On August 18, 2021, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) published an interim rule with request for comments in the Federal Register at 86 FR 46103. The interim rule implemented the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3116 for appointing certain post-secondary students to certain positions in the competitive service.

During the 60-day comment period between August 18, 2021, and October 18, 2021, OPM received 21 written sets of comments on the regulations. The comments were received from two non-profit organizations, two labor unions representing federal employees, five agencies, and 12 members of the public. OPM did not address the following suggestions from commenters that are outside the scope of this rulemaking:

• One comment asked about the impact this hiring authority would have on the Pathways Programs for students and recent graduates and attracting higher graded graduate students.

• One comment suggested that OPM should implement higher federal salaries.

• One comment suggested that the rule may be unnecessarily burdensome to applicants.

Many comments made arguments either for or against the authority in a more general manner, in addition to lodging specific comments on particular regulatory provisions. These are addressed below, at the outset of the discussion.

OPM received several comments related to how the agency determined the time limit associated with appointments made using this authority and the extension of temporary and term appointments. Two agencies requested clarifying guidance about how an agency makes the determination of whether to use a temporary or term appointment. Specifically, one agency asked if the duration of the appointment was based on the student's curriculum or the agency's need. The other agency asked whether an agency could give a term appointment of two years if the student anticipates completing a degree in less than a year.

The regulation allows an agency to select the appointment duration that coincides with the student's curriculum. We have written the provision in this manner to allow agencies the flexibility to set an appointment duration that meets the needs of both the student and the agency. When selecting an appointment duration, the agency should select a reasonable length that corresponds with the student's expected degree completion date. For example, an agency anticipating that a student will graduate in 6 to 8 months of the effective date of the appointment should make the appointment for up to 1 year to allow flexibility in case the completion of the degree is delayed by an unforeseen situation. An initial two-year appointment for this situation would not be appropriate.

We received several comments on the ability to extend temporary or term appointments beyond the regulatory time limitations of 24 months for temporary appointments or four years for term appointments. One labor union stated that agencies should be required to request OPM approval for extensions beyond four years. Two federal agencies encouraged OPM to delegate the approval of extensions to agencies. One of these agencies presented several compelling reasons in support of delegating extensions of term appointments beyond four years. These reasons include:

• Many individuals need to attend school part-time and work in the evenings (or vice versa) due to financial hardships or family responsibilities. The four-year term limit only benefits those who have the means to complete school in the typical timeframe.

• Limiting appointments to four years may adversely affect an agency's ability to attract students who need longer than usual to complete their degree.

• Students in programs that include combined degree or accelerated degree programs where students can earn credits for both an undergraduate and master's degree at the same time would face an additional challenge to continued employment under the authority.

That same agency specifically recommended removing the four-year limit for term appointments under this authority because there is nothing in the statue that limits the appointments to four years.

OPM agrees and has modified the duration for term appointments under this authority in § 316.901 consistent with 5 CFR 316.301. This will enable agencies to make term appointments for up to four years (see § 316.301(a)), for an initial duration beyond 4 years when authorized by OPM for non-STEM positions (see § 316.301(b)), or for up to ten years for covered STEM occupations (see § 316.301(c)), as appropriate.

OPM received three comments related to the application of veterans' preference. Two comments from individuals encouraged OPM to require agencies to apply veterans' preference, especially for disabled veterans. Another commenter asked if veterans' preference would be required when an agency uses USAJOBS to notify the public about opportunities that will be filled using the authority. The wording in 5 U.S.C. 3116(b)(1) clearly authorizes an agency to make appointments without regard to any provision of 5 U.S.C. 3309 through 3319 and 3330, which outline the requirements to apply veterans' preference. For this reason, OPM cannot include a requirement to apply veterans' preference when using this authority.

OPM received four comments requesting that the use of USAJOBS be a mandatory requirement when using this hiring authority. The commenters indicated that requiring the use of USAJOBS.gov would ensure transparency and that without the requirement the visibility of opportunities may be limited. Additionally, the commenter indicated that the absence of a USAJOBS posting may hinder the general public and interested applicants' ability to track opportunities. While OPM does not disagree with these claims, we are unable to modify the regulations to require the use of USAJOBS. The requirement to post competitive service opportunities on USAJOBS.gov is based in 5 U.S.C. 3330. The provisions at 5 U.S.C. 3116(b) specifically state that that an agency may make appointments without regard to 5 U.S.C. 3330. This means that agencies may provide the required public notice through USAJOBS or through other venues as discussed below.

We received a number of comments focused on the content needed for inclusion in a job announcement. One agency requested information about how the information for public notice was different from the requirements for the job announcement. Another agency asked whether agencies could conduct targeted advertisements with minority serving institutions. The public notice requirement is for agencies to share information about opportunities in a manner that provides for recruitment from all segments of society to produce qualified applicants and ensure potential applicants have appropriate information relevant to the positions available. An agency meets the public notice requirement by using job announcements on USAJOBS or by posting job announcements on the agency's website. Either of these options may be supplemented by posting on third-party websites and strategic recruitment activities to tell the public and other strategic recruiting sources about opportunities that will be filled using this authority. When conducting strategic advertising to recruiting sources, an agency cannot craft an announcement that limits the acceptance of applications from one institution and excludes other applicants.

Another commenter asked whether the hiring agency has the flexibility to determine what an announcement will look like. An agency may use any format it likes when crafting an announcement for its web page or a third-party website provided that the announcement includes the following information, and it gives a potential applicant a realistic preview about the opportunity:

• position title, series, grade and pay level, minimum qualifications, and geographic location;

• whether the position will be filled on a temporary or term basis (and in the case of a term appointment whether the agency may extend the appointment up to the 4-year limit);

• whether an individual in the position will be eligible for promotion while a student and upon conversion;

• the potential for conversion to a position in the agency's permanent workforce;

• any pertinent flexibilities that may be offered in conjunction with the position ( e.g., reasonable accommodation or other workplace accommodations in accordance with the President's return to work directive, or student loan repayments);

• information on how to apply; and

• equal employment opportunity and reasonable accommodation statements. (Agencies may use the recommended statements located on OPM's USAJOBS website.)

Finally, an agency asked if it is possible to advertise for both temporary and term opportunities in the same announcement.

The regulations do not prohibit an agency from advertising for both temporary and term appointments using the same announcement. If an agency chooses to use this approach, then it must make clear what is being offered and establish appropriate procedures to ensure that all parties involved know the basis for whether a temporary or term appointment will be offered to applicants who are selected for employment.

An agency asked if it may accept applications outside of a job announcement or website posting or after an announcement has closed. OPM's response is no because the public notice provisions in 5 U.S.C. 3116 and § 316.905 require that an agency advertise opportunities that will be filled using the authority. Accepting applications outside of an announcement or after an announcement has closed would conflict with this requirement. Additionally, such a practice would not support the merit system principle of fair and open competition (5 U.S.C. 2301). Agencies should follow their existing policies for accepting applications to competitive service announcements.

An agency also asked whether an appointment can be extended if the announcement did not address the possibility of an extension. The announcement must provide a realistic preview of the position, availability of benefits, and the possibility for extension to the appointment duration in accordance with 5 CFR part 316, subparts B and C. If the announcement used to fill the position does not include information on the potential for extension of the appointment, anyone selected from the announcement would not be eligible for an extension.

An agency asked how applicants hired under the authority should be assessed. Agencies use the same assessment for hiring students under this authority as they do when filling the position under other hiring authorities (and at the same grade level) in accordance with Executive Order (E.O.) 14170, “Reforming the Federal Hiring Process and Restoring Merit to Government Service. See 90 FR 8621 (Jan. 30, 2025).

Consistent with E.O. 14170 and section II.A. of the OPM-Executive Office of the President (EOP) joint memorandum “Merit Hiring Plan” ( https://www.opm.gov/chcoc/transmittals/2025/Merit%20Hiring%20Plan%205-29-2025%20FINAL.pdf ), agencies should use a skills-based assessment approach when filling positions under this authority. Skills-based hiring shifts the focus from what applicants say on a resume to what applicants can do as demonstrated through proven, competency-based assessments. In accordance with E.O. 13932, “Modernizing and Reforming the Assessment and Hiring of Federal Job Candidates”, agencies must revamp position descriptions so that they delineate eligibility and qualification criteria and eliminate any requirements that are not relevant. 85 FR 39457 (July 1, 2020). Section 3 of E.O. 13932 directs agencies to utilize assessments to determine the extent to which candidates possess relevant knowledge, skills, competencies, and abilities. Skills-based hiring is particularly more important when filling positions at or near the GS-11 grade levels under this authority.

OPM received three comments recommending that the eligibility criteria in § 316.902 be expanded to include students pursuing associates degrees, trade school or certificate programs, and Department of Labor-approved apprenticeship programs. OPM is unable to expand the eligibility requirements for this authority because the provisions in 5 U.S.C. 3116(a)(2) define a student as “. . . an individual enrolled or accepted for enrollment in an institution of higher education who is pursuing a baccalaureate or graduate degree on at least a part-time basis . . .” For this reason, we have removed the references to certificate programs found in § 315.714(b)(1), § 316.901, and § 316.910. OPM recognizes this definition, based on the authorizing statute, limits the type of students that may be recruited using the authority. However, there are other programs available to agencies such as the Pathways Internship Program that may be used to recruit students pursuing other types of degrees or certificates.

One agency asked for guidance on how a students' deferral of enrollment would affect a student's eligibility when applications are accepted from students accepted for enrollment. Deferred enrollment generally refers to a situation in which a student who is accepted for admission for a specific academic period delays or defers enrollment to a later academic period. Such applicants may be selected and begin working under this authority if the student can provide documentation of acceptance, deferral that indicates when enrollment is expected to begin, and actually begins enrollment at the deferred time. After enrollment begins, the student must be required to submit additional documentation to verify that they are currently enrolled. If the student does not later provide documentation of actual enrollment, they would be subject to separation as required by § 316.912(b). For example, at the time of appointment in June 2025, the student provides documentation of deferred enrollment that will begin in January of the following year (2026). To continue employment, the agency must require that the student provide enrollment documentation in January 2026.

A labor union suggested that OPM should explicitly require a nexus between the position being filled and the student's area of study to limit the potential for abuses such as favoritism. OPM disagrees that there needs to be a nexus between the position and the student's area of study. Students may change majors or career goals while pursuing a degree. Upon conversion, students must meet all qualification requirements of the permanent position. A requirement for a nexus would limit flexibility for the agency and restrict opportunities for students. For this reason, we are not incorporating a requirement for a nexus between the student's academic study and the position being filled.

Two commenters requested information on whether the position descriptions used for Pathways Internship positions may be used for positions filled under this authority. An agency may use similar position descriptions for Pathways Intern positions for Post-Secondary Student positions. However, an independent position description may need to be established as required by an agency's classification policy.

A labor union opposed the provisions in § 316.906 that allow time spent under this authority to be creditable toward meeting the competitive service probationary period. OPM disagrees with this comment. The regulations in 5 CFR 11.4 state that time served in a federal position may be creditable toward meeting the probationary period requirement when the service is in the same agency, in the same line of work and does not include a break in service of more than 30 days.

An agency asked for additional guidance for situations where the student may attain competitive status upon conversion. Competitive status is acquired upon completion of a probationary period (which includes certification by the hiring agency in accordance with Civil Service Rule XI). Upon conversion to a permanent position the agency looks at the time served under the post-secondary student authority and determines if it meets the criteria in 5 CFR 11.4 (same agency, same line of work, no break in service of more than 30 days). For example, a student served 8 months under the appointment before conversion at the agency. The agency determined that the time served prior to conversions met the criteria in 5 CFR 11.4 and is creditable toward the one-year probationary period requirement. After conversion, the employee must serve an additional four months and be certified for continued employment by the employing agency in accordance with 5 CFR 11.2(d), 11.4, and 11.5, before meeting the probationary period requirement and gaining competitive status. In a different example the student served one year under the authority before conversion. The agency determines that the time served prior to conversion met the criteria in 5 CFR 11.4 and is creditable toward the one- year probationary period requirement. At the time of conversion, the agency documents that the probationary period has been met and that certification of the employee's continued employment advances the public interest in accordance with 5 CFR 11.5, if applicable, and the student obtains competitive status upon conversion.

OPM received several comments asking for clarification on the provisions for breaks in program. These comments included questions about how a break in program is defined; how a break in program is different from when the employee no longer meets the definition of a student; and whether a maximum period of leave without pay (LWOP) may be defined when establishing an agency policy for breaks in program.

A break in program is defined as a period of time when a student is working for the agency but is unable to go to school or is neither attending classes nor working for the agency. While breaks in program are not common, they are permissible in certain circumstances such as, but not limited to, medical leave, financial hardship, or military service. An agency may use its discretion to either approve or deny a request for a break in program, as well as determine the length of the break. For example, a student who will be unable to work for the first month of the three-month summer break between school years may be approved for a break in program. A student who has withdrawn from one educational institution to transfer to a different one may also be approved for a break in program. In both instances the student intends to return to enrollment. However, a student who is withdrawing from enrollment at an educational institution and has no plans or intention to return to enrollment within reasonable period of time would no longer meet the definition of student and should not be approved for a break in program.

Agencies have the discretion to determine what is considered a reasonable period for a break in program depending on the student's reasons for requesting a break in program. To allow agencies the most discretion and flexibility, OPM is not prescribing a maximum length of time for a break in program or the maximum number of breaks in program that an agency may authorize for a student. Using this discretion, an agency can create policies that address the length or number of breaks in program that may be allowed. OPM has modified § 316.908 to indicate that an agency may create policies that address limitations on the duration and frequency of breaks in program.

One agency recommended OPM clarify whether individuals appointed under a term appointment may be promoted. We have modified § 316.909 to make clear that only students on term appointments are eligible for career ladder promotions prior to conversion.

Another commenter asked OPM to modify the regulatory text by including information addressing promotion potential upon conversion to a permanent position in the competitive service. OPM agrees and has modified § 316.909(c) to address this comment. We have also added information to indicate that students appointed under this authority may be eligible for non-competitive career ladder promotions upon conversion provided that the agency has established a career ladder or promotion potential for the position and the public notification for the position filled by the student stated the potential for promotion and specified a career ladder upon conversion.

One commenter requested the final regulation include a provision allowing promotion potential beyond the GS-11 level. OPM has modified § 316.904 Classification and § 316.909 Promotion to clarify that career ladders or promotion potential beyond the GS-11 grade level may be used with this authority.

Two commenters questioned why students cannot be converted to permanent positions in other agencies. The governing statute at 5 U.S.C. 3116(e) states that an agency head may convert a student serving in an appointment under this authority to a permanent appointment in the competitive service within the agency. For this reason, the regulations do not allow the conversion of students to a permanent appointment in a different agency.

Several commenters inquired about the time frame in which a student may be converted to a permanent position in the competitive service. An agency must convert the student to a permanent position as soon as practical after the completion of a degree and prior to the expiration of the appointment. The regulations do not prescribe a specific time frame to allow time for the agency to receive documentation of degree completion. Agencies should try to process the conversion as soon as possible after the documentation is received. For example, a student on an appointment that expires in December completes a degree on June 1 and provides documentation about completion of their degree on July 1. The agency should convert the student within one or two pay periods of receiving the documentation. The agency should not wait until December to convert the student.

Several commenters asked OPM to clarify the time frame for notifying a student that he or she will not be converted to a permanent position. A hiring agency should notify a student that he or she will not be converted as soon as possible once the agency makes its determination. Prompt notification that conversion is not available will allow the student time to make alternate career plans. For example, in January a student reminds their manager that they will be graduating in May and asks for information about whether a permanent position will be available. Due to budgetary constraints, the manager determines in February that the agency will not be able to convert the student upon completion of the degree. The manager should inform the student in February that conversion will not be available. The student would need to be separated within one pay period of when the degree is completed in May.

One commenter asked whether a student could remain on the rolls until the expiration date of the appointment when the agency is not going to convert the student to a permanent position. When an agency has determined it will not convert a student, that agency must terminate the student as soon as practicable after the student completes their degree requirements. Additionally, the agency should inform a student as soon as possible once that determination has been made to allow the student time to make alternate career plans.

One commenter suggested OPM should consider allowing a waiver of the 640-work hour requirement for those students who have grade point average (GPA) of 3.5 or higher. OPM is not adopting this recommendation. The governing statute at 5 U.S.C. 3116(e)(2) requires, as a condition of conversion, that a student must complete not less than 640 hours of current continuous employment. The statute does not give OPM the discretion to waive this requirement.

One agency asked how agencies should monitor the conversion requirements. The employing agency is responsible for keeping track of when students have met conversion requirements. This process would be similar to what agencies currently do to track conversion requirements under the Pathways programs or other hiring programs that have non-competitive conversion requirements.

OPM received several comments on the requirement that appointments under this authority are limited to 15 percent of the number of students appointed in the prior year. Some commenters advocated for a higher limit to meet the needs of the agencies. Other commenters supported the limit and advocated that OPM's discretion to lower the limit could be a tool to prevent misuse or abuse of the authority. OPM agrees that the ability to lower the limit could be a tool to prevent misuse or abuse of the authority. We have no reason at this time to lower the current limit allowed by statute. The 15 percent limit was established in 5 U.S.C. 3116(d)(1). OPM does not have the discretion to prescribe a higher limitation in the regulations.

Some commenters questioned the type of appointments that may be counted when determining the limit. These comments indicated that not being able to count appointments made under the authority would be unnecessarily restrictive; and that the count should be expanded to any appointments of students. One individual suggested OPM include students hired under non-title 5 U.S.C. hiring authorities, as well as the title 5 excepted service Schedule A appointing authority for individuals with disabilities (5 CFR 213.3102(u)). Another commenter supported the statutory limitation of 15 percent of prior year's student hires but exclude appointments under this authority. One non-profit organization indicated that the calculation should be based on all competitive appointments hired as indicated in 5 U.S.C. 3115. Some agencies asked whether an agency could count hires through programs that provide conversion to the competitive service after completing a trial period in the excepted service pursuant to 5 CFR 11.3, such as the Pathways Recent Graduate Program, or appointments of Pathways Interns on temporary appointments. An agency asked if each appointment counts separately if an intern is given multiple appointments in the same year or if temporary or indefinite appointments needed to be treated differently when counting the number of appointments to determine the numerical limits. Other commentors asked whether an agency could in future years count appointments made under the post-secondary student authority. A different commenter recommended that OPM follow the original language of the statute and use all competitive positions hired toward the count instead of students. In 2019, Congress amended the language in 5 U.S.C. 3116(d)(1) from:

“. . . the head of an agency may appoint under this section during a fiscal year may not exceed the number equal to 15 percent of the number of students that the agency head appointed during the previous fiscal year to a position in the competitive service . . .”

to

“. . . the head of an agency may appoint under this section during a fiscal year may not exceed the number equal to 15 percent of the number of students that the agency head appointed during the previous fiscal year . . .”

This change in the statute means the 15 percent limitation is based on the number of students appointed by the agency during the previous fiscal year. OPM agrees additional clarification is necessary on which types of appointments may be counted when determining the numerical limit. We have modified the provisions at § 316.913 to clarify that an agency may count appointments made under this authority and other appointments of students made using an appointing authority that was specifically created for the appointment of students. This would include appointments under the Pathways Internship Authority, the Post-secondary Student authority, agency specific statutory appointing authorities for hiring students; and other statutory appointing authorities for hiring students such as the Boren Awards Programs (under 50 U.S.C. 1902) appointments.

An agency suggested that, when determining the numerical limit, an agency should be able to include in the count of the prior fiscal year's appointments conditional job offers that were given but for which the agency was unable to finalize the appointment before the conclusion of the fiscal year due to the timing of the background investigation, medical clearances, or other preemployment process. OPM is not adopting this suggestion. The authorizing statute clearly defines that the numerical limit is based on the number of appointments made and not the number of job offers given.

One federal union indicated support for the use of a reporting requirement. The authorizing statute required specific reporting requirements for the first 3 years after enactment of the statute (August 2018 through August 2020). Because the dates for required reporting have passed, we have removed the reporting requirement from the regulatory text. OPM continues to conduct oversight of all hiring activities including agency use of this hiring authority.

OPM moves § 316.915 ( Special provisions for Department of Defense ) to replace the current § 316.914 ( Reporting requirement ). OPM also updates the language to reflect that Sec. 1116 of Public Law 118-31 extended the DOD direct hire authority for post-secondary students until Sept 30, 2030, and that subpart I does not apply to DOD during that time.

Finally, OPM is updating and correcting the Authority citations for part 316.

OPM is issuing this rule to implement 5 U.S.C. 3116. This statute establishes a hiring authority for students into time limited positions at specified grade levels in the competitive service. The interim rule allowed agencies to make appointments of post-secondary students directly into the competitive service positions, without regard to rating, ranking, veterans' preference, and public notice provisions in 5 U.S.C. 3309-3319 and 3330. Upon successful completion of degree requirements, the students may be converted into permanent positions in the competitive service. Commenters requested clarification regarding a variety of implementation issues related to the interim rule. The final rule also supports section I.C.1 (Early Career Recruitment) of the “Merit Hiring Plan.” This authority, when combined with agencies' strategic recruitment and Merit Hiring Plan actions pertaining to early career talent, may help agencies better recruit and fill mission critical occupations.

OPM expects the impact of this final rule will be a streamlined hiring flexibility for recruiting early career talent. This rule finalizes non-competitive procedures for appointment of eligible students directly into competitive service positions and allows agencies to convert students who meet certain regulatory requirements into permanent competitive service positions. This final rule clarifies regulatory text from the interim rule based on comments received and provides additional flexibility to agencies with respect to permissible appointment lengths. The purpose of this rule is to provide agencies with information necessary to create policies and procedures for using the authority to hire post-secondary students as a part of an agency's overall strategy to implement strategic workforce, and recruitment plans. It may also help agencies address hiring and recruiting gaps for filling early career talent positions.

OPM's implementing regulations are required by statute and cannot be avoided. The statue prescribes eligibility requirements; types of positions that can be filled using the authority; public notice requirements; a numerical limit for the number of appointments made; and reporting requirements.

The strict wording of the eligibility requirements in the statute regulations does not allow the regulations to offer any alternatives. For this reason, the eligibility requirements in the rule match those specifically prescribed by the statute.

For the public notice requirement created in the statute, OPM has given agencies the flexibility to use a variety of ways to tell the public about opportunities. While the regulations specify the information required to be included in the public notice, they also allow the agency the discretion to determine the format of the notice when the agency is not using OPM's USAJOBS platform.

The numerical limitation on the use of the authority is prescribed in statute. The precise wording does not allow OPM to prescribe a limit higher than 15 percent or a waiver of the limit. Our approach in writing the implementing regulations for this issue is to provide instructions and clarifying information on how an agency must calculate the statutorily prescribed limit.

This final rule will affect the operations of over 80 Federal agencies— ranging from cabinet-level departments to small independent agencies. We estimate that this rule will require individuals employed by these agencies to modify policies and procedures to implement the rule and perform outreach and recruitment activities when using the authority. For the purpose of this cost analysis, OPM assumed an average salary rate of Federal employees performing this work will be the rate in 2026 for GS-14, step 5, from the Washington, DC, locality pay table ($163,104 annual locality rate and $78.15 hourly locality rate). We assume that the total dollar value of labor, which includes wages, benefits, and overhead, is equal to 200 percent of the wage rate, resulting in an assumed labor cost of $156.30 per hour.

In order to comply with the regulatory changes in this final rule, affected agencies may need to review and update their policies and procedures. We estimate that, in the first year following publication of this final rule, this will require an average of 100 hours of work by employees with an average hourly cost of $156.30. This would result in estimated costs in the first year of implementation of about $15,630 per agency, and about $1,250,400 in total Governmentwide. We do not believe this rule will substantially increase the ongoing administrative costs to agencies (including the administrative costs of administering the program and hiring and training new staff).

This authority will allow agencies to use strategic recruiting to hire students in baccalaureate or graduate degree programs. When using the authority, agencies will have additional flexibility in how college students are hired. Federal agencies will determine recruitment sources and processes for the solicitation of applications and will be held responsible for merit-based selections and in accordance with the Merit Hiring Plan guidance. This authority—when combined with agencies' strategic recruitment plans—may help agencies better recruit to fill mission critical occupations.

If any of the provisions of this final rule is held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person or circumstance, we believe that the other sections should be severable and would not be impacted. Similarly, many of the operational requirements have no bearing on other provisions and are severable. For example, a holding that a hiring provision is invalid should not impact provisions related to conversion. In enforcing the provisions of this rule, OPM will comply with all applicable legal requirements. OPM did not receive any comments on severability in the proposed rule.

OPM has examined the impact of this rule as required by E.O. 12866 and 13563, which direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits (including potential economic, environmental, public, health, and safety effects, distributive impacts, and equity). A regulatory impact analysis must be prepared for rules that have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities. This rule is not a “significant regulatory action” under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866. This rule is considered a deregulatory action under E.O. 14192.

The Director of the Office of Personnel Management certifies that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This regulation will not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Therefore, in accordance with E.O. 13132, it is determined that this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant preparation of a Federalism Assessment.

This regulation meets the applicable standard set forth in section 3(a) and (b)(2) of E.O. 12988.

Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) requires that agencies assess anticipated costs and benefits before issuing any rule that would impose spending costs on State, local, or tribal governments in the aggregate, or on the private sector, in any 1 year of $100 million in 1995 dollars, updated annually for inflation. That threshold is currently approximately $206 million. This rulemaking will not result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, in excess of the threshold. Thus, no written assessment of unfunded mandates is required.

OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has determined this rule does not satisfy the criteria listed in 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person is required to respond to, nor shall any person be subject to a penalty for failure to comply with, a collection of information subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, as amended (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ) (PRA), unless that collection of information displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Control Number. This rule involves the following OMB-approved collections of information subject to the PRA: USAJOBS 3.0 (OMB Control Number 3206-0219).

OPM believes any additional burden associated with this final rule falls within the existing estimates currently associated with this control number. OPM does not anticipate that the implementation of this final rule will increase the cost burden to members of the public. Additional information regarding this collection of information—including all background materials—can be found at https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAMain by using the search function to enter either the title of the collection or the OMB Control Number.

The Director of OPM, Scott Kupor, reviewed and approved this document and has authorized the undersigned to electronically sign and submit this document to the Office of the Federal Register for publication.

Accordingly, Office of Personnel Management amends 5 CFR parts 315 and 316 as follows:

In 1975, Congress passed the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA), Public Law 94-163. Title III of EPCA amended the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (15 U.S.C. 1901 et. seq. ) (the Motor Vehicle Act) by mandating fuel economy standards for automobiles produced in, or imported into, the United States. This legislation, as amended, requires every manufacturer to meet applicable specified corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards for their fleets of light-duty vehicles under 8,500 pounds that the manufacturer manufactures in any model year. 1 The Department of Transportation (through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)) is responsible for prescribing the CAFE standards and enforcing the penalties for failure to meet these standards. 49 U.S.C. 32902. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is responsible for calculating each manufacturer's fleet CAFE value. 49 U.S.C. 32902 and 32904.

With respect to electric vehicles, EPA uses the PEF determined by DOE in the calculation of CAFE standards. DOE reviews the PEF annually and determines whether revisions are necessary based on the following factors:

(i) The approximate electrical energy efficiency of the vehicle, considering the kind of vehicle and the mission and weight of the vehicle.

(ii) The national average electrical generation and transmission efficiencies.

(iii) The need of the United States to conserve all forms of energy and the relative scarcity and value to the United States of all fuel used to generate electricity.

(iv) The specific patterns of use of electric vehicles compared to petroleum-fueled vehicles.

49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B).

Section 18 of the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee Act of 1979 further amended the Electric and Hybrid Vehicle Research, Development, and Demonstration Act of 1976 by adding a new paragraph (3) to section 13(c), which directed the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Administrator of EPA, to conduct a seven-year evaluation program of the inclusion of electric vehicles in the calculation of average fuel economy. As required by section 503(a)(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act, DOE proposed a method of calculating the petroleum-equivalent fuel economy of electric vehicles utilizing a PEF in a new 10 CFR part 474 on May 21, 1980. 45 FR 34008. The rule was finalized on April 21, 1981, and became effective May 21, 1981. 46 FR 22747. The seven-year evaluation program was completed in 1987, and the calculation of the annual petroleum equivalency factors was not extended past 1987.

DOE published a proposed rule for a permanent PEF for use in calculating petroleum-equivalent fuel economy values of electric vehicles on February 4, 1994, and obtained comments from interested parties. 59 FR 5336 (1994 NOPR). Following consideration of comments, DOE's own internal re-examination of the assumptions underlying the proposed rule, and existing regulations for other classes of alternative fuel vehicles, DOE decided to modify the PEF calculation approach proposed in 1994. The 1994 NOPR was later withdrawn, and DOE proposed a modified approach in a July 14, 1999, notice of proposed rulemaking. 64 FR 37905 (1999 NOPR). DOE published a final rule with a PEF of 82,049 Watt-hours per gallon on June 12, 2000, that amended 10 CFR part 474. 65 FR 36985 (2000 Final Rule).

On October 22, 2021, DOE received a petition for rulemaking from the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Sierra Club requesting that DOE update its regulations at 10 CFR part 474. DOE published a notice of receipt of the petition on December 29, 2021, and solicited comment on the petition and whether DOE should proceed with a rulemaking. 86 FR 73992. In April 2023, DOE agreed that the inputs upon which the calculations and PEF values are based were outdated and that the technology and market penetration of EVs has significantly changed since the 2000 Final Rule and granted the petition from NRDC and Sierra Club. When granting the petition, DOE also published a notice of proposed rulemaking. 88 FR 21525 (April 11, 2023) (2023 NOPR).

In the 2023 NOPR, DOE proposed to update the PEF value and revise the methodology used to calculate the PEF. One of the proposed revisions was to remove the fuel content factor (FCF) as DOE determined that the fuel content factor was not supported by the underlying statutory provisions. 88 FR 21525, 21530. However, in a final rule published on March 29, 2024, DOE elected to phase-out the FCF between Model Year (MY) 2027 and MY 2030 rather than removing it from the PEF equation as of the effective date of the final rule. 89 FR 22041, 22052 (2024 Final Rule).

On April 5, 2024, the states of Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and the American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Iowa, et al. v. Wright (Case No. 24-1721 (8th Cir.)). In a September 5, 2025, opinion, the Eighth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated the 2024 Final Rule, and remanded the proceedings to DOE. Specifically, the court ruled, among other things, that the FCF was illegal or otherwise contrary to statute. Consistent with the court's opinion and DOE's own determination in the 2023 NOPR, DOE is issuing this interim final rule to immediately remove the FCF from the PEF calculation. As noted previously, DOE will propose additional revisions to the PEF calculation in a forthcoming notice of proposed rulemaking.

In the 1994 NOPR, DOE proposed a scarcity factor as an intermediate factor that used a complex approach to quantify the relative scarcity and value of all fuels used to generate electricity in the United States. 59 FR 5336, 5339; see 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii). This proposed scarcity factor was based on estimates of the U.S. share of world reserves of fossil fuels and estimated rates of depletion of world reserves. The scarcity factor was derived by determining the U.S. percent and numeric share of the world reserve market and calculating the rate at which the United States is depleting each fuel source's reserves. These values were then normalized to obtain the relative scarcity value for each fuel source. 59 FR 5336, 5338-5339.

In response to the 1994 NOPR, DOE received comments that were critical of the proposed scarcity factor. After considering these comments, DOE concluded that scarcity did not appear to be of concern and should not be a guiding factor in setting the PEF value. 64 FR 37905, 37907. In the 1999 NOPR, due to concerns with assumptions and calculations used, DOE decided to replace the scarcity factor rather than attempt to refine it. After considering alternative approaches to quantifying scarcity and value, DOE determined that each of these approaches were found to have technical or policy shortcomings or internal inconsistencies. Id. at 37906-37907.

Instead of trying to quantify scarcity, DOE examined existing law, specifically 49 U.S.C. 32905, which prescribes procedures for determining the petroleum-equivalent fuel economy of non-EV alternative fueled vehicles. Id. at 37907. DOE then determined to include an FCF of 1.0/0.15 into its PEF calculation for EVs, noting that this approach would be consistent with the existing regulatory and statutory procedures for other types of alternative fuel vehicles, the approach treated manufacturers of all alternative fuel vehicles similarly, and that the calculation is relatively simple and straightforward to apply. Id. at 37907.

In the 2000 Final Rule, DOE stated that although it did not expressly incorporate scarcity in the 1999 NOPR, DOE added the FCF, in part, to help address scarcity issues by rewarding electric vehicles' benefits to the Nation relative to petroleum-fueled vehicles. 65 FR 36986, 36988. Specifically, DOE noted that the 1.0/0.15 factor results in a substantial adjustment to the raw calculated energy efficiency of electric vehicles, which would result in a higher petroleum-equivalent fuel economy for EVs and that manufacturers would be rewarded for adding EVs to its corporate-wide fleet. Id.

In the 2023 NOPR, DOE proposed removing the FCF from the PEF equation. In addition to changing EV technology and market penetration and the fact that the current PEF value overvalues EVs in determining fleetwide CAFE compliance, 2 DOE also stated that the FCF lacks legal support. Specifically, DOE noted that the FCF is based on the same factor for non-EV alternative fuel vehicles under 49 U.S.C. 32905. However, DOE noted that section 32905 does not apply the factor to EVs. DOE concluded that although DOE sought to treat EVs the same as other alternative fuel vehicles by using the same fuel content factor, there is no basis to do so in sections 32905 or 32904.

DOE received several comments on its proposal to remove FCF from the PEF calculation. In the 2024 Final Rule, DOE decided instead to phase out the FCF starting with MY 2027 EVs through MY 2030 vehicles. DOE reasoned that other incentives and support for EVs would become more fully operative and effective over time, reducing the need for the FCF. But, in the meantime, DOE concluded that retaining and phasing out the FCF would “incentivize additional EV production” and result in petroleum conservation. Id.

On April 5, 2024, the states of Iowa, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, and the American Free Enterprise Chamber of Commerce filed a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Iowa, et al. v. Wright (Case No. 24-1721 (8th Cir.)). In a September 5, 2025, opinion, the Court granted the petition for review, vacated the 2024 Final Rule, and remanded the proceedings to DOE. Specifically, the court ruled, among other things, that the FCF exceeded DOE's authority under the substantive statute.

