On May 16, 2025, DOE published a direct final rule. 90 FR 20769. DOE stated in that direct final rule that if significant adverse comments were received by June 16, 2025, DOE would withdraw the direct final rule. Id. On July 14, 2025, DOE published a document delaying the effective date to consider comments submitted in response to the direct final rule. 90 FR 31137.

In this document, DOE is further extending the effective date pending Department of Justice action on the topic of the direct final rule under Executive Order 14281, “Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy” and Executive Order 12250, “Leadership and Coordination of Nondiscrimination Laws.” 90 FR 17537 (April 28, 2025); 45 FR 72995 (Nov. 4, 1980).

To the extent that 5 U.S.C. 553 applies to this action, it is exempt from notice and comment because it constitutes a rule of procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A) and for which no notice or hearing is required by statute. Additionally, this action is not a “substantive rule” for which a 30-day delay in effective date is required under 5 U.S.C. 553(d).

This document of the Department of Energy was signed on May 29, 2026, by Chris Wright, Secretary of Energy. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DOE. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DOE Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of the Department of Energy. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register .

This Federal Register Notice corrects technical errors in the FDIC's regulations concerning brokered deposits, 12 CFR parts 303 and 337, which were amended by a final rule published in the Federal Register on January 22, 2021 (2021 rule). The 2021 rule inadvertently deleted the text accompanying two footnotes (which, additionally, were previously misnumbered) in 12 CFR 337.6(a)(3)(i). The 2021 rule also failed to update a cross-reference to 12 CFR 337.6(b)(2)(ii), a section which was relocated to 12 CFR 337.7(c)(2). Finally, the 2021 rule inadvertently used the term “assets under management” in the regulatory text for Part 303 when the rule's preamble, as well as two related provisions of the FDIC's regulations, used the correct terminology, “assets under administration,” to describe the same concept. Through this document, the FDIC is correcting these inadvertent errors, as well as making several minor grammatical changes.

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) generally requires an agency to publish notice of a rulemaking in the Federal Register and provide an opportunity for public comment. This requirement does not apply, however, if the agency “for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.”  1 The technical amendments do not impose any new substantive regulatory requirements on any party. The technical amendments make minor revisions to promote clarity and consistency, as well as correct certain drafting errors contained in the 2021 brokered deposit rule. For these reasons, there is good cause for the FDIC to find that it is unnecessary to publish notice of these amendments in the Federal Register or to solicit public comment thereon.

Although the APA generally requires publication of a rule at least 30 days before its effective date, for similar reasons there is good cause for the amendments to take effect on June 3, 2026. Additionally, the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 2 which apply only when notice and comment are required by the APA or other law, are not applicable. These amendments do not contain any collection of information requirements as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 3

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the FDIC corrects 12 CFR parts 303 and 337 by making the following correcting amendments:

In the Federal Register of April 16, 2026 (91 FR 20337), FDA published the final rule “New Animal Drugs; Approval of New Animal Drug Applications; Withdrawal of Approval of New Animal Drug Applications; Change of Sponsor; Change of Sponsor Address” with errors. On page 20340, amendatory language in instruction 9 for § 520.1263b Lincomycin hydrochloride soluble powder, did not properly provide instructions to revise paragraphs (d)(1), (d)(2) heading, (d)(2)(i), (d)(2)(iii), and (d)(3). On page 20343, amendatory language in instruction 30 for § 558.305 Laidlomycin propionate potassium, did not properly provide instructions to revise paragraphs (d)(1) introductory text, (d)(2), (d)(3) introductory text, and (e) introductory text including table headings. On page 20346, amendatory language in instruction 33 for § 558.500 Ractopamine, did not include instructions to revise paragraph (d)(2) introductory text. This document corrects these errors.

Accordingly, 21 CFR parts 520 and 558 are corrected by making the following correcting amendments:

The Coast Guard will enforce the special local regulations in 33 CFR 100.1102 for the Great Western Tube Float in Parker, AZ for the location described in Table No. 1 to § 100.1102, Item No. 9 of that section, from 7 a.m. to 5 p.m. on June 13, 2026. This action is being taken to provide for the safety of life on the navigable waterway during the float. Our regulation for recurring marine events within Southwest District on the Colorado River, between Davis Dam (Bullhead City, Arizona) and Headgate Dam (Parker, Arizona), § 100.1102, Table 1 to § 100.1102, Item No. 9, specifies the location of the regulated area for the Great Western Tube Float, which encompasses portions of the Colorado River. Under the provisions of § 100.1102, persons and vessels are prohibited from entering, transiting through, or anchoring within this regulated area unless authorized by the Captain of the Port, or his designated representative. The Coast Guard may be assisted by other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies in enforcing this regulation.

In addition to this document in the Federal Register , the Coast Guard will provide the maritime community with advance notification of this enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners and local advertising by the event sponsor.

