[Federal Register Volume 91, Number 11 (Friday, January 16, 2026)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2250-2264]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2026-00803]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-104590; File No. SR-EMERALD-2025-23]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; MIAX Emerald, LLC; Notice of
Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change To Amend
the MIAX Emerald Options Exchange Fee Schedule To Amend Non-Transaction
Fees
January 13, 2026.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (``Act'' or ``Exchange Act'') \1\ and Rule 19b-4
thereunder,\2\ notice is hereby given that on December 31, 2025, MIAX
Emerald, LLC (``MIAX Emerald'' or ``Exchange'') filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (``Commission'') a proposed rule
change as described in Items I, II, and III below, which Items have
been prepared by the Exchange. The Commission is publishing this notice
to solicit comments on the proposed rule change from interested
persons.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The Exchange proposes to amend the MIAX Emerald Options Exchange
Fee Schedule (the ``Fee Schedule'') to update various non-transaction
fees that have not been changed in a number of years to be comparable
to fees charged by other like exchanges for similar products.
The text of the proposed rule change is available on the Exchange's
website at https://www.miaxglobal.com/markets/us-options/miax-options/rule-filings, and at the Exchange's principal office.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the Exchange included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the proposed rule change and
discussed any comments it received on the
[[Page 2251]]
proposed rule change. The text of these statements may be examined at
the places specified in Item IV below. The Exchange has prepared
summaries, set forth in sections A, B, and C below, of the most
significant aspects of such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
1. Purpose
The Exchange first launched operations in March 2019 to attract
order flow and encourage market participants to experience the high
determinism and resiliency of the Exchange's trading Systems.\3\ To do
so, the Exchange chose to waive the fees for some non-transaction
related services or provide them at a very marginal cost, which was not
profitable to the Exchange. This resulted in the Exchange forgoing
revenue it could have generated from assessing higher fees. The
Exchange now proposes to amend various fees for non-transaction related
services to be in line with those of its peer exchanges and enable it
to continue to effectively compete with other options exchanges who
charge higher non-transaction fees and generate greater revenue. This
proposal simply seeks to increase certain fees to reflect current
market rates. The Exchange notes that significant portion of the fees
for non-transaction related services that are the subject of this
filing have not been increased since October 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The term ``System'' means the automated trading system used
by the Exchange for the trading of securities. See Exchange Rule
100.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Specifically, the Exchange proposes to amend the Fee Schedule to
amend the following non-transaction fees: (1) monthly Trading Permit
\4\ fees applicable to Electronic Exchange Members (``EEMs'') \5\ and
Market Makers; \6\ (2) connectivity fees to the primary/secondary
facility and disaster recovery facility for Members \7\ and non-
Members; and (3) FIX,\8\ MEI,\9\ Purge,\10\ CTD \11\ and FXD \12\ Port
fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The term ``Trading Permit'' means a permit issued by the
Exchange that confers the ability to transact on the Exchange. See
Exchange Rule 100.
\5\ The term ``Electronic Exchange Member'' or ``EEM'' means the
holder of a Trading Permit who is not a Market Maker. Electronic
Exchange Members are deemed ``members'' under the Exchange Act. See
Exchange Rule 100.
\6\ The term ``Market Makers'' refers to ``Lead Market Makers'',
``Primary Lead Market Makers'' and ``Registered Market Makers''
collectively. See Exchange Rule 100.
\7\ The term ``Member'' means an individual or organization
approved to exercise the trading rights associated with a Trading
Permit. Members are deemed ``members'' under the Exchange Act. See
Exchange Rule 100.
\8\ ``FIX Port'' means an interface with MIAX Emerald systems
that enables the Port user to submit simple and complex orders
electronically to MIAX Emerald. See the Definitions section of the
Fee Schedule.
\9\ MIAX Emerald Express Interface (``MEI'') is a connection to
the MIAX Emerald System that enables Market Makers to submit simple
and complex electronic quotes to MIAX Emerald. ``Full Service MEI
Ports'' means a port which provides Market Makers with the ability
to send Market Maker simple and complex quotes, eQuotes, and quote
purge messages to the MIAX Emerald System. Full Service MEI Ports
are also capable of receiving administrative information. Market
Makers are limited to two Full Service MEI Ports per Matching
Engine. ``Limited Service MEI Ports'' means a port which provides
Market Makers with the ability to send simple and complex eQuotes
and quote purge messages only, but not Market Maker Quotes, to the
MIAX Emerald System. Limited Service MEI Ports are also capable of
receiving administrative information. Market Makers initially
receive four Limited Service MEI Ports per Matching Engine. See the
Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\10\ ``Purge Ports'' provide Market Makers with the ability to
send quote purge messages to the MIAX Emerald System. Purge Ports
are not capable of sending or receiving any other type of messages
or information. See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\11\ ``CTD Port'' or ``Clearing Trade Drop Port'' provides an
Exchange Member with a real-time clearing trade updates. The updates
include the Member's clearing trade messages on a low latency, real-
time basis. The trade messages are routed to a Member's connection
containing certain information. The information includes, among
other things, the following: (i) trade date and time; (ii) symbol
information; (iii) trade price/size information; (iv) Member type
(for example, and without limitation, Market Maker, Electronic
Exchange Member, Broker-Dealer); and (v) Exchange MPID for each side
of the transaction, including Clearing Member MPID. See the
Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\12\ The FIX Drop Copy (``FXD'') Port is a messaging interface
that will provide a copy of real-time trade execution, trade
correction and trade cancellation information to FXD Port users who
subscribe to the service. FXD Port users are those users who are
designated by an EEM to receive the information and the information
is restricted for use by the EEM. FXD Port Fees will be assessed in
any month the Member is credentialed to use the FXD Port in the
production environment. See Fee Schedule, Section 5)d)iv).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monthly Trading Permit Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the Fee Schedule to amend the amount
of the monthly Trading Permit fees assessed to EEMs and Market Makers.
EEMs
The Exchange notes that Trading Permit fees for EEMs have not been
amended since October 2020.\13\ The Exchange assesses a flat monthly
fee of $1,500 per Trading Permit to each EEM. The Exchange now proposes
to increase the monthly Trading Permit fee assessed to EEMs from $1,500
to $2,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90196 (October 15,
2020), 85 FR 67064 (October 21, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-11) and 91033
(February 1, 2021), 86 FR 8455 (February 5, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-
03).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market Makers
The monthly Trading Permit fees for Market Makers have not been
amended since October 2020.\14\ Currently, the Exchange assesses
monthly Trading Permit fees to Market Makers based on the lesser of
either the per class basis or percentage of total national average
daily volume (``ADV'') measurements. The amount of the monthly Trading
Permit fee is based upon the number of classes in which the Market
Maker was assigned to quote on any given day within the calendar month,
or upon class volume percentages. The Exchange will assess Market
Makers the monthly Trading Permit fee based on the greatest number of
classes listed on MIAX Emerald that the Market Maker was assigned to
quote in on any given day within a calendar month.\15\ The class volume
percentage is based on the total national ADV in classes listed on MIAX
Emerald in the prior calendar quarter. Newly listed option classes are
excluded from the calculation of the monthly Trading Permit fee until
the calendar quarter following their listing, at which time the newly
listed option classes will be included in both the per class count and
the percentage of total national average daily volume.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90196 (October 15,
2020), 85 FR 67064 (October 21, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-11) and 91033
(February 1, 2021), 86 FR 8455 (February 5, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-
03).
\15\ Pursuant to Exchange Rule 602(a), the Board or a committee
designated by the Board shall appoint Market Makers to one or more
classes of option contracts traded on the Exchange based on several
factors described in the Rule in the best interest of the Exchange
to provide competitive markets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Currently, the Exchange assess the following Trading Permit fees to
Market Makers:
$7,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 10 option
classes or up to 20% of option classes by national ADV;
$12,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 40 option
classes or up to 35% of option classes by ADV;
$17,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 100 option
classes or up to 50% of option classes by ADV; and
$22,000 for Market Maker registrations in over 100 option
classes or over 50% of option classes by ADV up to all option classes
listed on MIAX Emerald.
The Exchange also assesses an alternative lower Trading Permit fee
to Market Makers who fall within the 3rd and 4th levels of the Market
Maker Trading Permit fee table, which levels
[[Page 2252]]
are described immediately above if certain volume thresholds are met.
This alternative lower Trading Permit fee for Market Makers is set
forth in footnote ``[mshbox]'' that is included in the Market Maker
Trading Permit fee table and provides that if the Market Maker's total
monthly executed volume during the relevant month is less than 0.025%
of the total monthly executed volume reported by OCC in the customer
account type for MIAX Emerald-listed option classes for that month,
then the fee will be $15,500 instead of the fee otherwise applicable to
such level.
The Exchange now proposes to increase the Trading Permit fees
assessed to Market Makers, which, as described above, were last amended
in October 2020. In particular, the Exchange proposes to assess the
following Trading Permit fees to Market Makers:
$8,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 10 option
classes or up to 20% of option classes by national ADV;
$14,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 40 option
classes or up to 35% of option classes by ADV;
$20,000 for Market Maker registrations in up to 100 option
classes or up to 50% of option classes by ADV; and
$26,000 for Market Maker registrations in over 100 option
classes or over 50% of option classes by ADV up to all option classes
listed on MIAX Emerald.
The Exchange also proposes to decrease the alternative lower
Trading Permit fee to Market Makers who fall within the 3rd and 4th
levels of the Market Maker Trading Permit fee table if certain volume
thresholds are met from $15,500 to $14,000 per month by amending the
footnote ``[squf]'' following the Market Maker Trading Permit fee table
for these monthly Trading Permit tier levels.
System Connectivity Fees
1Gb and 10Gb Network Connectivity Fees
Next, the Exchange proposes to amend the Fee Schedule to increase
connectivity fees to the primary/secondary and disaster recovery
facilities for Members and non-Members. Currently, the Exchange
assesses the same amount of connectivity fees to Members and non-
Members that connect to the Exchange's primary/secondary facility and
disaster recovery facility. In particular, the Exchange assesses the
following connectivity fees to Members and non-Members:
$1,400 per 1 gigabit (``Gb'') connection to the primary/
secondary facility;
$550 per 1Gb connection to the disaster recovery facility;
$2,750 per 10Gb connection to the disaster recovery
facility; and
$13,500 per 10Gb ultra-low latency (``ULL'') connection to
the primary/secondary facility.