The Court observed that when DOE adopted the 2024 Final Rule, DOE justified the retention and gradual phasing out of the FCF on 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii). Iowa, et al. v. Wright (Slip Opinion 21). However, the Court determined that DOE's reading of subsection 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii) is broad and contradicts DOE's decades-long construction of the statute because the FCF does not try to quantify the relative value of scarcity of various fuels but instead applies a flat fuel content factor. Id. at 21-22. Furthermore, the Court notes that DOE does not tie the 1.0/0.15 factor to the relative costs of various fuels but instead justifies the FCF as an incentive for EV production. Id. at 22. The Court noted the stark difference between DOE's previous interpretation of factor (iii) from the reading of subsection 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii) adopted by DOE in the 2024 Final Rule.

The Court also discussed why DOE's interpretation of subsection 32904(a)(2)(B) is not the best reading of the statute. Specifically, factor (iii) is one of four factors that DOE considers when determining the petroleum equivalency factor. The Court stated that DOE's interpretation of factor (iii) would enable DOE to set the value of the FCF at any value “so long as `applying such a fuel content factor would in fact conserve energy.' ” Id. However, the Court noted that “[i]f Congress aimed to empower DOE to incentivize the production of electric vehicles so long as the use of electric vehicles conserved energy overall and scarce fuels in particular, `Congress easily could have drafted' the statute `in that broad manner.' ” Id. at 23; citing National Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Defense, 583 U.S. 109, 128 (2018).

The Court held that “DOE exceed[ed] the boundaries of its statutory authority for the reasons discussed—the dramatic difference between DOE's current view and its previous constructions of section 32904, the broadness of the authority DOE assert[ed] by including the fuel content factor, [and] the risk of making other subsections superfluous[.]” Id. at 25. In short, the “fuel content factor—as currently determined and justified by the DOE—lacks statutory authority.” Id. at 27.

After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 2024 Final Rule in Iowa, et al. v. Wright, DOE reviewed the PEF value adopted by the 2000 Final Rule to ensure consistency with the Court's decision. For the following reasons, DOE concludes that the FCF is unlawful and, as a result, is issuing this IFR to remove the FCF from the PEF calculation.

In Iowa, et al. v. Wright, the Eighth Circuit concluded that “fuel content factor—as currently determined and justified by the DOE—lacks statutory authority” and vacated the 2024 Final Rule that preserved and then phased out the FCF. Id. (emphasis added). In this rulemaking, DOE determines that the FCF adopted by the 2000 Final Rule is not supported by section 49 U.S.C. 32904 for the same reasons the Court found the FCF, as determined and justified by DOE in the 2024 Final Rule, unlawful.

In the 1994 NOPR, DOE proposed a scarcity factor to quantify the relative scarcity and value of all fuels used to generate electricity in the United States. 59 FR 5336, 5339. However, after considering comments, in the 1999 NOPR, DOE decided to replace the scarcity factor rather than attempt to refine it. Instead of a scarcity factor that is based on the relative scarcity and value for each fuel source, DOE proposed a flat 1.0/0.15 FCF, which is based on the factor Congress set for liquid and gaseous alternative fuel in section 32905. 64 FR 37905, 37907. This marked DOE's departure from its initial interpretation of subsection 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii) and DOE abandoned its decade-long approach of attempting to quantify the relative value or scarcity of various fuels as it did in the 1981 rulemaking or the 1994 NOPR. In the 2000 Final Rule, in response to comments stating that “DOE should provide a technical basis for its application [of the 1.0/0.15 factor] to EVs, or else modify the factor accordingly,” DOE failed to provide a technical basis for setting the factor at that value. 65 FR 36986, 36988. Instead, DOE stated that it replaced the proposed scarcity factor with the FCF to simplify the calculation, and to “maintain consistency with the existing regulatory treatment of other types of alternative fueled vehicles.” Id. By adopting a flat FCF in the 2000 Final Rule, DOE contradicted its decades-long understanding that factor (iii) as requiring quantification of the relative value or scarcity of various fuels.

Additionally, in the 2000 Final Rule when DOE adopted the current FCF, DOE stated that it adopted the 1.0/0.15 FCF, in part, to help address scarcity issues by rewarding electric vehicles' benefits to the Nation relative to petroleum-fueled vehicles, in a manner consistent with the treatment of other types of alternative fueled vehicles. 65 FR 36986, 36988. Like DOE's rationale in the 2024 Final Rule, the 2000 Final Rule incorporated the FCF to incentivize manufacturers to produce more EVs. Thus, DOE interpretated subsection 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii) as enabling it to set a PEF value to incentivize the manufacture of EVs to conserve petroleum. By interpretating subsection 32904(a)(2)(B)(iii) to grant such broad authority, DOE rendered factors (i) and (ii) redundant. Similar to the Court's decision regarding the 2024 Final Rule, DOE determines that this interpretation is not the best reading of the statute.

For the reasons discussed previously, the 1.0/0.15 FCF adopted in the 2000 Final Rule is unsupported by section 32904(a)(2)(B).

Section 32905 also does not empower DOE to include a fuel content factor of 1.0/0.15 when calculating the petroleum-based fuel economy of EVs. In section 32905, Congress explicitly said that the “fuel economy” of alternative liquid fuel vehicles and gaseous fuel vehicles would be “based on” their “fuel content.” 49 U.S.C. 32905(a), (c). Congress specifically set the “fuel content” at 1.0/0.15. Id. But Congress did not do so for EVs, because section 32905 explicitly excluded EVs. Id. 32905(a) (“Except as provided in . . . section 32904(a)(2) of this title . . .”). Instead, Congress listed specific factors for DOE to consider when determining the equivalent petroleum-based fuel economy values of EVs. 49 U.S.C. 32904(a)(2)(B).

The basis for the current fuel content factor is attached to statutory provisions not pertinent to EVs. As noted, in the 2000 Final Rule, DOE set the FCF at 1.0/0.15 because that same factor applies to non-EV alternative fuel vehicles under section 32905. However, in adopting the FCF, DOE ignored that Congress intended for liquid and gaseous alternative fuel vehicles to be treated differently from EVs. Section 32905 does not apply that factor to EVs and instead instructs DOE to set the PEF value based on the four factors of subsection 32904(a)(2)(B). Accordingly, there is no basis in section 32905 for DOE to adopt the 1.0/0.15 FCF when calculating the petroleum-based fuel economy of EVs.

For these aforementioned reasons, DOE removes the FCF from the PEF calculation. The PEF value is equal to the product of the values of the gasoline-equivalent energy content of electricity (Eg), the fuel content factor of 1/0.15 , the petroleum-fueled accessory factor (AF), and the driving pattern factor (DPF). 65 FR 36986, 36987. This methodology is expressed in the following equation:

On February 19, 2025, Executive Order (E.O.) 14219, “Ensuring Lawful Governance and Implementing the President's `Department of Government Efficiency' Deregulatory Initiative,” was signed by President Trump. The E.O. directed agencies to review all regulations for consistency with law and Administration policy. The E.O. specified seven classes of regulations that agencies, in consultation with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), were required to rescind or modify.

FCA reviewed its regulations pursuant to E.O. 14219. Following the conclusion of our review, FCA identified several provisions in one regulation that meet one of the classes of regulations listed in E.O. 14219. The table below summarizes our review of our regulations:

The identified regulatory provisions in § 618.8440(b) meet class iv of E.O. 14219 because they are inconsistent with E.O. 14151, “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing,” signed on January 20, 2025, which required the termination of all diversity, equity, and inclusion mandates throughout the Federal government. These provisions require Farm Credit System (System) institutions to take diversity and inclusion into account in their business planning.

In accordance with E.O. 14219, FCA is removing or revising four paragraphs in § 618.8440 that impose diversity and inclusion requirements on System institutions. Specifically, paragraph (b)(2)(ii) will no longer require institution business plans to assess diversity as a need of the board of directors. Additionally, paragraph (b)(7)(iii) will no longer require institution human capital plans to include strategies and actions to strive for diversity and inclusion within their workforce and management. And paragraph (b)(8)(ii) will no longer require institutions, in their marketing plans' strategies and actions to market their products and services to all eligible and creditworthy persons, to have specific outreach toward diversity and inclusion. In addition, because of the deletion of paragraph (b)(7)(iii), we are removing paragraph (c)(1), which requires an institution to report annually to its board on its progress in accomplishing the strategies and actions required by paragraph (b)(7)(iii), as a conforming change. All other requirements in § 618.8440 will remain in effect.

Public notice and comment are not required for this rulemaking. Section 553(b)(B) of the Administrative Procedure Act  1 (APA) provides that when an agency for good cause finds that public notice and comment procedures are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest, the agency may issue a rule without providing notice and an opportunity for public comment. The President and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) directed agencies to repeal regulations identified as inconsistent with E.O. 14219 without public notice and comment when such action is consistent with the good cause provision of the APA. 2

FCA determined that good cause exists to finalize these amendments without public notice and comment because they implement the requirements of E.O. 14219 by removing regulatory requirements that are inconsistent with E.O. 14151. Following notice and comment procedures would delay a repeal that is legally required and would necessitate expenditure of resources in service of retaining a regulation that cannot be lawfully enforced. Nothing that might emerge during the comment period could cure the inconsistency of these requirements with E.O. 14151 or overcome FCA's non-discretionary inability to retain or enforce them, and therefore notice and comment are superfluous and “unnecessary” within the meaning of the APA.

The Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has determined that this final rule is not a “significant regulatory action” as defined by Section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866, made applicable to FCA by Executive Order 14215. This action is an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action.

Pursuant to section 605(b) of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 3 the FCA hereby certifies this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. Each of the banks in the System, considered together with its affiliated associations, has assets and annual income in excess of the amounts that would qualify them as small entities. Therefore, System institutions are not “small entities” as defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Under the provisions of the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. ), the Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has determined that this final rule is not a “major rule” as the term is defined at 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Farm Credit Administration amends 12 CFR part 618 as follows:

The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority as it amends Class D, Class E2, Class E4, and Class E5 airspace in Patuxent River, MD.

The FAA published an NPRM for Docket No. FAA-2025-5340 in the Federal Register (90 FR 59419; December 19, 2025), proposing to amend Class D, Class E2, Class E4, and Class E5 airspace above Patuxent River, MD. Interested parties were invited to participate in this rulemaking effort by submitting written comments on the proposal to the FAA. No comments were received.

Subsequent to the publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register , the FAA discovered that the Patuxent River Non-Directional Beacon (NDB) had been decommissioned. Notice of this decommissioning was published in the National Flight Data Digest (NFDD) on December 18, 2025 (NFDD 241-3). Accordingly, this final rule incorporates corrective revisions that remove the references to the Patuxent River NDB from the airspace legal descriptions for Patuxent River, MD. Because this is an administrative change that does not alter airspace boundaries or impose additional requirements on users of the airspace, the FAA finds good cause that recirculating the NPRM for public notice and comment is unnecessary.

Class D, Class E2, Class E4, and Class E5 airspace designations are published in paragraphs 5000, 6002, 6004, and 6005 of FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 on an annual basis. This document amends the latest version of that order, FAA Order JO 7400.11K, dated August 4, 2025, and effective September 15, 2025. These amendments will be published in the next update to FAA Order JO 7400.11. FAA Order JO 7400.11K, which lists Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting points, is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

This action amends 14 CFR part 71 by modifying the Class D, Class E2, Class E4, and Class E5 airspace for Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field), Patuxent River, MD. Controlled airspace is necessary for the safety and management of IFR operations in the area for existing instrument approach procedures.

This action amends the Class D airspace over Patuxent River, MD, by updating the Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field) geographic coordinates and increasing the lateral boundary of the Class D airspace to within a 4.7-mile radius of Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field) and within a .5-mile radius of Chesapeake Ranch Airport, excluding that airspace within Restricted Areas R-4005 and R-4007 when active. The superseded reference to the “Airport Facility Directory” is replaced with “Chart Supplement” in the airspace legal description.

This action amends the Class E2 airspace over Patuxent River, MD, by updating the geographic coordinates of Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field) and modifying the dimensions from the current configuration to that airspace extending upward from the surface within a 4.7-mile radius of Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field) and within 1.8 miles each side of the 047° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius of Patuxent River NAS to 6.5 miles northeast of the airport; and within 1.9 miles each side of the 233° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius to 6.2 miles southwest of the airport; and within 1.8 miles each side of the 137° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius to 10.8 miles southeast of the airport; and within a .5-mile radius of Chesapeake Ranch Airport, excluding that airspace within Restricted Areas R-4005 and R-4007 when active. This reconfiguration properly contains the currently published standard instrument approach procedures. The references to the decommissioned Patuxent VORTAC and Patuxent River NDB in the Class E2 legal description are removed.

This action also amends the Class E4 airspace over Patuxent River, MD, by updating the geographic coordinates of Patuxent River NAS (Trapnell Field) and modifying the dimensions from the current configuration to that airspace extending upward from the surface within 1.8 miles each side of the 047° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius of Patuxent River NAS to 6.5 miles northeast of the airport; and within 1.9 miles each side of the 233° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius to 6.2 miles southwest of the airport; and within 1.8 miles each side of the 137° bearing from Patuxent River NAS extending from the 4.7-mile radius to 10.8 miles southeast of the airport, excluding that airspace within Restricted Areas R-4005 and R-4007 when active. This reconfiguration properly contains the currently published standard instrument approach procedures. Additionally, the references to the decommissioned Patuxent VORTAC and Patuxent River NDB in the Class E4 legal description are removed; and the superseded reference to the “Airport Facility Directory” is replaced with “Chart Supplement”.

This action also amends the Class E5 airspace over Patuxent River, MD, by replacing the reference to the decommissioned Patuxent VORTAC with point in space coordinates using the same geographic coordinates.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore: (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a Regulatory Evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that will only affect air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this proposed rule, when promulgated, does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The FAA has determined that this action qualifies for categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1G, “FAA National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures” paragraph B-2.5(a). This airspace action is not expected to cause any potentially significant environmental impacts, and no extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant the preparation of an environmental assessment.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority as it updates the information in the South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport, South Bend, IN, Class C airspace description.

During a review of the Class C airspace description for the “South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport, IN”, the FAA identified the need to update the airport name to the “South Bend International Airport” and update the geographic coordinates to match what is currently published in the NASR database. Additionally, the FAA identified a need to update the airspace description header format to match current formatting requirements and update the publication name “Airport/Facility Directory,” which is now referred to as the “Chart Supplement”.

Class C airspace areas are published in paragraph 4000 of FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 on an annual basis. This document amends the current version of that order, FAA Order JO 7400.11K, dated August 4, 2025, and effective September 15, 2025. These amendments will be published in the next update to FAA Order JO 7400.11. FAA Order JO 7400.11K, which lists Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting points, is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

This action amends 14 CFR part 71 by updating the Class C airspace description for the former “South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport, IN”, as published in FAA Order JO 7400.11K, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points. The airport name “South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport” is changed to “South Bend International Airport” to match the Airport Master Record database. Further, to comply with current FAA airspace description formatting standards, the airport name is removed from the first line in the text header of the description, leaving just the city and state location of the airport.

Additionally, the geographic coordinates for the South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport is updated from “lat. 41°42′26″ N, long. 86°19′04″ W” to “lat. 41°42′30″ N, long. 86°19′02″ W” to match what is currently published in the NASR database. These are nominal coordinate updates that do not result in regulatorily significant changes to airspace boundaries. Lastly, the FAA is updating the publication name “Airport Facility Directory,” which is now referred to as the “Chart Supplement.”

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes agencies to dispense with ordinary notice and comment requirements when the agency for “good cause” finds that those procedures are “impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.” 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). This action will not impose any additional substantive restrictions or requirements on the persons affected by these regulations. As mentioned, the geographic coordinate updates are nominal and do not materially impact airspace boundaries. Accordingly, these changes are administrative in nature. Therefore, the FAA finds good cause that notice and public procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) is unnecessary.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore: (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that only affects air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The FAA has determined that this action of amending the “South Bend, Michiana Regional Airport, IN”, Class C airspace description to update the airport name, geographic coordinates, and title of the Chart Supplement qualifies for categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq. ), and in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1G, FAA National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures, paragraph B-2.5(a), which categorically excludes from further environmental impact review rulemaking actions that designate or modify classes of airspace areas, airways, routes, and reporting points ( see 14 CFR part 71, Designation of Class A, B, C, D, and E Airspace Areas; Air Traffic Service Routes; and Reporting Points). As such, this action is not expected to result in any potentially significant environmental impacts. In accordance with the FAA's NEPA implementation policy and procedures regarding extraordinary circumstances, the FAA has reviewed this action for factors and circumstances in which a normally categorically excluded action may have a significant environmental impact requiring further analysis. The FAA has determined that no extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

Authority for This Rulemaking

The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority as it modifies the route structure as necessary to preserve the safe and efficient flow of air traffic within the National Airspace System (NAS).

The WP “SWTHN” is frequently referenced by Air Traffic Control (ATC) Traffic Management Unit (TMU) as a fix on multiple RNAV Routes, but it is not easily pronounceable. This action renames the WP from “SWTHN” to “STORZ” on RNAV Routes Q-121 and Q-156 to enhance pronounceability. This action does not otherwise impact the routes or alter their course.

United States RNAV Routes are published in paragraph 2006 of FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 on an annual basis. This document amends the current version of that order, FAA Order JO 7400.11K, dated August 4, 2025, and effective September 15, 2025. These amendments will be published in the next update to FAA Order JO 7400.11. FAA Order JO 7400.11K, which lists Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting points, is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

This action amends 14 CFR part 71 by renaming the waypoint identified as “SWTHN” to “STORZ” on RNAV Routes Q-121 and Q-156 to ensure the WP names are pronounceable.

The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) authorizes agencies to dispense with ordinary notice and comment requirements for rules when the agency, for “good cause,” finds that those procedures are unnecessary. 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B). The renaming of the WP from “SWTHN” to “STORZ” on RNAV Routes Q-121 and Q-156 will not impose any additional restrictions or requirements on the persons affected by these regulations, as it only changes the name of an existing WP to a name that is easier to pronounce. This action also does not alter the course of the affected routes. The updating of the WP name constitutes “a routine determination, insignificant in nature and impact, and inconsequential to the industry and to the public.” Mack Trucks, Inc. v. EPA, 682 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The action is administrative in nature. Therefore, the FAA finds that notice and public procedure under 5 U.S.C. 553(b) is unnecessary.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore: (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that only affects air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The FAA has determined that this action renaming the waypoint identified as “SWTHN” to “STORZ” on RNAV Routes Q-121 and Q-156 qualifies for categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq. ) and in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1G, FAA National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures, paragraph B-2.5(a) which categorically excludes from further environmental impact review rulemaking actions that designate or modify classes of airspace areas, airways, routes, and reporting points (see 14 CFR part 71, Designation of Class A, B, C, D, and E Airspace Areas; Air Traffic Service Routes; and Reporting Points). This airspace action is not expected to cause any potentially significant environmental impacts, and no extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant preparation of an environmental assessment.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

This action eliminates NIST's regulation at 15 CFR part 272, which sets forth various marking requirements for toy, look-alike, and imitation firearms. Part 272 was promulgated by a final rule published on May 5, 1989 (54 FR 19358), to implement Section 4 of the Federal Energy Management Improvement Act of 1988 (Pub. L. 100-615), codified at 15 U.S.C. 5001. In 2022, as part of the CHIPS and Science Act, Section 4 was amended to replace the Department (and NIST) with CPSC as the relevant agency. See Public Law 117-167, 136 Stat. 1366, 1492. CPSC has since promulgated the new, operative marking requirements for toy, look-alike, and imitation firearms at 16 CFR part 1272. In sum, NIST's regulation at 15 CFR part 272 is now no longer authorized by the underlying statute, and it also has been rendered obsolete by CPSC's regulation at 16 CFR part 1272. The elimination of 15 CFR part 272 is therefore necessary to reflect Congress's amendment of 15 U.S.C. 5001, to remove outdated and obsolete regulatory language, and to minimize the risk of public confusion regarding the status and applicability of both 15 CFR part 272 and 16 CFR part 1272.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Department finds good cause to waive the prior notice and opportunity for public participation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for this final rule. The Department considers this rule to be uncontroversial, and has determined that prior notice and opportunity for public participation is unnecessary, because this rule only removes a regulation that lacks a valid statutory authorization, no longer serves any purpose, and poses some risk of confusing the public; public participation would not justify the continued maintenance of 15 CFR part 272 under the Department's regulatory policy. For the same reason, the Department has determined that delaying the effectiveness of this elimination would be contrary to the public interest. Eliminating part 272, an obsolete regulation that poses some risk of confusion, will immediately benefit the public at little to no cost. The Department therefore finds good cause to waive the public notice and comment period under 553(b)(B) and to waive the 30-day delay in effectiveness under 553(d).

The Office of Management and Budget has determined this rule is not significant pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 12866. This rule is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. This rule does not contain policies having federalism implications as the term is defined in E.O. 13132.

Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public participation are not required to be given for this rule by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) are not applicable. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required, and none has been prepared.

This rule will not impose additional reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.

This action eliminates NIST's regulations at 15 CFR parts 295 and 296, which outline the ATP and the TIP, respectively. The ATP and the TIP were grant programs operated by NIST and related to the development of technology. Part 295, which outlines the ATP, was promulgated by a final rule published on July 24, 1990 (55 FR 30145); and part 296, which outlines the TIP, was promulgated by a final rule published on June 25, 2008 (73 FR 35915). Both parts were promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. 278n, and 15 U.S.C. 278n is their cited statutory authority. But 15 U.S.C. 278n has since been repealed. See Public Law 114-329, Title II, § 205(a)(1), Jan. 6, 2018, 130 Stat. 3000. And neither the ATP nor the TIP is operationally active today. The elimination of 15 CFR parts 295 and 296 is therefore necessary to remove outdated regulatory language, minimize the possibility of public confusion regarding the status of these programs, and ensure that NIST's regulations remain accurate and up-to-date.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Department finds good cause to waive the prior notice and opportunity for public participation requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act for this final rule. The Department considers this rule to be uncontroversial, and has determined that prior notice and opportunity for public participation is unnecessary, because this rule only removes two regulations that both lack a valid statutory authorization, no longer serve any purpose, and pose some genuine risk of confusing the public; public participation would not justify the continued maintenance of either 15 CFR part 295 or 15 CFR part 296 under the Department's regulatory policy. For the same reason, the Department has determined that delaying the effectiveness of this elimination would be contrary to the public interest. Eliminating parts 295 and 296, which are obsolete and pose some risk of confusion, will immediately benefit the public at little to no cost. The Department therefore finds good cause to waive the public notice and comment period under 553(b)(B) and to waive the 30-day delay in effectiveness under 553(d).

The Office of Management and Budget has determined this rule is not significant pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 12866. This rule is an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. This rule does not contain policies having federalism implications as the term is defined in E.O. 13132.

Because a notice of proposed rulemaking and an opportunity for public participation are not required to be given for this rule by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the analytical requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ) are not applicable. Accordingly, no regulatory flexibility analysis is required, and none has been prepared.

This rule will not impose additional reporting or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. 3501, et seq.

FDA is revoking the regulations at part 26 (21 CFR part 26), which substantially reflect certain provisions of the “Agreement on Mutual Recognition Between the United States of America and the European Community” that was signed in 1998 (1998 MRA). These regulations have been superseded in part by the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex, are outdated, do not reflect current Agency practice, and are unnecessary.

The final rule revokes part 26, “Mutual Recognition of Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice Reports, Medical Device Quality System Audit Reports, and Certain Medical Device Product Evaluation Reports: United States and The European Community.” This part substantially reflects certain provisions of the 1998 MRA between the United States and the European Community (EC) that were created to better utilize the inspectional resources of each signatory by recognizing one another's inspection reports. Part 26 consists of 3 subparts: Subpart A—Specific Sector Provisions for Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practices (which substantially reflects the 1998 MRA's “pharmaceutical sectoral annex”), Subpart B—Specific Sector Provisions for Medical Devices (which substantially reflects the 1998 MRA's “medical device sectoral annex”), and Subpart C—“Framework” Provisions (which substantially reflects the 1998 MRA's “umbrella” agreement that contained general provisions applicable to the operation of all of the sectoral annexes).

FDA is taking this action under the general administrative provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act) (see generally 21 U.S.C. 301-399). We discuss our legal authority in greater detail in part IV.

Because this final rule would not impose any additional regulatory burdens, this regulation is not anticipated to result in any compliance costs and the economic impact, if any, is expected to be minimal.

Part 26 was issued in response to the 1998 MRA between the United States and the EC, under which both parties would recognize certain drug and device inspection/evaluation reports of the other, in order to more effectively allocate limited inspection resources (Mutual Recognition of Pharmaceutical Good Manufacturing Practice Inspection Reports, Medical Device Quality System Audit Reports, and Certain Medical Device Product Evaluation Reports Between the United States and the European Community, 63 FR 60122 at 60141 (November 6, 1998)). Subparts A and B of part 26 substantially reflect the 1998 MRA's pharmaceutical and medical device sectoral annexes, respectively. Subpart C of part 26 sets forth the framework provisions by which Subparts A and B can be implemented. Subpart A governs “the exchange between the parties and normal endorsement by the receiving regulatory authority of official [pharmaceutical] good manufacturing practices (GMP) inspection reports[.]” (21 CFR 26.2). Subpart B specifies “the conditions under which a party will accept the results of quality system-related evaluations and inspections and premarket evaluations of the other party with regard to medical devices as conducted by listed conformity assessment bodies (CAB's)” and provides for “other related cooperative activities.” (21 CFR 26.31(a)).

The pharmaceutical sectoral annex to the 1998 MRA was superseded by the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex ( https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements/mutual-recognition-agreements-mra ). The 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex included new terms, rendering Subpart A obsolete. The medical device sectoral annex was not addressed in the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex, but since the 1998 MRA went into effect, it has never been fully implemented. As other mechanisms ( e.g., Medical Device Single Audit Program) now exist for mutual recognition with Europe with respect to medical device inspections, Subpart B is no longer necessary. Subpart C contains general provisions applicable to both Subparts A and B that will be unnecessary once Subparts A and B are revoked.

FDA published a notice of proposed rulemaking that would revoke 21 CFR part 26 in the Federal Register on September 20, 2024 (89 FR 77062). The public was invited to submit electronic or written comments during the comment period, which closed on November 19, 2024.

FDA received eight submissions on the proposed rule by the close of the 60-day comment period with each containing one or more comments on one or more issues. Some of the comments were submitted by individuals and some were submitted anonymously. Some of the comments supported the proposed rule while others were opposed to the proposed rule.

We are issuing this final rule under the drugs, medical devices, and general administrative provisions of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 321, 331, 351, 352, 355, 360, 360b, 360c, 360d, 360e, 360f, 360g, 360h, 360i, 360j, 360l, 360m, 371, 374, 381, 382, 383, 384e, and 393) and under certain provisions of the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 216, 241, 242l, 262, 264, and 265). Under section 701(a) of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 371(a)), FDA has the authority to issue regulations, and under section 809 of the FD&C Act (21 U.S.C. 384e), FDA has the authority to “enter into arrangements and agreements with a foreign government or an agency of a foreign government to recognize the inspection of foreign establishments registered under section 510(i) in order to facilitate preapproval or risk-based inspections in accordance with the schedule established in paragraph (2) or (3) of section 510(h)[.]”

We received eight comment submissions on the proposed rule by the close of comment period, with each containing one or more comments on one or more issues. Some of the comments were submitted by individuals while others were submitted anonymously.

We describe and respond to the comments in section V.B. and V.C. of this document. We have numbered each comment to help distinguish between different comments. We have grouped similar comments together under the same number, and in some cases, we have separated different issues discussed in the same comment and designated them as distinct comments for purposes of our responses. The number assigned to each comment or comment topic is purely for organizational purposes and does not signify the comment's value or importance or the order in which comments were received.

We also received several comments that were not responsive to the content of the proposed rule, and therefore, were not considered in its final development. After reviewing and considering all comments that were responsive to the proposed rule, we are finalizing the proposed rule without change.

Several comments make general remarks either supporting or opposing the proposed rule. In the following paragraphs, we discuss and respond to such general comments.

(Comment 1) Three comments are in support of finalizing the proposed rule and recommend FDA provide clear guidance about the changes and their impact to help maintain compliance and uphold high safety and quality standards.

(Response 1) We agree with the comments and in the proposed rule we stated that the rule would not impose any new changes or additional regulatory burdens. The rule is not anticipated to result in any compliance costs and the economic impact, if any, is expected to be minimal.

(Comment 2) One comment asks how an MRA has the force of law such that it could supersede a regulation for which the American public received advanced notice and opportunity to comment.

(Response 2) MRAs are agreements between two or more countries or regulatory counterparts to recognize certain processes or procedures. In the context of FDA, MRAs have generally focused on recognizing the inspections and accepting the inspectional documents of foreign regulatory authorities. FDA's current MRAs, including the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex, are binding international agreements entered into by the United States. (22 CFR 181.2) In 2012, the 112th Congress passed, and the President signed into law, Title VII of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act (FDASIA) (Pub. L. 112-144 ) amending the FD&C Act. Under the FD&C Act as amended, FDA itself has the authority to enter into agreements to recognize inspections conducted by foreign regulatory authorities if FDA determines those authorities are capable of conducting inspections that meet the applicable requirements of the FD&C Act.

When the United States entered into an MRA with the EC in 1998, FDA issued part 26, which substantially reflects certain provisions of the 1998 MRA. Under 21 CFR 26.80(b), the 1998 MRA can be “amended in writing by the parties to that agreement.” In 2017, the 1998 MRA was amended through an exchange of letters between the United States and the European Union (EU).

The regulations at part 26 also provide that “[i]f the parties to the MRA subsequently amend or terminate the MRA, FDA will modify this part accordingly, using appropriate administrative procedures[.]” (21 CFR 26.0). We have determined that this rulemaking is an appropriate procedure for revoking the regulations at part 26.

As we explained in the proposed rule, we do not believe it is required or would be beneficial for FDA to issue regulations that substantially reflect the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex with the EU. The 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex is in force and has been successfully implemented without regulations that substantially reflect it. The same is true for the MRAs that the United States entered into subsequently with Switzerland and the United Kingdom ( https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements/mutual-recognition-agreements-mra ).

(Comment 3) One comment asserts that revoking the MRA on pharmaceutical inspections would lead to increased costs, reduced access to affordable medications, and potentially less international collaboration.

(Response 3) This rule does not revoke an MRA. This rule revokes the regulations that substantially reflect certain provisions of the 1998 MRA. As noted, in 2017, the United States and the EU completed an exchange of letters to amend the 1998 MRA. Under the 2017 Amended Pharmaceutical Annex, which is in force and has been successfully implemented, United States and EU regulators are able to utilize each other's GMP inspections of pharmaceutical manufacturing facilities. FDA's revocation of part 26 should not be interpreted as FDA retreating from our commitment to working with our foreign counterparts, including through MRAs, to achieve greater efficiencies and increase our inspectional reach.

This final rule is effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

We have examined the impacts of the final rule under Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 14192, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), the Congressional Review Act/Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 801, Pub. L. 104-121), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4).

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct us to assess all benefits and costs of available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. Rules are “significant” under Executive Order 12866 if they have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

Executive Order 14192 requires that any new incremental costs associated with certain significant regulatory actions “shall, to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least 10 prior regulations.” This final rule is considered an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action.

Because this rule is not likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or meets other criteria specified in the Congressional Review Act/Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, OIRA has determined that this rule does not fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires us to analyze regulatory options that would minimize any significant impact of a rule on small entities. Because this final rule does not add any new regulatory burden on the pharmaceutical or medical device industries, we certify that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (section 202(a)) requires us to prepare a written statement, which includes estimates of anticipated impacts, before issuing “any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.” The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $187 million, using the most current (2024) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. This final rule will not result in an expenditure in any year that meets or exceeds this amount.

We believe industry will maintain its current practices following the removal of part 26. In line with Executive Order 14192, in Table 1 we estimate present and annualized values of costs, cost savings, and net costs over a perpetual time horizon. We estimate that this rule will generate no quantifiable costs or cost savings. Therefore, we expect this final rule to be cost neutral.

We have determined under 21 CFR 25.31(h) that this action is of a type that does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. Therefore, neither an environmental assessment nor an environmental impact statement is required.

This final rule contains no collection of information. Therefore, clearance by the Office of Management and Budget under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 is not required.

We have analyzed this final rule in accordance with the principles set forth in Executive Order 13132. We have determined that the rule does not contain policies that have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the National Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule does not contain policies that have federalism implications as defined in the Executive Order and, consequently, a federalism summary impact statement is not required.

We have analyzed this rule in accordance with the principles set forth in Executive Order 13175. We have determined that this final rule does not contain policies that have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes. Accordingly, we conclude that the rule does not contain policies that have tribal implications as defined in the Executive Order and, consequently, a tribal summary impact statement is not required.

This final rule revokes the methods of analysis regulation, § 2.19 (21 CFR 2.19), which describes an FDA policy to use certain methods of analysis for FDA enforcement programs when the method of analysis is not prescribed in a regulation. The regulation is no longer necessary.

This final rule revokes § 2.19, which states that, where a method of analysis is not prescribed by regulation, it is FDA policy in its enforcement programs to utilize the methods of analysis of AOAC INTERNATIONAL (hereinafter referred to as “AOAC”)  1 as published in the latest edition (13th Ed., 1980) of their publication “Official Methods of Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists,” and their supplements thereto, which are incorporated by reference, when available and applicable.

FDA is taking this action under the general administrative provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act).

There may be qualitative benefits to removing § 2.19 because there will no longer be any inefficiencies due to keeping unnecessary regulations on the books. Revocation of § 2.19 will not change Agency current practice; therefore, there are no costs. Annualized over 10 years, the estimated benefits ( i.e., cost savings) of the final rule will be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates. The annualized costs of the final rule will be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates.

