On August 19, 2025, FSIS published the proposed rule, “Visual Post-Mortem Inspection in Swine Slaughter Establishments” (90 FR 40257), which proposed to amend FSIS' inspection regulations to end mandatory mandibular lymph node incision and viscera palpation of swine carcasses in all swine slaughter establishments. Specifically, FSIS proposed to amend the meat inspection regulations to remove requirements for establishment sorters to “incise mandibular lymph nodes and palpate the viscera” as part of their sorting activities before FSIS post-mortem inspection in NSIS establishments. FSIS also proposed to amend the post-mortem swine inspection staffing standards table applicable to swine slaughter establishments operating under traditional inspection.

As discussed in the proposed rule, lymph node incision and viscera palpation of swine carcasses are not needed to ensure food safety, as FSIS swine condemnation rates are low and disease conditions that are condemnable defects can be detected visually through other pathological changes in the carcass and its parts (90 FR 40257, 40258). Further, research demonstrated that visual-based post-mortem swine inspection procedures may reduce the probability of carcass cross-contamination by microbial food safety hazards (90 FR 40257, 40258). Therefore, removing the requirements for lymph node incision and viscera palpation during post-mortem NSIS sorting activities and traditional swine inspection may improve food safety.

As also discussed in the proposed rule, ending mandatory lymph node incision and viscera palpation in swine slaughter establishments will improve FSIS inspection efficiency, make better use of FSIS inspection resources, and provide flexibility to industry (90 FR 40257, 40258). In traditional swine slaughter establishments, the final rule will allow FSIS more flexibility to assign IPP based on the establishment's line configuration, other establishment operations, and FSIS staffing needs. Removing the lymph node incision and viscera palpation requirements for NSIS establishments may also reduce establishments' costs to operate under the NSIS because they may be able to reduce the number of employees required to make carcasses ready for inspection before the head and viscera stations.

FSIS is finalizing the proposed rule with no changes. The final rule will revise 9 CFR 310.26(b) to remove requirements for establishment sorters to incise lymph nodes and palpate the viscera in swine slaughter establishments operating under the NSIS. Establishment sorters will continue to conduct carcass sorting activities and identify any condemnable conditions or defects before carcasses are presented to online IPP, as currently required under these regulations. For example, establishment sorters will still be required to visually examine all surfaces of viscera to detect condemnable conditions or defects.

The final rule also will revise the post-mortem inspection staffing standards applicable to swine slaughter establishments operating under traditional inspection in 9 CFR 310.1(b)(3)(ii). Specifically, the heading of Table 4 in 9 CFR 310.1(b)(3)(ii) will be revised to state that the listed number of inspectors per station ( i.e., the head, viscera, and carcass stations) will be the maximum number of inspectors required. Because FSIS is removing unnecessary inspection procedures, the Agency may be able to assign fewer online inspectors at the head and viscera inspection stations in traditional swine slaughter establishments.

As stated in the proposed rule, FSIS will not make changes to its staffing in NSIS establishments as a result of the final rule (90 FR 40257, 40259). Establishment sorters, rather than FSIS inspectors, incise lymph nodes and palpate the viscera in NSIS establishments. FSIS inspectors already conduct a primarily visual post-mortem inspection of the head, viscera, and carcass. Eliminating the requirement for establishment sorters to incise lymph nodes and palpate the viscera should not impact the workload of FSIS inspectors in NSIS establishments.

Additionally, ending mandatory lymph node incision and viscera palpation under the final rule will have no impact on line speed requirements for traditional or NSIS swine slaughter establishments (90 FR 40257, 40259).

On the effective date of this final rule, FSIS will update its instructions to IPP on the primarily visual inspection of lymph nodes and viscera during post-mortem traditional swine inspection. 1

The proposed rule comment period closed on October 20, 2025. FSIS received 37 comments on the proposed rule from meat producers, consumers, IPP, and trade associations representing the meat industry.

The producers, trade associations, and a few consumers supported the proposed rule, agreeing that universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation are not needed to ensure food safety. A few trade associations and producers stated that the proposed rule would remove unnecessary burdens on both the Agency and industry, and represent a data-centered, science-based effort to reduce microbial cross-contamination food safety risks. A few trade associations specifically stated that the proposed rule would allow for further industry research on post-mortem swine inspection, including Salmonella contamination mitigation strategies. However, IPP who commented were opposed to the proposed rule. Specifically, IPP disagreed that the end of universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation would result in increased inspection efficiency and argued that incision and palpation are needed to ensure food safety.

A summary of the relevant issues raised by commenters and the Agency's responses follows.

Comment: One trade association asked the Agency to clarify that the proposed rule would apply to all classes ( e.g., market hogs, sows, boars) and ages of swine. One consumer asked the Agency to clarify that the proposed rule would apply to older swine and other types of swine ( e.g., feral swine).

Response: The final rule will apply to all classes and ages of swine processed in all swine slaughter establishments operating under traditional FSIS swine slaughter inspection or the NSIS.

Comment: A few trade associations, while generally supportive of the proposed rule, raised concerns that the proposed rule may create issues of IPP availability and inspection consistency across establishments. A few trade associations specifically stated that the Agency's expected reduction in the total number of assigned IPP in traditional establishments may cause reduced IPP availability to perform inspection activities. One trade association stated that full IPP staffing is required for establishments to efficiently operate and ensure the production of safe and wholesome pork products. Another trade association argued that the expected staffing reductions would make it difficult for the Agency to cover absences, complete offline tasks, and conduct export verifications. One trade association stated that reduced IPP assignments may cause an uneven playing field across the industry, whereby establishments with more assigned IPP are subject to an overabundance of inspection and establishments with fewer assigned IPP struggle to maintain operations and receive timely export verifications.

A few trade associations stated that should IPP reductions occur, FSIS should prioritize reassignments to address discrete absences, broader district and circuit staff shortages, or to fill offline inspection roles and complete export inspection tasks. One trade association stated that the Agency should reconsider its plan to rely, in part, on IPP attrition to adjust FSIS staffing. The commenter explained that reductions, created through attrition, could cause too much inspection inconsistency.

Response: The end of universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation during post-mortem swine inspection is expected to result in a more efficient allocation of FSIS inspection resources, as online IPP will no longer be required to spend time incising and palpating (90 FR 40257, 40260). Therefore, the Agency may reduce the number of online IPP in some traditional swine slaughter establishments, if appropriate. As stated in the proposed rule, the Agency would make any reductions in the number of online IPP over time through both attrition and reassignment to other positions (90 FR 40257, 40260). Such reassignments will allow FSIS to address IPP absences and staff establishments based on their specific line configuration and other operational needs. The Agency also will continue to evaluate staffing needs across districts and circuits. FSIS remains committed to conducting consistent and thorough inspection across all swine slaughter establishments.

Comment: One trade association questioned the proposed revision to the FSIS inspection staffing standards table applicable to traditional swine slaughter establishments. Specifically, the commenter argued that the proposed revision to the heading of Table 4 in 9 CFR 310.1(b)(3)(ii), to state that the listed number of inspectors per station would be the maximum number of inspectors required, would create too much ambiguity. For example, under the proposed revision, FSIS could assign seven inspectors per line at one establishment and only three inspectors at another establishment of similar size. The commenter stated that this distribution would be unfair to the establishment assigned seven inspectors, as the establishment would be required to provide for additional inspection stations and overtime pay, when applicable, compared to the establishment assigned three inspectors. The commenter noted that the economic impact analysis in the proposed rule estimates a reduction of two to four inspectors per line in traditional establishments. Therefore, the commenter suggested, Table 4 in 9 CFR 310.1(b)(3)(ii) should be revised to reflect the actual number of inspectors required at each inspection station. The commenter suggested that Table 4 could allow for flexibility ( e.g., 1 to 2 inspectors per inspection station), but that the ranges provided for in the proposed revised table ( i.e., 1 to 3 inspectors per inspection station) is too ambiguous.

Response: FSIS disagrees that the revised FSIS inspection staffing standards applicable to traditional swine slaughter establishments will result in unfair IPP assignments across establishments or create undue ambiguity. As stated in the proposed rule, under the revised staffing standards, FSIS will determine the number of inspectors at the head and viscera inspection stations based on the establishment's operations, including inspection line configurations, and FSIS staffing needs (90 FR 40257, 40259). By revising the staffing standards to allow for such flexibility, FSIS will ensure consistent, efficient inspection services across all traditional swine slaughter establishments and assign IPP based on an establishment's specific facility designs and other operational needs.

Comment: A few IPP generally argued that incision and palpation are necessary during post-mortem swine inspection to detect diseases and other food safety conditions in the lymph nodes and viscera. For example, a few IPP stated that they have detected pathology when incising lymph nodes that would not have otherwise been detected visually. IPP provided examples including tuberculosis identified from a lesion buried in lymph nodes, and other conditions purportedly only detected through incision, such as parasites. A few other IPP stated that small malignant masses and other conditions which may require condemnation cannot be detected without viscera palpation. One IPP recommended that, in any final regulatory text, the Agency require the visualization of the mandibular lymph node, so that establishment sorters would need to cut through any excessive surrounding fat to allow IPP to determine whether the lymph node is enlarged or reactive. One other IPP stated that food safety conditions may only have pathology on one side of a carcass or are otherwise difficult to identify without palpation.

Response: FSIS disagrees that routine lymph nodes incision and viscera palpation are necessary to detect diseases and other food safety conditions during post-mortem swine inspection. First, Mycobacterium avium (M. Avium), the animal disease that causes tuberculosis in swine, does not present a food safety concern, as the prevalence of M. Avium in U.S. swine is very low, 2 and science does not support that humans become infected with M. Avium through pork consumption. 3 Further, since the widespread adoption of modern pork production systems, most U.S. swine are raised indoors under biosecurity measures. 4 Thus, the presence of parasites on swine carcasses and parts is not a significant post-mortem inspection concern. For example, research demonstrates that biosecurity measures focused on preventing exposure of swine to rodents, wildlife, and contaminated feed or waste products effectively reduce the risk of Trichinella (a parasite) infection in pork. 5 Finally, if masses on a swine carcass are malignant, they likely have spread to other parts of the carcass or have caused enlarged lymph nodes, which can be detected visually. Similarly, as stated in the proposed rule, the Agency's experience demonstrates that swine carcasses affected with animal disease conditions that would result in condemnation ( e.g., arthritis, pyometra, and splenic torsion) often exhibit systemic pathological changes in the same carcass, rather than isolated within the lymph nodes or other parts (90 FR 40257, 40258). Therefore, FSIS online IPP are able to identify and retain those carcasses for disposition by an FSIS veterinarian without needing to incise lymph nodes or palpate the viscera (90 FR 40257, 40258). FSIS inspectors will maintain authority to incise and palpate lymph nodes and examine the viscera for defects, if needed (90 FR 40257, 40258).

FSIS also disagrees that the amended regulatory text in 9 CFR 310.26 needs to specifically require the visualization of lymph nodes as part of NSIS establishment sorting activities. As stated in the proposed rule, IPP and establishment sorters will continue to visually identify any condemnable conditions, as currently required under FSIS inspection regulations and policies (90 FR 40257, 40259). For example, per 9 CFR 310.26(b), NSIS establishments must develop, implement, and maintain written procedures to ensure that market hog carcasses adulterated with septicemia, toxemia, pyemia, or cysticercosis are properly removed before the point of post-mortem inspection of carcasses. The establishment must incorporate these procedures into its Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) plan, Sanitation Standard Operating Procedures, or other prerequisite program (9 CFR 310.26(b)).

Comment: A few IPP argued that the proposed rule lacked sufficient data or scientific support for ending universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation during post-mortem swine inspection. One IPP stated that while FSIS condemnation rates for swine are low, the number of condemnations still are significant. Another IPP argued that the proposed rule lacked scientific support to replace incision and palpation with visual-based inspection.

Response: FSIS disagrees that visual-based inspection of lymph nodes and viscera during post-mortem swine inspection lacks sufficient data or scientific support. First, the FSIS swine condemnation rates discussed in the proposed rule supported that lymph nodes incision and viscera palpation are not needed to identify the conditions of condemnable swine carcasses during post-mortem inspection. During the twelve-year period of 2012-2023, the total post-mortem condemnation rate for all swine slaughtered under FSIS inspection was very low. 6 Further, as discussed in the proposed rule, swine disease conditions for which a carcass may be condemned ( e.g., arthritis, pyometra, and splenic torsion) are primarily identified during the visual observation component of post-mortem swine inspection, and swine carcasses affected with animal diseases that would result in condemnation often exhibit multiple pathological changes in the same carcass (90 FR 40257, 40258). These changes can be observed visually, allowing FSIS online inspectors to identify and retain those carcasses for disposition by an FSIS veterinarian without needing to incise lymph nodes in swine heads or palpate the viscera. Finally, as also discussed in the proposed rule, the visual-based post-mortem inspection of lymph nodes and viscera is well-supported by science. Specifically, research demonstrates that ending universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation may reduce the probability of carcass cross-contamination by microbial food safety hazards (90 FR 40257, 40258).

Comment: A few IPP argued that the proposed rule would grant establishments too much control over inspection. One IPP stated that many establishments would not cooperate with an inspector's discretion to incise the lymph nodes or palpate the viscera of a particular carcass. Another IPP argued that establishments would be reluctant to allow establishment sorters to similarly incise lymph nodes or palpate viscera on an as-needed basis.

Response: Amending the FSIS inspection regulations to end universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation during post-mortem swine inspection will not impact the ability of IPP to verify that establishments operate in a sanitary manner and produce safe, unadulterated, and properly labeled products. As discussed in the proposed rule, FSIS inspectors will maintain authority to incise lymph nodes and palpate the viscera for disease conditions and defects, if needed (90 FR 40257, 40259). IPP also will continue to retain carcasses, organs, or parts showing lesions or conditions that might make the meat unfit for human consumption for final disposition by an offline FSIS veterinarian (9 CFR 310.3 and 310.4). Further, establishment sorters in NSIS establishments will continue to conduct carcass sorting activities and identify any condemnable conditions or defects before carcasses are presented to online IPP (90 FR 40257, 40259). FSIS will update its instructions to IPP on the primarily visual inspection of lymph nodes and viscera during post-mortem traditional swine inspection. FSIS guidance to NSIS establishments will also continue to address establishment responsibilities to ensure conditions and defects in lymph nodes and viscera are identified and removed before FSIS post-mortem inspection. 7

Comment: A few FSIS IPP disagreed that the end of universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation during swine post-mortem inspection would result in increased inspection efficiency. One commenter argued that, under current post-mortem inspection procedures, IPP and establishment sorters visually inspect or observe at the same time as they incise and palpate. According to the commenter, if the final rule leads to reduced FSIS staffing, IPP and establishment sorters would spend less time in total inspecting or observing each carcass and its parts. The commenter further argued that while the proposed rule stated that IPP could continue to incise lymph nodes and palpate viscera when needed, the likely reduced FSIS staffing would result in insufficient time to conduct such case-by-case incision and palpation.