The Exchange notes that the above fees for 1Gb connectivity and
10Gb to the disaster recovery facility, and 1Gb connectivity to the
primary/secondary facilities, have not been increased since December
2019.\16\ The fee for 10Gb ULL connectivity was last increased in
January 2023.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 87877 (December 31,
2019), 85 FR 738 (January 7, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2019-39).
\17\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 96628 (January 10,
2023), 88 FR 2651 (January 17, 2023) (SR-EMERALD-2023-01) and 99824
(March 21, 2024), 89 FR 21379 (March 27, 2024) (SR-EMERALD-2024-12)
(noting that while the proposed fee changes subject to this filing
were immediately effective, the proposed fee changes had been
effective since January 1, 2023 pursuant to the Exchange's initially
filed proposal on December 30, 2022 (i.e., SR-EMERALD-2022-38, which
was withdrawn without being noticed to make a minor technical
correction and refiled immediately as SR-EMERALD-2023-01)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange now propose to amend Sections 5)a)-b) of the Fee
Schedule to increase connectivity fees for Members and non-Members. In
particular, the Exchange proposes to assess the following connectivity
fees to Members and non-Members:
$1,500 per 1Gb connection to the primary/secondary
facility;
$650 per 1Gb connection to the disaster recovery facility;
$3,500 per 10Gb connection to the disaster recovery
facility; and
$15,000 per 10Gb ULL connection to the primary/secondary
facility.
Port Fees
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for FIX Ports, Full Service
MEI Ports, Limited Service MEI Ports, Purge Ports, CTD Ports and FXD
Ports. Some of these fees have not been increased since they were first
adopted in 2020. Each port provides access to the Exchange's primary
and secondary data centers as well as its disaster recovery center for
a single fee.
FIX Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for FIX Ports, which have
not been increased since October 2020.\18\ A FIX Port allows Members to
submit simple and complex orders electronically to MIAX Emerald.\19\
The Exchange currently assesses the following monthly FIX Port fees:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90184 (October 14,
2020), 85 FR 66636 (October 20, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-12) and 91460
(April 2, 2021), 86 FR 18349 (April 8, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-11).
\19\ See supra note 8.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
$550 for the first FIX Port;
$350 per port for the second to fifth FIX Ports; and
$150 per port for the sixth or more FIX Ports.
The Exchange proposes to increase monthly FIX Port fees as follows:
$650 for the first FIX Port;
$400 per port for the second to fifth FIX Ports; and
$175 per port for the sixth or more FIX Ports.
Full Service MEI Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the Full Service MEI Port fees for
Market Makers, which have not been increased since October 2020.\20\
Full Service MEI Ports provide Market Makers with the ability to send
Market Maker simple and complex quotes, eQuotes, and quote purge
messages to the MIAX Emerald System. Full Service MEI Ports are also
capable of receiving administrative information.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90184 (October 14,
2020), 85 FR 66636 (October 20, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-12) and 91460
(April 2, 2021), 86 FR 18349 (April 8, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-11).
\21\ See supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange assesses the amount of the monthly Full Service MEI
Port fees for Market Makers based on the lesser of either the per class
basis or percentage of total national ADV measurements. The amount of
the monthly Full Service MEI Port fee is based upon the number of
classes in which the Market Maker was assigned to quote on any given
day within the calendar month, or upon class volume percentages. The
Exchange assesses Market Makers the monthly Full Service MEI Port fee
based on the greatest number of classes listed on MIAX Emerald that the
Market Maker was assigned to quote in on any given day within a
calendar month. The class volume percentage is based on the total
national ADV in classes listed on MIAX Emerald in the prior calendar
quarter. Newly listed option classes are excluded from the calculation
of the monthly Full Service MEI Port fee until the calendar quarter
following their listing, at which time the newly listed option classes
will be included in both the per class count and the percentage of
total national average daily volume. Specifically, the Exchange
assesses the following Full Service MEI Port fees to Market Makers:
$5,000 for Market Maker assignments in up to 5 option
classes or
[[Page 2253]]
up to 10% of option classes by national ADV;
$10,000 for Market Maker assignments in up to 10 option
classes or up to 20% of option classes by ADV;
$14,000 for Market Maker assignments in up to 40 option
classes or up to 35% of option classes by national ADV;
$17,500 for Market Maker assignments in up to 100 option
classes or up to 50% of option classes by ADV; and
$20,500 for Market Maker assignments in over 100 option
classes or over 50% of option classes by ADV up to all option classes
listed on MIAX Emerald.
The Exchange also provides an alternative lower Full Service MEI
Port fee for Market Makers who fall within the 4th and 5th levels of
the Market Maker Full Service MEI Port fee table, which levels are
described directly above if certain volume thresholds are met. This
alternative lower Full Service MEI Port fee for Market Makers is set
forth in footnote ``[squf]'' in the Market Maker Full Service MEI Port
fee table and provides that if the Market Maker's total monthly
executed volume during the relevant month is less than 0.025% of the
total monthly executed volume reported by OCC in the customer account
type for MIAX Emerald-listed option classes for that month, then the
fee will be $14,500 instead of the fee otherwise applicable to such
level.
The Exchange now proposes to increase the Full Service MEI Port
fees assessed to Market Makers as follows:
$6,000 for Market Maker assignments in up to 5 option
classes or up to 10% of option classes by national ADV;
$12,000 for Market Maker assignments in up to 10 option
classes or up to 20% of option classes by ADV;
$16,500 for Market Maker assignments in up to 40 option
classes or up to 35% of option classes by national ADV;
$20,500 for Market Maker assignments in up to 100 option
classes or up to 50% of option classes by ADV; and
$24,000 for Market Maker assignments in over 100 option
classes or over 50% of option classes by ADV up to all option classes
listed on MIAX Emerald.
The Exchange also proposes to decrease the alternative lower Full
Service MEI Port fee for Market Makers who fall within the 3rd, 4th and
5th levels of the proposed Market Maker Full Service MEI Port fee table
if certain volume thresholds are met from $14,500 to $12,000 per month
by amending footnote ``[squf]'' following the Market Maker Full Service
MEI Port fee table.
Limited Service MEI Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for Limited Service MEI
Ports, which provide Market Makers with the ability to send simple and
complex eQuotes and quote purge messages only, but not Market Maker
Quotes, to the MIAX Emerald System. Limited Service MEI Ports are also
capable of receiving administrative information. Market Makers
currently receive four free Limited Service MEI Ports per matching
engine.\22\ Currently, Market Makers may request additional Limited
Service MEI Ports for which MIAX will assess Market Makers $420 per
month per additional Limited Service MEI Port for each matching engine.
The Exchange proposes to increase the fee for each additional Limited
Service MEI Port from $420 to $450 per month per additional Limited
Service MEI Port for each matching engine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ See supra note 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Purge Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for Purge Ports, which
provide Market Makers with the ability to send quote purge messages to
the MIAX Emerald System. Purge Ports are not capable of sending or
receiving any other type of messages or information.\23\ The Exchange
proposes to increase the monthly Purge Port fee from $600 per matching
engine to $700 per matching engine.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ See supra note 10.
\24\ A Market Maker may request and be allocated two (2) Purge
Ports per matching engine to which it connects and will be charged
the monthly fee per Matching Engine. See Fee Schedule, Section
5)d)ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CTD Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for CTD Ports, which have
not been increased since October 2020.\25\ CTD Ports provide an
Exchange Member with a real-time clearing trade updates, including,
among other things, the following: (i) trade date and time; (ii) symbol
information; (iii) trade price/size information; (iv) Member type (for
example, and without limitation, Market Maker, Electronic Exchange
Member, Broker-Dealer); and (v) Exchange MPID for each side of the
transaction, including Clearing Member MPID. The Exchange now proposes
to increase the monthly fee per CTD Port from $450 to $525.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90184 (October 14,
2020), 85 FR 66636 (October 20, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-12) and 91460
(April 2, 2021), 86 FR 18349 (April 8, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FXD Ports
The Exchange proposes to amend the fees for FXD Ports, which have
not been increased since October 2020.\26\ A FXD Port means a messaging
interface that will provide a copy of real-time trade execution, trade
correction and trade cancellation information for simple and complex
orders to FIX Drop Copy Port users who subscribe to the service. FXD
Port Fees will be assessed in any month the Member is credentialed to
use the FXD Port in the production environment. The Exchange now
proposes to increase the monthly fee per FXD Port from $500 to $600.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Securities Exchange Act Release Nos. 90184 (October 14,
2020), 85 FR 66636 (October 20, 2020) (SR-EMERALD-2020-12) and 91460
(April 2, 2021), 86 FR 18349 (April 8, 2021) (SR-EMERALD-2021-11).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementation
The Exchange issued an alert publicly announcing the proposed fees
on October 14, 2025 and a reminder alert on December 19, 2025.\27\ The
fees subject to this proposal are effective beginning January 1, 2026.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See Fee Change Alert, MIAX Options, Pearl Options and
Emerald Options--January 1, 2026 Non-Transaction Fee Changes (dated
October 14, 2025), available at https://www.miaxglobal.com/alert/2025/10/14/miax-options-pearl-options-and-emerald-options-exchanges-january-1-2026-non-1?nav=all and Fee Change Alert, MIAX Options,
Pearl Options and Emerald Options Exchanges--Reminder: January 1,
2026 Non-Transaction Fee Changes (dated December 19, 2025),
available at https://www.miaxglobal.com/alert/2025/12/19/miax-options-pearl-options-and-emerald-options-exchanges-reminder-january-1-1?nav=all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Statutory Basis
The Exchange believes that the proposed rule change is consistent
with the provisions of Section 6(b) \28\ of the Act in general, and
furthers the objectives of Section 6(b)(4) \29\ of the Act, in
particular, in that it is designed to provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among its Members
and other persons using its facilities. Additionally, the Exchange
believes that the proposed fees are consistent with the objectives of
Section 6(b)(5) \30\ of the Act in that they are designed to promote
just and equitable principles of trade, to foster cooperation and
coordination with persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling,
processing information with respect to, and facilitating transactions
in securities, to remove impediments to a free and open market and
national market system, and, in general, to protect investors and the
public interest, and, particularly, are not designed to
[[Page 2254]]
permit unfair discrimination between customers, issuers, brokers, or
dealers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ 15 U.S.C. 78f.