FDA's regulation concerning its policy of methods of analysis in enforcement programs dates back more than 50 years (37 FR 16174, Aug. 11, 1972). Early versions of the regulation stated that unless a regulation prescribed a specific method of analysis, it would be FDA's policy to use the methods of analysis in the “latest edition of [the AOAC's] publication . . . and the supplements thereto . . .” 21 CFR 3.89 (later reorganized and republished as 21 CFR 2.19 (42 FR 15559 (Mar. 22, 1977))). However, in 1982, 1 CFR 51.1 was amended to limit incorporation by reference of a publication to the edition of the publication that is approved, and to exclude future amendments or revisions of the publication.

FDA has revised the methods of analysis regulation several times, including in 1982 to meet the drafting requirements for incorporation by reference set forth in 1 CFR 51.1(f), and after to make several editorial amendments to update names and addresses. However, since the 1982 revision, the regulation has referred to the methods of analysis in the 13th Edition, 1980 of AOAC's publication and supplements thereto (“Changes in Methods” as published in the March issues of the “Journal of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists”). FDA is now revoking the methods of analysis regulation as specified in this final rule.

The Agency believes that the methods of analysis regulation is unnecessary as a general matter. Absent a method of analysis specified in statute or regulation, FDA believes it is more appropriate, flexible, and efficient to identify the Agency's preferred methods of analysis in documents such as compliance program guidance documents, Agency methods compendia, and other resources. FDA is revoking this rule because it is not FDA's preferred policy to always use the 13th edition of the “Official Methods of Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists,” or the supplements thereto, for enforcement programs when the method is not prescribed by statute or regulation. Unless a method of analysis is specified in law, FDA believes it is more appropriate, flexible, and efficient to identify the Agency's preferred and validated methods of analysis in documents that can be updated more frequently and efficiently as the science and technologies advance while continuing to maintain transparency about FDA analytical methods.

We published a proposed rule entitled “Revocation of Methods of Analysis Regulation” (the proposed rule) in the Federal Register on July 15, 2022 (87 FR 42398). The comment period closed on September 28, 2022. We received comments supporting and opposing the proposed rule. Some comments expressed concerns that revoking § 2.19 would result in a lack of quality control or in FDA using non-validated methods. Some comments recommended retaining the regulation with updated language.

We are making some clarifications in this final rule. In the proposed rule, under the Analysis of Environmental Impact section, we stated that, in accordance with 21 CFR 25.31(h), this action does not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. However, the correct applicable exemption for this rule is 21 CFR 25.30(h).

In the proposed rule we also stated that, absent specifying a method of analysis in law, FDA believes it is more appropriate, flexible, and efficient to identify the Agency's preferred methods of analysis in documents such as the Office of Inspections and Investigations' (OII's) Laboratory Procedures Manual, FDA compliance programs, and other resources. However, OII's laboratory manual does not contain actual methods of analysis; rather, it describes policy on methods of validation and verification, irrespective of the source of the method. Further, we identify methods of analysis in Agency methods compendia. Therefore, we are clarifying that FDA believes it is more appropriate, flexible, and efficient to identify preferred methods of analysis in documents such as compliance programs, Agency methods compendia, and other resources.

FDA is issuing this final rule under the following provisions of the (FD&C Act): 21 U.S.C. 321, 331, 335, 342, 343, 346a, 348, 351, 352, 355, 360b, 361, 362, 371, 372, 374.

We received approximately 40 comments on the proposed rule by the close of the comment period, each containing one or more comments on one or more issues. We received comments from consumers, food associations, accreditation bodies, laboratory associations, laboratories, consumer groups, and other organizations.

We describe and respond to the comments in sections V.B through E of this document. We have numbered each comment to help distinguish between different comments. We have grouped similar comments together under the same number, and, in some cases, we have separated different issues discussed in the same comments and designated them as distinct comments for purposes of our responses. The number assigned to each comment or comment topic is purely for organizational purposes and does not signify the comment's value, importance, or the order in which comments were received. After review and consideration of all relevant comments, as stated above, FDA is removing the prescriptive requirements of § 2.19.

Some comments make remarks supporting or opposing the proposed rule without focusing on a particular proposed provision. In the following paragraphs, we discuss and respond to such general comments.

(Comment 1) The comments generally support the revocation of the methods of analysis regulation and do not foresee the revocation as having a negative impact. Comments go on to say that the proposed revocation may encourage more laboratories to adopt a laboratory quality systems approach and adopt a more flexible technology strategy.

(Response 1) We appreciate the support expressed in the comments received. Revoking the methods of analysis regulation is intended to make it more flexible and efficient for the Agency to use its preferred methods of analysis by identifying those analyses in documents such as compliance program guidance documents and other resources.

(Comment 2) One comment suggests the loss of AOAC as a Federal partner would be very expensive and add a large economic burden to the Federal Government.

(Response 2) This rulemaking does not preclude FDA from using AOAC official methods or working with AOAC as a partner. FDA may continue to use AOAC official methods when they are appropriate for the particular analysis needed. In fact, as some of the comments point out, FDA has existing manuals and guidelines that recommend FDA use AOAC official methods for certain analyses. Revoking this regulation does not affect those recommendations. The comment does not provide any evidence of the rule being expensive or how it would create an economic burden to the Federal Government.

(Comment 3) Many comments express concerns about the lack of quality control that may follow from the rule, and how AOAC's rigorous standards and systematic evaluations are heavily relied upon. Some of the comments assert that the withdrawal of this regulation by FDA would undermine the credibility of many analytical methods used by industry and governments. Other comments maintain that AOAC's official methods are used as a basis for most of their tests, and that revoking the regulation would make test results less transparent and accurate.

(Response 3) As previously mentioned, revoking § 2.19 will not end FDA's use of AOAC's official methods of analysis when these methods are appropriate. Methods used by the Agency undergo rigorous qualification, validation, and fitness-of-use in accordance with international standards, including the International Organization for Standardization/International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) 17025 accreditation framework. FDA remains committed to using the appropriate methods for any given analysis, whether or not the methods are AOAC official methods. FDA has and does use non-AOAC-approved methods for analyses unrelated to enforcement, such as for scientific research and risk assessment, and we did not receive any comments that challenged the validity of these methods.

For example, with the issuance of the FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (FSMA) (Pub. L. 111-353) Final Rule on Laboratory Accreditation for Analyses of Foods (LAAF) in 2021, 2 many private laboratories conducting analyses of FDA regulated products are now governed by an Agency-approved accrediting body. Under the LAAF regulation, that accreditation body must ensure that the methods, and scientific results are valid, adequate, and reliable, regardless of the method source. 3

To the extent comments suggest that revoking the methods of analysis regulation would undermine the credibility of methods or tests used by industry, the regulation only established a policy for FDA to use AOAC official methods. This rulemaking does not create new testing requirements for the regulated industry nor prevent industry from using AOAC official methods. Neither revoking nor maintaining the regulation affects what industry uses for analytical testing, as they are still free to use AOAC official methods as appropriate and permissible.

(Comment 4) One comment claims that revoking § 2.19 would undermine the standing of thousands of methods of analysis used by industry and governments worldwide. As an example, this comment explains how AOAC methods have been used as a basis to arbitrate trade disputes under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, pre-1995) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements. The commenter asserted that, without a codified recognition of AOAC methods, the United States will likely be at a disadvantage in future trade disputes.

(Response 4) As the proposed rule explained, § 2.19 states, in part, that where a method of analysis is not prescribed by regulation, it is FDA policy in its enforcement programs to utilize the methods of analysis of the AOAC as published in the latest edition (13th Ed., 1980) of their publication “and the supplements thereto.” Section 2.19 does not address or establish which methods of analysis are used “as a basis for trade disputes under [the WTO]” or any other forum external to FDA. The comment does not provide information as to how the WTO determines which methods of analysis to use as a basis to arbitrate trade disputes. Additionally, the WTO is still free to reference AOAC Official Methods as a basis to arbitrate trade disputes with or without § 2.19, as this regulation pertains only to methods of analyses used by FDA. Thus, revoking § 2.19 does not affect or preclude the reference to AOAC official methods in trade disputes arbitrated by the WTO.

(Comment 5) Several comments express concern about revoking a policy that commits to using a validated method and assert that revoking § 2.19 would result in FDA using non-validated methods of analysis.

(Response 5) The revocation of FDA's policy of only using AOAC methods in its enforcement programs does not condone the use of unvalidated methods of analysis. FDA is a science-based agency and is committed to using only methods that are validated. For instance, in the foods program, FDA's Compendium of Analytical Methods contains analytical methods that have a defined validation status and are currently used by FDA regulatory laboratories. In these cases, the validation status of a method may have been established through the FDA Foods Program Method Development, Validation, and Implementation Program using the Foods Program Method Validation Guidelines or by internal FDA Foods Program committees that have established the equivalency of the method validation level to the FDA guidelines. 4 The regulatory laboratories are all accredited to an ISO standard that requires FDA to validate the methods. Further, FDA has developed a methods portal that is publicly facing on FDA's website. 5

(Comment 6) Some comments recommend retaining the regulation with updated language reflecting the use of the latest versions of AOAC Official Methods of Analysis.

(Response 6) Retaining the regulation only to update it with the latest version would still be a policy of using only AOAC official methods at the exclusion of other, potentially more suitable methods. Our revocation of this rule is intended to allow FDA the discretion to use methods more fit for the purpose of any given analysis, as science and technologies continually evolve, and FDA needs the flexibility to use other methods that might be more recent, accurate, and efficient.

(Comment 7) Some comments suggest that revoking the regulation could weaken the validity of many analytical methods used by industries and governments globally, potentially harming the Agency's operations.

(Response 7) The rule does not govern analytical methods used by industry and foreign governments, so revoking it will not impact the validity of methods used by industry and governments worldwide. FDA may continue, as appropriate, to use AOAC official methods and will encourage and refer stakeholders to use methods that are best for the given analysis. AOAC official methods are widely regarded as the default standard rather than the sole standard. FDA acknowledges AOAC's significant influence and methodologies, yet believes that in certain cases, alternative methods may be more suitable and fit for purpose.

(Comment 8) Several comments express concern about revoking a policy that provides a level of certainty to stakeholders about which methods of analysis FDA will use and claim that revoking the regulation will reduce predictability about the methods FDA will use for any given analysis.

(Response 8) FDA has multiple public-facing resources that provide the methods FDA intends to use for any given analysis, and therefore, does not agree that revoking this regulation will result in uncertainty as to what methods FDA may use. For example, FDA's web page on laboratory methods for foods has resources containing some of the analytical laboratory methods the Agency uses FDA to help ensure food safety. 6 These include validated methods for chemical, microbiological, and microanalytical analyses. FDA also has published Compliance Policy Guides (CPGs), such as CPG Sec. 150.500 Analytical Methodology Used by FDA—Drugs, 7 that set forth specific analytical methods. Compliance programs issued by FDA, such as Compliance Program 7321.008 Dietary Supplements—Foreign and Domestic Inspections, Sampling, and Imports, 8 may also specify tailored analytical methods used by FDA laboratories.

(Comment 9) One comment references the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-119, which states that voluntary consensus standards are appropriate or adaptable for the government's purposes. These standards “eliminate the cost to the government of developing its own standards” and “promote efficiency and economic competition through harmonization of standards.” The comment maintains that this final rule appears in conflict with the circular.

(Response 9) Revoking the methods of analysis regulation is not inconsistent with OMB Circular A-119. FDA agrees that voluntary standards are appropriate for government purposes and relieve FDA of developing its own standards. However, FDA is not in favor of maintaining a Federal regulation that establishes a policy for FDA to utilize a singular approving body's standard or method for all analyses not prescribed by regulation in its enforcement programs. It is in the public's best interest for FDA to have the flexibility to select the methods or standards deemed more suitable for a specific analysis.

This rule is effective on the date of publication in the Federal Register .

We have examined the impacts of the final rule under Executive Order 12866, Executive Order 13563, Executive Order 14192, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612), the Congressional Review Act/Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (5 U.S.C. 801, Pub. L. 104-121), and the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4).

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct us to assess all benefits and costs of available regulatory alternatives and, when regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. Rules are economically significant under Executive Order 12866 if they have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

Executive Order 14192 requires that any new incremental costs associated with significant new regulations “shall, to the extent permitted by law, be offset by the elimination of existing costs associated with at least 10 prior regulations.” This final rule is an Executive Order 14192 deregulatory action because it eliminates an unnecessary regulation.

Because this rule is not likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or to meet other criteria specified in the Congressional Review Act/Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, OIRA has determined that this rule does not fall within the scope of 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

The Regulatory Flexibility Act requires us to analyze regulatory options that would minimize any significant impact of a rule on small entities. Because this final rule does not add any new regulatory burden on the industry, we certify that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Section 202(a)) requires us to prepare a written statement, which includes estimates of anticipated impacts, before issuing “any rule that includes any Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year.” The current threshold after adjustment for inflation is $187 million, using the most current (2024) Implicit Price Deflator for the Gross Domestic Product. This final rule will not result in an expenditure in any year that meets or exceeds this amount.

This final rule will revoke 21 CFR 2.19 Methods of analysis, which states that FDA policy is to use the Association of Official Analytical Chemists (AOAC) methods of analysis as published in the 1980 edition of “Official Methods of Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists” to analyze samples in FDA enforcement programs when the method of analysis is not prescribed in a regulation. FDA is proposing this action because a general reference to the 1980 edition of the “Official Methods of Analysis of the Association of Official Analytical Chemists” is unnecessary and because newer, updated methods of analysis may exist. FDA believes it is more appropriate, flexible, and efficient to identify the Agency's preferred methods of analysis in documents such as the Agency methods compendium, FDA compliance programs, and other resources. Thus, § 2.19 is an unnecessary policy. We expect the economic impact on FDA resulting from revoking an unnecessary regulation to be minimal.

Table 1 summarizes the estimated benefits and costs of the final rule. Annualized over 10 years, the estimated benefits ( i.e., cost savings) of the final rule will be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates. The present value of the estimated benefits ( i.e., cost savings) of the final rule will also be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates. The annualized costs of the final rule will be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates. The present value of costs of the final rule will also be $0 at both the 3 and 7 percent discount rates.

SMCRA allows States with federally approved programs to regulate surface coal mining and reclamation operations on non-Federal, non-Indian lands within their borders. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 1253. Once a State regulatory program is approved, “the State's laws and regulations implementing the program become operative for the regulation of surface coal mining, and the State officials administer the program, giving the State `exclusive jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining' within its borders . . . .” Bragg v. W. Va. Coal Ass'n, 248 F.3d 275, 288 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted). In general, even after a State receives primary jurisdiction (“primacy”) to administer SMCRA, SMCRA continues to provide the Secretary of the Interior (the Secretary) with oversight authority regarding the State regulatory program and limited ongoing enforcement authority in two separate scenarios: (1) when the Secretary has reason to believe there have been violations of SMCRA, and (2) where the Secretary has reason to believe that violations of an approved State program are due to a State regulatory authority not properly enforcing its State program. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a) and (b).

In the first scenario, for a non-imminent harm situation, the Secretary can issue a notice, known as a “ten-day notice” (TDN), to a State regulatory authority if the Secretary has a “reason to believe” that “any person is in violation of any requirement of [SMCRA].” Id. § 1271(a) (emphasis added). SMCRA directs the Secretary to determine whether there is a potential violation “on the basis of any information available to him.” Id. (emphasis added). If so, SMCRA provides that the Secretary, acting through the Director of OSM, will issue a TDN to the State regulatory authority. A TDN gives the State regulatory authority ten days to respond to OSM to show that it either has taken “appropriate action” to “cause said violation to be corrected” or to show “good cause” for not doing so. Id. Under certain circumstances, such as if the State regulatory authority fails to respond in ten days or if OSM disagrees with the State's response to the TDN, the Secretary is authorized to conduct a Federal inspection. When a person provides adequate proof that an imminent danger of significant environmental harm exists and the State has failed to take appropriate action, the TDN process is waived, and OSM would then conduct a Federal inspection. Id.

In the second scenario, SMCRA provides a separate enforcement process if the Secretary suspects that a violation of an approved State program is due to a failure on the part of the State to properly enforce its approved program. Id. § 1271(b). Here, the Secretary must issue “public notice” and “hold a hearing thereon in the State within thirty days of such notice.” Id. If the Secretary finds that there are violations stemming from the State's failure to enforce its own State program effectively and the State “has not adequately demonstrated its capability and intent to enforce such State program,” the Secretary must take over the enforcement and issuance of permits in that State. Id.; see also 30 U.S.C. 1254(a).

SMCRA requires the Secretary, acting through OSM, to, among other things, “publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [SMCRA]” and to “cooperate with . . . State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of [SMCRA].” 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(2) and (12). The Secretary first exercised his authority to regulate the TDN process in 1979. See 44 FR 14902 (Mar. 13, 1979). OSM revised this rule in 1982, including by adding a requirement that a person who requests a Federal inspection must also notify the State regulatory authority. See 47 FR 35620, 35628 (Aug. 16, 1982). OSM modified the regulation again in 1988, including to add updated definitions for “appropriate action” and “good cause” and to recognize that a State regulatory authority could get extensions if necessary to conduct an investigation into a potential violation. 53 FR 26728, 26729, 26736 (July 14, 1988).

In 2020, OSM again revised the TDN Rule for two primary purposes: (1) to enhance the early identification of State regulatory program issues so that they could be corrected programmatically, and (2) to clarify and reduce duplication in the Federal regulations related to OSM's processing of citizen complaints and the issuance of TDNs to State regulatory authorities. 85 FR 75150 (Nov. 24, 2020). As OSM summarized in 2020: “The final rule is consistent with SMCRA and will add transparency to OSMRE's oversight responsibilities; promote regulatory certainty for State regulatory authorities, regulated entities, and the public; enhance OSMRE's relationship with the State regulatory authorities; reduce redundancy in inspection and enforcement; and streamline the process for notifying State regulatory authorities of possible violations.” Id. at 75151.

After its promulgation, several citizen groups challenged the 2020 Rule. See Citizens Coal Council v. De la Vega, No. 1:21-cv-195 (D.D.C. filed Jan. 22, 2021). However, the court stayed that case in response to a joint motion of the parties after OSM announced in the Fall 2021 Unified Agenda, published by the Regulatory Information Service Center within the General Services Administration, in cooperation with the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), which is part of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), that “OSMRE is re-examining its regulation on ten-day notices that went into effect on December 24, 2020.” See Joint Motion to Stay Proceedings at paragraph 3, Citizens Coal Council v. De la Vega, No. 1:21-cv-195 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2021).

OSM's re-examination of the 2020 Rule culminated in the publication of the 2024 Rule on April 9, 2024, which amended portions of the 2020 Rule. 89 FR 24714 (Apr. 9, 2024). The 2024 Rule stated that it was further clarifying the 2020 Rule to, among other things, “increase efficiency and to make it easier for citizens to report possible violations . . . .” See id. (adopting the rationale in the preamble to the proposed rule) and 88 FR 24944, 24948 (Apr. 25, 2023) (proposed rule). Although the preamble to the proposed rule for the 2024 Rule stated that it would “afford our State regulatory authority partners due deference during the TDN process to an extent that is appropriate under SMCRA”, 88 FR at 24944, at least 14 States, State agencies, and attorneys general disagreed and almost immediately filed suit challenging the legality of the 2024 Rule. See Indiana v. Haaland, No. 1:24-cv-1665 (D.D.C. filed June 7, 2024). Among other things, these States alleged that the 2024 Rule improperly usurps SMCRA's deference to States and that it:

Meanwhile, on January 20, 2025, the President declared a national energy emergency and directed agencies, such as OSM, to unleash American energy. See Executive Order (“E.O.”) 14156 “Declaring a National Energy Emergency” and E.O. 14154 “Unleashing American Energy.” As part of this effort, E.O. 14154 directs OSM to “ensure that all regulatory requirements related to energy are grounded in clearly applicable law.” E.O. 14154 § 2(d). In addition, the Secretary identified the 2024 Rule as a regulation to be suspended, repealed, or amended in order to unleash American energy. Secretary's Order 3418 § 4.b. Moreover, on April 8, 2025, the President specifically recognized that “[o]ur Nation's beautiful clean coal resources will be critical to meeting the rise in electricity demand due to the resurgence of domestic manufacturing and the construction of artificial intelligence data processing centers.” E.O. 14261 “Reinvigorating America's Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241” § 1.

As discussed in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule, OSM is revising the 2024 Rule to align the Federal regulations with clearly applicable law and to “streamline the process for OSMRE's coordination with State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of efforts in the administration of SMCRA and appropriately recognize that State regulatory authorities are the primary regulatory authorities of non-Federal, non-Indian lands within their borders.” 90 FR 25174 (Jun. 16, 2025).

As explained fully in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule, the Department of the Interior (“the Department”) proposed to return the Federal regulations back to the 2020 Rule to better align the Federal regulations with the single, best meaning of SMCRA and streamline OSM's coordination with State regulatory authorities to ensure that the goals of SMCRA are achieved while granting the appropriate deference to State regulatory authorities under this cooperative federalism statute. See 90 FR at 25174. As part of this rulemaking process, OSM reviewed the preambles to the proposed and final 2020 Rule, which fully explained its rationale for the regulatory changes resulting in the 2020 Rule, to ensure that the analysis continues to reflect OSM's position, and, except as otherwise stated in the preambles to the 2025 proposed rule and this final rule, OSM adopts them here and directs the reader to those preambles for a more detailed rationale and section-by-section analysis. 85 FR 28904 (May 14, 2020); 85 FR 75150 (Nov. 24, 2020). Moreover, after further consideration and review of the comments received in response to the 2025 proposed rule, the Department is adopting the regulatory provisions as proposed on June 16, 2025, with a few minor changes.

First, OSM is, in large part, retaining the definitions of “action plan” and “State regulatory program issue” from the 2024 Rule because OSM determined the wording to be clearer than the 2020 Rule. Notably, within the definition of “action plan,” OSM added language to make clear that OSM typically works with the State regulatory authority to develop the action plan. The 2024 Rule already included this concept at existing § 733.12(b) but putting it in the definition emphasizes the cooperation between OSM and the State regulatory authority to correct a State regulatory program issue. For “State regulatory program issue,” OSM retained the minor non-substantive edits to the first sentence of the definition made by the 2024 Rule, but OSM removed the last sentence, which was not in the 2020 Rule. By removing this sentence, OSM is clarifying that State regulatory program issues may no longer be resolved under part 842.

Second, OSM is retaining the minor editorial changes that the 2024 Rule made to § 733.12(a), which explains what the OSM Director should do once a State regulatory program issue is identified. OSM finds that the 2024 Rule was clearer in the language in this section than in the proposal and the 2020 Rule.

Third, in response to a comment, OSM is replacing “concludes” with “has reason to believe” in the final version of § 733.12(a)(2). This change inserts the appropriate standard that the OSM Director will follow when determining whether a State regulatory authority is not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or a portion of its approved program. As the commenter noted, “concludes” implies that the Director has already made a decision about whether a State regulatory authority is not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or a portion of its approved program even though he or she has not followed the procedures set forth in § 733.13 to reach that conclusion. Replacing “concludes” with “has reason to believe” better aligns the Federal regulations with the statutory structure of SMCRA and the cooperative federalism framework.

Fourth, OSM is retaining some minor editorial changes from the 2024 Rule in §§ 733.12(b)(2) and (3) and 733.12(c). For example, this final rule retains the use of the word “specific” from the 2024 Rule, instead of “explicit” in §§ 733.12(b)(3)(iii) and (iv). In addition, OSM is retaining the editorial changes from the 2024 Rule in §§ 733.12(b)(3)(iii) and (iv) that more accurately state that a State regulatory program issue, rather than a “violation” or a “problem,” is what will be corrected by an action plan. To the extent that a State regulatory program issue includes one or more violations of SMCRA, this wording does not prohibit OSM from including corrective actions for violations in the action plan.

Fifth, in § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 1 ), OSM has decided to retain some language from the 2024 Rule related to the issuance of a single TDN for substantively similar possible violations. In the 2025 proposed rule, OSM specifically requested comments about whether OSM should retain this provision. See 90 FR at 25177. Commenters were overwhelmingly supportive of the policy behind this provision, even if they supported removing the language in furtherance of the deregulatory agenda. For example, one commenter noted that “OSMRE has always had discretion” to include multiple similar violations in a single TDN and retention of the provision may not be necessary, but it could be beneficial, particularly in light of websites that facilitate public letter-writing campaigns. Although this provision adds a sentence to the regulations, OSM ultimately decided to retain it so that it would be clear that OSM could include substantively similar possible violations in a single TDN. As stated in the preamble to the 2024 Rule, this grouping will allow OSM to be more efficient because it will not have to write numerous, repetitive TDNs and the State regulatory authority will not have to respond to numerous, repetitive TDNs.

Sixth, OSM is removing proposed § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 4 )( vi ), which was a duplicate of § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 4 )( v ) and erroneously included in the 2025 proposed rule.

Finally, in response to a comment, OSM is adding “at the surface mining site” after the word “exists” at the end of the first sentence of § 842.12(a). This change will clarify that a citizen request for a Federal inspection under the authority of section 517(h)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(h)(1), must allege a violation at a specific mine. This change better aligns the regulation with the statutory provision. Notably, this provision only applies to a request for a Federal inspection under section 517(h)(1) of SMCRA. This regulation does not limit the Secretary's authority to consider any readily available information when determining whether a reason to believe a potential violation exists under section 521(a) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a).

OSM published its proposed rule on June 16, 2025 (90 FR 25174) and solicited public comments for 30 days. During the comment period, OSM received 13 comments from members of the public, State governmental units, trade associations, environmental advocacy groups, and private companies. Eleven commenters were generally supportive of the proposed rule, which proposed to return the regulations to those promulgated in 2020. Some of these commenters suggested further revisions to better align the regulations with SMCRA and its cooperative federalism principles. Only two commenters, including one joint comment from a coalition of citizens groups, opposed the proposed rule; these commenters generally opined that OSM should retain the 2024 Rule and considered the 2025 proposed rule a rollback of citizen protections. OSM considered each public comment in the development of this final rule.

Comments received that are similar in nature have been categorized by subject and, in some instances, have been combined with related comments.

Comment: Some commenters disputed OSM's assertion in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule that the 2020 Rule reflected the best reading of the statute. Instead, these commenters opined that the 2024 Rule reflects the best reading of the statute and that the proposed changes are an abuse of discretion by OSM. Other commenters agreed that the 2020 Rule reflects the best reading of the statute.

Response: OSM agrees with the commenters that stated the 2020 Rule reflects the best reading of the statute as a whole. As noted above, SMCRA directs OSM to “publish and promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [SMCRA]” and to “cooperate with . . . State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of [SMCRA].” 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(2) and (12). The 2020 Rule appropriately interpreted other provisions of SMCRA, such as section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1). For example, it maximized OSM's cooperation with State regulatory authorities by providing, among other things, that OSM can consider all readily available information before deciding whether it has a reason to believe that a violation exists and issuing a TDN to the State regulatory authority. Although a TDN is simply a communication tool between OSM and the State regulatory authority, it triggers administrative obligations for OSM—to issue the TDN and review the State's response—and the State—to respond to OSM within ten days. If OSM can rely on readily available information to determine that there is no reason to believe a violation exists before issuing a TDN, both the additional burden on the State regulatory authority and unnecessary Federal oversight will be avoided.

Comment: Several commenters supported OSM's proposal to return to the 2020 Rule because they considered the 2024 Rule to be burdensome and unnecessary. They also reiterated criticisms they made to the proposed 2024 Rule, which focused on OSM's alleged failure to adequately consult with the State regulatory authorities before promulgating the 2024 Rule. These commenters reiterated that the 2020 Rule best addresses the concerns of the State regulatory authorities and reduces regulatory burdens.

Response: Although OSM followed all required notice and comment procedures in promulgating the 2024 Rule, as well as this rule and the 2020 Rule, OSM acknowledges that it could have better engaged with the key stakeholders—the State regulatory authorities—particularly about the potential for increased administrative burdens resulting from the 2024 Rule. In response to these and other comments, OSM compared the number of citizen complaints received and the number of citizen complaints resulting in the issuance of one or more TDNs under the 2020 Rule and under the 2024 Rule. OSM found that OSM received more citizen complaints and issued more TDNs to the State regulatory authorities under the 2024 Rule. On average, OSM received approximately 16 citizen complaints per year under the 2020 Rule and issued an average of 3 or fewer TDNs per year. Under the 2024 Rule, OSM received approximately 23 citizen complaints per year and issued an average of 13 TDNs per year. Of the citizen complaints received by OSM under the 2024 Rule and resolved by December 2025, approximately 81 percent either did not provide reason to believe a violation exists, meaning OSM did not issue a TDN, or the State regulatory authority provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there was good cause to not take action, usually because the alleged action was not a violation under the State program. Despite a difference in the volume of citizen complaints and TDNs, Federal inspections and enforcement actions as a result of citizen complaints were similar under both rules. These trends support OSM's and the State regulatory authorities' observations that the 2024 Rule led to a greater number of citizen complaints and TDNs. While it was not possible to identify the exact cause of the increase in the number of TDNs issued, some evidence points to the 2024 Rule's restrictions on the types of information that OSM could use to make a reason to believe determination. However, despite issuing more TDNs under the 2024 Rule, in the majority of circumstances for those TDNs resolved before publication of this final rule, OSM found that the State regulatory authorities had already taken appropriate action or there was good cause for not taking action, and there was no comparable increase in Federal inspections or enforcement action. Although OSM recognizes the small sample size, this data indicates that the 2024 Rule may have increased the paperwork for OSM and the State regulatory authorities related to reviewing citizen complaints and issuing and responding to TDNs without any clear indication that it improved enforcement or oversight of SMCRA. In light of the concerns raised by commenters and OSM's experiences implementing both the 2020 and 2024 Rules, and in support of this Administration's focus on removing regulatory burdens ( e.g., E.O. 14219 § 3(a)), this final rule will largely revert to the 2020 Rule.

Comment: A commenter reiterated comments first submitted in response to the proposed rule for the 2024 Rule that alleged that OSM did not adequately justify its decision to quickly reverse course from the 2020 Rule. The commenter also contended that the 2024 Rule lacked a reasonable basis and was arbitrary and capricious. As support, the commenter opined that OSM's administrative record for the 2024 Rule was unsupported by data or other evidence to show how the 2020 Rule either delayed consideration of some possible violations or compromised SMCRA's public protections.

Response: OSM understands the commenter's concerns about the justification for the 2024 Rule, but it is not necessary for OSM to revisit that justification in this rulemaking. This rulemaking will rescind almost all of the 2024 Rule that the commenter contended violated the Administrative Procedure Act.

Comment: Several commenters noted that another benefit of returning to the 2020 Rule would be a decreased chance that operators would be subject to differing interpretations of required standards by the State regulatory authority and OSM, which should help with the production of coal.

Response: OSM agrees with these commenters. Replacing the 2024 Rule with a new rule that is substantially similar to the 2020 Rule will help with this Administration's deregulatory efforts by reducing red-tape associated with the TDN process, eliminating unnecessary dual State and Federal regulations, and unleashing American energy to ensure there is a sufficient domestic supply of coal. This coal, in turn, will help strengthen our national security by enhancing supply chains in the United States and for our allies.

As explained in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule, OSM proposed to remove the definitions of “citizen complaint” and “ten-day notice” that the 2024 Rule added to 30 CFR 842.5.

Comment: Several commenters expressed support for the removal of the definition of “citizen complaint” in § 842.5. These commenters noted that SMCRA does not include the term “citizen complaint” and that the definition added by the 2024 Rule was overbroad in light of the language in sections 517(h) and 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1267(h) and 1271(a)(1). Specifically, these commenters noted that citizen complaints should be required to pertain to on-the-ground conditions at an actual surface coal mining and reclamation operation. They also stated that a citizen should have to include a request for inspection to both OSM and the State regulatory authority, and the rule should not make a request for inspection automatic, as the 2024 Rule did.

Response: For the first time, the 2024 Rule inserted a regulatory definition of “citizen complaint” into a newly created 30 CFR 842.5. In the preamble to the 2024 Rule, OSM stated that it intended for the definition to provide clarity for what would be considered a citizen complaint, which could trigger the TDN process. 89 FR at 24716.

In light of the Federal government's deregulatory initiative and as further explained in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule (see, e.g., 90 FR at 25175-25176), OSM has determined that this definition is no longer necessary as it is not grounded in clearly applicable law. E.O. 14154, § 2(d). As the commenter noted, the term “citizen complaint” is not found in SMCRA, and OSM successfully implemented SMCRA's public participation requirements without such a definition for over 45 years.

Moreover, although OSM promulgated this definition in the 2024 Rule to clarify the meaning of the phrase and clarify that a citizen complaint is intended for citizens to inform OSM of a possible violation (89 FR at 24716), upon review of the statutory language, OSM concludes that the definition improperly conflates the standards of two statutory provisions. Section 517(h)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(h)(1), allows any person who may be adversely affected by an operation to notify OSM in writing if that person has reason to believe a violation exists at a surface mining site. A request under this section has traditionally been considered a “request for a Federal inspection” and, by statute, contains appeal rights, i.e., “procedures for informal review,” if the person is dissatisfied with OSM's response. Id. at 1267(h)(2). In contrast, section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1)), states that OSM can consider information provided by “any person” about a violation of “any requirement” of the Act or permit condition. The 2024 Rule essentially adopted the statutory standard of section 521(a)(1), but then later in § 842.11(b)(2), that rule stated that all citizen complaints would be considered requests for a Federal inspection. This is improper because, pursuant to section 517(h)(1), a request for a Federal inspection can only be for a narrower scope of violations—those that may exist “at a surface mining site.” By removing this definition, as well as the additional language in existing §§ 842.11(b)(2) and 842.12(a) that says all citizen complaints will be treated as requests for Federal inspections, the Federal regulations will more closely mirror the statutory requirements and remove unnecessary regulations in the form of definitions that confuse and conflate separate SMCRA requirements.

Comment: Several commenters expressed support for the removal of the definition of “ten-day notice” from 30 CFR 842.5 because there has never been any confusion over the use of the term and therefore a definition is unnecessary.

Response: OSM agrees that, as stated in the preamble to the proposed rule (see, e.g., 90 FR at 25175-25176), a definition for the term “ten-day notice” is not necessary, only adds to the “ever-expanding morass of complicated Federal regulations” (E.O. 14192 “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” § 1), and should be removed from the regulations. As with the definition of “citizen complaint,” “ten-day notice” is not defined in SMCRA, and OSM implemented SMCRA without such a definition for over 45 years. Thus, OSM is removing this definition.

