group has used
following previous instances of negative public attention.
Specifically, Huione Group has used name changes and creation or co-
option of new or other entities as a method to circumvent public
scrutiny and the finding and special measure placed upon it by FinCEN.
For example, on October 19, 2024, following a spate of negative media
reports detailing Huione Group's indiscretions, ``Huione Guarantee''
rebranded as ``Haowang Guarantee.'' \68\ Later, in December 2024,
Haowang Guarantee announced it was buying a stake in another illicit
marketplace, Tudou Guarantee.\69\ Shortly after the publication of the
First NPRM, Haowang Guarantee's illicit marketplace was reportedly
banned from Telegram,\70\ resulting in Haowang Guarantee announcing it
would close on its website.\71\ Haowang Guarantee then began directing
its former customers to the illicit marketplace, Tudou Guarantee, that
it had invested in earlier.\72\ And, given the rapid transition of
Huione Pay PLC operations, facilities, and branding to H-Pay, FinCEN
assesses that Huione Pay PLC changing its name to H-Pay presents
another example of the Huione Group attempting to circumvent the impact
of Huione Pay's corporate delisting and loss of license, as well as,
ultimately, enforcement of the Final Rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Telegram, Haowang Guarantee Customer Service Channel (Sept.
30, 2024), formerly available at https://t.me/s/kefu (last accessed
Mar. 27, 2025).
\69\ In the same post, Tudou Guarantee claimed that Tudou
Guarantee and Haowang Guarantee are independent organizations.
FinCEN assesses that this is not credible. The combination of
overlap in customers, particularly following Haowang Guarantee's ban
from Telegram, the ownership stake by Haowang Guarantee of Tudou
Guarantee, and media reporting lead FinCEN to believe Tudou
Guarantee subsumed Haowang Guarantee. Telegram, @danbl0 Channel
(Dec. 14, 2024), https://t.me/danbl0/16 (last accessed Jan. 14,
2026); Telegram, @hwgq Channel (Dec. 10, 2024), tgstat.com/channel/@hwgq/249 (last accessed Jan. 14, 2026).
\70\ Reuters, 2 massive black market services blocked by
Telegram, messaging app says (May 15, 2025), https://www.reuters.com/world/china/2-massive-black-market-services-blocked-by-telegram-messaging-app-says-2025-05-15/.
\71\ Haowang Guarantee website, formerly available at hwdb.la
(last accessed on Nov. 11, 2025).
\72\ Elliptic, Telegram dark markets expand to fill the gap left
by Huione Guarantee (Jun. 23, 2025), www.elliptic.co/blog/telegram-
dark-markets-expand-to-fill-the-gap-left-by-huione-guarantee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In an announcement on April 10, 2026, the National Bank of Cambodia
reportedly revoked H-Pay's payment services license. However, given the
continued operations of Huione Pay and its eventual migration to H-Pay
after the National Bank of Cambodia revoked Huione Pay's license in
March 2025, FinCEN has reason to believe the same pattern of activity
will persist with H-Pay and a future, successor entity.
Therefore, for the reasons set out above, FinCEN assesses that
reasonable grounds exist to conclude that H-Pay is a financial
institution operating outside the United States, a Component of Huione
Group that, like other Components of Huione Group is of primary money
laundering concern, and, as such, should be included in the definition
of Huione Group and subject to the special measure applicable to Huione
Group.
C. Proposed Amended Definition of Huione Group
The Final Rule defines ``Huione Group'' to mean ``all subsidiaries,
branches, and offices of Huione Group operating as a financial
institution in any jurisdiction outside of the United States, including
Haowang Guarantee (formerly known as Huione Guarantee), Huione Pay PLC,
and Huione Crypto Sp[oacute][lstrok]ka Z Ograniczon[aogon]
Odpowiedzialno[sacute]ci[aogon] (d/b/a Huione Crypto).'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ 31 CFR 1010.664(a)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This proposed rule would amend the definition of Huione Group set
forth at 31 CFR 1010.664(a)(1) to add: (1) H-Pay; and (2) the term
``successor entity.'' In addition, this proposed rule would define
``successor entity'' for purposes of this rule to mean any person that
replaces Huione Group by acquiring its assets, in whole or in part,
and/or carrying out the affairs of Huione Group under a new name.