\29\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(4).
\30\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Proposed Fees Are Reasonable and Comparable to the Fees Charged by
Other Exchanges for Similar Products and Services
Overall. The proposed fees are comparable to those of other options
exchanges. Based on publicly-available information, no single exchange
had more than approximately 11.21% equity options market share for
2025,\31\ and the Exchange compared the fees proposed herein to the
fees charged by other options exchanges with similar market share. A
more detailed discussion of the comparison follows. Except where
otherwise provided (i.e., proposed Trading Permit fees for Market
Makers), the Exchange assesses the market share \32\ for each of the
below referenced options markets utilizing total equity options
contracts traded in 2025, as set forth in the following tables: \33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See The OCC, Options Volume by Exchange--2025, available at
https://www.theocc.com/market-data/market-data-reports/volume-and-open-interest/volume-by-exchange (last visited December 1, 2025).
\32\ Market share is the percentage of volume on a particular
exchange relative to the total volume across all exchanges, and
indicates the amount of order flow directed to that exchange. High
levels of market share enhance the value of trading, ports and
connectivity. Total contracts include both multi-list options and
proprietary options products. Proprietary options products are
products with intellectual property rights that are not multi-
listed.
\33\ The fee amounts listed in each table provided in the
Statutory Basis section of this filing that pertain to the Exchange
are the proposed new rates for each product or service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
EEM Trading Permit Fees
The proposed Trading Permit fee for EEMs is comparable to the
trading permit fee charged by Cboe C2 Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe C2''), as
summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share
Exchange (%) Type of product/service Monthly fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 EEM Trading Permit............ $2,000
Cboe C2 \a\................................. 2.93 Electronic Access Permit...... 1,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Access Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/.
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%,
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges a similar trading
permit fee as the Trading Permit fee proposed by the Exchange for EEMs.
Cboe C2's Electronic Access Permit is analogous to the Exchange's
Trading Permits for EEMs. In general, a Trading Permit is a permit
issued by the Exchange that confers the ability to transact on the
Exchange.\34\ EEMs are assessed the monthly Trading Permit fee in order
to transact on the Exchange on behalf of their customers or to conduct
proprietary trading. Likewise, Cboe C2's Electronic Access Permits
entitle the holder to access Cboe C2.\35\ Like Trading Permit holders
on the Exchange, Electronic Access Permit holders must be broker-
dealers registered with Cboe C2 and are allowed transact on Cboe
C2.\36\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See Exchange Rule 100.
\35\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Access Fees section, available at
https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/.
\36\ See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe C2 charges a comparable trading permit fee as the Trading
Permit fee proposed by the Exchange. Cboe C2 charges a flat $1,000 per
Electronic Access Permit per month, while the Exchange proposes to
charge a flat $2,000 per EEM Trading Permit per month.
Market Maker Trading Permit Fees
The Exchange believes the proposed Trading Permit fees for Market
Makers are reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory as the
fees will apply equally to all Market Makers. As such, all similarly
situated Market Makers, with the same number of class registrations, or
percentage of total national ADV, will be subject to the same Market
Maker Trading Permit fee.
The Exchange also believes that assessing lower fees to Market
Makers that quote in fewer classes is reasonable and not unfairly
discriminatory as it will allow the Exchange to retain and attract
smaller-scale Market Makers, which are an integral component of the
options industry marketplace. Since these smaller Market Makers
typically utilize less bandwidth and capacity on the Exchange network
due to the lower number of quoted classes, the Exchange believes it is
reasonable, equitable and not unfairly discriminatory to offer such
Market Makers a lower fee, designated in footnote ``[squf]'' following
the Market Maker Trading Permit fee table. The Exchange also notes that
the Exchange's affiliates, MIAX, MIAX Pearl, and MIAX Sapphire, provide
lower Trading Permit fees for Market Makers who quote the entire
markets of those exchanges (or substantial amount of those markets), as
objectively measured by either number of classes assigned or a
percentage of total national ADV, but who do not otherwise execute a
significant amount of volume on MIAX, MIAX Pearl, or MIAX Sapphire,\37\
and, as such, this concept is not new or novel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ See MIAX Fee Schedule, Section 3)b), note ``*''; MIAX Pearl
Options Fee Schedule, Section 3)b), note ``**''; and MIAX Sapphire
Fee Schedule, Section 3)b), note ``a.''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is no requirement, regulatory or otherwise, that any broker-
dealer connect to and access any (or all of) the available options
exchanges. A competing options exchange noted in a similar proposal to
amend their own trading permit fees that, at the time of that filing in
2022, of the 62 market making firms that were registered as Market
Makers across Cboe, MIAX, and BOX, 42 firms accessed only one of the
three exchanges.\38\ In addition, the Exchange and its affiliates,
MIAX, MIAX Pearl, and MIAX Sapphire, have a total of fifty-four members
(as of December 18, 2025). Of those fifty-four total members, thirty-
three are members of all four exchanges, eight are members of only
three exchanges, two are members of only two exchanges, and eleven are
members of only one exchange.\39\ The above data evidences that a
Market Maker need not be a member of all options exchanges, let alone
the Exchange and its affiliates, and market makers elect to do so based
on their own business decisions and need to directly access each
exchange's liquidity pool. Not only is there no regulatory requirement
to connect to every options exchange, the Exchange believes there is
also no ``de facto'' or practical
[[Page 2255]]
requirement as well, as further evidenced by the membership analysis of
the options exchanges discussed above. Indeed, Market Makers choose if
and how to access a particular exchange and because it is a choice, the
Exchange must set reasonable pricing, otherwise prospective market
makers would not connect and existing Market Makers would disconnect
from the Exchange.\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 94894 (May 11,
2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-BOX-2022-17) (Notice of Filing
and Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed Rule Change to Amend the
Fee Schedule on the BOX Options Market LLC Facility To Adopt
Electronic Market Maker Trading Permit Fees). The Exchange believes
that BOX's observation demonstrates that market making firms can,
and do, select which exchanges they wish to access, and,
accordingly, options exchanges must take competitive considerations
into account when setting fees for such access.
\39\ See Member Directories for MIAX, MIAX Pearl Options, MIAX
Emerald and MIAX Sapphire, available at https://www.miaxglobal.com/markets/us-options/all-options-exchanges/membership (last visited
December 18, 2025).
\40\ This is further supported by the analysis performed by the
Commission Staff ahead of the September 2025 Roundtable on Trade-
Throughs, which analysis looked at how all broker-dealers access the
current U.S. equities and options exchanges. The analysis shows that
not every broker-dealer accesses each exchange. See Trade-Through
Roundtable Support Data Memorandum, Staff of the Office of Analytics
and Research, Division of Trading and Markets (revised September 12,
2025), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/meetings-events/roundtable-trade-through-prohibitions (last visited December 23,
2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that elasticity of demand for Exchange
membership exists when it comes to purchasing a Trading Permit and, as
evidenced by the data provided below, prior fee proposals have resulted
in Members terminating their memberships. As an example, one Market
Maker terminated their MIAX Pearl membership effective January 1, 2023,
as a direct result of the proposed connectivity and port fee changes
proposed by MIAX Pearl. As another example, two Market Makers
terminated their MIAX Emerald memberships effective February 1, 2024,
as a direct result of the proposed non-transaction fee changes proposed
by MIAX Emerald. Other exchanges have also experienced termination of
memberships if their members deem fees to be unreasonable or excessive.
The Exchange notes that a BOX participant modified its access to BOX in
connection with the implementation of a proposed change to BOX's permit
fees.\41\ The absence of new memberships coupled with the termination
of memberships on the Exchange's affiliates, as well as similar
membership changes on another options exchange in relation to a trading
permit fee increase, shows that elasticity of demand exists. The
Exchange is not aware of any reason why Market Makers could not simply
drop their access to an exchange (or not initially access an exchange)
if an exchange were to establish prices for its non-transaction fees
that, in the determination of such Market Maker, did not make business
or economic sense for such Market Maker to access such exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ According to BOX, a Market Maker on BOX terminated its
status as a Market Maker in response to BOX's proposed modification
of Market Maker trading permit fees. See Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 94894 (May 11, 2022), 87 FR 29987 (May 17, 2022) (SR-
BOX-2022-17). BOX noted, and the Exchange agrees, that this Market
Maker's decision demonstrates that Market Makers can, and do, alter
their membership status if they deem permit fees at an exchange to
be unsuitable for their business needs, thus demonstrating the
competitive environment for Market Maker permit fees and the
constraints on options exchanges when setting Market Maker permit
fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Connectivity Fees (Disaster Recovery Facility)
The proposed network connectivity fees to the Exchange's disaster
recovery facility for Members and non-Members are comparable to, or
lower than, the connectivity fees charged by Cboe C2 and MEMX LLC
(``MEMX''), as summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of product/service connection)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 1Gb Connectivity (disaster $650
recovery). 3,500
10Gb Connectivity (disaster
recovery).
Cboe C2 \a\................................. 2.93 Physical Port 1Gb (disaster 2,000
recovery). 6,000
Physical Port 10Gb (disaster
recovery).
MEMX \b\.................................... 3.74 xNet Physical Connection 3,000
(Secondary).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/.
\b\ See MEMX Connectivity Fee Schedule, Physical Connectivity section, available at https://info.memxtrading.com/connectivity-fees/.
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%, lower
than the Exchange's market share, charges higher 1Gb and 10Gb
connectivity fees to connect to its disaster recovery facility than the
Exchange proposes to connect to its disaster recovery facility. Cboe
C2's connectivity fees to connect to its disaster recovery facility are
analogous to the Exchange's connectivity fees to its disaster recovery
facility. In general, the disaster recovery facility is a secondary
data center in a separate, geographically diverse location that
Exchange participants are able to connect to in order to have
redundancy for their trading and market data connections in the event
that the Exchange's primary data center operations are disabled. Cboe
C2's 1Gb and 10Gb connections to its disaster recovery center allow its
members to connect to that data center in the event that Cboe C2's
primary data center is no longer operational.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\42\ See Cboe BCP/DR Plan Highlights, v1.3, page 2, available at
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/Cboe_Corporate_BCP-DR.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having lower market share than the Exchange, Cboe C2
charges higher 1Gb and 10Gb connectivity fees to its disaster recovery
facility than the fees proposed by the Exchange herein for connectivity
to the Exchange's disaster recovery facility. Cboe C2 charges monthly
fees of $2,000 per 1Gb connection and $6,000 per 10Gb connection to its
disaster recovery facility. Meanwhile, the Exchange proposes to charge
monthly fees of $650 per 1Gb connection and $3,500 per 10Gb connection
to its disaster recovery facility.