In the 2025 proposed rule, OSM proposed to return to the 2020 Rule's language at § 842.11(b)(1) describing the types of information OSM can rely on when determining whether there is reason to believe that there exists a violation of SMCRA, the State regulatory program, or any condition of a permit or an exploration approval. 90 FR at 25175. OSM is finalizing this change as proposed, which will allow OSM's authorized representative to consider “any information readily available to him or her, from any source[,]” which could include information obtained from a State regulatory authority.

Comment: Several commenters supported OSM's decision to modify the Federal regulations to ensure it can consider all “readily available” information regardless of the source of that information when determining if it had a reason to believe a violation exists. These commenters indicated that the 2024 Rule inappropriately narrowed the scope of information that OSM could evaluate when making its determination of whether there was reason to believe a violation exists and prevented OSM from relying on non-publicly available information that the State regulatory authority might have. Commenters in favor of the proposed changes indicated that State regulatory authorities tend to have a better understanding of their programs and permits issued under those programs, making information from the States invaluable to OSM in making a reason to believe determination.

Response: OSM agrees with these commenters that the 2024 Rule unnecessarily narrowed the scope of information that OSM can evaluate when making its determination of whether there is reason to believe a violation exists. In the preamble to the 2024 Rule, OSM explained that the intent of the change was to limit the sources of information that OSM will consider in determining whether it has reason to believe a possible violation exists to avoid excessive delays in making the reason to believe determination. 89 FR at 24715. While OSM remains committed to prompt evaluations of citizen complaints and determinations of whether there is reason to believe a violation exists, OSM's experience in implementing the 2024 Rule has demonstrated that the limits on the types of information available to OSM as a result of the 2024 Rule forced OSM to ignore some types of critical information, such as readily available information from the State regulatory authority, that were not publicly available when making a reason to believe determination. The result is that, starting in May 2024, OSM issued TDNs in response to citizen complaints at times where there would not have been reason to believe a violation exists if OSM had been able to access the information barred by the 2024 Rule. On average, under the 2020 Rule, OSM issued TDNs in response to a citizen complaint less than 17 percent of the time. In comparison, as of December 2025, OSM issued a TDN in response to a citizen complaint over 56 percent of the time under the 2024 Rule. However, as mentioned above, the increased number of TDNs did not have any measurable impact on Federal oversight. For instance, there was no difference in the number of Federal enforcement actions under the two different rules, and OSM determined that either there was no actual violation or the State regulatory authority had taken appropriate action in the majority of the TDNs resolved under the 2024 Rule. Therefore, the 2024 Rule did not actually lead to improved oversight of State regulatory programs, despite aiming for that outcome. Instead, as indicated by the numbers, the 2024 Rule resulted in an increase in the number of citizen complaints received and processed by OSM and the number of TDNs for OSM and States to review and respond to, rather than in an improvement in oversight of State regulatory programs.

The changes finalized today are a commonsense attempt to alleviate this increased unnecessary burden and to make the regulatory text better match the statutory direction that the Secretary, acting through OSM, should make the reason to believe determination based on “any information available to him.” Nowhere in section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), is “any information” restricted to information that is publicly available. OSM is not a member of the public and, by virtue of its oversight role, is uniquely able to access “information available” from multiple sources to make the best determination of whether there is reason to believe a violation exists. Where the available information makes it clear that there is no violation, OSM and the State regulatory authority can avoid a useless paperwork exercise and unwarranted issuance of a TDN.

OSM agrees that, in general, State regulatory authorities have better site-specific information about the surface coal mining and reclamation operations at issue in citizen complaints and that it is most efficient and effective for OSM to obtain preliminary information from the State regulatory authority before making a reason to believe determination. The 2024 Rule arbitrarily forced OSM to ignore non-public but readily available information, such as State databases, that could allow OSM and the State regulatory authority to avoid the administrative burdens associated with the issuance of an unsupported TDN. The intent of this change is to reduce the number of unnecessary TDNs resulting from citizen complaints that are easily resolved with information readily available to OSM. This reduction will allow OSM and the State regulatory authorities to focus on substantive enforcement issues to ensure full compliance with SMCRA, the applicable State regulatory program, or any condition of a permit or an exploratory approval.

Comment: A commenter alleged that the proposed changes would limit the role of citizens and OSM in oversight and enforcement of violations, which the commenter alleged is contrary to the text and best reading of section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1). This commenter argued that section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA requires that, where information given to the Secretary provides “reason to believe” that any person is in violation of SMCRA, OSM must immediately notify the State regulatory authority, starting the ten-day period, and that it would be contrary to SMCRA to allow a new, non-statutory procedural step where OSM contacts a State regulatory authority to consider the State regulatory authority's action before determining if there is reason to believe a violation exists. The commenter noted that creating an additional informal information-gathering process with no enforceable timeline or deadline before OSM makes a “reason to believe” determination would be at odds with Congress' clear intent that States have ten days to either correct the violation or provide information about why no action is necessary.

Response: OSM disagrees with the premise of this comment, which is very similar to comments received in response to the 2020 Rule, and OSM directs the commenter to OSM's response in that rulemaking. 85 FR at 75156-62. As OSM explained when these changes were first introduced in 2020, and as OSM reiterates now as those changes are renewed, the proposed rule would not limit the role of citizens or OSM in oversight and enforcement of violations and is not contrary to the text and best reading of section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1). Under the 2025 proposed rule and as finalized today, citizens retain an important role in ensuring that all violations of any requirement of SMCRA or any permit condition are identified and addressed as quickly and efficiently as possible. None of the clarifications to parts 733 and 842 would impair, weaken, or eliminate the ability of the public to report violations directly to OSM or for OSM to issue TDNs when appropriate. OSM intends the changes adopted today to recalibrate the citizen complaint process and the cooperative federalism relationship between OSM and the State regulatory authorities after the 2024 Rule, which prevented OSM from using certain types of readily available information that would have allowed OSM to more easily and accurately determine whether there is reason to believe a violation of SMCRA or a permit condition existed before issuing a TDN. These changes will also reduce unnecessary administrative burdens on both OSM and the State regulatory authorities, consistent with this Administration's priorities. E.g., E.O. 14154 “Unleashing American Energy,” E.O. 14192 “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” and E.O. 14261 “Reinvigorating America's Beautiful Clean Coal Industry and Amending Executive Order 14241.”

Consistent with OSM's longstanding practice, this final rule requires citizens to provide advance or simultaneous notice to State regulatory authorities when submitting a request for a Federal inspection to OSM. Except for the recent change to the Federal regulations resulting from the 2024 Rule, OSM's practice since 1982 has been to require advance or contemporaneous notice to the State regulatory authority. 47 FR at 35620. This revision is not intended to limit the role of a citizen in the enforcement of regulations, standards, reclamation, plans, or programs established under SMCRA but to recognize that most alleged violations can be expeditiously and effectively resolved by the State regulatory authority, which is in the best position to address any potential issues. As with the 2020 Rule, this final rule provides that, when requesting a Federal inspection, the citizen must indicate that they notified the State regulatory authority before or at the time they notified OSM and the basis for their assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation. See, e.g., 85 FR at 75157 (explaining how the 2020 Rule is fundamentally no different than the rule in effect since 1982). This provision encourages, and does not require, citizens to notify the appropriate State regulatory authority before involving OSM in a primacy State's regulatory program and best implements SMCRA's mandate that OSM cooperate with State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(12).

Furthermore, OSM does not agree with the commenter's assertion that the proposed revision creates a new, non-statutory procedural step before the statutory TDN process is started or that allowing OSM to consider all information available before making a reason to believe determination is contrary to section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1211(a)(1). This comment is similar to comments received in response to the 2020 Rule, and OSM directs the commenter to the preamble to that rulemaking for a more detailed response. 85 FR at 75162-75166. Certainly, once OSM has reason to believe that a person is in violation of any requirement of SMCRA or any permit condition, SMCRA requires OSM to notify the State regulatory authority, if one exists, and begin the TDN process. However, SMCRA does not contain a requirement that OSM rush to determine whether there is reason to believe that a violation exists based only on information from a citizen complaint as this commenter suggests. Instead, SMCRA directs that the decision should be based on “any information available to” OSM, “including receipt of information from any person.” As noted in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, the clarifications finalized here will require that OSM consider all “readily available information,” including any information that a State regulatory authority provides, which promotes the goal of ensuring that those regulators with primary jurisdiction over State programs provide OSM with information essential to its assessment of alleged violations.

Finally, the change to § 842.12 requiring that a citizen requesting a Federal inspection provide information about the alleged violation “at the surface mining site” is not intended to limit citizen engagement but to ensure that the citizen complaints are actually related to a surface coal mining and reclamation operation. Under the 2024 Rule, OSM received numerous citizen complaints that were not related to any surface coal mining or reclamation operation but were instead related to non-mine activities such as a blocked storm drain on a public road, private property rights disputes, a landfill, and a clay mine. Requiring that a request for an inspection specify that the alleged violation is occurring at a surface mining site should have no impact on citizens with concerns about actual mining operations but should help limit the number of non-mining complaints that are sent to OSM.

Comment: A commenter stated that the phrase “reason to believe” is not ambiguous and alleges that the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule failed to provide a reasoned explanation for changing the longstanding interpretation of “reason to believe” or identify any examples of OSM, the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), State regulatory authorities, or any State administrative body having difficulty evaluating a citizen complaint to determine if there was “reason to believe” a violation exists. This commenter argued that because agencies are no longer provided deference under Chevron, USA v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), OSM does not have the discretion to interpret “reason to believe” differently than the plain meaning of the statute. This commenter pointed to the legislative history, which they claim indicates that “reason to believe” is the same as “reasonable belief” and “could be established by a snapshot of an operation in violation or other simple and effective documentation of a violation.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 129 (Apr. 22, 1977).

Similarly, the same commenter alleged that allowing an additional fact-finding phase after an individual provides “reason to believe” a violation exists but before notifying the State of the possible violation and triggering the ten-day period for the State's response is inconsistent with the plain language of SMCRA, which the commenter alleged requires OSM to first notify the State of the alleged violation and then provide the State with ten days to take appropriate action or show good cause for not taking action. This commenter expressed concern that the proposed changes to allow additional fact-finding before issuing a TDN could allow indefinite administrative delay that is inconsistent with SMCRA, the legislative history of the Act, and OSM's historic interpretation of this provision.

Response: OSM strongly disagrees with this commenter's assertions. As discussed throughout the preamble to the 2020 Rule and reiterated here, due to the complex nature of SMCRA and coal mining in general, ambiguity has arisen about how OSM should perform some of its oversight functions, including how OSM should interpret the “reason to believe” standard contained in section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. See, e.g., 85 FR at 75155. Although the commenter alleged that OSM did not identify any examples where there was difficulty evaluating a citizen complaint to determine if there was “reason to believe” a violation exists, this commenter ignored the numerous examples of such situations provided by OSM of the varying interpretations of how to administer section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA and the implementing regulations at 30 CFR part 842. For example, in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, OSM provided as evidence of this confusion the fact that OSM had revised its primary Directive on the TDN process, INE-35, eight times in 33 years attempting to find the right balance between citizen engagement, agency expertise, and cooperative federalism.

Moreover, as described in more detail in section I of this preamble, since OSM provided those examples in the 2020 Rule, the 2020 Rule was judicially challenged, then replaced by the 2024 Rule before there was any ruling on the merits of the case, and then the 2024 Rule was challenged, and there has not been any ruling on the merits in that case either. In these lawsuits, opponents of the 2020 Rule and opponents of the 2024 Rule vigorously argued for opposite outcomes and maintained differing interpretations of section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. However, we assert that the 2020 Rule, along with the changes offered in this final rule, reflect the best reading of the statute. Instead of retreating to the pre-2020 Rule language, which needed clarification, or retaining the 2024 Rule's approach, OSM approached this rulemaking with the goal of removing ambiguity and formulating a regulatory program that, as a whole, represents the best reading of SMCRA.

After reviewing SMCRA, the legislative history of the Act, OSM's prior regulations and guidance documents, the rulemaking records for the 2020 Rule and the 2024 Rule, all of the comments and submissions in response to this proposed rule, and recent case law ( e.g., Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)), OSM is finalizing a rule today, which is substantially similar to the 2020 Rule, because, in OSM's opinion, it reflects the best reading of SMCRA. As the commenter noted, early legislative history from the House of Representatives notes that “it is anticipated that `reasonable belief' could be established by a snapshot of an operation in violation or other simple and effective documentation of a violation.” H.R. Rep. No. 95-218, at 129 (1977). However, Congress did not envision OSM as a mere pass-through entity between citizen complainants and State regulatory authorities. Instead, Congress equipped OSM with the statutory authority, staff, expertise, and resources to deploy limited, but strategic, Federal oversight to ensure that States adequately enforce SMCRA. S. Rep. No. 95-128, at 90 (May 10, 1977). Congress also directed the Secretary, acting through OSM, to “cooperate with other Federal agencies and State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of this Act.” 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(12). Limiting OSM's role in determining “reason to believe” to simply determining which State regulatory authority to send a TDN to without evaluating the content of a citizen complaint along with any information readily available, including information from a State regulatory authority, would conflict with the mandate in section 201(c)(12) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(12), because it would lead to increased instances of duplicate inspections, enforcement, and administrative burdens with no clear benefit.

The commenter is also incorrect that agencies receive no deference under the new Loper Bright standard set by the Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court held that issues of statutory interpretation are for courts to decide under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act and, accordingly, agency interpretations are no longer entitled to deference under Chevron, agency rules are once again reviewed under the previous framework set forth in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), which focuses on whether the agency's rule is the “best reading of the statute.” OSM's history of implementing SMCRA, including its experience implementing the 2020 Rule and 2024 Rule, provided the agency with recent, on-the-ground experience with the competing approaches to determining “reason to believe.” OSM has determined that the ability to have access to any information readily available is invaluable to avoid wasting OSM and State resources pursuing citizen complaints that, on their face, seem to provide “reason to believe” that a violation exist but that, after minimal investigation, are found to be meritless. OSM understands that, to the commenter, meritless citizen complaints could be weeded out after a TDN is issued, however, that approach is inefficient and burdens the State to respond to a meritless TDN. Under the 2020 Rule and the rule that OSM is finalizing today, OSM can use readily available information to help understand the citizen complaint before triggering a burden on the State. This approach, therefore, is most efficient and best implements SMCRA as a whole to avoid duplicative enforcement and administrative burdens on OSM and the State regulatory authorities.

Comment: A commenter noted that information not in OSM's possession at the time it receives a citizen complaint, or an oversight inspection is not “information available” to the Secretary and should not be considered before making a “reason to believe” determination. According to the commenter, for this reason, any information submitted from a State regulatory authority or other party after OSM receives a citizen complaint should not be considered in determining whether OSM has a reason to believe a violation exists.

Response: Section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), directs that “[w]henever, on the basis of any information available to him, including receipt of information from any person, the Secretary has reason to believe that any person is in violation of any requirement of this Act or any permit condition required by this Act, the Secretary shall notify the State regulatory authority, if one exists, in the State in which such violation exists.” Contrary to the assertions of the commenter, SMCRA does not limit OSM to only considering the information from any person, such as a citizen complaint, or freeze OSM's analysis of information available to the moment the citizen complaint is submitted. Instead, SMCRA plainly directs the Secretary, through OSM, to determine whether there is reason to believe that any person is in violation of SMCRA or a permit condition “on the basis of any information available to him,” which would include, but is not limited to, information obtained from a citizen and any other information available to OSM before making the “reason to believe” determination.

Comment: A commenter stated that SMCRA does not allow OSM to create or revive a procedural barrier in 30 CFR 842.12(a) to start the TDN process found in section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), by requiring that the complainant assert and demonstrate that the State regulatory authority has first been notified of the potential violation and has failed to take appropriate action.

Response: As fully explained in OSM's response to comments in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, and reiterated here, the rule OSM is finalizing today does not create, or revive, a procedural barrier to a citizen submitting a citizen complaint to OSM or requesting a Federal inspection. The final rule will require a citizen to provide the basis for the person's assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation in the context of a request for a Federal inspection under § 842.12, as with the 2020 Rule. However, OSM is not suggesting that the citizen must provide definitive, hard-to-obtain proof that the State regulatory authority has not acted on the possible violation. Instead, the requirement in § 842.12 merely directs the citizen to provide any information they may have about the State regulatory authority's action or inaction. See 85 FR at 75160. Of course, the more detailed a citizen complaint is about a possible violation, the more information OSM will have to consider when determining whether there is a reason to believe. OSM certainly recognizes that citizens have limited access to mine sites, and the final rule does not require any more information than a citizen has available.

Furthermore, this commenter misstates the final rule. The final rule does not require that a citizen demonstrate that the State regulatory authority has first been notified of the potential violation and has failed to take appropriate action. Instead, the final rule reverts to the 2020 Rule language, which, as OSM explained at the time, requires a citizen requesting a Federal inspection to notify the State regulatory authority before, or simultaneously with, reporting violations to OSM. 85 FR at 75157. This provision was part of the Federal regulations from 1982 until the 2024 Rule changed it in the spring of 2024 and reflects OSM's long-held understanding that a State regulatory authority will resolve most alleged violations without intrusion by OSM, as long as the State regulatory authority is made aware of the citizen's concern.

Comment: A commenter asserted that the proposal to modify § 842.11(b)(1)(i) to require that OSM consider information “readily” available to the Secretary is inconsistent with SMCRA and OSM's prior practice. The commenter also claimed that OSM's justification for this reversion to the 2020 Rule lacks support. The commenter noted that OSM rejected comments favoring stricter application of the “reason to believe” standard in earlier rulemakings as contrary to Congressional intent in section 521(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a), which the commenter alleges imposes a mandatory duty to conduct an inspection when OSM has “reason to believe” a violation exists. The commenter asserted that it is not necessary for OSM to have some degree of certainty that the violation exists before issuing a TDN because any Federal inspection that followed the State's response would be when OSM would determine whether a violation actually exists. For support, the commenter points to several administrative and judicial decisions supporting OSM's pre-2020 Rule standard that a TDN would be issued if the possible violation in the citizen complaint, if true, would constitute a SMCRA violation. See, e.g., W. Va. Highlands Conservancy ( WVHC I ), 152 IBLA 158, at 186-87 (2000); Jessica Bier, 193 IBLA 109, 112 n.8 (2018).

Response: As discussed in greater detail above, considering information readily available to OSM is consistent with SMCRA and represents the best reading of the statute as a whole. OSM also disagrees with the commenter's characterization of the changes in this rulemaking as being a stricter application of “reason to believe.” With the changes approved here, OSM is not changing its “reason to believe” standard, increasing the standard, or placing any additional obligations on citizens for what they must provide in a citizen complaint. Instead, OSM is merely clarifying that a responsible official can use all readily available information to ensure that they have a full and complete picture of the matter before making its determination of whether there is “reason to believe” a violation exists. Further, the final rule does not require a higher level of certainty about whether a violation exists before OSM will issue a TDN. However, where there is readily available information related to a citizen complaint, OSM can use that information to make a better and more informed decision. The following hypothetical example illustrates how the changes do not modify the “reason to believe” standard but instead prevents the unnecessary issuance of TDNs by allowing OSM to use available information. For example, if a citizen alleges that a mine site was missing the appropriate signage on January 1, that information alone would arguably be sufficient to support a reason to believe that a violation exists. However, if OSM also had an inspection report that stated a State inspector noted the signage violation during a routine inspection on January 2 and the mine was able to fix the signage issue during the inspection, that would provide OSM with information indicating that there was not reason to believe the violation currently existed and avoid the administrative burden that the TDN process places on OSM and the State regulatory authority. Mine inspection reports are not typically publicly available immediately after an inspection but are readily available to OSM as the agency responsible for oversight of these State programs. Allowing OSM to use this type of information, where it is readily available, does not change the “reason to believe” standard and is a common sense approach to implementing the direction in section 201(c)(12) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1211(c)(12), that OSM should cooperate with State regulatory authorities to minimize duplication of inspections, enforcement, and administration of SMCRA.

With regard to the cases cited by the commenter purporting to mandate the use of an “if true” standard for determining reason to believe, OSM disagrees that these cases require OSM to reach the conclusion that the citizen complaint alone is sufficient information to consider whether there is reason to believe a violation exists under section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1). These decisions do not address the reasonableness of the post-2020 regulations or OSM's interpretation of SMCRA. Instead, the decisions cited by the commenters are applying the pre-2020 regulations, which grafted the “if true” standard onto the statutory standard. OSM's rulemaking today does not retroactively vacate or change the outcome of these cases, which were decided under earlier regulations. Moreover, these decisions did not reflect whether those pre-2020 regulations were the best reading of SMCRA as a whole or whether they would, as the 2020 Rule did, remove ambiguity and give effect to OSM's professional judgment by allowing it to consider any readily available information. See 85 FR at 75155-56, 75164-65. Notably, even the 2024 Rule retained the elimination of the “if true” standard. See 89 FR at 24724.

Comment: A commenter noted that OSM's 2025 proposed rule, which allows OSM to consider information from a State regulatory authority before determining if there is reason to believe a violation exists, is contrary to OSM's past positions and inconsistent with the regulations because information from a State regulatory authority would be considered by OSM when it looked at the State's TDN response to determine if the State had taken “appropriate action” or had “good cause” for not doing so. The commenter alleged that OSM's statement that this change is justified because it reduces the potential for duplicate inspections and conserves resources in the event that a State has already begun investigation or correcting an alleged violation is without merit because the regulations already prevent duplicate inspections by giving a State regulatory authority ten days to respond with this type of information after receiving a TDN.

Response: OSM disagrees with the commenter's characterization of this rule. This final rule is neither contrary to OSM's past practices nor inconsistent with the Federal regulations. As revised today, the regulations do not change the nondiscretionary statutory and regulatory requirement that a State regulatory authority must respond to a TDN with good cause for inaction or by taking appropriate action within ten days. 30 CFR 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)(1). OSM is, however, reverting to the approach in the 2020 Rule to ensure a more uniform and efficient process when OSM receives a citizen complaint. The revised regulation clarifies the information OSM's authorized representatives should consider when they receive a citizen complaint, which eliminates the possibility that different OSM offices will apply different standards when determining whether to issue a TDN. This revised process also ensures that OSM's authorized representatives can apply their independent, professional judgment to determine whether they have reason to believe a possible violation exists based on all readily available information before them, regardless of the source of that information. Once OSM's authorized representative determines that he or she has a “reason to believe” a violation exists, he or she must issue a TDN to the State regulatory authority and the State regulatory authority must respond within ten days. See 30 CFR 843.12(a)(2). Therefore, OSM's oversight of alleged violations is not materially altered.

As explained in the preamble to the proposed rule at 90 FR at 25176, based on the Supreme Court's ruling in Loper Bright that the regulations should reflect the best reading of the statute, OSM now disagrees with the direction it took in the preamble to the 2024 Rule that announced OSM's intention to treat a State regulatory authority as a “person,” who could be in violation of the Act under section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1).

Comment: Some commenters opposed OSM's proposal to return to its prior understanding that a State regulatory authority cannot be found in violation of SMCRA and its implementing regulations for purposes of a TDN, unless the State regulatory authority is acting as a permit holder. These comments claim that OSM did not provide adequate support for this change and opined that site-specific violations should be addressed through the TDN process and programmatic violations should be addressed through the 30 CFR part 733 process.

Response: OSM thoroughly explained its rationale for generally not including a State regulatory authority as a “person” for purposes of issuance of a TDN in the preamble to the 2020 Rule. See, e.g., 85 FR at 75176 and 75179. Instead of using the TDN process, OSM will handle any programmatic issues caused by State regulatory authorities as State regulatory program issues under 30 CFR 733.12. Id. As stated in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, “[o]f course, under finalized 30 CFR 733.12(d), if the State regulatory program issue manifests itself as a violation of the approved State program that often results in an on-the-ground impact, OSM can still take direct enforcement action.” Id. at 75177.

Comment: In contrast to the previous comment, several commenters supported OSM's proposal to return to OSM's prior position that a State regulatory authority is not a “person” that can commit a violation under section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), unless the State regulatory authority is acting as a permit holder. The commenters asserted that the preamble to the 2024 Rule was inconsistent with SMCRA. In support of their position, they noted that the SMCRA definition of “person” at section 701(19) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1291(19), does not include “State,” “State program,” or “State regulatory authority” among the entities that can be a “person.”

Response: OSM agrees with the commenter that the best reading of SMCRA as a whole is that a State regulatory authority should not be considered “any person” who may be “in violation of any requirement of this Act” under section 521(a) of SMCRA unless the State is a permit holder. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a). As OSM noted in the preamble to the proposed rule (90 FR 25176), SMCRA's definition of “person” further indicates that the interpretation outlined in the 2020 Rule and reiterated in this final rule is the most consistent with SMCRA.

Comment: A commenter stated that OSM's proposal to clarify that “any person” does not include State regulatory authorities is unjustified and contrary to SMCRA. The commenter asserts that Congress's use of “any” as a modifier to “person” and “requirement” in section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), indicates a statutory intent to broaden the scope of entities that may receive a TDN beyond the business entities identified in section 701(19) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1291(19). The commenter also notes that because the citizen suit provision in section 520 of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1270, applies to actions “against the United States or any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution” it is apparent that Congress intended to include State regulatory authorities in the group of actors capable of violating SMCRA under section 521(a)(1) 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1). Finally, the commenter notes that OSM's own regulations at 30 CFR 700.5 define “person” as including “any agency, unit, or instrumentality of Federal, State or local government.” The commenter notes that this regulation is binding on OSM and requires that State regulatory authorities be brought within the scope of section 521(a) and that OSM's proposed interpretation would be inconsistent with OSM's own regulations.

Response: OSM disagrees with the commenter's interpretation of SMCRA and the Federal regulations. Although it is true that the regulatory definition of “person” at 30 CFR 700.5 includes State agencies, its inclusion of Federal and local government agencies indicates that it is not specifically geared toward State regulatory authorities in the context discussed in this rule ( i.e., the agency issuing the surface mining permit). Indeed, in the preamble to the proposed rule that introduced this term, OSM noted that, while the definition expanded on the definition in section 701(19) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1291(19), it did so to ensure that “governmental agencies listed in section 524 of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1274, would be included because they are subject to regulation when engaged in surface coal mining and reclamation operations.” 43 FR 41662, 41666 (Sept. 18, 1978). Likewise, the citizen suit provision at section 520 of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1270(a)(1), cited by the commenter, is also geared toward citizen suits against operators of surface coal mining and reclamation operations. Because section 524 authorizes Federal, State, and local governments to operate surface coal mining and reclamation operations, it only makes sense that the citizen suit provision at section 520(a)(1) would apply to those entities when acting in that specific capacity. This rule does not change that. As OSM noted in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule, OSM could still issue a TDN to a State agency if the State were acting as an operator of a surface coal mining and reclamation operation or a permit holder. See 90 FR at 25176 (“Properly understood, a State regulatory authority can only be a `person' that could `be in violation of any requirement of the Act' in order to trigger a TDN if the State is acting as a business organization of some type, such as a permit holder operating a surface coal mining operation.”). To the extent that OSM determines that the definition of “person” in § 700.5 is causing any confusion, OSM will consider subsequent clarifications as part of its deregulation effort.

As discussed in more detail in the preamble to the 2025 proposed rule, 90 FR at 25176, the best reading of section 521(a)(1), 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), and SMCRA as a whole is that the TDN process is not an acceptable way to review the action of a State regulatory authority. Instead, programmatic issues should be addressed under section 521(b) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(b).

Comment: One commenter opined that the 2020 Rule, and thus the proposed rule, correctly excluded matters that are programmatic in nature from the TDN process. The commenter supported OSM's rationale for the 2020 Rule, agreeing that site specific alleged violations should be addressed through the TDN process as governed by section 521(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a), and 30 CFR part 842, but that State regulatory program issues should be corrected through a separate process under section 521(b) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(b), and 30 CFR part 733. This commenter alleged that the 2024 Rule, by allowing OSM to issue notices of violations (NOVs) for State regulatory program issues that are not permit violations, effectively made remedies for State regulatory program issues useless. The commenter further alleged that the part 733 procedures for implementing sections 504(b) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C.1254, and 521(b) of SMCRA are the only allowable pathways for addressing a situation where a State regulatory authority is failing to maintain and implement its regulatory program effectively.

Response: OSM appreciates the support of this commenter and generally agrees with its analysis. OSM will note, however, that even under the 2024 Rule, OSM still used the part 733 procedures for State regulatory program issues; however, the 2020 Rule better and more clearly distinguished between the two processes under section 521 of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271. Thus, OSM is reverting, in large part, to that rule.

Comment: Several commenters supported reverting to the 2020 Rule's approach of distinguishing State regulatory program issues, which would be addressed through 30 CFR part 733, from on-the-ground violations, which would be addressed through 30 CFR part 842. Commenters alleged that a “violation” under section 521(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a), is limited to actions or omissions by a permittee at a permitted operation and is not broad enough to relate to a State regulatory program issue. These commenters recommended removing permitting matters and programmatic disputes from the TDN process and revising 30 CFR part 842 to define “violation” as “an on-the-ground nonconformance” or “an activity condition or practice at a surface coal mining and reclamation operation which does not conform to the permit or applicable regulatory program.” These commenters also stated that citizen complaints requesting Federal inspections should not be allowed for indirect challenges to State permits or programs.

Response: While OSM generally agrees with these commenters, OSM has declined to adopt their suggestion to expand the list of definitions. As discussed above, OSM drafted this rule with an eye toward reducing Federal regulations. The 2020 Rule, which this final rule largely adopts, sufficiently draws the distinctions advocated by the commenters without additional changes to the regulations.

Comment: Another commenter proposed additional changes to §§ 733.5 and 842.11 to fully exclude programmatic and permitting issues from the definition of “State regulatory program issue” in § 733.5 and preclude the issuance of TDNs or Federal inspections for programmatic or permitting issues.

Response: After reviewing the proposed additional changes suggested by the commenter, OSM has declined to adopt them. The 2020 Rule was in effect for over three years, and, in OSM's experience, it struck the correct balance between State primacy and Federal oversight for both on-the-ground or imminent violations and programmatic violations. In addition, OSM's staff found the 2020 Rule to be easy to implement. The changes suggested by the commenter could cause confusion and remove discretion.

Comment: One commenter stated that Congress intended OSM to use TDNs to address site-specific violations by State regulatory authorities when it enacted SMCRA and, as support, cited to SMCRA's legislative history. See S. Rep. No. 95-128 (“Federal standards are to be enforced by the Secretary on a mine-by-mine basis for all or part of the State as necessary without finding that the State regulatory program should be superseded by a Federal permit and enforcement program.”). The commenter opined that the legislative history shows that Congress intended the only limitation on TDNs to be that the alleged violation must be specific to a particular mine and that OSM's proposed interpretation that the permittee must be in violation of the permit to warrant a TDN is unsupported. Further, the commentor alleged that the legislative history indicates that while the 30 CFR part 733 process is an appropriate method for addressing programmatic issues, OSM has the authority to address mine-specific violations that a State regulatory program issue may cause without a specific finding that the State regulatory authority is not implementing, administering, or enforcing its State program properly.

Response: OSM considered SMCRA's legislative history when it promulgated the 2020 Rule, including the legislative report cited by the commenter. See, e.g., 85 FR at 75155. In the preamble to that rule, OSM noted that over the years, OSM struggled with many issues related to 30 CFR part 842, including “how to address various types of violations.” Id. The 2020 Rule represented one interpretation of those regulations, and the 2024 Rule represented another interpretation. After having recent experience implementing both interpretations, OSM is returning to the interpretation in the 2020 Rule because it is more closely aligned with the statutory text of SMCRA as a whole and because it gives full effect to section 521(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a), for mine-specific violations and section 521(b) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(b), for programmatic issues with a State regulatory authority's implementation of its State program. This rule is in accordance with SMCRA, as well as the regulatory provision that the commenters highlighted.

Comment: One commenter pointed to numerous IBLA decisions in support of the position that OSM has a duty under SMCRA to address potential violations by State regulatory authorities, including so called “permit defects,” through the TDN process and that ignoring on-the-ground violations to pursue a programmatic action under part 733 is inappropriate. The commenter specifically cited Mullinax, 96 IBLA 52 (Feb. 27, 1987), W.E. Carter, 116 IBLA 262 (Oct. 18, 1990), Kuhn, 120 IBLA 1 (July 3, 1991), and Molinary, 134 IBLA 244 (Nov. 30, 1995) in support of this position. The commenter alleges that, contrary to what OSM said in the preamble to the proposed rule, the distinction should not be whether an operator or a State regulatory authority caused the alleged SMCRA violation but whether the violation is permit-specific. Where the violation is permit-specific, regardless of whether it is caused by an operator or the State regulatory authority, the commenter argued that OSM must issue a TDN, and that only where the violation is more general or programmatic is a part 733 procedure alone appropriate. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, et al., 152 IBLA 158 (Apr. 25, 2000) and West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, 166 IBLA 39 (June 9, 2005).

Response: OSM addressed a similar comment in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, and OSM will not repeat that discussion in detail here because the rationale is the same. See, e.g., 85 FR at 75162. Fundamentally, the IBLA cases cited by the commenter are not interpreting SMCRA itself; instead, they are interpreting the pre-2020 Federal regulations, which were ambiguous and led the IBLA to conclude that every citizen complaint should automatically result in a TDN. As stated in the preamble to the 2020 Rule and reiterated in this final rule, this regulatory change is meant to clarify when OSM uses each of the enforcement tools in its toolbelt. Notably, the commenter did not cite to even one example of OSM inappropriately forgoing the part 842 process in favor of the part 733 process during the more than three years the 2020 Rule was in effect.

