[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 48 (Thursday, March 12, 2026)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 12059-12064]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-04829]
[[Page 12059]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2025-0618; Project Identifier AD-2024-00637-T;
Amendment 39-23280; AD 2026-05-07]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
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SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by discovery of a crack at one
of the forward lower fastener holes following replacement of a cracked
underwing longeron (UWL) fitting. This AD requires performing an open
hole high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection for cracks of the
fastener holes common to the UWL fitting, upper drag splice angle, and
lower drag splice angle, and applicable on-condition actions. The FAA
is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.
DATES: This AD is effective April 16, 2026.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in this AD as of April 16,
2026.
ADDRESSES: AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov
under Docket No. FAA-2025-0618; or in person at Docket Operations
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, any comments
received, and other information. The address for Docket Operations is
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE,
Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
For Boeing material identified in this AD, contact Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS),
2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600;
telephone 562-797-1717; website myboeingfleet.com.
You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des
Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material at the
FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available at regulations.gov under
Docket No. FAA-2025-0618.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Stefanie Roesli, Aviation Safety
Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 206-
231-3964; email: [email protected].
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain The Boeing
Company Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -400ER series airplanes. The
NPRM was published in the Federal Register on April 10, 2025 (90 FR
15318). The NPRM was prompted by discovery of a crack at one of the
forward lower fastener holes, outside of the inspection area of Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126, following replacement of a cracked
UWL fitting. In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to require performing an
HFEC inspection for cracks of the fastener holes common to the UWL
fitting, upper drag splice angle, and lower drag splice angle and
applicable on-condition actions. The FAA is issuing this AD to ensure
that any crack in the forward lower fastener holes at the UWL fitting
is found and repaired before reaching a critical length. Such cracking,
if not addressed, could result in loss in the primary load path between
the fuselage and the wing box, adversely affecting the structural
integrity of the airplane.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received comments from Aviation Partners Boeing and ProTech
Aero Services Limited who supported the NPRM without change.
The FAA received additional comments from four commenters,
including Boeing, Delta Air Lines (Delta), FedEx Express (FedEx), and
United Airlines (United). The following presents the comments received
on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.
Request To Clarify What Prompted the Proposed AD
Boeing requested that the FAA revise the first sentence of
paragraph (e) of the proposed AD to state that this AD was prompted by
discovery of a crack at one of the UWL fitting forward fastener holes,
outside of the inspection area of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-
57A0126, following replacement of a cracked UWL fitting. The commenter
clarified that the crack was discovered on the UWL fitting outside of
the inspection area, not outside of the UWL fitting.
The FAA agrees and has revised paragraph (e) accordingly.
Request To Clarify the Inspection Compliance Time Based on UWL
Replacement
Boeing requested that the FAA add the following exception to
paragraph (h) of the proposed AD: Where the Compliance Time column of
the tables in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements
Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, refers to ``after the
replacement of the underwing longeron fitting,'' the compliance time
includes fitting replacement in accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 767-57A0126, Revision 1, dated November 9, 2011; Revision 2,
dated March 12, 2012; Revision 3, dated November 8, 2012; Revision 4,
dated April 17, 2014; and Revision 5, dated April 7, 2016 (Revisions 1
through 5 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126). The commenter
stated this exception clarifies the compliance time for operators who
have replaced fittings using Revisions 1 through 5 of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-57A0126. The commenter also stated that the
compliance time for the initial open hole HFEC inspection is based on
an individual fitting's flight cycles or flight hours, not the
airplane's accumulated flight cycles or flight hours, and that
replacement of the fitting per Revisions 1 through 5 of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-57A0126 resets the compliance time even though it
is not explicitly stated.
The FAA agrees that the compliance time for the initial open hole
HFEC inspection in tables 3 and 4 of the Boeing Alert Requirements
Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, can be calculated from
the replacement of the UWL fitting using either Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, or
Revisions 1 through 5 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126.
Accordingly, the FAA has added a new exception to paragraph (h)(2) of
this AD to clarify that compliance time.
