[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 51 (Tuesday, March 17, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 12886-12891]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-05214]
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OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
[Docket No. USTR-2026-0067 and USTR-2026-0068]
Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and
Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity
and Production in Manufacturing Sectors
AGENCY: Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
ACTION: Notice of initiation of investigations and hearings, and a
request for comments.
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SUMMARY: The United States Trade Representative (Trade Representative)
[[Page 12887]]
has initiated investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974
regarding the acts, policies, and practices of certain economies
relating to structural excess capacity and production in certain
manufacturing sectors. Key trading partners have developed production
capacity untethered from the incentives of domestic and global demand.
This excess capacity leads to, among others, overproduction and large
or persistent trade surpluses, as well as underutilized and unused
capacity, in manufacturing sectors. These investigations will focus on
economies that appear to exhibit structural excess capacity and
production in various manufacturing sectors, such as through large or
persistent trade surpluses or underutilized or unused capacity: China,
the European Union (EU), Singapore, Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh,
Mexico, Japan, and India. The inter-agency Section 301 Committee is
holding public hearings and seeking public comments in connection with
these investigations. USTR will open dockets for submission of written
comments and requests to appear at the hearings.
DATES:
March 11, 2026: The U.S. Trade Representative initiated the
investigations.
March 17, 2026: USTR will open dockets for submission of written
comments and requests to appear at the hearings.
April 15, 2026, at 11:59 p.m. EST: To be assured of consideration,
submit written comments and any requests to appear at the hearings,
along with a summary of the testimony, by this date.
May 5, 2026: The Section 301 Committee will convene public hearings
in the main hearing room of the U.S. International Trade Commission,
500 E Street SW, Washington, DC 20436, beginning at 10:00 a.m.,
continuing, as necessary, until May 8.
Seven calendar days after the last day of the public hearing: Due
date for submission of post-hearing rebuttal comments.
ADDRESSES: Submit documents in response to this notice, including
written comments, hearing appearance requests, summaries of testimony,
and post-hearing rebuttal comments through the online USTR portal:
https://comments.ustr.gov/s/.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For procedural questions concerning
comments or participating in the public hearing, contact the USTR
Section 301 support line at (202) 395-5725. Direct all other questions
regarding this notice to Philip Butler, Chair of the Section 301
Committee, or Nanda Srikantaiah, Assistant General Counsel, at (202)
395-5725.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
Structural excess capacity and production in manufacturing sectors
presents a serious challenge to U.S. efforts to re-shore supply chains
and provide good-paying jobs for American workers. Key trading partners
have developed production capacity untethered from the incentives of
domestic and global demand. This excess capacity leads to, among
others, overproduction and large or persistent trade surpluses, as well
as underutilized and unused capacity, in manufacturing sectors.
Structural excess capacity has been characterized generally as
underutilized industrial production capacity that is sustained through
governmental interventions or policies incentivizing companies to
maintain or grow their unused capacity inefficiently.\1\
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\1\ See, e.g., Rhodium Group, ``Overcapacity at the Gate'' (Mar.
26, 2024), https://rhg.com/research/overcapacity-at-the-gate/.
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In 2024, global manufacturing generated $16.6 trillion dollars in
economic output, up from $16.4 trillion in 2023, according to World
Bank data. Nonetheless, according to U.S. government estimates, global
manufacturing capacity utilization remains between 75.0 and 75.9
percent, below healthy utilization rates for many sectors of
approximately 80 percent.\2\ This is an indication that, for
manufactured goods, although global production is expanding, underlying
global supply exceeds underlying global demand. Further, unused foreign
capacity can chill production and new investments in the United States.
Indeed, many countries with excess capacity problems also have large
trade surpluses with the world, or at least with the United States--the
world's consumer market of last resort.
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\2\ See, e.g., Executive Office of the President, ``Proclamation
10896: Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States,'' 90 FR
9,817 (Feb. 10, 2025) (identifying 80% as the target rate for steel
capacity utilization).
