[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 77 (Wednesday, April 22, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 21497-21501]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-07844]


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FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

[File No. 251 0011]


Rollins, Inc.; Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent 
Order To Aid Public Comment

AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.

ACTION: Proposed consent agreement; request for comment.

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SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged 
violations of Federal law prohibiting unfair methods of competition. 
The attached Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Order to 
Aid Public Comment describes both the allegations in the complaint and 
the terms of the consent order--embodied in the consent agreement--that 
would settle these allegations.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before May 22, 2026.

ADDRESSES: Interested parties may file comments online or on paper by 
following the instructions in the Request for Comment part of the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section below. Please file your comment 
online at https://www.regulations.gov by following the instructions on 
the web-based form. If you prefer to file your comment on paper, please 
write ``Rollins, Inc.; File 251 0011'' on it and mail it to the 
following address: Federal Trade Commission, Office of the Secretary, 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Stop H-144 (Annex V), Washington, DC 
20580.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 6(f) of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 2.34, 16 CFR 2.34, 
notice is hereby given that the above-captioned consent agreement 
containing a consent order to cease and desist, having been filed with 
and accepted, subject to final approval, by the Commission, has been 
placed on the public record for a period of 30 days. The following 
Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public 
Comment describes the terms of the consent agreement and the 
allegations in the complaint. An electronic copy of the full text of 
the consent agreement package can be obtained from the FTC website at 
this web address: https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/commission-actions.
    The public is invited to submit comments on this document. For the 
Commission to consider your comment, we must receive it on or before 
May 22, 2026. Write ``Rollins, Inc.; File 251 0011'' on your comment. 
Your comment--including your name and your State--will be placed on the 
public record of this proceeding, including, to the extent practicable, 
on the https://www.regulations.gov website.
    Because of the agency's heightened security screening, postal mail 
addressed to the Commission will be delayed. We strongly encourage you 
to submit your comments online through the https://www.regulations.gov 
website. If you prefer to file your comment on paper, write ``Rollins, 
Inc.; File 251 0011'' on your comment and on the envelope, and mail 
your comment by overnight service to: Federal Trade Commission, Office 
of the Secretary, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Mail Stop H-144 (Annex 
V), Washington, DC 20580.
    Because your comment will be placed on the publicly accessible 
website at https://www.regulations.gov, you are solely responsible for 
making sure your comment does not include any sensitive or confidential 
information. In particular, your comment should not include sensitive 
personal information, such as your or anyone else's Social Security 
number; date of birth; driver's license number or other State 
identification number, or foreign country equivalent; passport number; 
financial account number; or credit or debit card number. You are also 
solely responsible for making sure your comment does not include 
sensitive health information, such as medical records or other 
individually identifiable health information. In addition, your comment 
should not include any ``trade secret or any commercial or financial 
information which . . . is privileged or confidential''--as provided by 
section 6(f) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and FTC Rule 4.10(a)(2), 
16 CFR 4.10(a)(2)--including competitively sensitive information such 
as costs, sales statistics, inventories, formulas, patterns, devices, 
manufacturing processes, or customer names.
    Comments containing material for which confidential treatment is 
requested must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled 
``Confidential,'' and must comply with FTC Rule 4.9(c). In particular, 
the written request for confidential treatment that accompanies the 
comment must include the factual and legal basis for the request and 
must identify the specific portions of the comment to be withheld from 
the public record. See FTC Rule 4.9(c). Your comment will be kept 
confidential only if the General Counsel grants your request in 
accordance with the law and the public interest. Once your comment has 
been posted on https://www.regulations.gov--as legally required by FTC 
Rule 4.9(b)--we cannot redact or remove your comment from that website, 
unless you submit a confidentiality request that meets the requirements 
for such treatment under FTC Rule 4.9(c), and the General Counsel 
grants that request.
    Visit the FTC website at https://www.ftc.gov to read this document 
and the news release describing this matter. The FTC Act and other laws 
the Commission administers permit the collection of public comments to 
consider and use in this proceeding, as appropriate. The Commission 
will consider all timely and responsive public comments it receives on 
or before May 22, 2026. For information on the Commission's privacy 
policy, including routine uses permitted by the Privacy Act, see 
https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacy-policy.

