The Secretary of Homeland Security has authority under 5 U.S.C. 301, 552, and 552a, and 6 U.S.C. 112(e) to issue Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act regulations. That authority has been delegated to the Chief Privacy Officer of the Department pursuant to 6 U.S.C. 142 and DHS Del. No. 13001, Rev. 01 (June 2, 2020). Most recently, DHS updated its procedures implementing the Freedom of Information Act and Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a., at 6 CFR part 5, subparts A and B on November 16, 2022 (87 FR 68599) and February 27, 2024 (89 FR 14369).

This rule updates Title 6, part 5, paragraphs 5.3(a)(2) and 5.21(a)(6), which provide instructions to requesters on how and where to make FOIA and Privacy Act (and Judicial Redress Act (JRA) if applicable) requests for DHS records. The rule generally requires requesters to submit their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and Privacy Act requests electronically through the web portal at https://www.dhs.gov/foia or other acceptable Federal Government or DHS Component websites. DHS and its components will generally no longer accept FOIA or Privacy Act/JRA requests mailed to the DHS Privacy Office, or other DHS components, or via fax or email. By accepting requests only through DHS's or its components' websites, DHS will ensure requests are sent to the correct DHS Headquarters office or DHS component. In addition, this will reduce the time to interact with requesters and also expedite the time requesters will receive responsive records to their requests. In addition, this change will allow the Department to respond to requesters quickly and efficiently to correct any mistakes made in submitting their requests or clarifying their requests. Upon request, DHS FOIA public liaisons may facilitate, in limited circumstances ( e.g., incarceration), an alternative method to submit requests for requesters who are unable to submit electronic requests. Requesters who are unable to submit electronic requests should contact the Office or DHS Component they wish to seek records from.

DHS did not publish a notice of proposed rulemaking for this rule. Under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(A), this final rule is exempt from notice and public comment rulemaking requirements because the change involves rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. In addition, under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), an agency may bypass notice and comment requirements if it finds, for good cause, that notice and comment is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest. DHS finds that notice and comment is unnecessary here because the change to the manner of submitting FOIA and Privacy Act requests is an agency procedural update that will have minimal substantive effect on the public. Specifically, DHS believes that submitting a request through a publicly accessible web portal is a routine and accepted method of seeking information in today's society, and the vast majority of requesters already submit their requests this way. Furthermore, DHS will continue to consider requests for exceptions in limited circumstances for requesters who lack internet access. In addition, the rule is procedural because it changes only the manner in which the public presents FOIA and Privacy requests to DHS, and not the substance of those requests. Notice and comment is unnecessary because the public has come to accept using web pages to submit information and generally does so routinely. Electronic submission via web portal is also more efficient than using the U.S. Postal Service. and allows for better tracking of the submission and quicker response by the Government.

Executive Orders 13563 and 12866 direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility. Executive Order 14192 establishes a policy that the executive branch be “prudent and financially responsible in the expenditure of funds, from both public and private sources, and [ ] alleviate unnecessary regulatory burdens placed on the American people.”

The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has not designated this rule a “significant regulatory action,” under section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, OMB has not reviewed this rule. This rule is also not subject to Executive Order 14192 because the rule is not significant under Executive Order 12866 and because it is related to agency organization, management, or personnel. See OMB Memorandum M-25-20, “Guidance Implementing Section 3 of Executive Order 14192, titled `Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation” (Mar. 26, 2025).

DHS has considered the costs and benefits of this rule. This rule will not impose any new costs on the government or the public. The rule's benefits include increased efficiency in processing and responding to FOIA and Privacy Act/JRA requests and decreased lag times for handling requests that would otherwise come from non-portal sources. Specifically, the rule allows DHS FOIA personnel to spend less time on data entry and administrative tasks if the requester submits through the electronic portal rather than through email, fax or physical mail. Spending less time on initial data entry and administrative tasks will allow DHS FOIA personal to spend more time searching and reviewing records to respond to the requests.

This rule will not result in the expenditure by state, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more in any one year, and it will not significantly or uniquely affect small governments. Therefore, no written statement was deemed necessary under the provisions of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.

Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 601-612, and section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 5 U.S.C. 601 note, agencies must consider the impact of their rulemakings on “small entities” (small businesses, small organizations, and local governments). The term “small entities” comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000. DHS has reviewed this regulation and by approving it certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. DHS does not believe this rule imposes any additional direct costs on small entities.

This rule is not a major rule as defined by section 251 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (as amended), 5 U.S.C. 804(2). The Office of Management and Budget's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has not found that this rule is likely to result in an annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; a major increase in costs or prices; or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based companies to compete with foreign-based companies in domestic and export markets.

DHS reviews regulatory actions to determine whether the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) applies to them and, if so, what degree of analysis is required. DHS Directive 023-01 Rev. 01 (Directive) and Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01 Rev. 01 (Instruction Manual) establish the procedures that DHS and its components use to comply with NEPA.

NEPA allows Federal agencies to establish, in their NEPA implementing procedures, categories of actions (“categorical exclusions”) that experience has shown do not, individually or cumulatively, have a significant effect on the human environment and, therefore, do not require an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement. The Instruction Manual, Appendix A, lists the DHS categorical exclusions.

Under DHS NEPA implementing procedures, for an action to be categorically excluded, it must satisfy each of the following three conditions: (1) the entire action clearly fits within one or more of the categorical exclusions; (2) the action is not a piece of a larger action; and (3) no extraordinary circumstances exist that create the potential for a significant environmental effect.

This rule is strictly procedural and is limited to updating the method by which requesters may submit requests for information under FOIA and the Privacy Act/JRA. DHS has reviewed this rule and finds that it clearly fits within categorical exclusion A3(a) as an administrative or procedural rule that will have no significant effect on the environment, is not part of a larger Federal action, and does not present extraordinary circumstances that create the potential for significant environmental impacts. Therefore, the rule is categorically excluded from further NEPA review.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS amends Chapter I part 5 of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

The Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act of 1992 (Safety and Soundness Act) requires FHFA to establish several annual housing goals for both single-family and multifamily mortgages purchased by the Enterprises. 1 The annual housing goals are one measure of the extent to which the Enterprises are meeting their public purposes as defined by statute, which include “an affirmative obligation to facilitate the financing of affordable housing for low- and moderate-income families in a manner consistent with their overall public purposes, while maintaining a strong financial condition and a reasonable economic return.”  2

FHFA establishes annual housing goals for Enterprise purchases of single-family and multifamily mortgages consistent with the requirements of the Safety and Soundness Act. The structure of the housing goals and the parameters for determining how mortgage purchases are counted or not counted towards the goals are defined in FHFA's Enterprise housing goals regulation. 3 This final rule establishes benchmark levels for the single-family and multifamily housing goals for 2026-2028.

Single-family housing goals. The single-family housing goals defined under the Safety and Soundness Act include separate categories for home purchase mortgages for low-income families, very low-income families, and families that reside in low-income areas. 4 For purposes of the single-family housing goals, families that reside in low-income areas  5 include: (1) families in low-income census tracts, defined as census tracts with median income less than or equal to 80 percent of area median income (AMI);  6 (2) families with incomes less than or equal to 100 percent of AMI who reside in minority census tracts (defined as census tracts with a minority population of at least 30 percent and a tract median income of less than 100 percent of AMI);  7 and (3) families with incomes less than or equal to 100 percent of AMI who reside in designated disaster areas. 8 The current Enterprise housing goals regulation also includes subgoals  9 within the low-income areas home purchase goal. 10 Performance on the single-family home purchase goals and subgoals is measured as the percentage of the total home purchase mortgages purchased by an Enterprise each year that qualify for each goal or subgoal. There is also a separate goal for single-family refinance mortgages for low-income families, and performance on the refinance goal is determined in a similar way.

Under the Safety and Soundness Act, the single-family housing goals are limited to mortgages on owner-occupied housing with one to four units. The single-family goals cover first lien, conventional, conforming mortgages, meaning mortgages that are not subordinate to other mortgage liens, that are not insured or guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration or another government agency, and that have principal balances that do not exceed the conforming loan limits for Enterprise mortgages.

Multifamily housing goals. The multifamily housing goals defined under the Safety and Soundness Act include separate categories for mortgages on multifamily properties (properties with five or more units) with rental units affordable to low-income and very low-income families. The Safety and Soundness Act also requires reporting on smaller properties. 11 The multifamily housing goals generally include all Enterprise multifamily mortgage purchases, regardless of the purpose of the loan. The multifamily housing goals evaluate the performance of the Enterprises based on the share of affordable units in properties that serve as collateral for mortgages purchased by an Enterprise (loans that are excluded as ineligible under 12 CFR 1282.16(b) are not counted for purposes of measuring Enterprise performance). The Enterprise housing goals regulation does not include a retrospective market level measure for the multifamily housing goals, due in part to a lack of comprehensive data about the multifamily market. As a result, FHFA measures Enterprise multifamily housing goals performance against the benchmark levels only and the final rule retains this approach.

The Safety and Soundness Act requires that affordability for rental units under the multifamily housing goals be determined based on rents that “[do] not exceed 30 percent of the maximum income level of such income category, with appropriate adjustments for unit size as measured by the number of bedrooms.”  12 The Enterprise housing goals regulation considers the net rent paid by the renter, i.e., the rent is decreased by any subsidy payments that the renter may receive, including housing assistance payments. 13

If, after publication of this final rule, new information indicates that any of the single-family or multifamily housing goals or subgoals should be adjusted in light of market conditions or the safety and soundness of the Enterprises, or for any other reason, FHFA may take any steps that are necessary and appropriate to respond, consistent with the Safety and Soundness Act and the Enterprise housing goals regulation.

For example, under the Safety and Soundness Act and the Enterprise housing goals regulation, FHFA is permitted to reduce a benchmark level in response to an Enterprise petition for reduction for any of the single-family or multifamily housing goals or subgoals in a particular year. Any adjustment in response to such a petition must be based on a determination by FHFA that: (1) market and economic conditions or the financial condition of the Enterprise require a reduction; or (2) efforts to meet the goal or subgoal would result in the constraint of liquidity, over-investment in certain market segments, or other consequences contrary to the intent of the Safety and Soundness Act or the purposes of the Enterprises' charter acts. 14 The Safety and Soundness Act and the Enterprise housing goals regulation also consider the possibility that achievement of a particular housing goal or subgoal may or may not have been feasible for an Enterprise. If FHFA determines that a housing goal or subgoal was not feasible for an Enterprise to achieve, then the statute and regulation do not require any further action related to that housing goal or subgoal for that year. 15 If FHFA determines that an Enterprise did not meet a housing goal or subgoal and that achievement of the housing goal or subgoal was feasible, then the statute and regulation provide FHFA with discretionary authority to require the Enterprise to submit a housing plan describing the specific actions the Enterprise will take to improve its housing goals performance. 16

This final rule establishes the benchmark levels for the single-family housing goals for 2026-2028 as follows:

The final rule combines the current low-income census tracts home purchase subgoal and the minority census tracts home purchase subgoal into a single low-income areas home purchase subgoal. The benchmark level for the low-income areas home purchase goal is the sum of the benchmark levels for the low-income areas home purchase subgoal, plus an additional amount that will be determined separately by FHFA that takes into account families in disaster areas with incomes no greater than 100 percent of AMI. 17 The low-income areas home purchase goal is published annually on FHFA's website. 18

To simplify the structure of the Enterprise housing goals regulation, FHFA is removing the temporary measurement buffers for the housing goals that the Agency previously established for 2025-2027. The measurement buffers were established to encourage the Enterprises to focus on achieving certain single-family housing goals by meeting the market level, if the benchmark level turns out to be higher than the market level. These measurement buffers partly addressed the uncertainty in forecasting the market several years in advance as well as the time lag in determining the actual market level retrospectively. Since the 2026-2028 benchmarks are set below the forecasted marketed level, FHFA expects that the Enterprises will be able to calibrate their mortgage purchase strategies to anticipate small fluctuations in market uncertainty, making it unnecessary to maintain an additional regulatory buffer. This accomplishes the original intent of the measurement buffers, rendering the buffers duplicative and unnecessary.

The final rule establishes the benchmark levels for the multifamily housing goals and subgoal for 2026-2028 as follows:

The Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act Improvements Act of 2015  19 (Adjustment Improvements Act) requires FHFA to adjust the level of civil monetary penalties for inflation (including an initial catch-up adjustment and annual adjustments thereafter). The final rule makes explicit that the required inflation adjustments apply to civil money penalties described in section 1345 of the Safety and Soundness Act (12 U.S.C. 4585), including penalties applicable to the Enterprise and Federal Home Loan Bank housing goals.

To streamline the housing goal compliance determination processes, this final rule requires the Director to provide written notice to an Enterprise of a preliminary determination only if an Enterprise has failed to meet a housing goal or subgoal.

The final rule also makes technical changes to the names of the single-family housing goals to distinguish between goals related to home purchase mortgages and the goal related to refinance mortgages.

On October 2, 2025, FHFA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (proposed rule) in the Federal Register (90 FR 47632) proposing single-family and multifamily housing goals for 2026-2028. Public comments were accepted between October 2nd and November 3rd, 2025.

FHFA received 19 comments in response to the proposed rule, which are published on FHFA's website. 20 Of these, 18 include substantial comments about the topics in the proposed rule. The comments submitted include letters from four individuals, six nonprofit policy advocacy groups, and nine trade associations. Six comment letters were signed by coalitions of organizations.

Five comments were in favor of the proposed rule, nine were not in favor, and four comments expressed mixed support. Three trade associations and two individuals generally supported the rule due to its anticipated benefits for middle-income borrowers and low-income renters, as well as its potential to reduce market distortions and regulatory burdens. Policy advocacy groups and one trade group generally opposed the rule because they believe it would reduce support for low- to moderate-income borrowers. Four trade groups supported parts of the proposed rule, such as the multifamily benchmarks, but opposed different parts of the single-family benchmarks. Several comments related to topics outside of the scope of rulemaking including recommendations for manufactured housing policy activity and legislative proposals to address housing affordability. Comments received and FHFA's responses are summarized by topic below.

The Safety and Soundness Act requires FHFA to consider the following seven factors in setting the single-family housing goals:

1. National housing needs;

2. Economic, housing, and demographic conditions, including expected market developments;

3. The performance and effort of the Enterprises toward achieving the housing goals in previous years;

4. The ability of the Enterprises to lead the industry in making mortgage credit available;

5. Such other reliable mortgage data as may be available;

6. The size of the purchase money conventional mortgage market, or refinance conventional mortgage market, as applicable, serving each of the types of families described, relative to the size of the overall purchase money mortgage market or the overall refinance mortgage market, respectively; and

7. The need to maintain the sound financial condition of the Enterprises. 21

FHFA has considered each of these seven statutory factors in setting the benchmark levels for each of the single-family housing goals in this final rule. FHFA also has considered each of the comments received in response to the proposed rule, as discussed in more detail below

FHFA's analysis of the single-family housing goals depends in part on a market forecast model developed by FHFA. The most recently developed models, published in December 2024, relied on 20 years of HMDA data, from 2004 to 2023, the latest year for which public HMDA data was available when the proposed rule was issued. FHFA also uses Moody's Analytics forecasts data as the primary data source for the model's independent or driver variables. Additional discussion of the most recent market forecast models can be found in a technical report on FHFA's website. 22

FHFA received several comments from national advocacy groups and individuals on the current state of housing affordability, racial disparities in lending, and threats to economic sustainability in the United States. Two commenters argued that the lower benchmarks would improve affordable housing, strengthen communities, and reduce inequality. However, most commenters contended that the lower benchmarks would widen gaps in affordable housing availability and increase financial hardship for low- to moderate-income borrowers. Some commenters claimed that FHFA asserted that mission focused lending undermines safety and soundness. These commenters argued FHFA should not prioritize recapitalization over equitable access to capital and the public interest. Furthermore, advocacy groups stated that the nation faces a housing affordability crisis compounded by a fair housing crisis, both of which exacerbate challenges for borrowers. Commenters provided evidence that racial homeownership gaps remain as wide today as in 1968 and cited ongoing redlining, exclusionary zoning laws, and labor market discrimination.

Other commenters, including trade associations, praised FHFA's efforts to enhance the supply of affordable housing and promote efficiency and innovation in the housing market. Specifically, trade associations supported FHFA's focus on housing supply in the proposed rule. They argued that the Enterprises should reconsider deployment of housing goal subsides to address drivers of housing affordability issues. Some policy advocacy groups, however, rejected the notion that current affordable housing supply conditions justify a reduction in goals, emphasizing that the Enterprises have a mandate to support borrowers regardless of housing supply levels.

The Agency also received comments on the proposed rule's impact on first-time homebuyers. Advocacy groups noted that homeownership remains out of reach for borrowers across all income levels, emphasizing that single-family home prices have risen faster than median incomes in nearly all metropolitan areas. They urged FHFA not to reduce the single-family benchmarks, emphasizing that Enterprise-backed mortgages represent important opportunities for first-time homebuyers. Advocacy groups further expressed concern that persistent drivers of wealth inequality, such as exposure to natural disasters and worsening macroeconomic conditions, continue to disproportionately affect low- to moderate-income communities, and cautioned that the single-family benchmarks should not be set at levels that could exacerbate disparities among borrowers.

FHFA also received comments in favor of its broad efforts to better serve middle- and working-class Americans. Trade organizations praised FHFA for acknowledging the past evidence of “denominator management” and other market distortions that negatively impact middle class borrowers and supported FHFA's proposed efforts to negate these effects. Other commenters argued that the regulation does not expand access to housing credit for all borrowers, but, instead, primarily benefits wealthier households. Some policy advocacy groups also challenged FHFA's belief that the rule, if finalized as proposed, will better support middle-income borrowers, noting that the current housing goals already target this group and that reducing the benchmarks undermines the regulation's intended objective. Commenters emphasized that middle-income borrowers should be supported by the Enterprises in all economic cycles and across all regions, and argued that the proposed benchmarks do not achieve this goal. Additionally, advocacy groups criticized FHFA for not providing sufficient quantitative evidence to support the assertion that moderate-income households will face increasing obstacles to homeownership due to competition among millennials pursuing first-time homeownership.

FHFA acknowledges the nation's affordable housing crisis, and believes that finalizing the proposed rule will be a meaningful step toward addressing these challenges for Americans. The rule accounts for the limited supply of affordable housing and establishes benchmark levels designed to prevent unfair market distortions, such as discouraging or denying access to mortgages for credit-eligible applicants in order to meet housing goals targets. The lower single-family benchmarks are also intended to help mitigate potential price escalation that could disproportionately harm affordability for goal-eligible populations. Furthermore, the proposed benchmarks will enable the Enterprises to focus their efforts on developing products and resources that better support first-time homeownership and enhance affordability, rather than competing in a bidding war over a limited supply of goal-qualifying loans. FHFA finds that the proposed rule, once finalized, will likely expand access to mortgage credit for approximately 201,000 additional goal-eligible borrowers who otherwise might not obtain mortgage financing. Therefore, FHFA concurs with commenters who argue that the lower single-family benchmarks will improve housing affordability and reduce inequalities for Americans.

The Agency is committed to ensuring non-discriminatory access to mortgage credit across the nation and works to ensure that fair lending laws and requirements are followed by all of its regulated entities. However, FHFA disagrees that the setting of housing goal benchmarks has direct impact on redlining, exclusionary zoning laws, or labor market discrimination. Rather, the Agency's policy is to ensure that all households have equal access regardless of race and ethnicity. Over the past year, the Agency has overseen and supported efforts by the Enterprises to make housing more affordable, including, for example, through down payment and closing cost assistance to very low-income borrowers, enhanced free borrower education, and modern underwriting that considers a borrower's rental payment history and cash flow.

While the rule is designed to support low- to moderate-income borrowers in light of ongoing affordability and fair lending challenges, FHFA emphasizes that other market participants also play a vital role in advancing affordable housing. State Housing Finance Agencies (HFAs), the Rural Housing Service (RHS), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) are among the government entities that help provide liquidity and access to credit for low- to moderate-income borrowers. These organizations are often able to offer more favorable products tailored to the unique needs of these borrowers. As noted above and in the preamble to the proposed rule, the final rule ensures that benchmark levels are calibrated to avoid crowding out government entities and other sources of mortgage liquidity, thereby fostering a balanced and coordinated effort to expand affordable housing opportunities.

Lastly, FHFA finds that, given current affordability challenges and heightened market uncertainty, it would be imprudent to set benchmarks at overly aggressive levels. To maintain compliance with statutory safety and soundness requirements and to promote long-term housing market stability, FHFA believes it is essential to establish benchmark levels that strengthen the Enterprises' financial positions while continuing to ensure that low- and moderate-income families are effectively served.

Commenters representing industry trade organizations supported the Agency's position regarding the potential for past goals to have been too aggressive and beyond the capacity of available supply in the market. In their view, the primary issue is the limited supply of affordable homes, and an over-emphasis on the demand side of the equation (high goal benchmarks) has historically led to market distortions and “gamesmanship,” including an extreme bidding war for goal-qualifying loans.

Commenters specifically referenced past market data and FHFA's own 2024 determination that the 2023 low-income and very low-income home purchase goals were not feasible to achieve. They posit that FHFA's failure to reset these benchmarks resulted in the Enterprises engaging in the kind of competition that the proposed rule noted produces market distortions, such as pricing increases or managing down the “denominator” of total loans purchased.

These commenters largely supported the proposed benchmarks, believing they were appropriately set at the low end of model confidence intervals or just below model estimates. They viewed this level as providing necessary flexibility for the Enterprises to respond to the market while maintaining their statutory obligations. The ultimate measure of success, they argued, should be the real-world impact on affordability and household sustainability, not just meeting a numerical loan production target. A commenter further noted that aggressive goal setting can inadvertently increase housing costs.

Conversely, many commenters disagreed that the Enterprises are crowding out other market participants and that their actions may lead to market distortion, stating that no evidence was presented. A commenter asserted that any perceived inefficiencies may lie in the Enterprises' underwriting and pricing frameworks, not in the goals themselves, and that updating those frameworks could strengthen liquidity for lenders while maintaining robust goals.

FHFA appreciates the thoughtful comments regarding the historical impact of setting housing goal benchmarks and the suggestions for improving the measurement of goal success. The Agency concurs with commenters who observed that aggressive goal setting in the past, where targets exceeded the available supply in the market, resulted in market distortions and bidding wars that ultimately do not benefit the homebuyer. This aligns with FHFA's rationale that benchmarks set inappropriately high penalizes middle-class borrowers and creates an inefficient subsidy mechanism. The Agency's determination that the 2023 low-income and very low-income goals were infeasible further reinforces the need for realistic, achievable targets.

FHFA also agrees that the housing goals should increase affordability and promote sustainable homeownership, not simply meet a numerical target. The proposed recalibration of the Enterprise housing goals is warranted to address the concern, as detailed in the proposed rule and reiterated in this final rule, that past benchmarks were too high, which hindered the efficient deployment of funds. The new benchmarks are designed to provide the necessary flexibility for the Enterprises to respond to market conditions, meet their statutory obligations, and facilitate a thorough examination of lending patterns without causing undue market distortion.

The Agency finds merit in the suggestion to focus on loan performance as an integral measure of housing goal success. Ensuring loan sustainability is directly tied to FHFA's core responsibility to maintain the safety and soundness of the housing finance system. FHFA will examine incorporating household sustainability factors into future goal credit calculations or performance assessments.

Regarding the comment that questioned the evidence of “denominator management,” FHFA relies on its analysis of how the Enterprises' pricing mechanisms and operational efforts, when driven by high benchmarks, can lead to the displacement of private capital and distort competition with other federal entities and harm middle-income borrowers. As noted in the proposed rule and the Regulatory Impact Analysis, FHFA notes that the non-Enterprise market segment  23 has experienced a growth in their share of goal-eligible loans since 2022, while the Enterprises acquisitions declined, potentially indicating “denominator management.”

FHFA aims to encourage the Enterprises to reassess the deployment of housing goal subsidies to more effectively address the underlying drivers of housing affordability. As described in the proposed rule and the Regulatory Impact Analysis, current benchmarks have contributed to bidding wars and market distortions over a limited housing supply. Housing supply conditions therefore directly affect the statutory factors FHFA must consider when setting benchmarks, including, but not limited to: the Enterprises' ability to fulfill public needs; their leadership role in the mortgage industry; and their support of safe and sound mortgage practices. Accordingly, FHFA finds that current and forecasted housing supply conditions may justify a reduction in goals, as affordable housing supply is part of the statutory considerations for benchmark-setting.

As noted previously in the preamble to the proposed rule and the Regulatory Impact Analysis, FHFA continues to believe that finalizing the proposed rule will expand access to housing credit for all borrowers. Critiques suggesting that the rule primarily benefits wealthier borrowers are unfounded. Goal-eligible loans exclude borrowers in the highest income brackets, such as investors and mortgages exceeding the conforming loan limit. Moreover, the Enterprises remain incentivized to meet statutory requirements for low- and moderate-income borrowers, as failure to comply could result in penalties. Lenders are also likely to continue originating loans to low- and moderate-income borrowers due to pay-ups (premiums) in secondary market trading and because these loans represent a significant and profitable segment of the homebuying market.

FHFA finds that finalizing the proposed rule will better support middle-income borrowers compared to the current rule. While the same number of goal-qualifying borrowers will be served, the proposed rule reduces the likelihood of turning away middle-income borrowers who do not fit a goal-qualifying definition solely to meet a ratio of goal-qualifying to goal-eligible borrowers. According to FHFA's regulatory impact analysis, finalizing the proposed rule is expected to result in an increase of 201,000 loans to goal-eligible borrowers, with the largest gains likely for middle-income households.

As described in the proposed rule, FHFA considers demographic factors as part of its post-model adjustment process to identify appropriate benchmarks based on model forecasts. One of the factors discussed was a potential significant increase in demand compared to the baseline forecasts due to indications that millennials are driving increased competition for moderate-income homeownership opportunities. According to NAR's Home Buyers and Sellers Generational Trends 2025 report and a Michigan Journal of Economics survey, millennials represent the largest share (29%) of recent homebuyers, 24 signaling current demand, and 55% are expected to inherit wealth over the next five years, indicating future demand. 25 Furthermore, the Joint Center for Housing Studies' 2025 report projects that the number of households aged 35-44 will grow by 3.0 million between 2025 and 2035. FHFA therefore finds it likely that an increasing number of moderate-income borrowers will seek homeownership and will likely benefit from the proposed rule. FHFA is committed to monitoring the impact of the final benchmarks to ensure borrowers across all economic cycles and regions are supported.

Many commenters asserted that the Enterprises have a statutory mandate to serve low- to moderate-income borrowers and communities and to lead the industry in making mortgage credit available. Commenters cited the Enterprises' public missions and the requirements under the Safety and Soundness Act, which includes a specific factor for FHFA to consider in setting goals: the Enterprises' ability to lead the market in supporting access to mortgage credit. 26 These commenters contend that Congress mandates the Enterprises to lead the industry in making mortgage credit available for low- and moderate-income borrowers. Many of the commenters believe that these goals, as proposed, would not fulfill this mandate.

Several commenters also disagreed with the rationale in the proposed rule that suggests it may be inappropriate for the Enterprises to have an outsized market share in mortgage lending to low- to moderate-income or that the Enterprises should cede their market share to allow for other industry participants. Some commenters expressed concern that the proposed benchmarks over-emphasize middle-income borrowers at the expense of low- to moderate-income borrowers.

Commenters disputed the Agency's suggestion that other federal government programs (FHA, VA, and USDA/RHS), state Housing Finance Agency (HFA) programs, or the private-label securities (PLS) market could serve to make mortgage credit available for low- to moderate-income borrowers. Commenters explained that VA and USDA loans have statutory eligibility restrictions that limit their availability, and one commenter expressed concern that a reduction in the benchmark may “create a credit gap for households on the margin of eligibility for both programs.” Furthermore, commenters noted that although FHA serves a wider segment of the market, these loans are generally more expensive for many creditworthy households due to higher upfront and ongoing costs in the form of a higher mortgage insurance premium, and interest rate, as well as the lifetime nature of the mortgage insurance. Commenters note that similar borrowers who qualify for a conventional mortgage are able to use Enterprise loan products often receive lower interest rates and cancelable mortgage insurance, reducing the lifetime costs of the mortgage.

Commenters contended that bank balance sheets cannot be expected to fill the gap, as banks already receive full Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) credit for loans sold to the Enterprises and have no reason to increase the share of low- to moderate-income loans they hold on balance sheet. Commenters pointed out that the PLS market is cyclical and historically has primarily funded mortgages to higher-income borrowers, with the one exception being the subprime lending boom preceding the 2008 financial crisis. Rather, a commenter noted, the PLS market is highly sensitive to global capital flows, and during times of credit pressure (such as the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2020-2021 coronavirus pandemic) the PLS market has either ceased to function, or fully withdrew from participating in the market. At these times, only government lending and the Enterprises remained to stabilize the mortgage market. Concern was also raised that supporting PLS market growth is not a mandate in statute and raises market stability concerns.

A few commenters agreed with the underlying principle that the Enterprises should not be the sole source of mortgage liquidity and that pricing should determine the extent of their reach. These commenters noted that while it is appropriate for the Enterprises to increase market share in periods of market stress or periods of retreat by other market participants to ensure credit availability, when the private markets are operating in a healthy manner, the Enterprises can and should reduce market share. Several commenters, including industry groups, supported the notion that goals should be set at an appropriate level to avoid market distortions and prevent the Enterprises from crowding out private sector participants.

A different set of commenters offered a criticism of past goals, arguing that setting them too low led to a sharp growth in volume for FHA, VA, and RHS programs, and simultaneously reduced private capital participation through instruments like private mortgage insurance and credit risk transfers. In their view, goals set too low concentrate risk with the federal government, which runs counter to the Congressional objective for the Enterprises to share risk with private capital providers. These commentators expressed a preference for an appropriate level of private capital to be deployed in the low- to moderate-income space, arguing this would increase affordability and efficiency while reducing dependence on Federal government support.

FHFA appreciates the commenters' detailed feedback regarding the statutory mission of the Enterprises and their role in the secondary mortgage market. The Agency acknowledges the Enterprises' fundamental statutory mandate to serve all borrowers, including low- to moderate-income borrowers and communities throughout the country. FHFA believes that the rule is designed to ensure that the Enterprises fulfill this statutory purpose while ensuring that all borrowers have equal access to a liquid secondary market, and balancing safety and soundness. FHFA disagrees that the benchmarks are at odds with this important role.

FHFA also notes that the Director is required by statute to establish goal targets by considering both historical performance and a number of statutory factors. One of these factors is “the ability of the enterprise to lead the industry in making mortgage credit available.”  27 This factor does not mean that the Enterprises must lead the industry; rather, the Enterprises' ability to lead the industry is one of several factors considered in conjunction with historical performance in setting goals. FHFA believes that the goal setting methodology described in the preamble to the proposed rule follows the statutory framework by considering all the required factors to set benchmarks that reflect the policy priorities of the Director.

FHFA agrees with the commenters who believe that the Enterprises should not be the sole source of mortgage credit liquidity, particularly for low- to moderate-income borrowers. The Agency maintains a policy interest in ensuring the Enterprises do not crowd out other market participants and intends to use the flexibility provided by the new goals to collect and analyze comprehensive data to definitively assess the relationship between goal levels and market behavior, including potential pricing inefficiencies. A diverse secondary mortgage market—one that includes the Enterprises, Federal government loan programs, state and local Housing Finance Agencies, and a robust, sustainable private-label securities market—is essential. This diversity allows for healthy competition that can reduce costs for borrowers, foster innovation, and ensure a more resilient and reliable supply of liquidity across the economic cycle.