[[Page 38346]]
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
A. Definition of Huione Group
This proposed rule defines the term ``Huione Group'' in 31 CFR
1010.664(a)(1) means ``all subsidiaries, branches, and offices of
Huione Group operating as a financial institution in any jurisdiction
outside of the United States, including Haowang Guarantee (formerly
known as Huione Guarantee), Huione Pay PLC, Huione Crypto
Sp[oacute][lstrok]ka Z Ograniczon[aogon]
Odpowiedzialno[sacute]ci[aogon] (d/b/a Huione Crypto), and H-Pay
Service PLC, as well as any successor entity.
B. Definition of Successor Entity
This proposed rule would also add a new definition, set forth at 31
CFR 1010.664(a)(6), to define the term ``successor entity'' for
purposes of this rule to mean any person that replaces Huione Group, or
any Component thereof, by acquiring its assets, in whole or in part,
and/or carrying out the affairs of Huione Group under a new name. In
the future, FinCEN may publish notifications of future name changes of
Huione Group, or any Component thereof, should they occur.
V. Executive Order 14294
Section 5 of Executive Order 14294 directs that all future NPRMs
and final rules published in the Federal Register, the violation of
which may constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a
statement identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal
regulatory offense and the authorizing statute.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Executive Order 14294, ``Fighting Overcriminalization in
Federal Regulations'' 90 FR 20367 (issued May 9, 2025; published May
14, 2025), https://www.federalregister.gov/executiveorder/14294.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Executive Order 14294 further directs that the regulatory text of
all NPRMs and final rules with criminal consequences published in the
Federal Register after May 9, 2025, should explicitly state a mens rea
requirement for each element of a criminal regulatory offense,
accompanied by citations to the relevant provisions of the authorizing
statute.
Willful violations of the regulations set forth in this proposed
rule may be subject to criminal penalties pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5322
and regulations promulgated in 31 CFR Chapter X. The statutory
authority for criminal liability requires a mens rea of willfulness as
an element pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 5322(a) and 31 U.S.C. 5322(b).
FinCEN's existing regulation, 31 CFR 1010.840, that sets out criminal
penalties for violations of regulations promulgated in 31 CFR Chapter X
also includes a mens rea of willfulness. In drafting this statement,
FinCEN has consulted with the Department of Justice.
VI. Regulatory Impact Analysis
FinCEN has analyzed this proposed rule as required under Executive
Order 12866,\75\ Executive Order 13563,\76\ the Regulatory Flexibility
Act (RFA),\77\ the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA),\78\ and the
Paperwork Reduction Act (PRA).\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58
FR 51735 (issued Sept. 30,1993; published Oct. 4, 1993).
\76\ Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and Regulatory
Review, 76 FR 3821 (issued Jan. 18, 2011; published Jan. 21, 2011).
\77\ 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.
\78\ 2 U.S.C. 1532.
\79\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(1)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The proposed amendments to the definition of Huione Group are
expected to better ensure that the imposition of special measure five
can achieve the intended effects as described in the First NPRM and
Final Rule.\80\ The analysis below presents an analysis of the expected
incremental economic effects that FinCEN anticipates would accompany
adoption of the amendments to the Final Rule as proposed and assesses
such expectations in more granular detail. This discussion includes an
explanation of how the assumptions in FinCEN's cost model and
methodological choices have influenced the conclusions of the agency's
analysis. The public is invited to comment on all aspects of FinCEN's
practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See FinCEN, Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 18934 (May 5, 2025); FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure
Regarding Huione Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of
Primary Money Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025). As
set out in the First NPRM and Final Rule, the rule is intended to:
(1) combat and deter money laundering in facilitation of
proliferation financing associate with Huione Group; and (2) prevent
Huione Group from using the U.S. financial system to enable its
illicit finance behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A. Executive Orders
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess costs
and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is
necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits
(including potential economic, environmental, public health and safety
effects; distributive impacts; and equity). Executive Order 13563
emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits,
reducing costs, harmonizing rules, and promoting flexibility.