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When global manufacturing investment outstrips global demand for
manufactured goods, and production surpluses are concentrated within
certain countries, production surpluses in those markets undermine
industrial ecosystems in other countries. Across numerous sectors, many
U.S. trading partners are disregarding market-based policies and
producing more goods than they can consume or productively invest
domestically. The result of this overproduction is large or persistent
goods trade surpluses, including the expansion of exports to the United
States or to third countries that, in turn, export to the United
States. This displaces existing U.S. domestic production or prevents
investment and expansion in U.S. manufacturing production that
otherwise would have been brought online. These dynamics are reflected
in U.S. global and bilateral goods trade deficits and the reduced
contribution of manufacturing to U.S. gross domestic product. In the
past fifteen years, U.S. capacity utilization peaked at 79.9 percent
during President Trump's first term, declining to a low of 75.2 percent
in November 2024 near the end of President Biden's term, further
evidence that U.S. industry is not operating at its full competitive
potential.
U.S. policy makers for years have expressed concern over large or
persistent goods trade imbalances. For example, in the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act of 1988, the U.S. Congress instructed: ``The
principal negotiating objective of the United States regarding current
account surpluses is to develop rules to address large and persistent
global current account imbalances of countries, including imbalances
which threaten the stability of the international trading system, by
imposing greater responsibility on such countries to undertake policy
changes aimed at restoring current account equilibrium, including
expedited implementation of trade agreements where feasible and
appropriate.'' \3\ It is no coincidence that the same 1988 Act was
passed in response to concerns about the decline of U.S. manufacturing
competitiveness.
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\3\ 19 U.S.C. 2901(b)(5), Public Law 100-418, title I, Sec.
1101(b)(5), Aug. 23, 1988, 102 Stat. 1121.
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Low capacity utilization rates in the manufacturing sectors of some
economies can be evidence of structural excess capacity in those
sectors. For example, the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity (GFSEC)
estimates that global steel excess capacity is expected to increase to
721 million metric tons by 2027. The worsening global steel excess
capacity trend is being driven by a wide range of non-market practices
that fuel new capacity growth that exceeds underlying market demand in
some economies, in turn putting jobs, investments, and supply chains in
other economies at risk.
Another example can be seen in the automotive sector where the
United
[[Page 12888]]
States is one key destination for other economies' automotive exports,
logging $157 billion and $128 billion deficits in the sector in 2024
and 2025, respectively. Structural excess capacity and production may
also be evidenced by a large number of firms that are unprofitable, or
cannot meet interest expenses through their operations. There is
evidence of a growing number of such firms in China, as well as Japan.
In addition, some countries export their excess capacity and production
by establishing distribution and production networks in other
countries. For example, as industrial production of electric vehicles
in China exhausts national demand, there is evidence that China's
national champion BYD is aggressively expanding its overseas
distribution and production network, with factories in Uzbekistan,
Thailand, Brazil, Hungary and Turkey. Further, analysts project that
Chinese automakers will likely build additional capacity in Europe, a
strategy invited and courted by current European political and business
leaders, notwithstanding the fact that there is evidence that European
automotive factories are operating at only 55 percent capacity
utilization.
An illustrative list of sectors plagued by excess capacity and
production includes aluminum, automobiles, batteries, cement,
chemicals, electronics, energy goods, glass, machine tools, machinery,
non-ferrous metals, paper, plastics, processed food and beverages,
robotics, satellites, semiconductors, ships, solar modules, steel, and
transportation equipment. In many of these sectors, the United States
has lost substantial domestic production capacity or has fallen
worryingly behind foreign competitors.
The creation or maintenance of structural excess capacity and
production may result from policy interventions by trading partners
that increase their domestic capacity and production while suppressing
their domestic demand. Such interventions maintain capacity and
production well above what would be expected under more market-oriented
conditions. This may include: (1) promoting production and export
untethered from market drivers of supply, demand, and investment,
including through subsidies; (2) suppressing domestic wages; (3) non-
commercial activities of state-owned or -controlled enterprises; (4)
sustained market access barriers; (5) lax or inadequate environmental
or labor protection or social safety net; (6) subsidized lending; (7)
financial repression and currency practices; and others.