Comment: A commenter alleged that the proposed rule is a departure from OSM's long-held official policy that TDNs should be used to address violations by a State regulatory authority, including for permit defects. The commenter noted that a prior OSM guidance document, known as a directive, specified that OSM should issue TDNs for permit “omissions or defects” identified as a result of individual field inspections. Further, the commenter stated a prior version of Directive INE-35, which OSM issued in 1990 and rescinded in 2006, imposed a mandatory duty on OSM to address violations by State regulatory authorities. Finally, the commenter pointed to a subsequent version of Directive INE-35, which OSM issued in 2011 and rescinded in 2019, to support its contention that OSM's longstanding position has been that the issuance of a TDN is mandatory to address a violation, even a violation that resulted from a permit defect caused by a State regulatory authority.

Response: While OSM does not dispute the references cited by the commenter, the reality, as presented in the 2020 Rule, is far more complex, and the history of OSM's treatment of permit defects shows an agency going back and forth on this issue. See also 85 FR at 75176 (preamble to the 2020 Rule noting OSM's varying positions over the years). After a brief experiment with a different policy reflected in the 2024 Rule, OSM has again decided that the 2020 Rule reflects the best reading of SMCRA as a whole and is an appropriate exercise of OSM's oversight. See also id. It ensures that primacy States have exclusive regulatory jurisdiction over permitting while preserving OSM's oversight and limited backup enforcement authority. It ensures that OSM can correct any programmatic issues through the part 733 process and site-specific issues through the part 842 process. For these reasons, and those set forth in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, OSM is returning to that balanced approach.

Comment: A commenter asserted that it would be inappropriate to exclude violations by a State regulatory authority from the TDN process. The commenter noted that there are a large number of mine-specific violations by a State regulatory authority that would still require OSM oversight, such as the issuance of a defective mining or reclamation plan, extension or renewal of an automatically terminated permit, failure to ensure adequate reclamation bonding, or inappropriate denial of a lands unsuitable petition because these issues have the potential to cause a site-specific, on-the-ground violation of SMCRA. The commenter expressed concern that because an operator would be acting in accordance with a validly issued permit or the nature of the violation may not be apparent until after the close of the public comment period or even when mining begins, it is imperative that OSM retain the ability to issue a TDN directly to a State regulatory authority.

Response: As OSM noted in the preamble to the 2020 Rule: “Congress intended the section 521(a) TDN process to be limited to violations at a specific site.” Id. At that time, OSM also noted that OSM “retain[s] the ability to take Federal enforcement action if any issue being addressed as a State regulatory program issue . . . results in, or may imminently result in, on-the-ground violation.” Id. This ability, in combination with other Federal regulations, allows OSM to appropriately address the hypotheticals that the commenter raised.

Comment: One commenter contended that OSM's only prior departure from its longstanding policy that TDNs should be used to address violations by State regulatory authorities was a 2005 letter from the Acting Secretary for Land and Minerals Management (the “Mettiki letter”) and that the Mettiki letter is deeply flawed. The commenter alleged that the Mettiki letter is not based on the plain language of section 521 of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271, but is instead premised on an unsupported interpretation of SMCRA where OSM lacks jurisdiction over State permitting decisions. Under this interpretation, argued the commenter, the only remedy available to OSM for a mine operating in a manner that has resulted or would result in a mine-specific, on-the-ground violation would be to address the issue programmatically, at the risk of allowing the on-the-ground violation to persist unabated. The commenter stated that allowing an on-the-ground violation to remain unabated would be contrary to the purpose of SMCRA and its legislative history, which indicate that all permit-specific violations should be addressed, regardless of the source. S. Rept. No. 128, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 88 (1977). Finally, to highlight the flaws in the Mettiki letter and the proposed rule, the commenter pointed to a case in Oklahoma where the State regulatory authority attempted to prevent OSM from correcting an on-the-ground violation of SMCRA's reclamation standards by claiming that the violation was a permit defect that could only be corrected through programmatic action and not a TDN.

Response: OSM disagrees with the commenter. As noted above, the Letter from Assistant Secretary Rebecca Watson to Joseph M. Lovett, Appalachian Center for the Economy and the Environment (Oct. 21, 2005) (“Watson letter” or “Mettiki letter”), is not the only time OSM has espoused this interpretation. For instance, the current Directive INE-35, which has been effective since 2019, does not state that TDNs can be issued for permit defects. Moreover, the 2020 Rule, which this final rule largely adopts, also clarified the distinction between programmatic issues and site-specific violations. In addition, OSM does not agree that this rule is contrary to the legislative history. Instead, it seeks to restore the statutory division that Congress put in place in 1977. In addition, OSM is familiar with Oklahoma's previous arguments related to approximate original contour and whether it was a permit defect that could be corrected through a TDN. In response, OSM notes that this occurred before the promulgation of the 2020 Rule, which would have clarified how programmatic issues are addressed versus how site-specific violations are addressed. Specifically, as stated in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, nothing in that rule “prevents a State regulatory authority from taking direct enforcement action in accordance with its State regulatory program, or OSMRE from taking appropriate oversight enforcement action, in the event that a previously identified State regulatory program issue results in or may imminently result in a violation of the approved State program.” 85 FR at 75171. Therefore, it is unclear if or how these arguments would have changed in light of the clarity provided by the 2020 Rule. Regardless of these arguments from the commenters, OSM maintains that the 2020 Rule reflects the best reading of SMCRA as a whole, particularly the distinction between section 521(a) of SMCRA and 521(b) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a) and (b).

Comment: One commenter warned that requiring all violations by State regulatory authorities to be addressed through the part 733 process, as opposed to the TDN process, would result in absurd outcomes that could delay or even prohibit OSM from correcting on-the-ground violations. The commenter noted that the part 733 process contains numerous steps, some with long deadlines and others with no timeframes attached, that would not facilitate the quick corrective action needed to address a mine-specific violation that has historically been addressed through the TDN process. The commenter also indicated that, in 2005, OSM reported that it had only started ten part 733 proceedings, indicating that there has historically been a very high threshold for State program issues that trigger a part 733 process. The commenter expressed worry that if a permit defect cannot be addressed through a TDN but is not substantial enough to warrant a part 733 proceeding, that the violation may not ever be addressed, or any resolution would occur well after the on-the-ground violation has caused irreparable harm.

Response: OSM disagrees with this commenter's assessment of the proposed rule. The example cited by the commenter predates the changes that the 2020 Rule made to 30 CFR part 733, which were largely unaffected by the 2024 Rule. Before the 2020 Rule, the part 733 process meant sending a letter to a State regulatory authority to begin the process for substituting Federal enforcement or withdrawing approval of all or a part of a State program. The 2020 Rule changed that to include what is now 30 CFR 733.12, which is a codification of the corrective action plan process that had previously been contained in agency guidance documents. The action plan process, as revised in this rule, will ensure that the part 733 process works swiftly to address State regulatory program issues. Indeed, OSM used this process three times in the approximately three years that the 2020 Rule was in effect. OSM's experience was that the action plan worked to resolve the State regulatory program issues identified. In the one instance where OSM's review of the State's compliance with the action plan indicated continuing issues, OSM invoked the procedures in 30 CFR 733.13, and the State swiftly resolved the matter. Thus, OSM's practical experience in implementing the 2020 Rule demonstrates that the scenario presented by the commenter is unlikely to occur.

In the preamble to the proposed rule, OSM specifically requested comments about whether it should retain the changes to § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 1 ) made by the 2024 Rule, which addressed similar possible violations. 90 FR at 25177. Retaining this language would allow OSM to reduce the paperwork burden on a State regulatory authority by specifically allowing OSM to issue one TDN for multiple similar violations, even if those violations are on different permits.

Comment: Most commenters either supported retention of this provision or indicated they were neutral on its retention because, in their view, OSM had the authority to issue one TDN for similar possible violations even without specific language in the regulations.

Response: While OSM has endeavored to remove unnecessary wording from the regulations as part of OSM's deregulation effort, OSM opts to retain this sentence from the 2024 Rule. As OSM noted then, it intended the change to reduce regulatory burdens on the State regulatory authorities. See 89 FR at 24718. The actual reduction of regulatory burdens outweighs streamlining OSM's regulations; thus, OSM has retained it.

As discussed in the preamble to the proposed rule, if OSM issues a TDN, a State regulatory authority has ten days to respond. OSM will then determine if that response constitutes “appropriate action” to cause the violation to be corrected or if the State regulatory authority has shown “good cause” for not doing so. 90 FR at 25177. Under the 2020 Rule, the regulations provided that if a State regulatory authority had entered into an action plan to correct a State regulatory program issue, that would be considered “appropriate action.” The 2024 Rule retained that concept but considered an action plan to be “good cause” rather than “appropriate action.” This rule adopts the proposal to return a corrective action plan to “appropriate action.” Notably, however, regardless of whether an action plan is considered good cause or appropriate action, no further Federal enforcement would result from the TDN.

Comment: One commenter alleged that, while SMCRA recognizes that general programmatic violations should be addressed through the part 733 process, the 2025 proposed rule violates SMCRA by eliminating federal oversight for site-specific violations caused by the State regulatory authority. This commenter cautioned that this approach would fail to provide effective and timely oversight for mine-specific violations, which is contrary to section 521(a) of SMCRA. 30 U.S.C. 1271(a).

Response: OSM disagrees with the commenter about the effect of returning to the 2020 Rule position that an action plan is “appropriate action.” As explained in the preamble to the proposed rule, an action plan does cause violations to be corrected, even at specific mine sites. 90 FR at 25177. For example, while the 2020 Rule was in effect, OSM entered into action plans with three State regulatory authorities after determining a State regulatory program issue existed. As part of the action plan, OSM and the States developed a schedule to ensure that the State corrected the State regulatory program issue impacting each permit. These concrete examples demonstrate that action plans do cause site specific issues to be remedied, if they exist, which is why it is more correct for action plans to be considered “appropriate action” under revised § 842.11(b)(1)(B)( 3 ).

Comment: Other commenters supported reverting to the 2020 Rule language in § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 3 ) affirming that a programmatic corrective action plan can be considered appropriate action in response to a TDN. These commenters noted that a corrective action plan is a necessary tool for successful collaboration between OSM and State regulatory authorities to expeditiously address program issues.

Response: OSM agrees with these commenters that an action plan should be considered appropriate action and that an action plan is a useful tool to collaborate with the State regulatory authorities to ensure SMCRA is effectively and efficiently enforced.

Comment: Another commenter opposed the proposed amendment to § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 3 ) and suggested modifying § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 4 ) to expand “good cause” to include a “response by the [S]tate regulatory authority indicat[ing] that the possible violation identified in the [TDN . . .] constitutes a [S]tate regulatory program issue under Part 733.” The commenter alleged that these proposed changes are necessary to prevent State regulatory program issues from being subject to Federal enforcement or inspections.

Response: In the 2024 Rule, OSM changed the regulations to provide that action plans correcting State regulatory program issues constituted good cause rather than appropriate action. However, as described above and in the preamble to the proposed rule, OSM is reverting back to the 2020 Rule's approach—that action plans are appropriate action to cause a violation to be corrected—because the action plan will take care of both the underlying problem ( i.e., the State regulatory program issue) as well as any manifestations of that issue in a permit. Thus, to more closely align the regulations with the statutory text of section 521(a)(2) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(2), OSM is revising the regulations as proposed and as set forth in the 2020 Rule to allow action plans to be considered appropriate action. State regulatory program issues are addressed under section 521(b) and, thus, are not addressed through Federal enforcement or inspections unless, as noted in § 733.12(d), that State regulatory program issue “results in or may imminently result in a violation of the approved State program.”

Comment: One commenter stated that programmatic oversight is not an appropriate replacement for TDNs or direct enforcement to correct a violation and would be contrary to SMCRA. The commenter noted that, historically, States had not adequately regulated coal mining and, in enacting SMCRA, Congress sought to address that issue by giving OSM a role in mine-specific enforcement, in addition to programmatic oversight, and that allowing programmatic oversight to replace permit-specific enforcement would prevent timely actions to abate violations and require OSM to use a more disruptive and time-consuming process of partial or complete program withdrawal. The commenter provided an example of a citizen who submitted a citizen complaint to OSM. In response, OSM issued a TDN to the State regulatory authority and, after a Federal inspection, issued a Federal notice of violation to the operator to correct the violation. The citizen also pursued a remedy with the State regulatory authority, but that process took four years (although it was eventually resolved in favor of the citizen). The commenter alleged that OSM's proposal to forego Federal enforcement in favor of programmatic action would result in situations where citizens must wait excessive amounts of time for violations to be abated, if they are abated at all.

Response: While OSM appreciates this commenter's concern, OSM notes that the example provided by the commenter occurred before OSM promulgated the 2020 Rule. Among other things, OSM developed the 2020 Rule to create a more efficient process that would also provide the same level of citizen participation. After a brief experiment with the 2024 Rule, OSM now recognizes that the 2020 Rule, as slightly modified here, strikes the proper balance. Programmatic action is appropriate for programmatic issues, such as State regulatory program issues. As noted repeatedly above, this final rule and the 2020 Rule at § 733.12(d) do not preclude use of the TDN process, even if a State regulatory issue has been identified if the State regulatory program issue “results in or may imminently result in a violation of the approved State program.”

Comment: One commenter expressed concern that this rule would allow OSM personnel to ignore a violation that is not being abated if a State regulatory authority is not properly interpreting or applying its approved State program. According to this commenter, such an outcome would be contrary to section 517(e) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(e), which requires that “[e]ach inspector, upon detection of each violation of any requirement of any State or Federal program or this Chapter, shall forthwith inform the operator in writing, and shall report in writing any such violation to the regulatory authority.”

Response: OSM disagrees with the premise of this comment. Nothing in the 2020 Rule or in the rule being finalized today would run afoul of section 517(e) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(e), or allow a Federal inspector to ignore a violation of SMCRA, the Federal regulations, the State program, or a permit condition. To OSM's knowledge, this situation did not occur when the 2020 Rule was in effect, and OSM does not expect it to occur here. If it does, SMCRA contains a citizen suit provision in section 520, 30 U.S.C. 1270(a)(2), that a citizen could use to ensure the Act is enforced.

Section 842.12 of the Federal regulations sets forth information about a citizen's request for a Federal inspection. For the first time, the 2024 Rule amended existing 30 CFR 842.11(b)(2) and 842.12(a) to deem every citizen complaint to be a request for a Federal inspection. 89 FR at 24718. While this was done to eliminate real or perceived barriers to public participation, this approach is contrary to the best reading of SMCRA as a whole and the cooperative federalism principles that form the bedrock of SMCRA. 90 FR at 25175. In addition, OSM proposed to revert § 842.12 back to the language contained in the 2020 Rule, which as discussed in the responses to comments in section III.D., also requires that, for a request for a Federal inspection, the citizen provide OSM with information about his or her contact with the State regulatory authority. Except as noted in this preamble, OSM is finalizing the provision as proposed.

Comment: A commenter opposed the proposal to amend § 842.12(a) to require that a citizen include a statement that they have notified the appropriate State regulatory authority of the existence of the possible violation and the reason why the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation. Their rationale is that this position is contrary to positions OSM took in the 1979 and 1982 rulemakings on this topic and is contrary to the intent that the public is allowed to participate in the enforcement of SMCRA. The commenter noted that OSM's position in 1979 was that OSM lacks the authority to require a citizen to ask a State regulatory authority to inspect a mine before asking for a Federal inspection. The commenter also noted that OSM's position in 1982 was that waiting for a citizen to notify a State regulatory authority would needlessly delay the TDN process.

Response: OSM disagrees with the premise that the proposed amendments to § 842.12(a) are contrary to its historical position in the 1979 and 1982 rulemakings. As noted in 2020 when OSM initially proposed these changes, the clarification adopted in this final rule does very little to change how citizens initiate complaints and requests for Federal inspection with OSM and places no additional burden on the citizen complaint process as compared to the pre-2020 Rule process. 85 FR at 75157. The final regulation at 30 CFR 842.12(a) reconfirms the longstanding requirement that, when requesting a Federal inspection, the citizen must include a statement that the citizen has informed the State regulatory authority of the existence of the possible violation, condition, or practice. The final rule also requires the citizen to provide the basis for the assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation. In removing this requirement in the 2024 Rule, OSM stated that citizens should not need to state their allegation in statutory or regulatory language because they are not necessarily well-versed on the text of SMCRA or its implementing regulations. 89 FR at 24718. But the requirement to provide the basis for the assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation does not require a statement based in statutory or regulatory language. Instead, it merely requires a statement explaining why the citizen believes the violation has not been corrected. As OSM noted in 2020, this requirement would provide critical information to help OSM more efficiently resolve the alleged violation and recognizes that the State regulatory authority is almost always in the best position to resolve any alleged violations more quickly and efficiently than OSM. 85 FR at 75160.

In addition, OSM's experience implementing the 2024 Rule highlights the need for the clarity and efficiency that the 2020 Rule provided. Since the effective date of the 2024 Rule, OSM has seen an increase in the number of citizen complaints, all of which were, under that rule, considered requests for a Federal inspection. However, this increase in the number of citizen complaints has not corresponded with an increase in enforcement actions taken by OSM in response to a TDN because only one of the citizen complaints received under the 2024 Rule required any follow up action by OSM after investigation. In other words, after completing its investigation of the State regulatory authority responses, OSM found that, after learning of the citizen concern, the State regulatory authority either took appropriate action or adequately explained to OSM why there was good cause for the State regulatory to take no action, often because there was no violation. Unfortunately, the processing of this increased number of citizen complaints and TDNs amounted to a waste of agency resources that could have been used to address other priorities.

For example, OSM received a citizen complaint with accompanying photographic evidence alleging SMCRA violations at an operation. Because the pictures provided reason to believe that a possible violation risking imminent harm existed, OSM conducted a Federal inspection. When OSM arrived at the mine site, two days after receiving the complaint, OSM discovered that all violations depicted in the photographs had already been resolved by the State regulatory authority and that the photos were more than two months old. Although this was an apparent imminent harm violation, which process has not been changed by either the 2020 Rule, the 2024 Rule, or this rule, it shows how a comparable situation could occur in a non-imminent harm situation, and how readily available information from a State regulatory authority could create efficiencies in OSM's oversight process and prevent an unnecessary expenditure of Federal resources.

Comment: Several commenters supported OSM's proposal to repeal the provision in the 2024 Rule that allowed all citizen complaints to be considered requests for Federal inspections because they contended that that provision eroded State primacy and created new regulatory uncertainties. These commenters maintained that the prior interpretation that citizens must independently request a Federal inspection better implements State primacy and is supported by the text of SMCRA.

Response: As explained above and in the preamble to the proposed rule, OSM agrees with these commenters and, as finalized, this rule maintains the statutory distinction between requests for Federal inspections under section 517(h)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(h)(1), and information that could give OSM a reason to believe a violation exists under section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), which could be from a citizen complaint.

Comment: Some commenters supported reverting to the 2020 Rule language at § 842.12 that required a citizen requesting a Federal inspection to provide the basis for the assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation.

Response: OSM agrees with these commenters and, as finalized, § 842.12 contains a sentence that states: “The statement must also set forth the fact that the person has notified the State regulatory authority, if any, in writing, of the existence of the possible violation, condition, or practice, and the basis for the person's assertion that the State regulatory authority has not taken action with respect to the possible violation.” OSM notes, however, as OSM did in the preamble to the 2020 Rule that “if the complainant notifies the State regulatory authority simultaneously with filing a complaint with OSMRE, the basis for the person's assertion could be as simple as restating the allegations in the complaint made to the State regulatory authority, coupled with the action, if any, taken by the State regulatory authority in response.” 85 FR at 75168. For example, OSM accepted a citizen complaint under the 2020 Rule where a group simultaneously submitted their complaint to OSM and the State regulatory authority. As the basis for asserting that the State regulatory authority had not taken action, the group cited specific instances in the past when the State regulatory authority did not act or did not resolve a previous complaint. OSM still encourages citizens to first contact State regulatory authorities with any concerns because the State regulatory authorities are often in the best position to correct the action and, when submitting a citizen complaint to OSM, to provide OSM with as much information about the basis for the assertions in the complaint as possible because it will help OSM determine if it has a reason to believe that a violation exists.

Comment: To better align the Federal regulations with section 517(h)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1267(h)(1), one commenter suggested that OSM further amend § 842.12(a), as proposed, to insert the phrase “at the surface mining site” after the word “exists” at the end of the first sentence and again at § 842.11(b)(1)(i) after the word “exists” and before the phrase “a violation” in the middle of the first sentence.

Response: As noted above, OSM agrees with the commenter's suggested change to § 842.12(a) and has amended the final rule to include the phrase “at the surface mining site” after the word “exists” at the end of the first sentence. OSM did not make the comparable change to § 842.11(b)(1)(i) because that provision implements section 521(a)(1) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1), which, unlike section 517(h)(1), 30 U.S.C. 1267(h)(1), does not contain that phrase. Thus, the change to § 842.12(a) aligns both sections more closely to the express statutory language.

Comment: One commenter stated that State regulatory authorities are the appropriate entities to make threshold determinations of whether to conduct Federal inspections of alleged violations.

Response: OSM disagrees with this comment. Whether or not OSM should conduct a Federal inspection is a decision that SMCRA leaves to OSM. See 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(1) (providing that the Secretary, acting through OSM, is the entity responsible for making a reason to believe determination). OSM understands the commenter's point about cooperative federalism and wholeheartedly agrees that a State regulatory authority is in the best position to determine whether a violation exists within its jurisdiction. However, SMCRA provides OSM with oversight in specific instances, including as provided in section 521 of SMCRA. OSM believes this rule, like the 2020 Rule, provides the correct balance as provided in the statute between State primacy and Federal oversight.

Comment: One commenter suggested that OSM revise its regulations further to add a requirement that citizens exhaust State procedures before requesting a Federal inspection in a primacy State, unless the complaint involves imminent danger or significant environmental harm. Similarly, another commenter suggested revisions to § 842.12 that would direct requests for inspections in States with an approved regulatory program to the relevant State regulatory authority, and not OSM, unless there is reason to believe there is an imminent danger to public health or safety or reasonably expected significant, imminent, environmental harm, in which case the citizen would need to reach out to the State regulatory authority and OSM.

Response: OSM appreciates the suggestions made by these commenters, but OSM is not making the suggested changes in the final rule. The 2020 Rule, and the minor modifications to that rule made by this rulemaking, reflect the best reading of statutory provisions in SMCRA. In non-imminent harm situations, SMCRA neither requires exhaustion of State procedures before a Federal inspection nor does it require OSM to direct requests for inspections to States first.

The final rule maintains the concept of corrective action plans, as first codified in the 2020 Rule and maintained, in large part, in the 2024 Rule. The final rule, however, generally reverts the substantive language of §§ 733.5 and 733.12 back to the 2020 Rule.

Comment: One commenter suggested modifying 30 CFR part 733 to prioritize the use of programmatic oversight tools before using Federal enforcement to correct permit issues. Similarly, another commenter stated that OSM should revise the Federal regulations to prohibit direct Federal enforcement unless the violation at the mine site constituted an imminent public danger or significant imminent environmental harm. This commenter argued that the Federal regulations should be modified to require that all other concerns, even non-imminent harm violations, should be addressed through the part 733 process.

Response: OSM appreciates the commenters' perspective, but, at this time, OSM has decided to simply return the regulations back to the 2020 Rule, with a few minor revisions. When OSM promulgated the 2020 Rule, OSM considered multiple alternative approaches and decided the 2020 Rule struck the best balance between State primacy and limited Federal oversight as set forth in SMCRA. Although OSM briefly experimented with the 2024 Rule's approach, as discussed in this preamble, it did not reflect the best reading of SMCRA as a whole and did not give appropriate consideration to its cooperative federalism principles. At this time, OSM does not consider the commenters' suggested approach to be as consistent with the balance articulated in SMCRA.

Comment: One commenter suggested that § 733.12(a)(2) should be revised to state that if the OSM Director “has reason to believe” that a State regulatory authority is not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or a portion of its program, the OSM Director may “initiate proceedings to” substitute Federal enforcement of the program or withdraw approval of the program. The commenter explained that the intent of the proposed revisions was to reinforce the flexibility of 30 CFR part 733 and clarify the chronology of a proceeding under part 733.

Response: This commenter made this same comment in response to the 2020 Rule. See 85 FR at 75174. At that time, OSM declined to make this change because OSM was concerned that it would muddy the distinction between the action plan, which is developed before the § 733.13 process is started, and the § 733.13 process itself, which could lead to the substitution of Federal enforcement of the State program or the withdrawal of the State program. Id. After reconsideration of this comment, as discussed above in section II, OSM has now decided to make the suggested change to § 733.12(a)(2) by replacing “concludes” with “has reason to believe” in the first clause. This change better aligns the Federal regulations with the statutory structure of SMCRA and the cooperative federalism framework. Moreover, after working through several action plans under the 2020 Rule, including one that ultimately initiated the § 733.13 process, OSM no longer thinks that it is likely to lead to the confusion that OSM previously noted in 2020.

Comment: Several commenters recommended removing 30 CFR 843.12(a)(2), which allows OSM to issue notices of violation in primacy states on the basis of “any federal inspection other than one described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section,” alleging that this practice is not grounded in SMCRA. These commenters allege that this language inaccurately extends OSM's authority to issue notice of violations to inspections not mentioned in section 521(a)(3) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a)(3), and, therefore, is not the best reading of SMCRA.

Response: While OSM appreciates the commenters' suggestions, OSM did not propose any changes to 30 CFR 843.12(a)(2) or the Federal enforcement provisions of the Federal regulations in the proposed rule. Thus, these comments are outside the scope of this rulemaking. Moreover, OSM fully addressed a similar suggestion in the preamble to the 2020 Rule. See 85 FR at 75180. For these reasons, OSM is not adopting the suggestions in this comment.

Comment: Several commenters recommended revising 30 CFR 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 2 ) to specify that a State regulatory authority owed “considerable” or “substantial” deference when OSM reviews a State regulatory authority's response to a TDN. One commenter suggested that while the current text of § 842.11(b) contains the “arbitrary, capricious or abuse of discretion” standard for reviewing a State regulatory authority's response to a TDN issued by OSM, a second sentence stating that “[t]he authorized representative will accord the State regulatory authority substantial deference in evaluating whether the response is arbitrary capricious or an abuse of discretion under the State program” was necessary to ensure that a State regulatory authority is granted the appropriate deference by OSM.

Response: These comments are virtually the same as comments received in response to the proposed rule that led to the 2020 Rule, and OSM directs the reader to its more detailed response in that document. 85 FR at 75178. In sum, OSM is still declining to make the proposed changes to § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 2 ). OSM reiterates that under the “arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion” standard, which was not changed by either the 2020 Rule or the 2024 Rule or proposed to be changed in this rulemaking, OSM already affords the appropriate level of deference to a State regulatory authority, which is consistent with SMCRA's cooperative federalism model.

Comment: One commenter suggested removing 30 CFR 842.15(d), which allows formal appeals to the Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA) if OSM decides not to undertake a Federal inspection or take appropriate action, arguing that SMCRA only authorizes informal review in such a situation.

Response: OSM disagrees with the suggestion to revise § 842.15 to remove paragraph (d). OSM did not propose any changes to § 842.15 in the proposed rule and removal of this provision would be beyond the scope of this rulemaking. Furthermore, OSM addressed a similar comment in the preamble to the 2020 Rule, and OSM directs the reader to the more detailed discussion of why OSM declined to make that change then. 85 FR at 75180. For the same reasons, OSM declines to make these changes in this rulemaking.

Comment: One commenter suggested a series of additional revisions to 30 CFR part 842 to preclude programmatic and permitting issues from the TDN process. The suite of suggested edits included adding new definitions to § 842.5 for “State regulatory program issue” and “violation” and defining the first term as it is defined in § 733.5 and the second term as “an activity, condition or practice at a surface coal mining and reclamation operation which does not conform to the permit or applicable regulatory program.” In addition the commenter suggested that OSM should not adopt proposed § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 3 ) and, instead, should amend § 842.11(b)(1)(ii)(B)( 4 ) to add that “good cause” can include “(ii) The response by the state regulatory authority indicates that the possible violation identified in the notice provided under paragraph (b)(1)(ii)(B)(1) constituted a State regulatory program issue under Part 733.” The commenter stated that these proposed changes were needed because the 2020 Rule and, thus, the 2025 proposed rule, would potentially subject operators to Federal inspections or enforcement if a State declines to enter into an action plan. The commenter stated that OSM should instead follow the approach of the 1988 TDN Rulemaking and revise the regulations to reflect that violations of SMCRA cannot be enforceable against an operator until OSM engages in a part 733 process to address the State implementation issues.

Response: OSM declines to accept the suggestions in this comment because they propose substantive changes to §§ 842.5 and 842.11 that were not proposed in the proposed rule. While these suggestions could be considered a logical outgrowth, these proposed changes would significantly alter the careful balance struck in the 2020 Rule that OSM developed to clarify the procedures for addressing violations outlined in section 521(a) of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271(a), and that are subject to the 30 CFR part 842 TDN process versus programmatic issues outlined in section 521(b) that are subject to 30 CFR part 733. Moreover, contrary to the suggestion from the commenter, OSM has consistently acknowledged that all programmatic and permitting issues should not automatically be precluded from the TDN process because these violations have the potential to manifest in site-specific violations that are appropriately addressed through the TDN process. See 85 FR at 75168, 75184-75185 (“If a citizen complainant makes OSMRE aware of a State regulatory program issue that has not resulted in actual or imminent violation of the approved State program that often manifests as an on-the-ground impact at a specific site, OSMRE will handle the issue initially through the enhancements to the 30 CFR part 733 process adopted in this final rule. However, as noted repeatedly, OSMRE will still initiate an appropriate Federal enforcement action, such as issuance of a TDN, if the State regulatory program issue results in, or may imminently result in, a violation of the approved State program.”). Prohibiting OSM from correcting an on-the-ground violation of SMCRA until OSM completes the part 733 process would impermissibly frustrate the purpose of SMCRA to “assure that surface coal mining operations are so conducted as to protect the environment” and “assure that appropriate procedures are provided for the public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of regulations, standards, reclamation plans, or programs established by the Secretary or any State under this Act.” 30 U.S.C. 1202(d) and (i). Furthermore, waiting to correct an on-the-ground violation until OSM and the State complete a part 733 process could significantly delay enforcement of a violation, increase costs to operators to remedy the violation, and potentially impact their ability to correct the violation.

Comment: One commenter supported the added flexibility that the proposed rule would provide for States and OSM to resolve disputes through action plans but noted concern that a lack of timeframes may cause excessive delays in resolving disputes.

Response: OSM appreciates the commenter's support for the rule and the flexibility it provides in tailoring OSM's oversight to the nature of the potential issue. OSM understands the commenter's concern that removing timeframes for designing and implementing action plans has the potential to result in delays in resolving a State regulatory program issue but, after reviewing the proposed language in § 733.12, the text as finalized here appropriately balances the need to resolve State regulatory program issues quickly with OSM's interest in retaining the flexibility to employ any number of compliance strategies, including but not limited to action plans, to ensure that the State regulatory authority corrects a State regulatory program issue in a timely and effective manner. Specifically, OSM was concerned that the rigid timelines and requirements in § 733.12(b) would leave OSM without sufficient flexibility to work with the States to develop the most appropriate and achievable compliance strategy to ensure that any identified State regulatory program issues are corrected and do not become an issue that would give the Director reason to believe that the State regulatory authority is not effectively implementing, administering, enforcing, or maintaining all or a portion of its State regulatory program. For example, the 2024 Rule required OSM to develop and approve an action plan within 60 days after OSM identified a State regulatory program issue via a TDN and required that each action plan conform to rigid requirements. While some of those requirements reflect common sense documentation and tracking of compliance measures, the prescriptive and rigid requirements created an overly complicated and time-consuming process that was unnecessary and burdensome for all but the most serious State regulatory program issues. The one-size-fits-all approach to addressing State regulatory program issues proved inefficient and unnecessary. Instead, OSM is returning to the more flexible approach of the 2020 Rule where those issues that cannot be resolved within 120 days will require an action plan but issues that can be resolved within that time frame can be managed without an action plan. Further, the approach adopted today still retains the important elements of an action plan and the tracking and monitoring required to ensure the State regulatory program issues are resolved without burdening OSM and State regulatory authorities with unnecessary procedures.

Comment: In response to OSM's invitation to comment on “whether any portions of the preexisting regulations could be improved to better meet this Administration's objectives” (90 FR at 25177), one commenter requested that OSM consider removing the provisions of 30 CFR 842.12(b)(1) that allow a State regulatory authority to seek informal review when OSM determines that a State's response to a TDN does not constitute appropriate action or good cause. In support of this recommendation, the commenter stated that nothing in section 521 of SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. 1271, provides for creation of a new right of “informal review” for State regulatory authorities in the TDN process. The commenter alleges that delaying a Federal inspection pending resolution of an “informal review” after the State regulatory authority has already had full opportunity to take action or to justify inaction, is contrary to the “best reading” of SMCRA and, therefore, should be removed.

Response: This commenter made a similar comment in response to the 2024 Rule. See 89 FR at 24727. Then, as now, OSM declines to make the change suggested by the commenter. The informal review procedures raised by the commenter, which are actually located in § 842.11(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(C), are too important to the balance of the cooperative federalism relationship between OSM's State regulatory authority partners and OSM to remove, especially without stakeholder input and full opportunity for notice and comment.

Comment: One commenter alleged that the rationale for the proposed changes was not efficiency or the elimination of duplication but instead was intended to reduce the workload of Federal and State regulatory authorities because of inadequate funding available to implement SMCRA. The commenter opined that the legislative history of SMCRA indicates that Congress passed SMCRA, in part, to address the fact that insufficient funding at the State level had led to inadequate enforcement of State mining laws and that, if inadequate State funding is the issue, it should be addressed programmatically through the part 733 process. Alternatively, the commenter alleged that the proposed changes are improperly designed to protect the coal industry and State regulatory authorities from citizen complaints.

Response: This comment is very similar to a comment received in response to the 2020 Rule. After reviewing OSM's response to that comment at that time and new material related to this rulemaking, OSM reaffirms its disagreement with the commenter and directs the reader to the agency's 2020 response. 85 FR at 75177. As OSM noted before, this commenter provided no evidence that either OSM or the State regulatory authorities have insufficient funding to carry out their obligations under SMCRA. As stated throughout this docket and in the justification for the 2020 Rule, this rulemaking is intended to add transparency to OSM's oversight responsibilities; promote regulatory certainty for State regulatory authorities, regulated entities, and the public; enhance OSM's relationship with the State regulatory authorities; reduce redundancy in inspection and enforcement; and streamline the process for notifying State regulatory authorities of possible violations and other issues. While it is true that States fund a significant portion of the cost to administer State SMCRA programs, Federal regulatory grants, appropriated annually by Congress, are awarded to State regulatory authorities based, in part, on the anticipated workload, such as permitting and inspection, that is necessary for State regulatory authorities to administer and enforce their approved State programs under SMCRA. See 30 CFR part 735.