It has been determined that this proposed rule is not a significant
regulatory action under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866.
Accordingly, a regulatory impact analysis is not required.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
When an agency issues a rulemaking proposal, the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA) requires the agency to ``prepare and make
available for public comment an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis'' (IRFA) that will ``describe the impact of the proposed rule
on small entities.'' \81\ However, section 605 of the RFA allows an
agency to certify a rule, in lieu of preparing an analysis, if the
proposed rulemaking is not expected to have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ 5 U.S.C. 603(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the First NPRM, FinCEN considered that the rule would apply to
all covered financial institutions and could thus potentially affect a
substantial number of small entities. FinCEN then provided the reasons
that led it to assesses that the imposition of special measure five on
Huione Group would be unlikely to have a significant economic impact on
such entities, and hence that certification was appropriate.\82\ FinCEN
then continued its analysis of the potential economic impact of the
impositions of special measure five, generally,\83\ and in the Final
Rule further concluded that it did not expect the rule to affect a
substantial number of entities in practice, and that few if any of
these entities would meet the criteria necessary to be considered small
entities for the purposes of the RFA.\84\ On this basis, FinCEN
maintained that certification of the rule continued to be appropriate.
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\82\ See FinCEN, Special Measure Regarding Huione Group, as a
Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern,
90 FR 18934, 18946 (Section VIII.B) (May 5, 2025).
\83\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Agency Information Collection
Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment Request: Renewal Without
Change of Information Collection Requirements in Connection With the
Imposition of Special Measures, 90 FR 57279, 57280-57283 (Section
II) (Dec. 10, 2025).
\84\ 5 U.S.C. 601(3)-(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since this proposed rule would amend a certified rule, FinCEN
considered the likelihood that the incremental economic effects of the
proposed amendments would, independently, significantly impact a
substantial number of small entities. Under the proposed amendments
covered financial institutions would be required to take reasonable
measures to detect use of their correspondent accounts to process
transactions involving Huione Group as it would be newly defined by the
proposed amendments to 1010.664(a). As
[[Page 38347]]
previously taken into consideration, because all U.S. persons,
including U.S. financial institutions, currently must comply with OFAC
sanctions, and U.S. financial institutions generally have suspicious
activity reporting requirements and systems in place to screen
transactions to comply with OFAC sanctions and section 311 special
measures administered by FinCEN, it is not foreseeable that adding H-
Pay Services PLC to the definition of Huione Group would have a
substantial impact. The systems that U.S. financial institutions have
in place to comply with economic sanctions and BSA requirements can
easily be modified to adapt to this addition.
However, it is less clear that the special due diligence that would
be required under the proposed rule--i.e., preventing the processing of
transactions involving Huione Group and the transmittal of notification
to certain correspondent account holders--would not impose a
significant additional economic burden upon U.S. financial institutions
because the proposed rule would also amend the definition of Huione
Group to include any successor entity and both (1) the number of future
successors and (2) the frequency with which such successor entities may
arise and be identified are unknown.\85\ FinCEN is therefore, as a
conservative precaution, not taking the position that the proposed rule
could not have a significant economic impact on a small covered
financial institution. Instead, FinCEN is certifying that the proposed
amendments to the Final Rule contained in this rulemaking would not
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small businesses
because it continues to expect, as in the Final Rule, that few, if any,
covered financial institutions that maintain foreign correspondent
accounts meet the applicable definitional criteria to be deemed a
``small entity'' under the RFA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\85\ FinCEN is requesting comment on the likelihood of
additional successor entities and the expected burden associated
with naming additional successor entities. See infra Section VI.D,
Additional Requests for Comments, Question #3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FinCEN invites comments from members of the public who believe
there would be a significant economic impact on small entities from the
imposition of a prohibition under the fifth special measure regarding
Huione Group.
C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Section 202 of the UMRA \86\ requires that an agency prepare a
budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule that may result
in expenditure by the State, local, and Tribal governments, in the
aggregate, or by the private sector, of $193 million or more in any one
year ($100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation).87 88 If
a budgetary impact statement is required, section 202 of the UMRA also
requires an agency to identify and consider a reasonable number of
regulatory alternatives before promulgating a rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ 2 U.S.C. 1532.