Among others, structural excess capacity in manufacturing sectors
can be evidenced by the existence of large or persistent trade goods
surpluses in certain sectors, including the nature and quality of an
economy's trade balance with the United States; as well as by
underutilized or unused production capacity or unprofitable firms in a
given economy or sector.
The delta between manufacturing capacity and demand is often
particularly acute in economies that have large and persistent trade
surpluses. Economists have noted that a large manufacturing surplus
requires an offsetting deficit in manufacturing elsewhere in the global
economy. Trade surpluses are often rooted in domestic saving-investment
imbalances shaped by government policies that tend to weaken domestic
demand and promote overproduction and capacity in surplus countries.
Instead of gains from trade flowing to workers and shareholders, these
governments encourage firms to use these gains to fund or stimulate
additional production capacity, regardless of demand. The resulting
weak or depressed domestic consumption compels these economies to
export their overproduction to underwrite their excess capacity,
generating trade surpluses. In turn, the trading partners of these
economies must run trade deficits, meaning they will have smaller
tradeable goods sectors than would otherwise prevail.
The United Nations Industrial Development Organization's (UNIDO)
recent quarterly report on Manufacturing Production and Trade indicates
that China, Asia and Oceania (excluding China), and Europe have
experienced trade surpluses in all manufactured goods, and in higher-
tech manufactured goods, consistently for years.\4\ In contrast, UNIDO
reports that North America and Latin America have shown growing trade
deficits in such goods during the same time period. The Report
characterizes the manufacturing trade surplus countries as ``export-
driven'' economies.\5\ Moreover, North America--driven largely by the
U.S. economy--accounts for less of world manufacturing output than it
did in 2015. Not only does U.S. manufacturing account for less global
manufacturing output, it also increasingly makes up a smaller share of
the U.S. economy. According to U.S. Department of Commerce data, ``U.S.
manufacturing value added was 10.5% of national GDP in 2023'' while
``Germany's manufacturing industry was 22.7%, China was 28.1%, and
Japan was 21.7% with the world average being 17.2%.''
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\4\ United Nations Industrial Development Organization,
Quarterly Report, Q3 2025, Manufacturing Production and Trade,
https://stat.unido.org/portal/storage/file/publications/qiip/World_Manufacturing_Production_2025_Q3.pdf.
\5\ Id.
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The nature and quality of an economy's trade balance with the
United States is also an indicator of excess capacity. The United
States is the global consumer market of last resort, and economies with
productive capacity that outstrip their domestic demand tend to send
overproduction to the United States, directly or indirectly through
third countries. Excess capacity can be focused in certain tradeable
sectors, leading to a large and persistent goods surplus with the
United States. This can be the case even if a given economy might
experience balanced trade or have an overall goods trade deficit with
the United States or with the world.
II. Investigated Economies
These investigations will focus on the following economies that
appear to exhibit structural excess capacity in various manufacturing
sectors, such as through large or persistent trade surpluses or
underutilized or unused capacity: China, the European Union, Singapore,
Switzerland, Norway, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand, Korea,
Vietnam, Taiwan, Bangladesh, Mexico, Japan, and India.\6\
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\6\ See generally U.S. Department of Treasury, Macroeconomic and
Foreign Exchange Policies of Major Trading Partners of the United
States (2020-2026) (``Report on Macroeconomic and Foreign Exchange
Policies'').
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Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
China. China's global goods trade surplus exceeded $1.2 trillion in
2025, a record high, and accounted for nearly 70 percent of global
goods trade surpluses. In 2024, China's global goods trade surplus was
$993 billion. By volume, China's trade surplus meaningfully expanded--
with net export volumes increasing to the highest recorded levels amid
a decline in China's export prices. China's bilateral goods trade
surplus with the United States was the largest of any U.S. trading
partner in 2024, at $361 billion in 2024. Additionally, China's data
transparency is limited, and available data contains statistical
anomalies that may suggest an even higher surplus. Overall, China's
capacity utilization rate is 74.4 percent in 2025, which is down from
75 percent in 2024.