MEMX. MEMX, with a market share of approximately 3.74%, which is
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges similar connectivity
fees to its disaster recovery facility as the Exchange proposes for
connectivity to its disaster recovery facility. MEMX's xNet Physical
Connection to its Secondary Data Center \43\ is analogous to the
Exchange's 1Gb and 10Gb connections to its disaster recovery facility.
MEMX charges similar disaster recovery connectivity fees as proposed by
the Exchange herein. MEMX charges $3,000 per xNet Physical Connection
to its Secondary Data Center per month. Meanwhile, the Exchange
proposes to charge monthly fees of $650 per 1Gb connection and $3,500
per 10Gb connection to its disaster recovery facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 100021 (April 24,
2024), 89 FR 34298 (April 30, 2024) (SR-MEMX-2024-13) (describing
that the Secondary Data Center is a geographically diverse data
center, which is operated for backup and disaster recovery
purposes).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Connectivity Fees (Primary/Secondary Facility)
The proposed network connectivity fees to the Exchange's primary
and secondary facility for Members and non-Members are lower than the
connectivity fees charged by Nasdaq BX,
[[Page 2256]]
Inc. (``Nasdaq BX'') for connectivity to its primary data centers, as
summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of product/service connection)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 1Gb Connectivity.............. $1,500
10Gb Connectivity............. 15,000
Nasdaq BX \a\............................... 1.63 1Gb Connection................ 2,750
10Gb Ultra Connection......... 18,500
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 104261 (November 25, 2025), 90 FR 55209 (December 1, 2025) (SR-BX-
2025-027).
Nasdaq BX. Nasdaq BX, with a market share of approximately 1.63%,
lower than the Exchange's market share, charges higher connectivity
fees to its primary data center. Nasdaq BX's 1Gb and 10Gb Ultra fiber
connection fees are analogous to the Exchange's 1Gb and 10Gb ULL
connectivity fees. In general, the Exchange's 1Gb and 10Gb ULL
connectivity fees provide Members and non-Members with access to the
Exchange's primary and secondary facilities (i.e., the live trading
platforms and market data systems). Nasdaq BX's 1Gb and 10Gb Ultra
fiber connections provide Nasdaq BX participants with the ability to
connect directly to Nasdaq BX's trading platforms and market data
feeds.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\44\ See, generally, Nasdaq Market Connectivity Options web
page, available at https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/nasdaq-co-location (last visited November 25, 2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having lower market share than the Exchange, Nasdaq BX
charges higher connectivity fees than the connectivity fees to the
primary and secondary facilities proposed by the Exchange herein.
Nasdaq BX charges all participants monthly fees of $2,750 per 1Gb
connection and $18,500 per 10Gb connection to access its primary data
center. Meanwhile, the Exchange proposes to charge Members and non-
Members monthly fees of $1,500 per 1Gb connection and $15,000 per 10Gb
ULL connection to the Exchange's primary and secondary facilities.
Nasdaq BX charges an additional installation fee for each 1Gb or 10Gb
connection of $1,650.\45\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ See Nasdaq BX, General 8: Connectivity, Section 1(b),
Connectivity to the Exchange, available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/bx/rules/BX%20General%208.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIX Port Fees
The proposed FIX Port fees are comparable to, or lower than, the
similar port fees charged by Cboe BZX Exchange, Inc. (``Cboe BZX''),
Cboe C2 and The Nasdaq Stock Market LLC (``Nasdaq''), as summarized in
the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly Fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of Product/Service port)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 1st FIX Port.................. $650
2nd to 5th FIX Ports.......... 400
6th or more FIX Ports......... 175
Cboe BZX \a\................................ 4.35 Logical Ports................. 750
Cboe C2 \b\................................. 2.93 FIX Logical Ports............. 650
Nasdaq \c\.................................. 3.62 FIX Ports..................... 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Cboe BZX Fee Schedule, Options Logical Port Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/bzx/.
\b\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/ ctwo/.
\c\ See Nasdaq Options 7 Pricing Schedule, Section 3(i)(1), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207.
Cboe BZX. Cboe BZX, with a market share of approximately 4.35%,
slightly higher than the Exchange's market share, charges higher
Logical Port fees than the FIX Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Cboe
BZX's Logical Ports are analogous to the Exchange's FIX Ports. In
general, a FIX Port allows an Exchange Member to send simple and
complex orders, as well as other messages, to the Exchange using the
FIX protocol.\46\ Cboe BZX's Logical Ports allow for order entry and
other messages to be sent to Cboe BZX by participants.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\47\ See, generally, Cboe Titanium U.S. Options FIX
Specification, Version 2.7.97 (dated October 20, 2025), available at
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/US_Options_FIX_Specification.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe BZX, which has slightly higher market share than the Exchange,
charges slightly higher Logical Port fees than the FIX Port fees
proposed by the Exchange herein. Cboe BZX charges a monthly fee of $750
per Logical Port, while the Exchange's highest proposed tier is only
$650 per FIX Port per month.
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%, lower
than the Exchange's market share, charges comparable FIX Logical Port
fees as the FIX Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Cboe C2's FIX
Logical Ports are analogous to the Exchange's FIX Ports. In general, a
FIX Port allows an Exchange Member to send simple and complex orders
and other messages to the Exchange using the FIX protocol.\48\ Cboe
C2's FIX Logical Ports allow for order entry and other messages to be
sent to Cboe C2 by participants.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\49\ See, generally, Cboe Titanium U.S. Options FIX
Specification, Version 2.7.97 (dated October 20, 2025), available at
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/US_Options_FIX_Specification.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having lower market share than the Exchange, Cboe C2
charges comparable FIX Logical Port fees as the FIX Port fees proposed
by the Exchange herein. Cboe C2 charges a monthly fee of $650 per FIX
Logical Port, while the Exchange's highest proposed tier is $650 per
FIX Port per month. Cboe C2 FIX Logical Port users may incur an
additional monthly fee of $650 per port. Cboe C2 provides that for the
standard monthly fee of $650 per FIX Logical Port, a user may enter up
to 70,000 orders per trading day per port as
[[Page 2257]]
measured on average in a single month. However, each incremental usage
of up to 70,000 per day per FIX Logical Port will incur an additional
$650 fee per month.\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees
section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/. Incremental usage is determined on a monthly
basis based on the average orders per day entered in a single month
across all of a market participant's subscribed FIX Ports. See id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq. Nasdaq, with a market share of approximately 3.62%, which
is comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges similar FIX Port
fees as the FIX Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Nasdaq's FIX Ports
are analogous to the Exchange's FIX Ports in that they that allow
Nasdaq participants to connect, send, and receive messages related to
orders to and from Nasdaq, which include the following: (1) execution
messages; (2) order messages; and (3) risk protection triggers and
cancel notifications.\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ See Nasdaq Options 3 Options Trading Rules, Section
7(e)(1)(A).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq charges participants $650 per FIX Port per month, while the
Exchange's highest proposed tier is $650 per FIX Port per month.
Accordingly, Nasdaq, with similarly market share as the Exchange,
charges comparable FIX Port fees as proposed by the Exchange herein.
Limited Service MEI Port Fees
The proposed Limited Service MEI Port (``LSPs'') fees are
comparable to, or lower than, the similar port fees charged by Nasdaq
and Nasdaq MRX, LLC (``Nasdaq MRX''), as summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of product/service port)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 Limited Service MEI Port...... $450
Nasdaq \a\.................................. 3.62 QUO Ports..................... 750
Nasdaq MRX \b\.............................. 3.36 OTTO Ports.................... 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Nasdaq, Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 3(i)(4), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207.
\b\ See Nasdaq MRX, Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 6(i)(4), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/mrx/rules/MRX%20Options%207.
Nasdaq. Nasdaq, with a market share of approximately 3.62%, which
is comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges higher Quote
Using Order (``QUO'') Port fees than the Limited Service MEI Port fees
proposed by the Exchange. The Exchange acknowledges differences between
the functionality of its LSPs and that of Nasdaq's QUO Ports; however,
the Exchange believes that the fee comparison between LSPs and QUO
Ports is relevant as both ports provide a limited subset of
functionality as provided by other ports offered by both the Exchange
and Nasdaq. In general, Limited Service MEI Ports support all MEI
Interface \52\ input message types,\53\ but do not support bulk quote
entry.\54\ Notifications sent over LSPs between market participants and
the Exchange may include the following information: (1) execution
notifications, cancel notifications, stock leg execution notifications,
and order notifications; (2) administrative messages (i.e., series
updates); (3) risk protection settings and notification updates; and
(4) trading status notifications (i.e., halted).\55\ Nasdaq's QUO Ports
allow Nasdaq market makers to connect, send, and receive messages
related to single-sided orders to and from Nasdaq.\56\ Messages sent
over QUO Ports may include the following: (1) options symbol directory
messages (e.g., underlying); (2) system event messages (e.g., start of
trading hours messages and start of opening); (3) trading action
messages (e.g., halts and resumes); (4) execution messages; (5) order
messages; and (6) risk protection triggers and cancel
notifications.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ The MIAX Express Interface (``MEI'') is a connection to
MIAX Emerald System that enables Market Makers to submit simple and
complex electronic quotes to MIAX Emerald. See the Definitions
section of the Fee Schedule.
\53\ See MIAX Emerald MEI Interface Specification, Version 2.2c
(revision date October 10, 2025), available at https://www.miaxglobal.com/sites/default/files/job-files/MIAX_Express_Interface_MEI_v2.2c.pdf (providing full description of
messages supported by the MEI Interface).
\54\ See MIAX Emerald Options Exchange User Manual, Version
1.0.0, Section 5.01 (revision date December 12, 2023), available at
https://www.miaxglobal.com/miax_emerald_user_manual.pdf.
\55\ See MIAX Emerald MEI Interface Specification, Version 2.2c
(revision date October 10, 2025), available at https://www.miaxglobal.com/sites/default/files/job-files/MIAX_Express_Interface_MEI_v2.2c.pdf (providing full description of
messages supported by the MEI Interface).