Request To Correct Paragraph Reference
Boeing requested that the FAA revise paragraph (h)(2) of the
proposed AD to refer to paragraph (i) instead of paragraph (g) of the
proposed AD. The commenter stated paragraph (i) of the
[[Page 12060]]
proposed AD should be referenced for repairs that require alternative
methods of compliance (AMOC) approval.
The FAA agrees and has revised paragraph (h)(3) of this AD
(corresponding to paragraph (h)(2) of the proposed AD) accordingly.
Request To Remove or Revise Requirement for Minimum Thickness of Cap
Seals
Boeing requested that the FAA remove paragraph (h)(3) and figure 1
from the proposed AD. Boeing stated Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, refers to section 28-11-00 of
the 767 Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM) (i.e., 767 AMM 28-11-00) for
the cap sealing procedure, and the AMM contains the same cap seal
minimum thickness specified in figure 1 to paragraph (h)(3) of the
proposed AD. Boeing asserted that deleting the proposed requirement
would prevent duplication of data and potential questions from
operators.
Alternatively, Boeing requested the FAA revise paragraph (h)(3) of
the proposed AD to clarify that the requirement applies to in-tank
fastener cap sealing only and add a note to refer to 767 AMM 28-11-00
as an acceptable cap sealing procedure for in-tank fasteners. Boeing
stated this clarification would prevent potential questions from
operators and eliminate conflicting cap sealing requirements for out-
of-tank fasteners.
The FAA agrees that the cap sealing requirement of paragraph (h)(4)
of this AD (corresponding to paragraph (h)(3) of the proposed AD) does
not apply to fasteners outside the fuel tank. Accordingly, the FAA has
revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD to clarify the requirement applies
only to fasteners, fastener heads, and fastener threads and collars
inside the fuel tank.
The FAA disagrees with Boeing's request to remove the exception or
add a note to refer to 767 AMM 28-11-00 as an acceptable procedure for
the cap sealing required for in-tank fasteners. Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, already
refers to 767 AMM 28-11-00 as an acceptable procedure, so including
such a note in this AD is unnecessary. Further, referencing material as
an accepted procedure does not make the actions in the material
mandatory. Therefore, the FAA has determined that the exception in
paragraph (h)(4) is necessary to ensure the cap sealing procedures are
enforceable.
Request To Require Other Service Information for Cap Sealing
Requirement
FedEx requested that the FAA remove figure 1 and revise paragraph
(h)(3) of the proposed AD to require application of the cap seals to
wing tank fasteners internally, in accordance with section 51-20-05 of
the 767 Structural Repair Manual (SRM) (i.e., 767 SRM 51-20-05). FedEx
stated the exception in paragraph (h)(3) of the proposed AD would
result in multiple requirements for cap sealing of fasteners internal
to the fuel tank, depending on the task being worked. FedEx also stated
that the exception is overly general and should be specific only to cap
seals internal to the fuel tank. FedEx noted fasteners that penetrate
the 767 fuel tank are subject to Critical Design Configuration Control
Limitations (CDCCLs) to ensure the lightning, fault current, and hot
short protection requirements of Airworthiness Limitation (AWL) 28-AWL-
08 are met. FedEx also noted that AWL 28-AWL-08 specifies no additional
FAA Oversight Office approval is required if the repair or alternation
is accomplished using 767 SRM procedures.
As stated previously, the FAA agrees that the cap sealing
requirement does not apply to fasteners outside the fuel tank and has
revised paragraph (h)(4) of this AD accordingly. However, the FAA
disagrees with the commenter's request to require that the cap sealing
for in-tank fasteners be done in accordance with 767 SRM 51-20-05
because the SRM refers to 767 AMM 28-11-00 for sealing of fuel tank
repairs. Referring to 767 AMM 28-11-00 does not make the actions in
that material mandatory, and the FAA has determined that the
requirements in paragraph (h)(4) of this AD must be accomplished.