\87\ Id.
\88\ The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis reports the annual
value of the gross domestic product implicit price deflator for
calendar year 1995 (the year UMRA was enacted) as 66.939, and as
128.974 for calendar year 2025 (the most recent available). Thus,
the inflation-adjusted estimate for $100 million is 128.974 / 66.939
x $100 million, or $192.7 million. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,
Table 1.1.9. Implicit Price Deflators for Gross Domestic Product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FinCEN has determined that this proposed rule will not result in
expenditures by State, local, and Tribal governments in the aggregate,
or by the private sector, of $193 million or more in any one year.
Accordingly, FinCEN has not prepared a budgetary impact statement or
specifically addressed the regulatory alternatives considered.
D. Paperwork Reduction Act
The recordkeeping and disclosure requirements in this proposed
rule, which qualify as ``collections of information'' under the PRA,
will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review in accordance with the PRA.\89\ Under the PRA, an agency may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a
collection of information unless it displays a valid control number
assigned by the OMB.\90\ Written comments and recommendations for the
amended prohibition can be submitted by visiting www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain. Find this particular document by selecting
``Currently under Review--Open for Public Comments'' or by using the
search function. Comments are welcome and must be received by [30 DAYS
AFTER DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER]. In accordance with
requirements of the PRA, 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A), and its implementing
regulations, 5 CFR part 1320, the following information concerning the
collection of information as required by 31 CFR 1010.664 is presented
to assist those persons wishing to comment on the information
collections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(1)(D).
\90\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(a)(3).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The provisions in this proposed rule would extend the scope of the
required collection of information found in sections
1010.664(b)(3)(i)(A) and 1010.664(b)(4) by including the additional
parties defined in 1010.664(a)(1), as amended, and 1010.664(a)(6). As
described in the Final Rule, the notification requirement in section
1010.664(b)(3)(i)(A) is intended to aid cooperation from foreign
correspondent account holders in preventing transactions involving
Huione Group from being processed by the U.S. financial system.\91\ The
information required to be maintained by section 1010.664(b)(4) will
continue to be used by federal agencies and certain self-regulatory
organizations to verify compliance by covered financial institutions
with the notification requirement in section 1010.664(b)(3)(i)(A). The
additional collection of information resulting from the proposed
amendment to the definition of Huione Group would be mandatory. The
proposed rule does not modify the intended purpose of the Final Rule or
the nature of the information required to be collected or disclosed. It
would exclusively modify the scope of the parties included within the
definition of ``Huione Group.'' FinCEN is revising the related PRA
estimates covered by OMB control number 1506-0083 accordingly to
account for the revised definition introduced by this proposed rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\91\ See FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione
Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency: As required.
Description of Affected Financial Institutions: Only those covered
financial institutions defined in section 1010.664(a)(3) that are
engaged in correspondent banking with, or processing transactions
potentially involving Huione Group, as defined in section
1010.664(b)(1) and (2) are expected to be affected.
Estimated Number of Potential Respondents: Approximately 14,575.
[[Page 38348]]
Table 1--Estimates of Covered Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial institution type Number of entities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Banks with a Federal Functional Regulator (FFR) \b\ 8,623
\a\...........................................
Banks without an FFR \c\....................... \d\ 365
Broker-dealers in securities (Broker-dealers) \f\ 3,278
\e\...........................................
Futures commission merchants (FCMs) and \h\ 954
Introducing brokers in commodities (IBCs) \g\.
Mutual funds \i\............................... \j\ 1,355
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(1); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(d) and 31 CFR
1020.210(a).
\b\ This includes 4,336 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation- (FDIC-)
insured depository institutions (i.e., federally regulated banks)
according to the FDIC's Quarterly Bank Profile for Q4 2025, p. 2
(https://www.fdic.gov/quarterly-banking-profile/past-quarterly-banking-profiles profiles). It also includes 4,287 National Credit Union Administration-
(NCUA-) chartered credit unions (i.e., federally regulated credit
unions) as of December 31, 2025, according to NCUA's Quarterly Credit
Union Data Summary: 2025 Q4, p. i (https://ncua.gov/analysis/credit-union-corporate-call-report-data/quarterly-data-summary-reports).