China maintains a global goods trade surplus across its economy,
led by exports in sectors such as electronic equipment, machinery,
automobiles and auto parts, plastics, furniture, articles of iron or
steel, apparel, organic chemicals,
[[Page 12889]]
toys and sporting goods, optical, photo, technical, and medical
apparatus, iron and steel, footwear, ships and vessels, aluminum, and
many others. Evidence suggests that China's goods trade surplus is
driven by increasing excess manufacturing capacity and production in
numerous sectors. In some of these sectors, Chinese excess capacity has
driven global overcapacity. For example, the GFSEC has found that
China's share of global excess capacity in steel production has ``risen
significantly'' during the course of 2025, to 54 percent of the world
gap between capacity and demand in Q3 2025, from 47 percent in Q3 2024.
Similarly, China's production of lithium-ion batteries reached 1.9
times the volume of domestically installed batteries in 2022. With
respect to polyethylene terephthalate (PET), evidence suggests that as
China continues to purchase low-cost Russian oil, Chinese chemical
companies are creating overcapacity in PET production.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
the European Union. Measured as a share of GDP, in 2024, the Euro area
maintained a surplus on trade in goods of $451 billion and 2.3 percent
of GDP. The European Union maintained a bilateral surplus of trade in
goods with the United States of $237 billion in 2024. The European
Union maintains a global goods trade surplus, led by exports in sectors
such as chemicals and related products and machineries and vehicles.
The European Union maintains this surplus despite very high energy
prices and regulatory obstacles that inhibit economic growth.
Among EU Member States, for example, Germany has run a large trade
surplus for well over a decade as production levels are consistently
above domestic absorption. The goods trade surplus reached 5.6 percent
of GDP in 2024. At the same time, Germany's bilateral goods trade
surplus with the United States reached $102 billion in 2024. Germany
maintains a large and persistent goods trade surplus, led by exports in
sectors such as automobiles and auto parts, machinery, electronic
equipment, pharmaceutical products, chemicals, and others. At the same
time, capacity utilization rates in these sectors as of January 2026,
such as chemicals (72.7 percent), have reached low levels.
Similarly, Ireland has run a significant goods trade surplus,
amounting to $97 billion, or 15.9 percent of GDP in 2024. In 2023, its
goods trade surplus with the rest of the world was $57 billion. In
2024, its bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States was $55
billion, driven by exports of the pharmaceutical sector. At only 72.7
percent in Q1 2026, Ireland's level of capacity utilization is low.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production for Singapore
includes large or persistent trade surpluses. Singapore maintains a
global goods trade surplus, led by exports in sectors such as
semiconductors, electronic equipment, petrochemicals, and
pharmaceuticals. In 2024, the goods trade surplus was $47 billion, or
8.6 percent of GDP. Furthermore, evidence suggests Singapore's trade
surplus in the semiconductor supply chain will grow. Similarly,
evidence suggests that Singapore's state-owned industrial landlord
continues to expand manufacturing capacity notwithstanding a recent
drop in its industrial occupancy rate.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production for
Switzerland includes large or persistent goods trade surpluses.
Switzerland's trade surplus reached 8.0 percent of GDP or $75 billion
in 2024, and similarly was $54 billion in 2023. Switzerland had a
bilateral surplus of trade in goods with the United States of $44
billion in 2024. Switzerland maintains a global goods trade surplus,
led by exports in sectors such as refined gold, pharmaceutical
products, organic chemicals, and machinery. Switzerland does not report
official statistics on capacity utilization, but it has pursued
policies in the past, such as currency intervention and sterilization
of foreign exchange inflows, that contribute to structural excess
capacity.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Norway. Norway maintains a global goods trade surplus, led by exports
in sectors such as mineral fuels and oils, certain electronic
equipment, and machinery. In 2024, Norway's goods trade surplus was
13.8 percent of GDP, or $67 billion, down from a goods trade surplus of
$79 billion in 2023. Norway's seafood exports hit a record high in
2025, with Norwegian companies exporting 2.8 million metric tons of
seafood worth $18 billion, representing a 4 percent increase from 2024.