Analysis of Proposed Agreement Containing Consent Orders To Aid Public 
Comment

I. Introduction

    The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted for 
public comment, subject to final approval, The Federal Trade Commission 
(``Commission'') has accepted for public comment, subject to final 
approval, an Agreement Containing Consent Order (``Consent Agreement'') 
with Rollins, Inc. (``Rollins'' or ``Respondent''). The proposed 
Decision and Order (``Proposed Order''), included in the Consent 
Agreement and subject to final Commission approval, is designed to 
remedy the anticompetitive effects that have resulted from Respondent's 
use of post-employment covenants not to compete (``Non-Compete 
Agreements''). A Non-Compete Agreement refers to contract terms that, 
after a worker has ceased working for an employer, restricts the 
worker's freedom to accept

[[Page 21498]]

employment with a competing business, to form a competing business, or 
otherwise to compete with the employer.
    The Consent Agreement settles charges that Respondent has engaged 
in unfair methods of competition in violation of section 5 of the FTC 
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45, by entering into Non-Compete Agreements 
with its employees and enforcing them against its former employees.
    The Proposed Order has been placed on the public record for 30 days 
in order to receive comments from interested persons. Comments received 
during this period will become part of the public record. After 30 
days, the Commission will again review the Consent Agreement and the 
comments received and will decide whether it should withdraw from the 
Consent Agreement and take appropriate action or make the Proposed 
Order final.

II. The Respondent

    Rollins is a corporation organized, existing, and doing business 
under, and by virtue of, the laws of the State of Delaware, with its 
principal place of business located in Atlanta, Georgia. Respondent is 
one of the largest pest-control companies in the United States. Rollins 
operates over 700 locations with over 18,000 U.S-based employees.

III. The Complaint

    The complaint makes the following allegations.
    Respondent provides pest-control services in the United States. 
Respondent long had a policy requiring all newly hired employees to 
enter Non-Compete Agreements, regardless of their position or 
responsibilities, with limited exceptions that depend on the employee's 
location of employment.
    Respondent's Non-Compete Agreements have covered a broad range of 
employees, including pest-control technicians, customer-service 
representatives, and other employees earning relatively low wages. 
These types of employees account for the bulk of Respondent's U.S.-
based employees subject to Non-Compete Agreements.
    As alleged in the complaint, Respondent's Non-Compete Agreements 
have contained a clause prohibiting, for two years following the 
conclusion of employment with Rollins, the employee from working in the 
pest-control services industry within a predetermined distance--usually 
a 75-mile radius around the Rollins location at which the employee 
worked, but often a multi-county region.
    The complaint alleges Respondent's Non-Compete Agreements are 
unfair and anticompetitive because they degrade employees' ability to 
negotiate for better terms of employment in the pest-control industry. 
The Non-Compete Agreements deny employees access to job opportunities 
and restrict their mobility, including their ability to start their own 
pest-control businesses. The complaint alleges this has the tendency or 
likely effect of restricting business formation, lowering worker 
earnings (including but not limited to wages and salaries), reducing 
benefits, and causing less favorable working conditions and other 
personal hardships to employees. The complaint further alleges that 
Respondent's Non-Compete Agreements are unfair and anticompetitive 
because they suppress competition to sell pest control services to 
consumers, including by inhibiting current competition in the pest-
control industry and by impeding competitive entry.
    The complaint further alleges that any procompetitive objectives 
Respondent sought to achieve through its Non-Compete Agreements do not 
depend on the use and enforcement of Non-Compete Agreements and could 
have been achieved through significantly less restrictive means. In 
particular, the complaint alleges that Respondent's Non-Compete 
Agreements are not reasonably necessary to incentivize Respondent to 
continue investing in developing confidential information and employee 
training. The complaint also alleges Respondent offers the same level 
of employee training where it does not use or enforce Non-Compete 
Agreements and is incentivized to provide adequate training to compete 
on the merits by offering quality services. The complaint further 
alleges Respondent can use narrowly tailored non-solicitation 
agreements, which may promote continued investment in growing or 
maintaining customer relationships and client goodwill. These 
agreements may reduce or eliminate the harms associated with more 
restrictive Non-Compete Agreements.