\c\ 31 CFR 1020.210(b).
\d\ The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Master Account
and Services Database (https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/master-account-and-services-database-existing-access.htm) contains
data as of November 30, 2025, on financial institutions that use
Federal Reserve Bank financial services, including those with no
additional Federal regulator. FinCEN used this data to identify 365
banks and credit unions with no additional Federal regulator using
Federal Reserve Bank financial services.
\e\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(2).
\f\ This estimate is based on U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) data on active broker-dealers available at ``Company Information
About Active Broker-Dealers'' (https://www.sec.gov/foia-services/frequently-requested-documents/company-information-about-active-broker-dealers dealers), which listed 3,278 active broker-dealers registered with the
SEC as of December 31, 2025.
\g\ 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(8) and (9).
\h\ According to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission data on FCMs
available at ``Financial Data for FCMs'' (https://www.cftc.gov/MarketReports/financialfcmdata/index.htm), there were 66 registered
FCMs as of December 31, 2025. The number of IBCs as of December 31,
2025 (888) was obtained from the National Futures Association, ``NFA
Membership Totals'' website (https://www.nfa.futures.org/registration-membership/membership-and-directories.html). Because deduplication of
entities registered as both FCMs and IBCs was not feasible, this
estimate may double-count some entities registered in both categories.
FinCEN, however, believes this subpopulation may be small.
\i\ See 31 CFR 1010.100(t)(10); see also 31 CFR 1010.100(gg).
\j\ This estimate is based on the number of registered investment
companies filing Form N-1A in SEC's Annual Registered Investment
Company Update: Form N-CEN Data, Period Ending December 2024, April
2025, table 1.3, p. 4 (https://www.sec.gov/files/annual-registered-investment-company-update-20250404.pdf).
Estimated Number of Expected Respondents: Approximately 129.\92\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\92\ While this regulation applies to all covered institutions
described in Table 1, in practice the burden would only be imposed
on select institutions that maintain correspondent accounts for
foreign banks. Table 2 presents an estimate of this subpopulation of
banks, brokers or dealers in securities, FCMs and IBCs, and mutual
funds.
Table 2--Estimates of Affected Financial Institutions by Type
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financial institution type Number of entities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Banks with an FFR.............................. \a\ 66
Banks without an FFR........................... \b\ 12
Broker-dealers................................. \c\ 30
FCMs and IBCs.................................. \d\ 9
Mutual funds................................... \e\ 12
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ Data is from the Federal Financial Institution Examination Council
Central Data Repository for Reports of Condition and Income (Call
Reports) and Uniform Bank Performance Reports, available for most FDIC-
insured institutions. Using this source of data, FinCEN determines
that as of Q4 2025, approximately 66 banks (as defined by FinCEN
regulations, see 31 CFR 1010.100(d)) would be affected by this
proposed rule in any given year. Specifically, as of Q4 2025, there
were approximately 66 banks that reported non-zero values for deposit
liabilities of banks in foreign countries. Deposit liabilities in a
foreign country is an indication that a bank maintains correspondent
accounts with a foreign financial institution.
\b\ The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Master Account
and Services Database contains data on financial institutions that use
Reserve Bank financial services, including those with no additional
Federal regulator. FinCEN used this data to identify an additional 12
international banking entities with no additional Federal regulator
and that do not file Call Reports, but that are also likely to
maintain correspondent accounts with a foreign financial institution.