Further, the FAA disagrees that the exception will result in multiple
requirements for cap sealing of fasteners internal to the fuel tank
because the 767 AMM 28-11-00 contains the same procedures as the
requirements of figure 1 to paragraph (h)(4) of this AD. The FAA has
not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Correct Action and Figure Reference
United requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to correct the instructions and figure reference for
Condition 3 (Action 2) in table 1, ``Left Side Underwing Longeron
Fitting Forward Lower Fastener Holes Inspection'' (for Group 1,
Configuration 1 and 3) in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024. The
commenter stated that Condition 3 (Action 2) incorrectly specifies
performing the HFEC at any hole(s) per figure 3, instead of figure 35.
The commenter noted the correct instructions are specified in another
condition for the right side underwing longeron fitting inspection. The
commenter also stated that Boeing concurred with this change.
The FAA agrees to correct the figure reference and instructions for
Condition 3 (Action 2) as requested by the commenter. The FAA notes
that the requested change to the instructions is consistent with the
``Action'' column for Condition 3 (Action 2) of table 1, ``Left Side
Underwing Longeron Fitting Forward Lower Fastener Holes Inspection,''
in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024. Accordingly, the FAA has added
a new exception in paragraph (h)(5) of this AD.
Request To Correct Task Name
Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to correct the task name to ``FITTING, UNDERWING
LONGERON, RH'' in step 5 of figures 6, 8, and 10 of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024. Delta
stated that those figures are for the right-hand UWL longeron, not the
left-hand.
The FAA agrees to correct the task name in figures 6, 8, and 10 of
Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10,
2024, as requested by Delta. Accordingly, the FAA has added a new
exception to paragraph (h)(6) of this AD.
Request To Clarify Procedures for Fastener Installation
Boeing requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD that requires fasteners installed per Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, figures
15 through 22, 27, and 28, step 11 (quantity 8) and figures 23 through
26, step 11 (quantity 7) be cap sealed per step 15. Boeing stated
Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10,
2024, omitted the cap sealing requirements (step 15) for certain
fasteners installed per step 11 of the referenced figures.
Alternatively, Boeing requested that the FAA revise the proposed AD to
mandate Revision 1 of the material, which it plans to issue as soon as
possible to add the omitted cap sealing requirements.
[[Page 12061]]
The FAA agrees that fasteners installed in accordance with step 11
of the applicable figure in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, should be cap sealed in accordance
with step 15. Further, fasteners installed in accordance with step 8 of
the same figures should also be cap sealed in accordance with step 15.
Sealing all of these fasteners is necessary to prevent possible
ignition sources within the fuel tank. Accordingly, the FAA has added a
new exception in paragraph (h)(7) of this AD. Under the provisions of
paragraph (i) of this AD, Boeing may request an AMOC to allow use of
Revision 1 to Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB after
it has been issued.
In its comment, Boeing noted step 11 of figures 23 through 26
involves 7 fasteners. However, the FAA notes that step 11 of those
figures in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated
October 10, 2024, specifies a quantity of 8 fastener and that sheet 2
of those figures only depicts 7 fastener locations. To address this
inconsistency, the FAA has added a new exception to paragraph (h)(8) of
this AD to require the installation of 7 fasteners.
Request To Correct Shim Part Number
United requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to correct the part number (P/N) for Shim B in step 9
of figures 23 through 26. The commenter stated that those figures
specify removing P/N BACS40R021C037F and installing P/N
BACS40R021C032F, but the correct instruction is to install the removed
shim P/N BACS40R021C037F. The commenter also stated that Boeing
concurred with this change.
The FAA agrees to correct the part number in step 9 (installation)
of figures 23 through 26 of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024. Accordingly, the FAA has added a
new exception in paragraph (h)(9) of this AD.
Request To Correct Step Reference
United requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to correct step 2 of figure 34 (sheet 2 of 3) of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024. The
commenter noted that although step 2 is mentioned on sheet 2 of figure
34, there is no circle note 2 on sheet 1 of figure 34. The commenter
stated that the fastener installation task in step 2 should be included
in step 1, like the fastener installation for the left side UWL fitting
in figure 33. The commenter also stated that Boeing concurred with this
change.