IV. Legal Analysis

    Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act prohibits 
unfair methods of competition.\1\ This prohibition includes agreements 
in restraint of trade proscribed by section 1 of the Sherman Act \2\ as 
well as agreements or other practices that ``conflict with the basic 
policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts'' even if they ``may not 
actually violate these laws.'' \3\ Section 5 claims typically ``bear 
the characteristics of recognized antitrust violations.'' \4\ Courts 
have long found agreements not to compete between workers and their 
current or former employers to be ``proper subjects for scrutiny'' 
under Federal antitrust law.\5\ That courts at common law prior to the 
passage of the Federal antitrust laws treated agreements between 
workers and business owners not to compete as presumptively unlawful 
further suggests that these agreements often conflict with the basic 
policies of the antitrust laws.\6\
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    \1\ 15 U.S.C. 45.
    \2\ 15 U.S.C. 1; see FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 693-94 
(1948).
    \3\ FTC v. Brown Shoe, 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966).
    \4\ Atl. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 381 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1965).
    \5\ See Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 
1081-82 (2d Cir. 1977); see also Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City 
Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) (``A covenant not 
to compete following employment does not operate any differently 
from a horizontal market division among competitors--not at the time 
the covenant has its bite, anyway.'').
    \6\ See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 
281-82 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (collecting cases 
and relating the treatment of agreements not to compete at common 
law to Sherman Act principles, describing them as permissible only 
where shown to be ancillary to the sale of a business, a 
partnership, a lease, or where otherwise shown ``reasonably 
necessary'' to protect confidential knowledge); cf. Mitchel v. 
Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347, 351 (Q.B. 1711) (analyzing noncompete 
accompanying the sale of a bakery and presuming noncompetes ``prima 
facie to be bad'' unless shown otherwise).
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    In applying antitrust scrutiny to such agreements, courts typically 
make a fact-specific determination to assess the agreements' likely 
effects on competition.\7\ Agreements between market participants not 
to compete may suppress competition by limiting the entry or growth of 
competitors or otherwise giving rise to the types of harms the 
antitrust laws are aimed at preventing. These harms include higher 
consumer prices, reduced availability of services, lower quality 
services, and reduced worker earnings and benefits. Courts have long 
held that agreements between market participants that restrain 
competition but are not reasonably necessary to achieve some 
procompetitive purpose can be unlawful ``even in the absence of 
elaborate market analysis.'' \8\ Moreover, a growing volume

[[Page 21499]]