\c\ Broker-dealers, unless they are publicly traded, are not required to
make reports indicating whether they have foreign correspondent
accounts or hold foreign deposits. FinCEN reviewed financial statement
data from 10-Q and 6-K filings with the SEC and identified nine
publicly traded broker-dealers with U.S. operations that reported
foreign deposits. FinCEN also examined Suspicious Activity Reports
filed by broker-dealers in 2024 to identify another two non-publicly
traded broker-dealers who appeared likely to be maintaining foreign
deposits. However, because many broker-dealers are not publicly
traded--so there may be less information about their business publicly
available--and because many did not file Suspicious Activity Reports,
FinCEN conservatively estimates that the proportion of broker-dealers
with foreign correspondent accounts is similar to the proportion for
banks (approximately 0.9 percent). 0.9 percent of 3,278 active broker-
dealers is approximately 30 broker-dealers assumed to have foreign
correspondent accounts.
\d\ FCMs, IBCs, and mutual funds generally use intermediary U.S. banks
to move and maintain client deposits and funds for investment.
Therefore, it is unlikely that many of these institutions maintain
direct correspondent accounts with foreign financial institutions
outside of their existing upstream banking relationships. However,
because these institutions may in some cases receive deposits from,
make payments or other disbursements, or otherwise transact directly
with foreign financial institutions, FinCEN conservatively estimates
that the proportion of FCMs, IBCs, and mutual funds with foreign
correspondent accounts is similar to the proportion for banks
(approximately 0.9 percent). 0.9 percent of 954 active FCMs and IBCs
is approximately nine FCMs and IBCs assumed to have foreign
correspondent accounts.
\e\ 0.9 percent of 1,355 active mutual funds is approximately 12 mutual
funds assumed to have foreign correspondent accounts.
[[Page 38349]]
Estimated Average Annual Burden in Hours per Affected Financial
Institution:
Imposing special measure five requirements as described in the
Final Rule was originally expected to result in new, incremental
recordkeeping burdens on certain covered financial institutions as
outlined below.
Original Burden Estimates
An affected covered financial institution is expected to incur
recordkeeping and disclosure burdens associated with preparing and
retaining the materials necessary to demonstrate compliance with the
imposition of special measure five, which includes records related to:
A. Documenting the reasonable steps the financial institution
undertakes to ensure no transactions involving Huione Group are
processed for a foreign correspondent account.\93\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\93\ See FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding Huione
Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295, 48309-48311 (Section VI.D) (Oct.
16, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Notifying, and documenting that the financial institution has
provided notice to, foreign correspondent account holders that the
financial institution knows or has reason to believe provide services
to Huione Group, informing such correspondents that they may not
provide Huione Group with access to the correspondent account
maintained at the financial institution.
C. Documenting the reasonable steps it took with respect to special
due diligence requirements, including but not limited to, the reasoning
that informed decisions to adopt (or not adopt) new measures adding to
its existing risk-based approach, and those new measures, if adopted.
Revised Burden Estimates
For purposes of modeling the anticipated changes in PRA burden
introduced by the proposed rule, FinCEN considered the amendments to
the definition of Huione Group in 31 CFR 1010.664(a) to include (1) H-
Pay Service PLC and (2) any successor entity separately. Because the
Final Rule already required affected financial institutions to
undertake activities A-C in 2025, FinCEN assumes that financial
institutions may leverage the existing work already undertaken when
newly applying special measure five to H-Pay Service PLC. As such,
FinCEN is assigning a burden of four hours, or half the typical year-
one burden, to integrate this newly named entity into an existing
section 311 finding.
FinCEN similarly expects that, in the future, should the agency
identify and provide notice to affected financial institutions of
additional successor entities upon which the special measure five
prohibitions would be imposed, the same ability to leverage existing
work would attenuate the burden associated with imposing special
measures on a new entity. At this time, FinCEN does not have the
additional data or information necessary to estimate the likelihood of
issuing such a determination, or otherwise notifying covered financial
institutions of their new obligations, in a given year with more
precision than a general binary random probability (i.e., p = 0.5).
Thus, in year two, the expected incremental PRA burden of two hours
associated with newly defining Huione Group to include any successor
entity, as defined and operationalized, reflects the 50 percent chance
of an additional four-hour burden and the 50 percent chance of no
additional burden. In year three, the expected incremental PRA burden
of 2.125 hours similarly reflects the equally weighted probabilities of
successors being identified in sequential periods.\94\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\94\ The annual outcomes are modeled as a Bernoulli process,
with a general formula of expected burden (1/2n-1) x
{s1, . . .,s2n-1{time} in year n.