Response: FSIS disagrees that the final rule will provide less time for IPP to visually inspect and establishment sorters to observe carcasses during post-mortem swine inspection. As stated in the proposed rule, in traditional establishments, the end of universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation will improve the use of IPP inspection time by removing unnecessary inspection duties and allowing IPP to focus more on observing the carcass (90 FR 40257, 40260). This increased inspection efficiency also will allow FSIS to improve the use of Agency inspection resources. It will help FSIS more effectively assign inspection verification responsibilities for IPP at all swine slaughter establishments, including offline verification activities to ensure that establishments comply with regulatory requirements critical to food safety ( e.g., HACCP verification tasks) (90 FR 40257, 40260). Similarly, the end of universal lymph node incision and viscera palpation will allow establishment sorters at NSIS establishments more time to visually identify any condemnable conditions or defects before carcasses are presented to online IPP (90 FR 40257, 40260). When determining IPP assignments, the Agency will provide staffing sufficient to provide enough time for IPP to conduct case-by-case lymph node incision and palpation viscera, as needed. As stated above, the Agency will issue instructions to IPP on the criteria for determining when to incise lymph nodes and palpate viscera.

Comment: A few IPP questioned whether, as stated in the proposed rule, visual-based swine post-mortem inspection procedures may improve food safety by reducing opportunities for the introduction of microbial cross-contamination. Specifically, a few commenters argued that the studies cited in the proposed rule regarding Salmonella cross-contamination risk from lymph node incision were too old or were misinterpreted to support the proposed rule. Another IPP argued that, because lymph node tissue is often incorporated into comminuted products, any contamination spread through a rupture in the lymph nodes would occur during downstream processing, whether the rupture was made intentionally ( i.e., through incision during inspection) or inadvertently. A few other IPP stated that procedures other than lymph node incision, such as head separation and sanitary dressing practices, create cross-contamination risks in swine slaughter establishments.

Finally, one IPP argued that FSIS sampling data shows that, in comminuted pork products, Salmonella prevalence varies widely among establishments and different market classes of swine. The commenter further stated that, according to FSIS data, pork products largely composed of lymph nodes do not exhibit higher Salmonella rates and that sanitary dressing and hygiene practices are the primary drivers of contamination, rather than lymph node incision.

Response: FSIS disagrees that the publication years of the studies cited in the proposed rule ( i.e., 2009 and 2011) invalidate the findings, as the scientific principle underlying those studies remains sound: invasive procedures such as lymph node incision introduce additional cross-contamination risk. Further, the studies findings demonstrate that lymph node incision during post-mortem swine inspection may increase Salmonella cross-contamination risk.

As one commenter noted, Salmonella prevalence may vary across establishments and classes of swine, and cross-contamination risks may exist throughout the swine slaughter process. However, one of the purposes of the final rule's elimination of universal lymph node incision is to address incision as a specific inspection procedure that may introduce unnecessary cross-contamination risk. As condemnable conditions can be identified visually, eliminating universal incision reduces unnecessary contamination risk and improves inspection efficiency without compromising food safety. Under the final rule, inspectors will retain authority to incise lymph nodes or palpate viscera when warranted, ensuring flexibility and maintaining inspection integrity.

Comment: One IPP noted that, as discussed in the proposed rule, FSIS has determined that France, Netherlands, and Denmark have met FSIS equivalence criteria for the use of discretionary lymph node incision and viscera palpation during post-mortem swine inspection. The commenter requested that FSIS clarify the proposed rule's effect on pork products imported to the United States from foreign countries.

Response: Equivalence is the process by which FSIS determines whether a foreign country's food safety inspection system achieves an appropriate level of public health protection as applied domestically by FSIS in the United States. FSIS implements an equivalence process in accordance with the World Trade Organization's Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). 8 Foreign meat, poultry, and egg products food safety and inspection systems are not required to develop and implement the same procedures as the United States. However, to be eligible to export product to the United States, the foreign government's food safety and inspection system is required to achieve an equivalent level of public health protection to the FSIS food safety and inspection system (9 CFR 327.2(a), 381.196(a), 557.2(a), and 590.910(a)). As explained in the proposed rule, FSIS will use the Agency's equivalence procedures to evaluate any future requests from foreign countries to determine whether a visual post-mortem swine inspection procedure achieves an appropriate level of public health protection as applied domestically by FSIS in the United States (90 FR 40257, 40258).

Comment: One trade association stated that FSIS must ensure that U.S. pork products exported to foreign markets would not be adversely affected under the proposed rule. The commenter noted that some foreign countries may require the removal of mandibular lymph nodes and that implementing visual-based post-mortem swine inspection may harm trade agreements and U.S. products.

Response: As with other inspection procedures, a foreign country may maintain additional eligibility requirements related to post-mortem swine inspection for products exported from the United States. The final rule will apply to products sold in the domestic market. For products exported from the United States, FSIS will continue to perform export certification activities, when appropriate, to verify that inspection requirements for the applicable foreign country are met, as shown in the FSIS Export Library. 9

Comment: One trade association stated that the assumption in the proposed rule's economic impact analysis that NSIS establishments would reduce the number of establishment sorters by between five to eight sorters per line per shift, was likely an overestimate. The commenter stated that, according to one of its members, a large NSIS establishment operating a single slaughter line under the proposed rule would reduce staffing by three employees for the single line. Therefore, the commenter estimated that the industry cost savings would still be substantial, but less than estimated in the proposed rule. The commenter estimated that the cost savings would be just under $8 million. For this estimate, the commenter used data that differed from the proposed rule. The commenter provided information that there would be a reduction in staffing across 18 establishments operating under the NSIS (estimating 33 total production lines  10 ) and using a conservative annual employment cost of $80,000.

Response: FSIS adjusted its estimates in the final rule to incorporate input from industry on the economic impact analysis. The new industry cost savings estimate ranges from $7.4 to $14.7 million. In the proposed rule, FSIS had estimated industry cost savings of approximately $14.7 to $25.4 million.

FSIS' estimate is based on 2025 data and included a total of 17 NSIS establishments and 31 slaughter lines, while the commenter included 18 establishments and 33 slaughter lines. This difference is likely due to an additional establishment converting to NSIS in 2026.

FSIS also estimated a reduction of five to eight sorters per line, per shift in the proposed rule, while the commenter estimated a reduction of three employees per line, per shift. FSIS incorporated the commenter's estimate into the Agency's original estimate, by adjusting the range of impacted sorters, as establishments have different line configurations and production levels and other NSIS establishments may be able to see a further reduction. Lastly, FSIS used an annual employee salary of $95,000 and $102,000 for the low and high estimates in the proposed rule, respectively, while the commenter included a salary of $80,000. 11 The commenter's estimate is based on one NSIS establishment and may not be representative of employee costs across all NSIS establishments. Therefore, FSIS included the commenter's salary estimate of $80,000 and a reduction of three employees per line, per shift as part of the low industry savings estimate in the final rule. For the high estimate, FSIS used the 75th percentile wage rate for production employees, 12 and a reduction of five employees per line, per shift.

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget will determine whether a regulatory action is significant as defined by E.O. 12866 and will review significant regulatory actions. This final rule has been designated a “not significant” regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866. E.O. 13563 reaffirms the principles of E.O. 12866 while calling for improvements in the Nation's regulatory system to promote predictability, to reduce uncertainty, and to use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. FSIS has developed the final rule consistent with E.O. 13563. E.O. 14192, “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” requires that any new incremental costs associated with certain significant regulatory actions “shall, to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least 10 prior regulations.” This final rule is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

FSIS is ending mandatory lymph node incision and viscera palpation in both traditional and NSIS swine slaughter establishments. Ending mandatory lymph node incision and viscera palpation in swine slaughter establishments will improve inspection efficiency, make a more efficient allocation of FSIS inspection resources, and provide flexibility to industry.

In 2024, there were 751 swine slaughter establishments that slaughtered approximately 127.8 million swine. 13 These changes will apply to inspection at all swine slaughter establishments. As of February 2025, there were 17 NSIS establishments, and 14 traditional establishments at which FSIS assigns four to seven online inspectors per line and at which the final rule may change the number of FSIS staff. For this analysis, FSIS assumed potential changes to Agency staffing at traditional establishments with two to three inspectors staffed at the viscera station or two to three inspectors staffed at the head station. 14 The 17 NSIS establishments may also change their establishment employee staffing in response to this final rule. FSIS does not anticipate any changes to the Agency's staffing at NSIS establishments.

FSIS does not expect the final rule will impose any costs on the Agency, industry, or consumers. The final rule may improve the safety or quality of the product. While the final rule does not require industry to implement any changes, they will likely stop lymph node incision and viscera palpation prior to post-mortem inspection. FSIS also estimated a de minimis cost of $90 per firm for rule familiarization.

In traditional establishments, FSIS IPP will more efficiently inspect each carcass presented for FSIS post-mortem inspection without affecting IPP's ability to detect animal diseases and conditions or ensure proper disposition of those affected. The changes will improve the use of FSIS IPP time during inspection by removing unnecessary inspection duties for incising lymph nodes and palpating viscera.

As described above, the final rule will allow FSIS IPP to focus more on observing the carcass and parts during post-mortem inspection. FSIS inspectors will also maintain authority to incise lymph nodes and palpate viscera to look for defects, if needed. The increased inspection efficiency will allow FSIS to improve the use of FSIS inspection resources and to more effectively assign inspection verification responsibilities for IPP at all swine slaughter establishments, including offline verification activities to ensure that establishments comply with regulatory requirements critical to food safety ( e.g., Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points verification tasks).

Because FSIS online IPP will no longer be spending time incising lymph nodes and palpating the viscera, the Agency may reduce the number of online IPP in some traditional swine slaughter establishments resulting in a more efficient allocation of FSIS inspection resources. However, these reductions would be made over time through attrition and reassignment to other positions.

FSIS IPP at traditional establishments will focus on observing the swine carcass and parts during post-mortem inspection procedures without being required to incise the lymph nodes and palpate the viscera. The traditional swine slaughter establishments that may experience changes to assigned FSIS online inspection personnel typically have five to seven inspectors per line. The Agency estimates that there could be a reduction equivalent to one to two online inspector positions at the head station and one to two online inspector positions at the viscera station in 14 traditional establishments because of the reduced workload, depending on establishment line configurations. 15

For this analysis, FSIS quantified the cost savings associated with this reduction in online post-mortem inspection positions. The Agency assumed an FSIS online inspector is paid between $111,124 and $135,922, which is the Office of Personnel Management's (OPM), Rest of the U.S. (RUS) General Schedule (GS) 07 step 5 to GS-09 step 5 salary with a benefits factor of two. 16 The Agency estimates a range of possible savings depending on how the resulting online inspection stations are staffed. Based on these assumptions, annualized savings range between $2.0 to $8.4 million over 10 years, discounted at 7 percent. 17 As mentioned above, any reductions to FSIS personnel would happen over time through attrition and reassignment to other positions.

FSIS will no longer require establishment sorters at NSIS establishments to incise lymph nodes and palpate the viscera. This change may result in NSIS establishments voluntarily reducing the number of employees needed to make carcasses and parts ready for inspection because the workload for sorters may be reduced. FSIS estimates that this change will result in a reduction of three to five sorters per line at each NSIS establishment. 18

As of February 2025, there were 17 large NSIS establishments with 31 slaughter lines across all shifts. 19 FSIS assumed these establishments staff up to 11 sorters per line. 20 Sorters are paid higher wages than other production employees, because sorters trim and identify defects, such as dressing defects, contamination, and pathology defects, on carcasses and parts before FSIS post-mortem inspection. 21 FSIS estimates these sorters are paid as production employees, with a salary range of approximately $80,000 to $95,000. FSIS based the low salary of approximately $80,000 on a comment from a trade association that received data from one of its members. FSIS included the 75th percentile production employee wage rate of $44.16 per hour ($22.08 multiplied by a benefits and overhead factor of two)  22 for the high estimate. This results in a high annual salary of approximately $95,000. 23 Under these assumptions, FSIS estimates the annual industry cost savings for the reduction in sorters at NSIS establishments range from approximately $7.4 to $14.7 million over 10 years discounted at 7 percent. 24 However, industry may offset these cost savings by assigning personnel to other areas of the establishment, as relevant. This final rule may incentivize additional swine slaughter establishments to convert to the NSIS.

The FSIS Administrator has determined that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities in the U.S., as defined by the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ).

FSIS is amending its regulations to end mandatory mandibular lymph node incision and viscera palpation of swine carcasses in all swine slaughter establishments ( i.e., establishments operating under traditional swine slaughter inspection or the NSIS). Mandibular lymph nodes incision and viscera palpation of swine carcasses are not needed to ensure food safety.

The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) defines the size standard for small businesses for swine slaughter establishments as having 1,150 employees or less. 25 Swine slaughter establishments are in the 311611-Animal (except Poultry) Slaughter sector of the North American Industry Classification System. 26 Based on U.S. Census Bureau Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) data, 27 approximately 1,208 firms (98 percent) in the Animal (except Poultry) Slaughter sector are small (Table 1) and approximately 22 firms (2 percent) in this industry are large. 28 The quantified industry benefits due to potential industry staffing changes will occur at the 17 NSIS establishments. These large NSIS firms will only receive the benefits from the changes in the final rule, and small firms will not be affected.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires the Agency to analyze whether the final rule will have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. FSIS defines a significant economic impact as one that is greater than 1 percent of small entities' annual receipts. FSIS considers a regulation to have an impact on a substantial number of small entities if it affects over 30 percent of the small entities identified in this analysis.

In the Regulatory Impact Analysis of this final rule, FSIS estimated that there are no costs to industry associated with the final rule. FSIS has estimated that this final rule will be net beneficial and noted that NSIS establishments may voluntarily reduce the number of employees needed to make carcasses and parts ready for inspection because the workload for sorters may be reduced. FSIS also estimated a one-time cost of $90 to account for the time needed for an entity to become familiarized with this final rule.

Using SUSB data, FSIS estimated that the one percent “significant impact”

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain BTCL Model 407 helicopters. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on February 3, 2026 (91 FR 4857). The NPRM was prompted by Transport Canada AD CF-2025-22, dated April 23, 2025, (Transport Canada AD CF-2025-22) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by Transport Canada, which is the aviation authority for Canada. The MCAI states that chafing could occur between the primary flight display/multi-function display harnesses and the cable harness protection system rack and could also occur between the electrical harnesses and the shroud behind the instrument panel area. This condition, if not addressed, could result in smoke or fire in the cockpit and loss of control of the helicopter.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require a one-time detailed visual inspection of the electrical harnesses for chafing and corrective actions if necessary. In the NPRM, the FAA also proposed to require rotation of the backshell cast housing of connectors of the lower engine airframe unit and installation of a wire harness bracket and support, and for certain helicopters, installation of a wire bundle sleeve.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-0736.

The FAA received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the costs.