\56\ See Nasdaq Options 3: Options Trading Rules, Section
7(e)(1)(D).
\57\ See Nasdaq Options 3: Options Trading Rules, Section
7(e)(1)(D).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq charges a monthly fee of $750 per QUO Port, per account
number, while the Exchange provides the first four LSPs for free and
proposes to charge $450 per additional LSP for each matching engine per
month thereafter. Despite having comparable market share as the
Exchange, Nasdaq charges higher QUO Port fees than the LSP fees
proposed by the Exchange herein.
Nasdaq MRX. Nasdaq MRX, with a market share of approximately 3.36%,
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges higher Ouch to Trade
Options (``OTTO'') Port fees than the Limited Service MEI Port fees
proposed by the Exchange. The Exchange acknowledges differences between
the functionality of its LSPs and that of Nasdaq MRX's OTTO Ports;
however, the Exchange believes that the fee comparison between LSPs and
OTTO Ports is relevant as both ports provide a limited subset of
functionality as provided by other ports offered by both the Exchange
and Nasdaq MRX. Nasdaq MRX's OTTO Ports allow Nasdaq MRX members to
connect, send, and receive messages related to orders, auction orders,
and auction responses to Nasdaq MRX.\58\ Messages sent over OTTO Ports
include the following: (1) options symbol directory messages (e.g.,
underlying and complex instruments); (2) system event messages (e.g.,
start of trading hours messages and start of opening); (3) trading
action messages (e.g., halts and resumes); (4) execution messages; (5)
order messages; (6) risk protection triggers and cancel notifications;
(7) auction notifications; (8) auction responses; and (9) post trade
allocation messages.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ See Nasdaq MRX, Options 3: Options Trading Rules,
Supplementary Material to Options 3, Section 7, .03(b).
\59\ See Nasdaq MRX, Options 3: Options Trading Rules,
Supplementary Material to Options 3, Section 7, .03(b).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq MRX charges a monthly fee of $650 per OTTO Port, per account
number (with fees for all OTTO Ports, CTI Ports, FIX Ports, FIX Drop
Ports and disaster recovery ports subject to a monthly cap of $7,500),
while the Exchange provides the first four LSPs for free and proposes
to charge $450 per additional LSP for each matching engine per month
thereafter. Despite having comparable market share as the
[[Page 2258]]
Exchange, Nasdaq MRX charges higher OTTO Port fees than the LSP fees
proposed by the Exchange herein.
Purge Port Fees
The proposed Purge Port fees are comparable to, or lower than, the
similar port fees charged by Nasdaq MRX, Cboe C2 and Nasdaq, as
summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share
Exchange (%) Type of product/service Monthly fee
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald............................ 3.52 Purge Ports............... $700 per matching engine.
Nasdaq MRX \a\.......................... 3.36 First 5 SQF Purge Ports... $1,620 per port.
Next 15 SQF Purge Ports... $1,080 per port.
All SQF Purge Ports over $540 per port.
20.
Cboe C2 \b\............................. 2.93 Purge Ports............... $850 per port.
Nasdaq \c\.............................. 3.62 First 5 SQF Purge Ports... $1,620 per port.
Next 15 SQF Purge Ports... $1,080 per port.
All SQF Purge Ports over $540 per port.
20.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 104005 (September 18, 2025), 90 FR 45855 (September 23, 2025) (SR-
MRX-2025-20) (new fees effective January 1, 2026).
\b\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/ ctwo/.
\c\ See Nasdaq Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 3 Nasdaq Options Market--Ports and Other Services, available
at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207.
Nasdaq MRX. Nasdaq MRX, with a market share of approximately 3.36%,
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges higher Specialized
Quote Feed (``SQF'') Purge Port fees than the Purge Port fees proposed
by the Exchange. Nasdaq MRX's SQF Purge Ports are analogous to the
Exchange's Purge Ports. In general, Purge Ports provide Market Makers
with the ability to send quote purge messages to the Exchange, but are
not capable of sending or receiving any other type of messages or
information.\60\ Nasdaq MRX's SQF Purge Ports allow Nasdaq MRX market
makers to send purge requests to the Nasdaq MRX trading system.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\61\ See Nasdaq MRX Options 3: Trading Rules, Supplementary
Material to Options 3, Section 7, .03(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having comparable market share as the Exchange, Nasdaq MRX
charges higher SQF Purge Port fees than the Purge Port fees proposed by
the Exchange herein. Nasdaq MRX will charge (beginning January 1, 2026)
SQF Purge Port fees as follows: (a) $1,620 per SQF Purge Port per month
for the first 5 ports; (b) $1,080 per SQF Purge Port per month for the
next 15 ports; and (c) $540 per SQF Purge Port for all ports over 20
ports. The Exchange proposes to charge $700 per Purge Port per matching
engine per month. The Exchange chose to charge Purge ports on a per
matching engine basis instead of a per port basis due to its System
architecture, which provides two (2) Purge Ports per matching engine
for redundancy purposes. Market Makers are able to select the matching
engines that they want to connect to based on the business needs of
each Market Maker, and pay the applicable fee based on the number of
matching engines and pair of ports utilized.\62\ This architecture
provides Market Makers with flexibility to control their Purge Port
costs based on the number of matching engines each Marker Maker elects
to connect to based on each Market Maker's business needs. Further, the
Exchange's monthly Purge Port fee provides access to the Exchange's
primary, secondary, and disaster recovery data centers for the single
monthly fee. Nasdaq MRX, on the other hand, assesses an additional fee
$50 per SQF Purge Port per month, per account number, to access its
disaster recovery facility (albeit, Nasdaq MRX currently waives the fee
for one SQF Purge Port to the disaster recovery facility per market
maker per month).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ The Exchange notes that each matching engine corresponds to
a specified group of symbols. Certain Market Makers choose to only
quote in certain symbols while other Market Makers choose to quote
the entire market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%, lower
than the Exchange's market share, charges higher Purge Port fees than
the Purge Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Cboe C2's Purge Ports are
analogous to the Exchange's Purge Ports. In general, Cboe C2's Purge
Ports allow its members the ability to cancel a subset (or all) of open
orders across the executing firm's ID, underlying symbol(s), or custom
group ID, across multiple logical ports/sessions.\63\ Cboe C2 charges
$850 per Purge Port per month, while the Exchange proposes to charge
$700 per pair of Purge Ports per matching engine per month. Despite
having lower market share than the Exchange, Cboe C2 charges higher
Purge Port fees than the Purge Port fees proposed by the Exchange
herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\63\ See Cboe Purge Ports, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S.
Options, Version 1.3, available at https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/features/Cboe_USO_PurgePortsFAQs.pdf (last visited November 5,
2025).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq. Nasdaq, with a market share of approximately 3.62%,
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges higher SQF Purge
Port fees than the Purge Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Nasdaq's
SQF Purge Ports are analogous to the Exchange's Purge Ports, which
allow Nasdaq market makers to send purge requests to the Nasdaq trading
system.\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\64\ See Nasdaq Options 3: Trading Rules, Section 7(e)(1)(B).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite having comparable market share as the Exchange, Nasdaq
charges higher Purge Port fees than the Purge Port fees proposed by the
Exchange herein. Nasdaq charges tiered SQF Purge Port fees as follows:
(a) $1,620 per SQF Purge Port per month for the first 5 ports; (b)
$1,080 per SQF Purge Port per month for the next 15 ports; and (c) $540
per SQF Purge Port for all ports over 20 ports. The Exchange proposes
to charge a flat $700 per set of Purge Ports per matching engine per
month.
CTD Port Fees
The proposed CTD Port fees are lower than the similar port fees
charged by Nasdaq, as summarized in the table below.
[[Page 2259]]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of product/service port)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 CTD Ports..................... $525
Nasdaq \a\.................................. 3.62 CTI Ports..................... 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Nasdaq Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 3 Nasdaq Options Market--Ports and Other Services, available
at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207.
Nasdaq. Nasdaq, with a market share of approximately 3.62%, which
is only slightly higher than the Exchange's market share, charges
higher Clearing Trade Interface (``CTI'') Port fees than the CTD Port
fees proposed by the Exchange. Nasdaq's CTI Ports are analogous to the
Exchange's CTD Ports. In general, CTD Ports provide an Exchange Member
with real-time clearing trade updates, including, among other things,
the following: (i) trade date and time; (ii) symbol information; (iii)
trade price/size information; (iv) Member type (for example, and
without limitation, Market Maker, Electronic Exchange Member, Broker-
Dealer); and (v) Exchange MPID for each side of the transaction,
including Clearing Member MPID.\65\ Nasdaq's CTI Ports provide real-
time clearing trade updates regarding trade details specific to the
Nasdaq participant, which include, among other things, the following:
(i) The Clearing Member Trade Agreement or ``CMTA'' or The Options
Clearing Corporation or ``OCC'' number; (ii) Nasdaq badge or house
number; (iii) Nasdaq internal firm identifier; (iv) an indicator which
will distinguish electronic and non-electronically delivered orders;
(v) liquidity indicators and transaction type for billing purposes; and
(vi) capacity.\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\66\ See Nasdaq Options 3: Trading Rules, Section 23(b)(1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq charges $650 per CTI Port per month, while the Exchange
proposes to charge $525 per CTD Port per month. Despite having slightly
higher market share than the Exchange, Nasdaq charges higher CTI Port
fees than the CTD Port fees proposed by the Exchange herein.
FXD Port Fees
The proposed FXD Port fees are comparable to the similar port fees
charged by Cboe C2 and Nasdaq BX, as summarized in the table below.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market share Monthly fee (per
Exchange (%) Type of product/service port)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................................ 3.52 FXD Ports..................... $600
Cboe C2 \a\................................. 2.93 Drop Logical Ports............ 650
Nasdaq \b\.................................. 3.62 FIX Drop Ports................ 650
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/ ctwo/.
\b\ See Nasdaq Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 3 Nasdaq Options Market--Ports and Other Services, available
at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207.