If the Captain of the Port Sector San Diego or his designated representative determines that the regulated area need not be enforced for the full duration stated on this document, he or she may use a Broadcast Notice to Mariners or other communications coordinated with the event sponsor to grant general permission to enter the regulated area.

The Coast Guard will enforce the special local regulation in 33 CFR 100.701 for the Cruce a Nado Internacional swim event regulated area identified in Paragraph (a), Item No. 7, in Table 1 to § 100.701, from 12 p.m. through 4 p.m. on September 6, 2026. This action is being taken to provide for the safety of life on navigable waterways during this event. Our regulation for marine events within the Southeast Coast Guard District Paragraph (a), Item No. 7, in Table 1 to § 100.701, specifies the location of the regulated area for the Cruce a Nado Internacional Swim event. Under the provisions of § 100.701(c), if you are the operator of a vessel in the regulated area you must comply with directions from the Patrol Commander or any Official Patrol displaying a Coast Guard ensign

In addition to this notification of enforcement in the Federal Register , the Coast Guard will provide notification of this enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners and marine information broadcasts.

The Coast Guard is issuing this final rule under the authority in 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). This statutory provision authorizes an agency to issue a rule without prior notice and opportunity to comment when the agency for good cause finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” The Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because the Route 280 Bridge, mile 5.8 across the Passaic River, Harrison, NJ meets the needs of navigation on the Passaic River in the closed position and permitted it as a fixed bridge on April 29, 2026. Therefore, the regulation under 33 CFR 117.739(g) is no longer necessary or applicable and shall be removed from publication. It is unnecessary to publish an NPRM because this regulatory action does not purport to place any restrictions on mariners but rather removes restrictions that have no further use or value. This rule will not have any effect on the waterway users or land users of the bridge.

Under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for making this rule effective in less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register . The modification of the bridge from a moveable to fixed bridge was authorized by the U.S. Coast Guard on April 29, 2026, and modifications are currently taking place. The removal of the regulation regarding an inapplicable operating schedule therefore will have no effect on mariners currently operating on this waterway. This rule merely requires an administrative change to the Federal Register , to omit a regulatory requirement that is no longer applicable or necessary. Therefore, a delayed effective date is unnecessary and impracticable.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule under authority 33 U.S.C. 499.

The purpose of this rule is to remove the section of 33 CFR 117.739(g) that refers to the Route 280 Bridge at mile 5.8 across the Passaic River, Harrison, New Jersey, from the Code of Federal Regulations since it governs a bridge that will no longer abide by an operating schedule.

The Coast Guard is removing the regulation in 33 CFR 117.739(g) related to the draw operations for this bridge because it is no longer a drawbridge that opens. The change removes the section of the regulation governing the Route 280 Bridge since the bridge has been permitted as a fixed bridge that will remain in a closed position. This Final Rule seeks to update the Code of Federal Regulations by removing language that governs the operation of the Route 280 Bridge, which no longer will be a drawbridge. This regulatory change does not affect waterway or land traffic as the permit regarding the conversion to a fixed bridge has already been approved.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive Orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive Orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT above.

Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule calls for no new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. We have analyzed this rule under that Order and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order 13132.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for inflation) or more in any one year. Though this rule will not result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule elsewhere in this preamble.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Management Directive 023-01, Rev.1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning Policy COMDTINST 5090.1 (series) which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f). The Coast Guard has determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. This rule promulgates the operating regulations or procedures for drawbridges and is categorically excluded from further review, under paragraph L49, of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

Neither a Record of Environmental Consideration nor a Memorandum for the Record are required for this rule.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 117 as follows:

The Coast Guard received notification that an air show will be occurring on the Wisconsin River in Wausau, WI. The Captain of the Port (COTP) Lake Michigan has determined that potential hazards associated with the air show are a safety concern for those in the immediate vicinity.

Because of these potential hazards, the Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable. We must establish this safety zone by June 25, 2026, to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment. Therefore, we do not have enough time to solicit and respond to comments.