The Agency's approach is consistent with the policy objectives of promoting competition, increasing private sector participation, and ensuring the Enterprises' role is defined without duplicating support provided by the Federal Housing Administration or other federal programs. Setting goals appropriately requires balancing the statutory obligation to promote access to affordable credit with the need to ensure safety and soundness while avoiding unnecessary and costly duplication of support. The Agency also acknowledges the critical need to reduce taxpayer exposure to risk and promote private capital participation.

The determination of the final goal targets balances the statutory obligation to promote access to affordable credit, the Enterprises' ability to lead the market, and the need to promote a sustainable, liquid, and competitive secondary market that includes other market participants and private risk-sharing mechanisms. The goal levels ultimately established are determined to provide a sufficient incentive for the Enterprises to fulfill their mission to low-to moderate-income borrowers and serve as leaders in the market while encouraging the sustainable growth and participation of other, non-Enterprise market participants and the appropriate deployment of private capital. Furthermore, as noted above, FHFA's analysis of past goal performance, where Enterprises continued to perform above benchmarks even when they were set lower, suggests that the Enterprises will maintain strong liquidity and outreach to low-to moderate-income borrowers, as is consistent with their broader statutory mission.

For many low-to moderate-income borrowers, the Enterprises are the appropriate liquidity providers, for others it may be FHA or VA (via Ginnie Mae), while still others could be better served by the PLS market. It is important, however, to clearly distinguish between the setting of the housing goals benchmarks and the selling and underwriting requirements of the Enterprises. In response to a commenter's belief that lower benchmarks could create a “credit gap,” FHFA notes that a reduced benchmark is separate and distinct from Enterprise business decisions regarding the appropriate amount of credit risk; further, it is unlikely that an applicant's mortgage that was eligible for purchase by the Enterprises would be ineligible by FHA. As noted above, FHFA does not agree that FHA loans are always a more expensive alternative because pricing depends on a borrower's financial profile, loan terms, and market conditions. FHFA also acknowledges that FHA has a clear statutory mandate to make homeownership more accessible, particularly for low- to moderate-income borrowers with low down payments.

It is FHFA's intent to ensure that the Enterprises do not crowd out other participants  28 and believes the updated benchmarks will encourage their involvement. It is also clear that under the current housing goals benchmarks, a distortive effect is present and FHFA believes that the means to correct this is to appropriately size the goals to the needs of the market. It is with this in mind that FHFA seeks to the right-size the goals and ensure that all borrowers are served appropriately and extended credit that fits within a borrower's need and circumstance. As noted earlier, the new benchmarks should not be viewed as a ceiling for the Enterprises, and the Enterprises are still expected to make best efforts at serving all segments of the market, ensuring they meet their affirmative statutory obligations.

FHFA received a total of 11 comment letters from advocacy groups regarding the single-family purchase benchmarks. All letters focused on the proposed reduction of the low-income purchase (LIP) benchmark from 25.0 percent to 21.0 percent, while all but one also addressed the proposed reduction of the very low-income purchase (VLIP) benchmark from 6.0 percent to 3.5 percent for the years 2026-2028.

The commenters generally expressed concerns that the proposed goals are not ambitious enough and fall below current market levels, undermining the assistance that the Enterprises could provide to families in need. They argued that these reduced goals could jeopardize the statutory mission of the Enterprises and significantly limit lending opportunities for households with incomes up to 80 percent and 50 percent of area median income for LIP and VLIP, respectively.

Additionally, several commenters raised issues with FHFA's reliance on qualitative evidence related to the crowding out of other funding sources, the increasing costs for middle-income borrowers, and the notion that increased lending to low and moderate-income borrowers could undermine safety and soundness. Despite these Agency concerns, the commenters argue that market data supports maintaining the current benchmark levels, which they say have consistently been met in previous years. The commenters advocate for more ambitious goals, especially given the ongoing affordability challenges in the housing market.

Most of the commenters urged FHFA to either maintain the current benchmarks or reassess them based on additional empirical data, rather than qualitative evidence and industry sentiment. One of these commenters suggested that the Enterprises could exceed the current purchase benchmarks, requesting increases in both LIP and VLIP benchmarks, although no specific targets were provided.

In contrast to the commenters advocating higher benchmarks, there were two letters from industry trade groups expressing their appreciation to FHFA for its recognition of the potential for market distortion and efforts to more appropriately calibrate the goals. One of these commenters pointed out that the LIP and VLIP goals were not feasible to achieve for 2023.

FHFA has thoroughly reviewed the comments and decided to retain the proposed reductions to both single-family purchase goals. This decision is based on FHFA's consideration of each of the statutory factors and the comments received, as discussed above.

The Agency reaffirms that while data is crucial, qualitative insights from stakeholder experience also play an essential role in understanding the complexities of the mortgage finance landscape. These qualitative assessments enrich the understanding of market dynamics and borrower needs. Further, the Agency provided quantitative data using the National Mortgage Database, noting unexpectedly lower acquisitions of goal-eligible loans by the Enterprises beginning in 2022, which may be explained by denominator management strategies identified by market participants through the qualitative data. The Regulatory Impact Analysis estimates that in 2024, the Enterprises would have acquired an additional 67,000 goal-eligible loans per annum without having to purchase any fewer housing goal qualifying loans. Both qualitative and quantitative data provide unique and valuable insights into the market. In this case, both qualitative and quantitative information reinforce the need for FHFA to make adjustments to the goals to appropriately align incentives with desired outcomes.

FHFA aims to balance market dynamics by reconciling the Enterprises' commitment to affordable lending with the necessity of providing liquidity in the broader market. The Agency believes that maintaining these revised goals will reduce market distortions and mitigate unintended consequences while continuing to provide robust support for low- to moderate-income households. Furthermore, FHFA acknowledges the current economic realities affecting the housing landscape, such as a significant decrease in affordable inventory and rising costs, necessitating a reevaluation of attainable targets.

With a focus on long-term stability in the housing market, FHFA believes that implementing lower benchmarks is a prudent strategy to ensure the Enterprises can operate sustainably while protecting their financial health and the structural integrity of the secondary mortgage market. It is important to note that these goals reflect minimum requirements, and the Agency expects the Enterprises to exceed these benchmarks whenever feasible and prudent.

As presented in Table 2, the market level for the low-income home purchase housing goal, derived from HMDA data, declined from 27.6 percent in 2020 to 26.3 percent in 2023. FHFA's most recent forecast for this goal projects a continued market level decline, averaging 25.9 ± 5.6 percent. FHFA's current model forecasts the market level to remain below 26.0 percent through 2027, with an average forecast midpoint value of 25.9 percent.

Regarding Enterprise performance, Freddie Mac recorded a low-income home purchase performance of 29.0 percent in 2022 and 28.5 percent in 2023, exceeding both the benchmark and market levels in those years. Fannie Mae's performance in 2022 was 27.4 percent, which was below the benchmark level but above the market level. In 2023, however, Fannie Mae's performance decreased to 26.1 percent, falling below both the benchmark and the market levels. For 2023, FHFA determined that while Fannie Mae did not meet the goal, the established benchmark was not feasible for the Enterprise. 29 For 2024, both Enterprises exceeded the market level, with Fannie Mae's performance at 26.7 percent and Freddie Mac's performance at 26.6 percent.

As detailed in Table 3, the market level for the very low-income home purchase housing goal, derived from HMDA data, decreased from 7.0 percent in 2020 to 6.5 percent in 2023. FHFA's most recent forecast projects a continued market level decline, averaging 6.0 ± 2.5 percent. FHFA's current model forecasts the market to continue its downward trajectory reaching below 6 percent through 2027, with an average forecast midpoint value of 5.9 percent.

Regarding the Enterprises, both Enterprises met the very low-income home purchase goal in 2022, with Freddie Mac's performance at 7.1 percent and Fannie Mae's performance at 6.9 percent. In 2023, Freddie Mac met the very low-income home purchase goal, with performance at 6.8 percent, but Fannie Mae's performance was 6.0 percent, which was below both the market and the benchmark. For 2024, Freddie Mac again met the very low-income home purchase goal, while Fannie Mae's performance was 5.9 percent, below both the market and the benchmark.

The Agency remains committed to its statutory mission of promoting affordable housing. However, the latest available market performance data, market forecasts, and Enterprise performance all indicate that the current benchmark levels for the low-income home purchase goal and the very low-income home purchase goal are set too aggressively. FHFA believes that the reductions in the LIP and VLIP goals are a necessary strategy to maintain the stability of the Enterprises and the broader housing market. FHFA values the constructive dialogue and insights from stakeholders and will continue to monitor market conditions closely to evaluate the ongoing viability of these housing goals.

The Agency received several comments regarding the restoration of the low-income areas subgoal, which would merge the current minority census tracts subgoal and the low-income census tracts subgoal. One individual supported the restoration of the low-income areas subgoal as it reduces administrative burden.

One individual, one trade association, two nonprofits, and three policy advocacy groups disagreed with the proposal to restore the previous subgoal and urged FHFA to keep the two area-based subgoals separate. They argued that given that the Enterprises can meet the low-income census tracts segment by serving borrowers at any income, combining both segments could result in greater service to higher-income borrowers and reduced focus on lower-income homebuyers in minority census tracts. One policy advocacy group argued that this change could result in the Enterprises' purchasing up to 88,000 fewer loans in minority census tracts from 2026 to 2028. In addition, commenters noted that while this merger may reduce administrative burden, it may make it more difficult to track the Enterprises' performance in the minority census tracts.

As stated in the proposed rule, FHFA is restoring the low-income areas subgoal to simplify the regulatory framework, improve operational clarity for the Enterprises, and better align the subgoal with existing borrower-based metrics. This merger ensures that both segments of the subgoal remain supported while considering the implementation challenges related to the current structure. This change also advances the Administration's priorities for race neutral policies, and for regulatory reform by reducing compliance costs, increasing efficiency, and reducing regulatory burden.

Under the current structure, all higher-income borrower loans in low-income census tracts that are also minority census tracts qualify for the low-income census tracts subgoal only, while the lower-income loans in those census tracts qualify for the minority census tracts subgoal only. Although this separation enables the Enterprises to focus on lower-income borrowers in census tracts that are both minority and low-income in one subgoal (the minority census tracts subgoal), it also places higher-income loans in those census tracts in the other subgoal, which increases operational complexity.

However, a 2020 study of Enterprise acquisitions between 2010 and 2019, conducted by FHFA, found that under the previous structure, when the loans were not separated as described above, the share of loans made to borrowers with incomes greater than 100 percent of AMI and residing in low-income census tracts declined from 40.7 percent in 2010 to 37.0 percent in 2019. 30 The trend was similar among borrowers residing in minority census tracts, with the share of higher-income borrowers declining from 45.4 percent in 2010 to 42.9 percent in 2019. 31 The share of high-income borrowers peaked between 2014 and 2016, corresponding with an overall increase in loan volume, decline in mortgage rates, and expansion of credit availability. In the following years, FHFA observed an overall decline in the share of higher-income borrowers that qualified for this housing goal. Based on this evidence, and assuming that the trend observed during the 2010 to 2019 study period is representative of the subgoal as a whole, there does not appear to be any evidence that having a combined goal results in reduced support for low-income borrowers. FHFA believes that the Enterprises will continue to support lower-income borrowers when borrowers in low-income census tracts and minority census tracts are served under one subgoal.

Additionally, FHFA notes that the public will still be able to track the Enterprises' performance in minority census tracts without the minority census tracts subgoal. The Enterprises provide this information in Tables 7 and 9 of their Annual Mortgage Reports published on their websites. 32 Additionally, FHFA publishes information on borrower race and ethnicity by loan product compared to the market in its Annual Housing Report. 33

Given the operational challenges that emerged with the current structure, and the evidence of Enterprise behavior under the previous structure, FHFA believes that it is reasonable and prudent to restore the low-income areas subgoal as it will reduce administrative burden while encouraging the Enterprises to focus on supporting borrowers in low-income areas.

Table 3 shows the market levels and Enterprise performance on this subgoal in 2021, along with implied market levels and Enterprise performance for the years 2022 through 2024, during which the low-income areas subgoal was replaced by the low-income census tracts and minority census tracts subgoals. As shown above, both Enterprises exceeded the proposed benchmark level for this subgoal in 2022, 2023, and 2024.

Based on the comments received and FHFA's consideration of the statutory factors, including the recent performance of the Enterprises and the market forecasts shown in Table 3, FHFA has determined that the benchmark level for the low-income areas home purchase subgoal should be established at the level that was proposed by FHFA earlier this year, 16 percent.

The Agency received comments regarding the proposal to maintain the low-income refinance benchmark level at 26.0 percent. A trade organization supported FHFA's proposal to maintain the benchmark level as was finalized in the 2025-2027 rule, given the segment's sensitivity to interest rates. Another trade organization urged FHFA to consider lowering the low-income refinance benchmark level—which is below the lower bound of the market forecast confidence interval—also due to the segment's sensitivity to interest rates. 34 They noted that there is a potential for a decline in interest rates given the Administration's stated policy priorities. They also urged FHFA to reinstate the measurement buffer for this goal, due to the potential of interest rates declining to a level that does not support the proposed benchmark level (as explained below).

As noted in the proposed rule, the Enterprises' annual performance on the low-income refinance goal tends to be inversely proportional to the volume of low-income refinance loans the market produces and the Enterprises purchase during a given year. 35 For example, during the low mortgage rate environment in 2020, overall low-income refinance volume in the market increased significantly, exceeding 1.3 million loans. 36 However, the total market volume for all refinances also surged, reaching over 6.3 million loans. 37 This resulted in a low-income refinance market performance of only 21.0 percent. During that time period, as well as during 2015 to 2017, neither the Enterprises nor the market was able to perform above the 26.0 percent proposed target.

Conversely, in 2023, amidst higher mortgage rates, the overall low-income refinance volume contracted sharply to approximately 160,000 loans, while total market refinance volume declined to about 397,000 loans. 38 This contraction in volume corresponded to a substantially higher low-income refinance market performance of 40.3 percent. The Enterprises' performance on the low-income refinance goal mirrored this pattern, with their low-income refinance percentages increasing significantly during this later period, even as the absolute volume of their low-income refinance mortgage purchases decreased.

Moreover, since the publication of the proposed rule, FHFA has observed declines in the 30-year mortgage rate in September and October. These rates correspond to expected increases in refinances for primary residences compared to the rest of 2025. With this surge in refinance activity, the Agency has already observed a decline in the rate of low-income refinance mortgages below the proposed benchmark. This performance is consistent with our expectations based on historical market performance.

Although mortgage rates are expected to decline during the 2026-2028 housing goals period, FHFA's model cannot forecast the low-income refinance market with a high degree of confidence due to the unpredictability of future interest rates and the strong sensitivity of refinance originations to interest rates. FHFA initially proposed to maintain the benchmark level at 26.0 percent, which is below the lower bound of the confidence interval in the market forecast used in the 2025-2027 final rule, to account for this uncertainty. Additionally, FHFA included the measurement buffer in the 2025-2027 final rule to enable the Enterprises to focus on meeting the market if mortgage rates decline more significantly than expected. Without a measurement buffer, FHFA believes that a 26.0 percent benchmark level may not be achievable if mortgage rates decline and the Enterprises need to focus on the market level to meet the goal.

As shown in Table 4, both Enterprises performed well above the 26.0 percent benchmark level in 2022-2024, when mortgage rates were high, and FHFA does not expect Enterprise performance to decline significantly due to a lowered benchmark level if mortgage rates remain elevated. 39 Considering that the Enterprises have performed well above the benchmark level in the current high-interest rate environment, FHFA believes the 21.0 percent benchmark level in the final rule is reasonable and will enable the Enterprises to remain focused on both affordability and safety and soundness, even if mortgage rates decline significantly. Additionally, FHFA believes that setting the benchmark level where the market performed when mortgage rates were low eliminates the need for a measurement buffer for this goal.

In response to comments and after reassessing the historical performance and market trends, FHFA has determined that a benchmark level lower than 26.0 percent for the low-income refinance goal is appropriate. The Agency believes that this decision is responsive to concerns expressed by commenters in this rule and in response to the 2025-2027 proposed housing goals rule, and that a lower benchmark goal will be a more reasonable and achievable, yet still difficult, target if interest rates decline significantly. Therefore, in this final rule FHFA is setting the benchmark level for the low-income refinance goal at 21.0 percent, which was the market performance during the 2020 refinance boom when mortgage rates were low.

The Safety and Soundness Act requires FHFA to consider the following six factors in setting the multifamily housing goals:

1. National multifamily mortgage credit needs and the ability of the Enterprises to provide additional liquidity and stability for the multifamily mortgage market;

2. The performance and effort of the Enterprises in making mortgage credit available for multifamily housing in previous years;

3. The size of the multifamily mortgage market for housing affordable to low-income and very low-income families, including the size of the multifamily markets for housing of a smaller or limited size;

4. The ability of the Enterprises to lead the market in making multifamily mortgage credit available, especially for multifamily housing affordable to low-income and very low-income families;

5. The availability of public subsidies; and

6. The need to maintain the sound financial condition of the Enterprises. 40

FHFA has considered each of these six statutory factors in setting the benchmark levels for each of the multifamily housing goals in this final rule.

FHFA received comments on the multifamily housing goals recommendations from seven commenters, including trade associations, nonprofit organizations, and letters signed by multiple organizations. Nearly all of the commenters that provided feedback on the proposed multifamily housing goals benchmark levels supported the proposal to maintain the current multifamily low-income goal benchmark at 61.0 percent, maintain the current very low-income goal benchmark at 14.0 percent, and maintain the current small multifamily low-income subgoal benchmark at 2.0 percent. One trade association stated that the proposed housing goals appropriately reflect past performance of the Enterprises and maintain their focus on serving the low- and very low-income renter community. Another trade association stated that the proposed benchmarks strike an appropriate balance, ensuring the Enterprises fulfill their mission to promote affordability while continuing to provide liquidity across the broader multifamily market. These two trade associations strongly supported the proposal to maintain the small multifamily low-income subgoal at 2.0 percent, noting that this segment already benefits from robust private capital participation. Regarding the proposed very low-income goal, one trade association expressed support for the 14.0 percent benchmark given the past performance of the Enterprises and the critical need for housing for this income cohort.

Of the remaining commenters on the multifamily housing goals, one trade association suggested increasing the low-income goal due to the Enterprises' track record of exceeding the 61 percent benchmark and ongoing national shortages of affordable rental housing for low-income households. The group noted that the need for affordable rental housing is well-documented and growing. Another trade association stated that the low-income goal should only be increased if the single-family housing goals are similarly increased, so as not to create an imbalance between rental and homeownership opportunities.

All the comments on the proposed multifamily housing goal benchmark levels emphasized the importance of the role of the multifamily housing goals in the affordable rental housing finance market. One letter submitted on behalf of 28 organizations stated that the multifamily housing goals are important in addressing the affordable rental housing crisis. Another letter submitted on behalf of 17 organizations noted that the Enterprises back more than 40 percent of multifamily mortgage debt, giving them a critical role in supporting affordable rental housing.

Additionally, a trade association recommended that FHFA help the Enterprises balance their multifamily housing goals with providing liquidity support for market-rate units. The Agency agrees that the Enterprises should support both affordable and market-rate units. FHFA considers market-rate units when setting the cap on multifamily purchase volume (the Multifamily Volume Cap) and the percent of loans purchased that must be “mission-driven” affordable housing. 41 The Enterprise housing goals, however, are focused on families at or below specific AMI levels.

The recent performance of the Enterprises on each of the multifamily housing goals and subgoal is shown in the tables below. Note that for each of the multifamily goals and subgoal, starting in 2023, the benchmark metrics changed from the number of low-income units to the share of low-income units.

The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is found in Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, Section 106 describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's authority. This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart I, Section 40103. Under that section, the FAA is charged with prescribing regulations to assign the use of the airspace necessary to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace. This regulation is within the scope of that authority as it modifies the National Airspace System as necessary to preserve the safe and efficient flow of air traffic.

The FAA published an NPRM for Docket No. FAA-2025-0141 in the Federal Register (90 FR 25173; June 16, 2025), proposing to amend VOR Federal Airway V-300 due to the planned relocation of the Wiarton, ON, Canada, VOR/DME NAVAID. Interested parties were invited to participate in this rulemaking effort by submitting written comments on the proposal. One comment was received.

The commenter suggested the FAA validate the 25-AGL-5 Airspace Docket Number used in the NPRM to ensure it was correct. The commenter also suggested validating the distance of the Wiarton, ON, Canada, VOR/DME relocation that was published in the NPRM. Additionally, the commenter offered that the magnetic radial (called bearings in the comment) values listed to describe the RIBIR, IILND, and MRUCI fixes in the V-300 description in the NPRM were incorrect and should have been lower than the companion true radials they were listed with instead of being larger. Finally, the commenter stated the CFNKB computer navigation fix (CNF) on the United States (U.S.)/Canada border that was listed in the NPRM should have been spelled CYNKB as contained in FAA Order JO 7400.11 and on the Detroit sectional.

The FAA reviewed each of the items raised by the commenter and offers the following in response. The 25-AGL-5 Airspace Docket Number was assigned by the Central Service Center, Operations Support Group in accordance with FAA Order JO 7400.2 and was determined to be correct as published in the NPRM.

With respect to the distance the Wiarton, ON, Canada, VOR was relocated, the FAA received the geographic latitude and longitude coordinates from NAV CANADA for the original and new locations of the VOR. Upon review, the distance of the VOR relocation was calculated to be just over 135 feet West-Southwest from the original location instead of approximately 80 feet West of the original location as specified in the NPRM. That information has been updated.

In determining the true and magnetic radials for the RIBIR, IILND, and MRUCI fixes in the V-300 description, the FAA used the most recent magnetic variation values associated with the Sault Ste Marie, MI, VOR/DME and the Pellston, MI, VOR/Tactical Air Navigation (VORTAC) NAVAIDs. The magnetic variation for the Sault Ste Marie VOR/DME is 4° West and for the Pellston VORTAC is 6° West. When calculating magnetic radials using counterpart true radials, West magnetic variation values are added to the true radial value; whereas East magnetic variation values are subtracted from the true radial value. The true and magnetic radials listed for the RIBIR, IILND, and MRUCI fixes in the V-300 description in the NPRM were correct as published. However, for awareness, the FAA only publishes true radial values in final rules.

Lastly, the FAA verified that the CFNKB CNF located on the U.S./Canada border was spelled correctly in the NPRM and matches the CNF information currently contained in the FAA's National Airspace System Resource database and as published on the IFR Enroute Low Altitude L-31 chart. CNFs are not published in FAA Order JO 7400.11 or on sectional charts.

VOR Federal Airways are published in paragraph 6010(a) of FAA Order JO 7400.11, Airspace Designations and Reporting Points, which is incorporated by reference in 14 CFR 71.1 on an annual basis. This document amends the current version of that order, FAA Order JO 7400.11K, dated August 4, 2025, and effective September 15, 2025. These amendments will be published in the next update to FAA Order JO 7400.11. FAA Order JO 7400.11K, which lists Class A, B, C, D, and E airspace areas, air traffic service routes, and reporting points, is publicly available as listed in the ADDRESSES section of this document.

This action amends 14 CFR part 71 by amending VOR Federal Airway V-300 due to the planned relocation of the Wiarton, ON, Canada, VOR/DME by NAV CANADA as part of its NAVAID Modernization Program. The airway action is described below.

V-300: Prior to this final rule, V-300 extended between the Sault Ste Marie, MI, VOR/DME and the Wiarton, ON, Canada, VOR/DME, excluding the airspace within Canada. The airway is amended to only describe the two airway segments that lie within U.S. airspace. The first segment extends between the Sault Ste Marie, MI, VOR/DME and the intersection of the Sault Ste Marie VOR/DME 125° and Pellston, MI, VORTAC 029° radials (RIBIR Fix). The second segment extends between the intersection of the Sault Ste Marie VOR/DME 125° and Pellston VORTAC 054° radials (IILND Fix), replacing the “CFNKB” CNF on the U.S./Canada border, and the intersection of the Sault Ste Marie VOR/DME 125° and Pellston VORTAC 067° radials (MRUCI Fix), replacing the “MKPDG” CNF on the U.S./Canada border. The two airway segments within U.S. airspace will continue to provide route continuity and cross-border connectivity with the V-300 airway segments being established by NAV CANADA within Canadian airspace.

The NAVAID radials listed in the VOR Federal Airway V-300 description above and in the regulatory text of this final rule are stated in degrees True north.

The FAA has determined that this regulation only involves an established body of technical regulations for which frequent and routine amendments are necessary to keep them operationally current. It, therefore: (1) is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866; (2) is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034; February 26, 1979); and (3) does not warrant preparation of a regulatory evaluation as the anticipated impact is so minimal. Since this is a routine matter that only affects air traffic procedures and air navigation, it is certified that this rule, when promulgated, does not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

The FAA has determined that this action amending Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range (VOR) Federal Airway V-300 qualifies for categorical exclusion under the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq. ) and in accordance with FAA Order 1050.1G, FAA National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures, paragraph B-2.5.(a) of FAA's NEPA implementation policy and procedures which categorically excludes from further environmental impact review rulemaking actions that designate or modify classes of airspace areas, airways, routes, and reporting points (see 14 CFR part 71, Designation of Class A, B, C, D, and E Airspace Areas; Air Traffic Service Routes; and Reporting Points); and section B-2.5.(k), which categorically excludes from further environmental impact review publication of existing air traffic control procedures that do not essentially change existing tracks, create new tracks, change altitude, or change the concentration of aircraft on these tracks. As such, this action is not expected to result in any potentially significant environmental impacts. In accordance with the FAA's NEPA implementation policy and procedures regarding Extraordinary Circumstances, the FAA has reviewed this action for factors and circumstances in which a normally categorically excluded action may have a significant environmental impact requiring further analysis. The FAA has determined that no extraordinary circumstances exist that warrant preparation of an environmental assessment or environmental impact study.

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration amends 14 CFR part 71 as follows:

The FAA published a final rule in the Federal Register (90 FR 51507; November 18, 2025) amending Colored Federal Airway G-8, Jet Route J-115, and RNAV Route T-227; and establishing RNAV Route Q-188. Subsequent to the publication of that final rule, the FAA discovered a final rule previously published in the Federal Register (90 FR 13060; March 20, 2025) amending J-115 in Alaska. The amendment revoked a segment of the airway between the Fairbanks, AK, Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/Tactical Air Navigation (VORTAC) and the Deadhorse, AK, VOR/Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). However, these changes were not reflected in the later-published final rule that is now being corrected. Specifically, in this now-corrected airspace action, the segment of J-115 between the Fairbanks, AK, VORTAC and the Deadhorse, AK, VOR/DME was included in the description despite having been previously revoked. This action corrects this error by removing the segment of J-115 between the Fairbanks, AK, VORTAC and the Deadhorse, AK, VOR/DME from the airspace description. No other portion of J-115 is affected by this rule.

Additionally, the FAA discovered a final rule previously published in the Federal Register (90 FR 20232; May 13, 2025) amending G-8 in Alaska. The amendment revoked a segment of the airway between the Elfee, AK, NDB and the Kachemak, AK, NDB. However, these changes were not reflected in the later-published final rule that is now being corrected. Specifically, in this now-corrected airspace action, the segment of G-8 between the Elfee, AK, NDB and the Kachemak, AK, NDB was included in the description despite having been previously revoked. This action corrects this error by removing the segment of G-8 between the Elfee, AK, NDB and the Kachemak, AK, NDB from the airspace description. No other portion of G-8 is affected by this rule.

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me, in Docket No. FAA-2025-0372 as published in the Federal Register on November 18, 2025 (90 FR 51507), FR Doc. 2025-20134, is corrected as follows:

The United States is a party to the United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Mar. 30, 1961, 18 U.S.T. 1407, 520 U.N.T.S. 151 (Single Convention), as amended by the 1972 Protocol. Article 3, paragraph 7 of the Single Convention requires that if the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (Commission) adds a substance to one of the schedules of such Convention, and the United States receives notification of such scheduling decision from the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Secretary-General), the United States, as a signatory Member State, is obligated to control the substance under its national drug control legislation. Under 21 U.S.C. 811(d)(1) of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), if control of a substance is required “by United States obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970,” the Attorney General must issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule she deems most appropriate to carry out such obligations, without regard to the findings required by 21 U.S.C. 811(a) or 812(b), and without regard to the procedures prescribed by 21 U.S.C. 811(a) and (b). The Attorney General has delegated scheduling authority under 21 U.S.C. 811 to the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). 1

On July 29, 2024, DEA issued a temporary scheduling order, placing N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene temporarily in schedule I of the CSA. 2 That order for N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene (codified at 21 CFR 1308.11(h)(68) and (69)) was based on findings by the then-Administrator that the temporary scheduling was necessary to avoid an imminent hazard to public safety. 3

On November 21, 2024, the Director-General of the World Health Organization recommended to the Secretary-General that N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene be placed in Schedule I of the Single Convention, as these substances have pharmacological effects similar to other opioid drugs that are controlled in Schedule I of the Single Convention. On June 9, 2025, the Secretariat of the United Nations informed the United States Government, by letter, that the Commission voted to place N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene in Schedule I of the Single Convention during its 68th session on March 12, 2025 (CND Mar 68/4 and 68/3).

N -Desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene are temporarily controlled in schedule I of the CSA because they pose imminent hazard to the public safety. Both N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene belong to the benzimidazole-opioid drug class, similar to etonitazene and isotonitazene. Substances of the benzimidazole-opioid drug class share similar pharmacological profile with other opioids such as morphine and fentanyl. N -Desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene, similar to morphine and fentanyl, act as mu-opioid receptor agonists. Adverse health effects have been associated with the abuse of these benzimidazole-opioids. The abuse of N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene has been associated with several toxicology cases in the United States and in Europe. Several substances belonging to the benzimidazole-opioid drug class have been controlled in the United States, and as a class of drug in China, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The appearance of benzimidazole-opioids on the illicit drug market is similar to other synthetic opioids that are trafficked and abused for their psychoactive effects.

Law enforcement reports demonstrate that N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene are being illicitly distributed and abused. According to the National Forensic Laboratory Information System (NFLIS-Drug)  4 database, which collects drug identification results from drug cases submitted to and analyzed by Federal, State and local forensic laboratories, there have been 151 reports for N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene between January 2022 and July 2025 (query date: July 17, 2025). Benzimidazole-opioids have been identified in counterfeit prescription tablets in the United States and other countries, including Sweden and the United Kingdom. The identification of these substances in counterfeit prescription drug products is of significant concern due to benzimidazole-opioids high potency.

N -Desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) advised DEA, by letter dated May 11, 2023, that based on a review by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), there were no investigational new drug applications (IND) or approved new drug applications (NDA) for N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene in the United States. Since this letter, HHS has not advised DEA of any new IND or NDA for these substances. Because N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene are not formulated or available for clinical use as approved medicinal products, all current use of these substances by individuals is based on their own initiative, rather than on the basis of medical advice from a practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs.

Consistent with 21 U.S.C. 811(d)(1), DEA concludes that N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States  5 and are most appropriately placed permanently in schedule I of the CSA, the same schedule in which they temporarily reside at present. Because control is required under the Single Convention, DEA will not be initiating regular rulemaking proceedings to permanently schedule N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 811(a).

In order to meet the United States' obligation under the Single Convention and because N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene have no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States, the Administrator has determined that N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of isomers, esters, and ethers, whenever the existence of such isomers, esters, and salts are possible within the specific existence of such isomers, esters, ethers, and salts are possible within the specific chemical designation, should be placed permanently in schedule I of the CSA.