When n = 3, (1/2 \2\) x {0, 0.25, 4, 4.25{time} = ((1/4) x (0)) +
((1/4) x (0.25)) + ((1/4) x (4)) + ((1/4) x (4.25)) = 2.125. This
reflects a 25 percent of no additional burden in s1
(there are no successor entities in year two or three), a 25 percent
chance of an additional 0.25-hour burden in s2 (there is
a successor entity in year two but no new successor entity in year
three), a 25 percent chance of an additional four-hour burden in
s3 (there is no new successor entity in year two but a
new successor entity in year three), and a 25 percent chance of an
additional 4.25-hour burden in s4 (there is a new
successor entity in both years two and three).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each newly identified entity is then subsequently expected to be
integrated into the existing section 311 special measures practices of
affected financial institutions as modeled elsewhere in FinCEN PRA
analyses.\95\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\95\ See, e.g., FinCEN, Imposition of Special Measure Regarding
Huione Group, as a Foreign Financial Institution of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 48295 (Oct. 16, 2025); FinCEN, Proposal of
Special Measure Regarding Transactions Involving Ten Mexican
Gambling Establishments as a Class of Transactions of Primary Money
Laundering Concern, 90 FR 51234 (Nov. 17, 2025); FinCEN, Agency
Information Collection Activities; Proposed Renewal; Comment
Request: Renewal Without Change of Information Collection
Requirements in Connection With the Imposition of Special Measures,
90 FR 57279 (Dec. 10, 2025); FinCEN, Proposal of Special Measure
Regarding MBaer Merchant Bank AG as a Financial Institution
Operating Outside of the United States of Primary Money Laundering
Concern, 91 FR 10034 (Mar. 2, 2026).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tables 3 through 5 reflect these revisions to the PRA analysis in
the Final Rule, including the estimated average annual burden per
affected financial institution assigned to the additional collection of
information in this proposed rule: four hours in year one, 2.25 hours
in year two,\96\ and 2.375 hours in year three.\97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\96\ 2.25 hours = 0.25 hours associated with including H-Pay
Service PLC + 2 hours associated with the potential additional
successor entity in year two.
\97\ 2.375 hours = 0.25 hours associated with including H-Pay
Service PLC + 2.125 hours associated with the potential additional
successor entities in years two and three.
Table 3--Expected PRA Burden Hours per Respondent by Effective Year
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Including
Huione group Including H-Pay potential
Year as defined in service PLC additional Total
final rule successor(s)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1............................................ 0.25 4 n/a 4.25
2............................................ 0.25 0.25 2 2.50
3............................................ 0.05 0.25 2.125 2.425
------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Burden............................. 0.55 4.5 4.125 9.175
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
[[Page 38350]]
Table 4--Summary of the Incremental Increase in PRA Burden Relative to the Final Rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Incremental Total
Number of increase in incremental Total incremental
Year respondents burden hours per increase in increase in cost \a\
respondent burden hours
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1......................................... 129 4 516.0 $64,283
2......................................... 129 2.25 290.3 36,159
3......................................... 129 2.375 306.4 38,168
---------------------------------------------------------------------
3-Year average............................ 129 2.88 370.9 46,204
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The wage rate applied here is a general composite hourly wage ($87.61) scaled by a private sector benefits
factor of 1.42 ($124.58 = $87.61 x 1.42). This incorporates Bureau of Labor Statistics mean wage data
associated with six occupational codes (11-1010: Chief Executives; 11-3021: Computer and Information Systems
Managers; 11-3031: Financial Managers; 13-1041: Compliance Officers; 23-1010: Lawyers and Judicial Law Clerks;
43-3099: Financial Clerks, All Other) for each of the nine groupings of North American Industry Classification
System industry codes that FinCEN determined are most directly comparable to its 11 categories of potentially
affected financial institutions as delineated in 31 CFR parts 1020 to 1030. See Bureau of Labor Statistics,
May 2024--National industry-specific and by ownership, https://www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. Given that many
occupations provide benefits beyond wages (e.g., insurance and paid leave), FinCEN applies the private sector
benefit factor to the unloaded wage rate to reflect the total cost to the employer. The benefit factor is the
ratio of total compensation (which includes wages and benefits) to wages. Total compensation = $43.94 and
Wages and salaries = $30.90 (1.42 = $43.94 / $30.90) as of June 2024, based on the private industry workers
series data downloaded from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employer Costs for Employee Compensation data,
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_09102024.pdf.