For the same reason, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes a safety zone from June 25, 2026 through June 27, 2026. It will be subject to enforcement from 2 p.m. through 4 p.m. on June 25, 2026; from 4:30 p.m. through 10 p.m. on June 26, 2026; and from 3:30 p.m. through 10 p.m. on June 27, 2026. The safety zone will cover all navigable waters of the Wisconsin River bounded by an area that is enclosed within the following points: Point 1 at 44°55.573′ N, 089°38.043′ W; thence to Point 2 at 44°55.465′ N, 089°38.215′ W; thence to Point 3 at 44°55.177′ N, 089°37.989′ W; thence to Point 4 at 44°54.631′ N, 089°37.480′ W; thence to Point 5 at 44°54.869′ N, 089°35.864′ W; thence to Point 6 at 44°55.122′ N, 089°37.115′ W; thence returning to Point 1. Vessels and persons will not be allowed to enter the zone during this time, unless authorized by the Captain of the Port.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a safety zone. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60(a) of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1. A Record of Environmental Consideration supporting this determination is available in the docket.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone regulation for a fireworks display at The Wharf D.C. from 9 p.m. until 10 p.m., on June 22, 2026. This action is being taken to provide for the safety of life on navigable waterways during this event. Our regulation for recurring safety zones for fireworks displays within the USCG East District, 33 CFR 165.506, specifies the location of the safety zone for the fireworks show, which encompasses portions of the Washington Channel in the Upper Potomac River, in line 1 of Table 2 to Paragraph (h)(2). As reflected in 33 CFR 165.23, vessels in the vicinity of the safety zone may not enter, remain in, or transit through the safety zone during the enforcement period unless authorized to do so by the COTP or his representative, and they must comply with directions from the Patrol Commander or any Official Patrol displaying a Coast Guard ensign.

In addition to this notification of enforcement in the Federal Register , the Coast Guard plans to provide notification of this enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners and marine information broadcasts.

The Coast Guard received notification that a drone display will be launched from First Street Beach on Lake Michigan near Manistee, MI. The Captain of the Port (COTP) Lake Michigan has determined that potential hazards associated with the drone display are a safety concern for anyone within near proximity of the display.

Because of these potential hazards, the Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable. We must establish this safety zone by June 20, 2026, to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment. Therefore, we do not have enough time to solicit and respond to comments.

For the same reason, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes a safety zone from 10 p.m. to 11:30 p.m. on June 20, 2026. The safety zone will cover all navigable waters of Lake Michigan within the following points: Point 1 at 44°14.890′ N, 086°20.943′ W; thence to Point 2 at 44°15.0633′ N, 086°21.0267′ W; thence to Point 3 at 44°14.9617′ N, 086°20.5267′ W; thence to Point 4 at 44°14.930′ N, 086°20.527′ W; thence returning to Point 1. The duration of the zone is intended to ensure the safety of vessels and these navigable waters before, during, and after the scheduled drone display. Vessels and persons will not be allowed to enter the zone during this time, unless authorized by the Captain of the Port.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a safety zone. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60(a) of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1. A Record of Environmental Consideration supporting this determination is available in the docket.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone regulation for a fireworks display on the Upper Potomac River, at Washington, DC from 8:30 p.m. until 9:30 p.m., on June 13, 2026. This action is being taken to provide for the safety of life on navigable waterways during this event. Our regulation for recurring safety zones for fireworks displays within the USCG East District, 33 CFR 165.506, specifies the location of the safety zone for the fireworks show, which encompasses portions of the Washington Channel in the Upper Potomac River, in line no. 3 of Table 2 to Paragraph (h)(2). As reflected in 33 CFR 165.23, vessels in the vicinity of the safety zone may not enter, remain in, or transit through the safety zone during the enforcement period unless authorized to do so by the COTP or his representative, and they must comply with directions from the Patrol Commander or any Official Patrol displaying a Coast Guard ensign.

In addition to this notification of enforcement in the Federal Register , the Coast Guard plans to provide notification of this enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners and marine information broadcasts.

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove the obsolete FMVSS No. 216, “Roof crush resistance, Applicable unless a vehicle is certified to § 571.216a,” which originally went into effect on September 1, 1973. It established strength requirements for the passenger compartment roof of vehicles. NHTSA has since implemented an updated roof crush resistance standard in FMVSS No. 216a, for which a multi-year phase-in required full compliance by Model Year 2016. Since FMVSS No. 216 is no longer necessary, this final rule removes it and modifies FMVSS No. 216a to clarify its applicability. NHTSA received a comment from The People's Republic of China, but the comment is outside the scope of the rulemaking. 2 The People's Republic of China requested a two-year phase-in for vehicles that are compliant with FMVSS No. 216; however, full compliance with FMVSS No. 216a was required by model year 2016.

For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 216 and FMVSS No. 216a in this final rule without amendment.

This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacture.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  3

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes FMVSS No. 216 in its entirety and modifies FMVSS No. 216a to clarify its applicability, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the removal of FMVSS No. 216 in its entirety and modification of FMVSS No. 216a to clarify its applicability, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR Part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove S4.1.3.2 in FMVSS No. 206, “Door locks and door retention components,” because the requirements in this section are redundant. Paragraph S4.1.3.2 purports to include requirements for side rear door locks. Paragraph S4.1.3.2 currently appears immediately following S4.1.2.3(b) in the standard, with no S4.1.3 or S4.1.3.1 appearing in the standard. Paragraph S4.1.3.2 was intended to have been deleted during updates to the regulatory text implemented in a 2007 final rule. 2 That rule included requirements for rear door locks in S4.3.1. Therefore, S4.1.3.2 is unnecessary, and NHTSA proposed to delete it.

NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 206 in this final rule without amendment.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  3

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because it deletes redundant text. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only deletes redundant requirements; the rule will not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 4 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 5 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 6 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  7 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 206, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 206, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete requirements from FMVSS No. 217 because the requirements apply to school buses manufactured before September 1, 1994. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 217 in this final rule without amendment. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacture.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I conclude and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

Executive Order 13132; Federalism Summary Impact Statement

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 217, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 217, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove the obsolete requirements of FMVSS No. 205(a) and revise the applicability of FMVSS No. 205. The text removed from FMVSS No. 205 and the entirety of FMVSS No. 205(a) apply only to glazing equipment manufactured before September 1, 2006, and to motor vehicles manufactured before November 1, 2006. The following standards appear in FMVSS No. 205(a): ANSI Z26.1-1977, ANSI Z26.1a-1980, and SAE Recommended Practice J673a, “Automotive Glazing,” revised August 1967. Because these three standards are incorporated by reference only in FMVSS No. 205(a), NHTSA proposed to remove the IBR material from 49 CFR 571.5.

NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed removal of FMVSS No. 205(a) from the Code of Federal Regulations in this final rule without amendment.

This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacture.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking required to publish a proposed rule by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because it only deletes obsolete regulatory text. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only deletes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes FMVSS No. 205(a) in its entirety and modifies FMVSS No. 205 to clarify its applicability, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the removal of the obsolete requirements of FMVSS No. 205(a), changes made to FMVSS No. 205, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove references to dates for certain requirements in FMVSS No. 210. Because the requirements specify that they are applicable for vehicles manufactured after dates that have long passed (September 1, 1987 and October 21, 2011), the dates in the regulatory text are no longer needed. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacture. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 210 in this final rule without amendment.

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 322, 30111, 30115, 30117, 30166; delegation of authority at 49 CFR 1.95.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which deletes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only deletes obsolete requirements; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 210, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 210, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR Part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete text in FMVSS No. 303, “Fuel system integrity of compressed natural gas vehicle.” This proposal removes references to dates for requirements in S5.1.1 and S5.1.2 that passed more than a decade ago. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 303 in this final rule without amendment. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacturer.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 303, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 303, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Public Law 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete requirements from FMVSS No. 207, Seating systems. The requirement in S4.2 applies to passenger seats on school buses manufactured before October 21, 2011, and therefore, this requirement is obsolete. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacturer. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 207 in this final rule without amendment.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which only deletes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year,. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and deletes obsolete requirements; the rule would not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 207, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 207, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete requirements from FMVSS No. 222, School bus passenger seating and crash protection. This proposal removes requirements that are no longer applicable. Several of the obsolete requirements apply to school buses manufactured before a specific date, including: S5(a)(1), for buses manufactured before October 21, 2011; S5(b)(1)(i), for buses manufactured before September 1, 1991; and S5.1.2(a), for buses manufactured before October 21, 2009. In addition, this proposal removes references to dates for requirements in S5.1.6 and S5.1.7 that passed more than a decade ago. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 222 in this final rule without amendment. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacture.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 222, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 222, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Public Law 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to amend FMVSS No. 304 by removing obsolete text in the standard. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 304 in this final rule without amendment. This action does not affect the applicability of 49 U.S.C. 30122, which prohibits certain entities from making inoperative any part of a device or element of design installed in vehicle pursuant to an FMVSS applicable on the date of manufacturer.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). 3 In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. 4 The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. 5 To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.”  6 This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 304, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 304, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025, proposing to remove obsolete requirements in FMVSS No. 301, Fuel system integrity,” that only pertain to vehicles manufactured in prior years. Specifically, the agency proposed to revise paragraphs S6.2 and S6.3 by deleting rear and side impact test specifications that pertain only to vehicles manufactured before September 1, 2006, and September 1, 2004, respectively.

NHTSA received two comments from anonymous commenters and one comment from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators). The two anonymous commenters expressed full support of the proposal.

Auto Innovators stated strong support for the proposed rule and the agency's efforts to eliminate outdated or burdensome regulations. Auto Innovators stated that it agrees that the provisions proposed for removal are no longer relevant to current production.

Auto Innovators also identified several additional instances of obsolete phase-in requirements in FMVSS No. 301. Specifically, Auto Innovators suggested the following updates to FMVSS No. 301:

• Replacing S7.2 using a revised paragraph S7.2(b),

• Removing S7.2(a), which contains an obsolete compliance date,

• Revising S7.2(b) to remove the date reference and use as S7.2,

• Replacing S7.3 using a revised paragraph S7.3(b),

• Removing S7.3(a), which contains an obsolete compliance date,

• Revising S7.3(b) to remove the date reference and use as S7.3, and

• Removing S8, which contains an obsolete phase-in requirement schedule.