These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

The FAA reviewed Transport Canada AD CF-2025-22, which specifies procedures for performing a detailed visual inspection of the electrical harnesses located behind the instrument panel for chafing and, depending on the inspection results, repairing damaged parts (chafed electrical harnesses) and performing further inspections; rotating the backshell cast housing; and installing the wire harness bracket and support. This material also specifies procedures for installing a sleeve to cover the wire bundle for certain helicopters without a sleeve installed on the wire bundle.

This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 333 helicopters of U.S. registry.

The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

The FAA estimates the following cost to do any repair that would be required based on the results of the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of helicopters that might need this repair:

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all Leonardo S.p.a. Model AB139, AW139, and AW189 helicopters. The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on January 26, 2026 (91 FR 3081); corrected February 6, 2026 (91 FR 9514). The NPRM was prompted by EASA AD 2025-0163, dated July 30, 2025, (EASA 2025-0163) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. The MCAI states that occurrences of cracking on the LH and RH pilot pedal tubes (also referred to as the tube assemblies installed on the brake pedal assemblies) were reported on a Model AW139 helicopter. The MCAI further states subsequent investigation revealed that the cracks originated from the locking slot where the upper clamping bolt engages with the tube; however, the root cause of the tube cracking is still under investigation. Additionally, the MCAI states that due to design similarity of the braking pedal assembly architecture, Model AB139 and AW189 helicopters could be also affected by the same structural damage.

In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require repetitively inspecting the LH and RH tube assemblies for Model AB139 and AW139 helicopters, and the LH and RH pedal shaft assemblies for Model AW189 helicopters, and depending on the results of the inspection, corrective actions. In the NPRM the FAA also proposed to prohibit installing certain parts unless certain requirements are met. The FAA is issuing this AD to detect and address cracks on the LH and RH tube assemblies and pedal shaft assemblies installed on the brake pedal assemblies. This unsafe condition, if not addressed, could lead to structural failure of the brake pedal assembly and result in reduced control of the helicopter around the yaw axis.

You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-0025.

The FAA received no comments on the NPRM or on the determination of the costs.

These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA's bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.

The FAA reviewed EASA AD 2025-0163, which specifies procedures for repetitive inspections of certain part-numbered LH and RH tube assemblies (for Models AB139 and AW139) and certain part-numbered LH and RH pedal shaft assemblies (for Model AW189) installed on the brake pedal assemblies. Depending on the inspection results, EASA AD 2025-0163 specifies procedures for replacing an affected part with a serviceable part or, for the copilot side only, as an alternative to replacing an affected part, installing a temporary serviceable part for the copilot pedal assembly set, performing repetitive inspections, manufacturing and installing a placard, and revising the limitations section of the rotorcraft flight manual (RFM) for the helicopter. EASA AD 2025-0163 also prohibits installing an affected part on any helicopter unless certain requirements are met. This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

The FAA estimates that this AD affects 153 helicopters of U.S. registry.

The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD.

The FAA estimates the following costs to do any replacements that would be required based on the results of the inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of helicopters that might need these replacements.

The FAA has included all known costs in its cost estimate. According to the manufacturer, however, some of the costs of this AD may be covered under warranty, thereby reducing the cost impact on affected operators.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

Since 1972, the Commission has maintained a policy, codified in Rule 202.5(e) of its rules of informal procedure, 17 CFR 202.5(e), that when it chooses to settle an enforcement action in which a sanction is imposed, it will not settle unless the defendant or respondent also agrees not to publicly deny the allegations in the complaint or administrative order. For the reasons explained below, the Commission now rescinds this policy and repeals Rule 202.5(e).

When the Commission exercises its authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions, 1 it does not litigate every action to judgment. Like all parties to litigation, the Commission and a litigant against whom it brings a district court action or agency adjudication may agree to settle. 2 The Commission's decision to settle depends on a range of factors, including the Commission's judgment that obtaining an immediate result by consent better serves the public interest than expending the resources and accepting the risk that comes with fully litigating a matter. 3 Similarly, a defendant's decision to settle turns on numerous factors.

In a typical Commission settlement, a defendant in Federal district court signs a consent that describes the terms on which the parties have agreed to settle, or, in an administrative action, a respondent signs an offer of settlement that contains those terms. 4 These documents reflect the defendant's (or respondent's) agreement and representation that the defendant (or respondent) is entering into the settlement knowingly and voluntarily. For actions in Federal district court, the Commission (sometimes jointly with the defendant) will then ask the court to enter a consent judgment that incorporates the terms of the consent and to retain continuing jurisdiction. 5 For administrative adjudications, when the Commission accepts an offer of settlement, the terms are incorporated into an order instituting proceedings.

In 1972, the Commission adopted Rule 202.5(e), which sets out a policy regarding settlements and is one of several “informal and other procedures” that concern enforcement activities. 6 The policy stated the Commission's view at the time that in any civil lawsuit or in any administrative proceeding of an accusatory nature, “it is important to avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an impression that a decree is being entered or a sanction imposed, when the conduct alleged did not, in fact occur.”  7 Accordingly, the Commission announced a “policy not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint” or administrative order. 8 By limiting the circumstances under which the Commission will accept a settlement offer, the policy binds the staff of the Commission's Division of Enforcement (Enforcement) in settlement negotiations.

The no-deny provisions that appear in settlements pursuant to this policy are usually paired with a statement that a defendant is not admitting the allegations (or liability). While the precise language has varied over time, defendants and respondents typically agree that they are entering into a consent without admitting or denying the allegations. More specifically, defendants and respondents agree, among other things, not to make “ `any public statement denying, directly or indirectly, any allegation in the complaint or creating the impression that the complaint is without factual basis.' ”  9 The no-deny provisions do not, however, apply to testimonial obligations by defendants and respondents, and they do not affect their ability to take legal or factual position in litigation and other legal proceedings to which the Commission is not a party, including parallel civil actions.

For the most part, the Commission does not require settling defendants to make admissions. 10 Together, these two components of settlement language have been referred to as the “no admit/no deny policy.” Thus, for over fifty years, when the Commission has settled on a no-admit basis, it has only agreed to cede its ability to prove its claims where the defendant has also agreed not to publicly deny the allegations in the complaint. Settlement brings certainty and closure without the risks and expenses of litigation, and often accelerates the Commission's ability to collect and, if feasible, distribute collected monetary sanctions to injured investors.

When the Commission agrees to settlements that contain no-deny provisions, the Commission has only a limited judicial remedy in the event a defendant breaches the settlement agreement by publicly denying allegations. In the event of a public denial, the Commission's only recourse, pursuant to the agreement, is to ask a court to vacate the settlement, returning the case to active litigation and permitting the Commission to prove its claims. 11 And, as with all parties to a contract who are faced with a breach, the Commission may forgo this remedy, opting not to dedicate resources to reviving a once-settled case. Moreover, district courts have discretion to deny the Commission's request to return a case to the active docket in the event the Commission does seek relief in the wake of a breach. We are not aware of any instance where the Commission has sought to reopen a district court action or administrative adjudication following a violation of a no-deny provision, and there are no reported opinions where a court has ruled upon such a motion.

In recent years, there have been several challenges to no-deny settlements. Some defendants made unsuccessful efforts to alter no-deny provisions years after they agreed to consent judgments, arguing that the no-deny provisions violated their First Amendment rights and that the Commission did not comply with the Administrative Procedure Act in adopting the policy. 12 Other parties have challenged the use of no-deny provisions because they claimed they wanted to publish the speech of those who agreed to no-deny provisions. 13 In a petition for rulemaking submitted to the Commission in 2018 and renewed in 2023, a petitioner asked the Commission to amend Rule 202.5(e) to provide that a defendant can consent to a judgment in which the defendant admits, denies, or neither admits nor denies the allegations in the complaint. 14 The Commission denied the petition (with one Commissioner issuing a statement dissenting from the denial). 15

The Second and Ninth Circuits have held that the no-deny policy is constitutional. 16 However, two judges in the Fifth Circuit (in a concurring opinion) have questioned whether the no-deny policy is constitutional. 17 And while the Ninth Circuit rejected a facial challenge to the no-deny policy, declining to hold that the no-deny policy is per se unconstitutional, it also noted that the policy, as applied, could “present different issues” if the facts and circumstances of particular settlements “sweep more broadly than Rule 202.5(e) itself,” which could implicate the “important values associated with permitting criticism of the government.”  18 Additionally, the policy has been subject to criticism in the district courts. 19

After further consideration of the existing policy, the Commission is rescinding Rule 202.5(e). The Commission initiates enforcement actions only after determining that information obtained in an investigation indicates that a violation of the securities laws occurred or is about to occur. 20 The commencement of such an enforcement action in district court (or institution of an administrative proceeding) reflects the Commission's intention to prove the facts of the case as alleged based on the results of that investigation. 21 When the Commission chooses settlement to serve the public interest by obtaining a more certain and faster result with fewer expenditure of resources and less risk, it forecloses its ability to obtain findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The Commission adopted Rule 202.5(e) on the view that it benefits the public interest “to avoid creating, or permitting to be created, an impression that a decree is being entered or a sanction imposed, when the conduct alleged did not, in fact, occur.”  22 More specifically, a defendant who later denies the allegations can create the incorrect impression that there was no basis for the Commission's enforcement action, but only after the Commission yielded its opportunity to prove in court, under the rules of procedure and evidence, the facts that led it to commence the enforcement action in the first place. 23 We conclude, however, that the negative effect on the public interest from such denials may be minimal. Moreover, we recognize that the policy itself may create the incorrect impression that the Commission is trying to shield itself from criticism, even though the main thrust of the policy was to allow the Commission, in the wake of a denial, to ask for the ability to test its allegations and legal theories. 24

Four additional reasons support the Commission's recission of Rule 202.5(e).

First, the benefits to the Commission and the public from the policy, and the only remedy available under the policy, have proven to be limited over time. Under Rule 202.5(e), as implemented, if a settling defendant who has agreed to a no-deny provision then publicly denies the allegations, the Commission's only recourse is to ask a district court to vacate the settlement (or to reopen an adjudicatory proceeding). 25 Thus, the policy existed in large part to ensure that the Commission did not irrevocably cede its ability to prove the allegations as part of a settlement. However, there is no known instance of the Commission exercising this option for administrative proceedings in the wake of a breach since Rule 202.5(e) was adopted, 26 and the Commission is not aware of any instances in which the Commission asked a court to vacate a settlement in the wake of a breach, or that a court has agreed to such a request and reopened an enforcement action in the wake of a public denial.

Moreover, there is a built-in temporal disincentive to invoking this limited remedy. As the gap in time between the settlement and a (hypothetical) denial grows, the Commission will be less likely to dedicate resources to reopen a case where the allegations will be harder to prove due to the passage of time and the concomitant fading of memories and loss of evidence. Similarly, as more time elapses from the entry of a consent judgment containing a no-deny provision, a court may be less likely to grant the Commission's request to reopen an older case because of comparable procedural and evidentiary concerns. Particularly given that the Commission has not sought to use this remedy, any of its benefits do not justify retaining the rule.

Second, technological changes in communication, particularly use of social media, have made the policy more challenging to implement. The no-deny provisions that implement Rule 202.5(e) cover public denials of allegations. 27 The line between public and private statements, however, is not always clear, particularly for social media interactions that are intended for a private, self-selected community, but nonetheless are visible to dozens of individuals. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit noted in upholding the no-deny policy against a facial constitutional challenge, the language of some consents “could be read to sweep more broadly than Rule 202.5(e) itself,” by covering public statements that are “ `indirectly' ” denying allegations or “ `creating the impression' ” that the allegations are without a factual basis. 28 Rather than have to parse whether such statements would trigger a no-deny provision, the Commission chooses to repeal Rule 202.5(e).

Third, eliminating Rule 202.5(e) aligns the Commission with the majority of Federal agencies that do not have a similar rule. 29 Most Federal agencies have not adopted a comparable no-deny policy, including the Department of Justice. Because nearly all other Federal agencies can settle enforcement actions without noticeable consequence even though the parties with whom they settle may deny the allegations against them after the time of settlement, we conclude that rescinding Rule 202.5(e) will not harm the public interest.

Fourth, rescinding Rule 202.5(e) gives the Commission more flexibility in settling enforcement actions, which conserves resources, provides certainty, and may speed the return of money to injured investors (when feasible). 30 The rule precludes the Commission from accepting settlements that lack a no-deny provision, and thus necessarily precludes settlements with defendants who do not wish to waive their rights by signing a no-deny provision that imposes a contractual obligation regarding denials that continues into the future beyond the time of settlement. The rescission of the rule will eliminate this restriction, allowing the Commission to better structure settlements resulting in collectible sanctions that can be returned (where feasible) to injured investors with fewer resources expended. 31

In light of the rescission of Rule 202.5(e), and for the same reasons, the Commission will not enforce existing no-deny provisions in settlements that have already been entered. To the extent a settling defendant has previously agreed to a no-deny provision as part of a consent judgment entered in Federal court or administrative adjudicative order before the Commission, and the defendant then breaches the terms of that no-deny provision, the Commission will not seek or attempt to reopen an otherwise settled case. Rather, in the event of a breach of an existing no-deny provision, the Commission will take no action to ask a district court to vacate the settlement (or to reopen an adjudicatory proceeding) in connection with the settlement agreement and the limited relief the Commission has pursuant to its terms.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) generally requires an agency to publish notice of a proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register and provide an opportunity for public comment. 32 This requirement does not apply, however, to “interpretive rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.”  33 The Commission finds that the rescission of the no-deny policy constitutes a general statement of policy and relates solely to agency organization, procedure, or practice, and therefore notice and comment are not required. 34 Similarly, the provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, which apply only when notice and comment are required by the APA or another statute, are not applicable. 35 Additionally, rescission of the no-deny policy does not impose or change any collection of information requirements as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 36

The Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) has determined that this action is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866, as amended, and the action has been reviewed by OMB. This action is an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action. For purposes of Subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (also known as the Congressional Review Act), 37 OMB has determined the final rule is not a “major rule.”

The rescission of this policy statement does not impose any new rules, regulations, or other requirements on non-agency parties, but it could expand the range of possible settlements in Commission enforcement actions compared to when the policy was in place. Different parties have different goals when approaching possible settlement, and it is difficult to estimate how important the ability to deny allegations may be to certain parties or whether parties may change their approach to settlement negotiations following this rescission. To the extent that more parties enter into settlements with the Commission as a result of the rescission, those settlements could reduce litigation costs for such parties and the Commission and help to conserve judicial resources.

The APA generally requires that an agency publish an adopted substantive rule in the Federal Register 30 days before it becomes effective. 38 This requirement, however, does not apply to “interpretative rules and statements of policy,” nor does it apply if the agency finds good cause for making the rule effective sooner. 39 For the reasons discussed in section II as to why we are rescinding the no-deny policy, and because delaying the effective date could create a period of time in which parties have an incentive to delay settlement until the rescission is in effect, we find delaying the effective date of this rescission is unnecessary and would be contrary to the public interest, and thus we find good cause to make the rescission effective [upon publication in the Federal Register ]. For the same reasons, this rescission may take effect [upon publication in the Federal Register ] pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 808(2).