The FAA agrees that the fastener installation task should be
included under step 1, not step 2. Accordingly, the FAA has added a new
exception in paragraph (h)(10) of this AD.
Request To Revise Open Access Instruction
Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to revise step 1.a(3) in ``Part 1: Open Access'' of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0148, dated October 10, 2024.
Delta stated that the instruction to make sure the airplane is at
operational empty weight (OEW) with or without engines installed should
instead specify to make sure the aircraft gross weight and center of
gravity, with or without engines installed, are within approved limits
for jacking the aircraft, and to refer to aircraft maintenance manual
(AMM) 07-11-03 as an accepted procedure. Delta stated that Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-57A0148, dated October 10, 2024, does not define
OEW, and each airline and manufacturer may have their own definition
for OEW based on what they consider to be operational items.
The FAA disagrees with Delta's request. The ``Part 1: Open Access''
steps are not tagged as required for compliance (RC) and therefore are
not included as RC steps in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, which is required by this AD.
Therefore, no change to this AD is necessary in this regard.
Request To Use Alternative Service Information
Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD specifying the removal and installation procedures for
the UWL replacement may be done using either Boeing Alert Requirements
Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, or Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 767-57A0126, Revision 5, dated April 7, 2016 (Revision
5 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126). Delta stated Revision
5 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126 is mandated by AD 2012-
15-12, Amendment 39-17141 (77 FR 46932, August 7, 2012) (AD 2012-15-
12). Delta also stated, if replacement of the UWL is required, the
removal and installation procedures in both bulletins are required for
compliance. Delta noted figures 5, 6, 9, and 10 of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, contain
removal instructions for the UWL fitting, inspections for an open hole
HFEC inspection of the tension bolt hole, and a surface HFEC of the
front spar lower chord, while figures 3, 4, 5, 6 in Revision 5 of
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126 contain instructions for the
same actions. Delta also noted figures 15, 16, 23, and 24 of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024,
contain installation instructions for the UWL fitting, while figures 7,
8, 9, 10 contain instructions for the same action.
The FAA disagrees with allowing use of alternative service
information to accomplish this AD. AD 2012-15-12 does not affect
accomplishment of this AD. If cracks are found while accomplishing an
inspection required by this AD, the corrective actions must be
accomplished according to this AD. The required actions of each AD are
standalone because they address different unsafe conditions; one is for
an inspection on the forward lower fastener holes where the underwing
longeron fitting attaches to two drag splice angles, and the other is
for an inspection of the underwing longeron fitting itself. The two ADs
are only similar in the on-condition actions of the two inspections.
The FAA has not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Provide Fabrication Instructions
Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to state the fabrication instructions (materials,
protective coatings, etc.) for fabricating shims. Delta noted step 1,
More Data note (a) in figures 1 and 2 of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
767-57A0148, dated October 10, 2024, specifies if shims are installed
in the joint, ensure they are kept in place during fastener removal, or
are removed and retained for re-installation. Alternatively, the
thickness can be measured to fabricate replacements. Due to this note,
Delta asserted the fabrication instructions for shims should be clearly
stated in the proposed AD.
The FAA disagrees with Delta's request. Figures 1 and 2 of Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0148, dated October 10, 2024, are not
tagged as RC and therefore are not included as RC steps in Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, that is
required by this AD. Therefore, no change to this AD is necessary in
this regard.
[[Page 12062]]
Request To Clarify the Insurance Cut Note
Delta requested that the FAA add an exception to paragraph (h) of
the proposed AD to clarify step 1, More Data note (b) in figures 3 and
4 of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October
10, 2024, as a precaution. Delta stated that note should be a caution
note because it specifies not to perform an insurance cut after the
hole is confirmed crack-free by the HFEC inspection, but step 1 and
More Data notes (a) and (b) do not specify to perform an insurance cut.