As discussed above, N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene have been temporarily controlled in schedule I of the CSA since July 29, 2024. Upon the effective date of this final order, N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene will be permanently subject to the CSA's schedule I regulatory controls and administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions applicable to the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, importing, exporting, engagement in research or conduct of instructional activities with, and possession of, schedule I controlled substances, including the following:

1. Registration. Any person who handles (manufactures, distributes, reverse distributes, imports, exports, engages in research or conducts instructional activities or chemical analysis with, or possesses), or who desires to handle, N -desethyl isotonitazene or N -piperidinyl etonitazene must be registered with DEA to conduct such activities pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 822, 823, 957, and 958, and in accordance with 21 CFR parts 1301 and 1312. Retail sales of schedule I controlled substances to the general public are not allowed under the CSA. Possession of any quantity of these substances in a manner not authorized by the CSA is unlawful and those in possession of any quantity of these substances may be subject to prosecution pursuant to the CSA.

2. Disposal of stocks. N -Desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene must be disposed of in accordance with 21 CFR part 1317, in addition to all other applicable federal, state, local, and tribal laws.

3. Security. N -Desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene are subject to schedule I security requirements and must be handled and stored pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 821, 823, and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.71 through 1301.76. Non-practitioners handling N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene must comply with the screening requirements of 21 CFR 1301.90 through 1301.93.

4. Labeling and packaging. All labels, labeling, and packaging for commercial containers of N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene must comply with 21 U.S.C. 825 and 958(e) and be in accordance with 21 CFR part 1302.

5. Quota. Only registered manufacturers are permitted to manufacture N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene in accordance with a quota assigned pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 826, and in accordance with 21 CFR part 1303.

6. Inventory. Any person registered with DEA to handle N -desethyl isotonitazene or N -piperidinyl etonitazene must have an initial inventory of all stocks of controlled substances (including these substances) on hand on the date the registrant first engages in the handling of controlled substances pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 827 and 958(e), and in accordance with 21 CFR 1304.03, 1304.04, and 1304.11.

After the initial inventory, every DEA registrant must take a new inventory of all stocks of controlled substances (including N- desethyl isotonitazene and N- piperidinyl etonitazene) on hand every two years pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 827 and 958(e) and in accordance with 21 CFR 1304.03, 1304.04, and 1304.11.

7. Records and Reports. Every DEA registrant must maintain records and submit reports with respect to N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 827 and 958(e), and in accordance with 21 CFR 1301.74(b) and (c), 1301.76(b), and 1307.11 and parts 1304, 1312, and 1317. Manufacturers and distributors must submit reports regarding N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene to the Automation of Reports and Consolidated Order System pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 827 and in accordance with 21 CFR parts 1304 and 1312.

8. Order Forms. Every DEA registrant who distributes N -desethyl isotonitazene or N -piperidinyl etonitazene must continue to comply with order form requirements pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 828 and in accordance with 21 CFR part 1305.

9. Importation and Exportation. All importation and exportation of N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene must continue to comply with 21 U.S.C. 952, 953, 957, and 958, and in accordance with 21 CFR part 1312.

10. Liability. Any activity involving N -desethyl isotonitazene or N -piperidinyl etonitazene not authorized by, or in violation of the CSA or its implementing regulations, is unlawful, and may subject the person to administrative, civil, and/or criminal sanctions.

This action is not a significant regulatory action as defined by Executive Order (E.O.) 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), and the principles reaffirmed in E.O. 13563 (Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review). DEA scheduling actions are not subject to E.O. 14192, Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulations, or E.O. 14294, Fighting Overcriminalization in Federal Regulations. This action makes no change in the status quo, as N -desethyl isotonitazene and N -piperidinyl etonitazene are already listed as schedule I controlled substances.

This action meets the applicable standards set forth in sections 3(a) and 3(b)(2) of E.O. 12988 to eliminate drafting errors and ambiguity, minimize litigation, provide a clear legal standard for affected conduct, and promote simplification and burden reduction.

This action does not have federalism implications warranting the application of E.O. 13132. This action does not have substantial direct effects on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

This action does not have tribal implications warranting the application of E.O. 13175. It does not have substantial direct effects on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal government and Indian tribes.

The CSA provides for an expedited scheduling action where control is required by the United States' obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols. 6 If control is required pursuant to such international treaty, convention, or protocol, the Attorney General, as delegated to the Administrator, must issue an order controlling such drug under the schedule he deems most appropriate to carry out such obligations, and “without regard to” the findings and rulemaking procedures otherwise required for scheduling actions in 21 U.S.C. 811(a) and (b). Id.

In accordance with 21 U.S.C. 811(d)(1), scheduling actions for drugs that are required to be controlled by the United States' obligations under international treaties, conventions, or protocols in effect on October 27, 1970, shall be issued by order, as opposed to scheduling by rule pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 811(a). Therefore, DEA believes that the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 553, do not apply to this scheduling action.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) (5 U.S.C. 601-612) applies to rules that are subject to notice and comment under the APA or any other law. As explained above, the CSA exempts this final order from notice and comment. Consequently, the RFA does not apply to this action.

This action does not impose a new collection of information requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 7 Also, this action does not impose new or modify existing recordkeeping or reporting requirements on State or local governments, individuals, businesses, or organizations. However, this action does require compliance with the following existing OMB collections: 1117-0003, 1117-0004, 1117-0006, 1117-0008, 1117-0009, 1117-0010, 1117-0012, 1117-0014, 1117-0021, 1117-0023, 1117-0029, and 1117-0056. An agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to a collection of information unless it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

On the basis of information contained in the “Regulatory Flexibility Act” section above, DEA has determined pursuant to the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1501 et seq. ) that this final rule would not result in any Federal mandate that may result “in the expenditure by State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any 1 year . . . .” Therefore, neither a Small Government Agency Plan nor any other action is required under UMRA of 1995.

This order is not a major rule as defined by the Congressional Review Act (CRA), 5 U.S.C. 804. However, DEA is submitting reports under the CRA to both Houses of Congress and to the Comptroller General.

For the reasons set out above, DEA amends 21 CFR part 1308 as follows:

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on December 17, 2025, by Administrator Terrance Cole. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register .

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) administers the pension plan termination insurance program under title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). PBGC's regulation on Allocation of Assets in Single-Employer Plans (29 CFR part 4044) sets forth (in subpart B) the methods for valuing plan benefits of terminating single-employer plans covered under title IV. Guaranteed benefits and benefit liabilities under a plan that is undergoing a distress termination must be valued in accordance with subpart B of part 4044. In addition, when PBGC terminates an underfunded plan involuntarily pursuant to ERISA section 4042(a), it uses the subpart B valuation rules to determine the amount of the plan's underfunding.

Under § 4044.51(b) of the asset allocation regulation, early retirement benefits are valued based on the annuity starting date, if a retirement date has been selected, or the expected retirement age, if the annuity starting date is not known on the valuation date. Sections 4044.55 through 4044.58 set forth rules for determining the expected retirement ages for plan participants entitled to early retirement benefits. Section 4044.58 contains tables to be used in determining the expected early retirement ages. 1

Table I to § 4044.58 (Selection of Retirement Rate Category) is used to determine whether a participant has a low, medium, or high probability of retiring early. The determination is based on the year a participant would reach “unreduced retirement age” (URA) ( i.e., the earlier of the normal retirement age or the age at which an unreduced benefit is first payable) and the participant's monthly benefit at the unreduced retirement age. The table applies only to plans with valuation dates in the current year and is updated annually by PBGC to reflect changes in the cost of living.

Tables II-A, II-B, and II-C (Expected Retirement Ages for Individuals in the Low, Medium, and High Categories respectively) are used to determine the expected retirement age after the probability of early retirement has been determined using Table I. These tables establish, by probability category, the expected retirement age based on both the earliest age a participant could retire under the plan and the unreduced retirement age. This expected retirement age is used to compute the value of the early retirement benefit and, thus, the total value of benefits under the plan.

This document amends § 4044.58 to replace Table I-25 with Table I-26 to provide an updated correlation, appropriate for calendar year 2026, between the amount of a participant's benefit and the probability that the participant will elect early retirement. Table I-26 will be used to value benefits in plans with valuation dates during calendar year 2026.

PBGC's regulation on Missing Participants (29 CFR part 4050) provides that the mortality assumption used to determine certain amounts to be transferred on behalf of a missing participant from a terminating defined benefit plan to PBGC is the mortality table in § 4044.53(h). The table currently provides the mortality assumption for benefit determination dates on or after July 31, 2024, but before January 1, 2026. 2 This rule updates the table to provide the mortality assumption for benefit determination dates in 2026.

PBGC has determined that notice of, and public comment on, this rule are impracticable, unnecessary, and contrary to the public interest. PBGC's update of § 4044.58 and § 4044.53(h) for calendar year 2026 are routine. If a plan has a valuation date in 2026, the plan administrator needs the updated table in § 4044.58 being promulgated in this rule to value benefits. Similarly, if a plan is transferring amounts on behalf of missing participants under part 4050, the plan administrator needs the updated mortality table in § 4044.53(h) for benefit determination dates in 2026. Accordingly, PBGC finds that the public interest is best served by issuing these tables expeditiously, without an opportunity for notice and comment, and that good cause exists for making the table set forth in this amendment effective less than 30 days after publication to allow the use of the proper tables to determine the value benefits for dates in early 2026.

PBGC has determined that this action is not a “significant regulatory action” under the criteria set forth in Executive Order 12866.

Because no general notice of proposed rulemaking is required for this regulation, the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 does not apply (5 U.S.C. 601(2)).

In consideration of the foregoing, 29 CFR part 4044 is amended as follows:

On August 25, 2025, the Coast Guard established a temporary final rule establishing a safety zone for the runway of Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas, USVI. 1 The Coast Guard originally published the temporary final rule to be effective through September 30, 2025. Later in October 2025 we promulgated a temporary interim rule to keep the zone open until December 31, 2025. 2 We are now implementing another temporary safety zone until March 31, 2026, to provide an opportunity for comment before we establish a permanent safety zone. The Captain of the Port (COTP) San Juan has determined that potential hazards associated low flying aircrafts to vessels in the vicinity of the waters off the Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas, USVI includes wake turbulence, collision risk, restricted visibility, and emergency maneuvers. Therefore, the COTP is issuing this rule under the authority in 46 U.S.C. 70034, which is needed to protect personnel, vessels, and the marine environment in the navigable waters within the safety zone.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule without prior notice and comment. As is authorized by 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that good cause exists for not publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) with respect to this temporary rule because there is an immediate need to mitigate the risk of vessels transiting between private port authority managed yellow buoys and the end of the St. Thomas Cyril E. King runway due to the proximity to low flying aircrafts. Prompt action is needed to respond to the potential safety hazards associated with vessels transiting in the proximity of the runway of Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas, USVI. It is impracticable and contrary to the public interest to publish an NPRM because we must establish this safety zone by January 1, 2026.

For the same reasons, the Coast Guard finds that under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), good cause exists for making this rule effective less than 30 days after publication in the Federal Register .

This rule establishes a temporary safety zone for navigable waters west of the Cyril E. King Airport in St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands. This temporary rule is effective through March 31, 2026, to give an opportunity for comment before the Coast Guard establishes a permanent safety zone. The temporary safety zone covers all navigable waters within 400 yards from shore directly west of the airport's runway within the two private port authority managed yellow buoys. No vessel or person will be permitted to enter the safety zone without obtaining permission from the COTP or a designated representative. No vessel or person will be permitted to enter the safety zone without obtaining permission from the COTP or their designated representative.

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders.

The regulatory flexibility analysis provisions of the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, do not apply to rules that are not subject to notice and comment. Because the Coast Guard has, for good cause, waived the notice and comment requirement that would otherwise apply to this rulemaking, the Regulatory Flexibility Act's flexibility analysis provisions do not apply here.

Under section 213(a) of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 104-121), if this rule will affect your small business, organization, or governmental jurisdiction and you have questions, contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

Small businesses may send comments to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards by calling 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520).

We have analyzed this rule under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in that Order.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes.

As required by The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538), the Coast Guard certifies that this rule will not result in an annual expenditure of $100,000,000 or more (adjusted for inflation) by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01, Rev. 1, associated implementing instructions, and Environmental Planning COMDTINST 5090.1 (series), which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment.

This rule is a safety zone. It is categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60(a) of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 1. See the Record of Environmental Consideration supporting this determination is available in the docket under USCG-2025-1105.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

On March 15, 2023, VA published a final rule in the Federal Register that amended its regulations governing the TSGLI program. 88 FR 15907. As part of this rulemaking, VA recodified the TSGLI Schedule of Losses and amended the eligibility standards for certain losses covered under the schedule. Following publication of the final rule, VA discovered that it had inadvertently changed the Schedule of Losses for inability to perform at least two ADLs as a result of a traumatic injury other than a traumatic brain injury. Neither the preamble to the proposed rule nor the preamble to the final rule addressed this change to the TSGLI regulation. See 85 FR 50973; 88 FR 15907. On July 24, 2024, VA published a proposed rule to correct this inadvertent change. 89 FR 59865. VA received one comment from the National Veterans Legal Services Program (NVLSP), which we address below.

The comments submitted by NVLSP assert that VA should leave the inadvertent change in the Schedule of Losses for the following reasons: (1) the TSGLI program is in good financial health as evidenced by the fact that VA has not needed to increase the TSGLI premium since inception; therefore, more generous benefits for this loss will not hurt the program; (2) the TSGLI program's focus should be on caring for wounded Service members and should not distinguish between temporary and permanent injuries; and (3) VA is not legally required to consult with the Department of Defense (DoD) in updating the TSGLI regulations published in March 2023.

TSGLI became effective on December 1, 2005. The program provides payments to Service members and Veterans who are insured by SGLI and suffer a serious traumatic injury in service resulting in a loss that qualifies for payment under TSGLI. TSGLI benefits are also payable retroactively to any member who suffered a traumatic injury from October 7, 2001, to November 30, 2005, resulting in a qualifying injury, regardless of whether they had SGLI coverage at the time of the injury. TSGLI premiums are $1.00 per month and are intended to cover only the civilian incidence of such injuries. The uniformed services fund the cost of claims in excess of premiums collected, with such claims attributed to the extra hazards of military service. Extra hazards funding in TSGLI was needed during periods of U.S. military involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, the uniformed services pay for the total cost of retroactive claims. The TSGLI fund balance as of June 30, 2024, was $60.1 million. Of this, $28 million was contributed by DoD as start-up funds when the program began and is therefore earmarked for extra hazards costs. In addition, a portion of the remaining fund balance must be set aside to account for the lag in reporting of claims.

An analysis of the claims experience for policy years 2015 to 2024 indicates that TSGLI payments using the shorter time periods for the TSGLI Schedule of Losses for Other Traumatic Injury (OTI) resulting in inability to perform ADLs (15, 30, 60, 90 days) would have resulted in an additional 1,385 claims and an increase of $34.6 million in payout. Additionally, the shorter time period for payment would have resulted in claims and administrative expenses exceeding premium collections for eight of the past 10 policy years. The additional claim payments using the shorter timeframes average approximately $3.5 million per year over the past 10 policy years. Assuming that OTI ADL loss experience trends similarly going forward, premium collections will cover only about 81% of claims and administrative expenses. Consequently, use of the shorter time periods for the Schedule of Losses for OTI would put upward pressure on the TSGLI premium rate in the long term. While program surplus can be used to supplement this deficit in the short term, it is necessary for the program to maintain a sufficient fund balance to guard against the risk of future conflicts or events resulting in significant injuries that may cause spikes in claims.

VA explained in the proposed rulemaking that leaving the shorter payment intervals as they currently are codified could “potentially result in higher payout amounts to individuals with severe but temporary injuries than those paid to injured servicemembers who have permanent injuries.” 89 FR at 59866. As required by 38 U.S.C. 1980A(j), VA has consulted with the uniformed services, and DoD does not support the inadvertent change to the payment standard. VA and DoD note that in the original TSGLI interim final rulemaking published on December 22, 2005 (70 FR 75940, 75943), VA stated, “As required by 38 U.S.C. 1980A(d), the amount of the payment in the schedule . . . is based on the severity of the member's loss.” Severity includes not only the length of recovery period for the loss but the nature of the injury itself, such as its permanence. Program experience demonstrates that the time periods of 15, 30, 60, and 90 days of loss of ADL due to traumatic brain injury (TBI) clearly indicate a severe injury with lasting impacts on the member's functions. However, the same cannot be said for the time period of 15 days of loss of ADL due to OTI. Since the inception of the program, denied claims that do not meet the time period of 30 days' loss of ADL due to OTI show less severe injuries of a more temporary nature, including bone fractures, lacerations, and torn ligaments. DoD and VA both agree that the initial justification for the payment standard should remain as valid rationale for maintaining the standard at the lower, instead of higher, payment amount.

NVLSP also commented that there was no legal mandate that VA follow DoD guidance following consultation with the uniformed services under 38 U.S.C. 1980A(j), and even if such consultation was required, there is no evidence that DoD has publicly stated their opposition to the change in standard from the 2023 final rulemaking.

First and foremost, 38 U.S.C. 1980A(j) does not require DoD to provide public statements as to the nature of the consultation or position prior to VA implementing TSGLI rulemaking. VA supports DoD's ongoing consultation on the TSGLI regulations as the program evolves because, although VA may promulgate TSGLI regulations, it is within the exclusive purview of the uniformed services to certify TSGLI claims, and VA plays no role in the adjudication process under 38 U.S.C. 1980A(f). Furthermore, DoD staff meet with VA staff and other Department officials each year as required by statute (38 U.S.C. 1974), and DoD involvement in TSGLI warrants a fair measure of deference from VA when evaluating and responding to feedback from DoD. Adopting regulations that contradict DoD feedback may not only be costly and inconsistent with actuarially sound business principles but also would not be aligned with improvements to the customer experience for the TSGLI program, which were implicit in the purpose, design, and intent of the TSGLI Year Ten Review.

Additionally, in the case of the regulatory publication error in March 2023, the uniformed services under DoD were the first to identify the issue in late Spring 2023 and raise the concern to VA that this change was never contemplated during the intensive collaboration with DoD and the services in the TSGLI Year Ten Review. Their concern arose from whether VA had made a change in OTI vs. TBI losses related to severity of injury in opposition to the long-standing rationale of the program they understood and supported. VA assured DoD and the uniformed services that the change was an inadvertent typographical error, and no change had been intended.

Based on the foregoing, VA adopts the proposed rule, without change, as a final rule.

VA examined the impact of this rulemaking as required by Executive Orders 12866 (Sept. 30, 1993) and 13563 (Jan. 18, 2011), which direct agencies to assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has determined that this final rule is not a significant regulatory action under E.O. 12866.

Through this rulemaking, VA will restore the intended payment schedule for TSGLI benefits, thereby preventing confusion and unnecessary re-processing of claims. Absent this rulemaking, VA staff would continue to spend more time adjudicating appeals and handling inconsistencies from the current payment structure. While VA is unable to quantify measurable cost savings, these qualitative benefits will generate positive outcomes to society, such as reductions in burden and confusion among stakeholders. This final rule is a deregulatory action under Executive Order 14192 as it removes an unintended burden and provides a net positive benefit to society.

Economic Impact: There are no costs or savings associated with this final rule. This rule ensures the TSGLI is managed according to actuarially sound principles, maintaining the TSGLI premium at a low rate. TSGLI is funded by the premiums that Service members pay for TSGLI coverage, and as such, there will be no cost to the Government with this final rulemaking.

The Secretary hereby certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities as they are defined in the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601-612). The overall impact of this final rule would be of no benefit or detriment to small businesses. Therefore, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 605(b), the initial and final regulatory flexibility analysis requirements of 5 U.S.C. 603 and 604 do not apply.

This final rule will not result in the expenditure by State, local, and Tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year.

Although this final rule contains collection of information under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3521), there are no provisions associated with this rulemaking constituting any new collection of information or any revisions to the existing collection of information. The collection of information for 38 CFR 9.21 is currently approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and have been assigned OMB control number 2900-0919.

The Assistance Listing number and title for the program affected by this document is 64.103, Life Insurance for Veterans.

Pursuant to Congressional Review Act) (5 U.S.C. 801 et seq. ), the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs designated this rule as not a major rule, as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Douglas A. Collins, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, approved this document on October 8, 2025, and authorized the undersigned to sign and submit the document to the Office of the Federal Register for publication electronically as an official document of the Department of Veterans Affairs.

For the reasons stated in the preamble, VA amends 38 CFR part 9 as set forth below:

This is a summary of the Commission's document ( Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice ) in AU Docket No. 25-117; DA 25-1075; adopted and released on December 18, 2025. The complete text of this document, including attachments and any related documents, are available on the Commission's website at https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-25-1075A1.pdf or by using the search function for AU Docket No. 25-117, on the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System (ECFS) web page at www.fcc.gov/ecfs. To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to FCC504@fcc.gov or by call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530.

In the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, the Office of Economics and Analytics (OEA), jointly with the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (WTB), establishes the procedures to be used for Auction 113, the auction of 200 Advanced Wireless Services licenses for spectrum in the Commission's inventory in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz bands (collectively, the “AWS-3” bands). Auction 113, which marks the Federal Communications Commission's (Commission) first auction since its authority to use competitive bidding lapsed in 2023, will bring unused, valuable 5G-ready spectrum to market, and proceeds will fund the Commission's ongoing efforts to protect American networks from untrustworthy and insecure foreign equipment.

Bidding in Auction 113 is scheduled to commence on June 2, 2026. Auction 113 will be conducted using an ascending clock auction with a supply of one in each category of frequency-specific channel blocks, referred to as the “clock-1” auction format. The Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice provides details regarding the procedures, terms, conditions, dates, and deadlines governing participation in Auction 113 bidding, as well as an overview of the post-auction application and payment processes.

The Commission is offering licenses in Auction 113 pursuant to the Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act of 2024 (Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act). The Spectrum and Secure Technology and Innovation Act directs the Commission to initiate a system of competitive bidding under 47 U.S.C. 309(j) to grant licenses for spectrum in its inventory in the AWS-3 bands as of December 23, 2024. See Servicemember Quality of Life Improvement and National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025, Public Law 118-159, Div. E, Title LIV, §§ 5401-5405, § 5403. Auction proceeds will support the Commission's Supply Chain Reimbursement Program, which implements the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019 by reimbursing eligible advanced communications service providers for their costs to remove, replace, and dispose of Huawei Technologies Company or ZTE Corporation equipment and services obtained on or before June 30, 2020.

On March 11, 2025, in accordance with 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3), OEA and WTB released the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, 90 FR 13117 (March 20, 2025), seeking comment on certain competitive bidding and other various procedures to be used in Auction 113. Ten parties filed comments in response to the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, and six parties filed reply comments.

One commenter recommends that funds from spectrum auctions and licenses be strategically and primarily directed towards expanding rural Tribal cellular services and communications infrastructure support on Tribal lands rather than for incumbent reimbursement. No parties commented on this recommendation. Even if this recommendation did not conflict with Congress's express direction for the Auction 113 proceeds, the use of auction proceeds is outside the scope of this proceeding on auction procedures as well as outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

The Commission's rules and decisions provide the underlying authority for the procedures OEA and WTB adopt for Auction 113. As specified in 47 CFR 27.1105, any auction of licenses for spectrum in the AWS-3 band is to be governed by the bidding procedures set forth in 47 CFR part 1, subpart Q. The Commission has also adopted rules regarding the AWS-3 bands, as well as the licensing and operating rules that are applicable to all 47 CFR part 27 services. See 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, 79 FR 32366 (June 4, 2014). On July 24, 2025, the Commission adopted the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order, 90 FR 36385 (August 4, 2025), in which it updated the designated entity provisions of the 47 CFR part 27 rules that had applied to the Commission's first auction of AWS-3 spectrum in 2014. One commenter requests that OEA and WTB adopt an accelerated two-year buildout deadline for Auction 113 winning bidders because it claims that doing so will favor bidders with the financial capacity, operational readiness, and technical sophistication to promptly deploy service as well as discourage “speculative bidding.” Four commenters oppose this request. The Commission adopted buildout rules for the AWS-3 bands in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, and any amendments to those rules require a rulemaking proceeding and cannot be made in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

Prospective applicants should familiarize themselves with the 47 CFR part 1, subpart Q rules, including amendments and clarifications thereto, as well as Commission decisions regarding competitive bidding procedures, application requirements, and obligations of Commission licensees. In addition, applicants must be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be released in this proceeding.

The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, and public notices are not negotiable. OEA and WTB may amend or supplement the information contained in their public notices at any time, and may issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental information that may generally apply to applicants. Pursuant to the Commission's rules, OEA and WTB also retain the authority to implement further procedures during the course of this auction. It is the responsibility of all applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices pertaining to Auction 113.

The AWS-3 spectrum available in Auction 113 will be licensed on a geographic area basis. Of the 200 licenses offered in Auction 113, the 48 licenses located in the A1 block (1695-1700 MHz), B1 block (1700-1710 MHz), H block (1760-1765/2160-2165), I block (1765-1770/2165-2170), and J block (1770-1780 MHz/2170-2180 MHz) are based on Economic Areas (EAs) and the 152 located in the G block (1755-1760/2155-2160) are based on Cellular Market Areas (CMAs). The AWS-3 frequencies will be licensed in five and ten megahertz blocks, with each license having a total bandwidth of five, ten, or twenty megahertz. The list of licenses to be offered in Auction 113 is available in the Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.

One commenter requests that Block G be redefined using county level geographic areas for Auction 113, rather than on a CMA basis, as specified in 47 CFR part 27. However, implementing such a change would require an amendment to the Commission's part 27 rules that must be adopted in a rulemaking proceeding. A Commission rule cannot be amended in the context of this proceeding establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

OEA and WTB did not seek comment on establishing a Tribal licensing window for AWS-3 spectrum inventory in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, however five parties commented on this topic. The Commission declined in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order to implement a Tribal licensing window for Auction 113, and has therefore resolved this issue.

The 1695-1710 MHz band will be licensed in an unpaired configuration for low-power mobile transmit ( i.e., uplink) operations. The 1755-1780 MHz band will be licensed paired with the 2155-2180 MHz band, with the 1755-1780 MHz band authorized for low-power mobile transmit ( i.e., uplink) operations and the 2155-2180 MHz band authorized for base station and fixed ( i.e., downlink) operations.

Figure 1 in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice shows the band plan for the 1695-1710 MHz band. Figure 2 in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice shows the band plans for the 1755-1780 MHz and 2155-2180 MHz bands. Table 1 contains summary information regarding the AWS-3 licenses available in Auction 113:

Each potential bidder is solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the potential uses of a license that it may seek in Auction 113. In addition to the typical due diligence considerations that the Commission encourages of bidders in all auctions, OEA and WTB call particular attention in Auction 113 to the incumbency issues in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and 2155-2180 MHz bands and protection of Federal and non-Federal incumbent operations described herein. Each applicant should closely follow releases from the Commission concerning these issues and consider carefully the technical and economic implications for commercial use of the AWS-3 band. The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this spectrum for particular services, or about the information in Commission databases that is furnished by outside parties.

The AWS-3 bands are currently being used for a variety of government and non-government services. In the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, the Commission allocated the 1695-1710 MHz band for non-Federal fixed and mobile (except aeronautical mobile) commercial use and the 1755-1780 MHz band for non-Federal fixed and mobile commercial use. Licenses in the 1695-1710 MHz band are being made available on a shared basis with incumbent Federal meteorological-satellite (MetSat) data users. The Commission adopted twenty-seven Protection Zones for the 1695-1710 MHz band in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, and the forty-seven Federal earth stations located in these Protection Zones will operate on a co-equal, primary basis with commercial AWS-3 licensees. All other Federal earth stations operate on a secondary basis. In order to facilitate coordination, uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1695-1710 MHz band must be under the control of, or associated with, a base station as a means to facilitate shared use of the band and prevent interference to Federal operations.

Licenses in the 1755-1780 MHz band are being made available on a shared basis with a limited number of Federal incumbents indefinitely, and some Federal systems that have or will over time relocate out of the band. The Federal systems located in the Protection Zones adopted by the Commission for the 1755-1780 MHz band in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order will operate on a co-equal, primary basis with commercial AWS licensees. The Federal systems that will relocate from the band pursuant to an approved transition plan will operate on a primary basis until they are reaccommodated. In order to facilitate coordination, uplink/mobile transmit devices in the 1755-1780 MHz band must be under the control of, or associated with, a base station as a means to facilitate shared use of the band and prevent interference to Federal operations. NTIA issues annual reports on the status of the transitions of spectrum in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands. See, e.g., https://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2024/2023-commercial-spectrum-enhancement-act-csea-report. See also https://www.ntia.doc.gov/category/aws-3-transition.

Licenses to operate in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands are subject to the condition that the licensee must not cause harmful interference to an incumbent Federal entity relocating from these bands under an approved Transition Plan. This condition remains in effect until the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) terminates the applicable authorization of the incumbent Federal entity. Although this license condition does not apply to the permanent sharing scenario, the Commission's rules require successful coordination to avoid causing harmful interference to these Federal incumbents. In addition, AWS-3 licensees in the 1755-1780 MHz band must agree to accept interference from incumbent Federal users while they remain authorized to operate in the band. The 2155-2180 MHz band is already allocated for exclusive non-Federal, commercial use. Although no Federal users are currently licensed or operating in the 2155-2180 MHz band, AWS-3 licensees may have to protect or relocate and/or share in the cost of relocating non-Federal incumbent Fixed Microwave and Broadband Radio Service licensees in the band.

AWS-3 licensees in the 1695-1710 MHz and 1755-1780 MHz bands are required to successfully coordinate with Federal incumbent users in these bands prior to operating in designated protection zones. The 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order established that 1695-1710 MHz licensees operating at certain power levels are required to coordinate with Federal incumbents in those protection zones, and higher-powered operations would generally require nationwide coordination. Similarly, operations in the 1755-1780 MHz band are subject to successful coordination with Federal incumbents in the protection zones adopted for that band, with the default coordination zone being nationwide. Prior to commencing operations in the 1755-1780 MHz band, an AWS-3 licensee must reach a coordination arrangement on an operator-to-operator basis with each Federal agency that has an assignment with United States and Possessions authority. The FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice, 79 FR 54710 (September 12, 2014), contains various refinements to the previously-defined protection zones for each of these bands. The FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice also provides information and guidance on the overall coordination process for these bands, as contemplated by the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, including informal pre-coordination discussion and the formal process of submitting coordination requests to, and receiving responses from, relevant Federal agencies. OEA and WTB encourage each potential applicant to carefully review these coordination requirements and the policies and procedures adopted by the Commission to implement them, and to consider the impact of those requirements and policies on the potential applicant's business plans.

One commenter expresses opposition to Federal spectrum sharing and coordination requirements for the AWS-3 bands because he contends that they create challenges for bidders and could deter participation or lead to underutilized spectrum. These arguments are outside the scope of this proceeding, and as such, OEA and WTB do not address them. The Commission adopted rules for the spectrum sharing and coordination requirements for the AWS-3 bands in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order. Amendments to those rules require a rulemaking proceeding and cannot be adopted in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

The auction of licenses for spectrum in the Commission's inventory in the AWS-3 bands will be referred to as “Auction 113.” Bidding in Auction 113 will begin on June 2, 2026. The initial schedule for bidding rounds in Auction 113 will be announced by public notice at least one week before bidding begins. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all licenses.

The following pre-bidding dates and deadlines apply to Auction 113:

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal that at any time before or during the bidding process, OEA, in conjunction with WTB, may delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 113 in the event of a natural disaster, technical obstacle, network interruption, administrative or weather necessity, evidence of an auction security breach or unlawful bidding activity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and efficient conduct of competitive bidding. This approach has proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in previous auctions, and OEA and WTB find no reason to depart from it here. OEA will notify participants of any such delay, suspension, or cancellation by public notice and/or through the FCC Auction Bidding System's (bidding system) announcement function. If the bidding is delayed or suspended, then OEA may, in its sole discretion, elect to resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current round or from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. OEA and WTB emphasize that they will exercise the authority to delay, suspend, or cancel bidding in Auction 113 solely at their discretion.