This release is being adopted pursuant to section 19 of the Securities Act of 1933, sections 21 and 23(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 38 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, the Commission is amending title 17, chapter II of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Ebola disease, caused by a group of viruses known as orthoebolaviruses, is a severe and often fatal disease that can affect humans and non-human primates. Disease transmission occurs via direct contact with bodily fluids ( e.g., blood, mucus, vomit, urine). Bundibugyo virus, one of the ebolaviruses, was discovered in 2007 and has been associated previously with two large outbreaks in the DRC (2012) and the other on the border of the DRC and Uganda (2007). These outbreaks caused death in about 30% of people who contracted the disease. The largest Ebola disease outbreak occurred from 2014-2016 in West Africa, with over 11,000 deaths and cases exported to seven additional countries across three continents. These epidemics demonstrated the potential for Ebola disease to become an international crisis in the absence of early intervention. Further, Ebola disease can have substantial medical, public health, and economic consequences if it spreads to densely populated areas. As such, Ebola disease may present a threat to U.S. health security given the unpredictable nature of outbreaks and the interconnectedness of countries through global travel.

On May 15, 2026, an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus was confirmed in northeastern DRC. There is no vaccine for Bundibugyo virus, and treatment consists of supportive care. As of May 17, 2026, a total of 12 confirmed cases, 336 suspected cases and 88 deaths have been reported in the DRC. Uganda has also reported imported cases from the DRC, with ongoing contact tracing and containment measures. South Sudan has not reported confirmed cases in the current outbreak, but it is considered at high risk because of its close border with affected areas in eastern DRC and Uganda, limited healthcare infrastructure, and cross-border population movement. As of May 18, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued Travel Health Notices for both the DRC and Uganda. Also on May 18, CDC issued an Order Suspending the Right to Introduce Certain Persons from Countries Where a Quarantinable Communicable Disease Exists pursuant to the agency's authority under 42 U.S.C. 265, 268; the Order suspends the right to introduce into the United States for a period of 30 days certain persons who have departed from, or were otherwise present within, the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan during the last 21 days (regardless of their country of origin).

In order to assist in preventing or limiting the introduction and spread of this communicable disease into the United States, the Departments of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, including CDC, and other agencies charged with protecting the homeland and the American public, are currently implementing enhanced public health measures at one U.S. airport that receives the largest number of travelers originating from the DRC, Uganda, and South Sudan. To ensure that all travelers with recent presence in the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan arrive at this airport, DHS is directing all flights to the United States carrying such persons to arrive at the airport where the enhanced public health measures are being implemented. Although DHS, in coordination with other applicable federal agencies, anticipates working with the operators of aircraft in an endeavor to identify potential travelers who have recently traveled from, or were otherwise present within, the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan prior to boarding, operators of aircraft will remain obligated to comply with the requirements of this notice. Department of War (DOW) flights, via either military aircraft or contract flights, will be managed by DOW in accordance with HHS guidelines.

Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 112(a), 19 U.S.C. 1433(c), and 19 CFR 122.32, DHS has the authority to limit the locations where all flights entering the United States from abroad may land. Under this authority and effective for flights departing after 11:59 p.m. Eastern Daylight Time on Wednesday, May 20, 2026, I hereby direct all operators of aircraft to ensure that all flights (with the exception of those operated or contracted by DOW) carrying persons who have recently traveled from, or were otherwise present within, the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan only land at the following airport:

• Washington-Dulles International Airport (IAD), Virginia.

This direction considers a person to have recently traveled from the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan if that person departed from, or was otherwise present within, the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan within 21 days of the date of the person's entry or attempted entry into the United States. Also, for purposes of this document, crew and flights carrying only cargo ( i.e., no passengers or non-crew), are excluded from the applicable measures set forth in this notification. This direction is subject to any changes to the airport landing destination that may be required for aircraft and/or airspace safety as directed by the Federal Aviation Administration.

This list of designated airports may be modified by the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Secretary of Transportation. This list of designated airports may be modified by an updated publication in the Federal Register or by posting an advisory to follow at www.cbp.gov. The restrictions will remain in effect until superseded, modified, or revoked by publication in the Federal Register .

For purposes of this Federal Register document, “United States” means the territory of the several States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

By delegation from the Attorney General, the Administrator of Drug Enforcement (“Administrator”) is responsible for carrying out all functions vested in the Attorney General by the Controlled Substances Act, with limited exceptions not relevant here. 1 The Administrator, in turn, is authorized to redelegate such functions to any subordinates of the Administrator. 2 Those functions that have been redelegated to the Administrator's subordinates are set forth in 28 CFR part 0, Appendix to subpart R.

The final rule being issued today amends section 4(a) of the Appendix to subpart R to delegate to additional DEA officials the authority to sign and issue subpoenas with respect to controlled substances, listed chemicals, tableting machines or encapsulating machines under 21 U.S.C. 875 and 876. Currently, within DEA, the Chief Inspector of DEA; the Deputy Chief Inspectors and Associate Deputy Chief Inspectors of the Office of Inspections and the Office of Professional Responsibility of DEA; all Special Agents-in-Charge of DEA; DEA Inspectors assigned to the Inspection Division; DEA Associate Special Agents-in-Charge; DEA Assistant Special Agents-in-Charge; DEA Resident Agents-in-Charge; DEA Diversion Program Managers; DEA Special Agent Group Supervisors; and DEA Regional Directors, Assistant Regional Directors, and Country Attachés have the authority to sign and issue such administrative subpoenas. 3 This final rule grants DEA Supervisory Diversion Investigators, Field Intelligence Managers, and Intelligence Group Supervisors, who, like DEA Special Agent Group Supervisors, hold supervisory positions within their respective divisions (the Diversion Control Division and the Intelligence Division), the same authority to sign and issue administrative subpoenas as these DEA Special Agent Group Supervisors.

This final rule relates to a matter of agency management or personnel, is a rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice, and is not a substantive rule. As such, this rule is exempt from the usual requirements for prior notice and comment and a 30-day delay in effective date. 4

This final rule is limited to matters of agency organization, management, or personnel. Accordingly, it is excluded from the categories of regulations or rules that are subject to review under Executive Orders (E.O.s) 12866, 13563, and 14192.

This final rule meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988 to eliminate ambiguity, minimize litigation, establish clear legal standards, and reduce burdens.

This final rule does not have federalism implications warranting the application of E.O. 13132. The final rule does not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

This final rule does not have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

This final rule does not reduce competition, entrepreneurship, and innovation.

E.O. 14294 specifies that all notices of proposed rulemaking and final rules published in the Federal Register , the violation of which may constitute criminal regulatory offenses, should include a statement identifying that the rule or proposed rule is a criminal regulatory offense, the authorizing statute, and the mens rea requirement for each element of the offense. This final rule does not involve a criminal regulatory offense, and thus E.O. 14294 does not apply.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”)  5 applies to rules that are subject to the notice-and-comment requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act. 6 DEA is not required to publish a general notice of proposed rulemaking before issuing this final rule. Consequently, the RFA does not apply to this final rule.

In accordance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (“UMRA”) of 1995, 7 DEA has determined that this action will not result in “any Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year . . . .”  8 Therefore, neither a Small Government Agency Plan nor any other action is required under the UMRA of 1995.

This final rule does not impose a new collection or modify an existing collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 9 Also, this final rule does not impose a recordkeeping or reporting requirement on State or local governments, individuals, businesses, or other organizations.

Because this is a rule of agency management or personnel and a rule of agency organization, procedure, or practice that does not substantially affect the rights or obligations of non-agency parties, the reporting requirement under 5 U.S.C. 801 does not apply.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of Justice amends 28 CFR part 0 as follows:

Subject to OSM's oversight, section 503(a) of the Act permits a State to assume primacy for the regulation of surface coal mining and reclamation operations on non-Federal and non-Indian lands within its borders by demonstrating that its program includes, among other things, State laws and regulations that govern surface coal mining and reclamation operations in accordance with the Act and consistent with the Federal regulations. See 30 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1) and (7).

On the basis of these criteria, the Secretary of the Interior conditionally approved the Kentucky program effective May 18, 1982. You can find background information on the Kentucky program, including the Secretary's findings, the disposition of comments, and conditions of approval of the Kentucky program in the May 18, 1982, Federal Register (47 FR 21434). You can also find later actions concerning the Kentucky program and program amendments at 30 CFR 917.11, 917.12, 917.13, 917.15, 917.16, and 917.17.

By letter dated May 18, 2020, (Administrative Record No. KY-2005), the Kentucky Energy and Environment Cabinet (KEEC or Cabinet), Department of Natural Resources sent OSM an amendment to its program under SMCRA (30 U.S.C. 1201 et seq. ). Through this submission, Kentucky seeks to repeal its administrative regulation at Title 405 of the Kentucky Administrative Regulations (KAR), Chapter 026, Regulation 001, 405 KAR 26:001 (Operation of two (2) acres or less), because such operations are no longer allowed in the Commonwealth due to a change in State law, discussed below. Likewise, Kentucky seeks to remove or revise provisions that relate to its interim program regulations, formerly at 405 KAR Chapters 1 and 3, which Kentucky repealed in 2018. See 44 Ky.R. 2708-2711 (June 1, 2018). Kentucky's repeal of its interim regulations did not require OSM approval because the interim regulations were by definition not part of the permanent regulatory program conditionally approved in 1982. OSM separately confirmed with Kentucky that it has no remaining interim program permits. Finally, Kentucky also made minor editorial revisions to the administrative regulations that do not alter the meaning of the content but rather clarify the regulations and achieve compliance with the legislative drafting requirements of Chapter 13A of the Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS). The full text of the program amendment is available for you to read at the locations listed above under ADDRESSES or at www.regulations.gov.

OSM announced receipt of the proposed amendment in the June 3, 2021, Federal Register (86 FR 29709) (Administrative Record KY-2005). In the same document, the public comment period was opened and an opportunity for a public hearing or meeting on the adequacy of the amendment was provided. No public hearing or meeting was held because none was requested. The public comment period ended on July 6, 2021. No comments were received.

OSM makes the following findings concerning the amendment under SMCRA and the Federal regulations at 30 CFR 732.15 and 732.17. Kentucky included in its submission revisions to 405 KAR 5:002 (Definitions for 405 KAR Chapter 5) and 405 KAR 5:032 (Permit requirements), which relate to Kentucky's regulation of the surface effects of noncoal mining. A State's noncoal mining statutes and regulations are outside the scope of our purview under SMCRA and so OSM did not consider these revisions part of this program amendment. Kentucky also made non-substantive editorial revisions throughout its program amendment, such as inserting general references to its regulations at “405 KAR Chapters 7-24”, replacing the word “must” with the word “shall”, replacing several uses of the word “may” with the word “could”, adding new subsection and paragraph numbering to its existing regulations, and rearranging subordinate clauses within a sentence. No specific findings were made about all these editorial changes, which are not otherwise referenced in this notice, but we state here that those changes do not impact the compliance of Kentucky's approved program with SMCRA. OSM also will not specifically address revisions Kentucky makes to the prefatory language of each substantive rule entitled, “Necessity, Function, and Conformity.” Those provisions simply annotate the statutory authority and purpose for each rule and have no operative effect on the Kentucky program. OSM is approving the amendment as specifically described below.

Kentucky deleted Section 4 (Existing Structures on Areas Sought to be Permitted) in its entirety and renumbered remaining sections accordingly. Kentucky likewise removed references to this provision in Section 5 (Hazard Classification for Impoundments) and Section 9 (regarding approximate original contour), now numbered Sections 4 and 8. From Section 7 (Coal Exploration), now numbered Section 6, Kentucky deleted references to a date specified in Section 11 after which any person conducting coal exploration must file a notice of intent to explore or obtain approval under 405 KAR 8:020, and two months after which any person conducting coal exploration must comply with the performance standards. Kentucky also revised Section 10 (Certifications by Registered Professional Engineers), now numbered Section 9, to describe professional engineers as “licensed” rather than “registered”, and eliminated subsection (7), which required that certification by a professional engineer must be made in the form prescribed by KEEC and allowed KEEC to reject any certification that is not made in such form.

OSM Findings: The Federal regulations at 30 CFR 701.5 define the term existing structure as “a structure or facility used in connection with or to facilitate surface coal mining and reclamation operations for which construction began prior to the approval of the State program. . . .” Kentucky defines the term likewise at 405 KAR 7:001(26), with construction having had to begin before January 18, 1983. The section that Kentucky proposes to eliminate under 405 KAR 7:040 was a part of Kentucky's interim program and implemented the Cabinet's limited discretion to permit pre-primacy structures that did not initially meet certain design or performance standards, as provided under SMCRA's regulations at 30 CFR 701.11(e)-(f) and 773.15(f) (formerly § 786.21). See 47 FR 21404, 21414 (May 18, 1982) (explaining OSM's removal of conditions on Kentucky's original program approval relevant to existing structures). We confirmed with the Cabinet that Kentucky's elimination of this provision means that all structures must meet the design and performance standards of its approved permanent program pursuant to 405 KAR 8:010, Section 14(10), which in turn requires that the existing structures comply with section 25 of either 405 KAR 8:030 (Surface coal mining permits) and 8:040 (Underground coal mining permits). Section 25 of those rules, which we have already approved as part of Kentucky's program, require that existing structures meet the performance standards of Kentucky's approved permanent program at 405 KAR Chapters 16 through 20 or provide a compliance plan with monitoring through the period of modification or reconstruction required to meet those performance standards. We also discuss below a corresponding revision to Section 25 of 405 KAR 8:030 to remove a reference to the interim standards; a similar provision did not exist in 405 KAR 8:040. We note that Kentucky has not proposed deleting 405 KAR 8:010, Section 15 (Criteria for Application Approval or Denial Regarding Existing Structures). This provision requires compliance with 405 KAR 7:040, Section 4. Our approval of Kentucky's deletion of Section 4 renders 405 KAR 8:030, Section 15 inoperative, but does not affect the requirement that existing structures meet the performance standards of Kentucky's approved permanent program.

Regarding coal exploration under Section 7, the date to which this provision cites under Section 11 is unknown because 405 KAR 7:040 has never included a Section 11 since its promulgation in 1982. See 8 Ky.R. 1460, 1470 (June 1, 1982). Nonetheless, Section 6, as amended, requires all persons conducting coal explorations to meet the program's requirements, and so we consider Kentucky's elimination of the non-existent reference date editorial. Regarding professional engineers, the Federal regulations refer to qualified, registered, professional engineers. See, e.g., 30 CFR 780.14, 817.49. We have never articulated a distinction between registered engineers and licensed engineers, and do not believe one exists. We interpret both terms to mean that the professional engineer is appropriately credentialed under State law with whichever entity registers or licenses individuals in that profession, and so Kentucky's revisions have no substantive effect on the regulation. Similarly, while the Federal regulations do in some instances specify the information a certification must contain, they do not specify beyond that, the form in which the certification must appear. Kentucky's removal of Section 6(7) has no substantive effect on the remaining provisions of Kentucky's program that require the certifications to contain certain required information. Therefore, we approve all of Kentucky's revisions to 405 KAR 7:040.