At 77.7 percent in Q4 2025, Norway's rate of capacity utilization was
more than a full percentage point below what it was a year ago, and
over two percentage points less than it was three years ago. In
addition, Norway engages in policies and practices that have the effect
of undervaluing its domestic currency, including the use of state-owned
or -controlled enterprises to recycle oil revenues into non-domestic
currencies, like the U.S. dollar, rather than its domestic currency.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Indonesia through large or persistent goods trade surpluses. In 2024,
Indonesia had a $31 billion global goods trade surplus, led by exports
in metals, agricultural products, fuels, textiles, and construction
goods. Indonesia's bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States
reached $18 billion in 2025. Indonesia's cement industry faces a
persistent oversupply due to a significant imbalance between production
and domestic demand.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Malaysia through its large or persistent goods trade surpluses.
Malaysia maintains a global goods trade surplus, led by exports in
sectors such as electronic equipment, mineral fuels and oils,
machinery, animal and vegetable fats and oils, and optical, photo,
technical, and medical apparatuses. In 2024, Malaysia's trade surplus
was 7.3 percent of its GDP, or $31 billion, down from $47 billion in
2023. In 2025, Malaysia maintained a bilateral goods trade surplus with
the United States of $24 billion. Most of this surplus is focused on
goods trade, driven by sectors such as electronics or machinery.
Evidence suggests that Malaysia has significant excess capacity in its
steel sector, which recorded capacity growth of 22 percent between 2018
and 2022, despite a 25 percent decline in steel demand during that
timeframe.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Cambodia. Cambodia maintains a bilateral trade surplus with the United
States, which in 2025 was approximately $12 billion. Evidence indicates
its garment, footwear, and travel goods (GFT) sector exported $11.8
billion in the first nine months of 2025, a 16 percent increase from
the same period in 2024. When Cambodia's GFT industry was facing
uncertainty with U.S. tariffs, Cambodia's Deputy Secretary-General
stated that enhancing capacity along the product chains was an option
to further boost the manufacturing sector and create lucrative
opportunities.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Thailand. It maintains a global goods trade surplus in sectors such as
autos and auto parts, machinery, and rubber. Thailand's bilateral goods
trade surplus with the United States totaled $51 billion in 2025, up
from $35 billion in 2024. Evidence suggests Thailand's manufacturing
sector has significant excess capacity, as it is operating at below 60%
capacity for two consecutive years, with only one-third of industries
recovering to pre-pandemic levels.
[[Page 12890]]
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Korea through large or persistent trade surpluses. Korea maintains a
global goods trade surplus, led by exports in sectors such as
electronic equipment, automobiles and auto parts, machinery, steel, and
ships and marine vessels. Korea's global goods trade surplus expanded
considerably in 2024, reaching $52 billion, up from a global goods
trade deficit of $10 billion in 2023. Korea's bilateral goods trade
surplus with the United States increased to $56 billion over the course
of 2024, and remained around $49 billion through 2025. The Korean
Government has acknowledged the need to cut capacity in the
petrochemicals sector.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Vietnam through large or persistent trade surpluses. Vietnam maintains
a global goods trade surplus, led by exports in sectors such as
electronic equipment, machinery, footwear, apparel, furniture, and
steel. In 2025, Vietnam's trade surplus was $196 billion and $127
billion in 2024. Vietnam's bilateral goods trade surplus with the
United States has expanded dramatically over the past six years,
primarily driven by growth in goods trade, led by electronics and
machinery. Vietnam's bilateral goods trade surplus with the United
States stood at $178 billion in 2025. Vietnam also functions as a hub
for the final assembly of goods before export, which contributes to its
trade surplus. Evidence suggests Vietnam has excess capacity in its
cement sector, including continued cement overcapacity of nearly 100
percent of domestic demand. Furthermore, Vietnam's intervention in
foreign exchange markets and undervaluation of its currency were found
to be unreasonable in a Section 301 investigation conducted by the U.S.