Those wishing to participate in Auction 113 must:

• Submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026, following the electronic filing procedures and other instructions set forth in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and in the FCC Form 175 Instructions.

• Submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026, following the procedures and instructions set forth in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice.

• Comply with all provisions outlined in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and applicable Commission rules.

Before the opening of the short-form filing window for Auction 113, detailed educational information will be provided in various formats to potential participants on the Auction 113 web page. Specifically, OEA will provide various materials on the pre-bidding processes in advance of the opening of the short-form application window, beginning with the release of step-by- step instructions for completing the FCC Form 175 in the FCC's Auction Application System (AAS), which is the Commission's newly developed system that will be used for the first time in Auction 113. These materials will be available in the Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113. In addition, OEA will provide an online application procedures tutorial for the auction, covering information on pre-bidding preparation, completing short-form applications, and the application review process. Applicants should carefully review both the Auction 113 application tutorial and the FCC Form 175 filing instructions, paying close attention to any departures from previous application processes as a result of the use of the new AAS for Auction 113.

In advance of the start of the mock auction, OEA will provide educational materials on the bidding procedures for Auction 113, including a user guide for the bidding system, bidding system file formats, and an online bidding procedures tutorial. These materials will provide detailed information on bidding features specific to the ascending clock auction format, including intra-round bidding and proxy bids. OEA and WTB recognize the importance of these materials to applicants' and bidders' comprehension of the bidding procedures OEA and WTB adopt herein. Accordingly, the educational materials will be released as soon as reasonably possible to provide potential applicants and bidders with time to understand them and ask questions of Commission staff before bidding begins.

OEA and WTB believe that parties interested in participating in Auction 113 will find the interactive, online tutorials an efficient and effective way to further their understanding of the application and bidding processes. The online tutorials will allow viewers to navigate the presentation outline, review written notes, and listen to audio of the notes. Additional features of these web-based tools include links to auction-specific Commission releases, email links for contacting Commission staff, and screen shots of the online application and bidding systems. The online tutorials will be accessible in the Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113. Once posted, the tutorials will remain continuously accessible.

One commenter advocates for additional educational support in the form of personalized and interactive tools for less experienced participants, claiming that the educational resources the Commission makes available to participants are often too generalized for bidders to apply to their particular circumstances. The Commission currently offers a wide variety of educational materials, demonstrations, educational opportunities, and other information and resources to assist prospective applicants and bidders with understanding the FCC's auction application system and the bidding system. Moreover, individual prospective applicants and bidders can address specific questions to Commission staff well in advance of all auction deadlines. As a result, OEA and WTB conclude that the added benefit, if any, of developing personalized and interactive educational tools in time for Auction 113 is outweighed by the time and expense that Commission would incur to customize such resources.

OEA and WTB remind each potential bidder that it is solely responsible for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors that may have a bearing on the value of the licenses that it is seeking in Auction 113 and that it is required to certify, under penalty of perjury, that it has read the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and has familiarized itself with the auction procedures and the service rules for the AWS-3 bands. The Commission makes no representations or warranties about the use of this spectrum or these licenses for particular services. Each applicant should be aware that a Commission auction represents an opportunity to become a Commission licensee, subject to certain conditions and regulations. This includes the established authority of the Commission to alter the terms of existing licenses by rulemaking, which is equally applicable to licenses awarded by auction. A Commission auction does not constitute an endorsement by the Commission of any particular service, technology, or product, nor does a Commission license constitute a guarantee of business success.

An applicant should perform its due diligence research and analysis before proceeding, as it would with any new business venture. In particular, OEA and WTB encourage each potential bidder to perform technical analyses and/or refresh its previous analyses to assure itself that, should it become a winning bidder for any Auction 113 license, it will be able to build and operate facilities that will fully comply with all applicable technical and legal requirements. OEA and WTB urge each applicant to inspect any prospective sites for communications facilities located in, or near, the geographic area for which it plans to bid, confirm the availability of such sites, and to familiarize itself with the Commission's rules regarding the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), and any other environmental statutes that may apply.

In August 2025, the Commission released the Modernizing the Commission's National Environmental Policy Act Rules NPRM, 90 FR 40295 (August 19, 2025), to consider updates to its rules implementing NEPA. Potential bidders in Auction 113 should be mindful that if the Commission amends its NEPA rules, AWS-3 licensees will be subject to the amended rules.

OEA and WTB also encourage each applicant in Auction 113 to continue to conduct its own research throughout the auction in order to determine the existence of pending or future administrative or judicial proceedings that might affect its decision on continued participation in the auction. Each applicant is responsible for assessing the likelihood of the various possible outcomes and for considering the potential impact on licenses available in an auction. The due diligence considerations mentioned in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice do not constitute an exhaustive list of steps that should be undertaken prior to participating in Auction 113. As always, the burden is on the potential bidder to determine how much research to undertake, depending upon the specific facts and circumstances related to its interests. For example, applicants should pay particular attention to the requirements presented by the temporary and indefinite sharing of portions of the AWS-3 bands by incumbent Federal users and AWS-3 licensees, which may vary by geography and frequency. The FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice contains additional information regarding the extent of sharing in the AWS-3 bands, refinements to the protection zones adopted in the 2014 AWS-3 Report and Order, and information and guidance on the overall coordination process between commercial and Federal users. OEA and WTB expect that the information in both the FCC/NTIA Coordination Procedures Public Notice and federal agencies' approved transition plans will be material to an applicant's potential participation in Auction 113. Therefore, OEA and WTB strongly encourage each applicant to closely review these materials, as well as future releases from the Commission and NTIA concerning these issues, and to carefully consider the technical and economic implications for commercial use of the AWS-3 bands.

Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make use of the licenses available in Auction 113. Each potential bidder is responsible for undertaking research to ensure that any licenses won in the auction will be suitable for its business plans and needs. Each potential bidder must undertake its own assessment of the relevance and importance of information gathered as part of its due diligence efforts.

The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any third-party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems. To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, it must obtain or verify such information from independent sources or assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases. Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.

In addition to the incumbency issues discussed in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, potential bidders should be aware of the following licensing considerations concerning the use of the AWS-3 frequencies they acquire in Auction 113.

Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican borders should be aware that the use of the AWS-3 frequencies they acquire in Auction 113 are subject to current and future agreements with the governments of Canada and Mexico.

The Commission routinely works with the United States Department of State and Canadian and Mexican government officials to ensure the efficient use of the spectrum as well as interference-free operations in the border areas near Canada and Mexico. Until such time as any adjusted agreements, as needed, between the United States, Mexico, and/or Canada can be agreed to, operations in the AWS-3 bands must not cause harmful interference across the border, consistent with the terms of the agreements currently in force.

Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules for environmental review under the NEPA, the NHPA, and any other environmental statutes that may apply. Licensees and other applicants that propose to build certain types of communications facilities for licensed service must follow Commission procedures implementing obligations under NEPA and NHPA prior to constructing the facilities. Under NEPA, a licensee or applicant must assess if certain environmentally sensitive conditions specified in the Commission's rules are relevant to the proposed facilities, and prepare an environmental assessment when applicable. If an environmental assessment is required, then facilities may not be constructed until environmental processing is completed. Under NHPA, a licensee or applicant must follow the procedures in 47 CFR 1.1320, as well as the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement for Collocation of Wireless Antennas and the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process ( see 47 CFR pt. 1, Appendices B and C). Compliance with section 106 of the NHPA requires Tribal consultation, and if construction of the communications facilities would have adverse effects on historic or Tribally significant properties, an environmental assessment must be prepared.

OEA and WTB remind bidders of the Commission's mobile spectrum holdings policies applicable to the AWS-3 band. Specifically, the Commission did not impose a pre-auction bright-line limit on acquisitions of the AWS-3 band. The Commission also determined that it would perform case-by-case review of proposed secondary market transactions once AWS-3 was found suitable and available for the provision of mobile telephony/broadband services. All 65 megahertz of AWS-3 spectrum have been found suitable and available and are currently included in the spectrum screen.

AWS-3 licensees must individually apply for and receive a separate license for each transmitter if the proposed operation will affect the radio quiet zones set forth in the Commission's rules.

In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 113, an applicant must first follow the procedures to submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically via the FCC's Auction Application Portal, following the instructions set forth in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. The short-form application will become available with the opening of the initial filing window and must be submitted prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026. Late applications will not be accepted. No application fee is required for short-form applications. However, in Amendment of the Schedule of Application Fees, 86 FR 15026 (March 19, 2021), the Commission adopted a long-form application filing fee that includes an amount to recover costs for processing the short-form application, and each Auction 113 winning bidder must submit the filing fee prescribed in 47 CFR 1.1102 with each separate long-form application.

Applications may be filed at any time beginning at 12:00 p.m. ET on January 26, 2026, until the filing window closes at 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026. Applicants are strongly encouraged to file early and are responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. There are no limits or restrictions on the number of times an application can be updated or amended until the initial filing deadline on February 11, 2026.

An applicant must always click on the CERTIFY & SUBMIT button on the Certify & Submit screen to successfully submit its FCC Form 175 and any modifications; otherwise, the application or changes to the application will not be received or reviewed by Commission staff. Additional information about accessing, completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is provided in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. Applicants requiring technical assistance should contact FCC Auctions Technical Support using the contact information provided in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice. In order to provide better service to the public, all calls to Technical Support are recorded.

After the deadline for filing auction applications, the Commission will process all timely submitted applications to determine whether each applicant has complied with the application requirements and provided all information concerning its qualifications for bidding. OEA will issue a public notice with applicants' initial application status, identifying: (1) those that are complete; and (2) those that are incomplete or deficient because of defects that may be corrected. The public notice will include the deadline for resubmitting corrected applications and an electronic copy will be sent by email to the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 for each applicant. In addition, each applicant with an incomplete application will be sent information on the nature of the deficiencies in its application, along with the name and contact information of a Commission staff member who can answer questions specific to the application.

After the initial application filing deadline on February 11, 2026, applicants can make only minor modifications to their applications. Minor amendments include any changes that are not major, such as: the deletion or addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three); revision of addresses and telephone numbers of the applicant, its responsible party, and its contact person; correcting typographical errors; and supplying or correcting information as requested to support the certifications made in the application. Major modifications ( e.g., change of license selection, change in ownership that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control of the applicant, change in the required certifications, change in applicant's legal classification that results in a change in control, or change in claimed eligibility for a higher percentage of bidding credit) will not be permitted. If an amendment reporting changes is a “major amendment,” as described in 47 CFR 1.2105(b)(2), the major amendment will not be accepted and may result in the dismissal of the application. After the deadline for resubmitting corrected applications, an applicant will have no further opportunity to cure any deficiencies in its application or provide any additional information that may affect Commission staff's ultimate determination of whether and to what extent the applicant is qualified to participate in Auction 113 and whether the applicant may be eligible to pursue any bidding credit claim.

Commission staff will communicate only with an applicant's contact person or certifying official, as designated on the applicant's FCC Form 175, unless the applicant's certifying official or contact person notifies Commission staff in writing that another representative is authorized to speak on the applicant's behalf. Authorizations may be sent by email to auction113@fcc.gov.

After Commission staff reviews resubmitted applications and upfront payments, OEA will release a Qualified Bidders Public Notice identifying applicants that have become qualified bidders for the auction. The Qualified Bidders Public Notice will be issued before bidding in the auction begins. Qualified bidders are those applicants with submitted FCC Form 175 applications that are deemed timely filed and complete and that have made a timely and sufficient upfront payment.

In order to be eligible to bid in Auction 113, a sufficient upfront payment and a complete and accurate FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03) must be submitted before 6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026. After completing its short-form application, an applicant will have access to an electronic blank version of the FCC Form 159. An accurate and complete FCC Form 159 must accompany each payment. Proper completion of this form is critical to ensuring correct crediting of upfront payments. Payers are responsible for ensuring that all information entered on the FCC Form 159, including payment amounts, is accurate. Instructions for completing FCC Form 159 for Auction 113 are provided below.

All upfront payments for Auction 113 must be transmitted by electronic wire transfer directly from a bank or other financial institution to the proper account at the U.S. Treasury. Wire transfer payments for Auction 113 must be received before 6:00 p.m. ET on April 8, 2026. No other payment method is acceptable. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss arrangements (including bank closing schedules and other specific bank wire transfer requirements, such as an in-person written request before a specified time of day) with their bankers several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and must allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed before the deadline. The following information will be needed:

At least one hour before placing the order for the wire transfer (but on the same business day), applicants must print and fax a completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to the FCC at (202) 418-2843. Alternatively, the completed form can be scanned and sent as an attachment to an email to RROGWireFaxes@fcc.gov. On the fax cover sheet or in the email subject header, write “Wire Transfer—Auction Payment for Auction 113.” To meet the upfront payment deadline, an applicant's payment must be credited to the Commission's account for Auction 113 before the deadline.

Each applicant is responsible for ensuring the timely submission of its upfront payment and for timely filing an accurate and complete FCC Form 159. An applicant should coordinate with its financial institution well ahead of the due date regarding its wire transfer and allow sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed prior to the deadline. The Commission repeatedly has cautioned auction participants about the importance of planning ahead to prepare for unforeseen last-minute difficulties in making payments by wire transfer. Each applicant also is responsible for obtaining confirmation from its financial institution that its wire transfer to the U.S. Treasury was successful and from Commission staff that its upfront payment was timely received and that it was deposited into the proper account. As a regulatory requirement, the U.S. Treasury screens all payments from all financial institutions before deposits are made available to specified accounts. If wires are suspended, the U.S. Treasury may direct questions regarding any transfer to the financial institution initiating the wire. Each applicant must take care to assure that any questions directed to its financial institution(s) are addressed promptly. To receive confirmation from Commission staff, contact Scott Radcliffe of the Office of Managing Director's Revenue & Receivables Operations Group/Auctions at (202) 418-7518 or Theresa Meeks at (202) 418-2945.

Please note the following information regarding upfront payments:

• All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.

• All payments must be made by wire transfer.

• Upfront payments for Auction 113 go to an account number different from the accounts used in previous FCC auctions.

Failure to deliver a sufficient upfront payment as instructed herein by the upfront payment deadline will result in dismissal of the short-form application and disqualification from participation in the auction.

The following information supplements the standard instructions for FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) and is provided to help ensure the correct completion of FCC Form 159 for upfront payments for Auction 113. Applicants need to complete FCC Form 159 carefully because:

• Mistakes may affect bidding eligibility; and

• Lack of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03), FCC Form 175, long-form application (FCC Form 601), and correspondence about an application may cause processing delays.

Therefore, appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form 159 Remittance Advice and the short-form application (FCC Form 175) are described in the following chart:

An upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each applicant seeking to participate in bidding to establish its eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments that are related to the inventory of licenses being auctioned protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at the close of bidding.

Applicants that are former defaulters must pay upfront payments 50% greater than non-former defaulters. For purposes of classification as a former defaulter or a former delinquent, defaults and delinquencies of the applicant itself and its controlling interests are included.

An applicant must make an upfront payment sufficient to obtain bidding eligibility on the licenses on which it will bid. OEA and WTB adopt the proposals in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice to set upfront payments based on the MHz-pops of each license offered in the auction and to determine an applicant's initial bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may place bids in any single round, based on the amount of the upfront payment. In order to bid for a license, qualified bidders must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum, therefore, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to establish eligibility to bid on at least one license in a market selected on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 113, or else the applicant will not become qualified to participate in the auction. The total upfront payment does not affect the total dollar amount the bidder may bid.

The Commission has authority to determine appropriate upfront payments for each license being auctioned, taking into account such factors as the efficiency of the auction process and the potential value of similar licenses. In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB proposed to base upfront payments for the paired licenses on dollars per MHz-pop in three population tiers: $0.005 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of less than 300,000, $0.01 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 300,000 and less than 1,000,000, $0.025 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 1,000,000, and $0.005 per MHz-pop for the unpaired licenses and sought comment on this proposal. OEA and WTB received no comment on this proposal. OEA and WTB believe that this methodology is appropriate here and therefore adopt it. For all licenses, upfront payments will be subject to a minimum of $500 per license. The upfront payment amount per license is set forth in the Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.

Additionally, for the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB adopt the proposal to assign each license a specific number of bidding units, equal to one bidding unit per $100 of the upfront payment, which is necessary for implementing the activity requirement described in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, and facilitates the efficient conduct of the auction. The number of bidding units for a given license is fixed and does not change during the auction as prices change. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine the maximum number of bidding units on which it may wish to bid in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering that number of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should add together the bidding units for the licenses on which it seeks to be active in any given round. Applicants should check their calculations carefully, as there is no provision for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.

If an applicant is a former defaulter, it must calculate its upfront payment for the maximum number of licenses on which it plans to bid by multiplying the number of bidding units on which it wishes to be active by 1.5. In order to calculate the number of bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will calculate the number of bidding units a non-former defaulter would get for the upfront payment received, divide that number by 1.5, and round the result up to the nearest bidding unit. If a former defaulter fails to submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid on at least one license, the applicant will not be eligible to bid in Auction 113.

All qualified bidders for Auction 113 are automatically registered for the auction. Registration materials will be distributed prior to the auction by overnight delivery. The mailing will be sent only to the contact person at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will include the SecurID® tokens that will be required to place bids.

Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder for Auction 113 that has not received this mailing by noon on May 15, 2026, should call the Auctions Hotline at (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration mailing is critical to participating in the auction, and each applicant is responsible for ensuring it has received all the registration materials.

In the event that a SecurID® token is lost or damaged, only a person who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the contact person, or the certifying official on the applicant's short-form application may request a replacement. To request a replacement, call the Auction Bidder Line at the telephone number provided in the registration materials or the Auction Hotline at (717) 338-2868.

Bidders will be able to participate in Auction 113 over the internet using the bidding system. In addition, bidders will have the option of placing bids by telephone through a dedicated auction bidder line. Please note that telephonic bid assistants are required to use a script when entering bids placed by telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient time to bid by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a round. The length of a call to place a telephonic bid may vary; please allow a minimum of 10 minutes. The toll-free telephone number for the auction bidder line will be provided to qualified bidders prior to the start of bidding in the auction.

Only qualified bidders are permitted to bid. Each authorized bidder must have his or her own SecurID® token, which the Commission will provide at no charge. Each applicant will be issued three SecurID® tokens. A bidder cannot bid without his or her SecurID® token. In order to access the bidding function of the bidding system, bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the passcode generated by the SecurID® token and a personal identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. For security purposes, the SecurID® tokens and a telephone number for bidding questions are only mailed to the contact person at the contact address listed on the FCC Form 175. Each SecurID® token is tailored to a specific auction. SecurID® tokens issued for other auctions or obtained from a source other than the FCC will not work for Auction 113. Please note that the SecurID® tokens can be recycled, and the Commission requests that bidders return the tokens to the FCC. Pre-addressed envelopes will be provided to return the tokens once the auction has ended.

The Commission makes no warranties whatsoever and shall not be deemed to have made any warranties, with respect to the bidding system, including any implied warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall the Commission, or any of its officers, employees, or agents, be liable for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of business profits, business interruption, loss of use, revenue, or business information, or any other direct, indirect, or consequential damages) arising out of or relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning, or use of the bidding system. Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the Commission's technical, programming, or other advice or service provided in connection with the bidding system.

To the extent an issue arises with the bidding system itself, the Commission will take all appropriate measures to resolve such issues quickly and equitably. Should an issue arise that is outside the bidding system or attributable to a bidder, including, but not limited to, a bidder's hardware, software, or internet access problem that prevents the bidder from submitting a bid prior to the end of a round, the Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the bidder. Similarly, if an issue arises due to bidder error using the bidding system, the Commission shall have no obligation to resolve or remediate such an issue on behalf of the bidder. Accordingly, after the close of a bidding round, the results of bid processing will not be altered absent evidence of any failure in the bidding system.

All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock auction. The mock auction, which will begin on May 29, 2026, will enable qualified bidders to become familiar with the bidding system and to practice submitting bids prior to the auction. OEA and WTB recommend that all qualified bidders, including all their authorized bidders, participate to assure that they can log in to the bidding system and gain experience with the bidding procedures. Participating in the mock auction may reduce the likelihood of a bidder making a mistake during the auction. Details regarding the mock auction will be announced in the Qualified Bidders Public Notice for Auction 113.

As is the case with many business investment opportunities, some unscrupulous parties may attempt to use Auction 113 to deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals of fraud include the following:

• The first contact is a “cold call” from a telemarketer or is made in response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television infomercial.

• The offering materials used to invest in the venture appear to be targeted at IRA funds, for example, by including all documents and papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA accounts.

• The amount of investment is less than $25,000.

• The sales representative makes verbal representations that: (a) the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), FCC, or other government agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not subject to state or federal securities laws; or (c) the investment will yield unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the offering materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or quotes from FCC personnel, giving the appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of the solicitation.

Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is available from the FCC, as well as the FTC and SEC. Additional sources of information for potential bidders and investors may be obtained from the following sources:

• the FCC's Consumer Call Center at (888) 225-5322 or by visiting www.fcc.gov/general/frauds-scams-and-alerts-guides.

• the FTC at (877) FTC-HELP ((877) 382-4357) or by visiting https://consumer.ftc.gov/.

• the SEC at (800) 732-0330 or by visiting https://www.investor.gov/.

Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Consumer League's Fraud Center at https://fraud.org/ or (202) 835-3323, Ext. 815.

An application to participate in Auction 113, referred to as a short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information concerning the applicant's legal, technical, and/or financial qualifications to participate in a Commission auction for spectrum licenses or permits. The short-form application is the first part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In the first phase, a party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file a short-form application in which it certifies, under penalty of perjury, that it is qualified to participate. Eligibility to participate in Auction 113 is determined based on an applicant's short-form application and certifications and on the applicant's upfront payment. Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2105, each applicant must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and its participation in the auction, and it must confirm that it is legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a Commission license. An auction applicant's failure to make the required certifications in its short-form application by the applicable filing deadline would render its application unacceptable for filing, its application would be dismissed with prejudice, and it would be ineligible to participate further in the auction. One commenter requests that the Commission “develop and mandate a Certification of Tribal Spectrum Access for all licensees.” No parties commented on this request, and the request is outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

After bidding closes, in the second phase of the process, each winning bidder in Auction 113 must file a more comprehensive post-auction long-form application (FCC Form 601) for the licenses it wins in the auction, and it must have a complete and accurate ownership disclosure information report (FCC Form 602) on file with the Commission. OEA and WTB remind applicants that being deemed qualified to bid in Auction 113 does not constitute a determination that a party is qualified to hold a Commission license or is eligible for a designated entity bidding credit.

A party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file an FCC Form 175 electronically via the Auction Application Portal (AAP) in the AAS prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on February 11, 2026, following the procedures prescribed in the FCC Form 175 Instructions. In order to access the AAP within the AAS to create a new auction application for an applicant, or save, edit, view, and/or withdraw an existing application for the applicant, an individual must: (1) have a unique email address associated with an FCC Username account that is associated with the applicant's FCC Registration Number (FRN) in the Commission Registration System (CORES), (2) be granted the appropriate permissions in CORES by an Administrator of that FRN, and (3) be assigned the appropriate Auctions Permissions in the AAP by the Administrator of that FRN. The AAS includes security features that are being implemented for the first time in Auction 113, including the use of multifactor authentication. The Commission expects to make the AAS available to the public for the Administrator(s) for an FRN to assign the appropriate Auctions Permissions in the AAP to each unique FCC Username associated with that FRN on January 7, 2026.

An Auction 113 applicant bears full responsibility for submitting an accurate, complete, and timely short-form application. Pursuant to the Commission's competitive bidding rules, an applicant must make a series of certifications under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 related to the information provided in its application and its participation in the auction, and an applicant must confirm that it is legally, technically, financially, and otherwise qualified to hold a license. If an applicant claims eligibility for a bidding credit, then the information provided in its FCC Form 175 will be used to determine whether the applicant appears to be eligible for the claimed bidding credit, with the final determination of bidding credit eligibility to occur based on a winning bidder's post-auction long-form application. Each participant in Auction 113 must also certify that it has read the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice and familiarized itself both with the auction procedures and with the requirements for obtaining a license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands. If an Auction 113 applicant fails to make the required certifications in its FCC Form 175 by the filing deadline, then its application will be deemed unacceptable for filing and cannot be corrected after the filing deadline.

An applicant should note that submitting an FCC Form 175 (and any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation by the certifying official that he or she is an authorized representative of the applicant with authority to bind the applicant, that he or she has read the form's instructions and certifications, and that the contents of the application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and correct. Submitting a false certification to the Commission may result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.

Applicants are cautioned that, because the required information submitted in FCC Form 175 bears on each applicant's qualifications, requests for confidential treatment will not be routinely granted. The Commission generally has held that it may publicly release confidential business information where the party has put that information at issue in a Commission proceeding or where the Commission has identified a compelling public interest in disclosing the information. In this regard, OEA and WTB have previously concluded that information submitted in support of receiving bidding credits in auction proceedings should be made available to the public.

An applicant must designate between one and three individuals as authorized bidders in its FCC Form 175. The Commission's rules prohibit an individual from serving as an authorized bidder for more than one auction applicant.

To access the bidding system, each authorized bidder will be required to have a unique email address associated with an FCC Username account that is associated with the applicant's FRN in CORES. The email address associated with an FCC Username account is also the FCC Username for that account. If an authorized bidder does not provide an FCC Username that is associated with the applicant's FRN in the applicant's FCC Form 175, that bidder will be unable to place or submit bids. For further details, applicants should refer to the FCC Form 175 Instructions for Auction 113.

No individual or entity may file more than one short-form application or have a controlling interest in more than one short-form application. If a party submits multiple short-form applications for an auction, then only one application may form the basis for that party to become qualified to bid in that auction.

Similarly, and consistent with the Commission's general prohibition on joint bidding agreements, a party generally is permitted to participate in a Commission auction only through a single bidding entity. Accordingly, the filing of applications in Auction 113 by multiple entities controlled by the same individual or set of individuals generally will not be permitted. As noted by the Commission in adopting the prohibition on applications by commonly controlled entities, this rule, in conjunction with the prohibition against joint bidding agreements, protects the competitiveness of the Commission's auctions.

After the initial short-form application filing deadline, Commission staff will review each timely submitted application to determine whether it complies with the application requirements. Following this review, a public notice will be released announcing the status of the submitted applications and establishing an application resubmission filing window, during which an applicant may make minor modifications to its application to address identified deficiencies. To become a qualified bidder, an applicant must have a complete application ( i.e., have timely filed an application that is deemed complete after the deadline for correcting any identified deficiencies) and make a timely and sufficient upfront payment. Qualified bidders will be identified by public notice at least 10 days prior to the mock auction.

The Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice provides details regarding certain information required to be submitted in the FCC Form 175, however, an applicant should consult the Commission's rules to ensure that, in addition to the materials described in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, all required information is included in its short-form application. To the extent the information in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice does not address an applicant's specific operating structure, or if the applicant needs additional information or guidance concerning the described disclosure requirements, the applicant should review the educational materials for Auction 113 (see the Education section on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113 ) and use the contact information provided in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice to consult with Commission staff to better understand the information that it must submit in its short-form application.

For the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB adopt the proposal to require any applicant seeking to participate in Auction 113 to certify in its short-form application, under penalty of perjury, that it has read the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice adopting procedures for Auction 113 and that it has familiarized itself with these procedures and with the requirements for obtaining a license and operating facilities in the AWS-3 bands.

This certification is designed to bolster applicants' efforts to educate themselves about the procedures for auction participation and to ensure that, prior to submitting their short-form applications, applicants understand their obligation to stay abreast of relevant information. Familiarity with the Commission's rules and procedures governing Auction 113 may also help bidders avoid the consequences to them associated with defaults, which also cause harm to other applicants and the public by reducing the efficiency of the auction process and reducing the likelihood that the license will be assigned to the bidder that values it the most. This certification, along with the other certifications required pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2105(a), will promote the submission of applications that meet the Commission's requirements, thereby leading to a more efficient application process.

A substantively similar requirement was instituted for Auctions 110, 108, and 112. This requirement furthers a long-standing policy under which the Commission expressly places a burden upon each applicant to be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms, and conditions contained in the relevant Procedures Public Notice and any future public notices that may be released in the auction proceeding. While the certification OEA and WTB add refers to information regarding auction procedures and licensing that is available at the time of certification, potential auction applicants are on notice from the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice that their educational efforts must continue even after their short-form applications are filed. Commission staff routinely makes available detailed educational materials, such as interactive, online tutorials and technical guides, to enhance interested parties' comprehension of the pre-bidding and bidding processes and to help applicants minimize their need to engage outside engineers, legal counsel, or other auction experts.

For these reasons, OEA and WTB will require each Auction 113 applicant to certify as follows in its short-form application:

An applicant must provide this certification under penalty of perjury, consistent with 47 CFR 1.2105(a). This certification must be provided in addition to the certifications already required under 47 CFR 1.2105. As with the other certifications required in the short-form application, an applicant's failure to make this certification in its FCC Form 175 by the February 11, 2026 short-form filing deadline will render its application unacceptable for filing, and its application will be dismissed with prejudice.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal to require each applicant that selects on its short-form application any market in which there is a license in the 1755-1780 MHz band available for bidding to submit as an attachment to its short-form application a signed statement acknowledging that the applicant's operations in the 1755-1780 MHz band may be subject to interference from Federal systems, that the applicant must accept interference from incumbent Federal operations, and that the applicant has considered these risks before submitting any bids for applicable licenses in Auction 113. The specific text that must be included in the required acknowledgement statement is contained in Attachment B to the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice. The acknowledgement statement must be signed by the same individual that signs the application on behalf of the applicant.

Auction 113 will offer 200 licenses in 199 markets. An applicant must select all of the markets in which it may want to bid from the list of available markets on its FCC Form 175. One market, EA173, has two licenses available (one in frequency block H and one in frequency block I). An applicant that wishes to bid on either license in that market must select the market (and will be therefore eligible to bid on both licenses, assuming that it otherwise has sufficient bidding eligibility), even if it intends to bid on only one license and not the other. An applicant must carefully review and verify its selections before the FCC Form 175 filing deadline because those selections cannot be changed after the auction application filing deadline. An applicant is not required to place bids on any of the licenses in the markets it selects, but the bidding system will not accept bids for license(s) in a market that the applicant did not select in its FCC Form 175.

When two or more short-form applications are submitted selecting the same market in Auction 113, mutual exclusivity exists for auction purposes as to the license(s) in that market, and those license(s) must be awarded by competitive bidding procedures. Once mutual exclusivity exists for auction purposes, even if only one applicant is qualified to bid for a particular license, that applicant is required to submit a bid in order to obtain the license.

An applicant must provide in its FCC Form 175 a brief description of, and identify each party to, any partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or other agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements that address or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the applicant, is a party. In connection with the agreement disclosure requirement, the applicant must certify under penalty of perjury in its FCC Form 175 that it has described, and identified each party to any such agreements, arrangements, or understandings to which it (or any party that controls it or that it controls) is a party. Moreover, since each applicant must maintain the accuracy and completeness of the information in its pending auction application, if it enters into any agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned after the FCC Form 175 filing deadline, then that agreement is subject to these same disclosure requirements.