NHTSA has reviewed Auto Innovators' suggested revisions and agrees that these revisions fall within the scope of the proposed revisions, as all of Auto Innovator's suggested revisions are also focused on removing obsolete phase-in requirements from the standard. Accordingly, NHTSA includes these revisions in the final rule.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and removes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 301, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 301, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025, that proposed revising sections of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 214 and 49 CFR part 571.5, Matter incorporated by reference. The agency proposed revising paragraphs S3, S5(b)(3), S7.1, S7.2(a), S7.2(b), S7.2.1, S7.2.2, S7.2.4, S9.1.1, S9.1.2, S9.1.3, S11.5(a), S12.1, and S13 of FMVSS No. 214 and amending paragraph (l)(23) of Part 571.5. The proposed revisions were intended to remove obsolete requirements from FMVSS No. 214. NHTSA received two comments in response to the NPRM: an anonymous comment in support of removal of obsolete requirements and comments from the Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators). Auto Innovators supported the proposal to amend FMVSS No. 214 because the text being removed is no longer applicable to vehicles being produced. Auto Innovators suggested that S8.3.2 of FMVSS No. 214 be removed because it pertains to a test device no longer used in compliance tests (the 50th Percentile Male SID Dummy defined in 49 CFR part 572 Subpart F), and that S11.5(a) be removed because it relates to data processing requirements for that unused test device. Auto Innovators also noted a typographical error in the NPRM that incorrectly referred to § 571.214 as “571.14.”

In this final rule, NHTSA is removing paragraph S11.5(a) from FMVSS No. 214 as suggested by Auto Innovators. This final rule is removing, reserving, or revising the other paragraphs of FMVSS No. 214 as proposed in the NPRM except for S7.2.2, S8.3.2 and S12.1. NHTSA is revising rather than removing S7.2.2, retaining S12.1 unedited, and making no changes to S8.3.2 because those sections are referenced in other FMVSSs. FMVSS No. 214 paragraphs S8.3.2 and S12.1 are referenced by FMVSS No. 201, “Occupant protection in interior impact” which is not being amended by this final rule. FMVSS No. 214 paragraph S7.2.2 is referenced by both FMVSS No. 305a, “Electric-powered vehicles: Electric powertrain integrity; mandatory applicability begins on September 1, 2027,” and FMVSS No. 307, “Fuel system integrity of hydrogen vehicles.” While these FMVSS are being amended by this final rule to remove references to S7.1.1 and S7.2.1, the reference to S7.2.2 remains. As a consequence of retaining S12.1, NHTSA is also not including any changes to incorporations by reference in this final rule because those are located in S12.1.

As proposed in the NPRM, the definition of “raised roof” is being revised. Currently, FMVSS No. 214 defines the term by referencing paragraph S4 of FMVSS No. 216, “Roof crush resistance; Applicable unless a vehicle is certified to § 571.216a.” A separate deregulatory action will remove FMVSS No. 216 from the Code of Federal Regulations. 2 As a result, the definition of “raised roof” must be included in FMVSS No. 214.

This final rule also amends FMVSS No. 305a and FMVSS No. 307 to remove reference to sections of FMVSS No. 214 that are being removed by this final rule. Previously, 49 CFR 571.305a S9.3 and 49 CFR 571.307 S6.1.3 referred to, “positions required for testing by S7.1.1, S7.2.1, or S7.2.2 of Standard 214 (§ 571.214)”. Because this final rule removes sections S7.1.1 and S7.2.1 of FMVSS No. 214, we are revising the respective sections of FMVSS No. 305a and FMVSS No. 307 to read, “positions required for testing by S7.2.2 of FMVSS No. 214 (§ 571.214).” This amendment makes no change in requirements because S7.1.1 and S7.2.1 are no longer valid. The same amendment is also being made to FMVSS No. 301 in a separate deregulatory action. 3

NHTSA finds good cause pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) to publish the amendments to FMVSS Nos. 305a and 307, which were not proposed in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, without prior notice and opportunity for public comment. NHTSA finds that prior notice and opportunity for public comment is unnecessary because the provisions being amended refer to obsolete requirements that are being deleted and do not result in changes to any existing requirements. Deletion of obsolete regulatory text is nonsubstantive and unlikely to generate public interest or comment. NHTSA has made the deletions to keep its regulations current.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders. This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  4

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. , as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the requirements of sections 202 and 205 of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and would only remove obsolete requirements; the rule will not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS Nos. 214, 305a, and 307, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) FTA to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the removal of the obsolete requirements of FMVSS Nos. 214, 305a, and 307; changes made to FMVSS No. 205; defines any necessary key terms; and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025, proposing to amend Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard (FMVSS) No. 204, Steering Control Rearward Displacement. This safety standard specifies requirements that limit the rearward displacement of the steering column in a frontal crash. NHTSA proposed to exclude vehicles from FMVSS No. 204 if they are certified to the frontal barrier crash protection requirements of FMVSS No. 208. NHTSA received one comment on this proposal. Alliance for Automotive Innovation (Auto Innovators) commented in support of the proposed amendments to FMVSS No. 204. Auto Innovators agreed with the conclusion reached by NHTSA that the frontal crash protection requirements of FMVSS No. 208 are sufficient to ensure limited steering column motion and occupant protection.