In Section 2 (Reports), Kentucky deleted introductory language indicating that the regulation would begin to require reports within 60 days of September 21, 1982. Kentucky also divided subsection (2) into three subordinate paragraphs lettered (a)-(c), and revised paragraph (b) to state that, if the failure of a coal waste disposal facility could cause damage to life, property, or the environment, then KEEC shall require operators to submit additional plans, analysis, investigations or testing necessary to determine the stability of the facility. The previous language stated that KEEC may, on a case-by-case basis and at any time, require additional submissions under those conditions. In Section 5(2), Kentucky again replaced the term registered with the term licensed in describing professional engineers.

OSM Findings: Kentucky's deletion of the effective date, which indicated the transition from its pre-primacy program to its approved SMCRA primacy program, has no substantive effect on the remaining language. We find that Kentucky's revision to Section 2(2)(b) removes KEEC's discretion to require additional investigations and reports necessary to determine the stability of these facilities, thereby making the regulation more stringent than its current form and as effective as the Federal regulations at 30 CFR 816.81(d) and 817.81(d). Finally, we incorporate our findings above regarding licensed professional engineers, and we approve these revisions to 405 KAR 7:050.

Kentucky deleted subsection (d) of Section 11 (Permit conferences), which specified that 405 KAR 1:090 (Use of explosives) and 1:110 (Revegetation) do not apply to the conduct of the permit conferences held under this section.

OSM Findings: Kentucky repealed its interim regulations, discussed above, which included the repeal of 405 KAR 1:090 and 1:110. Therefore, a reference to these regulations is no longer necessary, the deletion of subsection (d) has no effect on the remaining provisions of the rule, and we approve this revision.

From subsection (d) of Section 25 (MRP; Existing Structures), Kentucky deleted language allowing the permit applicant the alternative of showing that the existing structure meets the interim performance standards of 405 KAR Chapter 1.

OSM Findings: Kentucky's revision requires permit applicants to demonstrate that existing structures meet the performance standards of 405 KAR Chapters 16-20, which are part of Kentucky's approved program. Therefore, we approve this revision.

In Section 5(2), which governs the return of unused forfeited bond funds, Kentucky revised a citation used to indicate interim permits, substituting a reference to 405 KAR Chapter 1 or 3 with a reference to the Federal initial program regulations at 30 CFR part 715.

OSM Findings: Considering Kentucky's repeal of its interim program regulations at 405 KAR Chapters 1 and 3, we find that Kentucky's citation to the Federal initial program regulations at 30 CFR part 715 to be an adequate substitute to indicate that a provision refers to permits issued under Kentucky's interim program. The revision does not otherwise affect Kentucky's implementation of 405 KAR 10:050, and so we approve it.

Kentucky revised Section 1(10)(b) of both rules, which relate to all impoundments other than those subject to 30 CFR 77.216, or Class B (moderate hazard) and C (high hazard) impoundments, to add that inspections may be required more than quarterly based on evidence of structural weakness or hazardous conditions. Kentucky also added Section 1(12) to each rule, requiring the maintenance of impoundments to include cutting vegetative growth where necessary to facilitate inspection and repairs, cleaning ditches and spillways, and removing combustible material from the surface other than that used for stability, such as mulch or dry vegetation.

OSM Findings: The Federal regulations at 30 CFR 816.49(a)(12) require these impoundments to be examined quarterly, but the Federal regulations neither specify under what circumstances examinations may be required more than quarterly nor do they impose the specific impoundment maintenance requirements Kentucky included in subsection (12). Kentucky's revisions add detail not required by the Federal regulations and so are no less effective at meeting the requirements of SMCRA. Therefore, we approve these revisions.

Kentucky divided Section 2(2) of both rules into two subordinate paragraphs (a) and (b). In paragraph (a), Kentucky eliminated a reference to land not reclaimed in compliance with 405 KAR Chapters 1 or 3 (its interim program), leaving the reference to apply only to land not reclaimed in compliance with Chapters 7 through 24 (its approved program).

OSM Findings: Kentucky's revisions reflect the repeal of its interim program regulations and that all regulated land either be reclaimed in compliance with its approved program or otherwise comply with this rule. In other words, this reference is no longer necessary. Therefore, the revisions have no effect on Kentucky's approved program and we approve them.

In Section 6(3), Kentucky revised a citation used to indicate interim permits, substituting a reference to 405 KAR 1:250 with a reference to the Federal initial program regulations at 30 CFR part 715.

OSM Findings: As we noted above, considering Kentucky's repeal of its interim program regulations at 405 KAR Chapters 1 and 3, we find that Kentucky's citation to the Federal initial program regulations at 30 CFR part 715 to be an adequate substitute to indicate that a provision refers to permits issued under Kentucky's interim program.

Repeals the section that allowed for operations on two (2) acres or less.

OSM Findings: Kentucky had previously sought approval to repeal the statutory provision at KRS 350.060(12) that authorized the two-acre exemption, and we approved that repeal in a program amendment docketed at SATS No. KY-250-FOR (Administrative Record No. KY-1642). See 71 FR 54586, 54587 (Sept. 18, 2006). Therefore, we approve Kentucky's repeal of this related implementing regulation.

We asked for public comments on the amendment, but none were received.

On June 26, 2020, under 30 CFR 732.17(h)(11)(i) and section 503(b) of SMCRA, we requested comments on the amendment from various Federal agencies with an actual or potential interest in the Kentucky program (Administrative Record No. KY-2005). We did not receive any comments.

Under 30 CFR 732.17(h)(11)(ii), we are required to get a written concurrence from EPA for those provisions of the program amendment that relate to air or water quality standards issued under the authority of the Clean Water Act (33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq. ) or the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. ). None of the revisions that Kentucky proposed to make in this amendment pertain to air or water quality standards. Therefore, we did not ask EPA to concur on the amendment. However, on June 26, 2020, under 30 CFR 732.17(h)(11)(i), we requested comments from the EPA on the amendment (Administrative Record No. KY-2005). The EPA did not respond to our request.

Under 30 CFR 732.17(h)(4), we are required to request comments from the SHPO and ACHP on amendments that may have an effect on historic properties. On June 26, 2020, we requested comments on Kentucky amendment (Administrative Record No. KY-2005). We did not receive comments from the SHPO or ACHP.

Based on the above findings, we are approving the Kentucky amendment sent to us on May 18, 2020 (Administrative Record No. KY-2005).

To implement this decision, we are amending the Federal regulations at 30 CFR part 917 that codify decisions concerning the Kentucky state program. In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, this rule will take effect 30 days after the date of publication.

This rule would not result in a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications that would result in private property being taken for government use without just compensation under the law. Therefore, a takings implication assessment is not required. This determination is based on an analysis of the corresponding Federal regulations.

Executive Order 12866 provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review all significant rules. Pursuant to OMB guidance dated October 12, 1993 (OMB Memo M-94-3), the approval of State program amendments is exempted from OMB review under Executive Order 12866.

The Department of the Interior has reviewed this rule as required by Section 3 of Executive Order 12988. The Department determined that this Federal Register document meets the criteria of Section 3 of Executive Order 12988, which is intended to ensure that the agency review its legislation and proposed regulations to eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity; that the agency write its legislation and regulations to minimize litigation; and that the agency's legislation and regulations provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct rather than a general standard, and promote simplification and burden reduction. Because Section 3 focuses on the quality of Federal legislation and regulations, the Department limited its review under this Executive Order to the quality of this Federal Register document and to changes to the Federal regulations. The review under this Executive Order did not extend to the language of the Kentucky regulatory program or to the amendment that Kentucky drafted.

This rule has potential Federalism implications as defined under Section 1(a) of Executive Order 13132. Executive Order 1312 directs agencies to “grant the States the maximum administrative discretion possible” with respect to Federal statutes and regulations administered by the States. Kentucky, through its approved regulatory program, implements and administers SMCRA and its implementing regulations at the state level. This rule approves an amendment to the Kentucky program submitted and drafted by the State and thus is consistent with the direction to provide maximum administrative discretion to States.

The Department of the Interior strives to strengthen its government-to-government relationship with Tribes through a commitment to consultation with Tribes and recognition of their right to self-governance and tribal sovereignty. We have evaluated this rule under the Department's consultation policy and under the criteria in Executive Order 13175 and have determined that it has no substantial direct effects on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal government and Tribes. The basis for this determination is that our decision on the Kentucky program does not include Indian lands as defined by SMCRA or other Tribal lands and it does not affect the regulation of activities on Indian lands or other Tribal lands. Indian lands under SMCRA are regulated independently under the applicable, Federal Indian program. The Department's consultation policy also acknowledges that our rules may have Tribal implications where the State proposing the amendment encompasses ancestral lands in areas with mineable coal. We are currently working to identify and engage appropriate Tribal stakeholders to devise a constructive approach for consulting on these amendments.

Executive Order 13211 requires agencies to prepare a Statement of Energy Effects for a rulemaking that is (1) considered significant under Executive Order 12866, and (2) likely to have a significant adverse effect on the supply, distribution, or use of energy. Because this rule is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866 and is not a significant energy action under the definition in Executive Order 13211, a Statement of Energy Effects is not required.

Consistent with sections 501(a) and 702(d) of SMCRA (30 U.S.C. 1251(a) and 1292(d), respectively) and the U.S. Department of the Interior Departmental Manual, part 516, section 13.5(A), State program amendments are not major Federal actions within the meaning of section 102(2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C)).

This rule does not include requests and requirements of an individual, partnership, or corporation to obtain information and report it to a Federal agency. As this rule does not contain information collection requirements, a submission to the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) is not required.

This rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ). The State submittal, which is the subject of this rule, is based upon corresponding Federal regulations for which an economic analysis was prepared and certification made that such regulations would not have a significant economic effect upon a substantial number of small entities. In making the determination as to whether this rule would have a significant economic impact, the Department relied upon the data and assumptions for the corresponding Federal regulations.

This rule is not a major rule under 5 U.S.C. 804(2). This rule: (a) does not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million; (b) will not cause a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; and (c) does not have significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises. This determination is based on an analysis of the corresponding Federal regulations, which were determined not to constitute a major rule.

This rule does not impose an unfunded mandate of State, local, or Tribal governments, or the private sector of more than $100 million per year. The rule does not have a significant or unique effect on State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector. This determination is based on an analysis of the corresponding Federal regulations, which were determined not to impose an unfunded mandate. Therefore, a statement containing the information required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. ) is not required.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, 30 CFR part 917 is amended as set forth below:

Coast Guard regulations define “regatta or marine parade” as an organized water event of limited duration which is conducted according to a prearranged schedule. 33 CFR 100.05(a). And, as explained in 33 CFR 100.15, Coast Guard requires that an organization planning to hold a regatta or marine event apply for a permit if the event, by its nature, circumstances, or location, will introduce extra or unusual hazards to the safety of life on the navigable waters of the United States. These permits may be approved by the Coast Guard, or by the state in which the event is to take place, if there is a Coast Guard-State agreement in place. See 33 CFR 100.10. Upon the approval of an application, the Captain of the Port, Sector Virginia (COTP) may promulgate such “Special Local Regulations” (SLR's) as he or she deems necessary to ensure safety of life on the navigable waters immediately prior to, during, and immediately after the event. See 33 CFR 100.35(a).

An organization notified the Coast Guard on June 20, 2025 that they will be sponsoring a multi-day, multi- activity marine event on the York River near Yorktown, VA. On April 30, 2026, the Coast Guard received the information necessary to determine the duration and size of the event and that it will impact navigation and require additional safety measures to protect the safety of life before, during, and after the event. Among the activities that will take place during the marine event are a parade of sail, a search and rescue demonstration, and a fireworks display. The event will be held from 8 a.m. on June 12, 2026 through 3 p.m. on June 14, 2026, in Yorktown, VA. The sponsor anticipates there will be approximately 25 participants and 250 spectator craft present.

The Captain of the Port Sector Virginia (COTP) has determined that potential hazards associated with the event are a safety concern for anyone within the event area. Therefore, under the authority of 46 U.S.C. 70041, the COTP is issuing this rule to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment in the navigable waters within the regulated area. The regulatory text we are proposing appears at the end of this document.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable to do so if we are to establish the final SLR by June 12, 2026 to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment.

For the same reasons, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes three regulated areas. The regulated area for the Parade of Sail area will be enforced from 8 a.m. until noon on June 12, 2026. That regulated area will occur on the Yorktown Waterfront and will encompass all waters of the York River within the following latitude and longitude positions: 37°14′37″ N, 076°27′43″ W; 37°13′48″ N, 076°27′42″ W; 37°14′6″ N, 076°30′16″ W; 37°14′37″ N, 076°14′37″ N, 076°30′27″ W.

A Search and Rescue Demonstration Regulated Area will be enforced for one hour in the afternoon on June 13, 2026 and again for one hour in the afternoon on June 14, 2026. Specific enforcement times will be announced as noted below. The regulated area will encompass all waters of the York River within 800′ of the center position 37°14′15″ N, 076°30′22″ W.

A Fireworks Regulated Area will be enforced from 8:30 p.m. until 9:30 p.m. on June 13, 2026. The regulated area will encompass all waters of the York River within 300′ of the center position 37°14′7″ N, 076°30′15″ W.

No vessel or person will be permitted to enter the regulated areas while they are subject to enforcement without obtaining permission from the COTP or their designated representative. Any vessel or person in the regulated area will be required to follow the directions of the COTP or their designated representative. The Coast Guard will issue a Broadcast Notice to Marines via VHF FM marine channel 16 for specific times of enforcement. The regulatory text we are proposing appears at the end of this document.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a special local regulation. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L61 of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 100 as follows:

Coast Guard regulations define “regatta or marine parade” as an organized water event of limited duration which is conducted according to a prearranged schedule. 33 CFR 100.05(a). And, as explained in 33 CFR 100.15, Coast Guard requires that an organization planning to hold a regatta or marine event apply for a permit if the event, by its nature, circumstances, or location, will introduce extra or unusual hazards to the safety of life on the navigable waters of the United States. These permits may be approved by the Coast Guard, or by the state in which the event is to take place, if there is a Coast Guard-State agreement in place. See 33 CFR 100.10. Upon the approval of an application, the Captain of the Port, Sector Virginia (COTP) may promulgate such “Special Local Regulations” (SLR's) as he or she deems necessary to ensure safety of life on the navigable waters immediately prior to, during, and immediately after the event. See 33 CFR 100.35(a).

On April 30, 2026, the sponsor of an event entitled “Battle of the Boats” notified the Coast Guard that, on June 6 & 7, 2026, from 11 a.m. until 6 p.m. each day, they planned to sponsor a high speed boat race and boat docking contest. The COTP is issuing this Special Local Regulation (SLR) under the authority in 46 U.S.C. 70041. The COTP has determined that hazards associated with these events include personal injury and property damage which could result from collisions between vessels participating in the event, spectator vessels, and other non-participant vessels, such as transiting vessels. The purpose of this rulemaking is to protect event participants, non-participants, and transiting vessels before, during, and after the scheduled event.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable to do so if it is to issue a final rule by June 6.