The FAA disagrees with Delta's request. More Data note (a)
specifies doing the HFEC inspection in accordance with the Boeing 767
Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) Manual, which includes notes to perform
insurance cuts after the inspection, to show the crack is fully
removed. More Data note (b) is a directive to not perform those
insurance cuts. Therefore, no change to this AD is necessary in this
regard.
Conclusion
The FAA reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments
received, and determined that air safety requires adopting this AD as
proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe
condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, and
any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted as proposed
in the NPRM. None of the changes will increase the economic burden on
any operator.
Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51
The FAA reviewed Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB,
dated October 10, 2024. This material specifies procedures for
performing an open hole HFEC inspection for cracks of the fastener
holes common to the UWL fitting, upper drag splice angle, and lower
drag splice angle, and applicable on-condition actions. On-condition
actions include crack repair (e.g., hole oversize repair), an open hole
HFEC inspection of the fitting and angles for any crack at hole
oversize repair locations, an open hole HFEC inspection of the entire
fastener stack-up common to the tension bolt hole and a surface HFEC
inspection of the front spar lower chord for any crack, replacement of
the underwing longeron fitting with new underwing longeron fitting,
underwing longeron fitting hole repair, tension bolt fastener stack-up
repair, front spar lower chord repair, and subsequent repetitive open
hole HFEC inspections for cracks of the fastener holes common to the
UWL fitting, upper drag splice angle, and lower drag splice angle.
This material is reasonably available because the interested
parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by
the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD affects 600 airplanes of U.S.
registry. The FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost per Cost on U.S.
Action Labor cost Parts cost product operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
HFEC inspection of fastener holes...... 170 work-hours x $85 per $0 $14,450 $8,670,000
hour = $14,450.
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The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-
condition actions that would be required based on the results of the
inspection. The agency has no way of determining the number of aircraft
that might need these repairs:
On-Condition Costs *
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Action Labor cost Parts cost Cost per product
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replacement.......................... 19 work-hours x $85 per hour $15,270 $16,885.
= $1,615.
Inspections of the fitting and Up to 6 work-hours x $85 = Up $0 Up to $510.
angles, the entire fastener stack-up to $510.
common to the tension bolt hole, and
the front spar lower chord for any
crack.
Repetitive HFEC inspection of 170 work-hours x $85 per hour $0 $14,450.
fastener holes. = $14,450.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimates for time and work for the repairs
specified in this AD, as the work necessary is variable.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.
Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight
of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for
practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary
for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that
authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to
exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States,
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
[[Page 12063]]
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The FAA amends Sec. 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness
directive:
2026-05-07 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-23280; Docket No. FAA-
2025-0618; Project Identifier AD-2024-00637-T.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective April 16, 2026.
(b) Affected ADs
None.
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 767-200, -300, -
300F, and -400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category, as
identified in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB,
dated October 10, 2024.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 57, Wings.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by discovery of a crack at one of the
underwing longeron (UWL) fitting forward fastener holes, outside of
the inspection area of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126,
following replacement of a cracked UWL fitting. The FAA is issuing
this AD to ensure that any crack in the forward lower fastener holes
at the UWL fitting is found and repaired before reaching a critical
length. Such cracking, if not addressed, could result in loss in the
primary load path between the fuselage and the wing box, adversely
affecting the structural integrity of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified,
unless already done.
(g) Required Actions
Except as specified by paragraph (h) of this AD: At the
applicable times specified in the ``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024,
do all applicable actions identified in, and in accordance with, the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin
767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024.
Note 1 to paragraph (g): Guidance for accomplishing the actions
required by this AD can be found in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
767-57A0148, dated October 10, 2024, which is referred to in Boeing
Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024.