The changes to the TDN and Federal inspection provisions at 30 CFR part 842 are intended to be severable from the 30 CFR part 733 provisions for State regulatory program issues and associated action plans. Thus, if any of the provisions of this final rule are stayed or invalidated by a reviewing court, the other provisions could operate independently and would be applicable to the relevant provisions of the existing regulations. For example, if a court were to invalidate any portion of the changes to part 842, the provisions at part 733 could still operate independently. Conversely, if a court were to invalidate any of the provisions at part 733, the provisions at part 842 could still operate independently. Likewise, changes to specific sections within these parts are intended to be severable from the changes to other sections.

This final rule does not result in a taking of private property or otherwise have regulatory takings implications under E.O. 12630. The rule revises a regulation that OSM has determined does not represent the best reading of SMCRA and is inconsistent with principles of cooperative federalism but does not impact any property rights; therefore, the rule will not result in private property being taken for public use without just compensation. A takings implication assessment is not required.

E.O. 12866 provides that OIRA within OMB will review all significant rules. OIRA has determined that this final rule is not significant.

E.O. 13563 reaffirms the principles of E.O. 12866, while calling for improvements in the Nation's regulatory system to promote predictability, reduce uncertainty, and use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. E.O. 13563 directs agencies to consider regulatory approaches that reduce burdens and maintain flexibility and freedom of choice for the public where these approaches are relevant, feasible, and consistent with regulatory objectives. E.O. 13563 emphasizes further that agencies must base regulations on the best available science and that the rulemaking process must allow for public participation and an open exchange of ideas. The Department developed this final rule in a manner consistent with these requirements.

This final rule complies with the requirements of E.O. 12988. Among other things, this rule:

(a) Meets the criteria of section 3(a) requiring that all regulations be reviewed to eliminate errors and ambiguity and be written to minimize litigation;

(b) Meets the criteria of section 3(b)(2) requiring that all regulations be written in clear language and contain clear legal standards.

Under the criteria of section 1 of E.O. 13132, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a federalism summary impact statement. While revising the existing regulations governing the TDN process would have a direct effect on the States and the Federal government's relationship with the States, this effect would not be significant, as it would neither impose substantial unreimbursed compliance costs on States nor preempt State law. Furthermore, this final rule does not have a significant effect on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. The final rule would not increase burdens on State regulatory authorities to address and resolve underlying issues. In fact, OSM anticipates that its changes to more closely align the regulations to SMCRA would result in de minimis burden reduction for State regulatory authorities. As such, a federalism summary impact statement is not required.

The Department of the Interior (Department) strives to strengthen its government-to-government relationship with Tribes through a commitment to consultation with Tribes and recognition of their right to self-governance and Tribal sovereignty. OSM has evaluated this final rule under the Department's consultation policy and under the criteria in E.O. 13175 and determined that it does not have substantial direct effects on Federally recognized Tribes and that consultation under the Department's Tribal consultation policy is not required. Moreover, no Tribes have yet established primacy. Thus, this rule will not impact the regulation of surface coal mining operations on Indian lands as that term is defined under SMCRA.

This final rule is not a significant energy action as defined in E.O. 13211. Therefore, a Statement of Energy Effects is not required.

This final rule does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. A detailed statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., is not required because the rule is covered by a categorical exclusion. Specifically, OSM has determined that the final rule is administrative or procedural in nature in accordance with the Department of the Interior's NEPA regulations at 43 CFR 46.210(i). OSM has also determined that the final rule does not involve any of the extraordinary circumstances listed in 43 CFR 46.215 that would require further analysis under NEPA.

This final rule does not impose any new information collection burden under the Paperwork Reduction Act. OMB has previously approved the information collection activities contained in the existing regulations and has assigned OMB control number 1029-0118. This rule does not create any changes in the information collection burden because OSM is not making any changes to the information collection requirements. OSM estimates that the number of burden hours associated with TDN processing will stay the same as what is currently authorized by OMB control number 1029-0118.

OSM certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ). OSM previously evaluated the impact of the regulatory changes at the time that OSM promulgated the 2020 Rule and determined that the rule changes would not place, cause, or create any unnecessary burdens on the public, State regulatory authorities, or small businesses; would not discourage innovation or entrepreneurial enterprises; and would be consistent with SMCRA, from which the regulations draw their implementing authority.

This final rule is not a major rule under the Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 804(2). Specifically, the direct final rule: (a) will not have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (b) will not cause a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; and (c) will not have significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic and export markets.

This final rule does not impose an unfunded mandate on State, local, or Tribal governments, or the private sector, of more than $100 million per year. The rule does not have a significant or unique effect on State, local, or Tribal governments, or the private sector. The rule merely revises the Federal regulations to eliminate duplication of resources and processes between Federal and State agencies and enhance the cooperation between OSM and State regulatory authorities. Therefore, a statement containing the information required by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (2 U.S.C. 1531 et seq. ) is not required.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, the Department of the Interior, acting through OSMRE, amends 30 CFR parts 733 and 842 to read as follows:

On July 17, 2025, the BLM published a DFR amending the Code of Federal Regulations by rescinding the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock mineral permits and leases at 43 CFR 3503.37(f) and the provisions for hardrock mineral development contracts at 43 CFR subpart 3517 (90 FR 33310). The BLM stated in the DFR that if significant adverse comments were received by August 18, 2025, the BLM would withdraw the DFR or issue a new final rule that responds to the comments. The BLM received one substantive comment on August 18, 2025. The BLM elects to issue a new final rule that responds to the comment.

In issuing the DFR, the BLM determined that paragraph (f) of 43 CFR 3503.37 should be revised to remove the maximum acreage of hardrock permits and leases in any one State because the acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases is not mandated by statute and is unnecessary. The BLM also determined that 43 CFR subpart 3517, consisting of §§ 3517.10 through 3517.16, should be rescinded because the purpose of those regulations was to provide an exemption from the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases. With the removal of the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases in paragraph (f) of 43 CFR 3503.37, the regulations in 43 CFR subpart 3517 are obsolete and no longer needed.

On August 18, 2025, the BLM received a comment from Northeastern Minnesotans for Wilderness, The Wilderness Society, Center for Biological Diversity, and Earthworks opposing the rescission of 43 CFR 3503.37(f) and 43 CFR subpart 3715.

The commenters raised concerns that the DFR will result in large projects and degrade natural resources. Those concerns, however, are speculative and the commenters do not explain how the DFR will lead to those results. The BLM notes that the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases did not limit the overall amount of acreage that could be included in hardrock permits or leases in any one State by any number of entities, but rather limited the amount of acreage that any one entity could hold within a State. The purpose of the limitation was not related to any question of degradation of natural resources but was to prevent any one entity from monopolizing access to the mineral resources in a particular State despite the lack of any statutory mandate for the regulatory acreage limitation.

The BLM maintains that it has the authority to amend and rescind regulations pursuant to changing policy so long as such changes are permissible under applicable statutory authority. The statutes governing hardrock permits and leases do not contain any provisions limiting the amount of acreage that any one entity may hold in permits and leases in a State. The inclusion or removal of acreage limitations for hardrock permits and leases in the regulations is therefore within the BLM's discretion. Here, rescinding the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases will ease the regulatory burden by allowing any one entity to hold as permits and leases the amount of land needed for hardrock mineral operations without needing to enter into development contracts or processing and milling arrangements under 43 CFR subpart 3517.

The commenters raise concerns that the DFR will make it more difficult for the BLM and the Forest Service to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and the Endangered Species Act. In response, the BLM notes that the commenters do not explain how the rescission of the statewide acreage limitation relates to compliance with the listed statutes or explain why the acreage limitation was necessary to ensure compliance with those statutes. The BLM maintains that the DFR is not related to and will have no impact on the BLM's ability to comply with applicable statutes. The DFR does not authorize any mining activities. The BLM will continue to analyze any prospecting permit applications or proposals to lease or develop hardrock minerals under 43 CFR part 3500, as required by those environmental statutes, on a case-by-case basis.

The commenters raised procedural concerns for the BLM's consideration. In response, the BLM notes that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires that agencies provide all interested persons with fair notice and an opportunity to comment on the rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b) and (c). The July 2025 DFR provided the public with notice of the BLM's actions to rescind the statewide acreage limitation for hardrock permits and leases and to rescind the provisions providing for development contracts. See 90 FR 33312-13. The BLM also requested comments on the July 2025 DFR. See 90 FR 33310. Thus, the BLM provided interested persons with notice and an opportunity to comment as required by the APA. As a result, there was no need for a good cause exemption from notice-and-comment rulemaking under 5 U.S.C. 553(b).

The commenters raised concerns that the DFR does not comply with NEPA. In response, the BLM maintains that the commenters' alleged effects on the environment are speculative. The DFR is merely administrative and in and of itself does not cause any environmental effects. Therefore, the DFR does not constitute a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Moreover, the BLM will conduct environmental analysis under NEPA before approving any prospecting permit application or proposal to lease or develop hardrock minerals under 43 CFR part 3500.

For the reasons stated above, the BLM is not withdrawing the July 2025 DFR.

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0112/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

The ICC Termination Act of 1995 (ICCTA) (Pub. L. 104-88, 109 Stat. 803 (Dec. 29, 1995)) restructured the regulatory authorities previously held by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). It enacted a broad delegation of jurisdiction to the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) and the Surface Transportation Board (STB) over domestic water transportation ( i.e., transportation for compensation by water between two States) (49 U.S.C. 13521). Regulation of transportation to and from foreign countries is delegated to the Federal Maritime Commission (see generally 46 U.S.C. subtitle IV, part A; see also Kawashi Kisen Kaisha Ltd. v. Regal-Beloit Corp., 561 U.S. 89, 118-119 (2010) (dissenting opinion)).

Other provisions enacted as part of the ICCTA greatly limited the regulatory authority over water carriers, and specifically delegated it almost entirely to the STB, the Agency created to succeed the ICC. Rates and practices by water carriers engaged in “noncontiguous domestic trade” are required to be reasonable (49 U.S.C. 13701). Noncontiguous domestic trade is defined as “involving traffic originating in or destined to Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession of the United States,” (49 U.S.C. 13102(26)). The STB has authority to require tariffs to be filed for such transportation in the noncontiguous domestic trade (except for transportation of bulk cargo, forest products, recycled metal scrap, wastepaper, and paper waste) and to consider complaints and to provide remedies for unreasonable rates and practices (49 U.S.C. 13702). Water carriers subject to the general jurisdiction have a common carrier obligation, but there is no specific delegation to either the Secretary or the STB for enforcing compliance. In addition, water carriers may enter into contracts for transportation and, in agreement with shippers, contractually waive any regulatory provisions except those governing registration, insurance, or safety fitness (49 U.S.C. 14101).

The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999 (Pub. L. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748 (Dec. 9, 1999)) established FMCSA as a new operating administration within DOT (effective Jan. 1, 2000) to carry out the motor carrier safety and other regulatory responsibilities previously assigned to the Federal Highway Administration on behalf of the Secretary. This Act made no changes in the water carrier regulatory provisions enacted by ICCTA, which resulted in the carrying forward of certain obsolete references to water carriers into FMCSA's commercial regulations.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (FR) an NPRM titled “Removal of Obsolete References to `Water Carriers' ” (90 FR 22892). In the NPRM, FMCSA proposed to remove the words “water carrier” or “water carriers” from sections 365.107T, 1 370.1, 379.1, Appendix B to part 386, and Appendix A to part 390. 2 The terms are remnants carried over from FMCSA's predecessor Agencies and are obsolete, as FMCSA does not have regulatory jurisdiction over water carriers.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending on July 29, 2025. By that date, two comments were received from the following parties: National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC) and the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA).

Both commenters supported the removal of the term “water carrier” and “water carriers.” NTTC stated these targeted amendments would improve the clarity, accuracy, and applicability of the FMCSRs and would benefit both the Agency and regulated entities. OOIDA likewise supported the deregulatory efforts of FMCSA to eliminate or modify unnecessary and ineffective regulations. FMCSA received no comments in opposition to the proposal presented in the NPRM.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

Section 365.107T is amended by removing the term “water carriers” from paragraph (f), to reflect that water carriers do not submit applications for temporary operating authority to FMCSA.

Section 370.1 is amended by removing the term “water carrier” to reflect that the regulations in part 370 (Principles and Practices for the Investigation and Voluntary Disposition of Loss and Damage Claims and Processing Salvage) are not applicable to water carriers.

Section 379.1 is amended by removing paragraph (a)(2) (which used the term “water carriers”) and redesignating paragraph (a)(3) as paragraph (a)(2). This change is necessary to reflect that the regulations in part 379 (Preservation of Records) are not applicable to water carriers.

Appendix B to Part 386 is amended by removing the words “water carrier” from paragraph (g)(17) to reflect that FMCSA does not have authority to assess civil penalties against water carriers.

Appendix A to Part 390 is amended by removing the words “water carrier” from the paragraph under III. Specific Example Scenarios, called “Hotel Related Passenger Transportation.” This change reflects that, although water carriers are included in the statutory definition of carrier at 49 U.S.C. 13102(3), FMCSA's authority over the entities listed in that statute is limited to motor carriers and freight forwarders.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735 (Oct. 4, 1993)), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

The final rule removes language from predecessor Agencies that is not relevant and could be confusing. The term “water carriers” appeared in multiple areas of the FMCSRs and could have given the false appearance that these entities are subject to these regulations. Removing the term does not alter the applicability of the requirements and will streamline the language in the CFR. FMCSA does not expect that any regulated entities will change their behavior as a result of this final rule, and therefore the final rule will not result in any impacts to regulated entities other than removing unnecessary language from the CFR. It could result in some cost savings by reducing the amount of time needed to become familiar with the regulations. FMCSA assumes any realized cost savings will be de minimis. FMCSA does not have data to estimate the reduction in costs that will result from this final rule.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065 (Feb. 6, 2025)), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least 10 prior regulations be identified for elimination.” Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20 (Mar. 26, 2025)) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This rulemaking is expected to have total costs less than zero because it will result in a more streamlined and easy-to-read CFR, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an Agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule removes unnecessary and potentially confusing regulatory text that is no longer impacting regulated entities and would not impose costs or benefits. It may result in some cost savings by reducing the amount of time necessary to become familiar with the FMCSRs. FMCSA considers any realized cost savings to be de minimis. Consequently, I certify that the final action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If this final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 (64 FR 43255 (Aug. 10, 1999)) if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act of 1974  7 (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 8 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency submitted a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects this rulemaking might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA was adjudicated by DOT's Chief Privacy Officer on Sept. 4, 2025.

This rulemaking does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175 (65 FR 67249 (Nov. 9, 2000)), Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is therefore excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 9 Subpart B, Subsection (e). Specifically, paragraphs (e)(6)(e), (e)(6)(q), (e)(6)(u), and (e)(6)(bb), which cover regulations pertaining to applications for operating authority and certificates of registration, records preservation, rules of practice for administrative proceedings, and vehicle operation safety standards, respectively.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR parts 365, 370, 379, 386, and 390 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0118/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations in room W58-213 of the DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

On October 22, 2023, FMCSA received a petition from Mr. James D. Welch, an employee of the United States Air Force Reserve Command, asking the Agency to amend section 383.3(c). Mr. Welch asserted in his petition that the current regulation places an unfair burden on career U.S. Air Force Reserve Technicians (ARTs) who are required to wear the military uniform in the same manner as National Guard Military Technicians but are not similarly authorized to utilize the CDL exemption. On March 11, 2024, FMCSA granted Mr. Welch's petition after determining that the petition contained adequate justification to initiate a rulemaking. On May 20, 2025, FMCSA also granted an exemption sought by Mr. Welch for ARTs working under the U.S. Air Force Reserve Command from the requirement to obtain a CDL in order to operate a CMV (90 FR 21540). Subsequently, on May 30, 2025, FMCSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) (90 FR 22896) to amend the regulations to allow dual-status military technicians to qualify for the exception for certain military personnel from CDL standards.

In this final rule, FMCSA is removing the language making the military exception inapplicable to U.S. Reserve Technicians. For the reasons presented in the NPRM, and after reviewing the public comments, FMCSA concludes the existing regulation is outdated. FMCSA therefore amends 49 CFR 383.3(c) to allow dual-status military technicians appointed in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 10216 to be eligible for the military exception contained in the regulation.

The Administrator of FMCSA is delegated authority under 49 CFR 1.87 to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) by 49 U.S.C. chapters 311, 313, and 315 as they relate to commercial motor vehicle (CMV) operators, programs, and safety. The CDL regulations are based primarily on the broad authority of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1986 (CMVSA or the 1986 Act) (Title XII of Pub. L. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-170 (Oct. 27, 1986)), as amended, codified at 49 U.S.C. chapter 313, which established the CDL program. The authority for FMCSA to require an operator of a CMV to obtain a CDL rests on the authority found in 49 U.S.C. 31302. FMCSA, in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 31311 and 31314, has authority to prescribe procedures and requirements for the States to observe in order to issue CDLs (set forth, generally, in 49 CFR part 384).

Section 12013 of the CMVSA allowed the Federal Highway Administration, FMCSA's predecessor agency, to “waive, in whole or in part, application of any provision of this title or any regulation issued under this title with respect to class of persons or class of commercial motor vehicles if the Secretary determines that such waiver is not contrary to the public interest and does not diminish the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles” (Pub. L. 99-570, Title XII, 100 Stat. 3207-170, 3207-186 (Oct. 27, 1986), codified at 49 U.S.C. app. 2711). Following statutory amendments, 1 the language of the CMVSA's section 12013—that a waiver must not be “contrary to the public interest” and “not diminish the safe operation of commercial motor vehicles”—has been replaced by the standard that a waiver or exemption must “likely achieve a level of safety that is equivalent to, or greater than, the level that would be achieved in the absence of the waiver” (49 U.S.C. 31315(a)) or “absent such exemption” (49 U.S.C. 31315(b)(1)).

This final rule is also consistent with the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Title II of Pub. L. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832 (Oct. 30, 1984)), as amended, codified at 49 U.S.C. 31131, et seq.; and the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 543 (Oct. 9, 1935)), as amended, codified at 49 U.S.C. 31502. The 1984 statute granted the Secretary broad authority to issue regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety, including regulations to ensure that “commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely” (49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1)). This final rule is consistent with the safe operation of CMVs. In accordance with section 31136(a)(2), the amendment finalized in this final rule will not impose any “responsibilities . . . on operators of commercial motor vehicles [that would] impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely.” This final rule does not directly address medical standards for drivers (section 31136(a)(3)) or possible physical effects caused by driving CMVs (section 31136(a)(4)). FMCSA does not anticipate that drivers will be coerced (section 31136(a)(5)) as a result of this final rule because it will simply permit certain military personnel to operate subject to the same requirements as other military personnel currently operate. Under 49 U.S.C. 31315(a), the Secretary is authorized to grant waivers from any regulations prescribed under this section.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published an NPRM titled “Commercial Driver's License Standards; Requirements and Penalties: Applicability to the Exception for Certain Military Personnel” (90 FR 22896). The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSRs to allow dual-status military technicians to qualify for the exception for certain military personnel from CDL standards, by removing the phrase “This exception is not applicable to U.S. Reserve technicians,” from 49 CFR 383.3(c). The NPRM stated that removing the phrase pertaining to national guard military technicians would not affect their ability to claim the exception, as it also covers all part-time and full-time National Guard members on active duty; doing so merely indicates that the regulation no longer distinguishes between military technicians who are in the National Guard and those in the Reserves. FMCSA also proposed to add `dual-status military technicians' as defined in 10 U.S.C. 10216, to the list of exempt personnel. The Agency explained that the amendment would explicitly allow dual-status military technicians, regardless of whether they are members of either the Reserves or the National Guard, to qualify for the military exception from the CDL standards. The Agency also stated the rulemaking would remove outdated language, improve clarity for stakeholders, and promote greater efficiency for military units employing dual-status military technicians.

For a full discussion of the history behind the exception under 49 CFR 383.3(c), please see the May 30, 2025, NPRM. (90 FR 22896). FMCSA sought comment on its proposal to amend section 383.3(c) to allow dual-status military technicians to qualify for the exception. FMCSA also sought comment on the number of drivers that would be impacted by this rule each year, whether they would be considered Class A or Class B drivers, and any additional areas of cost savings associated with the exception, as well as any safety impacts.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 30 days ending July 29, 2025. Four unique comments were received. Two were from individuals, one was from the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA), and one was from the American Trucking Associations (ATA). 2 All commenters supported the proposed rule.

Michael Ravnitzky described the current regulation as outdated and stated that the proposed amendments would harmonize the treatment of all military personnel operating CMVs. He also estimated that the amendments would yield savings of approximately $1,900 to $3,100 in training costs per technician, allow Reserve Commands to better allocate resources toward mission-critical activities, and improve retention and recruitment. He also stated that safety would not be compromised because these Reservists receive rigorous, specialized training to carry out their duties as CMV operators.

Kyle White stated that he is a Chief Master Sergeant in the Air Force who operated CMVs as part of his duties, and that the ARTs who work for him have the same qualifications and training as he does. He highlighted the difficulty caused by allowing dual-status military technicians to operate CMVs while deployed but not while at their home base. He also estimated the cost of commercial training programs to be about $5,000 to $8,000 per operator for a license and endorsements.

OOIDA stated that the proposal was “an example of commonsense regulatory reform.” ATA commented that the proposal would remove ambiguity regarding who is eligible for the military-CDL exemption found in section 393.3(c), and stated that the individual exemptions FMCSA previously granted for military technicians have not compromised safety.

No commenters addressed the number or classification of drivers impacted by the amendments. Two commenters, identified above, estimated significant cost savings, ranging from $1,900 to $8,000 per driver. Both commenters also expressed that military Reservists, including dual-status military technicians, receive stringent training and that operational safety will not be compromised by allowing them to claim the military exception from the CDL requirements in 49 CFR 383.3.

The Agency did not receive any suggestions for modifications or comments that would cause it to reevaluate its proposal during the comment period. This action will benefit America's armed forces without compromising the safety of the nation's roadways. Therefore, FMCSA is finalizing the rule as proposed, without change.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes in numerical order.

In paragraph (c), FMCSA would remove the phrase “and national guard military technicians (civilians who are required to wear military uniforms)” and the sentence “This exception is not applicable to U.S. Reserve technicians.” FMCSA would add the phrase, “dual-status military technicians, as defined in 10 U.S.C. 10216” to the list of exempt personnel.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 3 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule removes the language making the military exception inapplicable to U.S. Reserve Technicians. This will allow the exception that already applies to certain military and Reserve personnel who operate CMVs for military purposes to also apply to U.S. Reserve Technicians operating CMVs for military purposes. The petition for rulemaking states that the ART program is experiencing difficulties in hiring and retaining employees and the current exclusion to the exception further exacerbates these concerns. Under the existing regulations, dual-status military technicians operating under the oversight of either the Army Reserve Command or the Air Force Reserve Command (but not those who are members of the Army National Guard or Air Force National Guard) are required to obtain training prior to receiving their CDL, causing an undue funding burden on the ART program. This final rule will result in cost savings for the ART program, and any similar program administered by the Army Reserve Command, by alleviating the need to receive training at a training provider located listed on FMCSA's training provider registry. The final rule requiring entry-level driver training (ELDT) training (81 FR 88732, Dec. 8, 2016) estimated that the tuition cost would range from $1,430 for a Class B license to $2,340 for a Class A license, both in 2014 dollars. Inflating those values to 2024 dollars using the Consumer Price Index for all Urban Consumers, FMCSA anticipates that the avoided training costs for each dual-status military technician driver will range from $1,900 to $3,100. The Reserve Commands may also experience cost savings in the form of reduced fees for CDLs. Commenters agreed with the Agency, stating that the cost savings could range from $1,900 to $8,000 per individual driver. Lacking data on the number of drivers that would no longer be receiving training each year, FMCSA is unable to quantify the total cost savings associated with this rulemaking. FMCSA does not anticipate that this final rule will impact safety. The dual-status military technicians covered by this final rule transport items on an installation with multiple layers of safety requirements along preapproved routes.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  4

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 5

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking is expected to have total costs less than zero as Reserve Command drivers would no longer be required to receive ELDT training or obtain a CDL, and therefore would be considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action upon issuance of a final rule.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  6

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 7 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses. No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This rule would impact dual-status military technician drivers and the Army Reserve Command and Air Force Reserve Command, which are part of the U.S. Military. Drivers are not considered small entities because they do not meet the definition of a small entity in section 601 of the RFA. Specifically, drivers are considered neither a small business under section 601(3) of the RFA, nor are they considered a small organization under section 601(4) of the RFA. The U.S. Military is also not considered a small entity because it does not meet the definition of small entity in section 601 of the RFA. Therefore, this final rule would not impact a substantial number of small entities.

This final rule will result in cost savings for the Reserve Commands by eliminating the need to fund ELDT training for dual-status military technician drivers. FMCSA cannot estimate the total cost savings that would result from this final rule but anticipates that it will not be a significant impact. Consequently, I certify that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this proposed rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) (UMRA) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520). FMCSA will evaluate whether this final rule will impact the currently approved Information Collection “Commercial Driver Licensing and Testing Standards” (OMB Control No. 2126-0011) during that collection's next routine renewal. The current Information Collection Request (ICR) was due to expire on April 30, 2025. On April 16, 2025, FMCSA published a 30-day notice to address the extension of the current ICR (90 FR 16061) and to announce its plan to submit the ICR to OMB for review and approval.

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor would it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Although States will be required to exempt dual-status military technicians operating CMVs for military purposes from CDL requirements, this is a small population of drivers and States are already required to exempt other listed individuals from those requirements. Moreover, States may already consider some dual-status military technicians exempt due to their status as members of Reserve Components, whether in the National Guard, the Army Reserve, or the Air Force Reserve. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 8 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 9 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Analysis (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency submitted a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the rulemaking may have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA was adjudicated by DOT's Chief Privacy Officer on August 28, 2025.

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion (CE) and is therefore excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 10 Subpart B, Subsection (e). The CE in paragraph (e)(6)(z) covers regulations establishing the minimum qualifications for persons who drive CMVs as, for, or on behalf of motor carriers; and the minimum duties of motor carriers with respect to the qualifications of their drivers.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 383 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0113/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

FMCSA's mission is to reduce crashes, injuries, and fatalities involving large trucks and buses. As discussed above, FMCSA is authorized by statute to establish minimum physical qualification standards for drivers of CMVs operating in interstate commerce. Physical qualification requirements date back to 1937, as implemented by the ICC's Bureau of Motor Carrier Safety (2 FR 113, Jan. 22, 1937). Regulations setting forth the physical qualification standards are currently found in 49 CFR part 391, with the vision requirements at 49 CFR 391.41(b)(10).

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), which administered the physical qualification standards for CMV drivers prior to the transfer of this function to FMCSA, revised the vision standard in 1970 (35 FR 6458, 6463, Apr. 22, 1970). Although medical examiners (MEs) who are knowledgeable about the on-the-job functions performed by a commercial driver make the determination about a driver's qualifications and whether the driver has a condition that would interfere with the operation of a CMV for most of the 13 physical qualification standards, FHWA's vision standard was absolute and provided no discretion to the ME. Thus, any individual who did not meet the vision standard in its entirety could not be physically qualified to drive a CMV in interstate commerce.

In July 1992, FHWA announced its decision to issue waivers of the vision requirements and published the final criteria for the vision waiver study program (57 FR 31458, July 16, 1992). Under the vision waiver study program, FHWA issued waivers to drivers following an individual determination of each driver's capability to operate a CMV safely. On August 2, 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that FHWA's determination that the vision waiver study program would not adversely affect the safe operation of CMVs lacked empirical support in the record ( Advocates for Highway and Auto Safety v. FHWA, 28 F.3d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, the court found that FHWA failed to meet the exacting statutory requirements to grant a waiver. Consequently, the court concluded that FHWA's adoption of the waiver program was contrary to law and vacated and remanded the decision to FHWA.

On November 17, 1994, FHWA published notice of its final determination to continue the vision waiver study program through March 31, 1996, and announced a change in the research plan (59 FR 59386). On March 26, 1996, FHWA issued a rule to allow those drivers participating in the vision waiver study program and holding valid waivers from the vision standard to continue to operate in interstate commerce after March 31, 1996 (61 FR 13338). FHWA amended 49 CFR part 391 by adding a new provision at section 391.64 to grant grandfather rights to these drivers, subject to certain conditions.

Following the enactment of the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21) (Pub. L. 105-178, 112 Stat. 107, 401, June 9, 1998), which made amendments to the statutes governing exemptions, FHWA established a vision exemption program on December 8, 1998 (63 FR 67600). FHWA, and later FMCSA, monitored the safety performance of drivers in the vision waiver study and the current exemption programs continuously. Based on the experience with the vision waiver study and exemption programs, FMCSA determined that the safety performance of individuals in these programs is at least as good as that of the general population of CMV drivers. Accordingly, in 2022, FMCSA amended its regulations to permit an individual who does not satisfy, with the worse eye, either the existing distant visual acuity standard with corrective lenses or the field of vision standard, or both, to be physically qualified to operate a CMV in interstate commerce if the individual satisfies the new alternative vision standard found at section 391.44, along with FMCSA's other physical qualification standards and other requirements (87 FR 3390, Jan. 21, 2022). The 2022 rule eliminated the need for both the vision exemption program that then existed and the grandfather provision in section 391.64 for drivers operating under the previously administered vision waiver study program.

The grandfathering provision remained in effect until March 22, 2023. After that date, all drivers were required to meet the new alternative vision standard and all Medical Examiner Certificates, Form MCSA-5876, issued under section 391.64 were voided. As the grandfathering provision is no longer applicable to any drivers, FMCSA has determined it should now be removed.

FMCSA has authority under 49 U.S.C. 31136(a) and 31502(b)—delegated to the Agency by 49 CFR 1.87(f) and (i), respectively—to establish minimum qualifications, including physical qualifications, for individuals operating commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) in interstate commerce. Section 31136(a)(3) requires specifically that the Agency's safety regulations ensure that the physical condition of CMV drivers is adequate to enable them to operate their vehicles safely and that certified MEs trained in physical and medical examination standards perform the physical examinations required of such drivers.

In addition to the statutory requirements specific to the physical qualifications of CMV drivers, section 31136(a) requires the Secretary of Transportation (Secretary) to issue regulations on CMV safety, including regulations to ensure that CMVs “are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely” (section 31136(a)(1)). The remaining statutory factors and requirements in section 31136(a), to the extent they are relevant, are also satisfied here. The final rule will not impose any “responsibilities . . . on operators of [CMVs that would] impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely” (section 31136(a)(2)), or “have a deleterious effect on the physical condition” of CMV drivers (section 31136(a)(4)). FMCSA also does not anticipate that drivers will be coerced to operate a vehicle because of this final rule (section 31136(a)(5)).

Finally, prior to prescribing any regulations, FMCSA must consider their “costs and benefits” (49 U.S.C. 31136(c)(2)(A) and 31502(d)). Those factors are discussed in the Regulatory Analyses section of this final rule.

In a proposed rulemaking published on May 30, 2025 (90 FR 22912), FMCSA proposed removing 49 CFR 391.64(b), which set out the requirements for participants in the vision waiver study program to remain grandfathered into that program until March 22, 2023. This change will not affect any current CMV drivers because, under the 2022 final rule, all drivers have been required to satisfy the alternative vision standard set out at 49 CFR 391.44 since March 22, 2023.

While the 2022 final rule amended 49 CFR 391.64(b) to include the date the provisions of that paragraph would no longer be in effect, it did not contain any instructions for the removal of those provisions from the CFR. Thus, the Agency proposed removing the obsolete language from FMCSA's regulations.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, the Agency received three comments. The American Trucking Associations and the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association both supported removing the obsolete provision. The third comment, received from an individual commenter, raised issues outside of the scope of this rulemaking.

The Agency did not receive any suggestions for modifications or comments that would cause it to reevaluate its proposal during the public comment period. Therefore, FMCSA is finalizing the rule as proposed, without change.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes in numerical order.

SECTION 391.64 Grandfathering for certain drivers who participated in a vision waiver study program.

FMCSA will remove 49 CFR 391.64 (b). As paragraph (a) is currently reserved, the title of the section will be amended to indicate that the entire section is now reserved.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 1 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule will remove obsolete language that is no longer relevant. FMCSA does not expect that any regulated entities will change their behavior as a result of this rule, and therefore the final rule will not result in any impacts to regulated entities other than removing unnecessary language from the CFR. It could result in some cost savings by reducing the amount of time to become familiar with the regulations. FMCSA assumes any realized cost savings to be de minimis. FMCSA does not have data to estimate the reduction in costs that will result from this final rule.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, Mar. 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rule is expected to have total costs less than zero and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. The cost savings of this final rule could not be quantified.

This rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule will remove obsolete regulatory text that is no longer impacting regulated entities and will not impose costs or benefits. Therefore, it will not impact a substantial number of small entities. It can result in some cost savings by reducing the amount of time necessary to become familiar with the regulations. FMCSA considers any realized cost savings to be de minimis. Consequently, I certify that the final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information (PII).

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Analysis (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency submitted a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the rulemaking may have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA was adjudicated by DOT's Chief Privacy Officer on September 17, 2025.