For the same reasons, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes a temporary SLR from June 6-7, 2026. The SLR will only be subject to enforcement, however, from 11 a.m. until 6 p.m. each day, when the events are taking place. The SLR includes two regulated areas on the York River. The first regulated area would encompass a portion of the waters of the York River in the vicinity of the Coleman Bridge in Yorktown, VA on June 6, 2026, where the event sponsor plans to host a high speed boat race. The second regulated area would encompass a portion of the waters of the York River within the docking basin between the two Yorktown Waterfront Piers in Yorktown, VA on June 7, 2026, for a boat docking contest.

No vessel or person will be permitted to enter the regulated area without obtaining permission from the COTP or their designated representative.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a special local regulation. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L61 of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 100 as follows:

Coast Guard regulations define “regatta or marine parade” as an organized water event of limited duration which is conducted according to a prearranged schedule. 33 CFR 100.05(a). And, as explained in 33 CFR 100.15, Coast Guard requires that an organization planning to hold a regatta or marine event apply for a permit if the event, by its nature, circumstances, or location, will introduce extra or unusual hazards to the safety of life on the navigable waters of the United States. These permits may be approved by the Coast Guard, or by the state in which the event is to take place, if there is a Coast Guard-State agreement in place. See 33 CFR 100.10. Upon the approval of an application, the Captain of the Port, Sector Virginia (COTP) may promulgate such “Special Local Regulations” (SLR's) as he or she deems necessary to ensure safety of life on the navigable waters immediately prior to, during, and immediately after the event. See 33 CFR 100.35(a).

On January 13th, 2026, the event sponsor of “Sail250® Virginia” submitted an application under 33 CFR 100.15 to conduct `Tall Ship Parade of Sail' on June 19th, 2026. Sail250®Virginia is part of Sail250®, a series of events which celebrates the 250th anniversary of the United States of America, 1 and which has been designated as a Marine Event of National Significance under Coast Guard regulations (46 CFR 26.03-8). 2

The Virginia event, Sail250® Virginia, is being held from June 19th, 2026, through June 23rd, 2026, with participating tall ships mooring in various berths throughout Norfolk, VA. It will commence with the arrival and anchoring of 60 tall ships and military vessels at Anchorage “B” in Lynnhaven, Virginia Beach, VA on June 16th, 2026. We have included a graphic below entitled “Parade of Sail” which illustrates the location of the anchoring along with the route the tall ships will use beginning in the Thimble Shoal Channel.

In addition to the Sail250® Virginia `Tall Ship Parade of Sail' into Norfolk, VA on June 19th, 2026, there will be fireworks displays on June 19th and June 20th, 2026, and an alternate weather day scheduled June 21st, 2026, for which we create a temporary regulated area. To illustrate that area, we have included a separate graphic below entitled “Fireworks” which will encompass a zone within Norfolk, Virginia on the Elizabeth River.

Sail250Virginia® and the fireworks display present potential hazards. Hazards during the parade of sail include limited maneuverability due to the likely high concentration of spectators and participant vessels, with an increased likelihood of potential collisions. Hazards from fireworks displays include the accidental discharge of fireworks, and the chance that people or vessels may be hit by dangerous projectiles, falling hot embers, or other debris. The COTP has therefore determined these regulations are necessary to ensure the safety of the `Sail250® Virginia' registered participants and spectators, and their vessels while operating in and around the Port of Virginia before, during, and after the scheduled events are completed. The Coast Guard is establishing this rulemaking under authorities in 46 U.S.C. 70041; 33 CFR 1.05-1.

As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable, given the amount of time we have before the rule must be in place.

For the same reasons, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule, containing restrictions which will only be subject to enforcement at various specified times between June 16th, 2026, through June 21st, 2026, establishes a “Tall Ship Staging Area,” “Spectator Areas,” and a “Parade Regulated Area” for tall ships participating in the `Sail250® Virginia Tall Ship Parade of Sail'. The “Parade Regulated Area” encompasses the navigational channel between Thimble Shoal Channel Buoys “3” and “4” until the end of the parade route at Town Point Reach. Restrictions are subject to enforcement in the “Tall Ship Staging Area” from 6 a.m. June 16th to 2:30 p.m. on June 19th. Restrictions in the “Parade Regulated Area” and in the “Spectator Areas” are subject to enforcement from 5 a.m. until 5 p.m. on June 19th.

The rule includes two buffer zones. A stationary 25-yard buffer zone exists around all Tall Ships while within Lynnhaven Anchorage (from June 16th, 2026, through June 19th, 2026). Additionally, a moving buffer zone 1,000-yards ahead, 50-yards abeam, 50- yards astern of participating Tall Ships exists during their transit from anchorage to and through the parade route, when registered participants will depart Lynnhaven Anchorage to begin the parade route within Thimble Shoal Channel and end in Norfolk Harbor on June 19th, 2026.

Under existing authority provided in 33 CFR 165.501, the auxiliary channels of the Thimble Shoal Channel will be designated for support vessels under COTP or designated representatives' authority during the Tall Ship Parade of Sail. Mariners may not loiter within the auxiliary channels, nor impede safety vessels.

In addition to the regulated area for the ships, the rule establishes a second regulated area for the Juneteenth/Sail250® Virginia Fireworks Extravaganza on June 19th, 2026, and Sail250® Virginia/Norfolk Harborfest Fireworks Spectacular on June 20th, 2026, from 9 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. on the Elizabeth River on the Downtown Norfolk Waterfront, with an alternate weather day scheduled for June 21st, from 9 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. in the event of rain.

Based on information from the event sponsor and regional maritime stakeholders, we determined that vessel control measures that direct non-participants (as defined at 33 CFR 100.501(b)) into designated spectator areas near the beginning and end of the parade of sail will enhance navigational safety. Vessels intending to observe the parade of sail will be encouraged to utilize Anchorage “C”, “E”, “F” and “N” as spectator areas to reduce the impact of spectator congestion on the rest of the local marine transportation system. Vessels may not utilize Anchorage “G-3” and “G-4” during the Parade of Sail on June 19th, 2026. The regulatory text we are establishing appears at the end of this document.

In summary, and based on the latest Sail250 Virgina schedule of events, we are establishing regulations which include:

1. A special local regulated area, `Parade Regulated Area,' the transit route to be used for Tall Ship Parade of Sail. (Prior to the parade, participating ships would make use of (existing) Anchorage “B” and Lynnhaven Anchorage. There will be buffer zones around each registered Tall Ship while anchored in Lynnhaven and while transiting into Norfolk, VA.)

2. A special local regulated area for fireworks events scheduled to occur June 19th and 20th, with an alternate date scheduled for the 21st.

3. Designated spectator areas—Anchorage “C”, “E”, “F” and “N” for the `Parade of Sail' and Fireworks

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section. Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a special local regulation. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L61 of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 100 as follows:

The Coast Guard has been notified that a Tall Ship will arrive at the Great Bridge Battlefield on the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal, and that it will fire blank cannon fire from the vessel while in the federal channel. Hazards from the cannon fire include being hit by dangerous projectiles. The Captain of the Port, Sector Virginia (COTP) has determined that potential hazards associated with cannon fire are a safety concern for anyone within 250 yards of the vessel from which the canon is fired. Therefore, the COTP is issuing this rule, under the authority in 46 U.S.C. 70034, to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment in the navigable waters within the safety zone from harm which might arise from the firing of blank cannons.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this rule because it is impracticable. The Coast Guard was notified of this event on May 15, 2026, but we must establish this safety zone by June 19, 2026, to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment. Therefore, we do not have enough time to solicit and respond to comments.

In addition, under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), the Coast Guard finds that there is good cause, due to a lack of time, for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes a safety zone which will be in effect from June 19 through June 21. It will only be subject to enforcement, however, from 6 p.m. until 7 p.m. on June 19, 2026, and on June 20, 2026, and June 21, 2026, from 11:30 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. until 3:30 p.m. on both days. The safety zone will reduce the likelihood of harm to people, vessels, and the environment from mishaps involving blank cannon fire. It will cover waters of the Albemarle and Chesapeake Canal in the vicinity of the bridge on Battlefield Boulevard in Great Bridge, in the City of Chesapeake, Virginia. The coordinates of the safety zone are provided in the text of the regulation below. No vessel or person will be permitted to enter the safety zone without obtaining permission from the COTP or their designated representative.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a safety zone. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60(c) of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

On January 10, 2025, OHA published an IFR titled Practices Before the Department of the Interior, with an effective date of February 10, 2025. OHA also invited the public to submit comments by February 10, 2025, indicating it would consider the comments received and consider further revisions, if appropriate. OHA received three sets of comments.

OHA later published a Rule Correction on June 2, 2025, at 90 FR 23290. The Rule Correction corrected the IFR to address: two technical errors in the amendatory instructions for §§ 4.845 and 4.1301, typographical errors in §§ 4.1, 4.26, and 4.27(a), and additional typographical errors in the amendatory instructions for §§ 4.845 and 4.1301 and the instructions provided for submitting comments on the Information Collection Review. The Rule Correction also removed the IFR's two references to an Executive Order that was revoked on January 20, 2025.

On January 20, 2025, the President issued a Memorandum titled “Regulatory Freeze Pending Review.” The President's Memorandum directed executive departments to “consider postponing for 60 days from the date of [the] memorandum the effective date for any rules that have been published in the Federal Register , or any rules that have been issued in any manner but have not taken effect, for the purpose of reviewing any questions of fact, law, and policy that the rules may raise.”

In order to conduct this review, OHA delayed the effective date of the IFR to March 21, 2025 (90 FR 9222), again to May 5, 2025 (90 FR 12461), again to June 4, 2025 (90 FR 18927), and again to July 21, 2025 (90 FR 24231). Pursuant to the President's Memorandum, the Department reviewed the IFR and identified a few changes to be made in response to public comments, including restoring provisions in OHA's regulations that the IFR had changed. The IFR went into effect on July 21, 2025. This final rule adopts the IFR with changes that respond to public comments, provide clarification, and correct typographical errors.

OHA is placing the final rule in immediate effect because good cause exists under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to forgo the 30-day delay of the effective date that would otherwise be required. Because the IFR, which went into effect on July 21, 2025, contains provisions that OHA is now removing or clarifying based on public comments, it is necessary to make the final rule immediately effective to limit the time the IFR remains in effect without these changes and to reduce public confusion about which regulations govern proceedings before OHA. Consequently, it is contrary to the public interest to wait 30 days before the final rule becomes effective.

Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), federal agencies must provide the public with notice of a proposed rule and the opportunity to submit comments on it, with a few exceptions. One of the exceptions is for interpretive rules, general statements of policy, and rules of organization, procedure, or practice. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A). In the IFR, OHA explained that the rule is subject to this exception because it “only makes changes to OHA's rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice.” We explained that OHA's rules describe procedures that parties and OHA must follow during administrative adjudication of a case and are similar to provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 90 FR 2335-36. We welcomed additional suggestions for improvements from the public, explaining that “OHA will consider comments received and consider further revisions, if appropriate.” Id. at 2336.

Two entities commented that portions of the IFR should have been subject to notice and comment because they are not appropriate changes to make in an IFR. One of these commenters focused on changes to the standards for petitions for stays in § 4.171 (DCHD provision) and § 4.405 (IBLA provision), specifically, removal of the public interest criterion and the requirement that the petitioner's harm be immediate. The commenter asserted that the revised criteria “impose[ ] substantive burdens, encode[ ] a substantive value judgment, encroach[ ] on substantial private rights and interests, and materially alter[ ] the rights and interests of the parties.” The commenter stated that, under these situations, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has held that the exception to the requirement for notice-and-comment rulemaking for “rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice” does not apply, citing, among other cases, James V. Hurson Assocs. v. Glickman, 229 F.3d 277, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The commenter concluded that the portions of the IFR adjusting the stay criteria do “not fall under the APA's procedural exception to notice and comment rulemaking and should be removed from the revisions to OHA's otherwise procedural amendments.”

The second commenter asserted more generally that the IFR “negates the notice and comment provisions for rulemaking as prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act” because it “very much implicates `substantive rights or interests' ” and is therefore not a rule of agency procedure or practice under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A).

The process OHA has used for this rulemaking fully complies with the APA, not only satisfying the procedural rule exception but also the requirements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. As emphasized by the D.C. Circuit, the procedural rule exception “covers agency actions that do not themselves alter the rights or interest of parties, although it may alter the manner in which the parties present themselves or their viewpoints to the agency.” James V. Hurson Assocs., 229 F.3d at 280. The IFR falls within these parameters because it does not change existing rights but instead updates the adjudication processes used by OHA and codifies pre-existing precedent. For example, with respect to stays of decisions pending appeal, eliminating the process for obtaining a stay (akin to the elimination of an entire type of approval process as presented in Hurson ) would constitute an alteration of a substantive right. But the IFR only modifies the procedure for asserting a stay and codifies pre-existing precedent governing the stay criteria. Nevertheless, as explained in more detail in the section of this final rule addressing the stay criteria, OHA has decided to remove the changes to the stay criteria in sections § 4.171 and § 4.405 in the final rule.

In addition, the process used by OHA to develop this final rule satisfies the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. By addressing comments received on the IFR in this final rule, OHA also meets all the APA-required elements for notice-and-comment rulemaking. The IFR and its preamble provided the public with all the information required by the APA: a reference to legal authority, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(2) (Section V); a description of the terms and substance of the rule, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3) (Section V); and a request for public comment, as required by 5 U.S.C. 553(c) (Section IV).

While the commenters did not take specific exception to the hearing rules, one commenter raised concerns about how recent legal developments might impact the statutory hearing requirements. With respect to the comments pertaining to the Supreme Court's opinion in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), it would be premature and outside the scope of this rulemaking to render an advisory opinion about how that holding might affect specific types of proceedings adjudicated by the Departmental Cases Hearings Division (DCHD). Any motions raising Jarkesy -related arguments will be addressed and decided on a case-by-case basis.

The other concerns raised by the commenter relate to apparent “omissions,” and more specifically, the implications of an opinion issued by an Acting Deputy Secretary. Again, it would be outside the scope of this rulemaking to render an advisory opinion about how similar issues might be resolved in the future. Any cases raising similar issues will be addressed and decided on a case-by-case basis.

One commenter took exception to the definition of an administrative law judge (ALJ) as it relates to being “appointed.” While we appreciate the commenter's observations, the process for appointing ALJs after Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 585 U.S. 237 (2018), is outside the scope of this rulemaking.

Although OHA received favorable feedback about the new electronic filing and service rules, one commenter raised concerns about the availability of current mailing and email addresses for permittees, applicants, and others that hold authorizations from the Department. The commenter suggested that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) be required to annually update its lists to include applicable email addresses so that appellants can email “each person or entity” rather than being required to mail documents. Alternatively, the commenter suggested that BLM expand its eplanning submission options so that appeals can be uploaded to BLM's website for access by “each person or entity.” Because these suggestions relate to BLM's procedures, they are beyond the scope of this final rule.