(h) Exceptions to Requirements Bulletin Specifications
(1) Where the Compliance Time column of the tables in the
``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, refers to the original issue
date of Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, this AD requires using
the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where the Compliance Time column of tables 3 and 4 in the
``Compliance'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, specifies a compliance time of
within 22,000 flight cycles or 80,000 flight hours after the
replacement of the underwing longeron fitting, whichever occurs
first, this AD requires that the compliance time be calculated from
when replacement of the underwing longeron fitting was done using
Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10,
2024; or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767-57A0126, Revision 1,
dated November 9, 2011; Revision 2, dated March 12, 2012; Revision
3, dated November 8, 2012; Revision 4, dated April 17, 2014; or
Revision 5, dated April 7, 2016.
(3) Where Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB,
dated October 10, 2024, specifies contacting Boeing for repair
instructions, this AD requires doing the repair using a method
approved in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph
(i) of this AD.
(4) During application of any cap seal to a fastener, fastener
head, and fastener threads and collars inside the tank, as required
by this AD, the cap seal must be applied with a thickness equal to
or greater than the dimensions specified in figure 1 to paragraph
(h)(4) of this AD.
Figure 1 to Paragraph (h)(4)--Cap Seal Minimum Thickness (All
Dimensions in Inches)
[[Page 12064]]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR12MR26.009
(5) Where Condition 3 (Action 2) of table 1 of the ``Work
Instructions'' paragraph of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, specifies to repeat the open
hole high frequency eddy current (HFEC) inspection at any hole(s)
using ``figure 3'' as the method of compliance, this AD requires, at
oversize hole repair location(s), doing an open hole HFEC inspection
of the fitting and the angles for any crack using ``figure 35'' as
the method of compliance.
(6) Where the ``Action'' column of step 5 of figures 6, 8, and
10 of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated
October 10, 2024, specifies ``FITTING, UNDERWING LONGERON, LH'',
this AD requires replacing that text with ``FITTING, UNDERWING
LONGERON, RH''.
(7) Where step 15 of figures 15 through 28 of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024,
specifies cap sealing fasteners (i.e., applying cap seal to wing
tank fasteners internally with BMS 5-45), this AD requires cap
sealing all fasteners installed in accordance with steps 8 and 11 of
the applicable figure in Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-
57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024.
(8) Where step 11 of figures 23 through 26 of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024,
specifies installing a quantity of 8 fasteners, this AD requires
installing 7 fasteners.
(9) Where the ``Identification'' column of step 9 of figures 23
through 26 of Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB,
dated October 10, 2024, specifies to install BACS40R021C032F, this
AD requires installing BACS40R021C037F.
(10) Where the ``Step'' column of figure 34 of Boeing Alert
Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated October 10, 2024, refers
to step 2, this AD requires reidentifying step 2 as an additional
step 1 task.
(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(1) The Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or
responsible Flight Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending
information directly to the manager of the Continued Operational
Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (j)(1) of this AD. Information may be emailed to:
[email protected]. Before using any approved AMOC, notify your
appropriate principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector,
the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(2) An AMOC that provides an acceptable level of safety may be
used for any repair, modification, or alteration required by this AD
if it is approved by The Boeing Company Organization Designation
Authorization (ODA) that has been authorized by the Manager, AIR-
520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, to make those
findings. To be approved, the repair method, modification deviation,
or alteration deviation must meet the certification basis of the
airplane, and the approval must specifically refer to this AD.
(j) Additional Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Stefanie Roesli,
Aviation Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA
98198; phone: 206-231-3964; email: [email protected].
(2) Material identified in this AD that is not incorporated by
reference is available at the address specified in paragraph (k)(3)
this AD.
(k) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of the material listed in this paragraph
under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
(i) Boeing Alert Requirements Bulletin 767-57A0148 RB, dated
October 10, 2024.
(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For Boeing material identified in this AD, contact Boeing
Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Contractual & Data Services (C&DS),
2600 Westminster Blvd., MC 110-SK57, Seal Beach, CA 90740-5600;
telephone 562-797-1717; website myboeingfleet.com.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness
Products Section, Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St.,
Des Moines, WA. For information on the availability of this material
at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations, or email [email protected].
Issued on March 4, 2026.
Lona C. Saccomando,
Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-04829 Filed 3-11-26; 8:45 am]
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