of empirical evidence indicates agreements not to compete between 
workers and their current or former employers can harm both competition 
between market participants and the workers subject to them.\9\ One 
notable study found such agreements can hinder the formation and growth 
of competitors.\10\
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    \7\ See Ohio v. Am. Express Co. (``Amex''), 585 U.S. 529, 541 
(2018). This analysis is similar to but distinct from that under 
many State employment law tests for enforceability of non-compete 
agreements, which tend to focus on balancing the interests of the 
two parties to the case rather than on competitive effects. See 
DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 SW2d 670, 688 (Tex. 1990) (``Rule 
of reason analysis under antitrust laws must not be confused with 
reasonableness analysis under the common law. . . . An agreement may 
be reasonable as between the parties and nevertheless violate 
antitrust laws. Conversely, an agreement may be unreasonable as 
between the parties and yet not violate the rule of reason test 
under the antitrust laws.'').
    \8\ FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-61 (1986) 
(citations omitted); see also, e.g., Newburger, 563 F.2d at 1082 
(suggesting similar framework for analysis of agreements not to 
compete between workers and their former employers); Mitchel, 24 
Eng. Rep. at 351 (non-compete agreements presumed ``prima facie to 
be bad'' unless shown otherwise); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 
756, 770 (1999) (affirming that an abbreviated rule of reason 
analysis is appropriate where ``an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that [they] would have an 
anticompetitive effect on customers and markets'').
    \9\ See, e.g., Michael Lipsitz & Mark Tremblay, Noncompete 
Agreements and the Welfare of Consumers, 16 (4) Am. Econ. J. 
Microecon. 112 (2024) (showing empirically that when non-compete 
agreements are enforced more at the State level, market 
concentration increases, with the potential for harm the greatest in 
industries in which non-compete agreements are likely to be used at 
the highest rate); Matthew S. Johnson, Kurt J. Lavetti & Michael 
Lipsitz, The Labor Market Effects of Legal Restrictions on Worker 
Mobility, J. Pol. Econ. 133(9), 2735-279 (2025) (linking non-compete 
agreement enforcement to negative worker earnings); Bo Cowgill, 
Brandon Freiberg & Evan Starr, Clause and Effect: Theory and Field 
Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses (Jan. 10, 2024) (last 
revised July 18, 2025), https://ssrn.com/abstract=5012370 (causal 
study finding that removing non-compete agreements increases 
workers' earnings and mobility without generating information 
leakage).
    \10\ Evan Starr, Natarajan Balasubramanian & Marik Sakakibara, 
Screening Spinouts?: How Noncompete Enforceability Affects the 
Creation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 Mgmt. Sci. 552 
(2018) (detailing how noncompete enforcement can hinder startup 
employment).
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    Determining agreements' lawfulness also typically requires 
consideration of whether (a) any purported procompetitive 
justifications are in fact legitimate,\11\ and (b) less restrictive 
alternative measures can incentivize any associated procompetitive 
investments.\12\ The existence of less restrictive alternatives can be 
dispositive.\13\ In assessing the validity of potential justifications, 
the basic fact that a company trains its employees, for example, does 
not mean that any worker restraints are necessary to incentivize 
investments in training.\14\ And even if an employer submits persuasive 
evidence of procompetitive investments that it aims to promote through 
its restrictive agreements, less restrictive alternatives often exist 
to advance those aims, including narrowly-tailored non-disclosure 
agreements and non-solicitation agreements.\15\
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    \11\ See Newburger, 563 F.2d at 1082 (suggesting non-compete 
agreements would be invalid if, as an initial step, they ``serve no 
legitimate purpose at the time they are adopted'').
    \12\ See Amex, 585 U.S. at 540-41.
    \13\ See NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69, 100 (2021) (``[R]estraints 
of trade may wind up flunking the rule of reason to the extent the 
evidence shows that substantially less restrictive means exist to 
achieve any proven procompetitive benefits.'').
    \14\ See, e.g., Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 281 (discussing employee 
training only in context of whether the noncompete is necessary to 
protect confidential information); Deslandes v. McDonald's USA, LLC, 
81 F.4th 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2023) (advocating scrutiny of whether 
restraints that affect employees are actually necessary for 
promoting output and do not ``just take advantage of workers' sunk 
costs and help[ ] [the] business's bottom line''); AWP, Inc. v. Safe 
Zone Servs., LLC, No. 3:19-CV-00734-CRS, 2022 WL 989133, at *10-11 
(W.D. Ky. 2022) (finding that even though the employer ``made some 
investment of `time, effort and money' in training its employees, 
whether this investment is `significant' enough to constitute a 
legitimate business interest is questionable at best'').
    \15\ See, e.g., AWP, 2022 WL 989133, at *8 (``Insofar as any 
Former Employees . . . had access to sensitive information, the fact 
that the Employee Agreement contains a separate nondisclosure 
provision forecloses any argument that [the employer] needed a 
noncompete agreement to protect it.''); Total Quality Logistics, LLC 
v. EDA Logistics LLC, No. 23-3713, 2024 WL 4372312, at *5 (6th Cir. 
Oct. 2, 2024) (affirming lower court decision that found employer's 
customer goodwill and relationship interest to be ``adequately 
protected by the agreement's non-solicitation provision'').
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    Applying these principles, the factual allegations described in the 
complaint support concluding that Respondent's Non-Compete Agreements 
constitute unfair methods of competition in violation of section 5 of 
the FTC Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 45. As detailed above, the Non-
Compete Agreements likely have anticompetitive effects, including by 
inhibiting new business formation and restricting worker mobility and 
self-determination. The Non-Compete Agreements are not needed to 
advance any procompetitive aims--for example, Respondent provides the 
same training to employees regardless of whether they are subject to a 
Non-Compete Agreement. And even if there were procompetitive aims 
associated with the Non-Compete Agreements, alternatives such as 
narrowly tailored non-solicitation agreements are available to promote 
them.