For purposes of making the required agreement disclosures on the FCC Form 175, if parties agree in principle on all material terms prior to the application filing deadline, then each party to the agreement that is submitting an auction application must provide a brief description of, and identify the other party or parties to, the agreement on its respective FCC Form 175, even if the agreement has not been reduced to writing. Parties that have not agreed in principle by the FCC Form 175 filing deadline should not describe, or include the names of parties to, the discussions on their applications.

The Commission's rules generally prohibit joint bidding and other arrangements involving auction applicants (including any party that controls or is controlled by such applicants). For purposes of the prohibition, a joint bidding arrangement includes any arrangement relating to the licenses being auctioned that addresses or communicates, directly or indirectly, bidding in the auction, bidding strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangement relating to the post-auction market structure.

This prohibition applies to joint bidding arrangements involving two or more nationwide providers, as well as joint bidding arrangements involving a nationwide provider and one or more non-nationwide providers, where at least one party to the arrangement is an applicant for the auction. In the Updating Part 1 Report and Order, 80 FR 56764 (September 18, 2015), the Commission stated that entities that qualify as nationwide providers generally would be identified in procedures public notices released before each auction. To that end, in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB proposed to identify AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as “nationwide providers” for the purpose of implementing the competitive bidding rules in Auction 113, including 47 CFR 1.2105(c), the rule prohibiting certain communications, which is consistent with the Commission's decisions in recent spectrum auctions and the 2024 Communications Marketplace Report, FCC 24-136 (released December 31, 2024).

One commenter requests that OEA and WTB also identify EchoStar Corporation (EchoStar), or any bidders “with whom EchoStar has agreements,” as a “nationwide provider” for purposes of Auction 113, citing the public statements made by DISH Network (DISH) and EchoStar that have referred to DISH's “nationwide 5G network” and because EchoStar's Boost Mobile Network touts 99% coverage. OEA and WTB decline to adopt this suggestion for Auction 113. The Commission has historically relied, in part, on the Communications Marketplace Report among its justifications for a determination of which entities are considered to be “nationwide providers” for competitive bidding purposes, and the Commission's most recent report, released in December 2024, did not identify EchoStar as a nationwide provider. In addition, EchoStar's geographic coverage as reflected on the Commission's National Broadband Map, is substantially less than that of AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon. Moreover, EchoStar's Boost Mobile is partially a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO), and its purported “99%” coverage that this commenter refers to is based in part on the nationwide networks of its wholesale providers ( e.g., AT&T and T-Mobile). OEA and WTB therefore adopt their proposal to identify only AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon as “nationwide providers” for purposes of implementing the competitive bidding rules in Auction 113.

Under certain circumstances, a non-nationwide provider may enter into an agreement to form a consortium or a joint venture (as applicable) that results in a single party applying to participate in an auction. Specifically, a designated entity can participate in one consortium or joint venture in an auction, and non-nationwide providers that are not designated entities may participate in an auction through only one joint venture. A non-nationwide provider may enter into only one agreement to form a consortium or joint venture (as applicable), and such consortium or joint venture shall be the exclusive bidding vehicle for its members in the auction. The general prohibition on joint bidding arrangements excludes certain agreements, including those that are solely operational in nature, as defined in 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(ix)(A)-(C).

To implement the prohibition on joint bidding arrangements, the Commission's rules require each applicant to certify in its short-form application that it has disclosed any arrangements or understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned to which it (or any party that controls or is controlled by it) is a party. The applicant must also certify that it (or any party that controls or is controlled by it) has not entered and will not enter into any arrangement or understanding of any kind relating directly or indirectly to bidding at auction with, among others, any other applicant or a nationwide provider.

Although the Commission's rules do not prohibit auction applicants from communicating about matters that are within the scope of an excepted agreement that has been disclosed in an FCC Form 175, OEA and WTB remind applicants that certain discussions or exchanges could nonetheless touch upon impermissible subject matters, and that compliance with the Commission's rules will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.

Applicants should bear in mind that a winning bidder will be required to disclose in its post-auction long-form application, the specific terms, conditions, and parties involved in any agreement relating to the licenses being auctioned into which it had entered prior to the time bidding was completed. This applies to any bidding consortium, joint venture, partnership, or other agreement, arrangement, or understanding of any kind entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, including any agreements relating to the licenses being auctioned that address or communicate directly or indirectly bids (including specific prices), bidding strategies (including the specific licenses on which to bid or not to bid), or the post-auction market structure, to which the applicant, or any party that controls or is controlled by the applicant, is a party.

Each applicant must comply with the applicable part 1 ownership disclosure requirements and provide information required by 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2112, and, when applicable, 47 CFR 1.2110. Specifically, in completing FCC Form 175, an applicant must fully disclose information regarding the real party- or parties-in-interest in the applicant or application and the ownership structure of the applicant, including both direct and indirect ownership interests of 10% or more, as prescribed in 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2112 and, where applicable, 47 CFR 1.2110. Each applicant is responsible for ensuring that information submitted in its short-form application is complete and accurate.

In certain circumstances, an applicant may have previously filed an FCC Form 602 ownership disclosure information report or filed an application to participate in a previous auction in which ownership information was disclosed. If in that previous filing, the applicant used the same FRN the applicant is using to create its FCC Form 175 for Auction 113, the applicant will have the option to pre-fill the most current ownership information contained in any such filing into certain ownership sections on the applicant's FCC Form 175, if such information is in an electronic format compatible with FCC Form 175. Applicants who want to take advantage of the pre-fill option are encouraged to submit an FCC Form 602 ownership report or update any ownership information on file with the Commission in an FCC Form 602 ownership report prior to starting a short-form application for Auction 113 to ensure that their most recent ownership information is pre-filled into their short-form application. Each applicant must carefully review any ownership information that has been pre-filled into its FCC Form 175, including any ownership attachments, to confirm that all information supplied on FCC Form 175 is complete and accurate as of the application filing deadline. Any information that needs to be corrected or updated must be changed directly in FCC Form 175.

47 U.S.C. 310 requires the Commission to review foreign investment in radio station licenses and imposes specific restrictions on who may hold certain types of radio licenses. 47 U.S.C. 310 applies to applications for initial radio licenses, applications for assignments and transfers of control of radio licenses, and spectrum leasing arrangements under the Commission's secondary market rules. In completing FCC Form 175, an applicant is required to disclose information concerning foreign ownership of the applicant. If an applicant has foreign ownership interests in excess of the applicable limit or benchmark set forth in 47 U.S.C. 310(b), then it may seek to participate in Auction 113 as long as it has filed a petition for declaratory ruling with the Commission prior to the FCC Form 175 filing deadline. An applicant must certify in its FCC Form 175 that, as of the deadline for filing its application to participate in the auction, the applicant either is in compliance with the foreign ownership provisions of 47 U.S.C. 310 or has filed a petition for declaratory ruling requesting Commission approval to exceed the applicable foreign ownership limit or benchmark in 47 U.S.C. 310(b) that is pending before, or has been granted by, the Commission.

In Auction 113, designated entity bidding credits will be available to applicants that demonstrate eligibility for a small business or a rural service provider bidding credit and are subsequently winning bidders in the auction. A bidding credit represents an amount by which an eligible small business or rural service provider bidder's overall payment across the licenses won may be discounted, subject to the specified caps on the total bidding credit discount they may receive adopted in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice. These bidding credits will not be cumulative—an applicant is permitted to request either a small business bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding credit, but not both.

The Commission's rules regarding designated entity bidding credits provide for, among other things: (1) a two-pronged standard for evaluating eligibility for small business benefits, (2) updated gross revenue requirements for determining whether a small business is eligible for a 15% or 25% bidding credit, (3) a bidding credit for eligible rural service providers, and (4) an attribution rule for certain disclosable interest holders of applicants claiming eligibility for bidding credits. An applicant seeking a designated entity bidding credit must disclose in its short-form application additional information demonstrating its eligibility for that bidding credit, and must also certify that it is eligible for the bidding credit it requests in its FCC Form 175.

In addition to the information provided in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, each applicant should review carefully the Commission's decisions regarding eligibility for designated entity benefits as well as the part 1 rules. In particular, OEA and WTB remind applicants requesting bidding credits that they should take due account of the requirements of the Commission's rules and implementing orders regarding de jure and de facto control of such applicants. Nearly all of the spectrum associated with the licenses to be offered in Auction 113 is in the Commission's inventory in connection with two Auction 97 winning bidders having claimed small business bidding credits for which the Commission later determined they were ineligible. Applicants should be mindful that the Commission will closely examine qualifications of all applicant claims of bidding credit eligibility and strictly enforce its designated entity eligibility requirements.

Moreover, the Commission's rules include a prohibition, which applies to all applicants (whether they seek bidding credits or not), against changes in ownership of the applicant that would constitute an assignment or transfer of control after the initial filing deadline for FCC Form 175. Applicants should not expect to receive any opportunities to revise their ownership structure after the filing of their short- and long-form applications, including making revisions to their agreements or other arrangements with interest holders, lenders, or others in order to address potential concerns relating to compliance with the designated entity bidding credit requirements.

This policy will help to ensure compliance with the Commission's rules applicable to the award of bidding credits prior to the conduct of the auction, which will involve competing bids from those that do and do not seek bidding credits, and thus preserves the integrity of the auction process. OEA and WTB also believe that this will meet the Commission's statutory objectives in awarding licenses through the competitive bidding process.

OEA and WTB did not make any proposals or seek comment in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice on eligibility for bidding credits or the small business bidding credit levels for Auction 113, however, two parties offered comments on this topic, seeking to roll back to the small business definitions and bidding credits and other designated entity rules that had been used in Auction 97 held in 2014. These comments are not addressed in this proceeding because the Commission has already addressed those contentions and determined bidding credit eligibility and the levels of small business bidding credits available in Auction 113 in the 2025 AWS-3 Report and Order.

For Auction 113, bidding credits will be available to eligible small businesses and consortia thereof, subject to the bidding credit caps adopted in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice. Under the service rules applicable to AWS-3 band licenses to be offered in Auction 113, the two-tiers of bidding credits available are determined as follows:

• A bidder that qualifies as a “small business”— i.e., one with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $55 million for the preceding five years—is eligible to receive a 15% discount on its overall payment.

• A bidder that qualifies as a “very small business”— i.e., one with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $20 million for the preceding five years—is eligible to receive a 25% discount on its overall payment.

Small business bidding credits are not cumulative; an eligible applicant may receive either the 15% or the 25% bidding credit on its overall payment, but not both. The Commission's unjust enrichment provisions also apply to a winning bidder that uses a bidding credit and subsequently seeks to assign or transfer control of its license within a certain period to an entity not qualifying for at least the same level of small business bidding credit.

Each applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must disclose the gross revenues for the preceding five years for each of the following: (1) the applicant, (2) its affiliates, (3) its controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of its controlling interests. The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 113. In addition, to the extent that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won in Auction 113, the applicant must disclose the identity and the attributable gross revenues of any such disclosable interest holder. This attribution rule will be applied on a license-by-license basis. As a result, an applicant may be eligible for a bidding credit on some, but not all, of the licenses for which it is bidding in Auction 113. If an applicant is applying as a consortium of small businesses, then the disclosures described in this paragraph must be provided for each consortium member.

An eligible applicant may request a 15% discount on its overall payment using a rural service provider bidding credit, subject to the cap discussed below. To be eligible for a rural service provider bidding credit, an applicant must: (1) be a service provider that is in the business of providing commercial communications services and, together with its controlling interests, affiliates, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, has fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers; and (2) serve predominantly rural areas. Rural areas are defined as counties with a population density of 100 or fewer persons per square mile. An applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must provide the number of subscribers served as of the short-form application deadline. An applicant may count any subscriber as a single subscriber even if that subscriber receives more than one service.

Each applicant seeking a rural service provider bidding credit must disclose the number of its subscribers, along with the number of subscribers of its affiliates, controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. The applicant must also submit an attachment that lists all parties with which the applicant has entered into any spectrum use agreements or arrangements for any licenses that may be won by the applicant in Auction 113. In addition, to the extent that an applicant has an agreement with any disclosable interest holder for the use of more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license that may be won in Auction 113, the identity and the attributable subscribers of any such disclosable interest holder must be disclosed. Like applicants seeking eligibility for small business bidding credits, eligible rural service providers may also form a consortium. If an applicant is applying as a consortium of rural service providers, then the disclosures described in this paragraph, including the certification, must be provided for each consortium member.

Controlling Interests and Affiliates. Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.2110, an applicant's eligibility for bidding credits is determined by attributing the gross revenues (for those seeking small business benefits) or subscribers (for those seeking rural service provider benefits) of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests. This information must therefore be disclosed in the short-form application of any auction participant seeking a small business or rural service provider bidding credit. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and entities with either de facto or de jure control of the applicant. Typically, ownership of greater than 50% of an entity's voting stock evidences de jure control. De facto control is determined on a case-by-case basis based on the totality of the circumstances. The following are some common indicia of de facto control:

• the entity constitutes or appoints more than 50% of the board of directors or management committee;

• the entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire senior executives that control the day-to-day activities of the licensee; and

• the entity plays an integral role in management decisions.

Additionally, for attribution purposes, officers and directors of an applicant seeking a bidding credit are considered to have a controlling interest in the applicant. Applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2) and the FCC Form 175 Instructions to understand how certain interests are calculated in determining control for purposes of attributing gross revenues.

Affiliates of an applicant or controlling interest include an individual or entity that: (1) directly or indirectly controls or has the power to control the applicant, (2) is directly or indirectly controlled by the applicant, (3) is directly or indirectly controlled by a third party that also controls or has the power to control the applicant, or (4) has an “identity of interest” with the applicant. The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant encompasses both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates of controlling interests of the applicant. For more information on how to disclose information regarding controlling interests and affiliates, applicants should refer to 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2) and (c)(5) respectively, as well as the FCC Form 175 Instructions.

An applicant seeking a small business bidding credit must demonstrate, through its disclosures, its eligibility for the bidding credit by: (1) meeting the applicable small business size standard, based on the Commission's controlling interest and affiliation rules; and (2) retaining control, on a license-by-license basis, over the spectrum associated with the licenses for which it seeks small business benefits. For purposes of the first prong of the standard, applicants should note that control and affiliation may arise through, among other things, ownership interests, voting interests, management and other operating agreements, or the terms of any other types of agreements—including spectrum lease agreements—that independently or together create a controlling, or potentially controlling, interest in the applicant's or licensee's business as a whole. In addition, once an applicant demonstrates eligibility as a small business under the first prong, it must also be eligible for benefits on a license-by-license basis under the second prong. As part of making the FCC Form 175 certification that it is qualified as a designated entity under 47 CFR 1.2110, an applicant is certifying that it does not have any spectrum use or other agreements that would confer either de jure or de facto control of any license it seeks to acquire with bidding credits.

With respect to the retention of control over the spectrum associated with the licenses at issue, applicants should note that, under this standard for evaluating eligibility for small business bidding credits, if an applicant executes a spectrum use agreement that does not comply with the Commission's relevant standard of de facto control, then it will be subject to unjust enrichment obligations for the benefits associated with that particular license. If that spectrum use agreement (either alone or in combination with the Commission's designated entity controlling interest and attribution rules) goes so far as to confer control of the applicant's overall business, then the gross revenues of the additional interest holders will be attributed to the applicant, which could render the applicant ineligible for all current and future small business benefits on all licenses.

Limitation on Spectrum Use. Under 47 CFR 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(J), the gross revenues (or the subscribers, in the case of a rural service provider) of an applicant's disclosable interest holder are attributable to the applicant, on a license-by-license basis, if the disclosable interest holder has an agreement with the applicant to use, in any manner, more than 25% of the spectrum capacity of any license won by the applicant and acquired with a bidding credit during the five-year unjust enrichment period for the applicable license. For purposes of this requirement, a disclosable interest holder of an applicant seeking designated entity benefits is defined as any individual or entity holding a 10% or greater interest of any kind in the applicant, including but not limited to, a 10% or greater interest in any class of stock, warrants, options, or debt securities in the applicant or licensee. Any applicant seeking a bidding credit for licenses won in Auction 113 will be subject to this attribution rule and must make the requisite disclosures.

Certain disclosable interest holders may be excluded from this attribution rule. Specifically, an applicant claiming the rural service provider bidding credit may have a spectrum license use agreement with a disclosable interest holder, without having to attribute the disclosable interest holder's subscribers, so long as the disclosable interest holder is independently eligible for a rural service provider credit and the disclosable interest holder's spectrum use and any spectrum use agreement is otherwise permissible under the Commission's existing rules. If applicable, the applicant must attach to its FCC Form 175 any additional information as may be required to indicate any license that may be subject to this attribution rule or to demonstrate its eligibility for the exception from this attribution rule. Consistent with the Commission's limited information procedures, OEA and WTB intend to withhold from public disclosure all information contained in any such attachments until after the close of Auction 113.

Exceptions from Attribution Rules for Small Businesses and Rural Service Providers. Applicants claiming designated entity benefits may be eligible for certain exceptions from the Commission's attribution rules. For example, in calculating an applicant's gross revenues under the controlling interest standard, the Commission will not attribute to the applicant the personal net worth, including personal income, of its officers and directors. However, to the extent that the officers and directors of the applicant are controlling interest holders of other entities, the gross revenues of those entities will be attributed to the applicant. Moreover, if an officer or director operates a separate business, then the gross revenues derived from that business would be attributed to the applicant.

The Commission has also exempted from attribution to the applicant the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's officers and directors, if certain conditions specified in 47 CFR 1.2110(b)(4)(iii) are met. An applicant claiming this exemption must provide, in an attachment, an affirmative statement that the applicant, affiliate, and/or controlling interest is an eligible rural telephone cooperative within the meaning of 47 CFR1.2110(b)(4)(iii), and the applicant must supply any additional information as may be required to demonstrate eligibility for the exemption from the attribution rule.

An applicant claiming a rural service provider bidding credit may be eligible for an exception from the Commission's attribution rules as an existing rural partnership. To qualify for this exception, an applicant must be a rural partnership providing service as of July 16, 2015, and each member of the rural partnership must individually have fewer than 250,000 combined wireless, wireline, broadband, and cable subscribers. Because each member of the rural partnership must individually qualify for the bidding credit, by definition, a partnership that includes a nationwide provider as a member will not be eligible for the benefit.

Finally, a consortium of small businesses or rural service providers may seek an exception from the Commission's attribution rules. Under the Commission's rules, a consortium of small businesses or rural service providers is a conglomerate organization composed of two or more entities, each of which individually satisfies the definition of small business or rural service provider. A consortium must provide additional information for each member demonstrating each member's eligibility for the claimed bidding credit in order to show that the applicant satisfies the eligibility criteria for the bidding credit. The gross revenue or subscriber information of each consortium member will not be aggregated for purposes of determining the consortium's eligibility for the claimed bidding credit. This information must be provided, however, to ensure that each consortium member qualifies for the bidding credit sought by the consortium.

Pursuant to the rules governing competitive bidding, each applicant must make certifications regarding whether it is a current or former defaulter or delinquent. A current defaulter or delinquent is not eligible to participate in Auction 113, but a former defaulter or delinquent may participate so long as it is otherwise qualified and makes an upfront payment that is 50% more than would otherwise be necessary. Accordingly, each applicant must certify under penalty of perjury on its FCC Form 175 that it, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests are not in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or license (including down payments) and that they are not delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency. Additionally, an applicant must certify under penalty of perjury whether it (along with its controlling interests) has ever been in default on any payment for a Commission construction permit or license (including down payments) or has ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, subject to the specific exclusions provided in the Commission's rules. For purposes of making these certifications, the term “controlling interest” is defined in 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(4)(i).

Under the Commission's rule regarding applications by former defaulters, an applicant is considered a “former defaulter” or a “former delinquent” when, as of the FCC Form 175 filing deadline, the applicant or any of its controlling interests has defaulted on any Commission construction permit or license or has been delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, but has since remedied all such defaults and cured all the outstanding non-tax delinquencies. For purposes of the certification under 47 CFR 1.2105(a)(2)(xii), the applicant may exclude from consideration any cured default on a Commission construction permit or license or cured delinquency on a non-tax debt owed to a Federal agency for which any of the following criteria are met: (1) the notice of the final payment deadline or delinquency was received more than seven years before the FCC Form 175 filing deadline, (2) the default or delinquency amounted to less than $100,000, (3) the default or delinquency was paid within two quarters ( i.e., six months) after receiving the notice of the final payment deadline or delinquency, or (4) the default or delinquency was the subject of a legal or arbitration proceeding and was cured upon resolution of the proceeding. With respect to the first exclusion, notice to a debtor may include notice of a final payment deadline or notice of delinquency and may be express or implied depending on the origin of any Federal non-tax debt giving rise to a default or delinquency. Additionally, for the third exclusion, the date of receipt of the notice of a final default deadline or delinquency by the intended party or debtor will be used for purposes of verifying receipt of notice.

In addition to the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, applicants are encouraged to review previous guidance on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of the auction short-form application process. Parties are also encouraged to consult with Auctions Division staff if they have any questions about default and delinquency disclosure requirements.

The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United States Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The Commission has previously adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the “red light rule,” that implement its obligations under the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of debts owed to the United States. Under the red light rule, applications and other requests for benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the Commission will not be processed. When adopting that rule, the Commission explicitly declared, however, that its competitive bidding rules “are not affected” by the red light rule. As a consequence, the Commission's adoption of the red light rule does not alter the applicability of any of its competitive bidding rules, including the provisions and certifications of 47 CFR 1.2105 and 1.2106, with regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.

OEA and WTB remind each applicant, however, that any indication in the Commission's Red Light Display System, which provides information regarding debts currently owed to the Commission, may not be determinative of an auction applicant's ability to comply with the default and delinquency disclosure requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105. Thus, while the red light rule ultimately may prevent the processing of long-form applications by auction winners, an auction applicant's lack of current “red light” status is not necessarily determinative of its eligibility to participate in an auction (or whether it may be subject to an increased upfront payment obligation). Moreover, a prospective applicant in Auction 113 should note that any long-form applications filed after the close of bidding will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's red light rule, and such review may result in the dismissal of a winning bidder's long-form application. OEA and WTB encourage each applicant to carefully review all records and other available Federal agency databases and information sources to determine whether the applicant, or any of its affiliates, or any of its controlling interests, or any of the affiliates of its controlling interests, owes or was ever delinquent in the payment of non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency.

Pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65, each applicant has a continuing obligation to maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in a pending application, including a pending application to participate in Auction 113. Consistent with the requirements for prior spectrum auctions, an applicant for Auction 113 must furnish additional or corrected information to the Commission within five business days after a significant occurrence, or amend its FCC Form 175 no more than five business days after the applicant becomes aware of the need for the amendment. An applicant is obligated to amend its pending application even if a reported change may result in the dismissal of the application because it is subsequently determined to be a major modification.

A party seeking to participate in Auction 113 must file an FCC Form 175 electronically via the AAP in the AAS. During the initial filing window, an applicant will be able to make any necessary modifications to its FCC Form 175 in the AAP. An applicant that has certified and submitted its FCC Form 175 before the close of the initial filing window may continue to make modifications as often as necessary until the close of that window; however, the applicant must re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 before the close of the initial filing window to confirm and effect its latest application changes. After each submission, a confirmation page will be displayed stating the submission time and submission date.

An applicant will also be allowed to modify its FCC Form 175 in the AAP, except for certain fields, during the resubmission filing window and after the release of the public notice announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. During these times, if an applicant needs to make permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175 or must make changes in order to maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), then it must make the change(s) in the AAP and re-certify and re-submit its application to confirm and effect the change(s).

An applicant's ability to modify its FCC Form 175 in the AAP will be limited between the closing of the initial filing window and the opening of the application resubmission filing window, and between the closing of the resubmission filing window and the release of the public notice announcing the qualified bidders for an auction. During these periods, an applicant will be able to view its submitted application, but will be permitted to modify only the applicant's address, responsible party address, and contact information ( e.g., name, address, telephone number) in the AAP. An applicant will not be able to modify any other pages of the FCC Form 175 in the AAP during these periods. If, during these periods, an applicant needs to make other permissible minor changes to its FCC Form 175, or changes to maintain the accuracy and completeness of its application pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65 and 1.2105(b)(4), then the applicant must submit a letter briefly summarizing the changes to its FCC Form 175 via email to auction113@fcc.gov. The email summarizing the changes must include a subject line referring to Auction 113 and the name of the applicant, for example, “Re: Changes to Auction 113 Auction Application of XYZ Corp.” Any attachments to the email must be formatted as Adobe® Acrobat® (PDF) or Microsoft® Word documents. An applicant that submits its changes in this manner must subsequently modify, certify, and submit its FCC Form 175 application(s) electronically in the AAP once it is again open and available to applicants.

Applicants should also note that even at times when the AAP is open and available to applicants, the system will not allow an applicant to make certain other permissible changes itself ( e.g., correcting a misstatement of the applicant's legal classification). If an applicant needs to make a permissible minor change of this nature, then it must submit a written request by email to the Auctions Division Chief, via auction113@fcc.gov requesting that the Commission manually make the change on the applicant's behalf. Once Commission staff has informed the applicant that the change has been made in the Auction Application Portal, the applicant must then re-certify and re-submit its FCC Form 175 in the AAP to confirm and effect the change(s).

As with filing the FCC Form 175, any amendment(s) to the application and related statements of fact must be certified by an authorized representative of the applicant with authority to bind the applicant. Applicants should note that submission of any such amendment or related statement of fact constitutes a representation by the person certifying that he or she is an authorized representative with such authority and that the contents of the amendment or statement of fact are true and correct.

Applicants must not submit application-specific material through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System. Further, parties submitting information related to their applications should use caution to ensure that their submissions do not contain confidential information or communicate information that would violate 47 CFR 1.2105(c) or the limited information procedures adopted for Auction 113. An applicant seeking to submit, outside the AAP, information that might reflect non-public information, such as an applicant's license selection(s), upfront payment amount, or bidding eligibility, should consider including in its email a request that the filing or portions of the filing be withheld from public inspection until the end of the prohibition on certain communications pursuant to 47 CFR1.2105(c).

Questions about FCC Form 175 amendments should be directed to the Auctions Division at auction113@fcc.gov or (202) 418-0660.

Consistent with past practice in many prior spectrum license auctions, OEA and WTB adopt the proposal to limit information available during Auction 113 in order to prevent the identification of bidders placing particular bids until after the bidding has closed. Specifically, OEA and WTB will not make public until after bidding has closed: (1) the licenses that an applicant selects for bidding in its short-form application, (2) the amount of any upfront payment made by or on behalf of an applicant for Auction 113, (3) any applicant's bidding eligibility, and (4) any other bidding-related information that might reveal the identity of the bidder placing a bid. Moreover, OEA and WTB will not make public until after the close of the auction whether an applicant has submitted with its short-form application a signed acknowledgment statement regarding the acceptance of interference from Federal incumbents for operations in the 1755-1780 MHz.

OEA and WTB also adopt their proposal to make public after each bidding round, for each license, the aggregate demand, the posted price of the last completed round, and the clock price for the next round. The identities of bidders making specific bids will not be disclosed until after the close of bidding in the auction. Bids placed according to a bidder's proxy instructions will be made available, but a bidder's proxy instructions will not be disclosed because they may contain price information private to the bidder. The limited comment OEA and WTB received on this proposal largely supports adopting it.

Each bidder will have access to additional information related to its own bidding and bid eligibility. Specifically, after the bids of a round have been processed, the bidding system will inform each bidder of its processed demand for each license, its proxy instructions, and its eligibility for the next round. The identities of bidders placing specific bids will not be disclosed until after the close of bidding. After the close of bidding, bidders' license selections, upfront payment amounts, bidding eligibility, bids, and other bidding-related actions will be made publicly available.

The limited information procedures (sometimes also referred to as anonymous bidding) OEA and WTB adopt here have been effective in past auctions to safeguard against potential anticompetitive behavior such as retaliatory bidding and collusion. Commenters generally support adopting the limited information procedures as proposed. One commenter supports adopting limited information procedures generally to promote fair competition and discourage anti-competitive conduct, but suggests a more restrictive approach— i.e., implementing phased disclosures of aggregate demand data, contending that in smaller markets with fewer licenses available, bidding patterns and price movements revealed by the proposed limited information procedures can indirectly reveal biding strategies. Another commenter, however, asks OEA and WTB to reject these suggested enhancements, arguing that such additional procedures would complicate the development of Auction 113 bidding software and strategies and that there is no reason for the Commission “to stray from the tried-and-true bidding framework that has made its auctions a success.”

Because the commenter suggesting this more restrictive approach provides no evidence that the limited information procedures used in the Commission's past auctions have facilitated anticompetitive bidding behavior in any auction, OEA and WTB are not persuaded that they should depart from the Commission's now-established practice of implementing these procedures in wireless spectrum auctions, and they conclude that the competitive benefits associated with limiting information disclosure support adoption of such procedures and outweigh any potential benefits of full disclosure. OEA and WTB also agree that implementing the proposal for the phased disclosure of aggregate demand data would unnecessarily complicate Auction 113 bidding procedures.

OEA and WTB warn applicants that direct or indirect communication to other applicants or the public disclosure of non-public information ( e.g., reductions in eligibility, identities of bidders) could violate the Commission's rule prohibiting certain communications. Therefore, to the extent an applicant believes that such a disclosure is required by law or regulation, including regulations issued by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), OEA and WTB strongly urge that the applicant consult with Commission staff in the Auctions Division before making such disclosure.

The rules prohibiting certain communications set forth in 47 CFR 1.2105(c) apply to each “applicant” in Auction 113. 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(1) provides that, subject to specified exceptions, “[a]fter the short-form application filing deadline, all applicants are prohibited from cooperating or collaborating with respect to, communicating with or disclosing, to each other or any nationwide provider [of communications services] that is not an applicant, or, if the applicant is a nationwide provider, any non-nationwide provider that is not an applicant, in any manner the substance of their own, or each other's, or any other applicants' bids or bidding strategies (including post-auction market structure), or discussing or negotiating settlement agreements, until after the down payment deadline[.]” Any applicant found to have violated these communication prohibitions may be subject to sanctions.

An “applicant” for purposes of this rule includes all “controlling interests” in the entity submitting the FCC Form 175 auction application, as well as all holders of interests amounting to 10% or more of the entity (including institutional investors and asset management companies), and all officers and directors of that entity. Under 47 CFR 1.2105(c), a party that submits an application becomes an “applicant” under the rule, which goes into effect at the application deadline, and that status does not change based on later developments.

The prohibition in 47 CFR 1.2105(c) on certain communications begins at an auction's short-form application filing deadline and ends at the auction's down payment deadline after the auction closes, which will be announced in a future public notice. To be clear, communications that occur even after bidding has ended and the auction has closed, but before the down payment deadline, are still subject to 47 CFR 1.2105(c).

47 CFR 1.2105(c) prohibits certain communications between applicants for an auction, regardless of whether the applicants seek permits or licenses in the same geographic area or market. The rule also applies to communications by applicants with non-applicant nationwide providers of communications services and by nationwide applicants with non-applicant, non-nationwide providers. For purposes of the prohibited communications rule for Auction 113, OEA and WTB consider AT&T, T-Mobile, and Verizon to be “nationwide providers.” The rule further prohibits “joint bidding arrangements,” including arrangements relating to the permits or licenses being auctioned that address or communicate, directly or indirectly, bidding at the auction, bidding strategies, including arrangements regarding price or the specific permits or licenses on which to bid, and any such arrangements relating to the post-auction market structure. The rule allows for limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission's rule prohibiting joint bidding, provided such arrangement is disclosed on the applicant's auction application. Applicants may communicate pursuant to any pre-existing agreements, arrangements, or understandings relating to the licenses being auctioned that are solely operational or that provide for the transfer or assignment of licenses, provided that such agreements, arrangements, or understandings are disclosed on their applications and do not address or communicate bids (including amounts), bidding strategies, or the particular permits or licenses on which to bid or the post-auction market structure.