In addition, one commenter advocated for adding a provision to create consequences for appellants who neglect to serve “each person or entity named in the decision” to ensure that potential intervenors are aware of appeals that could affect them. Both DCHD and IBLA have authority to address any failure to comply with service requirements. This authority is inherent in each unit's authority to manage its docket and enforce its regulations.

Finally, one commenter noted that appeals typically include supporting exhibits that exceed 20 megabytes and that OHA should “account for this challenge” by identifying a method to file and serve those supporting exhibits. For documents filed electronically with OHA, parties will have the option of dividing filings into multiple subparts that will facilitate the filing and service of large submissions.

One commenter asked that the provision authorizing an ALJ to strike and not consider any pleading or document that fails to comply with § 4.103 be removed. As noted by the commentor, the rule includes the word “may.” Consequently, an ALJ retains the discretion to determine the appropriate remedy, which could include allowing an amendment to a pleading or striking a pleading when a party consistently fails to conform to the standards. This provision has been included to encourage compliance with formatting standards because proper filings enable an ALJ to rule on motions and other requests for relief more expeditiously.

We received comments urging OHA to remove default page limits for briefs. Those default page limits have been included in the rules to expedite adjudication. Although the commenter argues that these page limits are arbitrary and unreasonable, the page limits serve as useful starting points. An ALJ or the IBLA has discretion to modify the limits in appropriate circumstances. This may include allowing longer page limits (or no limits) in more complex cases. Parties may also request permission to file overlength briefs when a more detailed analysis is warranted. Given this built-in flexibility, it is unnecessary to remove the default page limits. ALJs and the IBLA can address individual circumstances on a case-by-case basis.

OHA received comments urging DCHD to authorize reply briefs. Although the rules do not allow automatic replies, the rules also do not prohibit reply briefs. Instead, the rules authorize ALJs to use their discretion to allow replies in appropriate circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In the past, routinely allowing replies has led to unnecessary delays in case processing and has resulted in tight scheduling deadlines when the requested relief is time sensitive. DCHD has also found that some parties wait to raise key arguments until they file their reply briefs, which has led to additional rounds of time-consuming briefing. By setting the expectation that replies must be requested, we have found that parties tend to submit more complete briefing during the initial stages so that replies often become unnecessary.

One commenter stated that, while it does not take exception with the stipulated dismissal provision, the section should also provide as follows: “If BLM or another agency of the U.S. Department of the Interior requests DCHD or any Board via a stipulation to approve a stipulated settlement, including one that may modify the underlying appealed decision, then DCHD or the applicable Board should do so to ensure finality of agency decision-making.” As the commenter notes, the IBLA recently held in Petan Company of Nevada, Inc., IBLA 2024-0079, a non-precedential order dated January 16, 2025, that “[t]he Board encourages settlement and will grant a motion to dismiss an appeal without ruling on the merits when the parties have resolved their dispute and there is no longer any controversy between them.” However, “absent an exceptional circumstance, the Board will not itself order modification of an appealed decision, particularly when the Board is asked to do so without independently confirming the legality of the modification.” The principle that OHA will not typically modify a decision absent review of the merits reflects the fact that OHA exists to ensure the legality and finality of agency decisions, and OHA's authority, like that of the Attorney General, “does not include license to agree to settlement terms that would violate the civil laws governing the agency.” Exec. Bus. Media v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, 3 F.3d 759, 762 (4th Cir. 1993). The language of § 4.110 allows the ALJ to consider the facts of any stipulated dismissal and issue an appropriate order in response. We decline to add language requiring an ALJ to approve stipulated settlements.

One commenter explained that while it does not take exception with DCHD's use of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) as guidance when adjudicating summary judgments, the rule needed to “go a significant step further.” By way of example, the commenter pointed to the standard for review in grazing cases. While OHA appreciates the commenter's focus on grazing cases, this summary judgment provision establishes a rule of general applicability. As written, this rule broadly encompasses all the various types of cases adjudicated by DCHD's ALJs. This rule does not attempt to address specific standards that may apply in certain types of cases, such as grazing appeals. Instead, this rule adopts the same summary judgment standard used in Federal District Court proceedings and explicitly relies on FRCP 56 as guidance. It is outside the scope of this summary judgment rule to address long-standing case law and precedent surrounding the specific standards for reviewing different types of cases and issues.

We received one comment about the discovery provisions in subpart C. The general procedural rules in subpart C are designed to function like the FRCP but have been simplified and tailored to administrative proceedings. As such, the discovery rules mirror the methods of discovery allowed in the FRCP with an important qualification—discovery must be authorized by the ALJ. Some cases before DCHD require discovery and others require little, or no, discovery. Because the discovery procedures have been drafted to be generally applicable to all case types adjudicated by DCHD, it remains the responsibility of the parties and the ALJ to assess the discovery needs of each individual case.

For this reason, an ALJ would not authorize discovery in cases where it would not aid in the resolution of the proceeding. And even when the ALJ does authorize discovery, the ALJ could limit the scope of authorized discovery to ensure that the requests are “proportional to the needs of the case.” While the commenter specifically objects to depositions, that form of discovery is more appropriate in certain types of proceedings and less appropriate in others. By maintaining rules modeled after the FRCP, ALJs will have the flexibility to respond to the discovery needs of each individual case.

One commenter asked that the sanctions provisions in § 4.121 (for DCHD proceedings) and § 4.411 (for IBLA appeals) be deleted or revised because they are not needed and could be viewed as “ominous and draconian.” As we explained in the preamble to the IFR, these provisions merely codified the long-standing authority of ALJs and administrative judges to regulate the conduct of parties in hearings and appeals so that the administrative process proceeds in a fair and efficient manner that complies with applicable laws and orders. Nonetheless, because §§ 4.121 and 4.411 merely codify existing authority, they are not necessary additions to these procedural rules. We therefore have eliminated both sanctions provisions.

OHA has replaced the sanctions provisions with sections codifying DCHD's and IBLA's general authority to manage the proceedings and appeals before them. These sections use language similar to the language describing the authority and duty given to ALJs to conduct hearings in an orderly and judicial manner in § 4.126(b). The IBLA has the same general authority for appeals, but that fact is not reflected in the existing rules. To ensure regulatory consistency, we have replaced § 4.121 and § 4.411 in the IFR with § 4.121, titled “Case Management,” and § 4.411, titled “Management of Appeals.” These sections codify OHA's general authority to regulate the course of proceedings and appeals to ensure they are resolved in a fair and orderly manner. Consistent with the change to § 4.121, we have eliminated §§ 4.104(g) and 4.126(b)(12) as unnecessary.

One commenter raised concerns about transcript costs and the time period for proposing corrections to the official transcript prepared by a court reporter. While OHA appreciates the concerns about the cost of a written transcript, OHA's budget is insufficient to provide parties with a verbatim copy of written transcripts for hearings and other proceedings. OHA makes every effort to contract for a favorable rate, but we were unaware that court reporting companies did not always charge the same per page rate to parties. Going forward, OHA will endeavor to contract in advance to ensure the same per page transcript costs apply to the Department as well as the parties and will disclose that contract amount in advance of any hearing for transparency.

With respect to the regulatory time frame for making corrections, this rule merely establishes a default deadline that serves as a guide for proposing corrections. For lengthy, more complex proceedings, the ALJ retains discretion to establish an appropriate deadline on a case-by-case basis and can allow more time to identify and propose corrections to the official transcript as needed. Given this built-in flexibility, OHA declines to modify the default time period contained in § 4.128(c).

The IFR included two changes to the standards for stay petitions. First, the IFR removed the “public interest” criterion from the four criteria in the previous versions of § 4.21(b)(1) and § 4.471(c). DCHD and IBLA explained that removing this criterion is consistent with Federal court opinions holding that when the Federal Government is the party opposing the stay, the balance of harms and public interest “merge.” See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (holding that, in the context of a stay, assessing the harm to the opposing party and weighing the public interest “merge when the Government is the opposing party.”). The merged test has been applied in challenges to natural resources permitting decisions, see, e.g., Drakes Bay Oyster Co. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 1073, 1092 (9th Cir. 2014), and it is based on the principle that when the government is the defendant, the public interest and the balance of harms are best analyzed in tandem. A separate element is unnecessary because balancing the harm to the government includes assessing whether there is harm to the public interest.

Second, in § 4.171(a)(1)(i) and § 4.405(b)(4)(i), the IFR eliminated the word “immediate” from the criterion requiring an appellant to show “[t]he likelihood of immediate and irreparable harm if the stay is not granted.” Instead, the IFR required a showing that the irreparable harm will likely occur “pending resolution of the appeal.” This modification was intended to promote the purpose of a stay, which is to prevent or minimize irreparable harm at any time while an appeal is being considered. The IBLA made corresponding changes in § 4.405(b)(2) and (b)(8) to require any stay petition to be filed at the same time the appellant files its notice of appeal, eliminating the option to file a stay petition later, while the appeal is pending. With the expectation that a petition for a stay, filed at the beginning of an appeal, would seek to address harm that could occur at any time while the appeal was pending, OHA removed the immediacy requirement from the stay criterion in both § 4.171(a)(1)(i) and § 4.405(b)(4)(i).

One commenter stated that the removal of the public interest criterion is substantive and does not fall under the APA's procedural exception. The commenter stated that this rationale ignores the cases where a bureau or office has granted a permit or authorization, and an outside party challenges the permit or authorization. In that situation, the person or entity holding the permit or authorization that is the subject of the appeal usually participates as an intervenor. The commenter explained that “permits or authorizations may generate significant `public interest' that is separate and apart from the permitting agency's interest.” For example, where a bureau or office issues a permit or other authorization for construction and operation of a mine, a power line, or a pipeline, some public interest is related to local or state economic impacts, which can total millions of dollars. The commenter asserted that intervenors are in the best position to calculate these impacts and present these impacts to OHA for adjudication of a stay petition.

The merged test would not have the negative effects feared by the commenter, but after our required review of this regulatory action, we nonetheless believe it best to retain the four-criteria test in the final rule to avoid confusion and eliminate any unnecessary concern. Whether using a four-factor or three-factor test, an intervenor-defendant's harm—as well as related harm to parties not before OHA—may be presented by the intervenor and considered as part of the balance of harms. As recently stated by the Court of Federal Claims, “When the Government is the opposing party in a case, concerns over injury to the defendant, defendant-intervenor, and the public interest merge.” Sci. and Tech. Corp. v. United States, 2025 U.S. Claims LEXIS 174 at *32 (Feb. 20, 2025) (citing Nken ). Nonetheless, we have returned to the four-criteria test in the final rule so that it remains explicit that a stay may be granted only when it is in the public interest to do so.

The same commenter stated that removal of the immediacy requirement in the “immediate and irreparable harm” criterion will cause substantive harm to the holder of a permit or authorization given the typical duration of appeals at the IBLA. The commenter explained that granting a stay for harm that can occur any time during an appeal “could potentially have a project stayed at the outset and then hear nothing for years,” impacting “investment, economic viability, and jobs.” The commenter stated that “OHA provides no mechanism for the holder of a stayed permit or authorization to move the merits consideration along,” and therefore, “this aspect of the Interim Rule is also substantive and consideration of it under the procedural exception violates the APA.”

OHA appreciates the commenter's perspective as an intervenor in OHA proceedings. We note that, although the IBLA does not have a specific procedural rule about motions to expedite, parties use the IBLA's general motions rule to file such motions, and the IBLA has expedited appeals when a party requested expedited review and showed compelling circumstances for advancing an appeal ahead of other pending cases. See, e.g., Simpson, 199 IBLA 32, 36 (2024). We also observe that another commenter stated that “The proposed rule correctly refines the standards of stay to irreparable harm, balance of harms, and likelihood of success.”

Although the impact of removing the “immediacy” requirement might not be as impactful as the commenter predicts, and despite the different views of the commenters, upon review OHA nevertheless has eliminated the changes we made to the stay petition criteria in § 4.405(b)(4) and § 4.171(a)(1). Specifically, we withdraw the changes that removed the public interest criterion and the requirement that the petitioner's harm be immediate.

With the reintroduction of “immediate” in the stay criterion for “immediate and irreparable harm,” OHA has made two other conforming changes to § 4.405: (1) We have omitted § 4.405(b)(2), “When to file a petition for stay,” and renumbered the remaining paragraphs accordingly; and (2) In § 4.405(b)(8), we have omitted the sentence that reads, “The Board will deny any petition for a stay that is not filed at the same time the appellant filed its notice of appeal.” We have also clarified in § 4.405(b)(8) that the 45-day time frame for resolving petitions for stay applies only to petitions that are filed at the same time as a notice of appeal.

One commenter objected to the wording of the “balance of harms” criterion in § 4.171(a)(1)(ii) and § 4.405(b)(4)(ii), which references the irreparable harm “to the United States or other parties from a stay being granted.” The commenter questioned who the other parties are: “Sometimes they are known, but most of the time they are not known. Neither BLM nor any Appellant nor any Intervenor should be saddled with such type of obligation to have to argue for/against some unknown or unstated harm to `other parties.'” In both the original text of § 4.21(b)(1)(i)—“relative harm to the parties”—and the text of § 4.171(a)(1)(ii) and § 4.405(b)(4)(ii), “parties” refers to the named parties to an appeal, not to unknown persons or entities. Because the commenter did not otherwise object to the revised wording of this criterion, we will retain the descriptions in § 4.171(a)(1)(ii) and § 4.405(b)(4)(ii) consistent with the IFR. With the changes to the “balance of harms” criterion, the reordering of the criteria, and the addition of a label for each, the stay criteria in § 4.405(b)(4) and § 4.171(a)(1) are substantively the same as those in previous § 4.21(b)(1).

The same commenter urged OHA to make an additional change to § 4.171 and § 4.405 to incorporate a “sliding scale” because the burden on the person seeking a stay to show all stay criteria are met “raises the bar too high to get a stay and is unlawful according to some commentary.” Instead, the commenter asserted that OHA should adopt a “sliding scale” among the irreparable harm, balance of harms, and likelihood of success criteria “to ensure a fair and equitable opportunity to stay (in whole or in part) decisions which commonly have significant, immediate, and irreparable harm to an appellant.” We appreciate the commenter's suggestion that DCHD and IBLA adopt a “sliding scale” when adjudicating stay petitions, where a stronger likelihood of harm may compensate for uncertainty about the merits of an appeal. OHA considered adopting this practice during development of the final rule and determined that it was beyond the scope of this rulemaking.