V. Proposed Order

    The Proposed Order seeks to remedy Respondent's unfair methods of 
competition. Section II of the Proposed Order prohibits Respondent 
from: entering into, maintaining, or enforcing a Non-Compete Agreement 
against a Covered Employee; communicating to a Covered Employee or any 
other prospective or current employer that the Covered Employee is 
subject to a Non-Compete Agreement; and requiring any Covered Employee 
to pay any fees or penalties relating to a Non-Compete Agreement. 
Section II of the Proposed Order also specifies that Respondent cannot 
prohibit Covered Employees from using general advertisements to solicit 
customers in competition with Rollins nor prohibit Covered Employees 
from responding to inquiries initiated by Rollins customers.
    Section III of the Proposed Order requires Respondent to provide 
clear and conspicuous written notice to Covered Employees that they (i) 
are not subject to a Non-Compete Agreement; (ii) may compete with 
Respondent, including by starting their own business; and (iii) may 
solicit customers through general advertisements.
    Other sections of the Proposed Order contain standard order 
provisions regarding compliance reports, requirements for Respondent to 
provide notice to the FTC of material changes to its business, and 
access for the FTC to documents and personnel. The term of the Proposed 
Order is ten years.
    The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the 
Consent Agreement and Proposed Order to aid the Commission in 
determining whether it should make the Proposed Order final. This 
analysis is not an official interpretation of the Proposed Order and 
does not modify its terms in any way.

    By direction of the Commission.
April J. Tabor,
Secretary.

Statement of Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson Joined by Commissioner Mark R. 
Meador

    Over 18,000 workers are free from the constraints of unlawful 
noncompete agreements. The Commission has secured this victory by 
issuing an administrative complaint and accepting for public comment a 
proposed consent agreement with Rollins, Inc. (``Rollins''), one of the 
largest pest-control services companies in the United States, and the 
parent company of the Orkin brand, among others.\1\ Rollins provides 
pest-control services, including insect identification and treatment, 
trapping and removing wildlife, and termite treatment and 
prevention,\2\ through more than 700 locations in 49 States.\3\

[[Page 21500]]