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%, lower
than the Exchange's market share, charges comparable logical Drop Port
fees as the FXD Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Cboe C2's Drop
Logical Ports are analogous to the Exchange's FXD Ports. In general,
FXD Ports allow the Exchange's market participants to connect their
systems with a messaging interface that provides a copy of real-time
trade execution, trade correction and trade cancellation
information.\67\ Cboe C2's Drop Logical Ports allow its members to
receive real-time information about order flow, including execution
information (i.e., filled or partially filled) and cancellation
information.\68\ Like the Exchange's FXD Ports, Cboe C2's Drop Logical
Ports do not allow the user to submit orders to the exchange.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ See Fee Schedule, Section 5)d)iv).
\68\ See Cboe Titanium U.S. Options FIX Specification, Version
2.7.97, FIX Drop section (dated October 20, 2025), available at
https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/US_Options_FIX_Specification.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe C2 charges $650 per Drop Logical Port per month, while the
Exchange proposes to charge $600 per FXD Port per month. Despite having
lower market share than the Exchange, Cboe C2 charges higher Drop
Logical Port fees than the FXD Port fees proposed by the Exchange
herein.
Nasdaq. Nasdaq, with a market share of approximately 3.62%,
comparable to the Exchange's market share, charges comparable FIX Drop
Port fees as the FXD Port fees proposed by the Exchange. Nasdaq's FIX
Drop Ports are analogous to the Exchange's FXD Ports in that they
provide a real-time order and execution update message that is sent to
a Nasdaq participant after an order has been received or modified or an
execution has occurred and contains trade details specific to that
participant.\69\ The information provided through the Nasdaq FIX Drop
Port includes, among other things, the following: (i) executions; (ii)
cancellations; (iii) modifications to an existing order and (iv) busts
or post-trade corrections.\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ See Nasdaq Options 3: Trading Rules, Section 23(b)(3).
\70\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nasdaq charges $650 per FIX Drop Port per month, while the Exchange
proposes to charge $600 per FXD Port per month. Despite having
comparable market share as the Exchange, Nasdaq charges higher FIX Drop
Port fees as the FXD Port fees proposed by the Exchange herein.
Full Service MEI Port Fees
The proposed Full Service MEI Port fees are comparable to the
similar port fees charged by Cboe C2, as summarized in the table below.
[[Page 2260]]
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Exchange Market Type of product/service...................... Monthly fee
share
(%)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
MIAX Emerald................. 3.52 Market Maker Full Service MEI Port........... $6,000 Up to 5 Classes............... Up to 10% of Classes by
volume (as a % of
national ADV).
$12,000 Up to 10 Classes.............. Up to 20% of Classes by
volume (as a % of
national ADV).
$16,500 Up to 40 Classes.............. Up to 35% of Classes by
volume (as a % of
national ADV).
$20,500 Up to 100 Classes............. Up to 50% of Classes by
volume (as a % of
national ADV).
$24,000 Over 100 Classes.............. Over 50% of Classes by
volume up to all
Classes on MIAX
Emerald (as a % of
national ADV).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cboe C2 \a\.................. 2.93 Bulk BOE Ports............................... $1,500 per port for ports 1 though 5.
$2,500 per port for ports 6 or more.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a\ See Cboe C2 Fee Schedule, Logical Connectivity Fees section, available at https://www.cboe.com/us/options/membership/fee_schedule/ctwo/.
Cboe C2. Cboe C2, with a market share of approximately 2.93%, lower
than the Exchange's market share, charges similar, or higher, bulk
order port fees than the Full Service MEI Port fees proposed by the
Exchange. Cboe C2's Bulk BOE Ports are analogous to the Exchange's Full
Service MEI Ports. In general, Full Service MEI Ports provide Market
Makers with the ability to send simple and complex quotes, eQuotes, and
quote purge messages to the MIAX Emerald System.\71\ Full Service MEI
Ports are also capable of receiving administrative information.\72\
Full Service MEI Ports entitle a Market Maker to two such ports for
each matching engine for a single monthly port fee.\73\ The Exchange
has twelve total matching engines; therefore, for one monthly fee, each
Market Maker is provided twenty-four total Full Service MEI Ports
(i.e., two per matching engine multiplied by twelve matching engines).
Cboe C2's Bulk BOE Ports provide users with the ability to submit
single and bulk order messages to enter, modify, or cancel orders and
are intended for use by market makers quoting large numbers of simple
options series.\74\ Each Bulk BOE Port has access to all of Cboe C2's
matching units, which, according to Cboe, typically ranges from 31-35
matching units per Cboe-affiliated exchange.\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\72\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\73\ See the Definitions section of the Fee Schedule.
\74\ See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 83201 (May 9,
2018), 83 FR 22546 (May 15, 2018) (SR-C2-2018-006) and Cboe Titanium
U.S. Options Binary Order Entry Version 3 Specification, Version
1.10, page 45 (October 31, 2025), available at https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/US_Options_BOE3_Specification.pdf.
\75\ See Cboe Titanium U.S. Options Binary Order Entry Version 3
Specification, Version 1.10, page 224 (October 31, 2025), available
at https://cdn.cboe.com/resources/membership/US_Options_BOE3_Specification.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite Cboe C2 having lower market share, the Exchange believes
that Cboe C2 charges higher bulk port fees than the Full Service MEI
Port fees proposed by the Exchange herein. Cboe C2 charges $1,500 per
port for the first five Bulk BOE Ports, and $2,500 per port for each
Bulk BOE Port utilized in excess of five ports. The Exchange proposes
to charge between $6,000 and $24,000 per month for Full Service MEI
Ports for Market Makers, depending on the number of classes assigned or
percentage of national ADV. The Exchange's proposed Full Service MEI
Port fees for Market Makers provide two such ports for each of the
Exchange's twelve matching engines, for a total of twenty-four total
ports for the monthly fee (between $6,000 and $24,000). For a Cboe C2
member to utilize a Bulk BOE Port on each matching unit, that member
would have to purchase between 31 and 35 such ports. As such, the
approximated fees for doing so would be between $72,500 (($1,500 per
port multiplied by the first five Bulk BOE Ports) + ($2,500 per port
multiplied by the next twenty-six Bulk BOE Ports)) and $82,500 (($1,500
per port multiplied by the first five Bulk BOE Ports) + ($2,500 per
port multiplied by the next thirty Bulk BOE Ports)).
* * * * *
Each of the above examples of other exchanges' non-transaction fees
support the proposition that the Exchange's proposed fees are
comparable to those of other exchanges with lower or comparable market
share and are, therefore, reasonable.
The Proposed Fees Are Equitably Allocated and Not Unfairly
Discriminatory
Overall. The Exchange believes that its proposed fees are
reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory because, in sum,
they are designed to align fees with services provided by amending them
to levels that are comparable to similar fees for services assessed by
other equity options exchanges with similar market share. The Exchange
believes that the proposed fees are allocated fairly and equitably
among Members and non-Members because they apply to all Members and
non-Members equally, and any differences among categories of fees are
not unfairly discriminatory and are justified and appropriate.
The Exchange believes that the proposed fees are equitably
allocated because they will apply uniformly to all Members and non-
Members that choose to purchase a particular service based on their
business need. Any Member or non-Member that chooses to purchase a
particular product or service is subject to the same Fee Schedule,
regardless of what type of business they operate, and the decision to
purchase a particular product or service is based on objective
differences in usage of the particular product or service among
different Members and non-Member, which are still ultimately in the
control of any particular Member or non-Member. The Exchange believes
the proposed pricing is equitably allocated because of the service's or
product's utility and value to market participants as compared to other
like exchanges' products and services.
The Exchange further believes that the proposed fees are
reasonable, fair and equitable, and non-discriminatory because they
will apply to all Members in the same manner and are not targeted at a
specific type or category of market participant engaged in any
particular trading strategy.
EEM Trading Permit Fees. The Exchange believes the proposed Trading
Permit fee for EEMs is equitably allocated and not unfairly
discriminatory because the proposed fee would apply to each EEM in a
uniform manner without regard to membership status or the extent of any
other business with the Exchange or affiliated entities (i.e., order
flow provider, clearing services, etc.).
Market Maker Trading Permit Fees. The Exchange believes the
proposed Trading Permit fees for Market Makers are equitable as the
fees apply equally to all Market Makers based upon the number of class
registrations or percentage of executed national ADV each month. The
Exchange believes that assessing lower fees to Market Makers that quote
in fewer classes is equitable
[[Page 2261]]
because it will allow the Exchange to retain and attract smaller-scale
Market Makers, which are an integral component of the options industry
marketplace. Since these smaller Market Makers typically utilize less
bandwidth and capacity on the Exchange network due to the lower number
of quoted classes, the Exchange believes it is equitable to offer
Market Makers Trading Permit fee tiers with lower rates based on a
lower number of classes assigned or a lower percentage of executed
national ADV. In addition, smaller Market Makers who want to quote
greater number of classes or a higher percentage of executed national
ADV, but have lower volume thresholds, the Exchange believes it is
equitable to offer such Market Makers a lower fee, designated in
footnote ``[squf]'' following the Market Maker Trading Permit fee
table.
The Exchange believes it is equitable and not unfairly
discriminatory to charge higher Trading Permit fees to Market Makers
that quote a higher number of classes or execute higher percentages of
volume on the Exchange because the System requires increased
performance and capacity in order to provide the opportunity for Market
Makers to quote in a higher number of options classes on the Exchange.
Specifically, more classes that are actively quoted on the Exchange by
a Market Maker will require increased memory for record retention,
increased bandwidth for optimized performance, increased
functionalities on each application layer, and increased optimization
with regard to surveillance and monitoring of such classes quoted. As
such, basing the higher Market Maker Trading Permit fees on the greater
number of classes quoted in on any given day in a calendar month is
equitable and not unfairly discriminatory when considering how the
increased number of quoted classes directly impacts the resources
required for the Exchange to operate for all market participants.
Network Connectivity Fees. The Exchange believes that the proposed
fees for network connectivity to the primary/secondary facility and
disaster recovery facility for Members and non-Members are equitably
allocated because they would apply equally to all market participants
that choose to purchase such connectivity products and services from
the Exchange. Any participant that chooses to purchase the Exchange's
connectivity products and services would be subject to the same fees,
regardless of what type of business they operate or the use they plan
to make of the products and services. Additionally, the fee increases
would be applied uniformly to market participants without regard to
Exchange membership status or the extent of any other business with the
Exchange or affiliated entities.