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion (CE) and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, paragraphs (e)(6)(b) and (e)(6)(z)(1). The CE in paragraph (e)(6)(b) covers regulations that are procedural or technical in nature, and (e)(6)(z)(1) covers the minimum qualifications for persons who drive CMVs.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 391 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0110/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

FMCSA's authority to promulgate regulations governing Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation (49 CFR part 393) and many of the regulations on Driving Commercial Motor Vehicles (49 CFR part 392) rests on the requirement in 49 U.S.C. 31136(a) that the Department of Transportation “shall prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that—(1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate vehicles safely . . .; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.” The provisions of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2) and (4) apply indirectly in the sense that the rule slightly changes the “responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles” under section 31136(a)(2) without altering their “ability to operate” the vehicles safely. Similarly, the rule slightly modifies the operation of commercial motor vehicles under certain circumstances, but in a way that “does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition” of drivers, as required by section 31136(a)(4). In both of those cases, i.e., paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(4), the rule retains the requirement for the placement of warning devices other than liquid burning flares. However, 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(3) and (5) have no application to this final rule.

To ensure that commercial motor vehicles are “equipped” and “operated safely,” as required by 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1), FMCSA requires that vehicles stopped at roadside for reasons other than normal traffic stops be made visible to on-coming traffic through the placement of specified warning devices at designated locations. “Liquid-burning flares” as specified in 49 CFR 392.22(b)(2)(i)-(ii) are the subject of this rulemaking. The technical requirements for these flares are specified in 49 CFR 393.95(j); their number are specified in 49 CFR 393.95(f)(2); their placement is specified in 49 CFR 392.22(b)(2)(i) and (ii); and certain limitations on their use are outlined in 49 CFR 393.95(g).

Because this type of flare is no longer used and for the reasons discussed below, FMCSA has determined that the provisions dealing with “liquid-burning flares” are not needed to ensure that commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) are “equipped” or “operated safely.”

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0110, 90 FR 22919) an NPRM titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Liquid-Burning Flares.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSRs to remove references to liquid-burning flares from the warning device requirements. On June 5, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (90 FR 23868) a correction to address an incorrect docket number in the NPRM. On July 9, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (90 FR 30217) an additional correction to address an incorrect regulation identifier number in the NPRM and in the previous correction.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, six comments were received from the following parties: the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA), the American Trucking Associations, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Veolia North America, and two private citizens.

All the comments were supportive of the NPRM. AAMVA noted that there may be costs associated with this rulemaking, in combination with two other NPRMs that FMCSA proposed. 1 AAMVA stated that these regulatory changes would require changes to published safety information incorporated into six publications that convey Federal motor carrier safety requirements to commercial driver's license (CDL) applicants. AAMVA anticipates that there would be costs of up to $20,000 to make the associated changes to these publications as a result of this rulemaking. The cost of up to $20,000 for AAMVA to update its publications is considered de minimis, particularly since these changes can be incorporated during routine business updates. In addition, this cost estimate accounts for updates related to two other deregulatory actions, 2 effectively spreading the total cost across multiple rulemakings.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA removes references to liquid-burning flares in paragraphs (b)(2)(i) and (ii).

FMCSA removes references to liquid-burning flares in paragraphs (f)(2), (g), and (j). Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., UL No. 912, Highway Emergency Signals, Fourth Edition, July 30, 1979, is referenced in the amendatory text of this document but has already been approved for paragraph (j). No changes are proposed to the material incorporated by reference.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 3 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, as supplemented by E.O. 13563, and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule removes obsolete language that is no longer relevant. FMCSA does not expect that regulated entities will change their behavior as a result of this rule, and therefore the final rule will not result in impacts to regulated entities other than removing unnecessary language from the CFR. FMCSA does not have data with which to estimate the total cost savings that will result from this final rule but expects the savings to be de minimis. This action streamlines rule familiarization by eliminating a source of confusion for stakeholders, particularly new entrants, regarding the use of these obsolete warning devices.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  4

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 5

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking is expected to have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  6

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 7 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

This final rulemaking removes obsolete regulatory text that is no longer impacting regulated entities. Removal of the obsolete text will neither impose net costs nor impact benefits. Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) (UMRA) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), Federalism, if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 8 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 9 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175 (65 FR 67249, Nov. 9, 2000), Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 10 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (e)(6)(bb) covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR parts 392 and 393 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0122/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

Under 49 U.S.C. 31136(a), DOT is required to “prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that—(1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely . . . ; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section, or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.”

This final rule is based on the authority of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1) to ensure that commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) are equipped and operated safely. It does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2)-(4). Because this final rule creates an exception to a requirement for vehicle lighting that would otherwise apply to motor carriers, there is no obvious risk of coercion related to this rule to which a driver might be subjected.

In addition, the Administrator of FMCSA is delegated authority under 49 CFR 1.87 to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary of Transportation by 49 U.S.C. chapters 311, 313, and 315 as they relate to CMV operators, programs, and safety.

For the reasons explained below, FMCSA believes that allowing an additional exception to the requirement for rear license plate lamps in Footnote 11 to Table 1 of 49 CFR 393.11 will not adversely affect CMV safety.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0122, 90 FR 22930) a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; License Plate Lamps.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSRs to add an exception from the lamp and reflective device requirements for license plate lamps on the rear of truck tractors while towing a trailer.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, two comments were received from the following parties: the American Trucking Associations and the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. Both comments supported the NPRM.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA revises footnote 11 to Table 1 by adding truck tractors towing a trailer to the exception from the requirement for a rear license plate lamp to be illuminated.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) and DOT Order 2100.6B. 1 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866 and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule adds an exception from the lamp and reflective device requirements for license plate lamps on the rear of truck tractors while towing a trailer. Consequently, truck tractor owners will realize cost savings by no longer needing to maintain rear license plates with functional lamps when towing a trailer. FMCSA does not have information to estimate the cost savings for the owners of trucks who will no longer replace bulbs for license plate lamps on the rear of their truck tractors while towing a vehicle. FMCSA believes the cost savings and the number of affected entities will be minimal as some of these truck tractors will likely operate without a trailer in some instances, meaning that the owners will opt to have the rear license plate lamps fitted with functional bulbs to preserve the flexibility to operate without a trailer.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by the OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking will have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. The cost savings of this final rule could not be quantified.

This rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities comprises small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule adds an exception from the lamp requirements for license plate lamps on the rear of truck tractors while towing a trailer. This will result in minimal cost savings for owners of trucks who would have otherwise retrofitted their truck tractors with rear license plate lamp when towing a trailer. As some truck tractors will be operated with and without a trailer in certain instances, FMCSA believes the number of affected entities will be minimal as the owners of these trucks will likely continue to maintain and install rear license plate lamps.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (6) (bb), which covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0107/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations on the ground floor of the DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

This rulemaking is based on the authority of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 (49 Stat. 543) (1935 Act) and the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Title II of Pub. L. 98-554, 98 Stat. 2832) (1984 Act), as amended.

The 1935 Act, as amended, provides that “[t]he Secretary of Transportation may prescribe requirements for—(1) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and safety of operation and equipment of, a motor carrier; and (2) qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of, and standards of equipment of, a private motor carrier, when needed to promote safety of operation” (49 U.S.C. 31502(b)).

This final rule amends the FMCSR by rescinding the requirement that the rear impact guard be permanently marked or labeled with a certification from the impact guard manufacturer as required by the applicable FMVSS. The 1935 Act authorized the Agency to adopt and enforce this requirement, and also authorizes the amendment of this requirement.

The 1984 Act provides concurrent authority to regulate drivers, motor carriers, and vehicle equipment. It requires the Secretary of Transportation to “prescribe regulations on commercial motor vehicle safety.” The regulations shall prescribe minimum safety standards for CMVs. At a minimum, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 31136(a), as amended, the regulations shall ensure that: (1) CMVs are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of CMVs do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of CMVs is adequate to enable them to operate vehicles safely; (4) the operation of CMVs does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) drivers are not coerced by motor carriers, shippers, receivers, or transportation intermediaries to operate a vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under 49 U.S.C. 31136 (which is the basis for much of the FMCSR) or 49 U.S.C. chapters 51 or 313.

This final rule concerns parts and accessories necessary for the safe operation of CMVs. It is based on section 31136(a)(1) because it deals with maintenance of rear impact guards. The final rule does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of sections 31136(a)(2)-(4). As the amendment in this rule pertains only to the certification label or marking, FMCSA does not expect CMV drivers will be exposed to greater risk of being coerced to operate trailers with missing or non-compliant rear impact guards, as required by section 31136(a)(5).

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0107, 90 FR 22942) a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation: Certification and Labeling Requirements for Rear Impact Protection Guards.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSR to rescind the requirement that the rear impact guard be permanently marked or labeled with a certification from the impact guard manufacturer as required by NHTSA's applicable FMVSS.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, five comments were received from the following parties: the American Trucking Associations (ATA), the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), the National Tank Truck Carriers (NTTC), the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA), and Eric Hein, a private citizen.

ATA, CVSA, NTTC, and OOIDA submitted comments in support of the NPRM. Eric Hein opposed the NPRM, arguing that NHTSA and FMCSA had repeatedly declined previous requests to rescind 49 CFR 393.86(a)(6). He noted that NHTSA and FMCSA had both concluded that its removal would compromise the overall safety of the motoring public.

FMCSA disagrees with Mr. Hein. While a certification that a rear underride device meets applicable NHTSA standards at the time of manufacture is a safety measure, its value as a guarantor of safety declines as wear and tear degrade the legibility of the label as the vehicle continues in service. That fact is well known to CVSA, whose members are repeatedly confronted with so-called “permanent” labels that are only partially legible or even worn away. Furthermore, motor carriers are unable to obtain replacement certification labels if the original is degraded. When FMCSA amended its rules on rear impact guards in 2021, it declined to make obscured or missing certification labels a basis for a failed inspection. Sec. 15.a.1 of Appendix A to 49 CFR part 396 (Minimum Periodic Inspection Standards) makes a “missing guard” a reason for failure, along with certain structural and dimensional deficiencies, but a missing label was not considered a problem of comparable concern and was therefore not included on the list in the appendix (86 FR 62105, 62111, 62112, Nov. 9, 2021).

In the 2021 final rule, FMCSA acknowledged that CVSA had submitted petitions for rulemaking to both FMCSA and NHTSA requesting elimination of the labeling requirement for rear impact guards, and determined the petition was outside the scope of that rulemaking and would be addressed separately (86 FR 62108). In the September 4, 2024 letter denying CVSA's petition, FMCSA agreed with NHTSA's analysis of the safety benefits of FMVSS No. 223 in their separate denial of CVSA's petition. While FMCSA determined a rule text change was not necessary at that time, the Agency did find it appropriate to address the issue through regulatory guidance, which was issued shortly thereafter on December 10, 2024, explaining that an illegible, incomplete, or missing rear impact guard certification label does not establish a violation of 49 CFR 393.86(a)(6). 1 Following FMCSA's denial of CVSA's initial petition and subsequent issuance of guidance, the Agency determined that the requirement in section 393.86(a)(6) was still causing confusion and concern regarding rear impact guard inspection requirements. As noted in the NPRM for this rulemaking, FMCSA believes the rescission of section 393.86(a)(6) “would eliminate an unintended regulatory burden on motor carriers without compromising safety.” This rulemaking does not affect the applicable FMVSS. Therefore, this final rule does not remove the labeling requirement for rear impact guards in FMVSS No. 223, nor does it reduce the safety benefits associated with that requirement.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries in which they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA amends section 393.86 to remove the certification and labeling requirements in paragraph (a)(6).

This rule amends a regulation that has associated guidance statement(s) or interpretation(s). Such guidance statements do not have the force and effect of law, are strictly advisory, and are not meant to bind the public in any way. Conformity with guidance statements is voluntary. Guidance is intended only to provide information to the public regarding existing requirements under the law or FMCSA policies. A guidance statement does not alter the substance of a regulation.

On December 10, 2024, FMCSA issued a guidance document to address the issue of illegible, incomplete, or missing rear impact guard certification labels under section 393.86(a)(6). 2 FMCSA rescinds this guidance as no longer necessary.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 3 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, and does not require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed it under that E.O.

Section 393.86(a) currently requires most trailers and semitrailers manufactured on or after January 26, 1998, to be equipped with rear impact guards that meet NHTSA's requirements. This final rule eliminates only the FMCSR requirement that the impact guard have a certification label or marking in perpetuity, while retaining NHTSA's requirement applicable at the time of manufacture and sale.

This rulemaking eliminates the problem of motor carriers receiving citations for missing or illegible certification labels during inspections by Federal and State personnel. Because the Agency does not have data on the frequency with which such citations are accompanied by a State-issued fine, it is not possible to estimate the cost savings for motor carriers; however, the Agency expects the cost savings to be de minimis.

The Agency does not expect this final rule to result in safety benefits beyond the baseline established in the FMCSR. As required by section 396.17, motor carriers currently complete annual inspections of all items identified in Appendix A to part 396, which includes rear impact guards. In addition, CMVs are subject to inspections conducted in accordance with CVSA's North American Standard Inspection Program that may occur throughout the year, which include the examination of rear impact guards.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  4

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 5

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking is expected to have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. This rulemaking will result in cost savings for motor carriers that will no longer be issued citations for missing or illegible certification labels during Federal and State inspections. The cost savings of this final rulemaking could not be quantified.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  6

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 7 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses. The Small Business Administration develops the size standards used to classify entities as small, and establishes separate standards for each industry, as defined by the North American Industry Classification System. The motor carriers that will be affected by this rule fall into many different industry codes with differing size standards. Because this final rule will impact all motor carriers, including those considered to be small entities, FMCSA anticipates that this final rule will impact a substantial number of small entities.

However, FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have a significant impact on the affected entities. This final rule rescinds the requirement that the manufacturer certification label be permanently displayed on the rear impact guard. The manufacturer certification label provides a motor carrier purchasing new trailers or new impact guards to replace damaged devices with a means to determine whether the equipment is certified as meeting the NHTSA requirements. However, the labeling requirement has proven problematic for motor carriers when the label becomes illegible or wears off during the service life of the trailer. This final rule eliminates an unintended regulatory burden on motor carriers without compromising safety. The Agency expects the impacts of this final rule will be de minimis, and therefore, does not expect the final rule to have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 8 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 9 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Analysis (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 10 Subpart B, paragraph e(6)(bb). The categorical exclusion in paragraph (e)(6)(bb) covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0117/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

The provision now codified at 49 CFR 393.67(c)(12) was adopted over 50 years ago on the basis of the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1935. That authority is now found at 49 U.S.C. 31502(b), which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to prescribe requirements for, among other things, the “safety of operation and equipment” of a motor carrier and the “standards of equipment” of a motor private carrier (49 U.S.C. 31502(b)(1) and (2)).

Under the Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, as amended, 49 U.S.C. 31136(a), DOT is required to “prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that—(1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely . . .; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section, or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.”

This final rule is based on the authority of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1) to ensure that commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) are equipped and operated safely. It does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2)-(4). Because this final rule will remove a requirement otherwise applicable to motor carriers, there is no obvious risk of coercion related to this final rule to which a driver might be subjected.

While 49 U.S.C. 31502(b) and 31136(a)(1) authorize FMCSA to promulgate the rules in 49 CFR part 393 (Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation), they also allow the agency to remove regulations that are no longer needed for the safe operation of CMVs. For the reasons explained below, FMCSA believes 49 CFR 393.67(c)(12)(i) is obsolete and should be rescinded.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0117, 90 FR 22923) an NPRM titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Fuel Tank Overfill Restriction.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSR to remove the requirement that a liquid fuel tank manufactured on or after January 1, 1973, be designed and constructed so that it cannot be filled, in a normal filling operation, with a quantity of fuel that exceeds 95 percent of the tank's liquid capacity.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, four comments were received from the following parties: the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), Energy Marketers of America, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA), and the Truck and Engine Manufacturers Association (EMA).

CVSA, Energy Marketers of America, and OOIDA were generally supportive of the NPRM and agreed that the proposed change would remove an unnecessary and outdated requirement. CVSA and Energy Marketers of America stated that the language in section 393.67(c)(12)(i) is outdated and no longer applicable to the current state of the industry because liquid fuel tanks are now manufactured with a vented cap. Energy Marketers of America agreed with FMCSA's reasoning that the existing overfill safeguard in section 393.67(c)(12)(ii) is sufficient to prevent fuel spillage due to thermal expansion. CVSA stated that some manufacturers are equipping vehicles with tanks allowing 100 percent fill, based on the positioning of the filler neck and vented cap, with no resulting issues. CVSA also stated that the proposed revision would improve harmonization with the Canadian National Safety Code Standard 11B, which currently allows for a 100 percent fill, and benefit motor carriers who operate across the international borders between the U.S. and Canada.

EMA submitted a comment in opposition to the NPRM. EMA noted that the requirements in section 393.67(c) have been in place since January 1, 1973, and have provided a level of protection against incidental and catastrophic fuel spillage for more than 5 decades. EMA expressed concern that the NPRM did not adequately assess the safety implications of the proposed change to ensure that the system design amendment would provide for adequate control of fuel spillage on CMVs, citing the warnings provided by manufacturers in owner's manuals and in the vicinity of the fill spout indicating the dangers and risks of property damage, fuel spillage, and personal injury or death from filling beyond 95 percent of capacity.

In addition, EMA expressed concern that, due to confusion about the applicability of the amendment or because of operator misjudgment, some CMV operators could respond to the amendment by adjusting fill processes on current vehicles not designed for greater than 95 percent filling capacity. EMA stated that this could increase risk of spillage during fueling and fuel expansion and sloshing could lead to leakage past the seals and ventilation systems. EMA also stated that operators might pressure vehicle manufacturers to increase the fill capacity of their fuel tanks on new vehicle purchases, potentially up to 100 percent of their capacity, which would require manufacturers to redesign fuel tank systems, assess the safety consequences of the redesign, and undertake the full battery of demonstration tests required in section 393.67(d) and (e). EMA claimed that this would impose significant burdens on vehicle manufacturers. EMA also stated that while FMCSA proposed to eliminate the 95 percent fill limit in section 393.67(c)(12)(i), the NPRM did not propose to remove the warning marking requirement for the fill limit in paragraph (c)(11).

Finally, EMA stated that the NPRM was based on a flawed petition for rulemaking from CVSA. EMA disagreed with the assertion in the CVSA petition that vented caps render the current 95 percent maximum fill provision outdated or unnecessary because air and safety vent systems have been regulated requirements since 1973 and there is nothing new about the function of these systems that would alleviate the need for the refueling capacity requirement. EMA also disagreed with CVSA's claims that there are manufacturers equipping vehicles with tanks allowing 100 percent fill, because EMA is not aware of any tanks on CMVs that allow 100 percent fill and CVSA's claim would imply that such tanks would be in violation of the FMCSR requirements. In addition, EMA disagreed with CVSA's claims that the proposed amendment would eliminate the need for motor carriers who are operating these vehicles to request an exemption because there are no such exemptions listed on FMCSA's website. Finally, EMA disagreed with CVSA's claim that removing section 393.67(c)(12)(i) would improve harmonization with the Canadian National Safety Code Standard 11B because the Canadian National Safety Code is a set of Canadian periodic vehicle inspection requirements, and the FMCSR overfill restriction controls the design and construction of fuel tanks.

EMA's comment in opposition to the NPRM mischaracterizes the requirements in section 393.67(c)(12) as manufacturing standards. The fundamental purpose of 49 CFR part 393 is to ensure that no employer operates a CMV or causes or permits it to be operated unless it is equipped in accordance with the requirements and specifications of the part. Compliance with the rules concerning parts and accessories is necessary to ensure vehicles are equipped with the specified safety devices and equipment. Nothing in this part is a manufacturing standard. FMCSA does not have the authority to prescribe manufacturing standards, which are typically established by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. The standards in part 393 are enforced during vehicle inspections, which are conducted at roadside to ensure a CMV is operating in compliance with the FMCSR. There have been no recorded violations of section 393.67(c)(12) in any roadside inspections between 2021 and 2025 according to FMCSA Analysis & Information data. 1

Also, the length of time a regulation has been in effect is not a valid basis to challenge revisions to that regulation. FMCSA must constantly reevaluate its regulatory requirements to ensure they accurately reflect current technologies and real-world situations. The Agency is updating the requirements in section 393.67(c)(12) to reflect that circumstances have changed since 1973, and the 95 percent fill restriction is no longer necessary to prevent fuel tank overfill. Fuel tank designs have advanced significantly in the past 52 years, including the introduction of technologies like vented caps to relieve excess pressure and check valves to prevent fuel spillage during vehicle rollovers. The fuel capacity requirement specified in section 393.67(c)(12) was enacted to account for any spillage due to normal expansion of the fuel contained in the tank. FMCSA believes that modern venting systems for the tanks are sufficient to ensure that fuel will not spill during normal expansion. In addition, EMA's argument about safety risks with the proposed changes are without merit. While FMCSA is removing the 95 percent fill limit in section 393.67(c)(12)(i), the Agency is not requiring that tanks allow for 100 percent fill. Following this final rule, fuel tanks must still meet the testing requirements in section 393.67(d) in order to be equipped on a CMV. These testing requirements will prevent the spilling and safety concerns raised by EMA, regardless of a fill limit on the fuel tank. Manufacturers are also welcome to continue designing fuel tanks that do not allow filling past the 95 percent limit if they believe that is the best approach.

EMA's assertion that there cannot be fuel tanks that allow for over 95 percent fill based on the U.S. market and regulations is also flawed. As CVSA stated in its petition, Canada currently does not have a fill limit for fuel tanks. Therefore, fuel tanks in Canada may allow for 100 percent fill even if the FMCSR do not allow for anything above 95 percent. These vehicles may operate in cross-border operations between Canada and the U.S., which could result in violations due to the difference in Canadian requirements and the FMCSR. This change will harmonize inspections between the U.S. and Canada, regardless of EMA's assertion to the contrary.

FMCSA acknowledges that not proposing the removal of the warning marking requirement for the fill limit in paragraph (c)(11) was an oversight in the NPRM that would create conflicting requirements. The Agency incorporates that additional revision in this final rule to ensure consistency in the fuel tank regulations.

FMCSA amends section 393.67(c)(11) to remove the warning marking requirement for the fill limit, as discussed in the comment response to EMA above. Specifically, the Agency removes the second sentence of paragraph (c)(11). The revision ensures that paragraph (c)(11) conforms to revised paragraph (c)(12) and that the fill limit is no longer referenced anywhere in section 393.67.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA removes the second sentence from paragraph (c)(11). The Agency also removes paragraph (c)(12)(i) and incorporates the language from paragraph (c)(12)(ii) into (c)(12).

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule removes the requirement that liquid fuel tanks manufactured on or after January 1, 1973, are designed and constructed so that they cannot be filled, in a normal filling operation, with a quantity of fuel that exceeds 95 percent of the tank's liquid capacity. The rule also removes a warning mark requirement about the 95 percent fill limit. FMCSA has determined that a fill limit is unnecessary for safety, as fuel tanks must still meet the testing requirements outlined in section 393.67(d). These requirements explicitly prevent fuel spillage, even during normal expansion.

This final rule enables manufacturers to design fuel tanks that prioritize both safety and innovation. By reducing administrative burdens, the rule results in cost savings to manufacturers. FMCSA does not have the data to quantify these savings. Furthermore, this change aligns the FMCSR with existing Canadian requirements, thereby simplifying operations for affected motor carriers operating across borders.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking is expected to have total costs less than zero and is therefore considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an Agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rulemaking removes an outdated and unnecessary requirement for liquid fuel tanks manufactured on or after January 1, 1973.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), Federalism, if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175 (65 FR 67249, Nov. 9, 2000), Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (e)(6)(bb), which covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0123/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

Under 49 U.S.C. 31136(a), DOT is required to “prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that—(1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely, (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical conditions of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely. . . ; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section, or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.”

This final rule is based on the authority of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1) to ensure that CMVs are equipped and operated safely. It does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2)-(4). Because this final rule does not impose any requirement on motor carriers, there is no obvious risk of coercion related to this rule to which a driver might be subjected.

The Administrator of FMCSA is delegated authority under 49 CFR 1.87 to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary of Transportation by 49 U.S.C. chapters 311, 313, and 315 as they relate to CMV operators, programs, and safety.

For the reasons explained below, FMCSA believes that this clarification of 49 CFR 393.75(g) and (h) will not adversely affect the operational safety of CMVs.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0123, 90 FR 22949) a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Tire Load Markings.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSR to revise the requirements for tires on CMVs to clarify that the FMCSR do not require tire load restriction markings on their sidewalls.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, four comments were received from the following parties: the American Trucking Associations (ATA), the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA), Greg Smith, and Thomas Bray.

ATA and OOIDA supported the NPRM. ATA agreed that the FMCSR should make clear that any manufacturing requirements are imposed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and should reference the appropriate Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard. OOIDA stated that this was an example of commonsense regulatory reform.

Greg Smith did not support the proposed rule, stating that removing the requirement to mark tires with manufacturers weight ratings would be a threat to roadway safety, would make enforcing overloaded tires nearly impossible, and would lead to drivers not knowing the weight capacity of their tires.

Thomas Bray also opposed the proposed rule. Bray stated that the existing language is already clear, whereas the proposed language would imply that tire markings are no longer required on existing tires, only new ones. As a result, drivers could operate in excess of the tire ratings if the weight rating is not known. Bray also stated that an operator could deface or remove the load limit/rating markings, to delay enforcement actions while inspectors search for the weight ratings. Bray acknowledged that the regulations do not state that the marking is required and provide instructions if the ratings are not present, however Bray also stated that the proposed change could provide some in the industry with what they will see as a way around the tire rating violation.

FMCSA does not believe that the concerns raised in the comments accurately reflect the change that was proposed in the NPRM. As stated in the NPRM, FMCSA is adding clarifying language to the FMCSR to explicitly state that NHTSA, not FMCSA, is the agency which imposes requirements on tire manufacturers to add maximum load rating markings to the sidewalls of tires. FMCSA has no authority to require manufacturers to add such markings and the change does not alter any current regulatory requirements. The Agency does not believe that this final rule will result in any change in the likelihood of motor carriers or drivers defacing the sidewalls of tires. If a motor carrier or driver desired to deface their tires in an attempt to interfere with inspections, it would result in the same outcome regardless of this rule. If the markings are not displayed on a tire for any reason, section 393.75(g) and (h) provide procedures for determining the load rating of a tire through publications listed in FMVSS No. 119 (49 CFR 571.119) to ensure that a vehicle is not being operated in excess of that limit. Motor carriers and drivers are required to be aware of the load ratings of the tires on their CMV regardless of whether those ratings are on the tire or in the publications listed in FMVSS No. 119. Defacing the tires in any way does not alter that requirement. Adding clarifying language will make the regulated public better aware of the requirements under FMCSA regulations, resulting in less confusion about the applicability of section 393.75.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA adds a new paragraph (j) to clarify that FMCSA does not require tire markings under paragraphs (g) and (h).

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 1 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, as supplemented by E.O. 13563, and does not require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed it under that E.O.

FMCSA clarifies the requirements in section 393.75(g) and (h) by explicitly stating that those paragraphs do not require manufacturers to add markings to the sidewalls of tires. This revision avoids possible misunderstanding of the rules by affected entities, such as owners and operators of CMVs.

As NHTSA requires tires to be marked with a maximum load rating on the sidewall of the tire, FMCSA finds that members of the regulated public will not change their behavior due to this final rule. However, the increased clarity provided by this final rule will result in de minimis cost savings for regulated entities when navigating their obligations under more streamlined and easier to read FMCSR.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking will have total costs less than zero and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities comprises small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an Agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule clarifies the requirements in section 393.75(g) and (h) by explicitly stating that those paragraphs do not require manufacturers to add markings to the sidewalls of tires. Regulated entities will not change their behavior in response to this final rule because NHTSA requires manufacturers to add markings to the sidewalls of tires. De minimis cost savings could be realized by entities through the clarification of the FMCSR.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (e)(6)(bb), which covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements, applies to this rule.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0119/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations on the ground floor of the DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

Under 49 U.S.C. 31136(a), DOT is required to “prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that—(1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely . . .; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section, or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.”

This final rule is based on the authority of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1) to ensure that CMVs are equipped and operated safely. It does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2) through (4). Because this final rule creates an exception to a requirement for brakes, there is no obvious risk of coercion related to this final rule to which a driver might be subjected.

Commercial motor vehicle is defined in 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 390.5 to include “any self-propelled or towed motor vehicle used on a highway in interstate commerce to transport passengers or property when the vehicle—(1) Has a gross vehicle weight rating or gross combination weight rating, or gross vehicle weight or gross combination weight, of 4,536 kg (10,001 pounds) or more, whichever is greater.” The portable conveyors addressed by this final rule and their towing vehicles have gross combination weights of 10,001 pounds or more, and are thus CMVs.

For the reasons explained below, FMCSA believes that exempting portable conveyors from the requirement in 49 CFR 393.42(a) to have brakes acting on all wheels (under the required conditions) will not adversely affect the operational safety of combinations including such conveyors.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0119, 90 FR 22938) a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Brakes on Portable Conveyors.” The NPRM proposed to amend the FMCSR to add an exception for portable conveyors used in aggregate industry operations, and manufactured before 2010, from the requirements that each CMV be equipped with brakes acting on all wheels, provided certain conditions are satisfied. The proposal does not apply to portable conveyors manufactured in or after 2010 because such conveyors are fitted with disc braking systems that can withstand sand, rocks, and other material; however, the drum brakes available prior to 2010 were ineffectual or unsafe in such conditions and the older conveyors cannot be retrofitted with disc brakes.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, seven comments were received from the following parties: the Illinois Association of Aggregate Producers, Infra, the Michigan Aggregates Association, the National Sand, Stone & Gravel Association, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, the Pennsylvania Aggregates and Concrete Association, and the Virginia Transportation Construction Alliance. All comments were supportive of the NPRM, and none of the commenters suggested any modifications to the proposal. In addition, the Michigan Aggregates Association and the National Sand, Stone & Gravel Association stated that this rule would promote consistency across jurisdictions and reduce confusion and inconsistent enforcement of brake requirements for portable conveyors.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA adds new paragraphs (b)(7)(i) through (iii) which provide an exception for portable conveyors manufactured prior to 2010.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 1 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, as supplemented by E.O. 13563, and does not require an assessment of potential costs and benefits under section 6(a)(3) of that order. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed it under that E.O.

The final rule adds an exception to the requirement for brakes on all wheels for portable conveyors manufactured prior to 2010, when certain conditions are satisfied. The towing vehicle and the portable conveyor still need to meet the stopping performance required by section 393.52(d). Furthermore, most towing vehicles are now equipped with disc brakes or a combination of disc and drum brakes on wheels, which have improved stopping distances by 30 percent since 2013 after the adoption of FMVSS No. 121 (see 74 FR 37122 and 78 FR 9623). That advancement in braking technology further diminished the necessity for brakes on pre-2010 portable conveyors. Consequently, FMCSA determines that this final rule will have no impact on safety. The final rule will generate cost savings for owners of pre-2010 portable conveyors by enhancing their economic viability and potentially extending their useful lifespan. However, FMCSA does not have data to estimate the reduction in costs that will result from this final rule.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking will have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an Agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rulemaking adds an exception to the requirement for brakes on all wheels for portable conveyors manufactured prior to 2010. By extending this regulatory relief, owners of pre-2010 portable conveyors will experience some cost savings. FMCSA considers any realized cost savings to be de minimis.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). This action falls under a published categorical exclusion (CE) and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (e)(6)(bb), which covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements, applies to this final rule.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0120/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations on the ground floor of the DOT West Building, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

The provisions of 49 CFR 393.65 were adopted over 50 years ago on the basis of the Motor Carrier Act of 1935. As a result of subsequent recodifications of title 49, United States Code (U.S.C.), that authority is now found at 49 U.S.C. 31502(b), which authorizes the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) to prescribe requirements for, among other things, the “safety of operation and equipment” of a motor carrier and the “standards of equipment” of a motor private carrier (49 U.S.C. 31502(b)(1) and (2)).

The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984, as amended, required the Secretary to “prescribe minimum safety standards for commercial motor vehicles. At a minimum, the regulations shall ensure that: (1) commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely; (2) the responsibilities imposed on operators of commercial motor vehicles do not impair their ability to operate the vehicles safely; (3) the physical condition of operators of commercial motor vehicles is adequate to enable them to operate the vehicles safely . . .; (4) the operation of commercial motor vehicles does not have a deleterious effect on the physical condition of the operators; and (5) an operator of a commercial motor vehicle is not coerced by a motor carrier, shipper, receiver, or transportation intermediary to operate a commercial motor vehicle in violation of a regulation promulgated under this section [which is the basis for much of the FMCSRs], or chapter 51 or chapter 313 of this title.”

This final rule is based on the authority of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(1) to ensure that commercial motor vehicles (CMVs) are equipped and operated safely. It does not implicate the driver-centered requirements of 49 U.S.C. 31136(a)(2) through (4). Because this final rule removes a restriction that would otherwise apply to certain motor carriers, there is no obvious risk of coercion related to this final rule to which a driver might be subjected.

While 49 U.S.C. 31502(b) and 31136(a)(1) authorize FMCSA to promulgate the rules in 49 CFR part 393 (Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation), they also allow the Agency to remove or modify regulations that are not needed for the safe operation of CMVs. For the reasons explained below, FMCSA believes that allowing an exception to section 393.65(d)—prohibiting fuel from being supplied by gravity or syphon feed directly to the carburetor or injector—will not adversely affect CMV safety under the circumstances specified in this final rule.

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (Docket No. FMCSA-2025-0120, 90 FR 22934) a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Auxiliary Fuel Tanks.” The NPRM proposed to amend 49 CFR 393.65(d)(1) and (2) to add an exception to the prohibition on gravity and syphon feeds for auxiliary pumps with a fuel tank capacity of less than five gallons mounted on the trailer chassis frame or trailer bed, for purposes other than operation of the motor vehicle, that are operational only when the motor vehicle is not in motion.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, three comments were received from the following parties: the American Trucking Associations, the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, and the Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association (TTMA).

All the comments were supportive of the NPRM. TTMA suggested some adjustments to the language FMCSA proposed to add to section 393.65. Specifically, TTMA requested that the agency replace “a fuel tank capacity of less than five gallons” in proposed paragraph (d)(1) with “a nominal fuel tank capacity of not more than 5 gallons” instead. TTMA stated that the proposed language in the NPRM might prohibit a pump with a fuel tank nominally of five-gallon capacity but might hold just over five gallons because it includes air space for expansion and contraction of the fuel. In addition, TTMA stated that the proposed language in paragraph (d)(2), which read “The auxiliary pump shall be operational only when the motor vehicle is not in motion,” would require extensive modification to the pump or motor in order to prevent it from being operational while the vehicle in motion. TTMA suggested the word “operated” to replace “operational” so that it is clear that the pump is not actually being operated while the vehicle is in motion.