Trade Representative in 2021.\7\
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\7\ Office of the United States Representative, ``Section 301
Investigation: Report on Vietnam's Acts, Policies, and Practices
Related to Currency Valuation,'' (Jan. 15, 2021).
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Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Taiwan through large or persistent trade surpluses. Taiwan maintains a
global goods trade surplus, led by exports in sectors such as
semiconductors, electronic products, information technology products,
and machinery. Taiwan's trade surplus in goods was $73.3 billion in
2024, similar to its goods trade surplus of $73.4 billion in 2023.
Taiwan's bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States grew to a
record $65 billion in 2024.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Bangladesh, which has a bilateral goods trade surplus of $6.15 billion
with the United States. This bilateral surplus is led by exports in the
textiles sector. The government provides cash incentives for exports
across forty-three sectors, including domestic textiles and leather
products. Furthermore, Bangladesh's cement industry is wrestling with
significant excess capacity in the midst of the industry's worst
downturn in years, with Bangladesh's national consumption of cement
dropping to 38MT in 2024--less than 40% of total capacity--and
declining further in 2025.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Mexico. Mexico's bilateral goods trade surplus with the United States
was $197 billion in 2025, led by the automotive sector, as well as
construction, rail and ship transportation, and health. Mexico's
automotive industry is ranked fifth-largest globally in light vehicle
and heavy-duty manufacturing, with global exports amounting to $104.8
billion in 2024. The United States accounts for 79.7 percent of
Mexico's exports in the automotive sector. Furthermore, evidence
suggests its steel industry achieved rapid capacity growth between 2000
and 2019. Specifically, Mexico's steel sector experienced a capacity
increase of 9 MMT, representing a 46 percent increase, during that
timeframe. There is also evidence of structural excess production in
numerous other sectors of the Mexican economy, including process
manufacturing in food and beverages.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
Japan. In 2024, Japan had a global goods trade deficit of about $36
billion, but with the United States, Japan had a bilateral goods trade
surplus of $57 billion in 2024. Japan maintains a global goods trade
surplus in sectors such as automobiles and auto parts, and optical,
photo, technical, and medical apparatuses. Japan's trade surplus with
the United States is heavily focused on the automotive sector, which
accounts for more than one-third of its exports to the United States.
Today, Japan is one of the world's largest global vehicle exporters,
exporting 4.2 million units in 2024. The share of Japanese firms that
fail to make a profit, yet nonetheless continue to operate, is an
indication of excess capacity in Japan's economy.
Evidence of structural excess capacity and production exists for
India. In 2025, India had a bilateral trade surplus with the United
States of $42 billion. India's global goods trade surplus sectors
include textiles, health, construction goods, and automotive goods. For
example, evidence suggests the solar module sector is plagued by excess
capacity, including that India's current module manufacturing is nearly
triple annual domestic demand. India also has created significant
excess capacity in petrochemicals, steel, and other industries.
III. Initiation of Section 301 Investigation
Section 302(b)(1)(A) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended (Trade
Act), authorizes the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate an
investigation to determine whether an act, policy, or practice of a
foreign country is actionable under section 301 of the Trade Act.
Actionable matters under section 301 include acts, policies, and
practices of a foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminatory
and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. An act, policy, or practice is
unreasonable if, while not necessarily in violation of, or inconsistent
with, the international legal rights of the United States, it is
otherwise unfair and inequitable.
On March 11, 2026, the U.S. Trade Representative initiated section
301 investigations of the acts, policies, and practices of certain
economies relating to structural excess capacity or production in
certain manufacturing sectors. Pursuant to section 302(b)(1)(B) of the
Trade Act, USTR has consulted with appropriate advisory committees and
the inter-agency Section 301 Committee. Pursuant to section 303(a) of
the Trade Act, USTR is requesting consultations with the respective
governments of each investigated economy.