The Exchange believes that the proposed fees are equitably
allocated among anticipated users of the network connectivity as the
Exchange expects that users of 10Gb ULL connections will consume
substantially more bandwidth and network resources than users of 1Gb
connections. It is the experience of the Exchange and its affiliated
exchanges that this is the case as 10Gb ULL connection users have
historically accounted for more than 99% of message traffic over the
network, which drives increased capacity utilization, while the users
of the 1Gb connections account for less than 1% of message traffic over
the network. In the experience of the Exchange and its affiliates,
users of the 1Gb connections do not have the same business needs for
the high-performance network as 10Gb ULL users.
The Exchange's high-performance network and supporting
infrastructure (including employee support), provides unparalleled
system throughput. To achieve a consistent, premium network
performance, the Exchange built out and must now maintain a network
that has the capacity to handle the message rate requirements of its
most heavy network consumers. These billions of messages per day
consume the Exchange's resources and significantly contribute to the
overall increase in storage and network transport capabilities. The
Exchange must analyze its storage capacity on an ongoing basis to
ensure it has sufficient capacity to store these messages to satisfy
its record keeping requirements under the Exchange Act.\76\ Given this
difference in network utilization rate, the Exchange believes that it
is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory that the 10Gb ULL users
continue to pay higher network connectivity fees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ 17 CFR 240.17a-1 (recordkeeping rule for national
securities exchanges, national securities associations, registered
clearing agencies and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
FIX, CTD, and FXD Port Fees. The Exchange believes that the
proposed FIX, CTD and FXD Port fees are equitable and non-
discriminatory because they will apply to all Members in the same
manner and are not targeted at a specific type or category of market
participant engaged in any particular trading strategy. The proposed
fees for each type of port (FIX, CTD or FXD) does not depend on any
distinctions between Members, customers, broker-dealers, or any other
entity. The proposed fee will be assessed solely based on the number of
FIX, CTD or FXD Ports an entity selects and not on any other
distinction applied by the Exchange. The Exchange believes offering a
tiered fee structure where the fee for FIX Ports decreases with the
number utilized is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because
FIX Ports are used for order entry compared to CTD and FXD Ports, which
are used to provide messages concerning trade execution, cancellation,
and post-trade clearing information and, in the Exchange's experience,
Members tend to utilize fewer such ports overall. Further, the Exchange
believes the proposed fees for FIX, CTD and FXD Ports are reasonable
because for one monthly fee for each port, Members are able to access
all matching engines.
Purge Port Fees. The Exchange believes that the proposed Purge Port
fees are equitable because Purge Ports are completely voluntary as they
relate solely to optional risk management functionality. Purge Ports
enhance Market Makers' ability to manage quotes, which, in turn,
improves their risk controls to the benefit of all market participants.
The Exchange also believes that the proposed Purge Port fees are not
unfairly discriminatory because they will apply uniformly to all Market
Makers that choose to use the optional Purge Ports. Purge Ports are
completely voluntary and, as they relate solely to optional risk
management functionality, no Market Maker is required or under any
regulatory obligation to utilize them. All Market Makers that
voluntarily select this service option will be charged the same amount
for the same services based upon the number of matching engines. The
Exchange also believes that offering Purge Ports at the matching engine
level promotes risk management across the industry, and thereby
facilitates investor protection. Some market participants, in
particular the larger firms, could and do build similar risk
functionality in their trading systems that permit the flexible
cancellation of quotes entered on the Exchange at a high rate. Offering
matching engine level protections ensures that such functionality is
widely available to all firms, including smaller firms that may
otherwise not be willing to incur the costs and development work
necessary to support their own customized mass cancel functionality. As
such, the Exchange believes the proposed fees are equitable and not
unfairly discriminatory.
Limited Service MEI Port Fees. The Exchange believes the proposed
fee for
[[Page 2262]]
Limited Service MEI Ports is not unfairly discriminatory because it
would apply to all Market Makers equally. All Market Makers remain
eligible to receive four free Limited Service MEI Ports per matching
engine and those that elect to purchase more would be subject to the
same monthly rate depending upon the number they choose to utilize. In
the Exchange's experience, certain market participants choose to
purchase additional Limited Service MEI Ports based on their own
particular trading/quoting strategies and feel they need a certain
number of ports to execute on those strategies. Other market
participants may continue to choose to only utilize the free Limited
Service MEI Ports to accommodate their own trading or quoting
strategies, or other business models. All market participants elect to
receive or purchase the amount of Limited Service MEI Ports they
require based on their own business decisions and all market
participants would be subject to the same fee structure. Every market
participant may receive up to four free Limited Service MEI Ports and
those that choose to purchase additional Limited Service MEI Ports may
elect to do so based on their own business decisions and would continue
to be subject to the same monthly fees.
The Exchange believes that the proposed fee for Limited Service MEI
Ports is reasonable, equitable, and not unfairly discriminatory because
it is designed to align fees with services provided, will apply equally
to all Members that are assigned Limited Service MEI Ports, and
minimizes barriers to entry by providing all Members with four free
Limited Service MEI Ports. As a result, there are several Members that
are not subject to any additional LSP fees. In contrast, other
exchanges generally charge in excess of $450 per port (the fee the
Exchange proposes to charge for Limited Service MEI Ports) without
providing any initial ports for free.\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ See Nasdaq, Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section 3(i)(4),
available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/nasdaq/rules/Nasdaq%20Options%207 (providing zero free ports and charging $750
per QUO Port, which is analogous to the Exchange's Limited Service
MEI Ports) and Nasdaq MRX, Options 7: Pricing Schedule, Section
6(i)(4), available at https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/rulebook/mrx/rules/MRX%20Options%207 (providing zero free ports and charging $650
per OTTO Port, which is analogous to the Exchange's Limited Service
MEI Ports).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes that the proposed Limited Service MEI Port
fee structure is equitable and not unfairly discriminatory because it
will continue to enable Members to access the Exchange with four free
ports before the proposed fees for additional Limited Service MEI Ports
apply, thereby continuing to encourage order flow and liquidity from a
diverse set of market participants, facilitating price discovery and
the interaction of orders. The Exchange notes that a substantial
majority of Members only utilize the four Limited Service MEI Ports
provided for no fee. The proposed fee is designed to encourage Members
to be efficient with their Limited Service MEI Port usage. There is no
requirement that any Member maintain a specific number of Limited
Service MEI Ports and a Member may choose to maintain as many or as few
of such ports as each Member deems appropriate.
Full Service MEI Port Fees. The proposed fees for Full Service MEI
Ports are not unfairly discriminatory because they would apply to all
Market Makers equally. The Exchange's pricing structure for Full
Service MEI Ports is similar to the pricing structure used by the
Exchange's affiliates, MIAX Pearl, MIAX, and MIAX Sapphire, for their
Full Service MEI/MEO Port fees.\78\ In the Exchange's experience,
Members that are frequently in the highest tier for Full Service MEI
Ports consume the most bandwidth and resources of the network.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ See MIAX Pearl Fee Schedule, Section 5)d); MIAX Fee
Schedule, Section 5)d)ii); and MIAX Sapphire Fee Schedule, Section
5)d)ii).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To achieve a consistent, premium network performance, the Exchange
must build out and maintain a network that has the capacity to handle
the message rate requirements of its most heavy network consumers
during anticipated peak market conditions. The need to support billions
of messages per day consumes the Exchange's resources and significantly
contributes to the overall need to increase network storage and
transport capabilities. Thus, as the number of ports a Market Maker has
increases, the related pull on Exchange resources may continue to
increase.
The Exchange further believes that the proposed fees are
reasonable, equitably allocated and not unfairly discriminatory
because, for the flat fee in each tier, the Exchange provides each
Member two Full Service MEI Ports for each matching engine to which
that Member is connected. Unlike other options exchanges that provide
similar port functionality and charge fees on a per port basis,\79\ the
Exchange offers Full Service MEI Ports as a package and provides Market
Makers with the option to receive up to two Full Service MEI Ports per
matching engine to which it connects. The Exchange currently has twelve
matching engines, which means Market Makers may receive up to twenty-
four Full Service MEI Ports for a single monthly fee, which can vary
based on certain volume percentages or classes the Market Maker is
registered in. Assuming a Market Maker connects to all twelve matching
engines during the month, and achieves the highest tier for that month,
with two Full Service MEI Ports per matching engine, this would result
in a cost of approximately $1,000 per Full Service MEI Port ($24,000
divided by 24, and rounded up to the nearest dollar).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\79\ See NASDAQ Pricing Schedule, Options 7, Section 3, Ports
and Other Services and NASDAQ Rules, General 8: Connectivity,
Section 1. Co-Location Services (similar to the MIAX Pearl Options'
MEO Ports, SQF ports are primarily utilized by Market Makers); ISE
Pricing Schedule, Options 7, Section 7, Connectivity Fees and ISE
Rules, General 8: Connectivity; NYSE American Options Fee Schedule,
Section V.A. Port Fees and Section V.B. Co-Location Fees; GEMX
Pricing Schedule, Options 7, Section 6, Connectivity Fees and GEMX
Rules, General 8: Connectivity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Exchange believes the proposed reduced Full Service MEI Port
fee for Market Makers that fall within the 3rd, 4th, and 5th levels of
the Full Service MEI Port fee table and certain volume thresholds are
met is not unfairly discriminatory because this lower monthly fee is
designed to provide a lower fixed cost to those Market Makers who are
willing to quote the entire Exchange market (or substantial amount of
the Exchange market), as objectively measured by either number of
classes assigned or national ADV, but who do not otherwise execute a
significant amount of volume on the Exchange. The Exchange believes
that, by continuing to offer a lower fixed cost to Market Makers that
execute less volume, the Exchange will continue to retain and attract
smaller-scale Market Makers, which are an integral component of the
option industry marketplace, but have been decreasing in number in
recent years, due to industry consolidation and lower market maker
profitability. The Exchange believes it is beneficial to incentivize
these additional Market Makers to register to make markets on the
Exchange to increase liquidity as the Exchange begins operations.