In addition to express statements of bids and bidding strategies, the prohibition against communicating “in any manner” includes public disclosures as well as private communications and indirect or implicit communications. Consequently, an applicant must take care to determine whether its auction-related communications may reach another applicant.

Parties subject to 47 CFR 1.2105(c) should take special care in circumstances where their officers, directors, and employees may receive information directly or indirectly relating to any applicant's bids or bidding strategies, even if the officers, directors, or employees are not involved in their company's participation in the auction or if the information received is wholly unsolicited. Such information may be deemed to have been received by the applicant under certain circumstances. For example, Commission staff have found that, where an individual serves as an officer and director for two or more applicants, the bids and bidding strategies of one applicant are presumed to be conveyed to the other applicant through the shared officer, which creates an apparent violation of the rule.

Subject to the limited exceptions for communications within the scope of any arrangement consistent with the exclusion from the Commission's rule prohibiting joint bidding, 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(1) prohibits applicants from communicating with specified other parties only with respect to “their own, or each other's, or any other applicant's bids or bidding strategies.” The Prohibited Communications Guidance Public Notice, 80 FR 63215 (October 19, 2015), released in advance of the Broadcast Incentive Auction (Auction 1000), reviewed the scope of the prohibition generally, as well as in that specific auction's forward auction of spectrum licenses and reverse auction to relinquish broadcast licenses. As the Commission explained therein, a communication conveying “bids or bidding strategies (including post-auction market structure)” must also relate to the “licenses being auctioned” in order to be covered by the prohibition. Thus, the prohibition is limited in scope and does not apply to all communications between or among the specified parties. The Commission consistently has made clear that application of the rule prohibiting communications has never required total suspension of essential ongoing business. Entities subject to the prohibition may negotiate agreements during the prohibition period, provided that the communications involved do not relate to both: (1) the licenses being auctioned and (2) bids or bidding strategies or post-auction market structure.

Accordingly, business discussions and negotiations that do not convey information about the bids or bidding strategies, including the post-auction market structure, of an applicant are not prohibited by the rule. Moreover, not all auction-related information is covered by the prohibition. For example, communicating merely whether a party has or has not applied to participate in Auction 113 will not violate the rule. In contrast, communicating, among other things, how a party will participate, including specific geographic areas selected, specific bid amounts, and/or whether or not the party is placing bids, would convey bids or bidding strategies and would be prohibited

While 47 CFR 1.2105(c) does not prohibit business discussions and negotiations among auction applicants that are unrelated to the auction, each applicant must remain vigilant not to communicate, directly or indirectly, information that affects, or could affect, bids or bidding strategies. Certain discussions, even if they do not directly address the licenses offered in Auction 113 or the AWS-1 and AWS-3 bands still might touch upon subject areas that relate to bids and bidding strategies or to post-auction market structure, which could convey price or geographic information related to bidding strategies. Such subject areas include, but are not limited to, management, sales, local marketing agreements, and other transactional agreements.

OEA and WTB caution applicants that bids or bidding strategies may be communicated outside situations that involve one party subject to the prohibition communicating privately and directly with another such party. For example, the Commission has warned that prohibited “communications concerning bids and bidding strategies may include communications regarding capital calls or requests for additional funds in support of bids or bidding strategies to the extent such communications convey information concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or indirectly.” Moreover, the Commission found a violation of the rule against prohibited communications when an applicant used the Commission's bidding system to disclose “its bidding strategy in a manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate and collaborate . . . in specific markets,” and it has placed auction participants on notice that the use of its bidding system “to disclose market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will subject bidders to sanctions.”

Likewise, when completing a short-form application, each applicant should avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate 47 CFR 1.2105(c), particularly in light of the limited information procedures in effect for Auction 113. Specifically, an applicant should avoid including any information in its short-form application that might convey information regarding its license selections, such as referring to markets or other geographic areas in describing agreements, including any information in application attachments that will be publicly available that may otherwise disclose the applicant's license selections, or using applicant names or attachment file names in the application that refer to licenses being offered.

Applicants also should be mindful that communicating non-public application or bidding information publicly or privately to another applicant may violate 47 CFR 1.2105(c) even though that information subsequently may be made public during later periods of the application or bidding processes.

47 CFR 1.2105(c) does not prohibit an applicant from communicating bids or bidding strategies to a third party, such as a consultant or consulting firm, counsel, or lender. An applicant should take appropriate steps, however, to ensure that any third party it employs for advice pertaining to its bids or bidding strategies does not become a conduit for prohibited communications to other specified parties, as that would violate the rule. For example, an applicant might require a third party, such as a lender, to sign a non-disclosure agreement before the applicant communicates any information regarding bids or bidding strategy to the third party. Within third-party firms, separate individual employees, such as attorneys or auction consultants, may advise individual applicants on bids or bidding strategies, as long as such firms implement firewalls and other compliance procedures that prevent such individuals from communicating the bids or bidding strategies of one applicant to other individuals representing separate applicants. Although firewalls and/or other procedures should be used, their existence is not an absolute defense to liability if a violation of the rule has occurred.

As the Commission has noted in other spectrum auctions, in the case of an individual, the objective precautionary measure of a firewall is not available. As a result, an individual that is privy to bids or bidding information of more than one applicant presents a greater risk of becoming a conduit for a prohibited communication. OEA and WTB will take the same approach to interpreting the prohibited communications rule in Auction 113. OEA and WTB emphasize that whether a prohibited communication has taken place in a given case will depend on all the facts pertaining to the case, including who possessed what information, what information was conveyed to whom, and the course of bidding in the auction.

OEA and WTB remind potential applicants that they may discuss the short-form application or bids for specific licenses with the counsel, consultant, or expert of their choice before the short-form application deadline. Furthermore, the same third-party individual could continue to give advice after the short-form deadline regarding the application, provided that no information pertaining to bids or bidding strategies, including licenses selected on the short-form application, is conveyed to that individual.

Applicants also should use caution in their dealings with other parties, such as members of the press, financial analysts, or others who might become conduits for the communication of prohibited bidding information. For example, even though communicating that it has applied to participate in the auction will not violate the rule, an applicant's statement to the press or a statement on social media that it intends to stop bidding in an auction could give rise to a finding of a 47 CFR 1.2105 violation. Similarly, an applicant's public statement of intent not to place bids during bidding in Auction 113 could also violate the rule.

By electronically submitting its FCC Form 175, each applicant for Auction 113 certifies its compliance with 47 CFR 1.2105(c) of the rules. The mere filing of a certifying statement as part of an application, however, will not outweigh specific evidence that a prohibited communication has occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation when warranted.

47 CFR 1.2105(c)(4) requires that any applicant that makes or receives a communication that appears to violate 47 CFR 1.2105(c) must report such communication in writing to the Commission immediately, and in no case later than five business days after the communication occurs. Each applicant's obligation to report any such communication continues beyond the five-day period after the communication is made, even if the report is not made within the five-day period.

A party reporting any information or communication pursuant to 47 CFR 1.65(a), 1.2105(a)(2), or 1.2105(c)(4) must take care to ensure that any report of a prohibited communication does not itself give rise to a violation of 47 CFR 1.2105(c). For example, a party's report of a prohibited communication could violate the rule by communicating prohibited information to other parties specified under the rule through the use of Commission filing procedures that allow such materials to be made available for public inspection.

An applicant must file only a single report concerning a prohibited communication and must file that report with the Commission personnel expressly charged with administering the Commission's auctions. This rule is designed to minimize the risk of inadvertent dissemination of information in such reports. Any reports required by 47 CFR 1.2105(c) must be filed consistent with the instructions set forth in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice. For Auction 113, such reports must be filed with the Chief of the Auctions Division, Office of Economics and Analytics, by the most expeditious means available. Any such report should be submitted by email to the Auctions Division Chief and sent to auction113@fcc.gov. If you choose instead to submit a report in hard copy, contact Auctions Division staff at auction113@fcc.gov or (202) 418-0660 for guidance.

Given the potential competitive sensitivity of public disclosure of information in such a report, a party seeking to report such a prohibited communication should consider submitting its report with a request that the report or portions of the submission be withheld from public inspection by following the procedures specified in 47 CFR 0.459. OEA and WTB encourage such parties to coordinate with the Auctions Division staff about the procedures for submitting such reports.

A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and OEA/WTB addressing the application of 47 CFR 1.2105(c) is available on the Commission's auction web page at www.fcc.gov/summary-listing-documents-addressing-application-rule-prohibiting-certain-communications.

Regardless of compliance with the Commission's rules, applicants remain subject to the antitrust laws, which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the marketplace. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of 47 CFR 1.2105(c)(4) will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, a violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well before any party submits a short-form application. The Commission has cited a number of examples of potentially anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust laws: for example, actual or potential competitors may not agree to divide territories in order to minimize competition, regardless of whether they split a market in which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market for one and another market for the other.

To the extent OEA and WTB become aware of specific allegations that suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws may have occurred, they may refer such allegations to the United States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules in connection with its participation in the competitive bidding process, then it may be subject to a forfeiture and may be prohibited from participating further in Auction 113 and in future auctions, among other sanctions.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal to conduct Auction 113 using an ascending clock-1 auction format. The clock-1 auction format was used in Auction 108 and is similar to the clock phase of past Commission ascending clock auctions, but rather than offering multiple generic spectrum blocks in a category in a geographic area, each frequency-specific license in an EA or CMA will constitute its own category with a supply of 1. Therefore, in the clock-1 auction format adopted for Auction 113, bidders will bid on frequency-specific licenses in a clock phase. This proposal has ample support in the record.

While OEA and WTB set forth the key bidding procedures for the clock-1 auction in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice, OEA, in conjunction with WTB, released concurrently with the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice an updated technical guide (Auction 113 Technical Guide) that provides further technical details about the adopted bidding procedures. The information in the Auction 113 Technical Guide, which is available in the Education section on the Auction 113 website ( www.fcc.gov/auction/113 ), supplements the decisions made by OEA and WTB in the Auction 113 Procedures Public Notice.

Under the clock-1 format that OEA and WTB adopt, each bidder will be able to bid for specific licenses in the clock bidding rounds, in license-by-license bidding. The auction will proceed in a series of rounds, with bidding conducted simultaneously for all licenses available in the auction. Consistent with prior Commission clock auctions, for each bidding round, the bidding system will announce a clock price for each license, and a bidder will indicate its demand for licenses at the prices associated with the current round. Under the clock-1 auction format, a bidder's demand for a license can be zero or one.

The clock price for a license will increase from round to round if more than one bidder indicates demand for the license. The bidding rounds will continue until the number of bidders demanding each license does not exceed one. Once bidding rounds stop, the bidder with demand for a license will become the winning bidder.

Auction 113 will offer 200 geographic area-based licenses in 199 markets in the 1695-1710 MHz, 1755-1780 MHz, and the 2155-2180 MHz bands. The Auction 113 inventory consists of licenses in EAs and CMAs. The 48 EA licenses include frequency blocks designated A1, B1, H, I, and/or J; the 152 CMA licenses are all for frequency block G. In Auction 113, only one geographic area (EA173) has more than one frequency block available, and it includes both the H and the I blocks.

Auction 113 will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the release of round results. OEA and WTB will conduct bidding simultaneously for all licenses available in the auction. In the first bidding round of Auction 113, a bidder will indicate whether it demands the licenses at the minimum opening bid price. Before each subsequent bidding round, the bidding system will announce a start-of-round price and a clock price for each license, and during the round, qualified bidders will indicate the licenses for which they wish to bid at the prices associated with the current round. Bidding rounds will be open for predetermined periods of time. Bidders will be subject to activity and eligibility rules that govern the pace at which they participate in the auction.

For each license, the clock price will increase from round to round if more than one bidder indicates demand for that license. The bidding rounds will continue until, for every license, demand does not exceed one. At that point, the bidder still indicating demand for a license will be the winning bidder.

The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be released at least one week before the start of bidding. Details on viewing round results, including the location and format of downloadable results files for each round, will be released concurrent with or prior to that public notice.

A bidder will be able to submit bids via the internet through the bidding system user interface, the bidding system's upload function, or using the auction bidder line. The bidding system's upload function accepts bid files in a comma-separated values (CSV) text format. The bidding system will allow a bidder to submit bids only for licenses the bidder selected on its FCC Form 175 and for which the bidder has sufficient bidding eligibility.

During each open bidding round, a bidder will be able to modify its bids in the current bidding round. Bids can be modified either through the user interface, the bidding system's upload function, or through the auction bidder line. If a bidder modifies its bids by uploading a new file, then that file, including all of the file's bids and modifications, will replace all of the bidder's bids previously submitted in the round. The system will take the last bid file submission as that bidder's bids for the round. OEA and WTB urge bidders to verify their bids in each round. Information on how to do so will be made available in educational materials that OEA will provide, including a bidding system user guide and an online bidding procedures tutorial.

OEA will retain the discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. Such adjustments may include changes to the amount of time for bidding rounds, the amount of time between rounds, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon bidding activity and other factors.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal to employ a simultaneous stopping rule for Auction 113, which means all licenses simultaneously remain open for bidding until the first round in which, after bid processing, no license has excess demand, at which point the auction will close.

For the reasons set forth in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB adopt their proposal to employ an activity rule that requires bidders to bid actively throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction before participating. For this clock auction, a bidder's activity in a round for purposes of the activity rule will be the sum of the bidding units associated with the bidder's demands as applied by the bidding system during bid processing. Bidders are required to be active on a specific percentage (the activity requirement percentage ) of their current bidding eligibility during each round of the auction. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder's eligibility, possibly curtailing or eliminating the bidder's ability to place bids in subsequent rounds of the auction.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal to require that bidders maintain a fixed, high level of activity in each round of Auction 113 in order to maintain bidding eligibility. In order for posted prices and aggregate demand in the clock auction to reflect bidders' true demands reliably, the bidding system requires a high activity requirement percentage to incentivize bidders to start bidding early in the auction for the licenses that they want to acquire. Consistent with past practice, bidders will be required to be active on between 90% and 100% of their bidding eligibility in all clock rounds, with the specific percentage for each round to be set by OEA. OEA will set the activity requirement percentage initially at 95%.

If the activity requirement is met, then the bidder's eligibility will not change for the next round. If the activity requirement is not met in a round, the bidder's eligibility will be reduced to an amount that brings the bidder into compliance with the requirement. Bidding activity will be based on the bids that are applied by the bidding system. That is, if a bidder submits a bid to reduce its demand for a license, but the bidding system cannot apply the request because demand for that license will fall below one, then the bidder's activity will reflect its unreduced demand ( i.e., the license will still count toward the bidder's activity).

OEA retains the discretion to change the activity requirement percentage during the auction. The bidding system will announce any such changes in advance of the round in which they would take effect, giving bidders adequate notice to adjust their bidding strategies.

Most commenters did not object to the proposal to set the initial activity requirement percentage at 95%, which the Commission has successfully used in every clock auction since the format was introduced for the Broadcast Incentive Auction. However, one commenter proposes to reduce the activity requirement to 90% or to use a more complicated tiered eligibility system to reduce the activity requirement below 95%, arguing that “strict” activity requirements create challenges for bidders, especially smaller entities, who are “navigating complex auction rules.” This commenter claims that “unforeseen technical or financial constraints have limited bidder activity, leading to a loss of eligibility,” but provides no examples of such instances. OEA and WTB are not persuaded by these unsupported arguments, and see no convincing evidence of a need to deviate from the proposed 95% initial activity requirement. Moreover, OEA and WTB agree that they should not depart from the “tried-and-true bidding framework” that has made Commission auctions successful, including changing features that are in place to protect the integrity of the auction or introducing features that would unnecessarily complicate bidding system development or bidding strategies. The 95% initial activity requirement has consistently demonstrated that it balances providing bidders with the flexibility to substitute across markets in response to learned price information with providing bidders incentives to bid in each round of the auction for the markets that they are sincerely interested in. Lowering the initial activity requirement could extend the duration of the auction if bidders delay placing their bids until the activity requirement is increased. OEA and WTB therefore decline to reduce the initial activity requirement below 95% because doing so could create more uncertainty regarding the exact level of bidder demand, provide less helpful information to bidders about aggregate demand, and likely prolong the auction as bidders could delay their bidding until later in the auction.

In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB sought comment on procedures for a contingent bidding limit that would allow a bidder's submitted bids to have bidding activity that is greater than the bidder's eligibility. In particular, OEA and WTB sought comment on whether the contingent bidding limit would be useful with the limited inventory in Auction 113 or whether it would add unnecessary complexity. The only two commenters that addressed this both object to allowing contingent bidding in Auction 113, arguing that the contingent bidding limit would introduce complexity and uncertainty into the bidding without adding any appreciable benefits to the bidders or the Commission, and that the contingent bidding limit was scarcely utilized by bidders based on their analysis of bidding data from the Commission's four most recent clock auctions. OEA and WTB agree that including a contingent bidding limit in Auction 113 would introduce added complexity. Given that Auction 113 has a more limited inventory than recent auctions, OEA and WTB expect fewer bidders to attempt to switch between licenses, lowering the likelihood that bidders see submitted bids go unapplied during bid processing. As such, OEA and WTB find a contingent bidding limit to be unnecessary, and will not include it in Auction 113.

For Auction 113, OEA and WTB will not provide for activity rule waivers to preserve a bidder's eligibility. This approach has been followed in every ascending clock auction since the Commission introduced the format. The clock auction relies on precisely identifying the point at which demand decreases to equal supply to determine winning bidders and final prices. Allowing waivers would create uncertainty with respect to the exact level of bidder demand, would reduce the incentives to bid sincerely, and would interfere with the basic clock price-setting and winner determination mechanism. Moreover, uncertainty about the level of demand would affect the way bidders' requests to reduce demand are processed by the bidding system. Submitting proxy instructions can address some of the circumstances under which a bidder inadvertently risks losing bidding eligibility.

In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB proposed not to establish reserve prices other than minimum opening bid amounts for the licenses being offered in Auction 113, reasoning that, unlike Auction 97, the public interest did not provide any specific basis for doing so in Auction 113. However, OEA and WTB invited commenters that consider a reserve price to be in the public interest to describe what specific factors lead them to that conclusion.

Three commenters argue that adopting an aggregate reserve price is necessary to achieve Congress' goal of fully funding the Commission's Supply Chain Reimbursement Program in a single auction, to ensure that AWS-3 spectrum is not sold for less than it is worth, and to avoid subjecting Auction 97 defaulting bidders to disproportionately large liabilities—with one commenter specifically advocating for the adoption of a $3.3 billion aggregate reserve. Two other commenters, however, ask OEA and WTB to reject calls for an aggregate reserve price in Auction 113, arguing that it is not necessary where the Commission is already proposing robust minimum opening bids that will prevent licenses from being assigned at nominal amounts. Those commenters further observe that an aggregate reserve price that is set too high could ultimately cause the auction to fail, which would in turn deprive the Treasury of all revenue and result in valuable spectrum remaining unlicensed and unused.

OEA and WTB agree, and adopt their proposal not to establish reserve prices for Auction 113 licenses, other than minimum opening bid amounts. As the Commission has previously explained, while the primary purpose of a minimum opening bid is to speed up the course of an auction, a minimum opening bid also can serve a revenue-enhancing function like a reserve price, because if bids are not accepted below a certain level, they will also not be sold below that level. That is, a minimum opening bid effectively functions as a reserve price. OEA and WTB therefore conclude that adopting an aggregate reserve price is not necessary for an auction in which they are adopting minimum opening bids that are sufficiently high so as to prevent licenses from being assigned at nominal amounts and in which OEA and WTB have no statutory obligation to do so.

Contrary to one commenter's arguments, the Commission is not required to adopt a reserve price to ensure that the maximum funding earmarked by Congress for the Commission's Supply Chain Reimbursement Program is fully funded from a single auction. OEA and WTB agree that Congress's directive that proceeds raised in Auction 113 be used to support the Commission's Supply Chain Reimbursement Program does not require that the Commission risk a failed auction by setting a $3.3 billion reserve price. If a reserve was established but not met, the auction would provide no funds at all. It is unreasonable to believe that Congress intended such a result. Moreover, in the Part 1 Third Report and Order, 63 FR 2315 (January 15, 1998), 63 FR 12658 (March 16, 1998), 63 FR 29958 (June 2, 1998), the Commission concluded that 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(F) does not require it to use reserve prices or minimum opening bids to maximize the revenue earned in all future spectrum auctions because the other auction goals in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)—such as ensuring the deployment and rapid deployment of new technologies and services and promoting economic opportunity and competition—have not been eliminated, and the Commission must continue to balance and pursue all of its objectives.

OEA and WTB find unavailing commenters' arguments that the lack of a reserve price would be detrimental to defaulting bidders from Auction 97 and that setting a reserve price would help these defaulting bidders avoid facing disproportionately large liabilities in Auction 113. The Commission is not obligated to establish an aggregate reserve price equal to the sum of all bids on which bidders defaulted in Auction 97— i.e., $3.3 billion—in order to shield past defaulting bidders from the consequences of their own actions and to protect them from any risk that they would be required to pay a deficiency payment following Auction 113. Indeed, bidders in a Commission auction are on notice that they bear any risk that may be associated with their winning bids, because the Commission's default payment rules make clear that “[a] bidder assumes a binding obligation to pay its full bid amount upon acceptance of the winning bid at the close of an auction.” See 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2). Those rules also make clear that if a bidder defaults on its winning bid, it will be subject to a default payment consisting of a deficiency payment equal to the difference between the amount of the defaulted bid amount and the amount of the winning bid in a subsequent auction, plus an additional default payment percentage amount. Setting a reserve price that would render the deficiency payment provision of the default payment meaningless would distort auction incentives and likely encourage more defaults in the future.

The Commission has previously explained that the reserve price and minimum opening bid provision in 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(4)(F) is intended to prevent licenses from being assigned via auction at nominal amounts, which could result, for example, from insufficient competition in the auction that might in turn be due to the inability of potential bidders to assess the market adequately or develop business plans. Moreover, the Commission has discretion regarding whether to employ a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price in an auction, after considering, among other factors, the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being auctioned. Given the circumstances in Auction 113— i.e., that it is an auction of licenses in spectrum bands that are already in use for 5G services, that this is the first auction the Commission will be conducting in almost four years, and that the licenses being offered in Auction 113 have been lying fallow for ten years during the pendency of litigation—OEA and WTB conclude these factors should be sufficient to ensure that there will be sufficient competition in the auction and that these licenses will not be assigned at nominal amounts. This will in turn benefit the public more than establishing a reserve price in the absence of a statutory directive to do so.

As is typical for spectrum license auctions, OEA and WTB sought comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price, as mandated by 47 U.S.C. 309(j) of the Communications Act. OEA and WTB will establish minimum opening bids for every license in Auction 113. The bidding system will not accept bids at prices less than the minimum opening bid specified for each license. Based on the Commission's experience in past auctions, setting appropriate minimum opening bids is an effective tool to prevent an excessive number of bidding rounds at very low prices.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposed minimum opening bid amounts. OEA and WTB calculate minimum opening bids on a license-by-license basis based on $0.01 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of less than 300,000, $0.02 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 300,000 and less than 1,000,000, $0.05 per MHz-pop for the paired licenses in areas with a population of at least 1,000,000, and $0.01 per MHz-pop for the unpaired licenses. For all licenses, minimum opening bids will be subject to a minimum of $1,000 per license.

Two commenters argue the proposed minimum opening bids are too low and propose that the minimum opening bids for the licenses in Auction 113 not be lower than the minimum opening bids of the corresponding licenses in Auction 97. They both argue that lower minimum opening bids in Auction 113 on some licenses, relative to the corresponding minimum opening bids in Auction 97, may result in lower winning bids on those licenses and lower auction revenue.

OEA and WTB are unconvinced by these arguments. As the Commission has recognized in past auctions, minimum opening bids are not intended to be a reflection of final license prices, but instead a starting point for bidding. The minimum opening bid on a license has less bearing on the final price of the license than it does on the number of rounds required to reach the final price. OEA and WTB also disagree that lower minimum opening bids on some licenses in Auction 113 (relative to Auction 97) will reduce auction revenue, even though other minimum opening bids in Auction 113 are higher (relative to Auction 97). In past auctions, the Commission has recognized that a critical factor in setting minimum opening bids is to not set them above the market clearing price, which is unknown prior to the auction and, if set too high, could result in lower participation and unsold licenses. Another commenter supports this principle, agreeing that the minimum opening bids OEA and WTB adopt will facilitate robust price discovery and participation. OEA and WTB find that the amounts they adopt for Auction 113 balance the competing objectives for minimum opening bids because (1) they are sufficiently low so as not to deter participation or interfere with the price-setting and winner determination mechanisms of the auction, and (2) they are sufficiently high so as not to result in an excessive number of rounds at prices very distant from the final prices and to not permit the licenses to be sold for nominal amounts.

The minimum opening bids that OEA and WTB adopt for the midband AWS-3 spectrum licenses available in Auction 113 are in line with the minimum opening bids that have been set for every recent auction of mid-band spectrum. In Auction 110 for licenses in the 3.45-3.55 GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.02 or $0.06 per MHz-pop, according to the population tiers of the geographic area. In Auction 108 for licenses in the 2.5 GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.006 per MHz-pop for all licenses. In Auction 107 for licenses in the 3.7-3.98 GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.003, $0.006 or $0.03 per MHz-pop, according to the population tiers of the geographic area. In Auction 105 for licenses in the 3.55-3.65 GHz band, the minimum opening bids were calculated based on $0.02 per MHz-pop for all licenses. Commenters have not presented any evidence that there have been changes to the market conditions for 5G-suitable spectrum that could justify increasing the minimum opening bids for Auction 113 above the range of minimum opening bids found in these four auctions of midband spectrum. OEA and WTB find that this range of minimum opening bids better reflects current market conditions than the minimum opening bids that were used in Auction 97.

One commenter suggests implementing the use of “adaptive pricing mechanisms” that would decrease minimum opening bids during the auction for licenses that do not receive any bids at the current minimum opening bids. OEA and WTB do not believe that this approach would be helpful to bidders in Auction 113. No commenters submitted evidence demonstrating that the specific minimum opening bids OEA and WTB proposed for Auction 113 are too high. The minimum opening bids OEA and WTB adopt in Auction 113 use a lower dollar-per-MHz-pop basis in areas with lower populations than in areas with higher populations, reducing the risk of licenses in rural areas going unsold. The number of licenses unsold in recent auctions has been relatively small, suggesting that minimum opening bids have not been set inappropriately high. In Auction 110, 0.5% of licenses were not sold; in Auction 108, 1.8% of licenses were not sold; in Auction 107, there were no unsold licenses; and in Auction 105, 8.9% of licenses were not sold. Furthermore, OEA and WTB have concerns that introducing a feature into the bidding system to reduce certain minimum opening bids “for licenses that receive no bids after a defined number of rounds” could introduce additional complexity into bidding strategies and could run counter to the objective of not permitting licenses to be sold for nominal amounts. Therefore, OEA and WTB decline to implement this suggestion.

The minimum opening bids for all licenses offered in Auction 113 are set forth in the Attachment A file on the Auction 113 website at www.fcc.gov/auction/113.

OEA and WTB adopt the procedures regarding clock price increments as described in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice. Therefore, after bidding in the first round and before each subsequent round, for each license, the bidding system will announce the start-of-round price and the clock price for the upcoming round—that is, the lowest price and the highest price at which bidders can submit bids during the round. As long as aggregate demand for the license at the clock price exceeds one, the start-of-round price for the upcoming round will be equal to the clock price from the prior round. If aggregate demand equaled one at a price in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the next round will be equal to the price at which demand equaled one. If aggregate demand was zero in the previous round, then the start-of-round price for the next round will remain the same.

OEA and WTB will set the clock price for a license for a round by adding a percentage increment to the start-of-round price. OEA and WTB will set the initial increment percentage at 10%, and OEA may adjust this increment percentage within a range of 5% to 30%, inclusive, in later rounds. To ensure that an increase in the percentage increment does not result in an unduly large increase for a license, the total dollar amount of the increment (the difference between the clock price and the start-of-round price) will be capped at a certain amount. OEA and WTB will set this cap on the increment initially at $50 million, and OEA may adjust the cap in later rounds. The 5% to 30% increment range and cap will allow us to manage the auction pace and take into account bidders' needs to reevaluate their bidding strategies while also moving the auction along quickly.

Under the clock-1 auction format adopted for Auction 113, a bidder will indicate in each round the licenses it demands at the prices associated with the round. A “simple” bid indicates a desired quantity (in this auction, one or zero) at a price. In the first round, a bidder indicates the licenses it demands at the minimum opening bids by indicating a quantity of one for each of those licenses. After the first round, a bidder that wants to maintain the same processed demand for a license at the new clock price would submit a bid for the license at the clock price, indicating that it is willing to pay up to that price, if need be, for the license. A bid to maintain the same processed demand cannot be at a price less than the clock price.

OEA and WTB will not permit a “switch” bid to reduce demand for one license in a market and increase demand for another license in the same market in Auction 113. OEA and WTB did not receive any comments on this issue. The inventory of licenses for Auction 113 contains only one market in which there are multiple licenses that may be considered similar, thus the additional bidding and system complexity necessary to permit switch bidding in this market is not worthwhile. A bidder that wants to bid on both licenses within the market that has two licenses could bid on these two licenses separately.

After the first round, bids to change demand can be made at prices between the start-of-round price and the clock price. These are known as intra-round bids. A bidder will be permitted to make intra-round bids by indicating the quantity it demands for the license (in this auction, one or zero) and a price between the start-of-round price and the clock price at which it wants to change its demand. For example, if a bidder has processed demand for a license at the start-of-round price of $200, but no longer wants the license if the price increases by more than $10, the bidder would indicate a bid quantity of zero at a price of $210. Similarly, if the bidder wishes to reduce its demand to zero if the price increases at all above $200, the bidder would indicate a bid quantity of zero at the start-of-round price of $200.

Permitting intra-round bids allows the bidding system to use relatively large clock price increments, because bidders can submit bids at prices lower than the clock prices. This may reduce the number of rounds in the auction without increasing the risk that a large clock price increment will prevent the auction from accurately determining the market clearing price, at which only one bidder demands the license.

Intra-round bid amounts will be limited to multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for prices above $100,000. OEA and WTB limit intra-round bids to these multiples to deter anti-competitive strategic bidding.

OEA and WTB adopt their proposal, which is supported by the record, to make proxy bidding an option available to bidders in Auction 113. In the first round, a bidder may submit a proxy instruction to the bidding system for any license for which it submits a bid in the first round. After the first round, a bidder may submit a proxy instruction to the bidding system for any license for which it has processed demand. A proxy instruction for a license must indicate a reduction in demand for the license to zero at a price higher than the current round's clock price. Proxy instructions to increase a bidder's demand for a license at a given price will not be permitted.

Under the procedures OEA and WTB adopt here, if a proxy instruction has been submitted, the bidding system will automatically submit a proxy bid to maintain the bidder's demand for the license in every subsequent round as long as the clock price for the round is less than the proxy instruction price. In the first round in which the clock price is greater than or equal to the proxy instruction price, the bidding system will submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce the bidder's demand for that license to zero at the proxy instruction price. For example, if a bidder has processed demand for a license with a clock price of $1,000, and the bidder is willing to purchase the license for a price up to $1,800, the bidder could submit a proxy instruction to reduce its demand for the license to 0 at $1,800. In that case, the bidding system will submit proxy bids to maintain the bidder's demand for the license in each subsequent round as long as the clock price is less than $1,800. In a round in which the clock price is above $1,800, the bidding system will submit a proxy bid to reduce the bidder's demand for the license to zero at the price of $1,800.