Its customers are owners of residential and commercial real estate.\4\
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    \1\ Rollins, Brands, https://www.rollins.com/brands (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2026); Complaint, In re Rollins, Inc., Matter No. 
2510011 (Apr. 13, 2026) (``Complaint''); Decision and Order, In re 
Rollins, Inc., Matter No. 2510011 (Apr. 13, 2026) (``Order'').
    \2\ Western Pest Services, Pest Control, https://www.westernpest.com/pest-control (last visited Apr. 13, 2026); 
Orkin, Pest Control Services, https://www.orkinglobal.com/services/ 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2026).
    \3\ See Today's Homeowner, Orkin Review, https://todayshomeowner.com/pest-control/reviews/orkin-reviews/ (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2026).
    \4\ Rollins, About Us, https://www.rollins.com/about-us (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2026).
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    The unlawful conduct the Commission today proscribes was the 
alleged widespread imposition and enforcement of unfair and 
anticompetitive noncompete agreements.\5\ As I have said before, a 
priority for the Commission under my leadership is protecting American 
workers from practices that adversely impact competition in labor 
markets, including unlawful noncompete agreements.\6\ Of course, not 
all noncompete agreements are unlawful. ``Sometimes noncompete 
agreements have anticompetitive effects, and other times they have 
procompetitive effects.'' \7\ For this reason, noncompete agreements 
``present opposing economic considerations that require careful 
analysis.'' \8\ As with nearly every other type of business restraint, 
the Commission reviews the lawfulness of noncompete agreements on a 
case-by-case basis under a reasonableness inquiry.\9\ Under that 
balancing test, which is a particular application of the rule of 
reason, a noncompete agreement violates the antitrust laws where the 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint outweigh any procompetitive 
effects that could not be achieved through substantially less 
restrictive means.\10\
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    \5\ Compl. ]] 7-11.
    \6\ See Press Release, FTC, FTC Launches Joint Labor Task Force 
to Protect American Workers (Feb. 26, 2025), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2025/02/ftc-launches-joint-labor-task-force-protect-americanworkers; Statement of Chairman Andrew N. 
Ferguson, Joined by Comm'r Melissa Holyoak, In re Gateway Pet Mem'l 
Servs., Matter No. 2210170, at 1 (Sept. 4, 2025) (``Ferguson Gateway 
Statement''); Statement of Chairman Andrew N. Ferguson, Joined by 
Comm'r Melissa Holyoak, Ryan, LLC v. FTC, No. 24-10951, at 2, 3 
(Sept. 5, 2025).
    \7\ Dissenting Statement of Comm'r Andrew N. Ferguson, Joined by 
Comm'r Melissa Holyoak, In the Matter of the Non-Compete Clause 
Rule, Matter No. P201200, at 41-42 (June 28, 2024) (``Ferguson 
Noncompete Rule Dissent''). For example, noncompete agreements can 
promote investment in employees by ``mitigating the risk that a 
rival will lure employees away'' and ``allow business owners to sell 
their enterprise profitably because no one would buy a business if 
the seller could immediately compete again in the same field.'' 
Ferguson Gateway Statement at 3. Such agreements can also ``serve 
legitimate business interest by protecting employer investments in 
human capital development, safeguarding confidential information and 
proprietary know-how that cannot be easily protected though other 
means (e.g., non-disclosure and confidentiality agreements or 
intellectual property), and encouraging intra-firm collaboration and 
knowledge sharing.'' Statement of Mark R. Meador, In the Matter of 
Non-Compete Clauses, Matter No. P201200, at 3 (Sept. 5, 2025) 
(``Meador Noncompete Statement'').
    \8\ Meador Noncompete Statement at 1.
    \9\ Ferguson Gateway Statement at 4, 5; Meador Noncompete 
Statement at 2-5. Similarly, the common law ``abandoned the 
categorical proscription in the early eighteenth century in favor of 
a case-specific reasonableness test.'' Id. at 3, n.20 (citing 
Ferguson Noncompete Rule Dissent at 35 & Section I.B).
    \10\ See Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711); Ohio 
v. Am. Express, 585 U.S. U.S. 529, 541-42 (2018); NCAA v. Alston, 
594 U.S. 69, 100 (2021) (``[A]nticompetitive restraints of trade may 
wind up flunking the rule of reason to the extent the evidence shows 
that substantially less restrictive means exist to achieve any 
proven procompetitive benefits.''); cf. Newburger, Loeb & Co., Inc. 
v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977) (explaining that the 
relevant inquiry in employee agreements not to compete should focus 
on whether such restrictions ``operate in circumstances where no 
valid business interest of the ex-employer is at stake'' and whether 
they ``[a]re so burdensome that their anticompetitive purposes and 
effects outweigh their justifications.''); Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 
248 F.3d 131 (3d Cir. 2001) (challenged no-hire agreement ``not an 
antitrust violation under the rule of reason'' where the particular 
provision at issue ``did not have a significant anti-competitive 
effect on the plaintiffs' ability to seek employment''); Aya 
Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. AMN Healthcare, Inc., 9 F.4th 1102, 1110 
(9th Cir. 2021) (challenged non-solicitation agreement, involving 
employee outsourcing arrangement between healthcare staffing 
agencies collaborating to supply traveling nurses not unlawful under 
rule of reason where restraint was reasonably necessary to ensure 
neither would lose personnel during collaboration).
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    Here, staff obtained compelling evidence during their investigation 
that gives me the required ``reason to believe'' that Rollins's use of 
the vast majority of its noncompete agreements violates section 5 of 
the FTC Act,\11\ as charged in the Complaint.\12\ Let me briefly 
explain.
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    \11\ 15 U.S.C. 45(b); FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 
241 (1980); see also AMREP Corp. v. FTC, 768 F.2d 1171, 1177 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 498 F. Supp. 772, 779 (D. 
Del. 1980).
    \12\ Compl. ] 19.
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    On one side of the scale, the Commission evaluates the 
anticompetitive effect of the noncompete agreements. We start with the 
scope and coverage of Rollins's noncompete agreements that have applied 
to the vast majority of its workforce of more than 18,000 people. The 
noncompete agreements prohibited Rollins employees from working in the 
pest-control industry generally within 75 miles of the Rollins location 
at which the employee worked for two years after the end of the 
employment relationship.\13\ As our Complaint explains, Rollins 
required all newly hired employees, regardless of their position or 
responsibilities, to enter into these noncompete agreements--including 
employees at firms that Rollins acquired.\14\ That sort of 
indiscriminate ``general policy'' approach of requiring every single 
worker to sign a noncompete agreement irrespective of the worker's 
position or responsibilities cries out for scrutiny under the antitrust 
laws.
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    \13\ Id. ] 7.
    \14\ Id. ]] 7, 9, 10.
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    These noncompete agreements were not merely pro forma. When workers 
left Rollins to seek opportunities elsewhere or start their own 
businesses, we allege that Rollins sent hundreds of threatening letters 
or initiated litigation to enforce the noncompete agreements.\15\ The 
targets of this enforcement campaign often lacked the resources to 
litigate and acceded to the threat at great personal and professional 
expense.\16\ And our Complaint alleges that the agreements imposed 
additional anticompetitive effects, including impeding the expansion of 
existing competitors and delaying entry of new small-business 
competitors who could challenge Rollins.\17\
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    \15\ Id. ] 11.
    \16\ See id. ]] 11-12.
    \17\ See id. ]] 13-14.
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    Turning to the procompetitive interests that could justify these 
onerous agreements, we come up nearly empty. As the Complaint charges, 
Rollins did not need the challenged provisions to continue making any 
capital investments in training or the development of associated 
proprietary information--in fact, Rollins's pest control methods are 
publicly accessible on the internet, so they are hardly a secret.\18\ 
The majority of Rollins's workforce in the U.S. is comprised of pest 
control technicians and customer service representatives.\19\ Although 
technicians are critical to providing pest-control services, their job 
duties do not require access to proprietary information that may 
justify noncompete restrictions in other circumstances. Rollins's 
technicians had access to customer lists, and Rollins has an interest 
in protecting those lists to safeguard customer relationships and 
client goodwill. But Rollins has available to it the less restrictive 
alternative of narrowly tailored non-solicitation provisions to 
vindicate those interests.\20\ And, indeed, Rollins has available to it 
the alternative of tailored non-solicitation agreements.\21\ Therefore, 
Rollins's noncompete agreements flunk the test as to these categories 
of Rollins employees and those similarly situated.
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    \18\ Id. ] 15.
    \19\ See id. ] 9.
    \20\ Id. ]] 15-16.
    \21\ Cf. Order at Section II.D.
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    Nevertheless, the Commission's Order today, as was the case in 
Gateway,\22\ recognizes that noncompete agreements can have their 
(limited) place--it