FMCSA agrees with the changes proposed by TTMA and believes that the revisions will help clarify the proposed exception.

FMCSA revises the proposed language in section 393.65(d)(1) and (2) to incorporate the recommended revisions from TTMA, as discussed in the comment section above. Specifically, in paragraph (d)(1) the Agency replaces “a fuel tank capacity of less than five gallons” with “a nominal fuel tank capacity of not more than five gallons.” In paragraph (d)(2), FMCSA replaces “operational” with “operated.”

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

FMCSA adds new paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) which provide for an exception from the prohibition in paragraph (d).

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 1 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rulemaking is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This final rule adds an exception to the prohibition on gravity and syphon feeds for auxiliary pumps with a nominal fuel tank capacity of not more than five gallons mounted on the trailer chassis frame or trailer bed when the motor vehicle is not in motion. This change will have no impact on safety. The prohibition against gravity or syphon feeds is primarily intended to prevent the continuous fueling of any fires that may occur. The exception only applies when the vehicle is not in motion and only for fuel tanks with a nominal capacity of not more than five gallons, mounted on the trailer chassis frame or trailer, when the risk of fire is mitigated. The final rule will result in cost savings for owners of eligible auxiliary pumps by eliminating the need to invest in upgrades to comply with the current requirement. FMCSA assumes any realized cost savings will be de minimis. FMCSA does not have data to estimate the reduction in costs that will result from this final rule.

E.O. 14192 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025), Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, requires that for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”  2

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, March 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 3

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero.” This final rulemaking will have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action. As explained in the E.O. 12866 analysis section, the cost savings of this rulemaking could not be quantified.

This rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  4

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

No regulatory flexibility analysis is required, however, if the head of an Agency or an appropriate designee certifies that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. This final rule adds an exception to the prohibition on gravity and syphon feeds for auxiliary pumps with a nominal fuel tank capacity of not more than five gallons mounted on the trailer chassis frame or trailer bed when the motor vehicle is not in motion. By extending this regulatory relief, owners of eligible auxiliary pumps with a fuel pump capacity of not more than five gallons will experience cost savings that are expected to be de minimis.

Consequently, I certify that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Because this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, a written statement is not required.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rule has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this final rule will not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor will it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this final rule does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 6 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information.

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 7 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form. No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this final rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

In addition, the Agency submitted a Privacy Threshold Assessment (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule might have on collecting, storing, and sharing personally identifiable information. The PTA was adjudicated by DOT's Privacy Officer on DATE .

This final rule does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and is thus excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 8 Subpart B, subsection (e). Specifically, paragraph (e)(6)(bb), which covers regulations pertaining to vehicle operation safety standards, equipment approval, and/or equipment carriage requirements.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 393 to read as follows:

FMCSA organizes this final rule as follows:

To view any documents mentioned as being available in the docket, go to https://www.regulations.gov/docket/FMCSA-2025-0115/document and choose the document to review. To view comments, click this final rule, then click “Browse Comments.” If you do not have access to the internet, you may view the docket online by visiting Dockets Operations at U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590-0001, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. To be sure someone is there to help you, please call (202) 366-9317 or (202) 366-9826 before visiting Dockets Operations.

The Motor Carrier Safety Act of 1984 (Pub. L. 98-554, Title II, 98 Stat. 2832, Oct. 30, 1984), as amended, (the 1984 Act) provides broad authority to regulate drivers, motor carriers, and vehicle equipment. Section 211 of the 1984 Act grants the Secretary of Transportation (the Secretary) broad power, in carrying out motor carrier safety statutes and regulations, to “prescribe recordkeeping and reporting requirements” and to “perform other acts the Secretary considers appropriate” (49 U.S.C. 31133(a)(8) and (10)). The FMCSA Administrator has been delegated authority under 49 CFR 1.87(f) to carry out the functions vested in the Secretary by 49 U.S.C. chapter 311, subchapters I and III, relating to commercial motor vehicle (CMV) programs and safety regulation.

Two Federal statutes govern the Agency's implementation of electronic document and signature requirements. The Government Paperwork Elimination Act (GPEA) (Pub. L. 105-277, Title XVII (Secs. 1701-1710), 112 Stat. 2681-749, 44 U.S.C. 3504 note) was enacted on October 21, 1998, to improve customer service and governmental efficiency through the use of information technology. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act (E-SIGN) (Pub. L. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, 15 U.S.C. 7001-7031) was signed into law on June 30, 2000. E-SIGN was designed to promote the use of electronic contract formation, signatures, and recordkeeping in private commerce by establishing legal equivalence between traditional paper-based methods and electronic methods. The GPEA defines an electronic signature as a method of signing an electronic communication that: (a) Identifies and authenticates a particular person as the source of the electronic communication; and (b) indicates such person's approval of the information contained in the electronic communication (section 1710(1)). It also requires Federal agencies to provide individuals and entities the options of: (a) submitting information to or transacting with the Agency electronically; and (b) using electronic records retention when practicable. The GPEA states that electronic records and their related electronic signatures shall not be denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability merely because they are in electronic form (section 1707). It also encourages agencies to use electronic signature alternatives (section 1704).

For any transaction in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, E-SIGN supersedes all pre-existing requirements that paper records be kept so long as: (a) such records are generated in commercial, consumer, and business transactions between private parties; and (b) those parties consent to using electronic methods. Specifically, the statute establishes the legal equivalence for contracts, signatures, and other legally required documents, whether in traditional paper or electronic form (15 U.S.C. 7001(a)(1)).

On May 30, 2025, FMCSA published in the Federal Register (90 FR 22957) an NPRM titled “Electronic Driver Vehicle Inspection Reports.” The NPRM proposed to clarify the requirement to complete a DVIR, based upon a public comment filed by NTTC. Although a DVIR was already allowed to be completed electronically, the NPRM proposed explicit language to make this clear. This was intended to encourage motor carriers and drivers to utilize electronic, cost-saving methods when completing DVIRs.

FMCSA solicited comments concerning the NPRM for 60 days ending July 29, 2025. By that date, five comments were received—four in support and one recommended revision.

One individual and three trade organizations (NTTC, Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association, and the American Trucking Associations) were in favor of the proposal. One trade organization, the National School Transportation Association (NSTA), offered a suggestion.

The individual who commented in support also noted that explicitly allowing electronic DVIRs (eDVIRs) will promote their use and thereby increase efficiency. He also noted that this increased efficiency might justify reinstating a requirement for no-defect DVIRs by drivers of passenger-carrying CMVs. 1 He reasoned that the requirement to submit no-defect DVIRs could be reintroduced without substantially increasing paperwork burden for those drivers using eDVIRs due to the speed at which eDVIRs may be completed relative to paper-based DVIRs.

FMCSA does not agree with the commenter suggesting the Agency consider reinstating the requirement for the submission of no-defect DVIRs. The Agency stands by its rationale presented in the preamble to the December 18, 2014 (79 FR 75437) final rule. There is no basis for introducing regulatory burdens for drivers to prepare reports documenting there were no defects or deficiencies observed by or reported to the driver during the work shift, and for motor carriers to retain such reports, regardless of whether it is performed electronically. 2

NSTA requested that FMCSA continue to allow paper-based DVIRs as a compliance alternative. FMCSA will continue to do so.

This final rule makes no changes from the NPRM.

Motor carriers and drivers are subject to the laws and regulations of the countries where they operate, unless an international agreement states otherwise. Drivers and carriers should be aware of the regulatory differences between nations.

This section-by-section analysis describes the changes to the regulatory text in numerical order.

Two places in section 396.11 are revised by specifically noting that the reports required in that section may be created and maintained in electronic format, in accordance with section 390.32.

Similarly, section 396.13 is revised to specifically allow for the electronic creation and maintenance of the reports required in that section, in accordance with section 390.32.

FMCSA has considered the impact of this final rule under E.O. 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993), Regulatory Planning and Review, and DOT Order 2100.6B. 3 The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs within the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under section 3(f) of E.O. 12866, and has not reviewed it under that E.O.

This rulemaking revises the regulations to clarify that a DVIR may be completed electronically. This will encourage motor carriers and drivers to use electronic, cost-saving methods when completing DVIRs and will likely result in cost savings for those entities that choose to switch to electronic methods. FMCSA does not have data on the number of entities impacted by this rule. Absent this information, FMCSA is unable to quantify the cost savings associated with this rulemaking.

FMCSA does not anticipate that this rulemaking will impact safety. Motor carriers and intermodal equipment providers are required to undergo inspections and correct all violations found.

E.O. 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation, was issued on January 31, 2025 (90 FR 9065, Jan. 31, 2025). E.O. 14192 requires that, for “each new [E.O. 14192 regulatory action] issued, at least ten prior regulations be identified for elimination.”

Implementation guidance for E.O. 14192 was issued by OMB (Memorandum M-25-20, Mar. 26, 2025) defines two different types of E.O. 14192 actions: an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action, and an E.O. 14192 regulatory action. 4

An E.O. 14192 deregulatory action is defined as “an action that has been finalized and has total costs less than zero. This final rule is expected to have total costs less than zero, and therefore is considered an E.O. 14192 deregulatory action.

This final rule is not a major rule as defined under the Congressional Review Act (5 U.S.C. 801-808).”  5

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq. ), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 6 requires Federal agencies to consider the effects of the regulatory action on small business and other small entities and to minimize any significant economic impact. The term small entities means small businesses and not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000 (5 U.S.C. 601(6)). Accordingly, DOT policy requires an analysis of the impact of all regulations on small entities, and mandates that agencies strive to lessen any adverse effects on these businesses.

This final rule will impact motor carriers and drivers that currently use a paper-based DVIR process and chose to switch to electronic, cost-saving methods. FMCSA anticipates that the majority of motor carriers who wish to use an electronic process are already doing so, and therefore, this final rule will not impact a substantial number of small entities.

FMCSA does not have information to estimate the cost savings associated with switching to an electronic process for DVIR creation, maintenance, and signature but anticipates that any cost savings would be de minimis.

Given that this rulemaking is not expected to impact a substantial number of small entities, the Agency is comfortable certifying as such. Consequently, I certify that the action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

In accordance with section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857), FMCSA wants to assist small entities in understanding this final rule so they can better evaluate its effects on themselves and participate in the rulemaking initiative. If the final rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions concerning its provisions or options for compliance, please consult the person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT .

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce or otherwise determine compliance with Federal regulations to the Small Business Administration's Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman (Office of the National Ombudsman, see https://www.sba.gov/about-sba/oversight-advocacy/office-national-ombudsman ) and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of FMCSA, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). DOT has a policy regarding the rights of small entities to regulatory enforcement fairness and an explicit policy against retaliation for exercising these rights.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA) (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. The Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or Tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $206 million (which is the value equivalent of $100 million in 1995, adjusted for inflation to 2024 levels) or more in any 1 year. Though this final rule will not result in such an expenditure, and the analytical requirements of UMRA do not apply as a result, the Agency discusses the effects of this rule elsewhere in this preamble.

This final rule contains no new information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

A rulemaking has implications for federalism under section 1(a) of E.O. 13132 (64 FR 43255, Aug. 10, 1999), Federalism, if it has “substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.”

FMCSA has determined that this rulemaking would not have substantial direct costs on or for States, nor would it limit the policymaking discretion of States. Nothing in this document preempts any State law or regulation. Therefore, this rulemaking does not have sufficient federalism implications to warrant the preparation of a Federalism Impact Statement.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 7 requires the Agency to assess the privacy impact of a regulation that will affect the privacy of individuals. This final rule will not require the collection of personally identifiable information (PII).

The Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a) applies only to Federal agencies and any non-Federal agency that receives records contained in a system of records from a Federal agency for use in a matching program.

The E-Government Act of 2002, 8 requires Federal agencies to conduct a Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for new or substantially changed technology that collects, maintains, or disseminates information in an identifiable form.

No new or substantially changed technology will collect, maintain, or disseminate information as a result of this rule. Accordingly, FMCSA has not conducted a PIA.

The Agency will complete a Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA) to evaluate the risks and effects the final rule may have on collecting, storing, and sharing PII. The PTA will be submitted to FMCSA's Privacy Officer for review and preliminary adjudication and to DOT's Privacy Officer for review and final adjudication.

This rulemaking does not have Tribal implications under E.O. 13175 (65 FR 67249, Nov. 9, 2000), Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian Tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian Tribes.

FMCSA analyzed this final rule pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. ). The Agency believes this final rule will not have a reasonably foreseeable significant effect on the quality of the human environment. This action falls under a published categorical exclusion and thus is excluded from further analysis and documentation in an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement under DOT Order 5610.1D, 9 Subpart B, Subsection (e). Specifically, paragraphs (e)(6)(f)(1), (e)(6)(q), and (e)(6)(aa), which cover regulations pertaining to driver/vehicle inspections, implementing record preservation procedures, and requiring motor carriers, their officers, drivers, agents, representatives, and employees directly in control of CMVs to inspect, repair, and provide maintenance for every CMV used on a public road, respectively.

Accordingly, FMCSA amends 49 CFR part 396 to read as follows:

The Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council (Council), in cooperation with the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission), develops management measures for the summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish fisheries. The Council, pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act), develops recommendations regarding fisheries in Federal waters seaward of New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina. The Commission, pursuant to the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management Act, addresses fisheries in State waters from Florida to Maine. These bodies work together in the development of complementary FMPs for species including summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish that are harvested in both Federal and State waters, and each year these bodies work together to develop specifications for these fisheries. The Council provides its recommendations to NMFS, and NMFS engages in a Federal rulemaking process by which the agency adopts specifications that become binding on the Federal fisheries. Specifications in these Federal fisheries include stock-wide overfishing limits (OFL) and acceptable biological catches (ABC), as well as various catch and landing subdivisions, such as the commercial and recreational sector annual catch limits (ACL), annual catch targets (ACT), and sector-specific landing limits ( i.e., the commercial fishery quota and recreational harvest limit (RHL)) established for 1 to 3 years at a time. Adjustments to commercial management measures for all four species and the recreational management measures for bluefish ( i.e., minimum fish sizes, seasonal closures, and possession restrictions) are also considered in the specifications process.

This action implements the 2026 and projects the 2027 ABCs, recreational and commercial ACLs, recreational and commercial ACTs, commercial quotas, and RHLs for all four species. Any fish caught since January 1, 2026, 50 CFR 648.2, will apply to the 2026 specifications included in this action in accordance with 50 CFR 648.103, 648.123, 648.143, and 648.163. This action also implements increases to the recreational possession limits in the bluefish fishery. Changes to summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass recreational management measures were discussed at the joint Council and Commission meeting in December and will be implemented through a separate action.

This action does not implement any changes to the commercial management measures for any of the four species.

This action adopts the Council and the Commission's Summer Flounder Board-recommended 2026 summer flounder catch and landings limits shown in table 1. The summer flounder specifications are based on the OFLs and a constant, averaged 2026-2027 ABC from the 2025 management track assessment and 12-percent commercial and recreational management uncertainty buffers. These management uncertainty buffers are intended to support greater stability in the catch limits and to allow for the larger 2023- and 2024-year classes to recruit to the fishery. This results in 2026 and projected 2027 commercial quotas of 12.78 million pounds (lb; 5,795 metric tons (mt)) and RHLs of 8.79 million lb (3,987 mt), representing 45-percent and 38-percent increases, respectively, compared to 2025.

This action sets the final summer flounder State-by-State commercial quotas for 2026 (table 2). According to the process described in the summer flounder regulations at § 648.102(c)(1), these State-specific quotas take into account any overages that occurred during the previous (2024) fishing year that were previously unaccounted for and overages in the current (2025) fishing year through October 31, 2025.

This action does not include any changes to the current commercial management measures, including the minimum fish size (14-inch (36-centimeters (cm)) total length), gear requirements, and possession limits. This action does not include any changes to the recreational management measures. Any changes to the recreational management measures would take place through a separate action.

This action adopts the Council and the Commission's Scup Board-recommended 2026 scup catch and landings limits shown in table 3. The scup specifications are based on the OFLs and ABCs from the 2025 management track assessment projections and no management uncertainty buffers. This results in commercial quotas of 17.70 million lb (8,029 mt) in 2026 and 15.57 million lb (7,060 mt) in 2027 and RHLs of 13.17 million lb (5,972 mt) in 2026 and 11.58 million lb (5,251 mt) in 2027, consistent with the recommendations of the Council and Board.

The final specifications include adjustments required by scup accountability measures based on available catch data, as specified in the regulations. Current data indicate that the 3-year average recreational scup catch exceeds the 3-year average recreational scup ACL. Because biomass is above the target, the current regulations require adjustments to the recreational management measures, taking into account the performance of the measures and conditions that precipitated the overage. Any such changes would be made during the rulemaking for the 2026 and 2027 scup recreational management measures. The Council has recommended changes to the recreational accountability measures in Framework Adjustment 19 to the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass FMP. Should the changes proposed in Framework 19 be implemented prior to the rulemaking for the 2026 and 2027 recreational measures, a response to the scup recreational ACL overage would not be required. No other scup accountability measures were triggered based on current data.

This action sets the scup commercial quotas by quota period, provided in table 4, as described in the scup regulations at § 648.122(c)(1).

The current quota period possession limits are not changed by this action and are outlined in table 5.

The Winter I scup commercial possession limit would drop to 1,000 lb (454 kg) if 80 percent of that period's allocation is landed. If the Winter I quota is not fully harvested, the remaining quota would be transferred to Winter II. The Winter II possession limit may be adjusted (in association with a transfer of unused Winter I quota to the Winter II period) via notice in the Federal Register . The regulations specify that the Winter II possession limit would increase to different levels consistent with any increase in the quota, as described in table 6.

This action does not include any changes to commercial management measures for scup, including the minimum fish size (9-inch (22.9-cm) total length), gear requirements, and quota period possession limits. As noted above, any potential changes to recreational management measures would take place through a separate action.

This action adopts the Council and the Commission's Black Sea Bass Board-recommended 2026 black sea bass catch and landings limits shown in table 7. The black sea bass specifications are based on an OFL and ABC using the terminal year biomass and maximum fishing mortality threshold (MFMT) from the 2025 management track assessment and no management uncertainty buffers. The Council, the Board, and the Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) recommended an alternative approach to set the OFL and ABC due to concerns regarding the 2025 assessment's projected stock conditions and that this approach had performed as well as using the standard projection methodology when it was simulation-tested during management strategy evaluations. The alternative approach results in commercial quotas of 7.83 million lb (3,553 mt) and RHLs of 8.14 million lb (3,691 mt) in 2026 and 2027, a 31-percent increase and a 30-percent increase, respectively, relative to 2025. The black sea bass specifications also include a 5-percent commercial in-season closure buffer in 2026 and 2027, as provided for in the regulations at § 648.142(a)(15) and recommended by the Council and Board. Given recent patterns in the fishery, an in-season closure is not expected for 2026 or 2027. In the unlikely event it is needed, a 5-percent buffer could have socioeconomic benefits with little risk to stock status.

These final specifications include adjustments required by the black sea bass accountability measures based on available catch data, as specified in the regulations. Current data indicate that the 3-year average recreational black sea bass catch exceeded the 3-year average recreational black sea bass ACL. Because biomass is above the target, the current regulations require adjustments to the recreational management measures, taking into account the performance of the measures and conditions that precipitated the overage. Any such changes would be made during the rulemaking for the 2026 and 2027 black sea bass recreational management measures. As described for scup above, should the changes proposed in Framework 19 be implemented prior to the rulemaking for the 2026 and 2027 recreational measures, a response to the black sea bass recreational ACL overages would not be required. No other black sea bass accountability measures were triggered based on current data.

This action includes no changes to commercial management measures for black sea bass, including the commercial minimum fish size (11-inch (27.94-cm) total length) and gear requirements. As noted above, any potential changes to black sea bass recreational management measures would take place through a separate action.

This action adopts the Council and the Commission's Bluefish Board-recommended 2026 bluefish catch and landings limits shown in table 8. The bluefish stock remains under a rebuilding program that started in 2022. The 2025 management track assessment projected that the stock will reach the rebuilding target in 2025. However, the stock will not be considered rebuilt until a future stock assessment determines the rebuilding target has been achieved.

The bluefish specifications are based on the OFLs and ABCs from the 2025 assessment projections, a 25-percent commercial management uncertainty buffer, and a 30-percent recreational management uncertainty buffer. The management uncertainty buffers are intended to reduce the likelihood of large swings in the catch limits while the stock is still rebuilding and to account for the uncertainty from the upcoming Marine Recreational Information Program recalibration, as bluefish is primarily a recreational species. The final specifications include adjustments required by the bluefish accountability measures based on available catch data, as specified in the regulations. Current data indicate the bluefish recreational ACL was exceeded by 1.68 million lb (763 mt) in 2024. Because the fishery is under a rebuilding plan, the bluefish accountability measures at § 648.163(d)(1) require payback of recreational ACL overages as soon as practicable, and the final 2026 bluefish specifications make this adjustment in 2026 (included in table 8). This results in commercial quotas of 4.66 million lb (2,115 mt) in 2026 and 4.75 million lb (2,153 mt) in 2027, representing a 54-percent and a 57-percent increase from 2025. It also results in RHLs of 20.34 million lb (9,224 mt) in 2026 and 22.50 million lb (10,206 mt) in 2027, representing a 30-percent and a 43-percent increase from 2025. Aside from the State commercial quota overages, described below, no other bluefish accountability measures were triggered based on current data.

The coastwide commercial quota is allocated to coastal States from Maine to Florida based on percent shares specified in the Bluefish FMP and the regulations at § 648.162(d). The final State commercial bluefish quotas provided in table 9 take into account overages that occurred during the 2024 fishing year.

This action increases the bluefish recreational bag limits, as recommended by the Council and Board, based on the increased RHLs and positive stock trajectory. It proposes a 2-fish increase for both recreational sectors, resulting in a 7-fish bag limit for the for-hire sector and a 5-fish bag limit for private anglers. This action does not include any changes to the commercial management measures for bluefish.

The public comment period for the proposed rule ended on December 24, 2025. We received six comments on the proposed rule. No changes to the final rule are necessary as a result of these comments. Three commenters expressed general support for the 2026 and projected 2027 specifications. We agree and are implementing the 2026 and projected 2027 specifications as proposed, and a more detailed response is not provided. One of the commenters who supported the proposed rule also suggested that rules such as this one, supporting sustainable fisheries, be expanded to include other species. The management of other species is not germane to this action, and no further response is provided on this topic. Another comment focused on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and wind development. The comment is not relevant to the current action, and no further response is provided.

Comment 1: One commenter summarized the rule as sustaining stricter regulations on the relevant species and providing adjustments to the Magnuson-Stevens Act to improve it.

Response: The majority of catch limits contained in this rule will increase based on the best scientific information currently available. The rule does not make changes to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, but adjusts catch limits and management measures under existing authority provided in the Magnuson-Stevens Act.

Comment 2: One commenter suggested that this rule would be improved by making the information in the rule more accessible to the general public, particularly when permits are issued, which would help reduce recreational fishing violations.

Response: Information on fisheries catch limits and management measures is provided through multiple venues to increase the accessibility of information to interested parties. The proposed rule for this action was published in the Federal Register and included an opportunity for public comment, in accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). This final rule is also published in the Federal Register in accordance with the APA, which makes it publicly available.

Information about the proposed rule and comment period was also provided in a web bulletin on the NMFS website and sent to summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish stakeholders, including all permit holders, via an email bulletin. The web bulletin will be updated with information about the final rule, and NMFS will send another email bulletin summarizing the final rule. Once the final specifications are effective, relevant pages on the NMFS website ( e.g., species-specific pages) will be updated with information on the current catch limits and management measures. In addition, the Code of Federal Regulations will be updated to reflect changes made to Federal regulations.

Comment 3: One recreational angler expressed concerns that the use of the MFMT and terminal year biomass to set the black sea bass specifications results in reduced transparency about long-term sustainability and that the practical effect of this approach is to defer recreational liberalization. The commenter suggested that the rule should clarify how and when the increased RHL will be reflected in liberalized recreational measures. The commenter also expressed concern that the application of the 5-percent in-season closure buffer for the commercial sector contrasts with rigid limits that do not include opportunities for adjustment in the recreational sector, resulting in a lack of equity. The commenter suggested that the Council and Commission should explore ways to promote recreational liberalization and fairness.

Response: The commenter did not provide further explanation why the use of MFMT and terminal year biomass in place of the standard projections decreases transparency, and the SSC and Council developed the recommended specifications through public processes. Both approaches rely on the data and analysis in the most recent black sea bass management track assessment. As noted in the proposed rule, the use of MFMT and terminal year biomass to set the 2026 and projected 2027 black sea bass specifications was recommended due to persistent and substantial inconsistency between previous assessments' projected stock conditions and updated stock information from subsequent black sea bass assessments. In general, projection models for species well above their biomass targets have recommended substantial decreases in OFLs and ABCs when projecting 2 or more years out because fishing mortality (F) is assumed to equal fishing mortality at maximum sustainable yield (F MSY ), resulting in biomass declining towards the biomass target. This trend was present in the 2026 and 2027 black sea bass assessment projections, despite the 2025 management track assessment indicating F was only 73 percent of F MSY in 2024. The assessment projections would have resulted in a small decrease for the 2026 ABC followed by a substantial decrease for 2027, relative to 2025. The use of MFMT and terminal year biomass was tested in previous simulation studies and was found to perform as well as using the standard projection methodology.

The use of this approach did not result in deferred liberalization of recreational measures. Recreational measures for summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass are not typically set during the annual specifications process. The RHL included in this rule is one of multiple factors used to evaluate and recommend recreational management measures for the next year. The Council and Boards typically take final action on the recreational measures in State waters and make recommendations regarding recreational measures in Federal waters during their joint December meeting, which is then followed by the Federal rulemaking process. For example, a final rule for the 2025 black sea bass recreational measures was published on June 26, 2025 (90 FR 27254), while the final specifications were published on December 10, 2024. The Council finalized its recommended black sea bass recreational measures at the December 2025 meeting, and the Federal rulemaking process for the 2026 and 2027 recreational measures will include an opportunity for public comment. Comments on those measures are not relevant to the current specifications action but will be requested as part of the process to set recreational measures.

With respect to the 5-percent commercial in-season closure buffer creating inequities between the commercial and recreational sectors, the option to include this buffer in the black sea bass specifications is responsive to constraints specific to the commercial fishery. The commercial and recreational fisheries are managed differently, with an intention to provide equity between the two sectors while accounting for differences between them. Unlike the commercial fishery, the recreational accountability measures (50 CFR 648.143(d)) do not include in-season closures when the RHL has been reached. In addition, the recreational accountability measures that consider overages apply only when the recreational ACL has been exceeded. The accountability measures provide additional flexibility to the recreational sector by requiring strict paybacks only under certain circumstances ( e.g., biomass is below the threshold), allowing paybacks spread over 2 years, and allowing adjustments to recreational measures instead of paybacks in certain circumstances ( e.g., biomass is between the threshold and the target and the stock is not under a rebuilding plan).

The commercial sector is more strictly managed to the commercial quota. The Commission allocates the black sea bass commercial quota among the relevant States. Commercial landings are monitored throughout the year, and the Commission closes a State's fishery when data indicate the State's quota has been reached. NMFS monitors coastwide landings and would close the commercial fishery coastwide only if the coastwide quota plus the buffer has been reached. When one or more States exceed their quota, the buffer provides an opportunity for other States, including States that divide their black sea bass quotas into individual fishing quotas (IFQ), to more fully harvest their allocation before the Federal coastwide closure is implemented. This increases equity among the States and for commercial fishermen who have invested in IFQ. The black sea bass commercial accountability measures (§ 648.143) require paybacks for any commercial quota overages, regardless of whether the commercial ACL is exceeded (non-landings overages of the commercial ACL are also paid back, depending on the status of the stock). These paybacks reduce the risk of impacts on the black sea bass stock from the application of the in-season closure buffer. The buffer is set as one component of the specifications, which allows the Council and Board to consider current information on the state of the stock and the performance of the commercial fishery when adopting a buffer between 0 and 5 percent of the quota. The Council and Board determined that a 5-percent buffer in 2026 and 2027 would pose little risk to the stock based on the current high biomass and the low likelihood that the coastwide quota would be exceeded.

As previously stated, the summer flounder, scup, and black sea bass recreational measures are addressed through a separate rulemaking. Suggestions about management changes to provide greater liberalization and fairness to the recreational sector are not germane to the current specifications action.

This final rule includes minor adjustments to the specifications to correct rounding errors. It includes adjustments to the summer flounder State-by-State commercial quotas to account for prior overages for fishing year 2024 and preliminary catch information for fishing year 2025, which were identified following the publication of the proposed rule. Similarly, this rule includes changes to the bluefish State-by-State commercial quotas to account for prior overages identified in the final catch information for fishing year 2024, and to the bluefish recreational ACT to account for a recreational ACL overage in 2024.

Pursuant to sections 304(b)(1)(A) and 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, the NMFS Assistant Administrator has determined that this rule is consistent with the Summer Flounder, Scup, and Black Sea Bass FMP, the Bluefish FMP, other provisions of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and other applicable law. NMFS is issuing this rule pursuant to sections 304(b)(1)(A) and 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, which provide specific authority for implementing this action. Section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorizes NMFS to implement rules and regulations deemed necessary by the Council. In a previous action under section 304(b), the regulations at 50 CFR 648.102(c), 648.122(b), 648.142(b), and 648.162(c) authorize NMFS to implement the summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish specifications under section 305(d).

The Assistant Administrator for Fisheries finds good cause to waive the 30-day delay in effective date of this action pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3). This action implements 2026 specifications for the summer flounder, scup, black sea bass, and bluefish fisheries. The fishing year for all four species runs from January 1 through December 31 each year. In compliance with the Court's order in North Carolina Fisheries Association v. Daley, these specifications should be effective as soon as possible following the start of the fishing year to allow for fishery participants to incorporate the revised specifications into their fishing plans. This rule also relieves restrictions by increasing the summer flounder, black sea bass, and bluefish commercial quotas and the recreational possession limits in the bluefish fishery, which will allow recreational anglers and for-hire businesses to take advantage of higher limits. See 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(1).

This rule is being issued at the earliest possible date. Preparation of the final rule is dependent on the analysis of commercial summer flounder landings for the prior fishing year (2024) and the current fishing year through October 31, 2025, to determine whether any overages have occurred and adjustments are needed to the final State quotas. This process is codified in the summer flounder regulations, and therefore, cannot be performed earlier. A proposed rule was published on December 9, 2025, with a public comment period through December 24, 2025. This final rule is being published as soon as possible following closure of the comment period.

This final rule has been determined to be not significant for purposes of Executive Order 12866.

This final rule is exempt from Executive Order 14192 because it is a routine fishing action under the Magnuson-Stevens Act.

The Chief Counsel for Regulation of the Department of Commerce certified to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration during the proposed rule stage that this action would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The factual basis for the certification was published in the proposed rule and is not repeated here. No comments were received regarding this certification. As a result, a regulatory flexibility analysis was not required and none was prepared.

This final rule contains no information collection requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.

For the reasons set out in the preamble, NMFS amends 50 CFR part 648 as follows:

NMFS manages the groundfish fishery in the BSAI exclusive economic zone according to the Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish of the BSAI Management Area (FMP) prepared and recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) under authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). Regulations governing fishing by U.S. vessels in accordance with the FMP appear at subpart H of 50 CFR part 600 and 50 CFR part 679.

In the Aleutian Islands subarea, the portion of the 2026 pollock TAC allocated to the Aleut Corporation and CDQ DFA is 14,100 metric tons (mt) and 1,900 mt, respectively, as established by the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025).

As of February 7, 2026, the Regional Administrator, Alaska Region, NMFS has determined that 6,300 mt of the Aleut Corporation's DFA and 1,900 mt of pollock CDQ DFA in the Aleutian Islands subarea will likely not be harvested and that there is harvesting capacity by Bering Sea sectors. The Regional Administrator made this determination based on harvest to date that indicates vessels participating in the Aleutian Islands directed pollock fishery and Aleutian Islands CDQ directed pollock fishery likely will not harvest the entire DFAs, the future harvest needs in the Aleutian Islands subarea reported by the Aleut Corporation and CDQ Program groups, and the current harvesting capacity of sectors in the Bering Sea subarea. Therefore, in accordance with § 679.20(a)(5)(iii)(B)( 4 ), NMFS reallocates 6,300 mt of the Aleut Corporation's DFA and 1,900 mt of pollock CDQ DFA from the Aleutian Islands subarea to the Bering Sea subarea allocations. The 1,900 mt of pollock CDQ DFA is added to the 2026 Bering Sea pollock CDQ DFA. The 6,300 mt of pollock reallocated from the Aleut Corporation's DFA is apportioned to the American Fisheries Act (AFA) inshore sector (50 percent), AFA catcher/processor (CP) sector (40 percent), and the AFA mothership sector (10 percent). The 2026 Bering Sea subarea pollock incidental catch allowance remains at 46,000 mt. As a result, the 2026 harvest specifications for pollock in the Aleutian Islands subarea included in the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025) is revised as follows: 0 mt to CDQ DFA and 7,800 mt to the Aleut Corporation's DFA. Furthermore, pursuant to § 679.20(a)(5), table 5 is revised to make 2026 pollock allocations consistent with this reallocation. This reallocation results in an adjustment to the 2026 CDQ pollock DFAs, Aleutian Islands Aleut Corporation DFA, and Bering Sea AFA sector allocations as established at § 679.20(a)(5).

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR part 679, which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, as it would prevent NMFS from responding to the most recent fisheries data on pollock catch in a timely fashion, and would delay the reallocation of unharvested Aleutian Islands pollock to the Bering Sea, where sectors have the current capacity to harvest this reallocated pollock. NMFS was unable to publish a notice providing time for public comment because the most recent, relevant data on pollock catch only became available as of February 7, 2026.

There is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to waive the 30-day delay in the effective date of this action. This finding is based upon the reasons provided above for waiver of prior notice and opportunity for public comment.