Pursuant to section 304 of the Trade Act, USTR must determine
whether the act, policy, or practice under investigation is actionable
under section 301. If that determination is affirmative, the U.S. Trade
Representative must determine whether action is appropriate, and if so,
what action to take.
IV. Request for Public Comments
You may submit written comments on any issue covered by the
investigation. In particular, USTR invites comments regarding:
The acts, policies, and practices of each investigated
economy creating or maintaining structural excess capacity or
production in specific sectors.
Whether the acts, policies, and practices are unreasonable
or discriminatory.
Whether the acts, policies, and practices burden or
restrict U.S. commerce, and if so, the nature and
[[Page 12891]]
level of the burden or restriction. This would include economic
assessments of the burden or restriction.
Whether the acts, policies, and practices are actionable
under section 301(b) of the Trade Act, and what action, if any, should
be taken, including tariff and non-tariff actions.
Whether there are additional considerations for assessing
acts, policies, and practices that contribute to structural excess
capacity or production in manufacturing sectors.
To be assured of consideration, USTR must receive written comments
by 11:59 p.m. EST on April 15, 2026. Additional instructions on how to
submit written comments are provided below in Part VI.
V. Hearing Participation
The Section 301 Committee will convene a public hearing covering
each investigated economy beginning on May 5, 2026. To testify at the
hearing, you must submit a request to appear using the electronic
portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/, following the instructions in
Part VI below. Requests to appear must indicate each investigation to
which it applies, include a summary of testimony, and may be
accompanied by a prehearing submission. Remarks at the hearing are
limited to five minutes to allow for possible questions from the
Section 301 Committee. All submissions must be in English. To be
assured of consideration, USTR must receive your request to appear and
summary of the testimony by April 15, 2026.
Post-hearing rebuttal comments, which should be limited to
rebutting or supplementing testimony presented at the hearing, may be
submitted within seven calendar days after the last day of the public
hearing. Rebuttal comments must be submitted using the electronic
portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/, following the instructions in
Part VI below.
VI. Submission Instructions
Interested persons must submit written comments, requests to appear
at the hearing, summaries of testimony, and post-hearing rebuttal
comments using the appropriate docket on the portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/. To make a submission, use the docket on the
portal entitled `Request for Comments on the Section 301 Investigations
of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to
Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors,'
docket number USTR-2026-0067. Interested persons wishing to provide
testimony at the hearing must submit a notification of intent and
summary of testimony using the docket entitled `Request to Appear at
the Hearing on the Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and
Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity
and Production in Manufacturing Sectors,' docket number USTR-2026-0068.
You do not need to establish an account to submit comments or a
notification of intent to testify. The first screen allows you to enter
identification and contact information. Third party organizations such
as law firms, trade associations, or customs brokers should identify
the full legal name of the organization they represent and identify the
primary point of contact for the submission. Information fields are
optional. However, USTR may not consider your comment or request if
insufficient information is provided. Fields with a gray Business
Confidential Information (BCI) notation are for BCI information that
will not be made publicly available. Fields with a green (Public)
notation will be viewable by the public. After entering the
identification and contact information, you can complete the remainder
of the comment, or any portion of it, by clicking `Next.' You may
upload documents at the end of the form and indicate whether USTR
should treat the documents as business confidential or public
information. Any page containing BCI must be clearly marked `BUSINESS
CONFIDENTIAL' on the top of that page and the submission should clearly
indicate, via brackets, highlighting, or other means, the specific
information that is BCI. If you request business confidential
treatment, you must certify in writing that the information would not
customarily be released to the public.
Parties uploading attachments containing BCI also must submit a
public version of their comments. If these procedures are not
sufficient to protect BCI or otherwise protect business interests,
please contact the USTR section 301 support line at (202) 395-5725 to
discuss whether alternative arrangements are possible. USTR will post
attachments uploaded to the docket for public inspection, except for
properly designated BCI. You can view submissions on USTR's electronic
portal at https://comments.ustr.gov/s/.
Jennifer Thornton,
General Counsel, Office of the United States Trade Representative.
[FR Doc. 2026-05214 Filed 3-16-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3390-F4-P