In their comments, Auto Innovators also noted that section S4.1 of FMVSS No. 204 includes an obsolete compliance date. S4.1 applies to vehicles manufactured before September 1, 1991, while S4.2 applies to vehicles manufactured on or after September 1, 1991. Auto Innovators suggested removing S4.1 and replacing the introductory text of S4 with a revised version of S4.2. NHTSA agrees with this suggestion and believes that it is consistent with the proposal. NHTSA finds that, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) providing prior notice and opportunity for comment on these additional changes to remove obsolete text is unnecessary. Removal of text that is no longer applicable is not substantive and unlikely to result in public interest or comment. NHTSA is updating the regulatory text so that it is current.

Therefore, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to FMVSS No. 204 and the further changes suggested by Auto Innovators.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes duplicative requirements and obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only removes duplicative requirements and obsolete text; the rule would not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from FMVSS No. 204, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the changes made to FMVSS No. 204, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Public Law 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 571 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete directives from its phase-in reporting requirements that pertain only to vehicles manufactured in prior years. A phase-in is a mechanism by which a final rule specifies a certain percentage of a vehicle manufacturer's vehicles that must comply with the requirements in a final rule in successive model years until all vehicles to which the standard applies comply with the new requirements. Some phase-ins are accompanied by reporting requirements, and Part 585 contains a number of such requirements, many of which have long since expired. The NPRM proposed amendments to delete the advanced air bag phase-in reporting requirements (subpart B); the rear inboard lap/shoulder belt phase-in reporting requirements (subpart C); the fuel system integrity phase-in reporting requirements (subpart E); the reporting requirements for tires for motor vehicles with a gross vehicle weight rating (GVWR) of 10,000 pounds or less (subpart F); the tire pressure monitoring system phase-in reporting requirements (subpart G); the side impact protection phase-in reporting requirements (subpart H); the electronic stability control system phase-in reporting requirements (subpart I); the head restraints phase-in reporting requirements (subpart J); the ejection mitigation phase-in reporting requirements (subpart K); the roof crush resistance phase-in reporting requirements (subpart L); and the rear visibility improvements reporting requirements (subpart M). The proposed rule would eliminate those directives while maintaining other directives in 49 CFR part 585 that pertain to vehicles that are being manufactured or will be manufactured.

NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to the phase-in reporting directives in this final rule without amendment.

NHTSA is also updating some sections of Part 585 with the agency's current address. NHTSA has determined that seeking comment on these address changes, which were not included in the proposal, is unnecessary pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553. Address changes are nonsubstantive and unlikely to generate public interest or comment. NHTSA has updated the addresses so they are current.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule, which removes obsolete regulatory text, will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of the UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and only removes obsolete requirements and updates addresses; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from 49 CFR part 585, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the removal of the obsolete requirements of FMVSS No. 205(a), changes made to Part 585, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Pub. L. 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy. You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.

In consideration of the foregoing, NHTSA amends 49 CFR part 585 as follows:

NHTSA published an NPRM  1 on May 30, 2025 proposing to remove obsolete regulatory procedures related to the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009, because that program has ended. The rule proposed removing 49 CFR part 599. NHTSA received no comments on this proposal. For the reasons set forth in the May 30, 2025 NPRM, NHTSA is adopting the proposed changes to the Consumer Assistance to Recycle and Save Act of 2009 in this final rule without amendment.

This rule does not meet the criteria of a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, as amended by Executive Orders 14215 and 13563. Therefore, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not reviewed this rule under those orders.

This regulation is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

The policy statement in section 1 of Executive Order 13609 provides that the regulatory approaches taken by foreign governments may differ from those taken by the United States to address similar issues, and that in some cases the differences between them might not be necessary and might impair the ability of American businesses to export and compete internationally. It further recognizes that in meeting shared challenges involving health, safety, and other issues, international regulatory cooperation can identify approaches that are at least as protective as those that are or would be adopted in the absence of such cooperation and can reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in regulatory requirements.