Increased liquidity from a diverse set of market participants helps
facilitate price discovery and the interaction of orders, which
benefits all market participants of the Exchange. Since these smaller-
scale Market Makers may utilize less Exchange capacity due to lower
overall volume executed, the Exchange believes it is reasonable,
equitably allocated and not unfairly discriminatory to offer such
Market Makers a lower fixed cost. The Exchange notes that its
affiliated
[[Page 2263]]
markets, MIAX Pearl, MIAX, and MIAX Sapphire, offer a similar reduced
fee for their Full Service MEO/MEI Ports for smaller-scale Market
Makers.\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ See MIAX Pearl Fee Schedule, Section 5)d), note ``**'';
MIAX Fee Schedule, Section 5)d)ii), note ``*''; and MIAX Sapphire
Fee Schedule, Section 5)d), note ``b''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* * * * *
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Exchange believes that the
proposed fees are equitably allocated and not unfairly discriminatory.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
In accordance with Section 6(b)(8) of the Act,\81\ the Exchange
does not believe that the proposed rule change would impose any burden
on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance of
the purposes of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ 15 U.S.C. 78f(b)(8).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intra-Market Competition
EEM Trading Permit Fees
The Exchange believes the proposed Trading Permit fee for EEMs does
not impose any burden on intra-market competition that is not necessary
or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act because the
proposed fee does not favor certain categories of market participants
in a manner that would impose a burden on competition. The proposed fee
is the same for all EEMs of different sizes and business models without
regard to membership status or the extent of any other business with
the Exchange or affiliated entities.
Market Maker Trading Permit Fees
The Exchange believes that the proposed Trading Permit fees for
Market Makers do not place certain market participants at a relative
disadvantage to other market participants because the proposed fees do
not favor certain categories of market participants in a manner that
would impose a burden on competition; rather, the fee rates are
designed in order to provide objective criteria for Market Makers of
different sizes and business models that best matches their order and
quoting activity on the Exchange. Further, the Exchange believes that
the proposed Market Maker Trading Permit fees will not impose a burden
on intra-market competition because, when these fees are viewed in the
context of the overall activity on the Exchange, Market Makers: (1)
consume the most bandwidth and resources of the network; (2) transact
the vast majority of the volume on the Exchange; and (3) require the
high touch network support services provided by the Exchange and its
staff, including more costly network monitoring, reporting and support
services, resulting in a much higher cost to the Exchange. The Exchange
notes that the majority of customer demand comes from Market Makers,
whose transactions make up a majority of the volume on the Exchange.
Further, other member types, i.e. EEMs, take up significantly less
Exchange resources and costs. As such, the Exchange does not believe
charging Market Makers higher Trading Permit fees than other member
types will impose a burden on intra-market competition.
The Exchange believes that the increasing fees under the tiered
Market Maker Trading Permit fee structure do not impose a burden on
intra-market competition because the tiered structure continues to take
into account the number of classes quoted by each individual Market
Maker or percentage of total national ADV. The Exchange's system
requires increased performance and capacity in order to provide the
opportunity for each Market Maker to quote in a higher number of
options classes on the Exchange. Specifically, the more classes that
are actively quoted on the Exchange by a Market Maker requires
increased memory for record retention, increased bandwidth for
optimized performance, increased functionalities on each application
layer, and increased optimization with regard to surveillance and
monitoring of such classes quoted. As such, basing the Market Maker
Trading Permit fee on the greatest number of classes quoted in on any
given day in a calendar month, or percentage of total national ADV,
does not impose any burden on intra-market competition that is not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act when
taking into account how the increased number of quoted classes directly
impact the costs and resources for the Exchange.
Network Connectivity Fees
The Exchange believes that the proposed network connectivity fees
for Members and non-Members do not place certain market participants at
a relative disadvantage to other market participants or affect the
ability of such market participants to compete. The proposed fees will
apply uniformly to all market participants regardless of the number of
1Gb or 10Gb ULL connections they choose to purchase to the primary/
secondary facility or the disaster recovery facility. The proposed fees
do not favor certain categories of market participants in a manner that
would impose an undue burden on competition.
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed fees for
connectivity services place certain market participants at a relative
disadvantage to other market participants because the proposed
connectivity pricing is associated with relative usage of the Exchange
by each market participant and does not impose a barrier to entry to
smaller participants. The Exchange believes its proposed pricing is
reasonable and, when coupled with the availability of third-party
providers that also offer connectivity solutions, participation on the
Exchange is competitive for all market participants, including smaller
trading firms. The connectivity services purchased by market
participants typically increase based on their additional message
traffic and/or the complexity of their operations. The market
participants that utilize more connectivity services typically utilize
the most bandwidth, and those are the participants that consume the
most resources from the network. Accordingly, the proposed fees for
connectivity services do not favor certain categories of market
participants in a manner that would impose a burden on competition;
rather, the allocation of the proposed connectivity fees reflects the
network resources consumed by the various size of market participants
and the costs to the Exchange of providing such connectivity services.
FIX, CTD and FXD Port Fees
The Exchange believes that the proposed FIX, CTD and FXD Port fees
do not place certain market participants at a relative disadvantage to
other market participants because they will apply to all Members in the
same manner and are not targeted at a specific type or category of
market participant engaged in any particular trading strategy. The
proposed fees for each type of port (FIX, CTD or FXD) do not depend on
any distinctions between Members, customers, broker-dealers, or any
other entity. The proposed fee will be assessed solely based on the
number of FIX, CTD or FXD Ports an entity selects and not on any other
distinction applied by the Exchange.
Purge Port Fees
The Exchange believes that the proposed Purge Port fees do not
place certain market participants at a relative disadvantage to other
market participants because Purge Ports are completely voluntary as
they relate solely to optional risk management functionality. Purge
Ports enhance Members' ability to manage orders, which, in turn,
improves their risk
[[Page 2264]]
controls to the benefit of all market participants. Further, the
proposed fees apply uniformly to all Members that choose to use the
optional Purge Ports and no Market Maker is required or under any
regulatory obligation to utilize them. All Members that voluntarily
choose to utilize Purge Ports will be charged the same amount based
upon the number of matching engines for each set of Purge Ports in use.
Limited Service MEI Port Fees
The Exchange does not believe its proposed fee for Limited Service
MEI Ports will place certain market participants at a relative
disadvantage to other market participants. All Market Makers would be
eligible to receive four free Limited Service MEI Ports and those that
elect to purchase more would be subject to the same monthly fee. All
Market Makers purchase the amount of Limited Service MEI Ports they
require based on their own business decisions and similarly situated
firms are subject to the same fee.
Full Service MEI Port Fees
The Exchange does not believe proposed fees for Full Service MEI
Ports will place certain market participants at a relative disadvantage
to other market participants because they would apply to all Market
Makers equally depending on the number of classes the Market Maker is
registered to quote in or the percentage of national ADV. The Exchange
believes the proposed fees will not result in any burden on intra-
market competition that is not necessary or appropriate in furtherance
of the purposes of the Act because, in the Exchange's experience,
Market Makers that are frequently in the highest tier for Full Service
MEI Ports consume the most bandwidth and resources of the network.
The Exchange further believes that the proposed fees do not place
certain market participants at the Exchange at a relative disadvantage
compared to other market participants or affect the ability of such
market participants to compete because, for the flat fee in each tier,
the Exchange provides each Market Maker two Full Service MEI Ports for
each matching engine to which that Market Maker is connected. Further,
the Exchange offers a reduced Full Service MEI Port fee for Market
Makers that fall within the 3rd, 4th and 5th levels of the Full Service
MEI Port fee table, which lower monthly fee is designed to provide a
lower fixed cost to those Market Makers who are willing to quote the
entire Exchange market (or substantial amount of the Exchange market),
as objectively measured by either number of classes assigned or
national ADV, but who do not otherwise execute a significant amount of
volume on the Exchange. The Exchange believes that, by continuing to
offer a lower fixed cost to Market Makers that execute less volume, the
Exchange will continue to retain and attract smaller-scale Market
Makers, which are an integral component of the option industry
marketplace, but have been decreasing in number in recent years, due to
industry consolidation and lower market maker profitability.
Accordingly, the Exchange believes the reduced fee will promote
competition by incentivizing these additional Market Makers to register
to make markets on the Exchange to increase liquidity.
Inter-Market Competition
The Exchange does not believe that the proposed changes will result
in any burden on inter-market competition that is not necessary or
appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. In contrast, the
Exchange believes that, without the fee changes proposed herein, the
Exchange is potentially at a competitive disadvantage to certain other
exchanges that have in place comparable or higher fees for similar
services with similar market share, as described above. The Exchange
believes that non-transaction fees can be used to foster more
competitive transaction pricing and additional infrastructure
investment and there are other options markets of which market
participants may connect to trade options that charge higher or
comparable rates as the Exchange for similar services and products.
Accordingly, the Exchange does not believe its proposed fee changes
impose any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received From Members, Participants, or Others
No written comments were either solicited or received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
The foregoing rule change has become effective pursuant to Section
19(b)(3)(A)(ii) of the Act,\82\ and Rule 19b-4(f)(2) \83\ thereunder.
At any time within 60 days of the filing of the proposed rule change,
the Commission summarily may temporarily suspend such rule change if it
appears to the Commission that such action is necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, for the protection of investors, or otherwise
in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. If the Commission takes such
action, the Commission shall institute proceedings to determine whether
the proposed rule should be approved or disapproved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\82\ 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(ii).
\83\ 17 CFR 240.19b-4(f)(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
IV. Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views and
arguments concerning the foregoing, including whether the proposed rule
change is consistent with the Act. Comments may be submitted by any of
the following methods:
Electronic Comments
Use the Commission's internet comment form (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml); or
Send an email to [email protected]. Please include
file number SR-EMERALD-2025-23 on the subject line.
Paper Comments
Send paper comments in triplicate to Secretary, Securities
and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090.
All submissions should refer to file number SR-EMERALD-2025-23. This
file number should be included on the subject line if email is used. To
help the Commission process and review your comments more efficiently,
please use only one method. The Commission will post all comments on
the Commission's internet website (https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro.shtml). Copies of the filing will be available for inspection and
copying at the principal office of the Exchange. Do not include
personal identifiable information in submissions; you should submit
only information that you wish to make available publicly. We may
redact in part or withhold entirely from publication submitted material
that is obscene or subject to copyright protection. All submissions
should refer to file number SR-EMERALD-2025-23 and should be submitted
on or before February 6, 2026.
For the Commission, by the Division of Trading and Markets,
pursuant to delegated authority.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ 17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
J. Matthew DeLesDernier,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2026-00803 Filed 1-15-26; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8011-01-P