In the case that a bid to reduce demand, whether placed according to proxy instructions or submitted by the bidder in the round, is not applied during bid processing, the bidding system will automatically generate a proxy instruction at the bid price and, in the following rounds, submit proxy bids on behalf of the bidder according to that proxy instruction. For example, suppose that the start-of-round price for a license is $10,000, the clock price is $12,000, and a bidder with processed demand for the license submits a bid to reduce its demand to 0 at price $11,500. If the bid is not applied during bid processing ( e.g., because there were no other bids for the license in the round), in the following round the bidding system will submit a proxy bid on behalf of the bidder to reduce demand for the license to 0 at price $11,500. The proxy instruction preserves in the bidding system the bidder's interest in retaining demand for the license only if the price is no higher than $11,500, which may help avoid having the license sold later in the auction to another bidder at a price less than what the initial bidder would be willing to pay.

In any round, a bidder can remove or modify any existing proxy instructions or proxy bids for the round by submitting new bids through the user interface or file upload. The system will take the last bid submission as that bidder's bids and proxy instructions. Bidders are reminded that any bids submitted through an upload will replace all bids and proxy instructions previously submitted.

As is the case for intra-round bid amounts, proxy instruction prices will be limited to multiples of $10 for prices below $10,000; to multiples of $100 for prices between $10,000 and $100,000, inclusive; and to multiples of $1,000 for prices above $100,000. Proxy instructions will not be publicly released either during or after the auction.

Commenters agree that proxy bidding as proposed in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice alleviates the burden and resources required to monitor a multiple-round auction. One commenter states that proxy bidding will also promote more efficient auction outcomes by reducing the risk of erroneous bids and allowing for more efficient use of bidder resources. Another commenter supports allowing proxy bidding, but suggests that OEA and WTB consider introducing conditional proxy bid increases in demand to allow a bidder to instruct the bidding system to bid on an additional license if its price falls below a certain level, claiming this approach would help bidders navigate the complexities of managing multiple licenses.

OEA and WTB conclude that adopting this commenter's proposal is unnecessary in an ascending clock auction because the posted prices and start-of-round prices never decrease from one round to the next. In the ascending clock auction managing substitutions between multiple licenses is already possible, for instance, by placing a bid to decrease demand on one license, and, if the bid to reduce demand is processed, placing a bid to increase demand for another license that has the same or fewer bidding units as the former license. This type of substitution does not require a proxy bid to increase demand. Proxy bids are not intended to relieve bidders of their responsibility to manage their bidding eligibility or to actively follow round-to-round changes in prices and aggregate demand. Furthermore, in the ascending clock auction, once a bidder has processed demand for a license, the bidder cannot ensure or guarantee that it will not win the license when the auction closes. Similarly, a bidder cannot ensure or guarantee that the price of a license will not continue to rise in future rounds, or that the relative price of a license compared to another license will not change in future rounds.

Under the clock-1 auction format, if a bidder does not submit bids in the current round for all of the licenses for which it had processed demand in the previous round and does not have proxy instructions in place, the bidding system will consider those licenses to have missing bids. Missing bids are treated by the bidding system as requests to reduce demand to zero at the start-of-round prices for the licenses with missing bids. If these requests are applied, then a bidder's bidding activity, and its bidding eligibility for the next round, may be reduced. A bidder can avoid having missing bids by either indicating its demand in every round or by entering appropriate proxy instructions.

OEA and WTB adopt bid processing procedures that the bidding system will use after each round of bidding to process bids to change demand, to determine the processed demand of each bidder for each license, and to determine the posted price for each license that will serve as the start-of-round price for the next round. Bids to maintain demand will always be applied by the bidding system during bid processing.

Under the clock-1 auction format, the bidding system will not allow a bidder to reduce its demand for a license if the reduction would cause aggregate demand to fall below one (the “no excess supply” rule). Therefore, if a bidder submits a bid to reduce its demand from one to zero for a license if the price should increase above the price in its bid, the bidding system will treat the bid as a request to reduce demand that will be applied only if the no excess supply rule would be satisfied.

OEA and WTB adopt the no excess supply rule for Auction 113. The no excess supply rule has been integral to the success of the clock auction since the clock auction was introduced at the Commission in the Broadcast Incentive Auction. One commenter proposes to introduce exceptions to the no excess supply rule, claiming it has created barriers for bidders in past auctions, but provides no examples to support this claim, which is counterintuitive on its face. The purpose of not allowing the use of withdrawals and proactive waivers in a clock auction is to reduce complexity and uncertainty about bidder demand for spectrum. The clock auction relies on identifying the point at which demand decreases to equal supply to determine prices. Allowing withdrawals, proactive waivers, or exceptions to the no excess supply rule would create uncertainty with respect to the exact level of bidder demand and would interfere with the basic clock price-setting and winner determination mechanism. The no excess supply rule ensures that once there is demand for a license that the license will not then go unsold. The no excess supply rule makes it risky or costly for a bidder to engage in gamesmanship by increasing its demand for a license in one round, potentially causing the price of the license to increase for another bidder, and then reducing its demand for the license in a subsequent round. OEA and WTB agree that they should not introduce exceptions that are contrary to the underlying purpose of the rules, which is to protect the integrity of the auction.

The bidding system will not allow a bidder to increase its demand for a license if the total number of bidding units associated with all of the bidder's license demands exceeds the bidder's eligibility for the round. Therefore, if a bidder submits a bid to add a license for which it did not have processed demand in the previous round, the bidding system will treat the bid as a request to increase demand that will be applied only if it would not cause the bidder's processed activity to exceed its eligibility.

OEA and WTB adopt the procedures described in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice to determine the order in which the bidding system will process bids after a round ends. After a round ends, the bidding system will first consider and apply all bids to maintain demand at the clock price, and then it will process bids to change demand in order of price point, where the price point represents the percentage of the distance between the bid price and the start-of-round price, relative to the distance between the clock price and the start-of-round price. The bidding system will process bids to change demand in ascending order of price point across all licenses and all bidders, first by considering intra-round bids in order of price point and then, finally, bids at the clock price ( i.e., bids with a price point equal to 100%). As it considers each submitted bid during bid processing, the bidding system will determine whether there is excess demand for a license at that point in the processing in order to determine whether a bidder's request to reduce demand for that license can be applied. Likewise, the bidding system will evaluate the activity associated with the bidder's most recently determined demands at that point in the processing to determine whether a request to increase demand can be applied.

If a bid can be applied, the licenses that the bidder holds at that point in the processing would be adjusted, and aggregate demand for the license would be recalculated accordingly. If the bid cannot be applied, the unfulfilled bid will be held in a queue, to be considered later during the current round's bid processing. The bidding system will then consider the bid submitted at the next lowest price point, and given the most recently determined demands of bidders, see if the bid can be applied. Note that the price point at which a bid is considered by the bidding system can affect whether the bid is applied, because at any given price point some bidders may request to increase demand for licenses while others may request reductions.

Every time a bid is applied, the unfulfilled bids held in the queue will be reconsidered, in the order of their price points. Bids that were not applied because demand would fall below one or because the bidder's processed activity would exceed its eligibility will be considered, again in price point order, if there should be excess demand or if the bidder's processed activity is reduced sufficiently later in the processing after other bids are processed.

This step of bid processing will conclude when all bids from the round have been processed and no unfulfilled bids held in the queue can be applied. The bidding system will then automatically generate a proxy instruction for each bid to reduce demand that was not applied. However, the bidding system will not carry over to the next round unfulfilled bid requests to increase demand. The bidding system will advise bidders about whether their bids were applied when round results are released.

As described in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, the bidding system further will determine, based on aggregate demand, the posted price for each license for the round, with a license's posted price serving as its start-of-round price for the next round. The price for a license will increase from round to round as long as there is excess demand for the license, but will not increase if either no bidder demands the license or if only a single bidder demands the license.

If, at the end of a round, aggregate demand for a license exceeds the supply of one, the posted price will equal the clock price for the round. If a reduction in demand was applied during the round and caused demand for a license to fall to one, the posted price will be the highest price at which a reduction was applied for that license. If aggregate demand is zero, or if aggregate demand is one and no bid to reduce demand was applied for the license, then the posted price will equal the start-of-round price for the round. The range of acceptable bid amounts for the next round will be set by adding the percentage increment to the posted price.

Under the clock-1 auction format, if a bid to reduce demand is not applied, it is because there is no excess demand for the license and, therefore, the posted price will not increase. Hence, the posted price for a license will not be higher than the bid price of a bidder that makes a bid to reduce demand that cannot be applied.

After the bids of the round have been processed, if the stopping rule has not been met, the bidding system will announce clock prices to indicate a range of acceptable bids for the next round. Each bidder will be informed of the licenses for which it has processed demand and of the aggregate demand for each license.

Eligible applicants claiming either a small business or rural service provider bidding credit will be subject to specified caps on the total bidding credit discount that they may receive. For Auction 113, OEA and WTB adopt the bidding credit caps at the amounts proposed for the reasons discussed in the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice. Specifically, OEA and WTB adopt a $25 million cap on the total bidding credit discount that may be awarded to an eligible small business, and a $10 million cap on the total bidding credit discount that may be awarded to an eligible rural service provider in Auction 113. Additionally, to create parity among eligible small businesses and rural service providers competing against each other in smaller markets, no winning designated entity bidder may receive more than $10 million in bidding credit discounts in total for licenses won in markets with a population of 500,000 or fewer.

Two commenters argue against adopting bidding credit caps in Auction 113. The Commission's part 1 rules, however, require a cap on a winning bid discount that will be offered to small businesses and rural service providers. See 47 CFR 1.2110(f)(2)(ii), (4)(ii). Amendments to those rules require a rulemaking proceeding and cannot be done in the context of establishing the procedures for Auction 113 because such action is outside the scope of OEA's and WTB's delegated authority.

The record supports adopting the small business bidding credit cap and rural service bidding credit cap for Auction 113 at the amounts proposed, and OEA and WTB find this consistent with the Commission's decisions in recent spectrum auctions. In the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order, the Commission adopted small business and rural service provider bidding credit caps and established the parameters for implementing such bidding credit caps in a given auction based on an evaluation of the expected capital requirements presented by the specific service and the inventory of licenses to be auctioned. The Commission's rules provide for a small business bidding credit cap of not less than $25 million and a rural service provider bidding credit of not less than $10 million, to be determined on an auction-by-auction basis.

Under the parameters established in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report Order, OEA and WTB find that a $25 million small business bidding credit cap for Auction 113 is appropriate because this is an auction of a limited number of AWS-3 licenses and the expected capital requirements associated with these AWS-3 licenses are not likely to be any higher than those for bands where OEA and WTB adopted the same $25 million cap, given that many providers have already cleared, standardized, deployed, and offer service using other licenses in the same bands.

Some commenters disagree with this approach. One commenter, for example, proposes that the Commission increase the bidding credit caps to account for inflation, noting that a decade has passed since Auction 97 and, “according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, $25 million in November 2014 dollars would be worth more than $33 million today.” However, recent auction data demonstrate that a $25 million cap on small business bidding credits has allowed a substantial majority of eligible small businesses to take advantage of the bidding credit program and be unaffected by the cap. Whatever the impact of inflation generally, OEA and WTB see no persuasive evidence that a $25 million cap would impair the meaningful opportunity that the bidding credit provides for small businesses to participate in Auction 113.

One commenter argues that, in proposing to apply a $25 million small business bidding credit cap, the “lens through which [OEA and WTB view] small business participation in Auction 113” is “out of focus” and OEA and WTB should instead draw on the results of Auction 97 to assess the capital requirements for Auction 113. This commenter reasons that the Auction 97 results demonstrate that a $25 million small business bidding credit cap is “untenable,” because Northstar Wireless, LLC (Northstar) and SNR Wireless LicenseCo, LLC (SNR) placed $3.4 billion in winning bids for 197 of the licenses available in Auction 113, with the expectation that they would be eligible for $859 million in bidding credits. OEA and WTB find this argument meritless inasmuch as the Commission's very purpose in requiring the implementation of a minimum small business bidding credit cap in all auctions that offer such a credit is to safeguard against the use of bidding credits by entities that are not bona fide small businesses, such as the applicants that were denied bidding credits in Auction 97. The fact that a bidder claiming eligibility for bidding credits in Auction 97 could have bid with an expectation of receiving close to $1 billion in bidding discounts, as Northstar and SNR did, illustrates why the Commission established a cap on bidding credits that is reasonably proportional to the capital expenditures for spectrum licenses likely needed by bona fide small businesses, as well as the appropriateness of the caps set in the Commission's most recent auctions. Moreover, applying a reasonable bidding credit cap in Auction 97 such as the one OEA and WTB adopt for Auction 113 would have substantially lessened the financial impact of SNR's and Northstar's being found ineligible for the bidding credits that they claimed, and perhaps they would not have had the incentive to bid, in aggregate, so much more than they were ultimately willing to pay. As the Commission concluded in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report Order, a $25 million bidding credit cap provides a significant benefit to the vast majority of bona fide small businesses that may participate in Auction 113, particularly since applying the cap would allow a bidder eligible for a 25% discount to receive that discount on gross bids of up to $100 million.

Nor are OEA and WTB persuaded by a commenter's proposal to introduce more complex bidding credit caps such as regional bidding credit caps that are a function of regional spectrum values, population density, median income, or broadband access disparities. Because the $25 million bidding credit cap in recent auctions allowed the substantial majority of small business to realize the full value of their bidding credit based on their gross winning bid amounts, OEA and WTB find it unnecessary to introduce other bidding credit caps in some regions that would increase complexity, make it more likely that a small business would be limited by some regional cap, and could create issues for bidders and the bidding system as a result of regional borders.

Based on the Commission's experience in its spectrum auctions, OEA and WTB also find a $10 million rural service provider bidding credit cap is appropriate because, as the Commission explained in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order, a rural service provider's approach to bidding is generally more targeted and usually focuses on competing for a few select license areas that align with its existing service territory or adjacent areas.

Lastly, OEA and WTB find that a $10 million cap on the overall bidding credit amount that any winning small business bidder may apply to licenses won in small markets is appropriate based on the Commission's conclusions in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order. This is consistent with the approach adopted in all of the Commission's spectrum actions beginning with the Broadcast Incentive Auction and strikes a measured and reasonable balance to protect against abuse of the designated entity program while also allowing large designated entities a higher cap in large service areas. One commenter proposes that rather than capping the bidding credits used by a designated entity for particular small markets based on population, OEA and WTB cap the bidding credits for rural service providers at the same level as that for small businesses. After considering the purpose and benefits of a rural service provider bidding credit, the Commission concluded in the 2015 Updating Part 1 Report and Order that rural service providers did not warrant as high a bidding credit as other designated entities. Given the different nature of their business plans and financial resources, it concluded that different bidding credit caps, and the methodology for implementing them in the Broadcast Incentive Auction, were warranted for small businesses and rural service providers. These different caps have been maintained for auctions subsequent to the Broadcast Incentive Auction. This commenter provides no evidence to support a finding that a different conclusion would be appropriate with respect to the AWS-3 licenses remaining in the Commission's spectrum inventory.

OEA and WTB conclude that the adoption of these caps on the overall amount of bidding credits offered in Auction 113 serves the Commission's statutory goals by awarding meaningful opportunities to bona fide small businesses and eligible rural service providers, while preventing unjust enrichment and ensuring efficient and intensive use of spectrum. Notably, by adopting these caps for Auction 113, OEA and WTB will provide an important additional safeguard, as the Commission intended, to prevent ineligible entities from undercutting the Commission's rules in a manner similar to circumstances of Auction 97. This approach is simple and straightforward to implement and will not impose an artificial restriction on the amount eligible small businesses and rural service providers are likely to bid.

Under the clock-1 auction format, a bidder with processed demand for a license at the time the stopping rule is met will become the winning bidder for the license. The final price for a license will be the posted price for the final round.

The public notice announcing the close of the bidding and auction results will be released within several days after bidding has ended in Auction 113. This public notice will also establish the deadlines for submitting down payments, final payments, and the long-form applications (FCC Form 601) for the auction.

The Commission's rules provide that, unless otherwise specified by public notice, within 10 business days after the release of the auction closing public notice for Auction 113, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit with the Commission to 20% of the net amount of its winning bids (less any bidding credits, if applicable).

The Commission's rules provide that each winning bidder must submit the balance of the net amount for each of its winning bids within 10 business days after the deadline for submitting down payments.

The Commission's rules provide that, within 10 business days after release of the auction closing public notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed post-auction long-form application (FCC Form 601), including the applicable filing fee prescribed in 47 CFR 1.1102, for the license(s) they won through the auction.

A winning bidder claiming eligibility for a small business bidding credit or a rural service provider bidding credit must demonstrate its eligibility for the bidding credit sought in its FCC Form 601. Further instructions on these and other filing requirements will be provided to winning bidders in the auction closing public notice for Auction 113.

A winning bidder will also be required to provide as part of its long-form application any agreement or arrangement it has entered into and a summary of the specific terms, conditions, and parties involved in any agreement it has entered into. This applies to any bidding consortia, joint venture, partnership, or agreement, understanding, or other arrangement entered into relating to the competitive bidding process, including any agreement relating to the post-auction market structure. Failure to comply with the Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.

A winning bidder organized as bidding consortium must comply with the long-from application procedures set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107(g). Specifically, license(s) won by a consortium must be applied for as follows: (a) an individual member of the consortium or a new legal entity comprising two or more individual consortium members must file for licenses covered by the winning bids; (b) each member or group of members of a winning consortium seeking separate licenses will be required to file a separate FCC Form 601 for its/their respective license(s) in their legal business name; (c) in the case of a license to be partitioned or disaggregated, the member or group filing the applicable FCC Form 601 shall include the parties' partitioning or disaggregation agreement with the FCC Form 601; and (d) if a designated entity credit is sought (either small business or rural service provider), the applicant must meet the applicable eligibility requirements in the Commission's rules for the credit.

Within 10 business days after the release of the Auction 113 Closing Public Notice, each winning bidder must also comply with the ownership reporting requirements in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112 by submitting an ownership disclosure information report for wireless telecommunications services (FCC Form 602) with its FCC Form 601.

If a winning bidder already has a complete and accurate FCC Form 602 on file in the FCC's Universal Licensing System (ULS), then it is not necessary to file a new report, but the winning bidder must certify in its FCC Form 601 that the information on file with the Commission is complete and accurate. If the winning bidder does not have an FCC Form 602 on file, or if the form on file is not complete and accurate, then the winning bidder must submit a new one.

When a winning bidder submits an FCC Form 175, ULS automatically creates an ownership record. This record is not an FCC Form 602, but it may be used to pre-fill the FCC Form 602 with the ownership information submitted on the winning bidder's FCC Form 175 application. A winning bidder must review the pre-filled information and confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the filing date of the FCC Form 601 before certifying and submitting the FCC Form 602. Further instructions will be provided to winning bidders in the Auction 113 Closing Public Notice.

A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy facilities and provide services to qualifying Tribal lands that have a wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85% may be eligible to receive a Tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2107 and 1.2110(f). A Tribal lands bidding credit is in addition to, and separate from, any other bidding credit for which a winning bidder may qualify.

Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to an auction, a winning bidder applies for a Tribal lands bidding credit after the auction when it files its FCC Form 601. When initially filing its FCC Form 601, the winning bidder will be required to advise the Commission whether it intends to seek a Tribal lands bidding credit, for each license won in a particular auction, by checking the designated box(es). After stating its intent to seek a Tribal lands bidding credit, the winning bidder will have 180 days from the close of the applicable long-form application filing deadline within which to amend its application to select the specific qualifying Tribal lands to be served and provide the required Tribal government certifications. A licensee receiving a Tribal lands bidding credit is subject to performance criteria as set forth in 47 CFR 1.2110(f)(3)(vii). For additional information on the Tribal lands bidding credit, including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants should review the Commission's rulemaking proceeding regarding Tribal lands bidding credits and related public notices.

Any winning bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of an auction ( i.e., fails to remit the required down payment by the specified deadline, fails to submit a timely long-form application, fails to make a full and timely final payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is liable for default payments as described in 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2). A default payment consists of a deficiency payment, equal to the difference between the amount of the bidder's winning bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional payment equal to a percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the subsequent winning bid, whichever is less.

The Commission's rules provide that, in advance of each auction, it will establish a percentage between 3% and 20% of the applicable winning bid to be assessed as an additional default payment. As the Commission has indicated, the level of this additional payment in each auction will be based on the nature of the service and the licenses being offered. In the Auction 113 Comment Public Notice, OEA and WTB proposed to set the additional default payment for Auction 113 at 15% of the applicable bid for winning bids. One commenter, however, opposes the proposed 15% additional default payment percentage, arguing instead that OEA and WTB should implement the maximum default payment percentage of 20% to ensure that defaults that occurred in Auction 97 are not repeated. Another commenter opposes this request, claiming that it is designed to discourage competitor participation in Auction 113.

As the Commission has previously emphasized, defaults weaken the integrity of the auction process and may impede the deployment of service to the public. Due to prior defaults, the AWS-3 spectrum being offered in Auction 113 has been in the Commission's inventory for a full decade after it was first offered in Auction 97. OEA and WTB therefore agree that it is important to take steps to minimize the chance of defaults on winning bids in this auction. OEA and WTB disagree with the assertion that implementing a 20% additional default payment would serve only to discourage participation in the auction. This commenter does not explain how adopting a higher additional default payment to discourage insincere bidding and defaults by bidders who are unable to pay their full bid amount would discourage bidding by sincere bidders who have adequate financing to pay their full bids. And in any case, whatever deterrent effect the higher default payment amount may or may not have would be outweighed by the public interest in encouraging only sincere bidding. OEA and WTB conclude that a higher additional default payment will be more effective in deterring defaults in Auction 113 and therefore adopt the maximum additional default payment percentage of 20% for this auction.

Finally, in the event of a default, the Commission has the discretion to re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest bidder (in descending order) at its final bid amount. In addition, if a default or disqualification involves gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, then the Commission may declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in future auctions and may take any other action that it deems necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any existing authorizations held by the applicant.

If a bidder is due a refund, the bidder must request a refund in writing with the information listed below. All refunds of upfront payment balances will be returned to the payer of record as identified on the FCC Form 159, or on the wire transfer, unless the payer submits written authorization instructing otherwise. Bidders are encouraged to use the Refund icon found in the Review or Modify Existing Applications table on the FRN Selection screen or the Refund Form link available on the Auction Application Submit Confirmation page in the AAP to access the form. After the required information is completed on the blank form, the form should be printed and signed, and submitted to the Commission by fax or email.

If you have elected not to access the Refund Form, the Commission is requesting that all of the following information be supplied in writing:

This is a synopsis of the Commission's Order, adopted December 16, 2025, and released December 17, 2025. The full text of this Commission decision is available online at https://apps.fcc.gov/ecfs/. The full text of this document can also be downloaded in Word or Portable Document Format (PDF) at https://www.fcc.gov/edocs. This document does not contain information collection requirements subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. The Commission will not send a copy of the Order in a report to be sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant to the Congressional Review Act, see 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A), because these allotments were previously reported.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications Commission amends 47 CFR part 73 as follows:

The Gulf reef fish fishery, which includes red snapper, is managed under the Fishery Management Plan for the Reef Fish Resources of the Gulf (FMP). The FMP was prepared by the Gulf Fishery Management Council, approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and is implemented by NMFS under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act) by regulations at 50 CFR part 622.

The final rule implementing Amendment 40 to the FMP established two components within the recreational sector fishing for Gulf red snapper: the private angling component, and the Federal for-hire component (80 FR 22422, April 22, 2015). Amendment 40 also allocated the red snapper recreational ACL (recreational quota) between the components and established separate seasonal closures for the two components. On February 6, 2020, NMFS implemented Amendments 50 A-F to the FMP, which delegated authority to the Gulf states (Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, and Texas) to establish specific management measures for the harvest of red snapper in Federal waters of the Gulf by the private angling component of the recreational sector (85 FR 6819, February 6, 2020). These amendments allocated a portion of the private angling ACL to each state, and each state is required to constrain landings to its allocation.

As described at 50 CFR 622.23(c), a Gulf state with an active delegation may request that NMFS close all, or an area of, Federal waters off that state to the harvest and possession of red snapper by private anglers. The state is required to request the closure by letter to NMFS, providing dates and geographic coordinates for the closure. If the request is within the scope of the analysis in Amendment 50A, NMFS publishes a notice in the Federal Register implementing the closure for the fishing year. Based on the analysis in Amendment 50A, Texas may request a closure of all Federal waters off the state to allow a year-round fishing season in state waters. As described at 50 CFR 622.2, “off Texas” is defined as the waters in the Gulf west of a rhumb line from 29°32.1′ N lat., 93°47.7′ W long. to 26°11.4′ N lat., 92°53′ W long., which line is an extension of the boundary between Louisiana and Texas.

On December 9, 2025, NMFS received a request from the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department (TPWD) to close the EEZ off Texas to the red snapper recreational private angling component during the 2026 fishing year. Texas requested that the closure be effective from January 1 through May 21, 2026. NMFS has determined that this request is within the scope of the analysis contained within Amendment 50A, which analyzed the potential impacts of a closure of all Federal waters off Texas, consistent with Texas's intent to maintain a year-round fishing season in state waters during which a part of Texas' ACL could be caught.

Therefore, the red snapper recreational private angling component in the Gulf EEZ off Texas will close at 12:01 a.m., local time, on January 1, 2026, until 12:01 a.m., local time, on May 22, 2026. This closure applies to all private-anglers (those on board vessels that have not been issued a valid Federal charter vessel/headboat permit for Gulf reef fish) regardless of which state they are from or where they intend to land. Once the EEZ off Texas opens on May 22, 2026, TPWD will continue to monitor private recreational landings, and if necessary, will request that NMFS again close the EEZ in 2026 to ensure the Texas regional management area ACL is not exceeded.

On and after the effective date of this closure in the EEZ off Texas, the harvest and possession of red snapper in the EEZ off Texas by the private angling component is prohibited and the bag and possession limits for the red snapper private angling component in the closed area is zero.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR 622.23(c), which was issued pursuant to 304(b), and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866, and other applicable laws.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment are unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. Such procedures are unnecessary because the rule implementing the area closure authority and the state-specific private angling ACLs has already been subject to notice and comment, and all that remains is to notify the public of the closure. Such procedures are contrary to the public interest because a failure to implement the closure by January 1, 2026, would be inconsistent with Texas's state management plan and may result in less access to red snapper in state waters.

For the aforementioned reasons, there is also good cause to waive the 30-day delay in the effectiveness of this action under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3).

The reef fish fishery in the Gulf of America (Gulf) includes DWG and is managed under the FMP. The FMP was prepared by the Gulf Fishery Management Council (Council), approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and is implemented by NMFS through regulations at 50 CFR part 622 under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act).

All catch limits in this temporary rule are in pounds (lb) gutted weight.

In the Gulf, the DWG complex consists of yellowedge grouper, warsaw grouper, snowy grouper, and speckled hind. Commercial harvest of the DWG species occurs under the GT-IFQ program and landings are managed to the commercial quota, which is reduced from the commercial ACL. The current DWG commercial ACL is 1,070,000 lb (485,000 kg) and the commercial quota is 1,024,000 lb (464,000 kg), which is 4 percent below the commercial ACL. The buffer between the commercial ACL and the commercial quota is in place to account for scientific uncertainty with the level of discards and to allow for the IFQ flexibility measures under which some species in the shallow-water grouper complex can be landed under the DWG quota.

In 2023, the Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review 85 (SEDAR 85) assessed Gulf yellowedge grouper and indicated that while the stock was not overfished, it was experiencing overfishing and therefore harvest must be reduced. The Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) accepted SEDAR 85 as consistent with the best scientific information available and recommended updated status determination criteria and catch levels for yellowedge grouper. The Council's SSC then evaluated the catch limits for the remaining species in the DWG complex and recommended that their catch levels also be reduced. As a result of the SSC recommendations, the Council initiated work on Amendment 58B to, among other measures, end overfishing of yellowedge grouper and reduce the harvest of the other species in the DWG complex. The Council approved Amendment 58B at its August 2025 meeting and is preparing to submit the amendment to NMFS for review. If approved, NMFS expects any final rule implementing Amendment 58B to be effective no later than June 1, 2026. Consistent with the SSC's recommendations, Amendment 58B would reduce the total allowable harvest of DWG. For the commercial sector, Amendment 58B would reduce the commercial ACL from 1,070,000 lb (485,000 kg) to 498,358 lb (226,051 kg) and the commercial quota from 1,024,000 lb (464,000 kg) to 478,424 lb (217,009 kg).

Under the GT-IFQ program, annual quota is distributed to IFQ shareholders as allocation (including multi-use allocation) on January 1, and most IFQ program participants begin to use or transfer their allocation early in each year. After shareholders begin transferring or landing allocation, NMFS is not able to retroactively withdraw allocation from shareholder accounts if a commercial quota decrease becomes effective after the beginning of the fishing year. Regulations at 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4), require NMFS to withhold distribution of IFQ allocation on January 1 in the amount equal to an expected reduction in the commercial quota. Accordingly, through this temporary rule NMFS withholds distribution of a portion of the 2026 commercial quota of DWG equal to the anticipated reduction recommended by the Council in Amendment 58B.

NMFS will distribute the available DWG allocation of 478,424 lb (217,009 kg), on January 1, 2026. If NMFS does not implement Amendment 58B, including the revised commercial quota, by June 1, 2026, then NMFS will distribute the withheld allocation back to the current shareholders, as determined by the shares held on the same date that NMFS distributes the withheld IFQ quota.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is taken under 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4), which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866, and other applicable laws.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment is unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. Such procedures are unnecessary because the regulation at 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4) has already been subject to notice and public comment, and the public is aware of the expected quota reduction included in Amendment 58B. Therefore, all that remains is to notify the public that a portion of the commercial DWG allocation in 2026 will be withheld to allow for the implementation of the Amendment 58B in 2026, if approved. Such procedures are contrary to the public interest because notice and comment would require delaying the reduction in DWG harvest as specified in Amendment 58B until 2027. If NMFS does not withhold the necessary DWG allocation, shareholders can begin transferring or landing allocation on January 1, 2026, and NMFS would not be able to retroactively withdraw allocation from shareholder accounts. Delaying implementation of Amendment 58B until 2027 could allow for continued overfishing of yellowedge grouper and harvest of other DWG species in excess of the level supported by the best scientific information available and recommended by the Council's SSC.

For the aforementioned reasons, the NMFS Assistant Administrator also finds good cause to waive the 30-day delay in the effectiveness of this action under 5 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.

The reef fish fishery in the Gulf of America (Gulf) includes Other SWG and is managed under the FMP. The FMP was prepared by the Gulf Fishery Management Council (Council), approved by the Secretary of Commerce, and is implemented by NMFS through regulations at 50 CFR part 622 under the authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act).

All catch limits in this temporary rule are in pounds (lb) gutted weight.

In the Gulf, the Other SWG complex consists of scamp, yellowmouth grouper, black grouper, and yellowfin grouper. Commercial harvest of Other SWG species occurs under the GT-IFQ program and landings are managed to the commercial quota, which is reduced from the commercial ACL. The current commercial ACL is 547,000 lb (248,115 kg) and the commercial annual catch target (ACT, or quota) is 526,000 lb (238,590 kg), which is 4 percent below the commercial ACL. The buffer between the commercial ACL and the commercial quota is in place to account for scientific uncertainty with the level of discards and to allow for the IFQ flexibility measures under which some species in the deep-water grouper complex can be landed under the Other SWG quota.