In addition, section 24211 of the Infrastructure, Investment, and Jobs Act, Global Harmonization, provides that DOT “shall cooperate, to the maximum extent practicable, with foreign governments, nongovernmental stakeholder groups, the motor vehicle industry, and consumer groups with respect to global harmonization of vehicle regulations as a means for improving motor vehicle safety.”  2

Because the changes adopted in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding international regulatory cooperation.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) (as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 1996; 5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), for any rulemaking where publication of a proposed rule is required by 5 U.S.C. 553 or any other law, agencies must prepare and make available for public comment a regulatory flexibility analysis that describes the effect of the rule on small entities ( i.e., small businesses, small organizations, and small government jurisdictions). No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. I have concluded and hereby certify that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because it would only delete obsolete regulatory text for a program that has ended. Therefore, a regulatory flexibility analysis is not required.

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. NHTSA will submit a report containing this rule and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register . This rule does not meet the criteria in 5 U.S.C. 804(2) to be considered a major rule.

This final rule does not contain Federal mandates (under the regulatory provisions of Title II of the UMRA) for State, local and Tribal governments, or the private sector of $206 million (the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2025) or more in any one year. Thus, the rule is not subject to the analytical requirements of UMRA.

Executive Order 13175 requires Federal agencies to consult and coordinate with Tribes on a government-to-government basis on policies that have Tribal implications, including regulations, legislative comments or proposed legislation, and other policy statements or actions that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. NHTSA has assessed the impact of this final rule on Indian tribes and determined that this rule would not have tribal implications that require consultation under Executive Order 13175.

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520), an agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information, unless the collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. This final rule is deregulatory and deletes obsolete regulatory text; the rule does not impose any additional information collection requirements.

NHTSA is committed to complying with the E-Government Act, 2002 to promote the use of the internet and other information technologies to provide increased opportunities for citizen access to Government information and services, and for other purposes. The E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-347, sec. 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921, Dec. 17, 2002), requires Federal agencies to conduct a privacy impact assessment for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology would collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this proposed rule. Accordingly, NHTSA has not conducted a privacy impact assessment.

NHTSA has examined this final rule pursuant to Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255; Aug. 10, 1999) and concluded that no additional consultation with States, local governments, or their representatives is mandated beyond the rulemaking process. The agency has concluded that the final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant consultation with State and local officials or the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. This final rule does not have “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

NHTSA rules can have preemptive effect in two ways. First, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act contains an express preemption provision: When a motor vehicle safety standard is in effect under this chapter, a State or a political subdivision of a State may prescribe or continue in effect a standard applicable to the same aspect of performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment only if the standard is identical to the standard prescribed under this chapter. 49 U.S.C. 30103(b)(1). It is this statutory command by Congress that preempts any non-identical State legislative and administrative law address the same aspect of performance.

The express preemption provision described above is subject to a savings clause under which “[c]compliance with a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed under this chapter does not exempt a person from liability at common law.” 49 U.S.C. 30103(e). Pursuant to this provision, State common law tort causes of action against motor vehicle manufacturers that might otherwise be preempted by the express preemption provision are generally preserved. However, the Supreme Court has recognized the possibility, in some instances, of implied preemption of State common law tort causes of action by virtue of NHTSA's rules—even if not expressly preempted.

This second way that NHTSA rules can preempt is dependent upon the existence of an actual conflict between an FMVSS and the higher standard that would effectively be imposed on motor vehicle manufacturers if someone obtained a State common law tort judgment against the manufacturer—notwithstanding the manufacturer's compliance with the NHTSA standard. Because most NHTSA standards established by an FMVSS are minimum standards, a State common law tort cause of action that seeks to impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers will generally not be preempted. However, if and when such a conflict does exist—for example, when the standard at issue is both a minimum and a maximum standard—the State common law tort cause of action is impliedly preempted. See Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).

Pursuant to Executive Order 13132, NHTSA has considered whether this final rule could or should preempt State common law causes of action. The agency's ability to announce its conclusion regarding the preemptive effect of one of its rules reduces the likelihood that preemption will be an issue in any subsequent tort litigation.

To this end, the agency has examined the nature ( e.g., the language and structure of the regulatory text) and objectives of this final rule and does not foresee any potential State requirements that might conflict with it. NHTSA does not intend that this final rule preempt state tort law that would effectively impose a higher standard on motor vehicle manufacturers than that established by this final rule. Establishment of a higher standard by means of State tort law would not conflict with the standards in this final rule. Without any conflict, there could not be any implied preemption of a State common law tort cause of action.