Finally, we appreciate the comment we received in response to the request for comments on an alternative procedure for how the IBLA would adjudicate petitions for stay. See 90 FR at 2366. Under this alternative procedure, decisions that are placed into immediate effect pursuant to a statute or regulation would remain in effect pending resolution of the appeal unless both the appellant and bureau or office that issued the decision on appeal filed a joint petition for stay. Id. The commenter “is generally supportive of this alternative procedure” but states that an operator or permit holder should be required to concur with the petition for the stay to be implemented. We appreciate the commenter's views on the alternative procedure we proposed for adjudicating stays, and we will consider this change and others if OHA proposes further revisions to subpart E in a future rulemaking.

We received one comment addressing § 4.413, which set forth the scope of the IBLA's review (§ 4.413(a)), the appellant's burden to show error in the decision on appeal (§ 4.413(b)), and the IBLA's standard of review (§ 4.413(c)). The commenter expressed concern with § 4.413(b), stating that it is contrary to the APA, 5 U.S.C. 556(d), which provides that the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof. The commenter also expressed concern with § 4.413(c), stating that it “elevated” OHA and imposed a new standard of review by conforming to the APA review standards found in 5 U.S.C. 706(2).

We explained in the IFR that the provisions in § 4.413 codified IBLA case law and historical practice to provide clarity and consistency for those bringing and responding to appeals. Section 4.413(b) provided that in appeals before the IBLA, the appellant has the burden to show error in the decision on appeal. The IBLA has imposed this burden on appellants since its creation, and we have long held that the APA's language specifying that the proponent of a rule or order bears the burden of proof applies only to formal hearings on the record; it does not apply to appeals before the IBLA. See, e.g., Stone Energy Corp., 185 IBLA 342, 351 n.12 (2015) (explaining that section 556(d) of the APA “is only applicable in the case of administrative hearings”); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 1977) (noting that the applicant for a permit under the Clean Water Act, rather than the agency issuing the permit, is the “proponent” who bears the burden of proof). Nevertheless, to account for any law that imposes a different burden of proof in a specific type of appeal, we have inserted the phrase “Except as otherwise provided by law” at the beginning of § 4.413(b).

In addition, § 4.413(c) reflected the IBLA's long-standing practice of reviewing decisions under a standard that reflects 5 U.S.C. 706(2) as interpreted by Federal courts. See, e.g., Larry Marker, 194 IBLA 283, 290 (2019) (“[T]he Board will uphold [a decision] which has a rational basis that is stated in the decision and supported by facts of record demonstrating that the decision is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”); Desert Sportsman's Rifle and Pistol Club, Inc., 188 IBLA 339, 346 (2016) (“The Board will therefore set aside a BLM decision if we conclude it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or lacks a rational basis supported in the record.”); David L. Antley, 178 IBLA 194, 197 (2009) (“BLM's exercise of its discretionary authority . . . must have a rational basis and be supported by facts of record demonstrating that an action is not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.”). It is unclear what the commenter meant by suggesting either that application of APA standards would be new or somehow inappropriately “elevate” the IBLA.

The comment reflects potential confusion about the differences between adjudicatory hearings under the APA and appellate review. Nevertheless, because the provisions in § 4.413(c) codify long-standing IBLA practice and precedent, they are not necessary additions to these procedural rules. We therefore have eliminated paragraph (c) from the rule.

Section 4.744 states: “If no written objection to a preliminary decision is timely filed in accordance with § 4.743(a) the presiding officer will issue a final decision.” The commenter argued that the term “timely filed” could be interpreted differently by different parties. The commenter suggested instead: “If no written objection to a preliminary decision is filed within the 40-day period specified in § 4.743(a) the presiding officer will issue a final decision.” We appreciate the commenter's suggestion to clarify, and we will consider this change if OHA proposes further revisions to this section. For now, the provision contains an adequate cross-reference for parties appearing in White Earth Reservation Land Settlement Act (WELSA) proceedings.

Section 4.763 states: “The presiding officer may take any action listed in § 4.732(b) to resolve any issues of fact and will issue an order upon reconsideration resolving the petition.” The commenter noted that the reference to actions in § 4.732(b) might not be immediately clear without consulting that section and suggested instead: “The presiding officer may take any of the actions listed in § 4.732(b) such as requesting additional information or scheduling a hearing to resolve any issues of fact and will issue an order upon reconsideration resolving the petition.” We appreciate the commenter's suggestion to clarify, and we will consider this change if OHA proposes further revisions to this section. For now, the provision contains an adequate cross-reference for parties appearing in WELSA proceedings.

A commenter recommended revising § 4.909, which states, “The IBLA has the discretion to decline any motion for an extension of time,” by adding at the end, “if it finds that the extension is unwarranted or would unduly delay the proceedings.” The commenter stated that, without this addition, “[i]t's not clear under what circumstances the IBLA might decline a motion.”

We appreciate the commenter's suggestion to clarify this paragraph, but the proposed addition is too narrow. The IBLA may deny an extension for reasons not encompassed by the commenter's proposal, such as untimeliness or prejudice to other parties. Rather than try to describe all reasons an extension may be denied, we believe it is preferable to retain this longstanding and noncontroversial provision. The only change OHA made to this paragraph of § 4.909 in the IFR was to replace the word “request” with the word “motion.”

Although we did not receive comments suggesting modifications to the grazing procedures at § 4.172 and § 4.175, we are making clarifying changes. For § 4.172, we are adding language to paragraph (b), directing that the BLM shall produce its entire record for the grazing decision within 45 days of receiving the notice of appeal, automatically without further order or request. This addition will provide clarity to parties who anticipate seeking judicial review by notifying those parties that they will obtain a copy of BLM's underlying record more expeditiously without filing a motion. We are also making a clarifying change to § 4.174(b) and § 4.175(a)(1) to remind parties that they are not required to appeal an ALJ's stay petition order to the IBLA to exhaust administrative remedies.

We correct two typographical errors in the IFR. First, we delete an extra comma in § 4.403(b)(2)(ii). Second, we delete duplicative words at the end of § 4.409(b)(4).

Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 provides that the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) will review all significant rules as defined by the E.O. OIRA determined this final rule is not significant as defined by E.O. 12866.

E.O. 13563 reaffirms the principles of E.O. 12866 while calling for improvements in the Nation's regulatory system to promote predictability, to reduce uncertainty, and to use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. The E.O. directs agencies to consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for the public where these approaches are relevant, feasible, and consistent with regulatory objectives. E.O. 13563 further emphasizes that regulations must be based on the best available science and that the rulemaking process must allow for public participation and an open exchange of ideas.

We have developed this rule in a manner consistent with these requirements.

The Department of the Interior certifies that this document will not have a significant economic effect on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ). It does not change current funding requirements and will not impose any economic effects on small business, small governmental entities, and small organizations.

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has determined that this rule does not meet the criteria set forth in 5 U.S.C. 804(2), subtitle E of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. It does not add to, change, or diminish any substantive rights of any parties or the public.It provides parties to OHA proceedings the option to file documents electronically, removes outdated information and references, and authorizes the use of OHA Standing Orders as the means of communicating current information on contract information, electronic filing, and other procedural matters.This rule:

(a) Will not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more.

(b) Will not cause a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions.

(c) Will not have significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or the ability of the U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises.

This rule does not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector of more than $100 million per year.The rule does not have a significant or unique effect on State, local, or Tribal governments or the private sector.A statement containing the information required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. ) is not required.

This rule does not affect a taking of private property or otherwise have taking implications under E.O. 12630.Therefore, a takings implication assessment is not required.

Under the criteria in section 1 of E.O. 13132, this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. A federalism summary impact statement is not required.

This rule complies with the requirements of E.O. 12988.Specifically, this rule:(a) meets the criteria of section 3(a) requiring that all regulations be reviewed to eliminate errors and ambiguity and be written to minimize litigation; and (b) meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2) requiring that all regulations be written in clear language and contain clear legal standards.

The Department of the Interior strives to strengthen its government-to-government relationship with Indian Tribes through a commitment to consultation with Indian Tribes and recognition of their right to self-governance and Tribal sovereignty.We evaluated this rule under the Department's consultation policy and under the criteria in E.O. 13175 and held three Tribal consultation sessions with federally recognized Indian Tribes, including with the White Earth Nation.

This final rule contains existing information collections in use without OMB approval. All information collections require approval under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ). We may not conduct, or sponsor, and you are not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

In accordance with the PRA and its implementing regulations at 5 CFR 1320.8(d)(1), we provide the general public and other Federal agencies with an opportunity to comment on our proposal to seek OMB approval of the information collections described below. This input will help us assess the impact of our information collection requirements and minimize the public's reporting burden. It will also help the public understand our information collection requirements and provide the requested data in the desired format.

We solicited comments in an interim final rule published on January 10, 2025, and no comments were received on the information collection requirements aspects of the rule.

As part of our continuing effort to reduce paperwork and respondent burdens, we invite the public and other Federal agencies to comment on any aspect of this information collection, including:

(1) Whether or not the collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of the agency, including whether or not the information will have practical utility;

(2) The accuracy of our estimate of the burden for this collection of information, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions used;

(3) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected; and

(4) Ways to minimize the burden of the collection of information on those who are to respond, including through the use of appropriate automated, electronic, mechanical, or other technological collection techniques or other forms of information technology, e.g., permitting electronic submission of response.

Comments that you submit in response to this final rule are a matter of public record. Before including your address, phone number, email address, or other personal identifying information in your comment, you should be aware that your entire comment—including your personal identifying information—may be made publicly available at any time. While you can ask us in your comment to withhold your personal identifying information from public review, we cannot guarantee that we will be able to do so.

The existing information collection requirements identified below require approval by OMB:

(1) Appeals (43 CFR part 4) —To initiate an appeal, an appellant is required to submit a Notice of Appeal or Request/Petition for Hearing, identifying the bureau or office decision that they are appealing to the relevant OHA unit. There are no specific forms required. In most instances, the basic contact information of the appellant and a statement that they are appealing the relevant bureau or office decision will suffice. However, some regulations will require more specificity such as the rules governing grazing appeals to DCHD (§ 4.170(d)) and the rules governing appeals to the IBLA (§ 4.403(a)). Those rules will require the appellant to provide a copy of the decision being appealed along with a statement of standing and timeliness. For grazing appeals to DCHD, an appellant will also be required to submit a statement that clearly and concisely describes the reasons why the appellant believes the grazing decision is incorrect. The appellant must also serve a copy of the Notice of Appeal on the bureau or office that issued the decision, and in some cases must also serve a copy on a specific office of the DOI Solicitor or Assistant Secretary, if required to do so by the regulations. Filing a Notice of Appeal or Request/Petition for Hearing is voluntary but is required to initiate a hearing or appeal. Once initiated, an OHA unit will open a hearing or appeal case file, and any subsequent filings will be associated with that file. Our burden estimates are broken down between hard-copy and electronic submissions.

(2) Amendments—Appeals (43 CFR part 4) —Amendments to appeals are extremely rare. An appellant may amend their appeal to correct a misstatement or to update basic name and contact information, for example.

Title of Collection: Office of Hearings and Appeals Procedural Regulations (43 CFR part 4).

OMB Control Number: 1094-New.

Form Number: None.

Type of Review: Existing collection in use without OMB approval.

Respondents/Affected Public: Individuals/households, private sector, and State/local/Tribal governments.

Respondent's Obligation: Required to obtain or retain a benefit.

Frequency of Collection: On occasion.

Total Estimated Annual Non-hour Burden Cost: $584.

Send your written comments and suggestions on this information collection by June 22, 2026 to the Departmental Information Collection Clearance Officer, U.S. Department of the Interior, Jeffrey Parrillo, 1849 C Street NW, Washington, DC 20240; or by email to DOI-PRA@ios.doi.gov. Please reference: “OMB Control Number 1094-New/RIN 1094-AA57” in the subject line of your comments.

This rule meets the criteria set forth at 43 CFR 46.210(i) for a Departmental categorical exclusion because it is an administrative and procedural regulation that does not involve any of the extraordinary circumstances listed in 43 CFR 46.215. Therefore, it is categorically excluded from the requirements to prepare an environmental impact statement or environmental assessment under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).

This rule is not a significant energy action under the definition in E.O. 13211. A Statement of Energy Effects is not required.

We are required by Executive Orders 12866 (sec. 1(b)(12)), and 12988 (sec. 3(b)(1)(B)), and 13563 (sec. 1(a)), and by the Presidential Memorandum of June 1, 1998, to write all rules in plain language. This means that each rule we publish must:

(a) Be logically organized;

(b) Use the active voice to address readers directly;

(c) Use clear language rather than jargon;

(d) Be divided into short sections and sentences; and

(e) Use lists and tables wherever possible.

Accordingly, the interim rule amending 43 CFR part 4, which was published at 90 FR 2332 on January 10, 2025, is adopted as final with the following changes:

In FR Doc. 2026-08280 appearing on page 23017 in the Federal Register of Wednesday, April 29, 2026, the following corrections are made:

NMFS manages the Gulf reef fish fishery that includes gag under the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf (FMP). The Gulf Council (Council) prepared the FMP, and NMFS implements the FMP under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) through regulations at 50 CFR part 622.

All weights described in this temporary rule are in gutted weight. The metric conversion for the imperial measurement used in this document is 1 pound (lb) equals approximately 0.45 kilograms.

On June 1, 2024, NMFS implemented the final rule for Amendment 56 to the FMP that modified management of gag in the Gulf EEZ (89 FR 40419, May 10, 2024). The final rule revised the commercial and recreational catch levels, recreational AMs, and recreational fishing season. For the recreational sector in 2026, the annual catch limit (ACL) is 499,000 lb, and the ACT is 399,000 lb (table 2 in 50 CFR 622.41(d)(2)(i)). The recreational AM for gag states that if NMFS projects that recreational landings will reach the applicable recreational ACT during a fishing year, then NMFS will close the recreational sector for the remainder of the fishing year (50 CFR 622.41(d)(2)(ii)). Recreational harvest of gag is prohibited each year from January 1 through August 31 (50 CFR 622.34(e)).

The recreational fishing season for gag opens each year on September 1. Based on a review of recreational landings data from 2023 through 2025, NMFS projects that recreational landings will reach the recreational ACT for gag on October 1, 2026. Thus, in accordance with 50 CFR 622.41(d)(2)(ii), the recreational fishing season for gag will close on October 1, 2026. NMFS implements this AM to reduce the chance of exceeding the recreational ACL and ACT, while allowing recreational fishermen the opportunity to harvest the gag ACT. During the closure from October 1 through December 31, 2026, the recreational bag and possession limits for gag harvested in or from the Gulf EEZ are zero. The possession of gag is also prohibited in state waters of the Gulf for any vessel issued a valid Federal charter vessel/headboat permit for Gulf reef fish.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR 622.41(d)(2)(ii), which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment are unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. Such procedures are unnecessary because the regulation associated with the closure of recreational harvest of gag at 50 CFR 622.41(d)(2)(ii) has already been subject to notice and public comment, and all that remains is to notify the public of the closure. Prior notice and opportunity for public comment are contrary to the public interest because such procedures would require time and those affected by the length of the recreational fishing seasons, particularly for-hire operations that reserve trips for clients in advance, need as much notice as NMFS is able to provide to adjust their business plans to account for changes to the recreational fishing season.