In 2022, the Southeast Data, Assessment, and Review 68 (SEDAR 68) assessed scamp and yellowmouth grouper together and indicated that harvest must be reduced. The Council's Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) accepted SEDAR 68 as consistent with the best scientific information available and recommended updated status determination criteria and catch levels for these two stocks. The remaining Other SWG species, black grouper and yellowfin grouper, could not be assessed due to a lack of the data necessary to accurately assess population metrics of these species in the Gulf.

As a result of the SSC recommendations for scamp and yellowmouth grouper, the Council initiated work on Amendment 58A to the FMP, which considers dissolving the Other SWG complex and creating two new complexes, one for scamp and yellowmouth grouper and another for black grouper and yellowfin grouper, and setting catch limits for these new complexes. Amendment 58A also considers changes to the commercial IFQ program to reflect the two new complexes as well as other management measures. In recognition of the complexity of Amendment 58A and the additional time required for its development and implementation, the Council developed a framework action to reduce harvest of scamp and yellowmouth, consistent with the SSC recommendations, until Amendment 58A can be completed. The Council approved the framework action at its June 2025 meeting. If NMFS determines that the proposed regulations to implement the framework action are consistent with the FMP and other applicable law, NMFS expects to publish a proposed rule in early 2026 and intends for any final rule to be effective by June 1, 2026. The framework action would reduce the total allowable harvest of Other SWG and reduce the commercial ACL from 547,000 lb (248,115 kg) to 255,636 lb (115,955 kg), and the commercial quota from 525,000 lb (238,136 kg) to 245,410 lb (111,316 kg). Commercial landings have never exceeded this proposed commercial quota.

Under the GT-IFQ program, annual quota is distributed to IFQ shareholders as allocation (including multi-use allocation) on January 1, and most IFQ program participants begin to use or transfer their allocation early in each year. After shareholders begin transferring or landing allocation, NMFS is not able to retroactively withdraw allocation from shareholder accounts if a commercial quota decrease becomes effective after the beginning of the fishing year. Regulations at 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4), require NMFS to withhold distribution of IFQ allocation on January 1 in the amount equal to an expected reduction in the commercial quota. Accordingly, through this temporary rule NMFS withholds distribution of the portion of the 2026 commercial quota of Other SWG equal to the anticipated reduction recommended by the Council in the framework action.

NMFS will distribute the available Other SWG allocation of 245,410 lb (111,316 kg), on January 1, 2026. If NMFS does not implement the framework action, including the revised commercial quota, by June 1, 2026, then NMFS will distribute the withheld allocation back to the current shareholders, as determined by the shares held on the same date that NMFS distributes the withheld IFQ quota.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is taken under 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4), which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866, and other applicable laws.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment is unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. Such procedures are unnecessary because the regulation at 50 CFR 622.22(a)(4) has already been subject to notice and public comment, and the public is aware of the expected quota reduction included in the framework action. Therefore, all that remains is to notify the public that a portion of the commercial Other SWG allocation in 2026 will be withheld to allow for the implementation of the framework action in 2026 if a final rule is effective before June 1. Such procedures are contrary to the public interest because notice and comment would not allow NMFS to implement the framework action to reduce Other SWG complex catch levels until 2027. If NMFS does not withhold the necessary commercial Other SWG allocation, shareholders can begin transferring or landing allocation on January 1, 2026, and NMFS would not be able to retroactively withdraw allocation from shareholder accounts. Delaying implementation of the framework action until 2027 could allow for harvest of scamp and yellowmouth grouper in excess of the level supported by the most recent stock assessment.

For the aforementioned reasons, the NMFS Assistant Administrator also finds good cause to waive the 30-day delay in the effectiveness of this action under 5 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.

U.S. northern albacore, swordfish, and bluefin tuna fisheries, are managed under the authority of ATCA (16 U.S.C. 971 et seq. ) and the Magnuson-Stevens Act (16 U.S.C. 1801 et seq. ). The Highly Migratory Species Fishery Management Plan (HMS FMP) and its amendments are implemented by regulations at 50 CFR part 635. Section 635.27(a) implements the ICCAT-recommended quota and describes the annual quota adjustment process for bluefin tuna, including in the event of an overharvest. Section 635.27(c) implements the ICCAT-recommended quotas and describes the quota adjustment process for both North and South Atlantic swordfish. Section 635.27(e) implements the northern albacore annual quota recommended by ICCAT and describes the annual northern albacore quota adjustment process. NMFS is required under the Magnuson-Stevens Act to provide U.S. fishing vessels with a reasonable opportunity to harvest quotas under relevant international fishery agreements such as the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, which is implemented domestically pursuant to ATCA.

Consistent with the relevant binding ICCAT Recommendations and the requirements under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, this action adjusts the 2025 baseline quotas for U.S. North Atlantic albacore tuna (northern albacore) and North and South Atlantic swordfish quotas based on 2024 underharvest and applicable international quota transfer. This action also adjusts the 2025 Atlantic bluefin tuna category subquotas based on 2024 overharvest. These temporary adjustments apply throughout the 2025 fishing year and are effective through December 31, 2025 (for portions of the 2025 fishing year that are already completed, they are considered to apply retrospectively). Furthermore, these temporary adjustments are consistent with the quota levels that NMFS considered throughout 2025 when taking actions during the fishing year to adjust the bluefin tuna retention limits and close bluefin tuna quota categories ( e.g., 90 FR 25158, June 16, 2025; 90 FR 45152, September 19, 2025). Full annual baseline allocations will be available to U.S. harvesters starting January 1, 2026. Once complete catch information for fishing year 2025 is available, NMFS will determine whether any resulting adjustments to 2026 quotas are necessitated based on ICCAT overharvest requirements or underharvest carryover allowances. Additionally, NMFS plans to take action as soon as possible in 2026 to modify the baseline bluefin tuna quota consistent with the quota that was agreed to at the 2025 ICCAT annual meeting.

Note that, consistent with how the quotas are established, weight information for northern albacore and bluefin tuna below is shown in metric tons (mt) whole weight (ww), and weight information for swordfish is shown in both dressed weight (dw) and ww.

Consistent with the northern albacore quota regulations at § 635.27(e), NMFS adjusts the U.S. annual northern albacore quota for allowable underharvest in the previous year. NMFS makes such adjustments consistent with ICCAT carryover limits, and when complete catch information for the prior year is available and finalized. The baseline quota is 889.4 mt. The maximum underharvest that may be carried forward from one year to the next is 25 percent of its baseline quota, thus 222.4 mt.

For 2024, the adjusted quota was 1,067.3 mt (89 FR 77029, September 20, 2024). In 2024, the United States landed 228.4 mt of northern albacore which is 838.9 mt less than the 2024 adjusted quota. This underharvest exceeds the 222.4-mt underharvest carryover limit allowed under Recommendation 23-05; therefore, only 222.4 mt may be carried forward to the 2025 fishing year. Thus, the adjusted 2025 northern albacore quota will be 1,111.8 mt (889.4-mt baseline quota + 222.4-mt carryover = 1,111.8 mt) (table 1).

Consistent with the North Atlantic swordfish quota regulations at § 635.27(c), in this action, NMFS adjusts the 2025 U.S. annual North Atlantic swordfish quota for allowable underharvest from 2024. NMFS makes such adjustments consistent with ICCAT carryover limits and when complete catch information for the prior year is available and finalized. The U.S. North Atlantic swordfish baseline annual quota is 2,937.6 mt dw (3,907 mt ww).

As codified at § 635.27(c)(3), the maximum North Atlantic swordfish underharvest that may be carried forward from one year to the next is 15 percent of the baseline quota, which equates to 440.6 mt dw (586 mt ww). For 2024, the adjusted North Atlantic swordfish quota was 3,227.8 mt dw (89 FR 77029, September 20, 2024). In 2024, U.S. landings of North Atlantic swordfish, which includes landings and dead discards, was 669.5 mt dw, which is 2,558.3 mt dw less than the 2024 adjusted quota. This underharvest exceeds the 440.6-mt dw underharvest carryover limit allowed; therefore, only 440.6 mt dw may be carried forward to the 2025 fishing year. Additionally, specific to only 2025, ICCAT Recommendation 24-10 provides for a transfer of quota from the United States to Costa Rica of 225.6 mt dw (300 mt ww).

Thus, the adjusted 2025 North Atlantic swordfish quota will be 3,152.6 mt dw (2,937.6-mt dw baseline quota + 440.6-mt dw underharvest−225.6-mt dw quota transfer to Costa Rica = 3,152.6 mt dw). From the adjusted quota and consistent with § 635.27(c)(1)(i), 50 mt dw would be allocated to the Reserve category for inseason adjustments and research; 300 mt dw would be allocated to the incidental category, which covers recreational landings and landings by incidental swordfish permit holders; and the remainder of the adjusted quota (2,802.6 mt dw) would be allocated to the directed category, which will be split equally between two seasons in 2025 (January through June, and July through December) (table 2).

Consistent with the South Atlantic swordfish quota regulations at § 635.27(c), NMFS adjusts the U.S. annual South Atlantic swordfish quota for allowable underharvest, if any, in the previous year. NMFS makes such adjustments, if needed, consistent with ICCAT carryover limits and when complete catch information for the prior year is available and finalized. Consistent with ICCAT Recommendation 17-03 as amended by Recommendation 22-04, the U.S. South Atlantic swordfish baseline annual quota is 75.2 mt dw (100 mt ww), and the amount of underharvest that the United States can carry forward from one year to the next is 75.2 mt dw (100 mt ww) (table 3). In 2024, there were no landings of South Atlantic swordfish by U.S. fishermen, which is an underharvest of 75.2 mt dw of the 2024 adjusted quota. Of that underharvest, 75.2 mt dw may be carried forward to the 2025 fishing year. Under Recommendations 17-03 and 22-04, the United States continues to transfer a total of 75.2 mt dw (100 mt ww) to other countries. These transfers are 37.6 mt dw (50 mt ww) to Namibia, 18.8 mt dw (25 mt ww) to Côte d'Ivoire, and 18.8 mt dw (25 mt ww) to Belize. Thus, the adjusted 2025 South Atlantic swordfish quota will be 75.2 mt dw (table 3).

Consistent with the bluefin tuna quota regulations at § 635.27(a), in this action, NMFS adjusts the 2025 U.S. annual bluefin tuna quota and subquotas due to an overharvest in 2024. NMFS makes such temporary adjustments consistent with ICCAT overharvest requirements and when complete catch information for the prior year is available and finalized. The 2025 U.S. bluefin tuna baseline annual quota is 1,316.14 mt, not including an additional annual 25-mt allocation allocated for incidental catch by pelagic longline vessels fishing in the Northeast Distant gear restricted area (NED). As described above, these temporary adjustments apply throughout the 2025 fishing year and are effective through December 31, 2025 (for portions of the 2025 fishing year that are already completed, they are considered to apply retrospectively). Furthermore, these temporary adjustments are consistent with the quota levels that NMFS considered throughout 2025 when taking actions during the fishing year to adjust bluefin tuna retention limits and close bluefin tuna quota categories ( e.g., 90 FR 25158, June 16, 2025; 90 FR 45152, September 19, 2025).

Per the regulatory formula established at 50 CFR 635.27(a), the baseline bluefin tuna quota is divided among domestic quota categories according to the following percentages: General—54 percent (710.7 mt); Angling—22.6 percent (297.4 mt); Longline—15.9 percent (209.3 mt) ( i.e., total not including the 25-mt allocation for the NED); Harpoon—4.5 percent (59.2 mt); Trap—0.1 percent (1.3 mt); and Reserve—2.9 percent (38.2 mt). Note that any fishing under exempted fishing permits, scientific research permits, and display permits per the regulations at § 635.32 is accounted against the school reserve or Reserve quota (§ 635.27(a)(6)) depending on the size of the fish.

Under ICCAT Recommendation 22-10, if, in a given year, any ICCAT Party has an overharvest of its total quota, its initial quota for the next year will be reduced by 100 percent of the excess of such total quota, and ICCAT may authorize other appropriate actions. Further, if an ICCAT Party has an overharvest of its total quota during any two consecutive years, ICCAT will recommend appropriate measures, which may include, but are not limited to, reduction in the ICCAT Party's total quota equal to a minimum of 125 percent of the overharvest amount and, if necessary, trade restrictive measures. Additionally, under the regulations at § 635.27(a)(9), on an annual basis, based on landing, catch statistics, and other available information, if NMFS determines that catches from the previous year indicates that a bluefin tuna quota for any category or, as appropriate, subcategory has been exceeded (overharvest), NMFS may subtract all or a portion of the overharvest from that quota category or subcategory for the following fishing year.

The 2024 adjusted bluefin tuna quota was 1,475.2 mt (89 FR 77029, September 20, 2024). The total U.S. bluefin tuna catch (which includes landings and pelagic longline dead discards) in 2024 was 1,616.4 mt. Thus, the U.S. catch exceeded the 2024 adjusted quota by 141.2 mt. As such, consistent with the ICCAT Recommendation 22-10 and the regulations, NMFS is reducing the overall 2025 quota by 141.2 mt. Subtracting the total overharvest amount of 141.2 mt from the 2025 U.S. baseline quota of 1,341.14 mt (including the 25-mt set-aside for the NED) results in a total adjusted quota of 1,199.94 mt for 2025.

Also, consistent with § 635.27(a)(9), NMFS is adjusting the subquotas of the categories that exceeded their quota. Catches by the following three bluefin tuna quota categories contributed to the 2024 overharvest: 78 percent by the Angling category, 19 percent by the General category, and 3 percent by the Harpoon category. Applying those percentages to the total overharvest amount of 141.2 mt results in the pro rata reductions shown in table 4. The resulting 2025 adjusted quota and subquota allocations can be found in table 4.

Regulations governing the Atlantic bluefish fishery are found in 50 CFR 648.160 through 648.167. These regulations require annual specification of a commercial quota that is apportioned among the coastal states from Maine through Florida. The process to set the annual commercial quota and the percent allocated to each state is described in § 648.162, and the final 2025 allocations were published on December 10, 2024 (89 FR 99138).

The final rule implementing amendment 1 to the FMP, as published in the Federal Register on July 26, 2000 (65 FR 45844), provided a mechanism for transferring bluefish commercial quota from one state to another. Two or more states, under mutual agreement and with the concurrence of the NMFS Greater Atlantic Regional Administrator, can request approval to transfer or combine bluefish commercial quota under § 648.162(e). The Regional Administrator is required to consider three criteria in the evaluation of requests for quota transfers or combinations: (1) the transfers would not preclude the overall annual quota from being fully harvested; (2) the transfers address an unforeseen variation or contingency in the fishery; and (3) the transfers are consistent with the objectives of the FMP and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). The Regional Administrator has determined these criteria have been met for the transfers approved in this notification.

New York is transferring 100,000 pounds (lb) (45,359 kilograms (kg)) to North Carolina through mutual agreement of the states. This transfer was requested to ensure North Carolina would not exceed its 2025 state quota. The revised bluefish quotas for 2025 are: New York, 377,518 lb (171,239 kg); and North Carolina, 1,422,012 lb (645,014 kg).

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR 648.162(e)(1)(i) through (iii), which was issued pursuant to section 304(b), and is exempted from review under Executive Order 12866.

Regulations governing the summer flounder fishery are found in 50 CFR 648.100 through 648.111. These regulations require annual specification of a commercial quota that is apportioned among the coastal states from Maine through North Carolina. The process to set the annual commercial quota and the percent allocated to each state is described in § 648.102, and the final 2025 allocations were published on December 10, 2024 (89 FR 99138).

The final rule implementing amendment 5 to the FMP, as published in the Federal Register on December 17, 1993 (58 FR 65936), provided a mechanism for transferring summer flounder commercial quota from one state to another. Two or more states, under mutual agreement and with the concurrence of the NMFS Greater Atlantic Regional Administrator, can transfer or combine summer flounder commercial quota under § 648.102(c)(2). The Regional Administrator is required to consider three criteria in the evaluation of requests for quota transfers or combinations: (1) the transfers or combinations would not preclude the overall annual quota from being fully harvested; (2) the transfers address an unforeseen variation or contingency in the fishery; and (3) the transfers are consistent with the objectives of the FMP and the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). The Regional Administrator has determined these three criteria have been met for the transfer approved in this notification.

North Carolina is transferring 100,000 pounds (lb; 45,359 kilograms (kg)) of summer flounder to New York through a mutual agreement between the states. This transfer was requested to ensure that New York would not exceed its 2025 state quota. The revised summer flounder quotas for 2025 are: North Carolina, 2,232,603 lb (1,012,692 kg); and New York, 822,157 lb (372,924 kg).

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR 648.102(c)(2)(i) through (iv), which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempted from review under Executive Order 12866.

NMFS and the New England Fishery Management Council (Council) manage the Atlantic herring fishery pursuant to the Atlantic Herring Fishery Management Plan. Regulations at 50 CFR 648.200 require the Council to recommend herring specifications for NMFS's approval and provide the Council with the discretion to recommend river herring and shad catch caps as part of the specifications. Prior to the start of 2026, the Council recommended herring specifications and river herring and shad catch caps for 2026. On December 11, 2025, NMFS published a final rule (90 FR 57376) setting the Council-recommended 2025 herring specifications and projecting the 2026-2027 herring specifications.

At the end of each fishing year, NMFS evaluates catch information to determine if there were catch overages or unharvested catch compared to the annual catch limit (ACL) or the sub-ACLs for the herring management areas. If catch exceeds a sub-ACL or the ACL, regulations at § 648.201(a)(3) may require a sub-ACL or ACL deduction in a subsequent year. Additionally, regulations at § 648.201(g)(2) prohibit the carryover of unharvested catch to 2026.

NMFS reviewed 2024 fishery information against the projected 2026 herring specifications. There were no catch overages, nor is there any new biological information that would require altering the projected 2026 specifications published in December 2025. Based on this information, NMFS is finalizing the 2026 herring specifications, including the river herring and shad catch caps, as projected in the December 2025 final rule and outlined below in tables 1 and 2. These 2026 herring fishery specifications are expected to prevent overfishing, help rebuild an overfished stock, and achieve optimum yield on a continuing basis. NMFS will provide notice of the final 2027 herring fishery specifications, and any necessary adjustments, prior to the start of 2027.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR part 648, which was issued pursuant to section 304(b), and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

The Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, finds good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B) to waive prior notice and the opportunity for public comment on this notice because it would be unnecessary and contrary to the public interest. The proposed rule for the 2025-2027 herring specifications (90 FR 26955; June 25, 2025), pursuant to the process described in the herring regulations (§ 648.200), provided the public with the opportunity to comment on the specifications, including the projected 2026 specifications and river herring and shad catch caps. None of the comments on the proposed 2025-2027 herring specifications resulted in any substantive changes in the final rule setting the 2025 specifications and projecting the 2026-2027 specifications. This action simply finalizes the projected 2026 specifications, as described in both the proposed and final rules, without changes as the proposed and final rules for the 2025-2027 herring specifications provided a full opportunity for the public to comment on the projected 2026 specifications and the substance and process of this action. Additionally, the 2026 ACL (9,134 mt) is 64 percent higher than the current, adjusted 2025 ACL (5,556 mt), providing additional economic opportunity for the vessels participating in the herring fishery. If implementation of this action is delayed beyond the start of the fishing year on January 1, 2026, to solicit public comment, it may result in a negative economic impact on the herring fishing industry. Based on these considerations, NMFS further finds, pursuant to 5 U.S.C 553(d)(3), good cause to waive the 30-day delayed effectiveness period for the reasons stated above.

NMFS manages the groundfish fishery in the GOA exclusive economic zone according to the FMP prepared and recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) under authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). Regulations governing fishing by U.S. vessels in accordance with the FMP appear at subpart H of 50 CFR part 600 and 50 CFR part 679.

The final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the GOA set the 2026 Pacific cod TAC at 22,235 metric tons (mt) in the GOA (90 FR 12468, March 18, 2025). In December 2025, the Council recommended a 2026 Pacific cod TAC of 21,826 mt for the GOA, which is less than the 22,235 mt established by the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the GOA. The Council's recommended 2026 Pacific cod TAC for the GOA is based on the Scientific and Statistical Committee's (SSC's) overfishing limit (OFL) and acceptable biological catch (ABC) recommendations and is adjusted to account for the State of Alaska's guideline harvest level (GHL). The GHL increased from 30 to 35 percent for the Western GOA regulatory area by the Alaska Board of Fisheries (BOF) in October 2025. There were no GHL changes by the BOF for the Central GOA or Eastern GOA regulatory areas, which remain at 25 percent for both areas. However, because the GHL increased for the Western GOA regulatory area, the Western GOA TAC and GOA wide TAC must be adjusted to account for that increase to ensure that the sum of all Pacific cod removals from State waters and Federal waters in the GOA not exceed the Pacific cod ABC.

Steller sea lions occur in the same location as Pacific cod fisheries and are listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act. Pacific cod are one of the predominant prey species for Steller sea lions in the GOA. Regulations implementing Steller sea lion protection measures include regulations at § 679.20(a)(12)(i) that specify, for each sector, the seasonal apportionment of Pacific cod TAC in the Western GOA and Central GOA regulatory areas.

Stock assessments were not completed in 2025 due to the lapse in appropriations and resulting government shutdown from October 1, 2025 through November 12, 2025. The SSC recommendations are informed by the Groundfish Plan Team's recommended OFLs and ABCs from their November 2024 meeting as well as a review of the most recent Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) report dated November 2024. The Council's TAC recommendations are based on those of its Advisory Panel, consistent with the SSC's OFL and ABC recommendations, and reflect the most recent information on the State GHL and Pacific cod.

In accordance with § 679.25(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(i)(A), and (a)(2)(iv), the Administrator, Alaska Region, NMFS (Regional Administrator), has determined that the 2026 Pacific cod TACs and subsequent sector allocations and seasonal apportionments are incorrectly specified and that adjustments are necessary to ensure that harvest of Pacific cod does not exceed biological limits for the stock. Without these adjustments, harvests of Pacific cod in State waters and Federal waters in the GOA could exceed the ABC which is equal to the annual catch limit and could increase the risk of overfishing. This determination is based on the November 2024 SAFE report and SSC recommendations for OFL and ABC, which is the best available scientific information on biological stock status. This determination is also based on TAC recommendations by the Council at the December 2025 meeting, and in consideration of the increase in the State GHL for the State waters fishery in the Western GOA regulatory area. The adjustments are also necessary to ensure that the Pacific cod TACs are seasonally apportioned among sectors consistent with Steller sea lion protection measures set forth in regulation (§ 679.20(a)(12)(i)(A) & (B)).

Pursuant to § 679.25(a)(1)(iii), the Regional Administrator is adjusting the 2026 GOA Pacific cod TAC to 21,826 mt. Therefore, table 2 of the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the GOA (90 FR 12468, March 18, 2025) is revised consistent with this adjustment.

Pursuant to § 679.20(a)(6)(ii) and (a)(12)(i), table 6 of the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the GOA (90 FR 12468, March 18, 2025) is revised for the 2026 TACs of Pacific cod in the GOA.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR part 679, which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, as it would prevent NMFS from responding to the most recent fisheries data and information in a timely fashion and would allow for harvests that exceed the appropriate allocation for Pacific cod based on the most recent information available. Without an immediate adjustment decreasing Pacific cod TACs, harvests of Pacific cod in State waters and Federal waters in the GOA could exceed the ABC, and therefore the annual catch limit for Pacific cod and increase the risk of overfishing. NMFS was unable to publish a notice providing time for public comment because the most recent, relevant data and information only became available as of December 19, 2025. This action must be effective by January 1, 2026, to ensure harvests of Pacific cod are consistent with seasonal apportionments for Pacific cod that are based on regulations implementing Steller sea lion protection measures.

Without this inseason adjustment, NMFS could not allow the fishery for Pacific cod in the GOA to be harvested in an expedient manner. Under § 679.25(c)(2), interested persons are invited to submit written comments on this action to the above ADDRESSES until January 7, 2026.

There is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to establish an effective date less than 30 days after date of publication. This finding is based upon the reasons provided above for waiver of prior notice and opportunity for public comment.

NMFS manages the groundfish fishery in the BSAI exclusive economic zone according to the Fishery Management Plan for Groundfish of the BSAI Management Area (FMP) prepared and recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council under authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). Regulations governing fishing by U.S. vessels in accordance with the FMP appear at 50 CFR part 679 and subpart H of 50 CFR part 600.

The 2025 TAC for “other flatfish” was established as 5,225 metric tons (mt) by the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025) and reapportionment of groundfish reserves (90 FR 27483, June 27, 2025).

The 2025 TAC and ITAC for octopuses was established as 400 mt and 340 mt, respectively, by the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025).

In accordance with § 679.20(a)(3), the Regional Administrator, Alaska Region, NMFS, has reviewed the most current available data and finds that the TAC for “other flatfish” and octopuses needs to be supplemented from the nonspecified reserves to promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources in the BSAI and allow fishing operations to continue.

Therefore, in accordance with § 679.20(b)(3), NMFS apportions 600 mt from the nonspecified reserves of groundfish in the BSAI management area as follows: 500 mt to “other flatfish” and 100 mt to octopuses. This apportionment is authorized by § 679.20(b)(1)(i) and consistent with § 679.20(a)(3) and does not result in overfishing of any target species because the revised TACs are equal to or less than the specifications of the acceptable biological catch for “other flatfish” and octopuses in the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025).

The harvest specifications for the 2025 TACs included in the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI is revised as follows: 5,725 mt for “other flatfish” and 440 mt for octopuses.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR part 679, which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, as it would prevent NMFS from responding to the most recent fisheries data in a timely fashion and would delay the apportionment of the nonspecified reserves of groundfish to “other flatfish” and octopuses. This action is necessary for the efficient utilization of fishery resources in the BSAI and to allow the fisheries harvesting these groundfish to continue operating. NMFS was unable to publish a notice providing time for public comment because the most recent, relevant data on catch of “other flatfish” and octopuses only became available as of December 19, 2025. Finally, NMFS provided notice and an opportunity for public comment on the proposed 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI that included the amount of proposed nonspecified reserves from which NMFS can apportion to any target species that contributed to that reserve (89 FR 96186, December 4, 2024). The final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI explained that, during the fishing year, any amount of the nonspecified reserve may be apportioned by NMFS to a target species that contributed to the nonspecified reserves consistent with § 679.20(b)(1)(i) (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025).

There is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to make this action effective immediately upon filing with the Office of the Federal Register. This finding is based upon the reasons provided above for waiver of prior notice and opportunity for public comment.

Under § 679.20(b)(3)(iii), interested persons are invited to submit written comments on this action (see ADDRESSES section) until January 6, 2026.

NMFS manages the groundfish fishery in the BSAI exclusive economic zone according to the FMP prepared and recommended by the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (Council) under authority of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson-Stevens Act). Regulations governing fishing by U.S. vessels in accordance with the FMP appear at subpart H of 50 CFR 600 and 50 CFR part 679.

The final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025) set the 2026 AI Pacific cod TAC at 8,432 mt. In December 2025, the Council recommended a 2026 AI Pacific cod TAC of 8,951 mt, which is more than the AI Pacific cod TAC of 8,432 mt established for 2026 by the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI. This increase in TAC accounts for a reduction in the guideline harvest level (GHL) set for the State of Alaska (State) waters Pacific cod fishery in the AI. The AI Pacific cod TAC accounts for the State GHL for Pacific cod to ensure that the sum of all State and Federal Pacific cod removals do not exceed the acceptable biological catch (ABC) set for AI Islands Pacific cod.

Steller sea lions occur in the same location as the Pacific cod fisheries and are listed as endangered under the Endangered Species Act. Pacific cod is a principal prey species for Steller sea lions in the BSAI. NMFS published regulations and the revised harvest limit amount for Pacific cod fisheries to implement Steller sea lion protection measures to ensure that groundfish fisheries of the BSAI are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the western distinct population segment of Steller sea lions or destroy or adversely modify their designated critical habitat (79 FR 70286, November 25, 2014). These measures include regulations requiring the seasonal apportionment of Pacific cod harvest and the specification of an Area 543 Pacific cod harvest limit. To calculate the Area 543 Pacific cod harvest limit, NMFS first subtracts the State GHL Pacific cod amount from the AI Pacific cod ABC. Then NMFS determines the harvest limit in Area 543 by multiplying the percentage of Pacific cod estimated in Area 543 by the remaining ABC for AI Pacific cod.

Stock assessments were not completed in 2025 due to the lapse in appropriations and resulting government shutdown from October 1, 2025 through November 12, 2025. The Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) recommendations are informed by the Groundfish Plan Team's recommended overfishing limits (OFLs) and ABCs from their November 2024 meeting as well as a review of the most recent Stock Assessment and Fishery Evaluation (SAFE) report dated November 2024. The Council's TAC recommendations are based on those of its Advisory Panel, consistent with the SSC's OFL and ABC recommendations, and reflect the most recent information on the State GHL and Pacific cod.

In accordance with § 679.25(a)(1)(iii), (a)(2)(i)(C), and (a)(2)(iv), the Administrator, Alaska Region, NMFS (Regional Administrator), has determined that the 2026 AI Pacific cod TAC and subsequent BSAI Pacific cod sector allocations and seasonal apportionments are incorrectly specified and that adjustments are necessary to address the underharvest of BSAI Pacific cod that could occur if the AI Pacific cod TAC and BSAI Pacific cod sector allocations are not increased consistent with the TAC recommendations by the Council at the December 2025 meeting. This determination is based on the November 2024 SAFE report and the TAC recommendations by the Council at the December 2025 meeting, and in consideration of the change in the State GHL for the State waters fishery in the AI and the regulations implementing the Steller sea lion protection measures. The adjustment to the AI Pacific cod TAC is also necessary to ensure that the BSAI Pacific cod TACs are seasonally apportioned among sectors consistent with the Steller sea lion protection measures and that the Area 543 Pacific cod harvest limit, which is based on Pacific cod abundance in Area 543, is correctly specified. These adjustments are based upon the best available scientific information concerning the biological stock status of AI Pacific cod.

Pursuant to § 679.25(a)(1)(iii), the Regional Administrator is adjusting the 2026 AI Pacific cod TAC to 8,951 mt. Therefore, table 2 of the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025) is revised consistent with this adjustment.

Pursuant to § 679.20(a)(7), table 10 of the final 2025 and 2026 harvest specifications for groundfish in the BSAI (90 FR 12640, March 18, 2025) is revised for the 2026 sector allocations and seasonal allowances of the BSAI Pacific cod TAC, Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program directed fishing allowances (DFAs), and Pacific Cod Trawl Cooperative (PCTC) Program DFAs consistent with this adjustment.

NMFS issues this action pursuant to section 305(d) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act. This action is required by 50 CFR part 679, which was issued pursuant to section 304(b) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and is exempt from review under Executive Order 12866.

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B), there is good cause to waive prior notice and an opportunity for public comment on this action, as notice and comment would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, as it would prevent NMFS from responding to the most recent fisheries data and information in a timely fashion and would result in the underharvest of Pacific cod in the BSAI if the AI Pacific cod TAC and BSAI Pacific cod sector allocations are not increased consistent with the TAC recommendations by the Council at their December 2025 meeting. NMFS was unable to publish a notice providing time for public comment because the most recent, relevant data and information only became available as of December 19, 2025. This action must be effective by January 1, 2026, to ensure harvests of Pacific cod are consistent with seasonal apportionments and harvest limits for Pacific cod that are based on regulations implementing Steller sea lion protection measures.

Without this inseason adjustment, NMFS could not allow the fishery for Pacific cod in the BSAI to be harvested in an expedient manner. Under § 679.25(c)(2), interested persons are invited to submit written comments on this action to the above ADDRESSES until January 7, 2026.

There is good cause under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3) to establish an effective date less than 30 days after date of publication. This finding is based upon the reasons provided above for waiver of prior notice and opportunity for public comment.