[[Page 21501]]

excludes from the prohibition certain employees who do meet a 
heightened bar for access to competitively sensitive information. That 
list includes directors, officers, or other defined senior leaders who 
exercise policy-making authority and are eligible for grants of equity 
or equity-based interests in Rollins as a benefit of employment.\23\
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    \22\ Decision and Order, In re Gateway Pet Mem'l Servs., Matter 
No. 2210170, Section I.F (Nov. 25, 2025).
    \23\ Order at Section II; see also Order at Section I.D.
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    Today's Order is consistent with the enforcement approach the 
Commission announced in 2025. We follow the general common-law rule 
from which our antitrust laws arose that noncompete agreements are 
lawful when they go no further than necessary to protect specific, 
identifiable, valid interests of the employer that could not be 
protected without the noncompete agreement.\24\ But we demand exacting 
proof to ensure that the dangers of unfair or anticompetitive 
noncompete agreements do not take hold. And the Commission will 
continue to act against noncompete agreements that unlawfully limit 
worker mobility and access to job opportunities, which in turn deny 
consumers the benefits of vigorous competition.
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    \24\ See Ferguson Gateway Statement at 7, n.50 (citing Horner v. 
Graves, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 1831) (English courts upheld 
noncompete agreements if ``the restraint is such only as to afford a 
fair protection to the interests of the party in favour of whom it 
is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interests of the 
public.''); 15 Corbin on Contracts Sec.  80.6 (2024) (describing 
multifactor reasonableness test); Restatement (2d) of Contracts 
Sec.  188 (1981) (same); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 
85 F. 271, 281 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) 
(collecting cases and relating noncompete agreements' treatment at 
common law to antitrust principles).
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[FR Doc. 2026-07844 Filed 4-21-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750-01-P