The Department has analyzed the environmental impacts of this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). NHTSA has determined that this rule is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4). Categorical exclusions are categories of actions that the agency has determined normally do not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore do not require either an environmental assessment (EA) or environmental impact statement (EIS). In analyzing the applicability of a categorical exclusion, the agency must also consider whether extraordinary circumstances are present that would warrant the preparation of an EA or EIS. The Department's Operating Administrations (OAs) may apply CEs established in another OA's procedures. To do so, the Operating Administration “must evaluate the action for extraordinary circumstances identified in the OA procedures in which the CE is established to determine if a normally excluded action may have a significant impact and coordinate with the originating OA to ensure that the CE is being applied correctly.” This rulemaking, which removes unnecessary regulatory text from 49 CFR part 599, is categorically excluded pursuant to 23 CFR 771.118(c)(4): “Planning and administrative activities not involving or leading directly to construction, such as: Training, technical assistance and research; promulgation of rules, regulations, directives, or program guidance; approval of project concepts; engineering; and operating assistance to transit authorities to continue existing service or increase service to meet routine demand.” NHTSA has coordinated with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) to ensure that this CE is being applied correctly. NHTSA does not anticipate any environmental impacts, and there are no extraordinary circumstances present in connection with this rulemaking.

With respect to the review of the promulgation of a new regulation, section 3(b)(2) of Executive Order 12988, “Civil Justice Reform” (61 FR 4729, February 7, 1996) requires that Executive agencies make every reasonable effort to ensure that the regulation: (1) clearly specifies the preemptive effect; (2) clearly specifies the effect on existing Federal law or regulation; (3) provides a clear legal standard for affected conduct, while promoting simplification and burden reduction; (4) clearly specifies the retroactive effect, if any; (5) adequately defines key terms; and (6) addresses other important issues affecting clarity and general draftsmanship under any guidelines issued by the Attorney General.

NHTSA has reviewed this rulemaking action and determined that it conforms to the applicable standards in section 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988, Civil Justice Reform. The issue of preemption is discussed above in connection with E.O. 13132 (Federalism). NHTSA believes that this final rule specifies clearly the removal of the obsolete requirements of FMVSS No. 205(a), changes made to Part 585, defines any necessary key terms, and provides a clear legal standard for manufacturers to follow. The amendments do not take effect retroactively. NHTSA notes further that there is no requirement that an individual submit a petition for reconsideration or pursue other administrative proceedings before they may file suit in court.

Under the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (NTTAA) (Public Law 104-113), “all Federal agencies and departments shall use technical standards that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, using such technical standards as a means to carry out policy objectives or activities determined by the agencies and departments.” Voluntary consensus standards are technical standards ( e.g., materials specifications, test methods, sampling procedures, and business practices) that are developed or adopted by voluntary consensus standards bodies, such as SAE (formerly, the Society of Automotive Engineers). The NTTAA directs this agency to provide Congress, through OMB, explanations when the agency decides not to use available and applicable voluntary consensus standards. Because the changes in this final rule are deleting obsolete regulatory text, they do not implicate any issues regarding consensus standards.

The Department of Transportation assigns a regulation identifier number (RIN) to each regulatory action listed in the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations. The Regulatory Information Service Center publishes the Unified Agenda in April and October of each year. You may use the RIN contained in the heading at the beginning of this document to find this action in the Unified Agenda.

NHTSA will place any petitions for reconsideration received into the docket. Anyone can search the electronic form of all documents received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or other organization). For information on DOT's compliance with the Privacy Act, see https://www.transportation.gov/privacy.

You should submit a redacted “public version” of your petition (including redacted versions of any additional documents or attachments) using any of the methods identified under ADDRESSES . This “public version” should contain only the portions for which no claim of confidential treatment is made and from which those portions for which confidential treatment is claimed has been redacted. See below for further instructions on how to do this.

If you submit confidential information, you also need to submit a request for confidential treatment directly to the Office of Chief Counsel. Requests for confidential treatment are governed by 49 CFR part 512. Your request must set forth the information specified in Part 512. This includes the materials for which confidentiality is being requested (as explained in more detail below); supporting information, pursuant to Part 512.8; and a certificate, pursuant to Part 512.4(b) and Part 512, Appendix A.

You are required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one unredacted “confidential version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.6, the words “ENTIRE PAGE CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION” or “CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION CONTAINED WITHIN BRACKETS” (as applicable) must appear at the top of each page containing information claimed to be confidential. In the latter situation, where not all information on the page is claimed to be confidential, identify each item of information for which confidentiality is requested within brackets: “[ ].” You are also required to submit to the Office of Chief Counsel one redacted “public version” of the information for which you are seeking confidential treatment. Pursuant to Part 512.5(a)(2), the redacted “public version” should include redactions of any information for which you are seeking confidential treatment ( i.e., the only information that should be unredacted is information for which you are not seeking confidential treatment). NHTSA is currently treating electronic submission as an acceptable method for submitting confidential business information to the agency under Part 512. Please do not send a hardcopy of a request for confidential treatment to NHTSA's headquarters. The request should be sent to Dan Rabinovitz in the Office of the Chief Counsel at Daniel.Rabinovitz@dot.gov. You may either submit your request via email or request a secure file transfer link. If you are submitting the request via email, please also email a courtesy copy of the request to John Piazza at John.Piazza@dot.gov.