Table 5--Annual Time Burden: Three-Year Averages
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Original
Total hours (final rule) Incremental Total
\a\ (NPRM)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Per Respondent.................................................. 0.18 2.88 3.06
On Aggregate.................................................... \b\ 23.65 370.88 394.53
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ The per-respondent burden for the Final Rule reflects the average annual burden for years two through four
to ensure comparability with the annual averages for years one through three of this proposed rule.
\b\ The burden was calculated by applying the per-respondent burden from the Final Rule (0.18 hours) to the
updated number of expected respondents (129) rather than the number of expected respondents under the Final
Rule (127).
FinCEN invites comments on: (1) whether the collection of
information found in section 1010.664(b)(4) is necessary for the proper
performance of the mission of FinCEN, including whether the information
will have practical utility; (2) the accuracy of FinCEN's estimate of
the burden of the collection of information; (3) ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the information required to be
maintained; (4) ways to minimize the burden of the required collection
of information, including through the use of automated collection
techniques or other forms of information technology; and (5) estimates
of capital or start-up costs and costs of operation, maintenance, and
purchase of services to report the information.
Additional Requests for Comment
1. Do FinCEN's expectations for how additional entities would be
integrated into ongoing compliance activities with the existing Final
Rule comport with industry practices? If not, how substantively does
this affect the conclusions of FinCEN's analysis?
2. Are FinCEN's estimates of burden and cost generally consistent
with the experience of affected financial institutions? If not, please
provide data, studies, reports, or anecdotal information that would
allow FinCEN to improve the accuracy of its burden and cost estimates.
3. Do FinCEN's expectations about the likelihood of additional
successor entities being identified comport with market expectations?
Are FinCEN's expectations about the burden associated with naming
additional successor entities reasonable?
4. Is FinCEN's characterization of a diminishing cost profile over
time in connection with the imposition of section 311 special measures
a reasonably accurate representation of market practices? If not,
please provide data, studies, reports, or anecdotal information that
would allow FinCEN to improve the accuracy of its burden and cost
estimates.
VII. Regulatory Text
List of Subjects in 31 CFR Part 1010
Administrative practice and procedure, Banks, Banking, Brokers,
Crime, Foreign banking, Terrorism.
Authority and Issuance
For the reasons set forth in the preamble, FinCEN proposes amending
31 CFR part 1010 to read as follows:
PART 1010--GENERAL PROVISIONS
0
1. The authority citation for part 1010 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1829b and 1951-1959; 31 U.S.C. 5311-5314,
5316-5336; title III, sec. 314, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 307; sec.
2006, Pub. L. 114-41, 129 Stat. 458-459; sec. 701 Pub. L. 114-74,
129 Stat. 599; sec. 6403, Pub. L. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388.
0
2. Amend 1010.664 to read as follows:
1010.664 Special measures regarding Huione Group.
(a) * * * * *
(1) Huione Group. The term ``Huione Group'' means all subsidiaries,
branches, offices of Huione Group operating as a financial institution
in any jurisdiction outside of the United States, including Haowang
Guarantee (formerly known as Huione Guarantee), Huione Pay PLC, Huione
Crypto Sp[oacute][lstrok]ka Z Ograniczon[aogon]
Odpowiedzialno[sacute]ci[aogon] (d/b/a Huione Crypto), and H-Pay
Service PLC, as well as any successor entity.
* * * * *
(6) Successor Entity. The term ``successor entity'' means any
person that replaces Huione Group by acquiring its assets, in whole or
in part, and/or carrying out the affairs of Huione Group under a new
name.
* * * * *
Jimmy L. Kirby,
Deputy Director, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.
[FR Doc. 2026-12794 Filed 6-24-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810-02-P